Part 3
§ 3. But, inasmuch as in the case of two brothers having married two sisters, the enactment of the preceding section might, and, in the event of one brother dying childless, would, authorize and require a man to take to wife two sisters, his brother’s widow being in such case his own wife’s sister, and whereas, if his own wife should at such time be alive, this might lead to rivalry and vexation, be it further enacted, that nothing herein enacted, in the previous section or in any part of this Act, shall authorize, permit or require any brother, even for the purpose of saving a house and family from extinction, to take to wife the sister of his own wife, his said wife her sister being yet alive; and be it therefore enacted, that in such case, where such would be the result of the enactment of the previous section of this Act the provision of the said previous section shall become inoperative and of none effect, rather than a man take a wife to her sister to vex her, beside the other, in her lifetime.
Upon this illustration I will only ask—Would not such an Act of Parliament be perfectly distinct and clear? Could any one possibly misunderstand it? Would not every clause and section have its own plain and intelligible sense? Especially would not the last clause or section have a full and sufficient both sense and application without any man’s dreaming for a single moment of there being contained in it a repeal of any portion of the table or schedule of degrees? I say contained _in it_, because no doubt the second section would contain something of this kind, and yet, be it observed, not a repeal, but a partial exception; that is, in one particular case, and for one particular specified purpose, the second section would modify one entry in the table, that of the brother’s wife or sister’s husband (as it is confessed on all hands, the law of the Levirate, Deut. xxv., does modify the law of the 16th verse of Lev. xviii.), but even so, I must insist upon it, not _repealing_ it; for the exception would operate _only_ when the brother had died childless, leaving the entry in the schedule in fulness of prohibition in all other cases. And it is beyond all question that that modification would be due to the second and not to the third section of the Act. The third or last section would have nothing to do with any relaxation of the law, but would be merely a restrictive provision in relation to the working of the previous section, being, as I have all along been shewing, a narrowing, not an enlarging the liberty given under the exception in the previous clause and having no further bearing:—therefore having nothing to do with any entry in the schedule; nothing to do with the permission to take the brother’s wife or the sister’s husband, and, if so, nothing at all to do with the object for which that clause, so to speak, is used by the promoters of the change in our law, as proposed in the Wife’s Sister’s Marriage Bill.
Moreover, does not this account make it perfectly intelligible why the first section should remain in the integrity of its enactment, and all the entries find their place in the schedule, because no single entry is repealed even by the modification caused by section 2? But surely it would have been absurd to enact, or to retain in the table, the entry as to a brother’s wife or sister’s husband, if an almost immediately subsequent contradictory enactment were wholly to repeal it, as contended by the promoters of the Bill in question.
I do not know that I have more to add unless it be to meet briefly a possible objection from the law of the Levirate not being found in the same place with the other two passages, nor indeed in the same book of Leviticus, but in another book of Holy Scripture. It may, perhaps, be asked—Is it not strange and unnatural to find the exception to an exception entered where the first exception itself is not recorded, and perhaps even before that exception was made at all?
I would reply, first—
If this be an objection, it is one to which the Mishna, and the Jewish Rabbis, and Dr. M’Caul are open just as much as I am. For they all acknowledge and maintain that upon that 18th verse of xviii. Leviticus is founded the prohibition which they all claim as to the brother in the case of two brothers having married two sisters; of the one not being permitted to obey the injunction of the law of the Levirate, as to taking the other’s wife in the particular case of the one brother leaving a widow whilst the other brother’s wife is yet living.
I would reply, secondly—
That the objection, from the exception in Deut. xxv. not possibly having been then made, is as nothing when the lawgiver is not man but God, who knows from the beginning all which He intends. {30}
I would reply, thirdly—
That a fair and reasonable account of the statements in Leviticus xviii. not alluding directly to the law of Deut. xxv., and not in any way indicating the exception there made or to be made to the prohibition of verse 16, is to be found in this: that all the statements in that chapter of Leviticus are _prohibitions_, whilst the record in Deuteronomy is a _permission_ or indeed a _command_; that, therefore, it is perfectly reasonable and natural that we should not find prohibitions and relaxations of the law mixed up together. Thus Leviticus keeps to its prohibitions, verse after verse, with the warnings and denunciation of penalties proper to its subject; and Deuteronomy deals with its exceptional relaxation, and the duties and consequences therewith connected. And it may be just worth while to add that although the 18th verse of Leviticus xviii. is an exception, it is still in the sense and application which I have been enforcing, a prohibitory not a permissive exception; a consideration which not only shows it is in its due place among the other prohibitions, but also strengthens the view taken in this letter of its being no more than a prohibition. It _prohibits_ the taking two sisters simultaneously, even under circumstances which, but for its existence, would have required such union, and it does not permit anything as against the laws of the 6th and 16th verses. Were Dr. M’Caul’s view, and the view of the promoters of the alteration of our law of marriage correct, we should at least have the anomaly of a permissive precept foisted in, if I may so say, among the prohibitory sentences of this chapter, dealing in all else with prohibitions only. For, it is plain, to read the verse as meaning a man may marry two sisters, if it be not simultaneously, is a permission upon the previous restriction; whilst to say a man may _not_ marry two sisters simultaneously, even when the law of the Levirate would seem to demand it, is a prohibition. The law of Deuteronomy, therefore, (the law of the Levirate,) being a permission or command, not a prohibition, makes it no marvel that that injunction is not found among the prohibitions, whilst that the prohibitional exceptional decree of the 18th verse of Lev. xviii., should be found where it is, among the prohibitions, is no marvel either.
I would reply, fourthly—
That to find the law of the Levirate in this place in the Book of Leviticus would have been to find a provision solely and simply of the Jewish economy and polity, most unnaturally intermixed with the provisions of God’s general moral law:—that is, what is applicable solely to Moses and the people under him, confused with the law intended for all nations and people, as witnessed by the denunciations of that chapter of the book of Leviticus with which we have been concerned. How is it possible to suppose the Leviratical injunction of Deuteronomy could have found a place among the things prohibited and condemned as the abominations of the Canaanites and Egyptians?
I would reply, fifthly—
That if any further answer to the above objection be needed, there is, at least, the general and most sufficient reply, that we are no judges of the right collocation of different points in God’s revelation to man. When we see the fitness of anything, even as we can judge, we may glorify Him and be thankful; when we cannot, we may and should “put our mouth in the dust” and be humble. If things are not made more plain to us than they are, or even are less plain than they might have been, let us remember our state of trial, and acknowledge that all such may be, for ought we know, exactly so revealed as they are, and so placed as they are, for our trial. There is no reason why we should not be tried just as much as to difficulties put before our intellect, as by temptations appealing to our passions; and, as Bishop Butler has remarked, there are some men who, but for the former, might be found to have hardly any trial at all. (Analogy, Part ii., chapter 6.) If the particular objection here advanced be analyzed, it will be found to be but this:—Why should there have been _an omission_ of this law of the Levirate in Leviticus, when, in the same place, there is the record of a prohibitory exception to it? But who shall pretend to account for the omissions of Holy Scripture? Take but that one record in St. Luke’s Gospel of the two disciples who, on the morning of the Resurrection, walked to Emmaus, and were met by Jesus on the way, as they talked of those things which had come to pass, and were sad. What can be more wonderful to our conception than what we find, and what we do not find! After their converse concerning Jesus of Nazareth, which was a Prophet mighty in word and deed before God and all the people, we find that He himself, “beginning at Moses and all the Prophets, expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself.” {32} But we _do not find_ a single syllable of all this discourse recorded in the Gospel. If we judged by what seemed to us likely, how sure should we feel that it would have been set down! Oh! how many difficulties might have been met! how many objections have been answered! how many heresies have been avoided! how great a flood of light have been thrown upon various points of history, prophecy, and doctrine! and how great a guide have been given for all in life and conduct! had it seemed good to the Holy Ghost to let the Evangelist record that discourse. If we judged by our sense of likelihood, should we not say, “What could be so full of interest and of edification! How important! how needful for us to know what our Lord said, when beginning at Moses and all the Prophets, He expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself!” But not one word of it is set down, and, perchance, for the very cause that it would have too much abridged our trial had we possessed such an exposition, and that we may learn in all things not to judge amiss as to the hard things or the secret things in God’s Word nor to think “His ways are as our ways.” Had that discourse been placed before us, perchance there had never been an Arian or a Socinian in the world. (How good we might think it!) Had the whole marriage law of God, if we may so say, been systematically set down in His holy Word, it may be there would have been none now to tamper with it. (How happy, too, we should think it!) But we might as well say, “How happy if Adam had had no trial put upon him, and so had never fallen!”
But our duty is, as it is, and as God has thought fit to set it before us. He has revealed to us His law and will in such manner and degree as seemed to Him good. It is our’s to receive it and to seek to understand it as most humbly and reverently we may, and, asking His grace and help, to do our best to keep it: to keep it individually in our own lives, and so far as He permits us, to keep it from all defilement or breach in the laws of our country. We call ourselves, and rightly, a Christian country, for we are, as baptized into the body of Christ, His members. Let us remember, if even carelessly, much more if wilfully, we go against His commands, and set human law in its permission against the divine law in its prohibition, we are rebellious against Him who is our God and our King; we are going back from our Christian state and profession; we are placing ourselves on the level of the nations—the Egyptians and the Canaanites—who committed all those abominations, against which His curse is denounced who is “the same yesterday and today, and for ever.”
I have the honour to be, My Lord, Your Lordship’s very faithful and humble servant,
M. W. MAYOW.
_Buckingham Road_, _Brighton_, _July_ 14_th_, 1869.
P.S.—Whilst these sheets are passing through the press, I am reminded of an objection taken to the whole line of the argument of my letter upon the very strength of the law of the Levirate. I am told (and I think the view was touched upon in the report of the Commission) that there are some who deem the law of the Levirate to be the total repeal of the prohibition as to the brother’s wife (which most certainly it is not), and who would then go on to say, And, upon your own shewing, after the wife’s death this very law of the Levirate will bring you to the conclusion of marrying the wife’s sister.
I should, perhaps, hardly deem it necessary to notice seriously such an objection, but that I hear of it as actually made or revived at the present time. I will then say a few words upon it. I reply; Consider what must be assumed, and what must be denied, to bring this argument in any way to bear upon the question before the Legislature.
First—It must be assumed that the law of the Levirate is a law binding upon Christians; that it is a law, not simply intended for the Jewish economy, but that a Christian man is intended to take his brother’s widow, if he have died childless, and raise up seed unto his brother.
Secondly—It must be assumed that this object is to be attained, not by the taking the brother’s widow, but by taking the wife’s sister, which is the object of the Bill, but was not the object at all of the Jewish legislation, and which, moreover, is absolutely absurd as to the end of raising up seed unto a brother.
Thirdly—It must be denied that polygamy is forbidden to Christians; for if the brother in the case supposed have a wife previously to his brother’s death, (this wife being still alive, but not the sister of his deceased brother’s wife,) then, according to the law of the Levirate hereby assumed to be in force, he must still take his brother’s widow to wife to raise up seed unto his brother.
Or, Fourthly, if the argument be not carried quite so far, and it be maintained that the brother should say, “I cannot take her, lest I mar my own inheritance;” or, “I cannot take her, as I have already a wife;” or, “I like not to take her for I am engaged to another;” or, if he should for any cause refuse, then, at least, if the law of the Levirate be binding upon us (which is the argument; for if not, it does not help the promoters of the Bill at all), the refuser should undergo the penalty provided in the case, and we should have to witness the scene of the widow, or the wife’s sister, calling together the elders of her city, and loosing the shoe of her husband’s brother, or sister’s husband, and spitting in his face and saying, “So shall it be clone unto that man that will not to build up his brother’s house;” and we should have to revive the name of “the house of him that hath his shoe loosed.”
No! Who does not see that the whole scope and intention of the law of the Levirate was Judaical, and limited to and exhausted by that economy. And, therefore, if the connection between the law of the Levirate and the 18th verse of Lev. xviii. be established, as I have endeavoured to shew it is, it will follow that the exception to that law _must_ belong exclusively to it and expire with it; and, therefore, that the supposed permission to take the sister, “beside the other,” if it be not “in her life-time,” has, as I have all along been arguing, nothing to do with us as Christians at all, but is tied to and restrained by the law of the Levirate, and of the Jewish dispensation. Under it, it was lawful, it was enjoined, when a brother died childless, for the brother to take his wife and raise up seed unto his brother; and this would be lawful and enjoined in that particular case even when his brother’s widow was his own wife’s sister, if his own wife, the sister of the other were dead. But among Christians I cannot believe that any one seriously believes for a moment that the law of the Levirate remains, and so no one can suppose, if the 18th verse of Lev. xviii. be merely the exception to that law, that it has any bearing upon, or gives any permission to, Christians in their marriages at all. {36}
M. W. M.
APPENDIX A.
The only two passages which I have met with taking the same line of argument with that of the foregoing letter are the following. In an appendix to the Speech of Vice-Chancellor Sir W. Page Wood, Feb. 1st, 1860, I find this comment upon the statements in the Mishna:—
“The passages from the _Mishna_ afford singular support to the view which the Bishop of Oxford, at the late meeting, stated to be held by some divines in America, viz., that the difficult 18th verse of the 18th chapter of Leviticus was, in fact, a special prohibition against a wife’s sister being married to her brother-in-law, even when the exceptional _Levirical_ law (or law by which the brother-in-law was to raise up seed to his deceased brother) might otherwise have appeared to supersede the general code of the 18th chapter.”
In an article recently reprinted from the Church Review, of February, 1861, understood to be from the pen of the Rev. T. W. Perry, I find also this:—
“May it not be, then, that the prohibition simply related to the (apparently) Patriarchal requirement (see Gen. xxxviii. 8), enforced in Deut. xxv. 5–10 (that is, _after_ the Levitical prohibitions were given), which commanded the _next kinsman_ to marry the widow of one who died without issue, in order to preserve the inheritance? For if the next kinsman was a brother of the deceased, the duty of raising up seed to his brother first devolved upon him. But he might refuse to perform it. In that instance he underwent a kind of punishment. The widow loosed his shoe and spat in his face before the elders of his city (Deut. xxv. 8 and 9), and he became stigmatized as ‘the house of him that hath his shoe loosed’ (v. 10). This liberty to refuse (see also Ruth iii. 12 and iv. 6) may have been a Divine relaxation of the Patriarchal rule, designed, perhaps, to render more effectual the prohibition in Lev. xviii. 18. But it may not improbably be, that the penalty attached was meant to secure the custom from contempt, by deterring the kinsman from excusing himself on grounds which the law of the Levirate (_i.e._, the law of raising up seed to the deceased brother) did not mean to recognize.”
Then, after some remarks upon the jealousy or vexation likely to arise, the writer continues:—
“May it not, therefore, have been that God designed, in Lev. xviii. 18, to provide against this evil, which was very likely to attend upon the performance of the existing rule, and of his own command (then to be given) touching the marriage of the deceased brother’s wife?
“Yet, how does this explanation meet the difficulty arising from the alleged permission contained in the words (v. 18) ‘in her life-time?’ Thus—If the next kinsman’s wife were already dead, or if she died before the kinsman’s part had been done to the widow, or after that part had been done by another kinsman, who had died leaving the widow still childless then, as she _could not be vexed_, the widow’s brother-in-law was free to marry her, for the purpose specified in the Levirate law.”
And again:—
“Since this first suggested itself to us, we have learnt (see Tract x. p. 21, of the Marriage Law Association) that the _Mishna_, treating of the civil law of the Jews as to marrying the deceased brother’s wife, says that he may not marry her _if she is his own wife’s sister_, and, moreover, that the prohibition holds good _after_ the wife’s death. It is possible that this latter part of the tradition may be akin to what our Lord called (S. Mark vii. 9) ‘your own tradition,’ and so may have tended to ‘frustrate the commandment of God,’ in Lev. xviii. 18, by perplexing the interpretation of the words, ‘in her life-time.”
I may add, however, as shewing my argument to be an independent witness to the same sense and application of Leviticus xviii. 18, that I had no knowledge of either of these statements when I sketched out the argument of the preceding letter.
APPENDIX B.
I have said that I have no need to enter into the question of the “one hour” mentioned in the Mishna. And this is certainly true, because the question which I have been considering is not whether, if a wife’s sister be forbidden at all she is forbidden for ever by both being alive together at a certain time but simply whether the whole matter involved in the words “in her life-time” be not explained and accounted for by its being a prohibition, narrowing the requirements of the law of the Levirate, and nothing more. But it may be added that the statement of the Mishna as to the “one hour” is certainly rather confirmatory than not of the second sister being wholly forbidden, except under that law’s provision in the case of the death of the one previous to the widowhood of the other, because if the being forbidden for one hour forbids for ever, the second sister, whether herself a virgin or the widow of a stranger, being (like the brother’s widow left a widow in her sister’s life-time) marriageable to any other man than her brother-in-law, during all the time of her sister’s married life, (she, I say,) would be all that time forbidden to him. This would answer certainly to the one hour, and if so, under the Rule of the Mishna, she would be forbidden to him for ever, which brings us to the general prohibition under the general law.