CHAPTER XV.

OF COMMITTEES.

Sect. I. Their Nature and Functions.

258. It is usual in all deliberative assemblies, to take the preliminary (sometimes, also, the intermediate) measures, and to prepare matters to be acted upon, in the assembly, by means of committees, composed either of members specially selected for the particular occasion, or appointed beforehand for all matters of the same nature.

259. Committees of the first kind are usually called _select_, the others _standing_; though the former appellation belongs with equal propriety to both, in order to distinguish them from another form of committee, constituted either for a particular occasion, or for all cases of a certain kind, which is composed of all the members of the assembly, and therefore denominated a _committee of the whole_.

260. The advantages of proceeding in this mode are manifold. It enables a deliberative assembly to do many things, which, from its numbers, it would be otherwise be unable to do;—to accomplish a much greater quantity of business, by dividing it among the members, than could possibly be accomplished, if the whole body were obliged to devote itself to each particular subject;—and to act in the preliminary and preparatory steps, with a greater degree of freedom, than is compatible with the forms of proceeding usually observed in full assembly.

261. Committees are appointed to consider a particular subject, either at large or under special instructions: to obtain information in reference to a matter before the assembly, either by personal inquiry and inspection, or by the examination of witnesses; and to digest and put into the proper form, for the adoption of the assembly, all resolutions, votes, orders, and other papers, with which they may be charged. Committees are commonly said to be the “eyes and ears” of the assembly; it is equally true, that, for certain purposes, they are also its “head and hands.”

262. The powers and functions of committees depend chiefly upon the general authority and particular instructions given them by the assembly, at the time of their appointment; but they may also be, and very often are, further instructed, whilst they are in the exercise of their functions; and, sometimes, it even happens, that these additional instructions wholly change the nature of a committee, by charging it with inquiries quite different from those for which it was originally established.

Sect. II. Their Appointment.

263. In the manner of appointing committees, there is no difference between standing and other select committees, as to the mode of selecting the members to compose them; and, in reference to committees of the whole, as there is no selection of members, they are appointed simply by the order of the assembly.

264. In the appointment of select committees, the first thing to be done is to fix upon the number. This is usually effected in the same manner that blanks are filled, namely, by members proposing, without the formality of a motion, such members as they please, which are then separately put to the question, beginning with the largest and going regularly through to the smallest, until the assembly comes to a vote.

265. The number being settled, there are three modes of selecting the members, to wit, by the appointment of the presiding officer,—by ballot,—and by nomination and vote of the assembly; the first, sometimes in virtue of a standing rule, sometimes in pursuance of a vote of the assembly in a particular case; the second always in pursuance of a vote; the last is the usual course where no vote is taken.

266. In deliberative assemblies, whose sittings are of considerable length, as legislative bodies, it is usual to provide by a standing rule, that, unless otherwise ordered in a particular case, all committees shall be named by the presiding officer. Where this is the case, whenever a committee is ordered, and the number settled, the presiding officer at once names the members to compose it. Sometimes, also, the rule fixes the number, of which, unless otherwise ordered, committees shall consist. This mode of appointing a committee is frequently resorted to, where there is no rule on the subject.

267. When a committee is ordered to be appointed by ballot, the members are chosen by the assembly, either singly or altogether, as may be ordered, in the same manner that other elections are made; and, in such elections, as in other cases of the election of the officers of the assembly, a majority of all the votes given in is necessary to a choice.

268. When a committee is directed to be appointed by nomination and vote, the names of the members proposed are put to the question singly, and approved or rejected by the assembly, by a vote taken in the usual manner. If the nomination is directed to be made by the presiding officer, he may propose the names in the same manner, or all at once; the former mode being the most direct and simple; the latter enabling the assembly to vote more understandingly upon the several names proposed. When the nomination is directed to be made at large, the presiding officer calls upon the assembly to nominate, and names being mentioned accordingly, he puts to vote the first name he hears.

269. It is also a compendious mode of appointing a committee, to revive one which has already discharged itself by a report; or by charging a committee appointed for one purpose with some additional duty, of the same or a different character.

270. In regard to the appointment of committees, so far as the selection of the members is concerned, it is a general rule in legislative bodies, when a bill is to be referred, that none who speak directly against the body of it are to be of the committee, for the reason, that he who would totally destroy will not amend; but that, for the opposite reason, those who only take exceptions to some particulars in the bill are to be of the committee. This rule supposes the purpose of the commitment to be, not the consideration of the general merits of the bill, but the amendment of it in its particular provisions, so as to make it acceptable to the assembly.

271. This rule, of course, is only for the guidance of the presiding officer, and the members, in the exercise of their discretion; as the assembly may refuse to excuse from serving, or may itself appoint, on a committee, persons who are opposed to the subject referred. It is customary, however, in all deliberative assemblies, to constitute a committee of such persons (the mover and seconder of a measure being of course appointed), a majority of whom, at least, are favorably inclined to the measure proposed.[36]

272. When a committee has been appointed, in reference to a particular subject, it is the duty of the secretary of the assembly to make out a list of the members, together with a certified copy of the authority or instructions under which they are to act, and to give the papers to the member first named on the list of the committee, if convenient, but, otherwise, to any other member of the committee.

Sect. III. Their Organization and Manner of Proceeding.

273. The person first named on a committee acts as its chairman, or presiding officer, so far as relates to the preliminary steps to be taken, and is usually permitted to do so, through the whole proceedings; but this is a matter of courtesy; every committee having a right to elect its own chairman, who presides over it, and makes the report of its proceedings to the assembly.

274. A committee is properly to receive directions from the assembly, as to the time and place of its meeting, and cannot regularly sit at any other time or place; and it may be ordered to sit immediately, whilst the assembly is sitting, and make its report forthwith.

275. When no directions are given, a committee may select its own time and place of meeting; but, without a special order to that effect, it is not at liberty to sit whilst the assembly sits; and, if a committee is sitting, when the assembly comes to order after an adjournment, it is the duty of the chairman to rise, instantly, on being certified of it, and, with the other members, to attend the service of the assembly.

276. In regard to its forms of proceeding, a committee is essentially a miniature assembly;—it can only act when regularly assembled together, as a committee, and not by separate consultation and consent of the members; nothing being the agreement or report of a committee, but what is agreed to in that manner;—a vote taken in committee is as binding as a vote of the assembly;—a majority of the members is necessary to constitute a quorum for business, unless a larger or smaller number has been fixed by the assembly itself;—and a committee has full power over whatever may be committed to it, except that it is not at liberty to change the title or subject.

277. A committee, which is under no directions as to the time and place of meeting, may meet when and where it pleases, and adjoin itself from day to day, or otherwise, until it has gone through with the business committed to it; but, if it is ordered to meet at a particular time, and it fails of doing so, for any cause, the committee is closed, and cannot act without being newly directed to sit.

278. Disorderly words spoken in a committee must be written down in the same manner as in the assembly; but the committee, as such, can do nothing more than report them to the assembly for its animadversion; neither can a committee punish disorderly conduct of any other kind, but must report it to the assembly.

279. When any paper is before a committee whether select or of the whole, it may either have originated with the committee, or have been referred to them; and, in either case, when the paper comes to be considered, the course is for it to be first read entirely through, by the clerk of the committee, if there is one, otherwise by the chairman; and then to be read through again by paragraphs by the chairman, pausing at the end of each paragraph, and putting questions for amending, either by striking out or inserting, if proposed. This is the natural order of proceeding in considering and amending any paper, and is to be strictly adhered to in the assembly; but the same strictness does not seem necessary in a committee.

280. If the paper before a committee is one which has originated with the committee, questions are put on amendments proposed, but not on agreeing to the several paragraphs of which it is composed, separately, as they are gone through with; this being reserved for the close, when a question is to be put on the whole, for agreeing to the paper, as amended, or unamended.

281. If the paper be one, which has been referred to the committee, they proceed as in the other case to put questions of amendment, if proposed, but no final question on the whole; because all the parts of the paper, having been passed upon if not adopted by the assembly as the basis of its action, stand, of course, unless altered or struck out by a vote of the assembly. And even if the committee are opposed to the whole paper, and are of opinion, that it cannot be made good by amendments, they have no authority to reject it; they must report it back to the assembly, without amendments, (specially stating their objections, if they think proper,) and there make their opposition as individual members.[37]

282. In the case of a paper originating with a committee, they may erase or interline it as much as they please; though, when finally agreed to, it ought to be reported in a clear draft, fairly written, without erasure or interlineation.

283. But, in the case of a paper referred to a committee, they are not at liberty to erase, interline, blot, disfigure, or tear it, in any manner; but they must, in a separate paper, set down the amendments they have agreed to report, stating the words which are to be inserted or omitted, and the place where the amendments are to be made, by references to the paragraph or section, line, and word.

284. If the amendments agreed to are very numerous and minute, the committee may report them altogether, in the form of a new and amended draft.

285. When a committee has gone through the paper, or agreed upon a report on the subject, which has been referred to them, it is then moved by some member, and thereupon voted, that the committee rise, and that the chairman, or some other member, make their report to the assembly.

Sect. IV. Their Report.

286. When the report of a committee is to be made, the chairman, or member appointed to make the report, standing in his place, informs the assembly, that the committee, to whom was referred such a subject or paper, have, according to order, had the same under consideration, and have directed him to make a report thereon, or to report the same with sundry amendments, or without amendment, as the case may be, which he is ready to do, when the assembly shall please; and he or any other member may then move that the report be now received. On this motion being made, the question is put whether the assembly will receive the report at that time; and a vote passes, accordingly, either to receive it then, or fixing upon some future time for its reception.

287. At the time, when, by the order of the assembly, the report is to be received, the chairman reads it in his place, and then delivers it, together with all the papers, connected with it, to the clerk at the table; where it is again read, and then lies on the table, until the time assigned, or until it suits the convenience of the assembly, to take it up for consideration.

288. If the report of the committee is of a paper with amendments, the chairman reads the amendments with the coherence in the paper, whatever it may be, and opens the alterations, and the reasons of the committee for the amendments, until he has gone through the whole; and, when the report is read at the clerk’s table, the amendments only are read without the coherence.

289. In practice, however, the formality of a motion and vote on the reception of a report is usually dispensed with; though, if any objection is made, or if the presiding officer sees any informality in the report, he should decline receiving it without a motion and vote; and a report, if of any considerable length, is seldom read, either by the chairman in his place, or by the clerk at the table, until it is taken up for consideration. In legislative assemblies, the printing of reports generally renders the reading of them unnecessary.

290. The report of a committee being made and received, the committee is dissolved, and can act no more without a new power; but their authority may be revived by a vote, and the same matter recommitted to them. If a report, when offered to the assembly, is not received, the committee is not thereby discharged, but may be ordered to sit again, and a time and place appointed accordingly.

291. When a subject or paper has been once committed, and a report made upon it, it may be recommitted either to the same or a different committee; and if a report is recommitted, before it has been agreed to by the assembly, what has heretofore passed in the committee is of no validity; the whole question being again before the committee, as if nothing had passed there in relation to it.

292. The report of a committee may be made in three different forms, namely: _first_, it may contain merely a statement of facts, reasoning, or opinion, in relation to the subject of it, without any specific conclusion; or, _second_, a statement of facts, reasoning, or opinion, concluding with a resolution, or series of resolutions, or some other specific proposition; or, _third_, it may consist merely of such resolutions, or propositions, without any introductory part.

293. The first question, on a report, is, in strictness, on receiving it; though in practice, this question is seldom or never made; the consent of the assembly, especially in respect to the report of a committee of the whole, being generally presumed, unless objection is made. When a report is received, whether by general consent, or upon a question and vote, the committee is discharged, and the report becomes the basis of the future proceedings of the assembly, on the subject to which it relates.

294. At the time assigned for the consideration of a report, it may be treated and disposed of precisely like any other proposition (59 to 77); and may be amended, in the same manner (78 to 133), both in the preliminary statement, reasoning, or opinion, if it contain any, and in the resolutions, or other propositions with which it concludes; so if it consist merely of a statement, etc., without resolutions, or of resolutions, etc., without any introductory part.

295. The final question on a report, whatever form it may have, is usually stated on its acceptance; and, when accepted, the whole report is adopted by the assembly, and becomes the statement, reasoning, opinion, resolution, or other act, as the case may be, of the assembly; the doings of a committee, when agreed to, adopted, or accepted, becoming the acts of the assembly, in the same manner as if done originally by the assembly itself, without the intervention of a committee.

296. It would be better, however, and in stricter accordance with parliamentary rules, to state the final question on a report, according to the form of it. If the report contain merely a statement of facts, reasoning, or opinion, the question should be on acceptance; if it also conclude with resolutions, or other specific propositions, of any kind,—the introductory part being consequently merged in the conclusion,—the question should be on agreeing to the resolutions, or on adopting the order, or other proposition, or on passing or coming to the vote, recommended by the committee; and the same should be the form of the question when the report consists merely of resolutions, etc., without any introductory part.

Sect. V. Committee of the Whole.

297. When a subject has been ordered to be referred to a committee of the whole, the form of going from the assembly into committee, is, for the presiding officer, at the time appointed for the committee to sit, on motion made and seconded for the purpose, to put the question that the assembly do now resolve itself into a committee of the whole, to take under consideration such a matter, naming it. If this question is determined in the affirmative, the result is declared by the presiding officer, who, naming some member to act as chairman of the committee, then leaves the chair, and takes a seat elsewhere, like any other member; and the person appointed chairman seats himself (not in the chair of the assembly but) at the clerk’s table.[38]

298. The chairman named by the presiding officer is generally acquiesced in by the committee; though, like all other committees, a committee of the whole have a right to elect a chairman for themselves, some member, by general consent, putting the question.

299. The same number of members is necessary to constitute a quorum of a committee of the whole, as of the assembly; and if the members present fall below a quorum, at any time, in the course of the proceedings, the chairman, on a motion and question, rises,—the presiding officer thereupon resumes the chair,—and the chairman informs the assembly (he can make no other report) of the cause of the dissolution of the committee.

300. When the assembly is in committee of the whole, it is the duty of the presiding officer to remain in the assembly-room, in order to be at hand to resume the chair, in case the committee should be broken up by some disorder, or for want of a quorum, or should rise, either to report progress, or to make their final report upon the matter committed to them.

301. The clerk of the assembly does not act as clerk of the committee (this is the duty of the assistant clerk in legislative bodies), or record in his journal any of the proceedings or votes of the committee, but only their report as made to the assembly.

302. The proceedings in a committee of the whole, though, in general, similar to those in the assembly itself, and in other committees, are yet different in some respects, the principal of which are the following:—

303. _First._ The previous question cannot be moved in a committee of the whole. The only means of avoiding an improper discussion is, to move that the committee rise; and, if it is apprehended, that the same discussion will be attempted on returning again into committee, the assembly can discharge the committee, and proceed itself with the business, keeping down any improper discussion by means of the previous question.[39]

304. _Second._ A committee of the whole cannot adjourn, like other committees, to some other time or place, for the purpose of going on with and completing the consideration of the subject referred to them; but if their business is unfinished, at the usual time for the assembly to adjourn, or, for any other reason, they wish to proceed no further at a particular time, the form of proceeding is, for some member to move that the committee rise,—report progress,—and ask leave to sit again; and, if this motion prevails, the chairman rises,—the presiding officer resumes the chair of the assembly,—and the chairman of the committee informs him that the committee of the whole have, according to order, had under their consideration such a matter, and have made some progress therein;[40] but, not having had time to go through with the same, have directed him to ask leave for the committee to sit again. The presiding officer thereupon puts a question on giving the committee leave to sit again, and also on the time when, the assembly will again resolve itself into a committee. If leave to sit again is not granted, the committee is of course dissolved.

305. _Third._ In a committee of the whole, every member may speak as often as he pleases, provided he could obtain the floor; whereas in the assembly itself, no member can speak more than once.

306. _Fourth._ A committee of the whole cannot refer any matter to another committee; but other committees may and do frequently exercise their functions, and expedite their business by means of sub-committees of their own members.

307. _Fifth._ In a committee of the whole, the presiding officer of the assembly has a right to take a part in the debate and proceedings, in the same manner as any other member.

308. _Sixth._ A committee of the whole, like a select committee, has no authority to punish a breach of order whether of a member, or stranger; but can only rise and report the matter to the assembly, who may proceed to punish the offender. Disorderly words must be written down in committee, in the same manner as in the assembly, and reported to the assembly for their animadversion.

309. The foregoing are the principal points of difference between proceedings in the assembly and in committees of the whole; in most other respects they are precisely similar. It is sometimes said, that in a committee of the whole, it is not necessary that a motion should be seconded. There is no foundation, however, either in reason or parliamentary usage, for this opinion.

310. When a committee of the whole have gone through with the matter referred to them, a member moves that the committee rise, and that the chairman (or some other member) report their proceedings to the assembly; which being resolved, the chairman rises and goes to his place,—the presiding officer resumes the chair of the assembly,—and the chairman informs him, that the committee have gone through with the business referred to them, and that he is ready to make their report, when the assembly shall think proper to receive it. The time for receiving the report is then agreed upon; and, at the time appointed, it is made and received in the same manner as that of any other committee (286).

311. It sometimes happens, that the formality of a motion and question as to the time of receiving a report is dispensed with. If the assembly are ready to receive it, at the time, they cry out, “now, now,” whereupon the chairman proceeds; if not then ready, some other time is mentioned, as “to-morrow,” or “Monday,” and that time is fixed by general consent. But, when it is not the general sense of the assembly to receive the report at the time, it is better to agree upon and fix the time by a motion and question.[41]

36. “In theory, the majority of the committee should be of the friends of the measure referred. But as a general rule it will be found that, whichever political party is in the ascendant, that party has a majority on the committee, as they will then be able to control the committee’s workings, etc.”—Ed.

37. This rule is not applicable, of course, to those cases in which the SUBJECT, as well as the FORM OR DETAILS of a paper, is referred to the committee.

38. Jefferson says he will sit at the clerk’s table.

Mell says, “The chairman thus designated will take the _President’s_ chair.”—Ed.

39. If the object be to stop debate, that can only be effected, in the same manner, unless there is a special rule, as to the time of speaking, or to taking a subject out of committee.

40. If it is a second time, the expression is, “some further progress,” etc.

41. “Amendments proposed by the committee may be amended or rejected by the assembly, and matters stricken out by the committee may be restored by the assembly.”—Ed.

CONCLUDING REMARKS.

312. In bringing this treatise to a close, it will not be deemed out of place, to make a suggestion or two for the benefit of those persons, who may be called upon to act as presiding officers, for the first time.

313. One of the most essential parts of the duty of a presiding officer is, to give the closest attention to the proceedings of the assembly, and, especially, to what is said by every member who speaks. Without the first, confusion will be almost certain to occur; wasting the time, perhaps disturbing the harmony, of the assembly. The latter is not merely a decent manifestation of respect for those who have elevated him to an honorable station; but it tends greatly to encourage timid or diffident members, and to secure them a patient and attentive hearing; and it often enables the presiding officer, by a timely interference, to check offensive language, in season to prevent scenes of tumult and disorder, such as have sometimes disgraced our legislative halls.

314. It should be constantly kept in mind by a presiding officer, that, in a deliberative assembly, there can regularly be but one thing done or doing, at the same time. This caution he will find particularly useful to him, whenever a quarrel arises between two members, in consequence of words spoken in debate. In such a case, he will do well to require that the regular course of proceeding shall be strictly pursued; and will take care to restrain members from interfering in any other manner. In general, the solemnity and deliberation, with which this mode is attended, will do much to allay heat and excitement, and to restore harmony and order to the assembly.

315. A presiding officer will often find himself embarrassed, by the difficulty, as well as the delicacy, of deciding points of order, or giving directions as to the manner of proceeding. In such cases, it will be useful for him to recollect, that—

The great purpose of all rules and forms, is to subserve the will of the assembly rather than to restrain it; to facilitate, and not to obstruct, the expression of their deliberate sense.

* * * * *

NOTE: The so-called “cloture” has the same end as the American previous question; it is intended to cut debate short. The English previous question works to continue debate, and a new scheme had to be devised in 1882. Then it was that the French cloture was adopted and naturalized. Under the Cloture act the Speaker of the House or the Chairman of Committee may say when he thinks the subject before the House or the Committee has been sufficiently discussed, and if a motion be made “That the question be now put,” he shall put the question. If 200 members are in favor of putting the question, or if less than 40 oppose it and more than 100 are in favor, he shall put the question on the principal question before the House or the committee at once. In this country, when a member reports a bill from his committee he moves that the previous question be put at the end of one hour; debate is therefore limited to one hour. In England, a member, calling up a bill for its second reading, moves the previous question, and votes against his motion. If the previous question should be ordered, he would feel grievously disgusted—so would the American Congressman, if the previous question should not be ordered.

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

PREAMBLE.

We, the People of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquillity, provide for the common defence, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

ARTICLE I.

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT.

Section I.—All legislative powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section II.—1. The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every second year by the people of the several States; and the electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislature.

2. No person shall be a representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty-five years, and been seven years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

3. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons. The actual enumeration shall be made within three years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law direct. The number of representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty thousand, but each State shall have at least one representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to choose three; Massachusetts, eight; Rhode Island and Providence Plantations, one; Connecticut, five; New York, six; New Jersey, four; Pennsylvania, eight; Delaware, one; Maryland, six; Virginia, ten; North Carolina, five; South Carolina, five; and Georgia, three.

4. When vacancies happen in the representation from any State, the executive authority thereof shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies.

5. The House of Representatives shall choose their Speaker and other officers, and shall have the sole power of impeachment.

Section III.—1. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the legislature thereof for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote.

2. Immediately after they shall be assembled in consequence of the first election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three classes. The seats of the Senators of the first class shall be vacated at the expiration of the second year, of the second class at the expiration of the fourth year, and of the third class at the expiration of the sixth year, so that one third may be chosen every second year; and if vacancies happen, by resignation or otherwise, during the recess of the legislature of any State, the executive thereof may make temporary appointments until the next meeting of the legislature, which shall then fill such vacancies.

3. No person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the age of thirty years, and been nine years a citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

4. The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no vote unless they be equally divided.

5. The Senate shall choose their other officers, and also a President _pro tempore_ in the absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the office of President of the United States.

6. The Senate shall have the sole power to try all impeachments. When sitting for that purpose, they shall be on oath or affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: and no person shall be convicted without the concurrence of two thirds of the members present.

7. Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment, according to law.

Section IV.—1. The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and Representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.

2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year; and such meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.

Section V.—1. Each house shall be the judge of the elections, returns, and qualifications of its own members, and a majority of each shall constitute a quorum to do business; but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the attendance of absent members, in such manner and under such penalties as each house may provide.

2. Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its members for disorderly behavior, and with the concurrence of two thirds, expel a member.

3. Each house shall keep a journal of its proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such parts as may in their judgment require secrecy; and the yeas and nays of the members of either house on any question shall, at the desire of one fifth of those present, be entered on the journal.

4. Neither house, during the session of Congress, shall, without the consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other place than that in which the two houses shall be sitting.

Section VI.—1. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a compensation for their services, to be ascertained by law, and paid out of the treasury of the United States. They shall, in all cases, except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their attendance at the session of their respective houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate in either house they shall not be questioned in any other place.

2. No Senator or Representative shall, during the time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil office under the authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such time; and no person holding any office under the United States shall be a member of either house during his continuance in office.

Section VII.—1. All bills for raising revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments, as on other bills.

2. Every bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be presented to the President of the United States; if he approve, he shall sign it; but if not, he shall return it, with his objections, to that house in which it shall have originated; who shall enter the objections at large on their journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such reconsideration, two thirds of that house shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other house, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered; and if approved by two thirds of that house, it shall become a law. But in all such cases the votes of both houses shall be determined by yeas and nays, and the names of the persons voting for and against the bill shall be entered on the journal of each house respectively. If any bill shall not be returned by the President within ten days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the same shall be a law in like manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their adjournment prevent its return, in which case it shall not be a law.

3. Every order, resolution, or vote, to which the concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of adjournment), shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the same shall take effect, shall be approved by him; or being disapproved by him, shall be re-passed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the rules and limitations prescribed in the case of a bill.

Section VIII.—The Congress shall have power—

1. To lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and excises; to pay the debts, and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States; but all duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States:

2. To borrow money on the credit of the United States:

3. To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes:

4. To establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws on the subject of bankruptcies throughout the United States:

5. To coin money, regulate the value thereof and of foreign coin, and to fix the standard of weights and measures:

6. To provide for the punishment of counterfeiting the securities and current coin of the United States:

7. To establish post-offices and post-roads:

8. To promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries:

9. To constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court:

10. To define and punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and offences against the law of nations:

11. To declare war, grant letters of marque and reprisal, and make rules concerning captures on land and water:

12. To raise and support armies; but no appropriation of money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years:

13. To provide and maintain a navy:

14. To make rules for the government and regulation of the land and naval forces:

15. To provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions:

16. To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia, and for governing such parts of them as may be employed in the service of the United States; reserving to the States respectively the appointment of the officers and the authority of training the militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress:

17. To exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of government of the United States; and to exercise like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings:—and

18. To make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the United States, or in any department or officer thereof.

Section IX.—1. The immigration or importation of such persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight; but a tax or duty may be imposed on such importation not exceeding ten dollars for each person.

2. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it.

3. No bill of attainder or _ex post facto_ law shall be passed.

4. No capitation or other direct tax shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken.

5. No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. No preference shall be given by any regulation of commerce or revenue to the ports of one State over those of another: nor shall vessels bound to or from one State be obliged to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.

6. No money shall be drawn from the treasury, but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement and account of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time.

7. No title of nobility shall be granted by the United States: and no person holding any office of profit or trust under them, shall, without the consent of Congress, accept of any present, emolument, office, or title, of any kind whatever, from any king, prince, or foreign state.

Section X.—1. No State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal; coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of attainder, _ex post facto_ law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts; or grant any title of nobility.

2. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws: and the net produce of all duties and imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the use of the treasury of the United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of Congress.

3. No State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage, keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power, or engage in war, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent danger as will not admit of delay.

ARTICLE II.

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT.

Section I.—1. The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his office during the term of four years; and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same term, be elected as follows:

2. Each State shall appoint, in such manner as the legislature thereof may direct, a number of electors equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or person holding an office of trust or profit under the United States, shall be appointed an elector.

3. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for two persons, of whom one at least shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a list of all the persons voted for, and of the number of votes for each; which list they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes shall be President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such a majority, and have an equal number of votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately choose, by ballot, one of them for President; and if no person have a majority, then, from the five highest on the list, the said House shall, in like manner, choose a President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote: a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. In every case after the choice of the President, the person having the greatest number of votes of the electors shall be Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal votes, the Senate shall choose from them, by ballot the Vice-President.

4. The Congress may determine the time of choosing the electors, and the day on which they shall give their votes, which day shall be the same throughout the United States.

5. No person except a natural born citizen, or a citizen of the United States at the time of the adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the office of President: neither shall any person be eligible to that office who shall not have attained to the age of thirty-five years, and been fourteen years a resident within the United States.

6. In case of the removal of the President from office, or of his death, resignation, or inability to discharge the powers and duties of the said office, the same shall devolve on the Vice-President; and the Congress may, by law, provide for the case of removal, death, resignation, or inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what officer shall then act as President; and such officer shall act accordingly, until the disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

7. The President shall, at stated times, receive for his services a compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he shall have been elected; and he shall not receive within that period any other emolument from the United States, or any of them.

8. Before he enters on the execution of his office, he shall take the following oath or affirmation:

“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States: and will, to the best of my ability, preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution of the United States.”

Section II.—1. The President shall be Commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States, when called into the actual service of the United States. He may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their respective offices; and he shall have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.

2. He shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, shall appoint ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other officers of the United States whose appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by law. But the Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in the President alone, in the courts of law, or in the heads of departments.

3. The President shall have power to fill up all vacancies that may happen during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions, which shall expire at the end of their next session.

Section III.—1. He shall, from time to time, give to Congress information of the state of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient. He may, on extraordinary occasions, convene both houses, or either of them; and in case of disagreement between them, with respect to the time of adjournment, he may adjourn them to such time as he shall think proper. He shall receive ambassadors and other public ministers. He shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed; and shall commission all officers of the United Slates.

Section IV.—The President, Vice-President, and all civil officers of the United States, shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.

ARTICLE III.

THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT.

Section I.—The judicial power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as Congress may, from time to time, ordain and establish. The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior; and shall, at stated times, receive for their services a compensation, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in office.

Section II.—1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases in law and equity arising under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under grants of different States; and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign states, citizens, or subjects.

2. In all cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, and those in which a State shall be a party, the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction. In all the other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions and under such regulations as Congress shall make.

3. The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury, and such trial shall be held in the State where the said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as Congress may by law have directed.

Section III.—1. Treason against the United States shall consist only in levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason, unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or on confession in open court.

2. Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted.

ARTICLE IV.

MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS.

Section I.—Full faith and credit shall be given in each State to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other State; and Congress may, by general laws, prescribe the manner in which such acts, records, and proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof.

Section II.—1. The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several States.

2. A person charged in any State with treason, felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another State, shall, on demand of the executive authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having jurisdiction of the crime.

3. No person held to service or labor in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labor; but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labor may be due.

Section III.—1. New States may be admitted by Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any other State, nor any State be formed by the junction of two or more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of Congress.

2. Congress shall have power to dispose of, and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory or other property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Section IV.—The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion: and, on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened), against domestic violence.

ARTICLE V.

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose amendments to this Constitution; or, on the application of the legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a convention for proposing amendments, which, in either case, shall be valid, to all intents and purposes, as parts of this Constitution, when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other mode of ratification may be proposed by Congress; provided that no amendment which may be made prior to the year one thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any manner affect the first and fourth clauses in the ninth section of the first article; and that no State, without its consent, shall be deprived of its equal suffrage in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI.

1. All debts contracted, and engagements entered into, before the adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution as under the Confederation.

2. This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

3. The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the members of the several State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by oath or affirmation to support this Constitution; but no religious test shall ever be required as a qualification to any office or public trust under the United States.

ARTICLE VII.

The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the same. Done in convention by the unanimous consent of the States present, the seventeenth day of September, in the year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and eighty-seven, and of the Independence of the United States of America the twelfth. In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our names.

George Washington, _President, and Deputy from Virginia._

AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES.

Article I.—Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.

Article II.—A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.

Article III.—No soldier shall, in time of peace, be quartered in any house without the consent of the owner; nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.

Article IV.—The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

Article V.—No person shall be held to answer for a capital or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a grand jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of war or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be put twice in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be witness against himself; nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use without just compensation.

Article VI.—In all criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law; and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor; and to have the assistance of counsel for his defence.

Article VII.—In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved; and no fact tried by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.

Article VIII.—Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.

Article IX.—The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.

Article X.—The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

Article XI.—The judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by citizens of another State, or by citizens or subjects of any foreign state.

Article XII.—1. The electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same State with themselves. They shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President; and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each; which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates, and the votes shall then be counted. The person having the greatest number of votes for President shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed: and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers, not exceeding three, on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But, in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by States, the representation from each State having one vote: a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two thirds of the States, and a majority of all the States shall be necessary to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President, whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.

2. The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of electors appointed; and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list the Senate shall choose the Vice-President. A quorum for the purpose shall consist of two thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.

3. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.

Article XIII.—_Section_ I.—Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.

_Section_ II.—Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation.

Article XIV.—_Section_ I.—All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.

_Section_ II.—Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President or Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the executive and judicial officers of a State, or the members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.

_Section_ III.—No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may, by a vote of two thirds of each house, remove such disability.

_Section_ IV.—The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void.

_Section_ V.—The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this Article.

Article XV.—_Section_ I.—The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.

_Section_ II.—The Congress shall have power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation.

DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE.

When, in the course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume, among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the laws of Nature and Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.

We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foundation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form as to them shall seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness. Prudence, indeed, will dictate that governments long established should not be changed for light and transient causes; and accordingly all experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves, by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed. But when a long train of abuses and usurpations, pursuing invariably the same object, evinces a design to reduce them under absolute despotism, it is their right, it is their duty, to throw off such government, and to provide new guards for their future security. Such has been the patient sufferance of these colonies, and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former systems of government. The history of the present king of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these States. To prove this, let facts be submitted to a candid world:

He has refused his assent to laws the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

He has forbidden his governors to pass laws of immediate and pressing importance, unless suspended in their operation till his assent should be obtained; and when so suspended he has utterly neglected to attend to them. He has refused to pass other laws for the accommodation of large districts of people, unless those people would relinquish the right of representation in the legislature—a right inestimable to them, and formidable to tyrants only.

He has called together legislative bodies at places unusual, uncomfortable, and distant from the repository of the public records, for the sole purpose of fatiguing them into compliance with his measures.

He has dissolved representative houses repeatedly for opposing, with manly firmness, his invasions on the rights of the people.

He has refused for a long time after such dissolution to cause others to be elected; whereby the legislative powers, incapable of annihilation, have returned to the people at large for their exercise, the State remaining, in the mean time, exposed to all the dangers of invasion from without and convulsions within.

He has endeavored to prevent the population of these States; for that purpose obstructing the laws of naturalization of foreigners; refusing to pass others to encourage their migration hither, and raising the conditions of new appropriations of lands.

He has obstructed the administration of justice by refusing his assent to laws for establishing judiciary powers.

He has made judges dependent on his will alone for the tenure of their offices and the amount of payment of their salaries.

He has erected a multitude of new offices, and sent hither swarms of officers to harass our people, and eat out their substance.

He has kept among us, in times of peace, standing armies, without the consent of our legislatures.

He has affected to render the military independent of and superior to the civil power.

He has combined with others to subject us to a jurisdiction foreign to our Constitution, and unacknowledged by our laws; giving his assent to their acts of pretended legislation:

For quartering large bodies of armed troops among us:

For protecting them by a mock trial from punishment for any murders which they should commit on the inhabitants of these States:

For cutting off our trade with all parts of the world:

For imposing taxes on us without our consent:

For depriving us, in many cases, of the benefits of trial by jury:

For transporting us beyond seas to be tried for pretended offences:

For abolishing the free system of English laws in a neighboring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government, and enlarging its boundaries, so as to render it at once an example and fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule into these colonies:

For taking away, our charters, abolishing our most valuable laws, and altering, fundamentally, the forms of our government:

For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever.

He has abdicated government here by declaring us out of his protection, and waging war against us.

He has plundered our seas, ravaged our coasts, burnt our towns, and destroyed the lives of our people.

He is at this time transporting large armies of foreign mercenaries to complete the works of death, desolation, and tyranny already begun, with circumstances of cruelty and perfidy scarcely paralleled in the most barbarous ages, and totally unworthy the head of a civilized nation.

He has constrained our fellow-citizens, taken captive on the high seas, to bear arms against their country, to become the executioners of their friends and brethren, or to fall themselves by their hands.

He has excited domestic insurrections among us, and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.

In every stage of these oppressions we have petitioned for redress in the most humble terms; our repeated petitions have been answered only by repeated injury. A prince whose character is thus marked by every act which may define a tyrant is unfit to be the ruler of a free people.

Nor have we been wanting in attentions to our British brethren. We have warned them, from time to time, of attempts by their legislature to extend an unwarrantable jurisdiction over us. We have reminded them of the circumstances of our emigration and settlement here. We have appealed to their native justice and magnanimity, and we have conjured them by the ties of our common kindred to disavow these usurpations, which would inevitably interrupt our connections and correspondence. They, too, have been deaf to the voice of justice and consanguinity. We must, therefore, acquiesce in the necessity which denounces our separation, and hold them, as we hold the rest of mankind, enemies in war, in peace friends.

We, therefore, the representatives of the United States of America, in General Congress assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the name and by the authority of the good people of these colonies, solemnly publish and declare that these United Colonies are, and of right ought to be, free and independent States; that they are absolved from all allegiance to the British crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain is, and ought to be, totally dissolved; and that, as free and independent States, they have full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish commerce, and to do all other acts and things which independent States may of right do. And for the support of this declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.

INDEX.

_The figures refer to the numbers of the paragraphs._

Acceptance by the maker of a motion, of an amendment, 92, 93.

Addition of propositions, how effected, 88.

Adjournment, without day, equivalent to a dissolution, 139. effect of, on business under consideration, 140. _motion for_, takes precedence of all other motions, 137. when it may be amended, 137. form of, 138, 200.

Amendment, purposes of motions for, 60, 78. order of proceeding in, 95, 191. acceptance of by mover of proposition, 92, 93. of amendments by striking out and inserting, 107, 108. of amendment, to be put before the original amendment, 110. of an amendment to an amendment, not allowed, 96. object of such motion, how attained, 96, 97. cannot be made to what has been agreed to on a question, 98, 99, 100, 101. inconsistency of, with one already adopted, 102. may show the absurdity of the original object of the proposition, 132. may change the object, 128, 129, 133. or may defeat the object, 130, 131. by addition, 88. by separation, 89. by transposition, 90. by striking out, 94, 103 to 112. by inserting or adding, 94, 113 to 121. by striking out and inserting, 94, 122 to 127. _motion for_, by striking out and inserting, 103, 104, 111, 122. may be divided, 122. may be amended, 126. manner of stating question on, 112, 121, 127. precedence of question on, 123. to strike out, decided in the negative, equivalent to the affirmative of agreeing, 98, 100, 252. if passed may not be renewed, 103 to 106, 113 to 116, 119, 124, 125. stands in the same degree with the previous question, and indefinite postponement, 184. superseded by a motion to postpone to a day or to commit, 185. may be amended, 96, 107, 117, 126, 184. effect of vote on, 94 to 127, 187. to be put before the original motion, 110, 120.

Apology, 42.

Assembly, Deliberative, purposes of, how effected, 1. how organized, 2, 3. judgment of, how expressed, 13.

Assembling, time of, to be fixed beforehand, 23. place of, in possession of assembly, 9.

Authentication of acts, etc., of a deliberative assembly, 27, 32.

Blanks, filling of, 84. with times or numbers, rule for, 85, 86, 87. See _Precedence_.

Chairman, preliminary election of, 3. See _Presiding Officer_.

Clerk, 5. See _Recording Officer_.

Committees, objects and advantages of, 258, 260, 261. who to compose, 258, 270. usually those favorable to the proposed measure, 271. mode of appointment of, 263, 267, 268, 269. when by the presiding officer, under a standing rule, 266. how notified of their appointment, 32, 272. when and where to sit, 274, 275, 277. _select_, 259. how appointed, 264 to 269. _standing_, 259. what to be referred to, 74. instructions to, 65, 76, 77, 262. list of, etc., given by the clerk to the member first appointed, 272. person first appointed on, acts as chairman by courtesy, 273. proceed like other assemblies, 276, 279. may proceed by sub-committees, 306. mode of proceeding on a paper which has been referred to them, 279, 281, 283. mode of proceeding on a paper originating in the committee, 279, 280, 282. manner of closing session of, 285. report of, how made, 282, 283, 284, 286, 287, 292. form of report of, 286, 292. mode of proceeding on report of, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296. acceptance of report of, 295. form of stating questions on report of, 295, 296. See _Report_.

Committee of the Whole, of whom composed, 259. how constituted, 297. what a quorum of, 299. who presides over, 297, 298. who is clerk of, 301. proceeding of, similar to those of the assembly itself, 302, 309. mode of proceeding if one session does not complete the business, 304. who may speak in, and how often, 305. cannot refer any matter to another committee, 306. cannot punish for breaches of order, 308. disorderly words in, how noticed, 308. differences between and other committees, 302 to 308. presiding officer of assembly to remain in the room, during the session of, 300. See _Reports_, _Disorderly Words_.

Commitment, definition and purposes of, 73. when a proper course, 60. what may be committed, 75, 76, 77. effect of a vote on a motion for, 183. _motion for_, may be amended, 181. supersedes a motion to amend, 185. is of the same degree with motions for the previous question and postponement, 182. See _Committees_.

Communications to the assembly, how made, 44, 46, 48, 49.

Consent of the assembly, in what cases, and how far, to be presumed by the presiding officer, 35, 237, 293.

Contested Elections, 7. See _Returns_.

Credentials of members, 7.

Debate, proper character of, 201. should be confined to the question, 209. usual mode of putting an end to, 220, 221. of shortening, 222. See _Speaking_.

Decorum, Breaches of, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 223, 224. how to be noticed, 40. remedy for, 224, 225, 226. how a member is to proceed to exculpate himself from a charge of, 40. See _Disorderly Words_, _Order_.

Disorderly Words, cause of proceedings, when spoken, 227 to 231. to be written down by the clerk, as spoken, 228, 229. members not to be censured for, unless complained of at the time, 232. spoken in a committee during its session, 278. in committee of the whole to be written down, and reported to the assembly, 308.

Disorderly Conduct, 9, 37 to 40, 313.

Division of a question, 79 to 83, 122, 123. effect of, 80. motion for, how made, 80. right to demand, 81, 82. when it may take place, 83. See _Question_.

Elections and Returns, 6, 7, 8.

Expulsion, 42.

Floor, how to obtain, 46. who has a right to, 47, 203, 204, 205. member in possession of, to be interrupted only by a call to order, 200. when usually allowed to the mover of a motion, 204. when one relinquishes, for one purpose, he does so for all purposes, 205, 219.

Forms of proceeding, 10, 59, 315. See _Order_, _Rules_.

Incidental Questions, 150 to 165. questions of order, 151 to 154. reading papers, 155 to 160. withdrawal of a motion, 161, 162. suspension of a rule, 163, 164. amendment of amendments, 165. See _Question_.

Introduction of business, how accomplished, 43. See _Rules_.

Journal of a deliberate assembly, what and how kept, 32, 33.

Judgment of an aggregate body, how evidenced, 14.

Lie on the Table, purpose of motion for, 60, 71, 72. _Motion for_, cannot be amended, 170. when to be resorted to, 171. effect of vote on, 71, 72, 172, 173. takes precedence of all other subsidiary motions, 171.

List of members, 6.

Main Question, 63, 64, 135, 213.

Majority, decision by, on questions and elections, 24.

Members, rights and duties of, 36. punishments of, 42. not to be present at debates on matters concerning themselves, 41, 225, 230. proceedings on quarrels between, caution relating to, 314.

Membership, rights of, how decided, 8.

Modification of a motion by the mover, 92.

Motion, definition of, 45, 59, 233. to be in writing, 54. to be seconded, 53 to 55. how seconded, 55. when in order, 247. subsidiary, need not be in writing, 54. but must be seconded, 55. to suppress a proposition, 62. to be stated or read for the information of any member, 57. can be withdrawn only by leave, 56, 92. when before the assembly, none other can be received, except privileged motions, 58. is not before the assembly, until stated by its presiding officer, 198. not in order unless the maker be called to by the presiding officer, 200. by one seated, or not addressing the chair, not to be received, 200. principal and subsidiary, cannot be made together, 199.

Naming a member, what, 40, 225.

Numbers prefixed to paragraphs of a proposition, not a part of it, 91.

Officers of an assembly, titles of, 5. who are, usually, 26. how appointed, and removable, 26. a majority, necessary to elect, 26. when not members of the assembly, 5. _pro tempore_, when to be chosen, 29. See _Presiding Officer_, _Recording Officer_.

Order of a deliberative assembly, what, 13. _of business_, 188 to 200. how established, 190. _questions of_, what, 152. how decided, 154, 248. form of, on appeal, 154. no debate upon, allowed during divisions, 248. _rules of_, to be enforced without delay, 151. _call to_, effect of, 214. who may make, 151. interrupts the business under consideration, 153. See _Disorderly Conduct_, _Disorderly Words_.

Orders of the Day, definition of, 142. motion for, a privileged question for the day, 143, 144, 145, 146. motion for, generally supersedes other propositions, 143, 144. being taken up, the business interrupted thereby is suspended, 147. fall, if not taken up on the day fixed, 149. unless by special rule, 149.

Organization, necessity for, 1. usual mode of, 3. on report of a committee, 4.

Papers and Documents, in whose custody, 33.

Parliamentary Law, common, what, 6, 10. See _Rules_.

Parliamentary Rules, whence derived, 11. in each State, how formed, 11. See _Rules_.

Petitions, requisites to, 49. to be offered by members, 49, 50. mode of offering, 51. to be read by the clerk, if received, 52. regular and usual action on presenting, 51, 52. contents of, to be known by member presenting, 50. to be in respectful language, 50.

Postponement, effect of vote on motion for, 180. _motion for_, may be amended, 176. how amended, 177, 178. supersedes a motion to amend, 185. is not superseded by a motion to commit or to amend, 179. is of the same degree with a motion for the previous question, 179. _indefinite_, purpose of motion for, 60, 67. effect of vote on motion for, 67. _to a day certain_, purpose of motion for, 68, 69. an improper use of, 70.

Power of assembly to eject strangers, 9.

Preamble, or title, usually considered after the paper is gone through with, 192.

Precedence _of motions_, 171, 174, 179, 182, 186, 197, 220. _of questions_, 123, 134, 135, 153. as to reference to a committee, 74. on motions to fill blanks, 85, 86, 87. questions of privilege take precedence of all motions but for adjournment, 141.

President, 5. See _Presiding Officer_.

Presiding Officer, duties of, 27, 30, 40, 225, 313, 314. to be first heard on questions of order, 207. how far member of an assembly, 5. not usually to take part in debate, 5, 202. but in committees of the whole, 307. or on point of order, 154. to give a casting vote, 5, 243. effect of not giving casting vote, 243. may not interrupt one speaking, but to call to order, 207. may not decide upon inconsistency of a proposed amendment with one already adopted, 102.

Previous Question, _motion for_, purpose of, 60. form of, 64, 170. original use of, 63, 64, 65. present use of, 65, 66, 220. use of in England, 66. cannot be amended, 170. effect of vote on, 64, 66, 175. effect of negative decision of, 65. cannot be made in committee of the whole, 303. stands in same degree with other subsidiary motions, except to lie on the table, 174.

Privileged Questions, 136 to 149. adjournment, 137 to 140. questions of privilege, 141. orders of the day, 142 to 149. take precedence of all motions but for adjournments, 141. when settled, business thereby interrupted to be resumed, 141.

Proceedings, how set in motion, 43.

Punishment of members, 41, 42. a question of, pending, the member to withdraw, 230.

Quarrel between members, 38, 314. See _Disorderly Words_.

Question, definition of, 233. forms of, in use, 15, 60, 61. when to be put, 235. mode of putting, 236. on a series of propositions, 193. on amendments reported by a committee, 194. mode of taking, 238, 240, 241, 242, 245. when and how decision of may be questioned, 238, 239. all the members in the room when a question is put are bound to vote upon it, 244. members not in the room, cannot vote on, 244. when taken by yeas and nays, 245. mode of taking, in Massachusetts, 246. when and how to be divided, 79. how taken when divided, 80. motion to divide, may be amended, 80. what may be divided, 83. who may divide, 81, 122. usually regulated by rule, 82. incidental, defined and enumerated, 150 to 165. subsidiary, or secondary, defined and enumerated, 166 to 170. privileged, defined and enumerated, 136. See _Incidental Questions_, _Privileged Questions_, _Subsidiary Questions_.

Quorum, necessity for, 17, 19. what constitutes, 16. effect of want of, on pending question, 249. necessary on a division of the assembly, 249. want of, how ascertained, 19. consequences of want of, 19, 249.

Reading of Papers by the clerk, 155. by members not allowed, without leave obtained by motion and vote, 157, 158. when to be omitted, 159. when necessary, if called for, 155. question on, to be first decided, 160.

Reception, question of, on petition, 51. on report, 286, 293.

Recommitment, what, 73, 290, 291.

Reconsideration, general principle relating to, 250 to 253. _motion for_, allowed in this country, 254, 255. effect of, 256. usually regulated by rule, 257.

Recording Officer, duties of, 31, 32, 33, 35. how his absence is to be supplied, 34. how elected, 3, 4. precedence of, if more than one, 5. papers and documents to be in his charge, 33.

Recurrence of Business, when interrupted by want of quorum, 249. by motion for the previous question, 66. for indefinite postponement, 67. to lie on the table, 71, 72. for adjournment, 140. for the orders of the day, 147, 148. by a question of privilege, 141. by a question of order, 153, 230. by a call of a member to order, 200, 214.

Reports of Committees, how made and received, 286 to 289. how treated and disposed of, 292 to 296. of a paper with amendments, 288. action upon, 194, 195, 292 to 296. when a new draft of a paper, 196. acceptance of, 295, 296. of committees of the whole, 310. when to be received, 311.

Reprimand, 42. See _Punishment_.

Resolution, what, 13, 233.

Returns, 6. time for investigating, 7. mode of investigating, 7. who to be on the investigating committee, 8. who to be heard on a question on, 8.

Roll, calling of, 32, 35, 245.

Rules of debate and proceeding, subject of, 14, 15. general purpose of, 315. what are necessarily adopted by assembly, 10, 20. the same in this country and in England, 11. usage does not give them the character of general laws, 12. to be enforced without delay or debate, 22, 151, 152. who may notice an infringement of, 22. _special_, each assembly may adopt, 10, 20. supersede ordinary parliamentary rules, 10. usually provide for their own amendment, 21. may be suspended on motion, 21, 163, 164. motion to suspend, supersedes the original question, 163. suspended only by general consent, 21, 164. usually provide for their own suspension, 164. may determine the number necessary to express the will of the assembly, 25. See _Reading of Papers_, _Speaking_.

Secondary Questions, 166. See _Subsidiary Questions_.

Seconding of motions, 55, 309.

Secretary, 5. See _Recording Officer_.

Separation of propositions, how effected, 89.

Speaking, rules as to manner of, 203 to 208. as to matter in, 209 to 214. as to times of, 215 to 219. member, to stand uncovered, 203, 208. not to make personal remarks, 211. not to mention names of members, 206. not to reflect on the assembly, or on its prior determinations, 210. confined to the subject, 209, 213. not to be interrupted, 219. to speak but once on the same question, 215, 216, except by leave, 217. or to explain himself in matter of fact, 218. See _Debate_, _Presiding Officer_.

Speech, reading of, by member, 157.

Subsidiary Questions, 166 to 187. nature and effect of, 166. enumeration of, 167. cannot be applied to one another, 168. exceptions to this rule, 169. lie on the table, 171, 172, 173. amendment, 184 to 187. previous question, 174, 175. postponement, 176 to 180. commitment, 181, 182, 183.

Suspension of a rule, 21, 163, 164. See _Rules_.

Transposition of proposition, how effected, 90.

Vice-President, duties of, 5, 28. See _Officers_.

Vote, what, 13, 233.

Voting, right and duty of, 41, 244. prohibition from, 42. See _Members_.

Will of assembly, majority necessary to express, 24. special rule may determine what proportion may express, 25.

Withdrawal of motion can be only by leave, 161. effect of vote upon motion for leave for, 162.

Yeas and Nays, how taken, 32, 245. in Massachusetts, 246. what number of members may require, 25. form of putting question, 245.

WASHINGTON’S FAREWELL ADDRESS.

_Friends and Fellow-Citizens_:

The period for a new election of a citizen to administer the executive government of the United States, being not far distant, and the time actually arrived when your thoughts must be employed in designating the person who is to be clothed with that important trust, it appears to me proper, especially as it may conduce to a more distinct expression of the public voice, that I should now apprise you of the resolution I have formed, to decline being considered among the number of those out of whom the choice is to be made.

I beg you at the same time to do me the justice to be assured, that this resolution has not been taken, without a strict regard to all the considerations appertaining to the relation which binds a dutiful citizen to his country; and that in withdrawing the tender of service, which silence in my situation might imply, I am influenced by no diminution of zeal for your future interest; no deficiency of grateful respect for your past kindness; but am supported by a full conviction, that the step is compatible with both.

The acceptance of, and continuance hitherto in, the office to which your suffrages have twice called me, have been a uniform sacrifice of inclination to the opinion of duty, and to a deference for what appeared to be your desire. I constantly hoped that it would have been much earlier in my power, consistently with motives which I was not at liberty to disregard, to return to that retirement from which I had been reluctantly drawn. The strength of my inclination to do this, previous to the last election, had even led to the preparation of an address to declare it to you; but mature reflection on the then perplexed and critical posture of our affairs with foreign nations, and the unanimous advice of persons entitled to my confidence, impelled me to abandon the idea. I rejoice that the state of your concerns, external as well as internal, no longer renders the pursuit of inclination incompatible with the sentiment of duty or propriety; and am persuaded, whatever partiality may be retained for my services, that in the present circumstances of our country, you will not disapprove of my determination to retire.

The impressions with which I first undertook the arduous trust were explained on the proper occasion. In the discharge of this trust I will only say that I have, with good intentions, contributed toward the organization and administration of the government the best exertions of which a very fallible judgment was capable. Not unconscious, in the outset, of the inferiority of my qualifications, experience in my own eyes, perhaps still more in the eyes of others, has strengthened the motives to diffidence of myself; and every day the increasing weight of years admonishes me more and more, that the shade of retirement is as necessary to me as it will be welcome. Satisfied that if any circumstances have given peculiar value to my services, they were temporary, I have the consolation to believe, that while choice and prudence invite me to quit the political scene, patriotism does not forbid it.

In looking forward to the moment which is to terminate the career of my political life, my feelings do not permit me to suspend the deep acknowledgment of that debt of gratitude which I owe to my beloved country, for the many honors it has conferred upon me; still more for the steadfast confidence with which it has supported me; and for the opportunities I have thence enjoyed of manifesting my inviolable attachment, by services faithful and persevering, though in usefulness unequal to my zeal. If benefits have resulted to our country from these services, let it always be remembered to your praise, and as an instructive example in our annals, that under circumstances in which the passions agitated in every direction, were liable to mislead—amidst appearances sometimes dubious—vicissitudes of fortune often discouraging—in situations in which not unfrequently want of success has countenanced the spirit of criticism—the constancy of your support was the essential prop of the efforts and a guarantee of the plans by which they were effected. Profoundly penetrated with this idea, I shall carry it with me to my grave, as a strong incitement to unceasing wishes, that Heaven may continue to you the choicest tokens of its beneficence—that your union and brotherly affection may be perpetual—that the free constitution which is the work of your hands, may be sacredly maintained—that its administration in every department may be stamped with wisdom and virtue—that, in fine, the happiness of the people of these States, under the auspices of liberty, may be made complete, by so careful a preservation and so prudent a use of this blessing, as will acquire to them the glory of recommending it to the applause, the affection, and the adoption of every nation which is yet a stranger to it.

Here, perhaps, I ought to stop. But a solicitude for your welfare, which can not end but with my life, and the apprehension of danger natural to that solicitude, urge me, on an occasion like the present, to offer to your solemn contemplation, and to recommend to your frequent view, some sentiments, which are the result of much reflection, of no inconsiderable observation, and which appear to me all-important to the permanency of your felicity as a people. These will be offered to you with the more freedom, as you can only see in them the disinterested warning of a parting friend, who can possibly have no personal motive to bias his counsel. Nor can I forget as an encouragement to it your indulgent reception of my sentiments on a former and not dissimilar occasion.

Interwoven as is the love of liberty with every ligament of your hearts, no recommendation of mine is necessary to fortify or confirm the attachment.

The unity of government, which constitutes you one people, is also now dear to you. It is justly so; for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence; the support of your tranquillity at home; your peace abroad; of your safety, of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize. But as it is easy to foresee, that from different causes and from different quarters, much pains will be taken, many artifices employed to weaken in your minds the conviction of this truth; as this is the point in your political fortress against which the batteries of internal and external enemies will be most constantly and actively (though often covertly and insidiously) directed, it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense value of your national union, to your collective and individual happiness; that you should cherish a cordial, habitual, and immovable attachment to it; accustom yourself to think and speak of it as of the palladium of your political safety and prosperity; watching for its preservation with jealous anxiety; discountenancing whatever may suggest even a suspicion that it can in any event be abandoned; and indignantly frowning upon the first dawning of every attempt to alienate any portion of our country from the rest, or to enfeeble the sacred ties which now link together the various parts.

For this you have every inducement of sympathy and interest. Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, that country has a right to concentrate your affections. The name of AMERICAN, which belongs to you in your national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism, more than any appellation derived from local discriminations. With slight shades of difference, you have the same religion, manners, habits, and political principles. You have in a common cause fought and triumphed together; the independence and liberty you possess are the work of joint councils and joint efforts—of common dangers, sufferings, and successes.

But these considerations, however powerfully they address themselves to your sensibility, are greatly outweighed by those which apply more immediately to your interest. Here every portion of our country finds the most commanding motives for carefully guarding and preserving the union of the whole.

The _north_, in an unrestrained intercourse with the _south_, protected by the equal laws of a common government, finds in the productions of the latter, great additional resources of maritime and commercial enterprise, and precious materials of manufacturing industry. The _south_, in the same intercourse, benefiting by the agency of the _north_, sees its agriculture grow and its commerce expand. Turning partly into its own channels the seamen of the _north_, it finds its particular navigation invigorated—and while it contributes, in different ways, to nourish and increase the general mass of the national navigation, it looks forward to the protection of a maritime strength, to which itself is equally adapted. The _east_, in like intercourse with the _west_, already finds, and in the progressive improvement of interior communications, by land and water, will more and more find a valuable vent for the commodities which it brings from abroad, or manufactures at home. The _west_ derives from the _east_ supplies requisite to its growth and comfort—and, what is of perhaps still greater consequence, it must of necessity owe the secure enjoyment of indispensable outlets for its own productions, to the weight, influence, and the future maritime strength of the Atlantic side of the union, directed by an indissoluble community of interest as one nation. Any other tenure by which the _west_ can hold this essential advantage, whether derived from its own separate strength, or from an apostate and unnatural connection with any foreign power, must be intrinsically precarious.

While then every part of our country thus feels an immediate and particular interest in union, all the parts combined can not fail to find in the united mass of means and efforts, greater strength, greater resources, proportionately greater security from external danger, a less frequent interruption of their peace by foreign nations; and, what is of inestimable value, they must derive from union an exemption from those broils and wars between themselves, which so frequently afflict neighboring countries not tied together by the same government which their own rivalships alone would be sufficient to produce; but which opposite foreign alliances, attachments, and intrigues would stimulate and imbitter. Hence, likewise, they will avoid the necessity of those over-grown military establishments, which, under any form of government, are inauspicious to liberty, and which are to be regarded as particularly hostile to republican liberty. In this sense it is that your union ought to be considered as a main prop of your liberty, and that the love of the one ought to endear to you the preservation of the other.

These considerations speak a persuasive language to every reflecting and virtuous mind, and exhibit the continuance of the union as a primary object of patriotic desire. Is there a doubt whether a common government can embrace so large a sphere? Let experience solve it. To listen to mere speculation in such a case were criminal. We are authorized to hope that a proper organization of the whole, with the auxiliary agency of governments for the respective subdivisions, will afford a happy issue to the experiment. It is well worth a fair and full experiment. With such powerful and obvious motives to union affecting all parts of our country, while experience shall not have demonstrated its impracticability, there will always be reason to distrust the patriotism of those who, in any quarter, may endeavor to weaken its bands.

In contemplating the causes which may disturb our union, it occurs as matter of serious concern, that any ground should have been furnished for characterizing parties by geographical discriminations—_Northern_ and _Southern_—_Atlantic_ and _Western_; whence designing men may endeavor to excite a belief that there is real difference of local interests and views. One of the expedients of party to acquire influence, within particular districts, is to misrepresent the opinions and aims of other districts. You can not shield yourselves too much against the jealousies and heart-burnings which spring from these misrepresentations; they tend to render alien to each other those who ought to be bound together by fraternal affection. The inhabitants of our western country have lately had a useful lesson on this head. They have seen, in the negotiation by the executive, and in the unanimous ratification by the senate, of the treaty with Spain, and in the universal satisfaction at that event throughout the United States, a decisive proof how unfounded were the suspicion propagated among them of a policy in the general government, and in the Atlantic States unfriendly to their interests in regard to the Mississippi. They have been witnesses to the formation of two treaties—that with Great Britain and that with Spain—which secure to them everything they could desire in respect to our foreign relations toward confirming their prosperity. Will it not be their wisdom to rely for the preservation of these advantages on the union by which they were procured? Will they not henceforth be deaf to those advisers, if such there are, who would sever them from their brethren and connect them with aliens?

To the efficacy and permanency of your union, a government for the whole is indispensable. No alliances, however strict, between the parts can be an adequate substitute; they must inevitably experience the infractions and interruptions which all alliances in all times have experienced. Sensible of this momentous truth, you have improved upon your first essay, by the adoption of a constitution of government better calculated than your former, for an intimate union, and for the efficacious management of your common concerns. This government—the offspring of your own choice, uninfluenced and unawed, adopted upon full investigation and mature deliberation, completely free in its principles, in the distribution of its powers uniting security with energy, and containing within itself a provision for its own amendments—has a just claim to your confidence and your support. Respect for its authority, compliance with its laws, acquiescence in its measures, are duties enjoined by the fundamental maxims of true liberty. The basis of our political systems is the right of the people to make and to alter their constitutions of government. But the constitution which at any time exists, until changed by an explicit and authentic act of the whole people, is sacredly obligatory upon all. The very idea of the power and the right of the people to establish a government, presupposes the duty of every individual to obey the established government.

All obstructions to the execution of the laws, all combinations and associations, under whatever plausible character, with the real design to direct, control, counteract, or awe the regular deliberations and actions of the constituted authorities, are destructive of this fundamental principle, and of fatal tendency. They serve to organize faction, to give it an artificial and extraordinary force, to put in the place of the delegated will of the nation the will of a party, often a small but artful and enterprising minority of the community; and, according to the alternate triumphs of different parties, to make the public administration the mirror of the ill-concerted and incongruous projects of faction, rather than the organ of consistent and wholesome plans, digested by common councils, and modified by mutual interests.

However combinations or associations of the above description may now and then answer popular ends, they are likely, in the course of time and things, to become potent engines, by which cunning, ambitious, and unprincipled men, will be enabled to subvert the power of the people, and to usurp for themselves the reins of government, destroying afterward the very engines which have lifted them to unjust dominion.

Towards the preservation of your government, and the permanency of your present happy state, it is requisite not only that you steadily discountenance irregular oppositions to its acknowledged authority, but also that you resist with care the spirit of innovation upon its principles, however specious the pretexts. One method of assault may be to effect in the forms of the constitution alterations which will impair the energy of the system, and thus to undermine what can not be directly overthrown. In all the changes to which you may be invited, remember that time and habit are at least as necessary to fix the true character of governments as of other human institutions—that experience is the surest standard by which to test the real tendency of the existing constitution of a country—that facility in changes upon the credit of a mere hypothesis and opinion, exposes to perpetual change from the endless variety of hypothesis and opinion; and remember especially that for the efficient management of your common interests, in a country so extensive as ours, a government of as much vigor as is consistent with the perfect security of liberty, is indispensable. Liberty itself will find in such a government, with powers properly distributed and adjusted, its surest guardian. It is, indeed, little else than a name, where the government is too feeble to withstand the enterprises of faction, to confine each member of the society within the limits prescribed by the laws, and to maintain all in the secure and tranquil enjoyment of the rights of person and property.

I have already intimated to you the danger of parties in the state, with particular references to the founding of them on geographical discriminations. Let me now take a more comprehensive view, and warn you in the most solemn manner against the baneful effects of the spirit of party, generally.

This spirit, unfortunately, is inseparable from our nature, having its root in the strongest passions of the human mind. It exists under different shapes in all governments, more or less stifled or controlled or repressed; but in those of the popular form, it is seen in its greatest rankness, and is truly their worst enemy.

The alternate domination of one faction over another, sharpened by the spirit of revenge, natural to party dissension, which in different ages and countries has perpetrated the most horrid enormities, is itself a frightful despotism. But this leads at length to a more formal and permanent despotism. The disorders and miseries which result, gradually incline the minds of men to seek security and repose in the absolute power of an individual: and sooner or later the chief of some prevailing faction, more able or more fortunate than his competitors, turns this disposition to the purposes of his own elevation, on the ruins of public liberty.

Without looking forward to an extremity of this kind (which nevertheless ought not to be entirely out of sight), the common and continual mischiefs of the spirit of party, are sufficient to make it the interest and duty of a wise people to discourage and restrain it.

It serves always to distract the public councils, and enfeeble the public administration. It agitates the community with ill-founded jealousies and false alarms; kindles the animosity of one part against another; foments occasional riot and insurrection. It opens the door to foreign influence and corruption, which find a facilitated access to the government itself through the channels of party passions. Thus the policy and the will of one country are subjected to the policy and will of another.

There is an opinion that parties in free countries are useful checks upon the administration of the government, and serve to keep alive the spirit of liberty. This, within certain limits, is probably true; and in governments of a monarchical cast, patriotism may look with indulgence, if not with favor, upon the spirit of party. But in those of the popular character, in governments purely elective, it is a spirit not to be encouraged. From their natural tendency it is certain there will always be enough of that spirit for every salutary purpose. And there being constant danger of excess, the effort ought to be, by force of public opinion, to mitigate and assuage it. A fire not to be quenched, it demands a uniform vigilance to prevent its bursting into a flame, lest, instead of warming, it should consume.

It is important, likewise, that the habits of thinking in a free country should inspire caution in those intrusted with its administration, to confine themselves within their respective constitutional spheres, avoiding in the exercise of the powers of one department to encroach upon another. The spirit of the encroachment tends to consolidate the powers of all the departments in one, and thus to create, whatever the form of government, a real despotism. A just estimate of that love of power, and proneness to abuse it, which predominate in the human heart, is sufficient to satisfy us of the truth of this position. The necessity of reciprocal checks in the exercise of the political power, by dividing and distributing it into different depositaries, and constituting each the guardian of the public weal against invasions by the others, has been evinced by experiments ancient and modern; some of them in our country, and under our own eyes. To preserve them must be as necessary as to institute them. If, in the opinion of the people, the distribution or modification of the constitutional powers be, in any particular, wrong, let it be corrected by an amendment in the way which the constitution designates; but let there be no change by usurpation; for though this, in one instance, may be the instrument of good, it is the customary weapon by which free governments are destroyed. The precedent must always greatly overbalance, in permanent evil, any partial or transient benefit which the use can at any time yield.

Of all the dispositions and habits which lead to political prosperity, religion and morality are indispensable supports. In vain would that man claim the tribute of patriotism, who would labor to subvert these great pillars of human happiness, these firmest props of the duties of men and citizens. The mere politician, equally with the pious man, ought to respect and to cherish them. A volume could not trace all their connections with private and public felicity. Let it simply be asked where is the security for property, for reputation, for life, if the sense of religious obligation desert the oaths which are the instruments of investigation in courts of justice? And let us with caution indulge the supposition that morality can be maintained without religion. Whatever may be conceded of the influence of refined education on minds of peculiar structure, reason and experience both forbid us to expect that national morality can prevail in exclusion of religious principle.

It is substantially true that virtue or morality is a necessary spring of popular government. The rule indeed extends with more or less force to every species of free government. Who that is a sincere friend to it can look with indifference upon attempts to shake the foundation of the fabric?

Promote, then, as an object of primary importance, institutions for the general diffusion of knowledge. In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be enlightened.

As a very important source of strength and security, cherish public credit. One method of preserving it is to use it as sparingly as possible, avoiding occasions of expense, by cultivating peace, but remembering also that timely disbursements, to prepare for dangers, frequently prevent much greater disbursements, to repel it; avoiding likewise the accumulation of debt, not only by shunning occasions of expense, but by vigorous exertions in time of peace to discharge the debts which unavoidable wars may have occasioned, not ungenerously throwing upon posterity the burden which we ourselves ought to bear. The execution of these maxims belongs to your representatives, but it is necessary that public opinion should co-operate. To facilitate to them the performance of their duty, it is essential that you should practically bear in mind that toward the payment of debts there must be revenue; that to have revenue there must be taxes; and no taxes can be devised which are not more or less inconvenient and unpleasant; that the intrinsic embarrassment inseparable from the selection of the proper objects (which is always a choice of difficulties) ought to be a decisive motive for a candid construction of the conduct of the government in making it, and for a spirit of acquiescence in the measures for obtaining revenue which the public exigencies may at any time dictate.

Observe good faith and justice toward all nations; cultivate peace and harmony with all. Religion and morality enjoin this conduct; and can it be that good policy does not equally enjoin it? It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and (at no distant period) a great nation, to give to mankind the magnanimous and novel example of a people always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence. Who can doubt that, in the course of time and things, the fruits of such a plan would richly repay any temporary advantages which might be lost by a steady adherence to it? Can it be that Providence has not connected the permanent felicity of a nation with virtue? The experiment, at least, is recommended by every sentiment which ennobles human nature. Alas! is it rendered impossible by its vices?

In the execution of such a plan, nothing is more essential than that permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular nations, and passionate attachments for others, should be excluded; and that, in the place of them, just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated. The nation which indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness, is in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest. Antipathy in one nation against another disposes each more readily to offer insult and injury, to lay hold of slight causes of umbrage, and to be haughty and intractable when accidental or trifling occasions of dispute occur. Hence, frequent collisions, obstinate, envenomed and bloody contests. The nation, prompted by ill-will and resentment, sometimes impels to war the government, contrary to the best calculations of policy. The government sometimes participates in the national propensity, and adopts, through passion, what reason would reject; at other times it makes the animosity of the nation subservient to projects of hostility, instigated by pride, ambition, and other sinister and pernicious motives. The peace often, sometimes perhaps the liberty of nations, has been the victim.

So, likewise, a passionate attachment of one nation for another produces a variety of evils. Sympathy for the favorite nation, facilitating the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists, and infusing into one the enmities of the other, betrays the former into a participation in the quarrels and wars of the latter without adequate inducement or justification. It leads also to concessions to the favorite nation, of privileges denied to others, which is apt doubly to injure the nation making the concessions by unnecessarily parting with what ought to have been retained, and by exciting jealousy, ill-will, and a disposition to retaliate in the parties from whom equal privileges are withheld; and it gives to ambitious, corrupted or deluded citizens (who devote themselves to the favorite nation) facility to betray, or sacrifice the interests of their own country, without odium, sometimes even with popularity, gilding with the appearances of a virtuous sense of obligation a commendable deference for public opinion, or a laudable zeal for public good, the base or foolish compliances of ambition, corruption, or infatuation.

As avenues to foreign influence in innumerable ways, such attachments are particularly alarming to the truly enlightened and independent patriot. How many opportunities do they afford to tamper with domestic factions, to practice the arts of seduction, to mislead public opinion, to influence or awe the public councils; such an attachment of a small or weak, toward a great and powerful nation, dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter.

Against the insidious wiles of foreign influence (I conjure you to believe me, fellow-citizens), the jealousy of a free people ought to be _constantly_ awake; since history and experience prove that foreign influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government. But that jealousy, to be useful, must be impartial, else it becomes the instrument of the very influence to be avoided, instead of a defense against it. Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another, cause those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side, and serve to veil and even second the arts of influence on the other. Real patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favorite, are liable to become suspected and odious, while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people to surrender their interests. The great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little _political_ connection as possible. So far as we have already formed engagements, let them be fulfilled with perfect good faith. Here let us stop.

Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none, or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or her enmities.

Our detached and distant situation invites and enables us to pursue a different course. If we remain one people, under an efficient government, the period is not far off when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality, we may at any time resolve upon, to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel.

Why forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition, rivalship, interest, humor, or caprice?

It is our true policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world, so far, I mean, as we are now at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood as capable of patronizing infidelity to existing engagements. I hold the maxim no less applicable to public than to private affairs, that honesty is always the best policy. I repeat it, therefore, let those engagements be observed in their genuine sense: but, in my opinion, it is unnecessary, and would be unwise to extend them.

Taking care always to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectable defensive posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies.

Harmony and a liberal intercourse with all nations are recommended by policy, humanity, and interest. But even our commercial policy should hold an equal and impartial hand, neither seeking nor granting exclusive favors or preferences, consulting the natural course of things, diffusing and diversifying, by gentle means, the streams of commerce, but forcing nothing; establishing, with the powers so disposed, in order to give trade a staple course, to define the rights of our merchants, and to enable government to support them, conventional rules of intercourse, the best that present circumstances and mutual opinion will permit, but temporary, and liable to be, from time to time, abandoned or varied, as experience and circumstances shall dictate; constantly keeping in view, that it is folly in one nation to look for disinterested favors from another; that it must pay, with a portion of its independence, for whatever it may accept under that character; that by such acceptance it may place itself in the condition of having given equivalents for nominal favors, and yet of being reproached with ingratitude for not giving more. There can be no greater error than to expect or calculate upon real favors from nation to nation. It is an illusion which experience must cure, which a just pride ought to discard.

In offering to you, my countrymen, these counsels of an old and affectionate friend, I dare not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression I could wish; that they will control the usual current of the passions, or prevent our nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the destiny of nations; but, if I may even flatter myself that they may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit; to warn against the mischiefs of foreign intrigue; to guard against the impostures of pretended patriotism; this hope will be a full recompense for the solicitude for your welfare by which they have been dictated.

How far, in the discharge of my official duties, I have been guided by the principles which have been delineated, the public records and other evidences of my conduct must witness to you and to the world. To myself the assurance of my own conscience is, that I have at least believed myself to be guided by them.

In relation to the still subsisting war in Europe, my proclamation of the 22d of April, 1793, is the index to my plan. Sanctioned by your approving voice, and by that of your representatives in both houses of Congress, the spirit of that measure has continually governed me, uninfluenced by any attempts to deter or divert me from it.

After deliberate examination, with the aid of the best lights I could obtain, I was well satisfied that our country, under all the circumstances of the case, had a right to take—and was bound in duty and interest to take—a neutral position. Having taken it, I determined, as far as should depend on me, to maintain it with moderation, perseverance, and firmness.

The considerations which respect the right to hold this conduct, it is not necessary on this occasion to detail. I will only observe that, according to my understanding of the matter, that right, so far from being denied by any of the belligerent powers, has been virtually admitted by all.

The duty of holding a neutral conduct may be inferred, without anything more, from the obligation which justice and humanity impose on every nation, in cases in which it is free to act, to maintain inviolate the relations of peace and amity toward other nations.

The inducement of interests for observing that conduct will best be referred to your own reflections and experience. With me, a predominant motive has been to endeavor to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress, without interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes.

Though in reviewing the incidents of my administration, I am unconscious of intentional error, I am, nevertheless, too sensible of my defects not to think it probable that I may have committed many errors. Whatever they may be, I fervently beseech the Almighty to avert or mitigate the evils to which they may tend. I shall also carry with me the hope that my country will never cease to view them with indulgence; and that after forty-five years of my life dedicated to its service with an upright zeal, the faults of incompetent abilities will be consigned to oblivion, as myself must soon be to the mansions of rest.

Relying on its kindness in this as in other things, and actuated by that fervent love towards it, which is so natural to a man who views in it the native soil of himself and his progenitors for several generations, I anticipate with phasing expectation that retreat in which I promise myself to realize, without alloy, the sweet enjoyment of partaking in the midst of my fellow-citizens, the benign influence of good laws under a free government—the ever favorite object of my heart, and the happy reward, as I trust, of our mutual cares, labors, and dangers.

GEORGE WASHINGTON. _United States, September 17, 1796._

Transcriber’s Note

Unequivocal typographical and paragraph numbering errors have been corrected.