Chapter 39

THE SERVICE OF SECURITY

(Based on the Field Service Regulations.)

General Principles

=1020. The Service of Security= embraces all those measures taken by a military force to protect itself against surprise, annoyance or observation by the enemy. On the march, that portion of a command thrown out to provide this security is called an advance, flank or rear guard, depending on whether it is in front, to the flank or in rear of the main command; in camp or bivouac, it is called the outpost.

The principal duties of these bodies being much the same, their general formations are also very similar. There is (1) the cavalry covering the front; next (2) a group (4 men to a platoon) or line of groups in observation; then (3) the support, or line of supports, whose duty is to furnish the men for the observation groups and check an enemy's attempt to advance until reinforcements can arrive; still farther in rear is (4) the reserve.

In small commands of an infantry regiment or less there usually will not be any cavalry to cover the front, and the reserve is generally omitted. Even the support may be omitted and the observation group or line of groups be charged with checking the enemy, in addition to its regular duties of observation. But whatever the technical designation of these subdivisions, the rearmost one is always in fact a reserve. For example, if the command is so small that the subdivision formally designated as the reserve is omitted, the rear element (squad or platoon or company, etc.) is used as a reserve. As this text deals principally with small commands and only those larger than a regiment usually have the subdivision termed the reserve, this distinction between the element in the Field Service Regulations called the reserve and the actual reserve, must be thoroughly understood.

The arrangements or formations of all detachments thrown out from the main force to provide security against the enemy, are very flexible, varying with every military situation and every different kind of country. The commander of such a detachment must, therefore, avoid blindly arranging his men according to some fixed plan and at certain fixed distances. Acquire a general understanding of the principles of the service of security and then with these principles as a foundation use common sense in disposing troops for this duty.

ADVANCE GUARD

=1021. Definition and Duties.= An advance guard is a detachment of a marching column thrown out in advance to protect the main column from being surprised and to prevent its march from being delayed or interrupted. (The latter duty is generally forgotten and many irritating, short halts result, which wear out or greatly fatigue the main body, the strength of which the advance guard is supposed to conserve.)

In detail the duties of the advance guard are:

1. To guard against surprise and furnish information by reconnoitering to the front and flanks.

2. To push back small parties of the enemy and prevent their observing, firing upon or delaying the main body.

3. To check the enemy's advance in force long enough to permit the main body to prepare for action.

4. When the enemy is met on the defenses, seize a good position and locate his lines, care being taken not to bring on a general engagement unless the advance guard commander is authorized to do so.

5. To remove obstacles, repair the road, and favor in every way possible the steady march of the column.

=1022. Strength:= The strength of the advance guard varies from one-ninth to one-third of the total command. The larger the force the larger in proportion is the advance guard, for a larger command takes relatively longer to prepare for action than a small one. For example, a company of 100 men would ordinarily have an advance guard of from one to two squads, as the company could deploy as skirmishers in a few seconds. On the other hand, a division of 20,000 men would ordinarily have an advance guard of about 4,500 men, all told, as it would require several hours for a division to deploy and the advance guard must be strong enough to make a stubborn fight.

=1023. Composition.= The advance guard is principally composed of infantry, preceded if possible, by cavalry well to the front. When there is only infantry, much more patrolling is required of the front troops than when cavalry (called "Advance cavalry") is out in advance. This book does not deal with large advance guards containing artillery and engineers. Machine guns, however, will be frequently used in small advance guards to hold bridges, defiles, etc.

=1024. Distance From Main Body.= The distance at which the advance guard precedes the main body or the main body follows the advance guard depends on the military situation and the ground. It should always be great enough to allow the main body time to deploy before it can be seriously engaged. For instance the advance guard of a company, say 1 squad, should be 350 to 500 yards in advance of the company. The distance from the leading man back to the principal group of the squad should generally be at least 150 yards. This, added to the distance back to the main body or company, makes a distance of from 500 to 650 yards from the leading man to the head of the main body.

Examples:

Command. Advance Guard. Distance (yds.).

Patrol of 1 squad 2 men 100 to 300 Section of 3 squads 4 men 200 to 400 Inf. platoon of 50 men 1 squad 300 to 450 Cav. platoon of 20 men 4 men 300 to 450 Inf. company of 108 men 1 to 2 squads 350 to 500 Cav. troop of 86 men 1/2 platoon 450 to 600 Inf. battalion 1/2 to 1 company 500 to 700 Cav. squadron 1/2 to 1 troop 600 to 800

These are not furnished as fixed numbers and distances, but are merely to give the student an approximate, concrete idea.

=1025. Connecting Files.= It should be remembered that between the advance guard and the main body, and between the several groups into which the advance guard is subdivided, connecting files are placed so as to furnish a means of communicating, generally by signals, between the elements (groups) of the column. There should be a connecting file for at least ever, 300 yards. For example, suppose the advance guard of a platoon is 300 yards in front of the main body. In ordinary rolling country, not heavily wooded, a connecting file would be placed half way between the two elements--150 yards from each one.

It is generally wiser to use two men together instead of one, because this leaves one man free to watch for signals from the front while the other watches the main body. However, in very small commands like a company, this is not practicable, as the extra man could not be spared.

FORMATION OF ADVANCE GUARDS.

=1026. Subdivisions.= The advance guard of a large force like a brigade or division is subdivided into a number of groups or elements, gradually increasing in size from front to rear. The reason for this is that, as has already been explained, a larger group or force requires longer to deploy or prepare to fight than a smaller one, therefore the small subdivisions are placed in front where they can quickly deploy and hold the enemy temporarily in check while the larger elements in rear are deploying. The number of these subdivisions decreases as the strength of the advance guard decreases, until we find the advance guard of a company consists of one or two squads, which naturally cannot be subdivided into more than two groups; and the advance guard of a squad composed of two men, which admits of no subdivision.

=Distance to next element in rear.=

=Advance Cavalry= 1 to 5 miles {=Advance party= {=Point= 150 to 300 yds. =Support= {(=furnishes patrols=) {=Advance party proper= 300 to 600 yds. {=Support proper= 400 to 800 yds. =Reserve= (usually omitted in small commands) 500 yds. to 1 mile

The distances vary principally with the size of the command--slightly with the character of the country.

The advance cavalry is that part of the advance guard going in front of all the foot troops. It is generally one to five miles in advance of the infantry of the advance guard, reconnoitering at least far enough to the front and flanks to guard the column against surprise by artillery fire--4,500 yards.

=1027. Support.= (=a=) The support constitutes the principal element or group of all advance guards. It follows the advance cavalry, when there is any, and leads the advance guard when there is no cavalry. The support of a large command is subdivided within itself in much the same manner as the advance guard as a whole is subdivided. It varies in strength from one-fourth to one-half of the advance guard.

=1028. (b) Advance Party.= As the support moves out it sends forward an advance party several hundred yards, the distance varying with the nature of the country and size of the command. For example, the advance party of a support of one company of 108 men, would ordinarily be composed of one section of three squads, and would march about 300 yards in advance of the company in open country, and about 200 yards in wooded country.

The advance party sends out the patrols to the front and flanks to guard the main body of the support from surprise by effective rifle fire. Patrols are only sent out to the flanks to examine points that cannot be observed from the road. As a rule they will have to rejoin some portion of the column in rear of the advance party. As the advance party becomes depleted in strength in this manner, fresh men are sent forward from the main body of the support to replace those who have fallen behind while patrolling. When there is advance cavalry, much less patrolling is required of the infantry.

(=c=) The point is a patrol sent forward by the advance party 150 to 300 yards. When the advance party is large enough the point should ordinarily consist of a complete squad, commanded by an officer or experienced noncommissioned officer. It is merely a patrol in front of the column and takes the formation described for patrols.

(=d=) The commander of the support ordinarily marches with the advance party. He should have a map and control of the guide, if any is present. He sees that the proper road is followed; that guides are left in towns and at crossroads; that bridges, roads, etc., are repaired promptly so as not to delay the march of the column and that information of the enemy is promptly sent back to the advance guard commander; he verifies the correctness of this information, if possible.

=1029.= (=a=) A thorough understanding of the arrangement of the support and the duties of the leaders of its subdivisions--point, flank patrols, advance party and main body (of the support)--is of the greatest importance to a noncommissioned officer. For example, the ignorance of one noncommissioned officer leading the advance party of a column of troops six miles long can cause the entire column to be delayed. If he halts because a few shots are fired at his men, and conducts a careful reconnaissance before attacking (instead of pushing right in on the enemy, forcing him to fall back quickly, if a weak detachment; or, to disclose his strength, if strong), the entire column, six miles long, is halted, the march interrupted, valuable time lost, and what is more important, the men irritated and tired out.

(=b=) The leader of the point must understand that as the principal duty of an advance guard is to secure the safe and uninterrupted march of the main body, he is the first man to discharge this duty. If, for example, his squad receives a volley of shots from some point to the front, he cannot take the time and precautions the commander of a large body would take to reconnoiter the enemy's position, determine something about his strength, etc., before risking an attack. If he did he would not be securing the uninterrupted march of the main body. He has to deploy instantly and press the enemy hard until the hostile opposition disappears or the advance party comes up and its commander takes charge. The point will lose men in this way, but it is necessary, for otherwise one small combat patrol could delay the march time after time.

(=c=) The same problem must be met in much the same manner by the leader of the advance party. In this case there is more time to think, as the point, being in advance, will have begun the fight before the advance party arrives; but the leader of the advance party must use his men freely and quickly to force the enemy to "show his hand," thus preventing small harassing or combat detachments from delaying the march.

(=d=) As the subdivisions of the advance guard become larger their leaders act with increasing caution, for as soon as it develops that the enemy in front is really present in some strength, then a halt becomes obligatory and a careful reconnaissance necessary.

(=e=) The leader of every subdivision must always start a reconnaissance the instant the enemy develops. He may, as in the case of the point, only send one man around to discover the enemy's strength; or, if the leader of the main body of the support, he may send an entire squad. In almost every case the instant he has given his orders for deploying and firing at or rushing the enemy, he sends out his man or men to work around to a position permitting a view of the hostile force. Every noncommissioned officer should impress this on his memory so that he will not forget it in the excitement of a sudden engagement.

(=f=) No attempt should be made to subdivide the advance guard of a small force into all the elements previously described. For example, the advance guard of a squad is simply a point of one or two men; the advance guard of a company is usually no more than a squad acting as a point, the squad actually having several men from 100 to 150 yards in advance, who really constitute a point for the squad; the advance guard of a battalion would usually consist of a company or less distributed as an advance party proper and a point. The advance guard of a regiment would have no reserve--if, for example, a battalion were used as the advance guard of a regiment, there would be only a support, which would be distributed about as follows: A support proper of about three companies and an advance party (point included) of about one company.

=1030. Reserve.= An advance guard large enough to have a reserve would be distributed as follows:

The distance Z would be greater than Y and Y would be greater than X. For example, a regiment acting as the advance guard of a brigade would, under ordinary conditions, be distributed about as follows:

As only large commands have a reserve, which would always be commanded by an officer, noncommissioned officers need not give this much consideration, but it must be understood that while this fourth subdivision of the advance guard is the only one officially termed reserve, the last subdivision of any advance guard actually is a reserve, no matter what its official designation.

The advance guard of a cavalry command adopts formations similar to those described above, except that the distances are increased because of the rapidity with which the command can close up or deploy. An advance party with a few patrols is usually enough for a squadron, and precedes it from 600 to 1,000 yards.

=1031. Reconnaissance.= In reconnaissance the patrols are, as a rule, small (from two to six men).

The flanking patrols, whether of the advance cavalry or of the advance party, are sent out to examine the country wherever the enemy might be concealed. If the nature of the ground permits, these patrols march across country or along roads and trails parallel to the march of the column. For cavalry patrols this is often possible; but with infantry patrols and even with those that are mounted, reconnaissance is best done by sending the patrols to high places along the line of march to overlook the country and examine the danger points. These patrols signal the results of their observations and, unless they have other instructions, join the columns by the nearest routes, other patrols being sent out as the march proceeds and as the nature of the country requires.

Deserters, suspicious characters and bearers of flags of truce (the latter blindfolded), are taken to the advance guard commander.

=1032. Advance Guard Order.= On receipt of the order for a march designating the troops for the advance guard, the commander of the latter makes his estimate of the situation; that is, he looks at the map or makes inquiries to determine what sort of a country he must march through and the nature of the roads; he considers what the chances are of encountering the enemy, etc., and then how he should best arrange his advance guard to meet these conditions, and what time the different elements of his advance guard must start in order to take their proper place in the column. He then issues his order at the proper time--the evening before if possible and he deems it best, or the morning of the march.

The order for a large advance guard would ordinarily be written; for a small command it would almost invariably be verbal, except that the commander or leader of each element should always make written notes of the principal points, such as the road to be followed, time to start, distances, etc.

ADVANCE GUARD PROBLEMS

Problem No. 1. (Infantry)

=1033. Captain (to one platoon of his company):= We will assume that our battalion camped last night at Oxford (Elementary Map) in the enemy's country. It is now sunrise, 5:30 A. M.; camp has been broken and we are ready to march. The officers have returned from reporting to the major for orders and I fall in the company and give the following orders:

"A regiment of the enemy's cavalry is thought to be marching towards Salem from the south. Our battalion will march at once towards Salem to guard the railroad trestle over Sandy Creek, following this road (pointing southeast along the road out of Oxford) and the Chester Pike Which is one and three-quarters miles from here.

"This company will form the advance guard.

"Sergeant Adams, you will take Corporal Baker's squad and form the point, followed by the remainder of the company at about 400 yards. Patrols and connecting files will be furnished by the company.

"The company wagon will join the wagons of the battalion.

"I will be with the company.

"Move out at once."

The weather is fine and the roads are good and free from dust. It is August and nearly all the crops are harvested. Bushes and weeds form a considerable growth along the fences bordering the road.

Sergeant, give your orders.

=Sergeant Adams:= 1st squad, =1. Right, 2. FACE, 1. Forward, 2. MARCH.= Corporal Baker, take Carter (Baker's rear rank man) and go ahead of the squad about 200 yards. Move out rapidly until you get your distance and then keep us in sight.

I would then have the two leading men of the rest of the squad follow on opposite sides of the road, as close to the fence as possible for good walking. This would put the squad in two columns of files of three men each, leaving the main roadway clear and making the squad as inconspicuous as possible, without interfering with ease of marching or separating the men. [Par. 1028 (c).] What sort of crops are in the fields on either side of the road?

=Captain:= The field on the right (south) is meadow land; that on the left, as far as the railroad, is cut hay; beyond the railroad there is more meadow land.

=Sergeant Adams:= I would have told Corporal Baker to wait at the cross roads by the Baker house for orders and--

=Captain:= If you were actually on the ground you probably could not see the cross roads from Oxford. In solving map problems like these do not take advantage of seeing on the map all the country that you are supposed to go over, and then give orders about doing things at places concerning which you would not probably have any knowledge if actually on the ground without the map.

Besides, in this particular case, it was a mistake to have your point wait at the cross roads. If there was any danger of their taking the wrong road it would be a different matter, but here your mission requires you to push ahead. (Par. 1029.) The major is trying to get south of the trestle towards Salem before the cavalry can arrive and destroy it.

=Sergeant Adams:= I would march steadily along the road, ordering the last man to keep a lookout to the rear for signals from the connecting file (Par. 511a), and I would direct one of the leading men to watch for signals from Corporal Baker.

=Captain:= You should have given the direction about watching for signals earlier, as this is very important. You also should have ordered two men to follow along the timber by the creek to your south until you signaled for them to come in. The trees along the creek would obstruct your view over the country beyond the creek.

=Sergeant Adams:= But I thought, Captain, that the patrolling was to be done by the company.

=Captain:= Yes, the patrolling is to be done by the company, but the creek is only a quarter of a mile, about 400 yards, from the road you are following and the men sent there are merely flankers, not a patrol. You have eight men under your command and you are responsible for the ground within several hundred yards on either side of your route of march. Long Ridge is almost too far for you to send your men, because they would fall far behind in climbing and descending its slopes, but it would not be a great mistake if you sent two men there. As Long Ridge affords an extended view of the valley through which the Chester Pike runs, a patrol should go up on it and remain there until the battalion passes, and this would be more than the leading squad could be expected to attend to. The creek is almost too far from the road in places, but as it is open meadow land you can keep the men within easy touch of you and recall them by signal at any moment you desire. In this work you can see how much depends on good judgment and a proper understanding of one's mission.

Corporal Baker, explain how you would move out with Carter.

=Corporal Baker:= We would alternate the walk and double time until we had gotten about 200 yards ahead of the squad. I would then say, "Carter, walk along this side of the road (indicates side), keeping on the lookout for signals from the squad. I will go about fifty yards ahead of you." I would keep to the opposite side of the road from Carter, trying to march steadily at the regular marching gait, and keeping a keen watch on everything in front and to the flanks.

=Captain:= Very good. When you arrive at the cross roads you see a man standing in the yard of the Baker house.

=Corporal Baker:= I would not stop, but would continue on by the cross roads, as I have no time to question the man and the Sergeant will want to do that. I would call to him and ask him if he had seen any of the enemy about and how far it was to the Chester Pike. If anything looked suspicious around the house or barnyard, I would investigate.

=Captain:= Sergeant, you arrive at the cross roads, and see the Corporal and Carter going on ahead of you.

=Sergeant Adams:= I would have already signaled to the two men following the creek to come in and would send a man to meet them with the following order: "Tell Davis to move along the railroad fill with Evans, keeping abreast of us. Then you return to me." I would then say, "Fiske, look in that house and around the barn and orchard and then rejoin me down this road (pointing east)." I would have the civilian join me and walk down the road with me while I questioned him.

=Captain:= Do you think you have made careful arrangements for searching the house, etc., by leaving only one man to do the work?

=Sergeant Adams:= I have not sufficient men nor time enough to do much more. I simply want to make sure things are reasonably safe and I thought that a couple of men from the main body of the advance guard would do any careful searching, questioning, etc., that might be deemed necessary. I must not delay the march.

=Captain:= That is right. You learn nothing from the civilian and he does not arouse any suspicion on your part. You continue along the road. The fields to the north of the road are in wheat stubble; the ground to the south, between your road and the railroad, is rough, rocky grass land with frequent clumps of bushes. Davis and Evans, your right flankers on the railroad fill, are just approaching the cut; Fiske has rejoined; Corporal Baker and his men are about 200 yards from the road forks at Brown's, and you and your four men are 200 yards in their rear, at the turn of the road. At this moment a half dozen shots are fired down the road in your direction from behind the wall along the edge of the orchard on the Brown farm. This firing continues and your two leading men are lying down at the roadside returning the fire. Tell me quickly just what you are going to do?

=Sergeant Adams:= I order my four men to deploy as skirmishers in that field (pointing to the rough ground south of the road); I go under the fence with the men and lead them forward at a fast run, unless the fire is very heavy.

=Captain= (interrupting the Sergeant): Davis, you had just reached the cut on the railroad when this happened. What do you do?

=Private Davis:= I take Evans forward with me at a run through the cut. What do I see along the Chester Pike or Sandy Creek?

=Captain:= You see no sign of the enemy any place, except the firing over the wall.

=Private Davis:= I run down the south side of the fill and along towards the road with Evans to open fire on the enemy from their flank, and also to see what is in the orchard. I will probably cross the road so that I can see behind the stone wall.

=Captain:= That's fine and shows how you should go ahead at such a time without any orders. There is usually no time or opportunity at such a moment for sending instructions and you must use common sense and do something. Generally it would have been better to have tried to signal or send word back that there was nothing in sight along the road or in the valley, but in this particular case you could probably do more good by going quickly around in rear as you did, to discover what was there and assist in quickly dislodging whatever it was. If there had been no nose of the ridge to hide you as you came up and a convenient railroad fill to hurry along behind as you made for the road, your solution might have been quite different.

Sergeant, continue with your movements.

=Sergeant Adams:= I would attempt to rush the wall. If the fire were too heavy, I would open fire (at will) with all my men, and, if I seemed to get a little heavier fire than the enemy's, I would start half of my men forward on a rush while the others fired. I would try to rush in on the enemy with as little delay as possible, until it developed that he had more than a small detachment there. I assumed it was a delaying patrol in front of me, and as my mission requires me to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body, I must not permit any small detachment to delay me. If, however, it proves to be a larger force, for instance, the head of an advance guard, I will lose some men by plunging in, but as I understand it, that is the duty of the point. Then again, if it be the head of a hostile advance guard, I will want to rush them out of their favorable position under cover of the stone wall, buildings and orchard, before any more of their force can come up. This would give the favorable position to our force; by acting too cautiously we would lose the valuable moments in which the enemy's reenforcements (next elements of the advance guard) were coming up, with this desirable position being weakly held by a small part of the enemy.

=Captain:= That is all correct. What messages would you have sent?

=Sergeant Adams:= Up to the present time I would not have sent any. I could not have sent any. I could not afford to take the time to send a man back, nor could I spare the man. Besides, all I could say was that we were fired on, and you should be able to see and hear that from where the company is.

=Captain:= About the time you reached the position of Corporal Baker the firing ceases, and when you reach the wall you see five mounted men galloping northeast up Farm Lane. The Brown farm appears to be deserted.

=Sergeant Adams:= I would turn to one of the men and say, "Run back to the Captain and tell him we were fired on from this orchard by a mounted patrol of five men who are galloping off up a lane to the northeast. I am going south." When he had repeated the message I would start south down the Chester Pike, directing Corporal Baker to follow this road south and to tell Davis to follow the high ridge west of the road, going through the clump of woods just ahead. I would send one man as a left flanker to follow the west bank of Sandy Creek. This would leave me with two men, one watching for signals from the front and along Sandy Creek, the other from Davis and from the rear. I would expect to see a patrol from the company moving across towards Boling Woods. Had I not been mixed up in a fight as I approached the Brown farm I would have sent two men as left flankers across country to the cut on the Chester Pike on the western edge of the Boling Woods.

=Captain:= Very good. That is sufficient for this problem. All of you should have caught the idea of the principal duties of the point and flankers of an advance guard. You must watch the country to prevent being surprised and you must at the same time manage to push ahead with the least possible delay. The point cannot be very cautious so far as concerns its own safety, for this would mean frequent halts which would delay the troops in rear, but it must be cautious about reconnoitering all parts of the ground near the road which might conceal large bodies of the enemy.

The leader of the point must be careful in using his men or he will get them so scattered that they will become entirely separated and he will lose all control of them. As soon as the necessity for flankers on one side of the line of march no longer exists, signal for them to rejoin and do not send them out again so long as you can see from the road all the country you should cover.

Problem No. 2. (Infantry)

=1034. Captain (to one platoon of his company):= Let us assume that this platoon is the advance party of an advance guard, marching through Salem along the Chester Pike [Par. 1028 (b)]. One squad is 350 yards in front, acting as the point. The enemy is thought to be very near, but only two mounted patrols have been seen during the day. The command is marching for Chester. The day is hot, the roads are good but dusty, and the crops are about to be harvested.

Sergeant Adams, explain how you would conduct the march of the advance party, beginning with your arrival at the cross roads in Salem.

=Sergeant Adams:= The platoon would be marching in column of squads and I would be at the head. Two pairs of connecting files would keep me in touch with the point. (Par. 1025.) I would now give this order: "Corporal Smith, take two men from your squad and patrol north along this road (pointing up the Tracy-Maxey road) for a mile and then rejoin the column on this road (Chester Pike), to the west of you." I would then say to Private Barker, "Take Carter and cut across to that railroad fill and go along the top of that (Sandy) ridge, rejoining the column beyond the ridge. Corporal Smith with a patrol is going up this road. Keep a lookout for him." When we reached the point where the road crosses the south nose of Sandy Ridge and I saw the valley in front of me with the long high ridge west of Sandy Creek, running parallel to the Chester Pike and about 800 yards west of it, I would give this order: "Corporal Davis, take the three remaining men in Corporal Smith's squad, cross the creek there (pointing in the direction of the Barton farm) go by that orchard, and move north along that high ridge, keeping the column in sight. Make an effort to keep abreast of the advance guard, which will continue along this road."

I gave Corporal Davis the remaining men out of Corporal Smith's squad because I did not want to break up another squad and as this is, in my opinion, a very important patrol, I wanted a noncommissioned officer in charge of it. Unless something else occurs this will be all the patrols I intend sending out until we pass the steel railroad trestle over Sandy Creek.

=Captain:= Your point about not breaking up a squad when you could avoid it by using the men remaining in an already broken squad, is a very important one. Take this particular case. You first sent out two pairs of connecting files between the advance party and your point--four men. This leaves a corporal and three men in that squad. If we assume that no patrols were out when we passed through Salem, this corporal and two of his men could have been sent up the Tracy-Maxey road, leaving one man to be temporarily attached to some squad. From the last mentioned squad you would pick your two men for the Sandy Ridge patrol and also the corporal and three men for the Barton farm, etc., patrol. This would leave three men in this squad and you would have under your immediate command two complete squads and three men. As the patrols return, organize new squads immediately and constantly endeavor to have every man attached to a squad. This is one of your most important duties, as it prevents disorder when some serious situation suddenly arises. Also it is one of the duties of the detachment commander that is generally overlooked until too late.

The direction you sent your three patrols was good and their orders clear, covering the essential points, but as you have in a very short space of time, detached nine men, almost a third of your advance party, don't you think you should have economized more on men?

=Sergeant Adams:= The Sandy Ridge patrol is as small as you can make it--two men. I thought the other two patrols were going to be detached so far from the column that they should be large enough to send a message or two and still remain out. I suppose it would be better to send but two men with Corporal Davis, but I think Corporal Smith should have two with him.

=Captain:= Yes, I agree with you, for you are entering a valley which is, in effect, a defile, and the Tracy-Maxey road is a very dangerous avenue of approach to your main body. But you must always bear in mind that it is a mistake to use one more man than is needed to accomplish the object in view. The more you send away from your advance party, the more scattered and weaker your command becomes, and this is dispersion, which constitutes one of the gravest, and at the same time, most frequent tactical errors.

To continue the problem, we will suppose you have reached the stone bridge over Sandy Creek; the point is at the cross roads by the Smith house; you can see the two men moving along Sandy Ridge; and Corporal Davis' patrol is just entering the orchard by the Barton farm. Firing suddenly commences well to the front and you hear your point reply to it.

=Sergeant Adams:= I halt to await information from the point.

=Captain:= That is absolutely wrong. You command the advance party of an advance guard; your mission requires you to secure the uninterrupted march of the main body; and at the first contact you halt, thus interrupting the march (Par. 1021). The sooner you reach the point, the better are your chances for driving off the enemy if he is not too strong, or the quicker you find out his strength and give your commander in the rear the much desired information.

=Sergeant Adams:= Then I push ahead with the advance party, sending back the following message--

=Captain= (interrupting): It is not time to send a message. You know too little and in a few minutes you will be up with the point where you can hear what has happened and see the situation for yourself. Then you can send back a valuable message. When but a few moments delay will probably permit you to secure much more detailed information, it is generally best to wait for that short time and thus avoid using two messengers. When you reach the cross roads you find six men of the point deployed behind the fence, under cover of the trees along the County Road, just west of the Chester Pike, firing at the stone wall along the Mills' farm lane. The enemy appears to be deployed behind this stone wall, from the Chester Pike west for a distance of fifty yards, and his fire is much heavier than that of your point. You think he has at least twenty rifles there. You cannot see down the Chester Pike beyond the enemy's position. Your patrol on Sandy Ridge is midway between the 68 and 66 knolls, moving north. The ground in your front, west of the road, is a potato field; that east of the road as far as the swamp, is rough grass land.

=Sergeant Adams:= I give order, "Corporal Gibbs, deploy your squad to the right of the Pike and push forward between the Pike and the swamp. Corporal Hall (commands the point), continue a heavy fire. Here are six more men for your squad." I give him the four connecting files and two of the three men in the advance party whose squad is on patrol duty. "Corporal Jackson, get your squad under cover here. Lacey, run back to the major and tell him the point has been stopped by what appears to be twenty of the enemy deployed behind a stone wall across the valley 500 yards in our front. I am attacking with advance party."

=Captain:= Corporal Davis (commands patrol near Barton farm), you can hear the firing and see that the advance is stopped. What do you do?

=Corporal Davis:= I would head straight across for the clump of woods on the ridge just above the Mills' farm, moving as rapidly as possible.

=Captain:= That is all right. Sergeant, Corporal Hall's squad keeps up a heavy fire; Corporal Gibb's squad deploys to the right of the pike, rushes forward about 75 yards, but is forced to lie down by the enemy's fire, and opens fire. Corporal Gibbs, what would your command for firing be?

=Corporal Gibbs:= =AT THE BOTTOM OF THAT WALL. BATTLE SIGHT. CLIP FIRE.=

=Captain:= Why at the bottom of the wall?

=Corporal Gibbs:= The men are winded and excited and will probably fire high, so I gave them the bottom of the wall as an objective.

=Captain:= The enemy's fire seems as heavy as yours. Sergeant, what do you do?

=Sergeant Adams:= I give this order. "Corporal Jackson, deploy your squad as skirmishers on the left of Corporal Hall's squad and open fire." What effect does this additional fire have on the enemy?

=Captain:= His bullets seem to go higher and wider. You appear to be getting fire superiority over him.

=Sergeant Adams:= If I do not see any signs of the enemy being reenforced, dust in the road behind his position, etc., I take immediate command of the squads of Corporals Hall and Jackson, and lead them forward on a rush across the potato field.

=Captain:= Corporal Gibbs, what do you do when you see the other two squads rush?

=Corporal Gibbs:= I order, =FIRE AT WILL=, and urge the men to shoot rapidly in order to cover the advance.

=Captain:= Sergeant Adams' squads are forced to halt after advancing about 150 yards.

=Corporal Gibbs:= I keep up a hot fire until they can resume their firing, when I lead my squad forward in a rush.

=Captain:= What do you do, Sergeant?

=Sergeant Adams:= I would have the Corporals keep up a heavy fire. By this time I should think the support would be up to the cross roads.

=Captain:= It is, but have you given up your attack?

=Sergeant Adams:= If it looks as if I could drive the enemy out on my next rush, I do so, but otherwise I remain where I am, as I have no reserve under my control and the action has gotten too serious for me to risk anything more when my chief is practically on the ground to make the next decision. He should have heard something about what is on the Pike behind the enemy, from the patrol on Sandy Ridge.

=Captain:= Your solution seems correct to me. Why did you send Corporal Gibbs' squad up between the pike and the swamp?

=Sergeant Adams:= It looked as if he would strike the enemy from a better quarter; there appeared to be better cover that way, afforded by the turn in the road, which must have some weeds, etc., along it, and the swamp would prevent him from getting too far separated from the remainder of the advance party.

=Captain:= The Sergeant's orders for the attack were very good. He gave his squad leaders some authority and attached his extra men to a squad. He did not attempt to assume direct control of individual men, but managed the three squads and made the squad leaders manage the individual men. This is the secret of successful troop leading. His orders were short, plain and given in proper sequence.

Problem No. 3 (Infantry)

(See Fort Leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.)

=1035.= Situation.

A Blue battalion, in hostile country, is in camp for the night, August 5-6, at Sprong (ja'). At 9:00 P. M., August 5th, Lieutenant A, Adjutant gives a copy of the following order to Sergeant B:

1st Battalion, 1st Infantry, Sprong, Kansas, 5 Aug., '09.

Field Orders No. 5.

1. The enemy's infantry is six miles east of FORT LEAVENWORTH. His cavalry patrols were seen at F (qg') today.

Our regiment will reach FRENCHMAN'S (oc') at noon tomorrow.

2. The battalion will march tomorrow to seize the ROCK ISLAND BRIDGE (q) at FORT LEAVENWORTH.

3. (a) The advance guard, consisting of 1st platoon Co. A and mounted orderlies B, C, and D, under Sergeant B, will precede the main body at 400 yards.

(b) The head of the main body will march at 6:30 A. M., from 19 via the 17 (jc')--15 (jg') 1--5 (lm')--FORT LEAVENWORTH (om') road.

4. The baggage will follow close behind the main body under escort of Corporal D and one squad, Co. B.

5. Send reports to head of main body.

C, Major, Comdg.

Copies to the company commanders, to Sergeant B and Corporal D.

=A. Required, 1.= Give Sergeant B's estimate of the situation. (The estimate of the military situation includes the following points:

1. His orders or mission and how much discretion he is allowed. 2. The ground as it influences his duty. 3. The position, strength and probable intentions of the enemy. 4. Sergeant B's decision.)

=Answer.= 1. The size of the advance guard, its route and the distance it is to move in front of the main body are prescribed by Major C. Sergeant B is free to divide up the advance as he sees fit, to use the various parts so as to best keep open the way of the main body, maintain the distance of 400 yards in front of it, and protect it from surprise by the enemy.

2. The ground may be such as to make easy or to hinder reconnaissance, such as hills or woods; to impede or hasten the march, such as roads, streams, defiles; to offer good or poor defensive positions; to offer good or poor opportunities for an attack. Sergeant B sees from his map that the ground is rolling and open as far as Kern (ji') with good positions for reconnaissance and for defense or attack. There is a bridge over Salt Creek (ig') which has steep banks and will be a considerable obstacle if the bridge has been destroyed. From this creek to Kern the advance would be under effective fire from Hancock Hill (ki'), so that these heights must be seized before the main body reaches 15 (jg').

Beyond Kern the heavy woods make reconnaissance difficult and must be treated somewhat like a defile by the point. (Par. 991.)

3. There is little to fear from the main body of the enemy which is 1-1/2 miles farther from the Rock Island bridge than we are, but we know the enemy has cavalry. The size of the cavalry force is not known, and may be sufficient to cause us considerable delay, especially in the woods. The enemy's evident intention is to keep us from seizing the bridge.

4. Having considered all these points, Sergeant B comes to the following decision: ... (Before reading the decision as contained in the following paragraph, make one of your own.)

=Answer:= To have only an advance party with which to throw forward a point of 5 men 200 yards to the front and send out flankers, as needed (Par. 983); to send the three mounted orderlies well to the front of the point to gain early information of the enemy, especially on Hancock Hill (ji') and the ridge to the north of 11 (jj').

=Required, 2.= Sergeant B's order. (Par. 963.)

=Answer.= Given verbally to the platoon and mounted orderlies, at 9:30 P. M.

"The enemy's cavalry patrols were seen at F (qh') today; no hostile infantry is on this side of the Missouri river. The battalion will move tomorrow to Fort Leavenworth, leaving 19 (ja') at 6:30 A. M.

"This platoon and orderlies B, C, and D will form the advance guard, and will start from the hedge 400 yards east of 19 at 6:30 A. M. via the 17 (jc')--15 (jg')--5 (lm') road.

"The point, Corporal Smith and 4 men of his squad, will precede the remainder of the advance guard at 200 yards.

"I will be with the advance party. Privates X and Y will act as connecting files with the main body."

The flankers will be sent out from time to time by Sergeant B as necessary.

=Required, 3.= The flankers sent out by Sergeant B between 19 (ja') and 15 (jg').

=Answer.= A patrol of 3 men is sent to Hill 900 southeast of 19 (ja'), thence by Moss (kc') and Taylor (lc') houses to Hill 840 east of Taylor, thence to join at 15 (jg').

Two men are sent from the advance party as it passes Hill 875.5 (ie') to the top of this hill to reconnoiter to the front and northeast. These men return to the road and join after the advance party has reached Salt Creek. Two men are sent ahead of the advance party at a double time take position on "Hill 875 northeast of J. E. Daniels" place (jf') and reconnoiter to the northeast and east.

=Reasons.= The patrol sent out on the south moves out far enough to get a good view from the hills which an enemy could observe or fire into the column. There is no necessity of sending out flankers north of the road at first, because from the road itself a good view is obtained. Hills 875.5 and 875 give splendid points for observing all the ground to the north and east. (Don't send flankers out unless they are necessary.)

=Required, 4.= When the advance party reaches J. E. Daniels' house (je') a civilian leaves the house and starts toward 15. What action does Sergeant B take?

=Required, 5.= When the advance party reaches Salt Creek bridge (jg') the point signals "enemy in sight," and Private H reports that he saw about 6 or 8 mounted men ride up to the edge of the woods at Kern, halt a moment, and disappear. What action does Sergeant B take?

=Answer.= He at once sends a message back by Private H stating the facts. He then orders the advance party to move forward, hastens up to the point and directs it to continue the march, seeking cover of fences and ravines and hill top.

=Required, 6.= When the point reaches Schroeder (jh') it receives fire from the orchard at Kern. What action is taken?

=Answer.= The men in the point are moved rapidly down the hill and gain shelter in the ravines leading toward Kern. Two squads are rapidly placed in line along the ridge west of Schroeder and under cover of their fire the remainder of the advance party run down the hill at 10 yards distance to join the point. A squad of this force is then hurried forward to the Kern house. Here the squad is stopped by fire and Sergeant B deploys two more squads which advance by rushes and drive out the enemy, found to be 10 cavalrymen. The squads left at Schroeder now join at double time and the advance party moves forward, without having delayed the march of the main body.

Problem No. 4 (Infantry)

=1036. Situation:=

A Blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on the line Pope Hill (sm')--National cemetery (pk')--E (qh'). A Red force is reported to have reached Soldiers' Home (3 miles south of Leavenworth) from the south at 7:00 o'clock this morning. Corporal A is directed by Sergeant B, in command of the left support at Rabbit Point (tn'), to take out a patrol toward the waterworks and south along the Esplanade (xo') to the Terminal bridge.

=Required, 1.= Give Sergeant B's orders to Corporal A.

=Answer.= "The enemy, strength unknown, was at Soldiers' Home at 7:00 o'clock this morning. Another patrol will advance along Grant avenue (tm').

"Our outposts will remain here for the day.

"Select from the first section a patrol and reconnoiter this road (Farragut avenue) as far as the waterworks (vn'), thence by Esplanade to the Terminal bridge, and report on the ground in our front. When you reach the Terminal bridge return if no enemy is seen.

"Send reports here."

=Required, 2.= How many men does Corporal A select, and why? (Par. 456.)

=Answer.= Five men are taken because the patrol is to reconnoiter, not to fight, and on account of the distance to go and lack of information of the enemy, 2 or 3 messages may have to be sent.

=Required, 3.= What equipment should Corporal A have? (Par. 457.)

=Required, 4.= State the points to be noted by Corporal A in selecting his patrol and what inspection does he make? (Par. 964.)

=Answer.= He selects Privates C, D, E, F and G, on account of their bravery, attention to duty and discretion. He directs them to carry one meal in their haversacks, full canteen and fifty rounds of ammunition. He then inspects them as to their physical condition, sees that they have proper equipment and that nothing to rattle or glisten is carried.

=Required, 5.= What does Corporal A next do? (Par. 965.)

=Answer.= He gives them their instructions as follows: "The enemy, strength unknown, was at Soldiers' Home (about three miles south of Leavenworth) at 7 o'clock this morning. There will be a friendly patrol along that road (pointing to Grant avenue). We are to reconnoiter along this road and down toward that bridge (pointing). Be very careful not to be seen, take advantage of all cover, and keep in touch with C and myself on this road at the point of the patrol. In case we get separated meet at the waterworks (vn')."

He then explains the signals to be used, and moves the patrol in, close order out along the road until it passes the sentinel at the bridge XV (un'), to whom he gives the direction to be taken by the patrol.

=Required, 6.= Upon leaving XV, what formation would the patrol take, and reasons for same. (Par. 968.)

=Answer.= Corporal A and Private C form the point on the road leading southwest of the waterworks; Private D moves on the left overlooking the railroad; Private E moves promptly up Corral creek (um') to the top of Grant Hill (um') to observe the country toward the southwest; Private F moves about 50 yards in rear of the point, followed at 50 yards by Private G.

Corporal A forms his patrol as stated because of the necessity of getting a view from the hill on each side. Only one man is sent out on each side because they can be plainly seen by the patrol on the road, and no connecting file is necessary. The distances taken along the road assure at least one man's escape, and Corporal A is in front to get a good view and to signal the flankers.

Problem No. 5 (Infantry)

=1037. Situation:=

The head of the patrol is now at the bridge, XVI (un') northwest of the waterworks.

Private E has reached the top of Grant Hill and signals the enemy in sight; the patrol halts and Corporal A moves out to meet Private E who is coming down toward the patrol. He says he saw three mounted men ride up to Grant and Metropolitan avenues (wm') from the south and after looking north a moment move west.

=Required, 1.= Corporal A's action. (Pars. 979 and 981.)

=Answer.= Corporal A at once writes the following message and sends it back by Private E:

"No. 1 Patrol, Company B, Farragut Avenue, Northwest of Waterworks, 10 May, '09, 8:30 A. M.

To Commander Blue Left Support, Rabbit Point.

Three mounted Reds, seen by Private E, just now reconnoitered at Grant and Metropolitan avenues; they are moving west on Metropolitan avenue; the patrol will continue toward the Terminal bridge.

A, Corporal."

=Reasons.= The message is sent because this is the first time the enemy has been seen, and they have not been reported north of Soldiers' Home before. The message should state who saw the enemy, and the man seeing them should always carry the message telling of the facts. The patrol would not allow this small hostile patrol to stop its advance, but would proceed on its route cautiously to avoid being seen, and to see if the Red cavalrymen are followed by others of the enemy.

=Required, 2.= Give the method of reconnoitering the buildings at the waterworks and coal mine. (Par. 996.)

=Answer.= Private D carefully examines the east side of the enclosures and buildings, while Private C examines the west side. The remainder of the patrol halts concealed in the cut west of the north enclosure, until C and D signal no enemy in sight, whereupon the patrol moves forward along the road (XV--3rd St.), C and D advancing rapidly between the buildings to the town where they join the patrol.

=Required, 3.= Give the route followed by E from Grant Hill to edge of Leavenworth.

=Answer.= He moves down the east slope of Grant Hill to the ravine just east of the old R. R. bed (um'), being careful to keep concealed from the direction of Leavenworth. He moves up the ravine, keeping a sharp lookout to the front, and moving rapidly until abreast, if he has fallen behind. He takes the branch ravine lying just west of Circus Hill (vm'), and moves up to its end. Here he halts and makes careful inspection of Metropolitan avenue and the street south into the city. Being sure the coast is clear, he darts across the narrow ridge south of Circus Hill to the ravine to the east and then joins the patrol. He reports to Corporal A any indication of the enemy he may have seen.

Problem No. 6 (Infantry)

=1038. Situation:=

A Blue force holds Fort Leavenworth (om') in hostile country. Outposts occupy the line Salt Creek Hill (gh')--13 (ij')--Sheridan's Drive, (mi') against the Reds advancing from the northwest.

At 4:30 P. M., June 25th, Sergeant A is given the following orders by Captain B, commanding the support:

"The enemy will probably reach Kickapoo late today. Our outposts extend as far north as Salt Creek Hill. There were six of our men prisoners at 45 (de') this afternoon at 1 o'clock, being held by 15 home guards at Kickapoo. Take ---- men from the company and move to Kickapoo, recapture the prisoners and gain all the information you can of the enemy north of there."

=Required, 1.= How many men does Captain B name, and why? (Par. 960.)

=Answer.= Thirty men are assigned.

=Reason.= This is twice as many as the enemy holding the prisoners, and to secure secrecy no larger force than is absolutely necessary should be taken. This force will allow men to surround the enemy while the remainder rush them.

=Required, 2.= Give the order of Sergeant A to his patrol. (See 6th requirement. Problem 4.)

=Required, 3.= What route will the patrol take?

=Answer, 11= (jj')--13 (ij')--Salt Creek Hill (gh')--and along the edge of the woods east of the M. P. R. R. (fg') as far as the bridge opposite Kickapoo Hill--thence up Kickapoo Hill toward 45 (de').

=Reasons.= Since the patrol's orders do not require any reconnaissance before reaching Kickapoo the shortest and most practical route is chosen. The route as far as Salt Creek Hill lies behind our outpost line and is thus protected. The main roads are avoided because they will be carefully watched by the enemy. The edge of the woods east of the M. P. Ry. (beginning about ff') gives good cover and by moving to the bridge the patrol can probably sneak close in on the enemy and capture them by surprise.

Problem No. 7 (Infantry)

=1039. Situation:=

The patrol reaches the top of Kickapoo Hill (cd'). Sergeant A and Private C move cautiously to the top and see the six prisoners in the cemetery (cd') just west of Kickapoo Hill, and a Red sentinel at each corner. Just west of the cemetery are about 10 more Reds. No others are visible.

=Required, 1.= What decision does Sergeant A make and what does he do?

=Answer.= He decides to capture the enemy by surprise. He leaves Private C to watch and, moving cautiously back to his patrol, makes the following dispositions: Corporal D with 10 men to move up to Private C and cover the enemy, remaining concealed. He takes the remainder of the patrol with fixed bayonets around the northeast slope of Kickapoo Hill in the woods and moves up the ravine toward 29. When his detachment arrives within about 100 yards of the enemy, they charge bayonet and rush them. Corporal D's party at the same time rush in from the opposite side. (Note: The enemy are demoralized by the surprise and are captured without a shot being fired.)

=Required, 2.= What action does Sergeant A now take?

=Answer.= He causes the enemy to be kept apart while he and his noncommissioned officers question them separately. He then questions the Blue prisoners, and furnishing them the guns taken from the Reds, sends them and the captured Reds back to our line under Corporal D, with a written message giving the information secured from his questions. (Par. 984.)

=Required, 3.= What does he then do?

=Answer.= Places his main body in concealment at the Cemetery (cd') and sends a patrol under Corporal H via 35-41-43 and one under Corporal F via 29-27-23 west to learn further of the enemy in execution of the second part of his orders.

The patrol under Corporal H sends back the following message:

"No.1 Patrol, Company A, 1st Infantry, 21 June, '09; 5:30 P. M.

Commander Expeditionary Patrol at 45:

A column of infantry is moving east about 1 mile west of Schweizer (aa'); about 800 yards in front of this body is another small body with 8 to 10 men 300 yards still farther east. It took the main body 2 min., 45 sec. to pass a point on the road. I remain in observation.

H, Corporal."

=Required, 3.= The size of the command reported by Corporal H and its formation. (Par. 983.)

=Answer.= One battalion infantry (512 men), preceded by 1 section at advance guard. The advance guard having only advance party and point, 2-3/4 minutes x 175 = 481 men in the main body, leaving about 32 men for the advance men for the advance guard.

Problem No. 8 (Infantry)

=1040. General Situation:=

A Blue force of one regiment of infantry has outposts facing south on the line Pope Hill (sm'), National Cemetery (qk')--E (qi'). A Red force moving north reached Soldiers' Home at 7 o'clock this morning.

=Special Situation:=

Corporal B is chosen by Sergeant A, commander of the right support at the National Cemetery, to take a patrol south as far as 20th street (yf') and Metropolitan avenue (wh'), to report on the ground along the route, and to reconnoiter the enemy. A friendly patrol moves along Sheridan's Drive (i)--Atchison Hill (rg')--Southwest Hill (ue'), and one on Prison Lane (rk').

=Required, 1.= Sergeant A's orders, verbatim (that is, word for word).

=2.= Give the various details attended to by Corporal B before he moves out with his patrol.

=3.= What is the formation of the patrol when its point is at E (qh')?

=4.= When the patrol reaches 14 (ug'), how are the intersecting roads reconnoitered?

=5.= Four mounted men are seen riding west at a walk at 64 (wb'). What action does Corporal A take?

=6.= Describe the ground passed over by the patrol.

Problem No. 9 (Infantry)

=1041. Situation:=

The enemy is moving east toward Frenchman (oc') and is expected to reach there early tomorrow. A company at 72 (uj') forms the left support of an outpost in hostile country, on the line 70 (vj')--National Cemetery (qj'). At 4 P. M. Sergeant A is ordered to take a patrol of 12 men and go to Frenchman and destroy the bridge there, and remain in observation in that vicinity all night.

=Required, 1.= His orders to the patrol.

=2.= The route the patrol will follow, and its formation crossing the Atchison Hill--Government Hill ridge.

=3.= Give the conduct of the patrol from Atchison Hill (rg')--Government Hill (tf') to its position at the bridge at Frenchman.

=General Situation:=

A Blue squadron is camped for the night at Waterworks (vn'), Fort Leavenworth, and has outposts on the line XIV (un')--Grant Hill (um')--Prison Hill (wk'). A Red force is reported to be advancing from the north on Kickapoo (cb').

Problem No. 10 (Cavalry)

=1042. Special Situation:=

Lieutenant A, commanding the left support on Prison Hill, at 5 P. M., directs Sergeant Jones to take a patrol of 5 men from his platoon and move via Atchison Cross (ug') to the vicinity of Kickapoo and secure information of any enemy that may be in that locality. Another patrol is to go via Fort Leavenworth (ol').

=Required, 1.= The order given by Lieutenant A, verbatim. (Pars. 963 and 965.)

=Answer.= "Sergeant Jones, the enemy is north of Kickapoo, moving on that place. This squadron will remain here tonight; Sergeant B will take a patrol through Fort Leavenworth.

"Select a patrol of 5 men from your platoon and move out via Frenchman's (oc') toward Kickapoo.

"Secure any information you can of the enemy in that locality.

"Report on the condition of the bridges between here and 47 (fd').

"You may have to stay out over night.

"Send messages here."

Sergeant Jones selects five good men, directs them to take one cooked ration each and canteen full of water. He inspects the men and horses carefully; sees that no horse of conspicuous color or that neighs is taken. Explains the orders to his men, etc., as was done in the infantry patrol.

=Required, 2.= What route does the patrol take, and why?

=Answer.= Metropolitan avenue (w)--70 (vj')--72 (vj')--14 (ug')--Frenchman (oc')--17 (jc')--47 (ec').

=Reasons.= The enemy is distant and Kickapoo, the objective of the patrol, is seen from the map, which Sergeant Jones has, to be over an hour's ride at a walk and trot. It is not at all probable that the enemy will be met until the patrol reaches the vicinity of Kickapoo and Sergeant Jones decides to take the shortest and best road though it is a main highway, instead of Sheridan's Drive (j) of the F (qg')--15 (jg') lane.

It is always well for a patrol to avoid main highways when the enemy is near, especially in hostile country, but here the time saved more than justifies the use of the direct route.

Problem No. 11 (Cavalry)

=1043.= Same situation as Problem 1.

=Required, 1.= The formation and conduct of the patrol as far as Frenchman's.

=Answer.= Sergeant Jones determines to move at a walk and trot (5 miles per hour) in order to reach the vicinity of Kickapoo and take up a position of observation before night. Sergeant Jones and Private B are in the lead, 2 men about 100 yards to the rear, the remaining 2 men about 75 yards in the rear of these. They move out at a trot along the road until Atchison Cross is reached. The two cross roads are reconnoitered without halting the patrol, inasmuch as from the cross roads a good view is had north and south.

From Atchison Cross to 16 (sf') the patrol moves at a walk, being up a slope from 4 to 6 degrees. Usually such a place would be rushed through, but the distance of the enemy makes this unnecessary. No scouting is done off the road through the woods, because of the distance of the enemy. On reaching the top of the hill the patrol is halted while Sergeant Jones moves up to the high ground south of the road at the crest, and in concealment searches with his glasses the road as far as Frenchman's, especially the village beyond G (qf'). Seeing no signs of the enemy he moves the patrol down the hill at a walk until the cut is passed and there takes a fast trot, so as to avoid being long in a position where they could be seen from the direction of Kickapoo. The same formation and gait are maintained as far as Gauss' (pd'), where a walk is taken to rest the horses and to gain opportunity to see if any enemy are holding the bridge at Frenchman's.

=Situation:=

Just as the patrol comes to a walk Sergeant Jones sees what appears to be a dismounted patrol moving south over the ridge about 650 yards north of Frenchman's. He can see three men.

=Required, 2.= Action taken by Sergeant Jones.

=Answer.= The patrol is moved into the orchard just off the road, while Sergeant Jones moves quickly to the top of the hill and, concealed by the trees, examines the road north to see if the 3 men are followed by others forming a part of a larger patrol or column. He finds the three men are not followed.

=Required, 3.= What does he do next?

=Answer.= He determines to capture the patrol by surprise. He has the horses led over south of the orchard hill so as not to be visible to the enemy. He then distributes his men along the north edge of the orchard, himself nearest the bridge, 2 men 75 yards back along the road toward G (qf'), then 2 men 75 yards farther along toward G. As the third man comes opposite him, Sergeant Jones cries "Halt," which is the signal for the other parties to similarly hold up their men.

=Reasons.= Sergeant Jones might either capture the hostile patrol or let it pass, and then proceed on his road. Since they are the first enemy seen and there is such a good chance to capture them, and as they may furnish definite information of the enemy's main force, he decides as stated. There is an objection in capturing them that he will have to send one or two men to take them to camp. The patrol is placed as described above so as to have the two men opposite each of the enemy, except for Sergeant Jones, who is alone. By thus covering each man of the hostile patrol by two of our men, they will at once see the folly of an effort to escape and no shot need be fired. One man is holding the horses.

Problem No. 12 (Cavalry)

=1044.= Same situation as Problem 10.

=Required:=

1. What action does Sergeant Jones take before leaving the vicinity of Frenchman's?

2. Give the formation and conduct of the patrol after leaving here.

3. Give the report submitted by Sergeant Jones under his instructions in regard to bridges. (Par. 1000.)

At 6:30 P. M. (it is dark at 7:30) the patrol reaches 17 (jc').

4. Give the route followed from here and the disposition of the patrol made for the night.

Problem No. 13 (Cavalry)

=1045. Situation:=

The Missouri river is the boundary between hostile countries.

A Blue separate brigade (3 regiments infantry, 1 squadron cavalry, 1 battery field artillery) is moving from Winchester (19 miles west of Leavenworth) to seize the Rock Island bridge (q) across the Missouri river at Fort Leavenworth. The cavalry squadron is camped at Lowemont, 8 miles west of Leavenworth, for night June 4-5. At 3 P. M. Sergeant Jones is directed to take a patrol of six men and move via the Rock Island bridge into Missouri and gain information of the enemy reported to be now just east of the river.

=Required, 1.= Give the formation of the patrol when it first comes on the map.

=Required, 2.= Give the conduct of the patrol from Mottin's (oa') to G (qf').

At Frenchman's, Sergeant Jones met a farmer coming from Fort Leavenworth, who said about 200 hostile cavalry were seen just east of the Missouri about 2 P. M., moving towards the Terminal Bridge (z).

=Required, 3.= Action of Sergeant Jones. (Does he hold the man? Does he send a message? Does he change his plans or direction of march?)

The patrol reaches the top of the hill, Sheridan's Drive--Government Hill (tf').

=Required, 4.= What action does Sergeant Jones take before proceeding east?

FLANK GUARDS

=1046.= The flanks of a column are ordinarily protected by the advance guard, which sends out patrols to carefully examine the country on both sides of the line of march. In some cases, however, the direction of march of the column is such that there is a great danger of the enemy's striking it in flank and some special provision is necessary to furnish additional security on the threatened flank. This is done by having a detachment, called a flank guard, march off the exposed flank. The flank guard usually follows a road, parallel to the one on which the column is marching and at least 1,000 yards (effective rifle range) beyond it. If hostile artillery is feared this distance is much greater.

The flank guard regulates its march so as to continue abreast of the advance guard of the main column. It takes a formation similar to an advance guard, does most of its patrolling to the front and on the exposed flank, and keeps in constant touch with the main column by means of mounted or dismounted messengers.

In case the enemy is encountered the flank guard drives him off if practicable or takes up a defensive position, protecting the march of the main column, and preventing the enemy from disturbing the latter's march.

REAR GUARD

=1047. Definition and Duties.= A rear guard is a detachment of a marching column following in rear to protect the main column from being surprised and to prevent the march from being delayed or interrupted.

When the main column is marching toward the enemy the rear guard is very small and its duties relatively unimportant. It is principally occupied in gathering up stragglers.

When the main column is marching away from the enemy (retreating) the rear guard is all important. It covers the retreat of the main body, preventing the enemy from harassing or delaying its march.

=1048. Strength.= The strength of a rear guard is slightly greater than that of an advance guard, as it cannot expect, like the latter, to be reinforced in case it is attacked, as the main column is marching away from it and avoiding a fight.

=1049. Form of Order.= The rear guard commander, on the receipt of the retreat order, issues a rear guard order, according to the form given in the Field Service Regulations.

The distance of a rear guard from the main body and its formation are similar to those of an advance guard. The elements corresponding to the advance cavalry, the point, and the advance party of an advance guard are termed the rear cavalry, rear point and rear party, respectively. The support and reserve retain the same designations.

A rear guard formed during an engagement to cover the withdrawal or retreat of the main body, may first be compelled to take up a defensive position behind which the main body forms up and moves off. It may be forced to withdraw from this position by successive skirmish lines, gradually forming up in column on the road as it clears itself from fighting contact with the enemy.

The rate of march of the rear guard depends upon that of the main body. The main body may be much disorganized and fatigued, necessitating long halts and a slow marching rate.

=1050. Action of the Rear Guard.= The withdrawal of defeated troops is delayed, if possible, until night. If it becomes necessary to begin a retreat while an engagement is in progress, the rear guard is organized and takes up a defensive position generally behind the fighting line; the latter then falls back and assembles under cover of the rear guard.

The rear cavalry gives away before the enemy's pursuit only when absolutely necessary, maintains communication with and sends information to the rear guard commander, and pays special attention to the weak points in the retreat, namely, the flanks. It makes use of every kind of action of which it is capable, according to the situation, and unless greatly outnumbered by hostile cavalry, it causes considerable delay to the enemy.

When the enemy is conducting an energetic pursuit the rear guard effects its withdrawal by taking up a succession of defensive positions (that is, where the nature of the ground enables the rear guard to defend itself well) and compelling the enemy to attack or turn them. (It should be understood that these successive defensive positions must, in the case of a large force, be from two to four miles apart and in the case of a small force at least one-half mile apart--not a few hundred yards as is frequently attempted in peace maneuvers.)

When the enemy's dispositions for attack are nearly completed, the rear guard begins to fall back, the cavalry on the flanks being usually the last to leave. The commander designates a part of the rear guard to cover the withdrawal of the remainder; the latter then falls back to a new position in rear, and in turn covers the withdrawal of the troops in front. These operations compel the enemy continually to deploy or make turning movements, and constantly retard his advance.

The pursuit may be further delayed by obstacles placed in the enemy's path; bridges are burned or blown up; boats removed or destroyed; fords and roads obstructed; tracks torn up; telegraph lines cut, and houses, villages, woods and fields fired. Demolitions and obstructions are prepared by engineers, assisted, if necessary, by other troops detailed from the reserve, and are completed by the mounted engineers of the rear party at the last moment.

The instructions of the supreme commander govern in the demolition of important structures.

OUTPOSTS

(See "Outpost," Par. 887)

=1051. Definition and Duties.= Outposts are detachments thrown out to the front and flanks of a force that is in camp or bivouac, to protect the main body from being surprised and to insure its undisturbed rest. In fact, an outpost is merely a stationary advance guard. Its duties, in general, are to _observe_ and _resist_--to observe the enemy, and to resist him in case of attack. Specifically its duties are:

(=a=) To observe toward the front and flanks by means of stationary sentinels and patrols, in order to locate the enemy's whereabouts and learn promptly of his movements, thus making it impossible for him to surprise us.

(=b=) To prevent the main body from being observed or disturbed.

(=c=) In case of attack, to check the enemy long enough to enable the main body to prepare for action and make the necessary dispositions.

=1052. Size.= The size of the outpost will depend upon many circumstances, such as the size of the whole command, the nearness of the enemy, the nature of the ground, etc. A suitable strength for an outpost may vary from a very small fraction to one-third of the whole force. However, in practice it seldom exceeds one-sixth of the whole force--as a rule, if it be greater, the efficiency of the troops will be impaired. For a single company in bivouac a few sentinels and patrols will suffice; for a large command, a more elaborate outpost system must be provided. The most economical form of outpost is furnished by keeping close contact with the enemy by means of outpost patrols, in conjunction with resisting detachments on the avenues of approach.

Troops at a halt are supposed to be resting, night or day, and the fewer on outpost the more troops will there be resting, and thus husbanding their strength for approaching marches and encounters with the enemy. Outpost duty is about the most exhausting and fatiguing work a soldier performs. It is, therefore, evident that not a man or horse more than is absolutely necessary should be employed, and that the commander should use careful judgment in determining the strength of the outpost, and the chiefs of the various outpost subdivisions should be equally careful in disposing their men so as to permit the greatest possible number to rest and sleep undisturbed, _but at the same time always considering the safety of the main body as the chief duty_.

=1053. Composition.= The composition of the outpost will, as a rule, depend upon the size and composition of the command, but a mixed outpost is composed principally of infantry, which is charged with the duty of local observation, especially at night, and with resisting the enemy, in case of attack, long enough for the main body to prepare for action.

The cavalry is charged with the duty of reconnaissance, and is very useful in open country during the day.

Artillery is useful to outposts when its fire can sweep defiles or large open spaces and when it commands positions that might be occupied by hostile artillery.

Machine guns are useful to command approaches and check sudden advances of the enemy.

Engineers are attached to an outpost to assist in constructing entrenchments, clearing the field of fire, opening communication laterally and to the rear. The outpost should be composed of complete organizations. For example, if the outpost is to consist of one company, do not have some of the platoons from one company and the others from another, and if it is to consist of one battalion, do not have some of the companies from one battalion and others from another, etc.

FORMATION OF OUTPOSTS

=1054. Subdivisions.= As in the case of an advance guard, the outpost of a large force is divided into elements or parts, that gradually increase in size from front to rear. These, in order from the main body, are the reserve, the line of supports, the line of outguards, and the advance cavalry, and their formation, as shown by the drawing on the preceding page, may be likened to an open hand, with the fingers apart and extended, the wrist representing the main body, the knuckles the line of supports, the first joints the line of outguards, the second joints the line of sentinels and the finger tips the advance cavalry.

In case of attack each part is charged with holding the enemy in check until the larger element, next in rear, has time to deploy and prepare for action.

=1055. Distances Between the Subdivisions.= The distances separating the main body, the line of supports, the line of outguards, the line of sentries and the advance cavalry, will depend upon circumstances. There can be no uniformity in the distance between supports and reserves, nor between outguards and supports, even in the same outpost. The avenues of approach and the important features of the ground will largely control the exact positions of the different parts of the outposts. The basic principle upon which the distances are based, is: _The distance between any two parts of the outpost must be great enough to give the one in rear time to deploy and prepare for action in case of attack, and the distance of the whole outpost from the main body must, in the case of small commands, be sufficiently great to hold the enemy beyond effective rifle range until the main body can deploy, and, in case of large commands, it must be sufficiently great to hold the enemy beyond effective artillery range until the main body can deploy._

It is, therefore, evident that the distances will be materially affected not only by the size of the main body, but also by the nature of the cover afforded by the ground.

The following is given merely as a very general guide, subject to many changes:

Distance to next element in rear.

Advance cavalry 2 to 6 miles Supports {Sentinels (furnished by outguard) 20 to 40 yds. (Generally {Outguards (furnished by support) 200 to 500 yds. two or {Support proper furnishes majority 400 to 800 yds. more) of patrols. Reserve (usually omitted in small commands) 1/2 to 2 miles

=1056. Advance Cavalry.= The advance cavalry is that part of the outpost sent out in front of all foot troops. It generally operates two to six miles beyond the outpost infantry, reconnoitering far to the front and flanks in order to guard the camp against surprise by artillery fire and to give early information of the enemy's movements.

After dusk the bulk of the cavalry usually withdraws to a camp in rear of the outpost reserve, where it can rest securely after the day's hard work and the horses can be fresh for the next day. Several mounted patrols are usually left for the night at junctions or forks on the principal roads to the front, from one to four miles beyond the infantry line of observation.

=1057. Supports.= The _supports_ constitute a line of _supporting_ and _resisting_ detachments, varying in size from a half a company to a battalion. In outposts consisting of a battalion or more the supports usually comprise about one-half of the infantry. Supports are numbered numerically consecutively from right to left and are placed at the more important points on the outpost line, on or near the line on which resistance is to be made in case of attack.

As a rule, roads exercise the greatest influence on the location of supports, and a support will generally be placed on or near a road.

Each support has assigned to it a definite, clearly-defined section of front that it is to cover, and the support should be located as centrally as possible thereto.

=1058. Outguards.= The outguards constitute the line of small detachments farthest to the front and nearest to the enemy, and their duty is to maintain uninterrupted observation of the ground in front and on the flanks; to report promptly hostile movements and other information relating to the enemy; to prevent unauthorized persons from crossing the line of observation; to drive off small parties of the enemy, and to make temporary resistance to larger bodies. For convenience outguards are classified as pickets, sentry squads, and cossack posts. They are numbered consecutively from right to left in each support.

=1059.= _A picket_ is a group consisting of two or more squads, ordinarily not exceeding half a company, posted in the line of outguards to cover a given sector. It furnishes patrols and one or more sentinels, double sentinels, sentry, squads, or cossack posts for observation.

Pickets are placed at the more important points in the line of outguards, such as road forks. The strength of each depends upon the number of small groups required to observe properly its sector.

=1060.= _A sentry squad_ is a squad posted in observation at an indicated point. It posts a double sentinel in observation, the remaining men resting near by and furnishing the reliefs of sentinels. In some cases it may be required to furnish a patrol.

=1061.= _A cossack post_ consists of four men. It is an observation group similar to a sentry squad; but employs a single sentinel.

At night, it will sometimes be advisable to place some of the outguards or their sentinels in a position different from that which they occupy in the daytime. In such case the ground should be carefully studied before dark and the change made at dusk. However, a change in the position of the outguard will be exceptional.

=1062.= _Sentinels_ are generally used singly in daytime, but at night double sentinels will be required in most cases. Sentinels furnished by cossack posts or sentry squads are kept near their group. Those furnished by pickets may be as far as 100 yards away.

Every sentinel should be able to communicate readily with the body to which he belongs.

Sentinel posts are numbered consecutively from right to left in each outguard. Sentry squads and cossack posts furnished by pickets are counted as sentinel posts.

If practicable, troops on outpost duty are concealed and all movements made so as to avoid observation by the enemy; sentinels are posted so as to have a clear view to the front and, if practicable (though it is rarely possible), so as to be able, by day, to see the sentinels of the adjoining outguards. Double sentinels are posted near enough to each other to be able to communicate easily in ordinary voice.

Sentinels are generally on duty two hours out of six. For every sentinel and for every patrol there should be at least three reliefs; therefore, one-third the strength of the outguards gives the greatest number of men that should be on duty as sentinels and patrols at one time.

Skillful selection of the posts of sentinels increases their field of observation. High points, under cover, are advantageous by night as well as by day; they increase the range of vision and afford greater facilities for seeing lights and hearing noises. Observers with good field glasses may be placed on high buildings, on church steeples or in high trees.

Glittering objects on uniform or equipment should be concealed. It is seldom necessary to fix bayonets, except at night, in dense fog, or in very close country.

Reliefs, visiting patrols, and inspecting officers, approach sentinels from the rear, remaining under cover if possible.

=1063. Reserve.= The reserve forms a general support for the line of resistance. It is, therefore, centrally located near the junction of roads coming from the direction of the enemy, and in concealment if practicable.

Of the troops detailed for outpost duty, about one-half of the infantry, generally all of the artillery, and the cavalry not otherwise employed, are assigned to the reserve. If the outpost consists of less than two companies the reserve may be omitted altogether.

The arms are stacked and the equipments (except cartridge belts) may be removed. Roads communicating with the supports are opened.

When necessary, the outpost order states what is to be done in case of attack, designates places of assembly and provides for interior guards. Interior guards are posted in the camp of the reserve or main body to maintain order, and furnish additional security. Additional instructions may be given for messing, feeding, watering, etc. In the vicinity of the enemy or at night a portion of the infantry may be required to remain under arms, the cavalry to hold their horses (cinches loosened), and the artillery to remain in harness, or take up a combat position.

In case of alarm, the reserve prepares for action without delay, and word is sent to the main body. In combat, the reserve reinforces the line of resistance, and if unable to check the enemy until the arrival of the main body, delays him as much as possible.

The distance of the reserve from the line of resistance varies, but is generally about half a mile; in outposts of four companies or less this distance may be as small as 400 yards.

=1064. Patrols.= Instead of using outguards along the entire front of observation, part of this front may be covered by patrols only. These should be used to cover such sections of the front as can be crossed by the enemy only with difficulty and over which he is not likely to attempt a crossing after dark.

In daylight much of the local patrolling may be dispensed with if the country can be seen from the posts of the sentinels. However, patrols should frequently be pushed well to the front unless the ground in that direction is exceptionally open.

Patrols must be used to keep up connection between the parts of the outpost except when, during daylight, certain fractions or groups are mutually visible. After dark this connection must be maintained throughout the outpost except where the larger subdivisions are provided with wire communication.

The following patrols are usually sent out from the main bodies of the supports:

(=a=) Patrols of from three men to a squad are sent along the roads and trails in the direction of the enemy, for a distance of from one to five miles, depending on how close the enemy is supposed to be, whether or not there is any advance cavalry out, and how long the outpost has been in position. The extreme right and left supports send patrols well out on the roads to the flanks. These patrols generally operate continuously as soon as one returns from the front, or possibly even before it returns, another goes out in the same general direction to cover the same country. Frequently a patrol is sent out along a road to the front for two or three miles with orders to remain out until some stated time--for example, 4 P. M., dusk or dawn. It sends in important information, and remains out near the extremity of its route, keeping a close watch on the surrounding country.

An effort should always be made to secure and maintain contact with the enemy, if within a reasonable distance, in order that his movements or lack of movement may be constantly watched and reported on. The usual tendency is towards a failure to send these patrols far enough to the front and for the patrol leader to overestimate the distance he has traveled. A mile through strange country with the ever-present possibility of encountering the enemy seems three miles to the novice.

At night the patrols generally confine their movements to the roads, usually remaining quietly on the alert near the most advanced point of their route to the front.

The majority of such patrols are sent out to secure information of the enemy--reconnoitering patrols--and they avoid fighting and hostile patrols, endeavoring to get in touch with the enemy's main force. Other patrols are sometimes sent out to prevent hostile detachments from approaching the outposts; they endeavor to locate the hostile patrols, drive them back, preventing them from gaining any vantage point from which they can observe the outpost line. These are called combat patrols and have an entirely different mission from reconnoitering patrols.

(=b=) Patrols of from two men to a squad, usually two men, are sent from the support around the line of its outguards, connecting with the outguards of the adjacent supports, if practicable. These are "visiting patrols," and they serve to keep the outguards of a support in touch with it and with each other; to keep the commander of a support in touch with his outguards and the adjacent supports; and to reconnoiter the ground between the outguards. Since a hostile force of any size is practically forced to keep to the roads, there are rarely ever any supports and very few outguards posted off the roads, the intervals being covered by patrols, as just described.

When going out a patrol will always inform the nearest sentinel of the direction it will take and its probable route and hour of return.

=1065. Detail for Patrols.= Since for every patrol of four men, twelve are required (3 reliefs of 4 men each), the importance of sending out just enough men and not one more than is actually needed, can readily be understood. As fast as one visiting patrol completes its round, another should usually be sent out, possibly going the rounds by a slightly different route or in the reverse direction. The same generally applies to the reconnoitering and combat patrols, though frequently they are sent out for the entire day, afternoon or night, and no 2d and 3d relief is required. Three reliefs are required for the sentinel or sentinels at the post of the supports, so care should be taken to establish but one post, if it can do all that is required. It should not be considered that every man in the support should be on duty or on a relief for an outguard, a patrol or sentinel post. There should be as many men as possible in the main body of a support (this term is used to distinguish this body from the support proper, which includes the outguards and their sentinels) who only have no duty other than being instantly available in case of attack.

=1066. Flags of Truce.= Upon the approach of a flag of truce, the sentry will at once notify the commander of the outguard, who will in turn send word to the commander of the outpost and ask for instructions. One or more men will advance to the front and halt the party at such distance as to prevent any of them from overlooking the outposts. As soon as halted, the party will be ordered to face in the opposite direction. If permission is given to pass the party through the outpost line, they will be blindfolded and led under escort to the commander of the outpost. No conversation, except by permission of the outpost commander, is to be allowed on any subject, under any pretext, with the persons bearing the flag of truce.

=1067. Entrenchments and Obstacles.= The positions held by the subdivisions of an outpost should generally be strengthened by the construction of entrenchments and obstacles, but conditions may render this unnecessary.

=1068. Concealment.= Troops on outpost must keep concealed as much as is consistent with the proper performance of their duties; especially should they avoid the sky line.

=1069. Detached Posts.= In addition to ordinary outguards, the outpost commander may detail from the reserve one or more detached posts to cover roads or areas not in general line assigned to the supports.

In like manner the commander of the whole force may order detached posts to be sent from the main body to cover important roads or localities not included in the outpost line.

Detached posts may be sent out to hold points which are of importance to the outpost cavalry, such as a ford or a junction of roads; or to occupy positions especially favorable for observation, but too far to the front to be included in the line of observation; or to protect flanks of the outpost position. Such posts are generally established by the outpost commander, but a support commander might find it necessary to establish a post practically detached from the rest of his command. They usually vary in strength from a squad to a platoon. The number and strength of detached posts are reduced to the absolute needs of the situation.

=1070. Examining Posts.= An examining post is a small detachment, under the command of an officer or a noncommissioned officer, stationed at some convenient point to examine strangers and to receive bearers Of flags of truce brought in by the outguards or patrols.

Though the employment of examining posts is not general in field operations, there are many occasions when their use is important; for example: When the outguards do not speak the language of the country or of the enemy; when preparations are being made for a movement and strict scrutiny at the outguards is ordered: at sieges, whether in attack or defense. When such posts, are used, strangers approaching the line of observation are passed along the line to an examining post.

No one except the commander is allowed to speak to persons brought to an examining post. Prisoners and deserters are at once sent under guard to the rear.

=1071. Cavalry Outpost.= Independent cavalry covering a command or on special missions, and occasionally the advance cavalry of a mixed command, bivouac when night overtakes them, and in such cases furnish their own outposts. The outposts are established, in the main, in accordance with the foregoing principles, care being taken to confine outpost work to the lowest limits consistent with safety. No precaution, however, should be omitted, as the cavalry is generally in close proximity to the enemy, and often in territory where the inhabitants are hostile.

The line of resistance is occupied by the supports, the latter sending out the necessary outguards and patrols. Each outguard furnishes its own vedettes (mounted sentinels), or sentinels. Due to the mobility of cavalry, the distances are generally greater than in an outpost for a mixed command. An outguard of four troopers is convenient for the day time, but should be doubled at night, and at important points made even stronger. The sentinels are generally dismounted, their horses being left with those of the outguards.

Mounted cavalry at night can offer little resistance; the supports and outguards are therefore generally dismounted, the horses being under cover in rear, and the positions are strengthened by intrenchments and obstacles. By holding villages, bridges, defiles, etc., with dismounted rifle fire, cavalry can greatly delay a superior force.

There should always be easy communication along the line of resistance to enable the cavalry to concentrate at a threatened point.

A support of one squadron covers with its outposts a section rarely longer than two miles.

As such a line is of necessity weak, the principal reliance is placed on distant patrolling. If threatened by infantry, timely information enables the threatened point to be reinforced, or the cavalry to withdraw to a place of safety. If there is danger from hostile cavalry, the roads in front are blocked at suitable points, such as bridges, fords, defiles, etc., by a succession of obstacles and are defended by a few dismounted men. When compelled to fall back these men mount and ride rapidly to the next obstacle in rear and there take up a new position. As the march of cavalry at night is, as a rule, confined to roads, such tactics seriously delay its advance.

In accordance with the situation and the orders they have received, the support commanders arrange for feeding, watering, cooking, resting and patrolling. During the night the horses of the outguards remain saddled and bridled. During the day time cinches may be loosened, one-third of the horses at a time. Feeding and watering are done by reliefs. Horses being fed are removed a short distance from the others.

Independent cavalry generally remains in outpost position for the night only, its advance being resumed on the following day; if stopped by the enemy, it is drawn off to the flanks upon the approach of its own infantry.

ESTABLISHING THE OUTPOST

=1072.= The outpost is posted as quickly as possible, so that the troops can the sooner obtain rest. Until the leading outpost troops are able to assume their duties, temporary protection, known as the _march outpost_, is furnished by the nearest available troops.

Upon receipt of the _halt order_ from the commander of the main column, the outpost commander issues the _outpost order_ with the least practicable delay.

The _halt order_, besides giving the necessary information and assigning camp sites to the parts of the command, details the troops to constitute the outpost, assigns a commander therefor, designates the general line to be occupied, and, when practicable, points out the position to be held in case of attack.

The _outpost order_ gives such available information of the situation as is necessary to the complete and proper guidance of subordinates; designates the troops to constitute the supports; assigns their location and the sector each is to cover; provides for the necessary detached posts; indicates any special reconnaissance that is to be made; orders the location and disposition of the reserve; disposes of the train if the same is ordered to join the outpost; and informs subordinates where information will be sent. In large commands it may often be necessary to give the order from the map, but usually the outpost commander will have to make some preliminary reconnaissance, unless he has an accurate and detailed map.

Generally it is preferable for the outpost commander to give verbal orders to his support commanders from some locality which overlooks the terrain. The time and locality should be so selected that the support commanders may join their commands and conduct them to their positions without causing unnecessary delay to their troops. The reserve commander should, if possible, receive his orders at the same time as the support commanders. Subordinates to whom he gives orders separately should be informed of the location of other parts of the outpost.

=1073.= After issuing the initial orders, the outpost commander inspects the outpost, orders the necessary changes or additions, and sends his superior a report of his dispositions.

_The reserve_ is marched to its post by its commander, who then sends out such detachments as have been ordered and places the rest in camp or bivouac, over which at least one sentinel should be posted. Connection must be maintained with the main body, the supports, and nearby detached posts.

The supports march to their posts, using the necessary covering detachments when in advance of the march outpost. A support commander's order should fully explain the situation to subordinates, or to the entire command, if it be small. It should detail the troops for the different outguards and, when necessary, define the sector each is to cover. It should provide the necessary sentinels at the post of the support, the patrols to be sent therefrom, and should arrange for the necessary intrenching.

In posting his command the support commander must seek to cover his sector (the front that he is to look after) in such manner that the enemy can not reach, in dangerous numbers and unobserved, the position of the support or pass by it within the sector intrusted to the support. On the other hand, he must economize men on observation and patrol duty, for these duties are unusually fatiguing. He must practice the greatest economy of men consistent with the requirements of practical security.

As soon as the posting of the support is completed, its commander carefully inspects the dispositions and corrects defects, if any, and reports the disposition of his support, including the patrolling ordered, to the outpost commander. This report is preferably made by means of a sketch.

By day the outpost will stack arms and the articles of equipment, except the cartridge belt and canteen, will be placed by the arms. At night the men will invariably sleep with their arms and equipment near them.

In addition to the sentinel posted over the support, a part of the support, say one-third or one-fourth, should always be awake at night.

Each outguard is marched by its commander to its assigned station, and especially in the case of a picket, is covered by the necessary patrolling to prevent surprise.

Having reached the position, the commander explains the situation to his men and establishes reliefs for each sentinel, and, if possible, for each patrol to be furnished. Besides these sentinels and patrols, a picket must have a sentinel at its post.

The commander then posts the sentinels and points out to them the principal features, such as towns, roads, and streams, and gives their names. He gives the direction and location of the enemy, if known, and of adjoining parts of the outpost.

He gives to patrols the same information and the necessary orders as to their routes and the frequency with which the same shall be covered. Each patrol should go over its route once before dark.

Each picket should maintain connection by patrols with the outguards on its right and left.

=1074. Intercommunication.= It is most important that communication should be maintained at all times between all parts of the outpost, and between the outpost and the main body. This may be done by patrols, messengers, wire or signal.

The commander of the outpost is responsible that proper communication be maintained with the main body, and the support commanders keep up communication with the outguards, with the adjoining supports and with the reserve. The commander of a detached post will maintain communication with the nearest outguard.

=1075. Changes for the Night.= In civilized warfare, it is seldom necessary to draw the outpost closer to the main body at night in order to diminish the front; nor is it necessary to strengthen the line of observation, as the enemy's advance in force must be confined to the roads. The latter are therefore strongly occupied, the intervening ground being diligently patrolled.

In very open country or in war with savage or semi-civilized people familiar with the terrain, special precautions are necessary.

=1076. Relieving the Outpost.= Ordinarily outposts are not kept on duty longer than twenty-four hours. In temporary camps or bivouac they are generally relieved every morning. After a day's advance the outpost for the night is usually relieved, the following morning when the support of the new advance guard passes the line of resistance. In retreat the outpost for the night usually forms the rear guard for the following day, and is relieved when it passes the line of observation of the new outpost.

Outguards that have become familiar with the country during the day time should remain on duty that night. Sentinels are relieved once in two hours, or oftener, depending on the weather. The work of patrols is regulated by the support commander.

Commanders of the various fractions of an outpost turn over their instructions and special orders, written and verbal, to their successors, together with the latest information of the enemy, and a description of the important features of the country. When practicable the first patrols sent out by the new outposts are accompanied by members of the old outpost who are familiar with the terrain. When relieved the old outguards return to their supports, the supports to the reserve and the latter to the main body; or, if more convenient, the supports and reserves return to the main body independently, each by the shortest route.

When relieved by an advance guard, the outpost troops ordinarily join their units as the column passes.

Evening and shortly before dawn are hours of special danger. The enemy may attack late in the day in order to establish himself on captured ground by intrenching during the night; or he may send forward troops under cover of darkness in order to make a strong attack at early dawn. Special precaution is therefore taken at those hours by holding the outpost in readiness, and by sending patrols in advance of the line of observation. If a new outpost is to be established in the morning it should arrive at the outpost position at daybreak, thus doubling the outpost strength at that hour.

OUTPOST PROBLEMS

Problem No. 1 (Infantry)

=1077. Lieutenant (to two squads of his company):= Two battalions of our regiment have camped by Baker's Pond (Elementary Map) for the night. It is now 3 P. M. on a rainy day in August. The enemy is thought to be about five miles to the south of us. Our platoon is the left support of the outpost and is stationed at the road fork on the Chester Pike, by the Mason house. The Twin Hills-Lone Hill ridge is taken care of by other troops. Corporal Baker, where do you think I should place outguards?

=Corporal Baker:= One at the junction of the Mills farm lane and the Chester Pike, and one at the steel railroad trestle over Sandy Creek.

=Lieutenant:= Those positions are both too far from the support, almost a half mile, but they cover the two main avenues of approach and there is no good place for a position nearer the support. A position farther north of the Mill's farm lane would have its view obstructed by the wall and trees along the lane and the wall would be a bad thing to leave unoccupied such a short distance to your front. So in this case, in spite of the excessive distances from the support, I think the two positions are well chosen. Each should be an outguard of a squad, for in the day time, in addition to furnishing a sentinel to observe to the front, they should have some power of resistance, particularly at the trestle. At night they should each have one double sentinel post. This requires three reliefs of two men each, which, with the corporal, only leaves one extra man, who can be used as a messenger.

Corporal Baker, I order you to take your squad and post it as Outguard No. 1, at the junction of this (Chester) pike and that farm lane (Mills farm) in front. Corporal Davis' squad will be Outguard No. 2, at the railroad trestle over there (pointing). Friendly troops will be on the ridge to the east of your position. Your meals will be cooked here and sent to you.

Explain how you post your squad.

=Corporal Baker:= I order Smith to double time 150 yards to the front and act as point for the squad. I then march the squad down to its position, keeping Smith about 200 yards in front until I have arranged everything. I then post Brown under cover of the trees along the lane where he can look down the road as far as possible and I tell him, "Brown, you are to take post here, keeping a sharp lookout to the front and flanks. The enemy is thought to be about five miles south (pointing) of us. This is the Chester Pike. That creek over there is Sandy Creek. Salem is about a mile and three-quarters down this pike in that (S. E.) direction. York is a mile and a half in that (S. W.) direction. Our troops are on that ridge (Twin Hills) and a squad is at the trestle over there. It is Outguard No. 2. You are in Outguard No. 1. You know where we left our platoon. It is our support. Signal Smith to come in." I then have the squad pitch their shelter tents along the northern side of the wall, where they will be hidden to view from the front by the trees along the lane and the wall. I want the men to get shelter from the rain as soon as possible. I then instruct the men of the squad, in the same manner that I did Brown; I notice the time, and detail Davis as second relief and Carter as third relief for Brown's post.

I then direct two men to take all the canteens and go over to that farm (Mills) and fill them, first questioning the people about the enemy and about the country around here. I also direct these two men to get some straw or hay for bedding in the shelter tents, and instruct them to return with as little delay as possible.

I wait until they return and order two other men to go down to the cross roads, question the people there, look the ground over and return here. I caution them not to give any information about our force or the outguard. I would see that the sentinel's position was the best available and that the men had as comfortable quarters as possible, without being unduly exposed to view and without interfering with their movements in case of attack. They would keep their rifles at their sides at all times and not remove their equipments. After dark I put two men on post at the same time. To do this I arrange three reliefs of two men each. They are posted in pairs for two hours at a time.

If no patrol from the support appeared within a half hour after I first took position I would send a messenger back to you to see if everything was all right and tell you what I had done.

=Lieutenant:= I think the two men sent to the crossroads should have been started out before sending anyone to the Mills house as this was a more important point. The Field Service Regulations state that outguards do not patrol to the front, but what you did was entirely correct. You were securing yourself in your position and should be familiar with your immediate surroundings. You should have told the crossroads patrol to determine how much of an obstacle Sandy Creek was. I suppose you assumed the swamp was impassable.

The sentinel in this case is, I suppose, across the lane from the outguard about ten or fifteen yards in advance. After dark the double sentinel post should be posted on the pike about thirty yards in advance of the outguard.

Very frequently it would not be wise to put up your shelter tents on outguard. But here, considering the rain and the protection the trees and wall furnish, it was wise to do so.

The noncommissioned officer in charge of an outguard should be very precise in giving his orders and in making his arrangements, details, etc. The discipline must be strict; that is, the men must be kept under absolute control, so that in case of sudden attack there will be no chance of confusion and the outguard commander will have his men absolutely in hand and not permit any independent action on their part. This is often not the case, owing to the familiar relations that usually exist in our army between a corporal and the members of his squad.

We will not have time to go into the arrangements for Outguard No. 2 other than to say that the conditions there are somewhat different from those Corporal Baker has had to deal with. The outguard should be posted on the west bank of Sandy Creek and the sentinel at the southeastern end of the trestle. A skirmish trench should be dug down the western slope of the fill west of the creek, and extended across the track by throwing up a parapet about two and one-half feet high, slightly bent back towards the northeast so as to furnish cover from fire from the east bank of the creek, north of the trestle. The shelter tents could be pitched as "lean tos" against the western slope of the fill, and hidden by bushes and branches of trees.

(Note: The details of commanding this outguard, its action in case of attack, what should be done with a passing countryman, etc., can be profitably worked out in great detail.)

Problem No. 2

=1078. Lieutenant (to six squads):= We will take the same situation as we had in Problem 1, with squad outguards as before.

Sergeant Adams, you have command of the platoon and have sent out the two outguards. Explain your arrangements for the support.

=Sergeant Adams:= I have the men fall out by squads and rest on the side of the road while I look the ground over. I then tell Sergeant Barnes, "You will have immediate charge of the guard, cooking, visiting patrols, etc., here at the support. Detail three men from Corporal Evan's squad as first, second and third relief for the sentinel over the support Post your sentinel at the road fork and give him the necessary instructions as to the outguards, the adjacent support which is on this road (pointing west) on top of that ridge, etc. I will give you further instructions later." I then fall in the remainder of the support (one sergeant, one cook, four corporals and twenty-seven privates, three squads being intact and one man on duty as sentinel) and have shelter tents pitched under cover of the orchard and Mason house. While this is being completed I select a line for a trench, about thirty-five yards long, behind the fence on the east and west road and extending east of the Chester Pike about fifteen yards, slightly bent back towards the northeast. No trench in the road. I then say to Sergeant Foss, "Take Graves' squad and construct a shelter trench along this line (indicating) having the parapet concealed. Cut the fences so as to furnish easy access."

I then say to Corporal Evans, "Take three men from your squad and, as a reconnoitering patrol, cross the trestle there (pointing), and follow that road (pointing to the Boling-Salem road) into Salem, reconnoitering that village. Then take up a position on that ridge (pointing to Sandy Ridge) and remain out until dusk. Send me a message from Sandy Ridge with a sketch and description of the country."

I assume that Corporal Evans is familiar with the information about the enemy, the location of our outguards, etc.

Selecting five men from Corporal Geary's squad and the remaining man of Corporal Evans' squad (three having been detailed for sentinel duty, and three sent out on patrol duty with Corporal Evans), I turn them over to Sergeant Barnes, saying, "Here are six men to furnish three reliefs for a visiting patrol of two men. Have this patrol visit Outguard No. 2 and cross the trestle, going south down the east bank of the creek; thence recross the creek at the road bridge, visiting Outguard No. 1; thence across to the adjacent outguard of the support on our left, which is somewhere on that ridge (pointing to the Twin Hills-Lone Hill Ridge); and thence to the starting point. Have them locate that support on their first trip. You can reverse the route and make such minor changes from time to time as you think best. Report to me after they have completed the first round. Make arrangements for sending supper to the outguards. Take two men from Corporal Jackson's squad to carry it out. Be careful that the cook fire is not visible. I am going out to visit Outguard No. 1 and then No. 2. You will have charge until I return."

The men have stacked arms in front of the tents and have removed all equipment but their belts.

I would now visit the outguards, taking a man with me, and see if they are properly located. I would instruct the outguard commanders as to what to do in case of attack, in case strangers approach, point out their line of retreat in case of necessity, etc. I would make a sketch of the position and send it, with a description of my dispositions, to the commander of the outpost.

=Lieutenant:= Your arrangements and dispositions appear satisfactory. You should have been more prompt in sending Corporal Evans out with his patrol. Why didn't you send a patrol towards York, or south along the Chester Pike?

=Sergeant Adams:= I considered that the support on my right would cover that ridge (Twin Hills-Lone Hill), and that the route I laid out for Corporal Evans would cover the Chester Pike and the country east of Sandy Creek at the same time, thus avoiding the necessity for two patrols.

=Lieutenant:= That seems reasonable, but you should have given some specific orders about reporting on the width, depth, etc., of Sandy Creek, which might prove a very valuable or dangerous obstacle. You can readily see how quickly a command becomes broken up and depleted in strength, and how important it is to make only such detachments as are necessary. It looks as if your outguards might have been made smaller considering the size of your platoon (6 squads), but I think the squad outpost is so much better than one not composed of a complete unit, that it is correct in this case. With Corporal Evans' patrol of three men, the visiting patrol requiring six men, the sentinel post requiring three men, Sergeant Barnes, and the two outguards, you have thirty men actually on duty or detailed for duty, out of fifty-one. Of course, the men constituting the outguards, the man detailed for the visiting patrol and support sentinel, have approximately two hours on duty and four hours off duty, so they get some rest. Furthermore, you should have a three-man patrol watching the crossroads at Salem during the night, Corporal Evans' patrol having returned. This patrol should be relieved once during the night, at a previously stated hour, which means six more men who do not get a complete night's rest.

=Sergeant Adams:= Isn't Salem rather far to the front to send a patrol at night?

=Lieutenant:= Yes, it is, but unless you touch the crossroads there you would have to have two patrols out, one near Maxey's farm and one on the Chester Pike. As it is you are leaving the road from York to the crossroads in front of Outguard No. 1 uncovered, but you should find that this is covered by a patrol from the adjacent support. The cross roads in front of Outguard No. 1 is the natural place for a stationary, night patrol, but it is so close to the outguard that the benefit derived from a patrol there would be too small to justify the effort.

(Note: Further details of the duties of this support can be gone into. The messages should be written, and patrols carried through their tour of duty with the resulting situations to be dealt with; the sentinels tested as to their knowledge of their duties, etc. Also note carefully the manner in which the support commander uses his noncommissioned officers for carrying out his intentions, and thus avoids the most objectionable and inefficient practice of dealing directly with the privates.)

Problem No. 3 (Infantry)

=1079.= (See Fort Leavenworth map in pocket at back of book.)

=Situation:=

A Blue force, Companies A and B, 1st Infantry, under Captain A, in hostile country, is covering the Rock Island Bridge and camped for the night, April 20-21, on the south slope of Devin ridge (rm'). The enemy is moving northward from Kansas City (30 miles south of Leavenworth). At 3:30 P. M. Captain A receives a message from Colonel X at Beverly (2 miles east of Rock Island Bridge, (qo')), stating that two or three companies of hostile infantry are reported five miles south of Leavenworth at 2:30 P. M. No enemy is west of Leavenworth. Captain A decides to place one platoon on outpost.

=Required, 1.= Captain A's order.

=Answer.= Verbally: "Two or three Red companies were five miles south of Leavenworth at 2:30 P. M. today. No enemy is west of Leavenworth. We will camp here. 1st Platoon, 'A' company, under Sergeant A, will form the outpost, relieving the advance guard (2d Platoon Co. A). The line, Pope Hill (sm')--Rabbit Point (tn') will be held. Detached posts will be placed on Hill 880, west of Merritt Hill (rl'), and on Engineer Hill (ql'). In case of attack the outpost line will be held.

"The baggage will be at the main camp.

"Messages will reach me on Devin Ridge (rm')."

Issued verbally to officers and Sergeant A.

=Required, 2.= Give verbatim (word for word) the order issued by Sergeant A.

=Answer.= "Two companies of the enemy were five miles south of Leavenworth at 2:30 P. M. today. Our camp is to be here. This platoon will be the outpost on the line, Rabbit Point (im')--Pope Hill (sm').

"The right support, 1st section, less 1 squad, under Sergeant B, will take position north of Pope Hill and cover the following front: the ravine (XIX--Merritt Hill) west of Grant avenue to the ravine about midway between Grant Avenue and Rabbit Point (tn').

"The left support, 2d section, less 1 squad under Sergeant H, will take position on north slope of Rabbit Point and will cover the following front: The ravine midway between Grant Avenue and Rabbit Point to Missouri River.

"Corporal D, you will take the eight men of your squad and form a detached post on Engineer Hill (qk').

"Corporal E, take your squad and form a detached post on Hill 880 west of Merritt Hill (rl').

"If attacked hold your front. Each support and detached post will entrench.

"Send messages to me at right support."

The outpost moves out, each support and detached post separately, without throwing out covering patrols, because the advance guard is now holding the front. There is no reserve.

=Required, 3.= What does Sergeant A do now?

=Required, 4.= What does Sergeant B do as soon as he reaches Pope Hill?

(Note: During the remainder of the afternoon one man up in a tree on Grant Avenue will be the only observing post necessary for this support. At night an outguard would be placed on Grant Avenue with continuous patrols along the front, because the open ground furnishes easy approach to the enemy. A post of four men might also be placed on the bridge over Corral Creek (um').)

=Required, 5.= The location of supports and the main body of detached post on Engineer Hill.

=Required, 6.= What patrolling would be done from the left support?