Part 3

When Pope learned of the engagement of Groveton he mistakenly decided that King had met the head of Jackson’s column in retreat. Confident of success, he ordered a concentration of his leg weary troops to crush the Confederate force. Sigel and Reynolds were to attack at dawn, reinforced by Heintzelman and Reno. McDowell and Porter were ordered to reverse their course and push toward Gainesville in an effort to cut off Jackson’s retreat. The text of this order known as the “Joint Order,” which was received about noon, reads as follows:

Headquarters Army of Virginia _Centreville, August_ 29, 1862.

Generals McDowell and Porter:

You will please move forward with your joint commands toward Gainesville. I sent General Porter written orders to that effect an hour and a half ago. Heintzelman, Sigel, and Reno are moving on the Warrenton turnpike, and must now be not far from Gainesville. I desire that as soon as communication is established between this force and your own the whole command shall halt. It may be necessary to fall back behind Bull Run at Centreville to-night. I presume it will be so, on account of our supplies....

If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order it will not be strictly carried out. One thing must be had in view, that the troops must occupy a position from which they can reach Bull Run to-night or by morning. The indications are that the whole force of the enemy is moving in this direction at a pace that will bring them here by to-morrow night or the next day. My own headquarters will be for the present with Heintzelman’s corps or at this place.

Jno. Pope, _Major-General, Commanding._

Prior to the receipt of the “Joint Order,” Porter had reversed his course to Centreville and had moved as far as Dawkin’s Branch, located about 3 miles from Gainesville. Finding the Confederates strongly posted in his front, he deployed a brigade of his leading division and waited. McDowell, who arrived shortly thereafter, showed him a dispatch he had received a few minutes before from Buford, who commanded the Union cavalry on the right. The dispatch stated that 17 regiments, 1 battery, and 500 cavalry had passed through Gainesville about 8:45 a. m. This was the advance of Longstreet’s command which had left Thoroughfare Gap early that morning and now, followed by heavy reinforcements, was moving into position on Jackson’s right (Porter’s front).

This information, the generals felt, had not reached Pope. After a conference, it was decided that in face of this new development they would take advantage of the latitude the order granted: McDowell would move towards Groveton, while Porter would remain in the vicinity of his present position.

The relative quiet in this sector was in sharp contrast to the heavy fighting now taking place along Jackson’s front. With about 18,000 infantry and 40 guns, Jackson had taken up a position along an unfinished railroad bed which extended from near Sudley Springs 2 miles southwesterly to Groveton. The grades and cuts of this road provided ready-made entrenchments and formed a very strong position. There, shortly after sunrise, Sigel’s and Reynolds’ columns were seen at a distance deploying for the attack. About 7 a. m., the Federal batteries opened fire. By 10:30 a. m., a number of sharp skirmishes had taken place, but no general assault had been made. About this time Federal reinforcements of Reno and Kearny reached the field. It was not until 2 p. m., however, that the battle reached its height. All afternoon in violent but uncoordinated attacks, blue columns gallantly assaulted Jackson’s line. At one point the Confederate left was pushed back dangerously near the breaking point, but the gray line steadied and held. Towards dusk, King’s division, of McDowell’s corps, arrived in time to take part in the action, engaging a part of Longstreet’s command which was then advancing on a reconnaissance.

Pope, still unaware of the arrival of Longstreet on the field, late in the day sent Porter the following order to attack Jackson’s right at once:

Headquarters in the Field, _August 29_—4:30 p. m.

Major-General Porter:

Your line of march brings you in on the enemy’s right flank. I desire you to push forward into action at once on the enemy’s flank, and, if possible, on his rear, keeping your right in communication with General Reynolds. The enemy is massed in the woods in front of us, but can be shelled out as soon as you engage their flank. Keep heavy reserves and use your batteries, keeping well closed to your right all the time. In case you are obliged to fall back, do so to your right and rear, so as to keep you in close communication with the right wing.

John Pope, _Major-General, Commanding._

This order, dated 4:30 p. m., was received by Porter at Bethlehem Church about 6:30 p. m. Upon receipt of the order Porter immediately sent his chief of staff, Locke, to order Morell’s division to attack. Shortly thereafter Porter rode to the front to find Morell’s preparations for the attack complete. By this time, however, it was so late that Porter decided to rescind the order.[1]

During the night the Confederates retired from the advance positions gained during the day to their original battle line. This fact was discovered by McDowell and Heintzelman in a reconnaissance on the evening of the 29th and confirmed by paroled Federal prisoners the following morning. This led Pope falsely to assume that Lee was in retreat to Thoroughfare Gap. Immediately plans were initiated to press a vigorous pursuit. At midnight the following order was issued:

Headquarters, Near Groveton, _August 30_, 1862—12 M.

Special Orders, No.—

The following forces will be immediately thrown forward in pursuit of the enemy and press him vigorously during the whole day. Major-General McDowell is assigned to the command of the pursuit; Major-General Porter’s corps will push forward on the Warrenton turnpike, followed by the divisions of Brigadier-Generals King and Reynolds. The division of Brigadier-General Ricketts will pursue the Hay Market road, followed by the corps of Major-General Heintzelman....

At 3 a. m. of the 30th, Porter received Pope’s dispatch ordering him to march his command immediately to the field of battle of the previous day. In compliance with this order he promptly withdrew from his position facing Longstreet and marched rapidly along the Sudley Road to the center of the battlefield where he reported to Pope for orders. Though this movement strengthened the center, it dangerously weakened the Federal left.

From its contracted left near Groveton, the Federal line now extended approximately 3 miles to Bull Run near Sudley Church. The opposing Confederate line was about 4 miles long. Jackson held the left along the unfinished railroad, while Longstreet held the right, with the main body of his troops “bent to the front” south of the Warrenton Pike. A heavy concentration of artillery was placed on high ground between the two wings. These guns commanded the open fields and the stretch of woods near Jackson’s right and center.

Preparations completed about midafternoon, the Federal columns of Porter and Heintzelman advanced three lines deep, preceded by a swarm of skirmishers and supported by great masses of men and guns in the rear. A strange quiet pervaded the fields as the unsuspecting troops pushed forward. Behind their protective cover, the Confederates watched the lines draw closer; then suddenly opened upon them a rapid artillery fire. Instantly, the infantry bugles sounded the alarm alerting Jackson’s men to action. The Federal advance line halted and staggered back. Other brigades quickly pushed forward only to be broken by the raking force of the fire.

Soon it was apparent that the main Federal assault was being directed by Porter and Hatch against Jackson’s right and center held by the divisions of Starke and Lawton. In gallant style, a third line moved up and impetuously pressed the attack. The force of this forward movement pushed back the famous Stonewall brigade, but later it reestablished its lines in a desperate countercharge. Heavy fighting at close quarters now ensued. At one point in their line near a section of the railroad bed known as the “Deep Cut,” Jackson’s veterans, with ammunition exhausted, partially repelled an attack with stones from the embankment.

Finally, the pressure became so great that Jackson sent an urgent request for reinforcements. Lee then ordered forward a brigade from Longstreet’s command. Anticipating the request, Longstreet had already moved up the batteries of Stephen D. Lee, which now opened a withering fire on the Federal columns on Jackson’s right and center. The effect was devastating. Within 15 minutes the whole aspect of the battle had changed.

Shortly after the Federal brigades had engaged Jackson along the unfinished railroad, Pope had ordered Reynolds’ division from his left at Bald Hill to move up and support the attack on the right. The weight of his numbers, however, proved insufficient to stem the tide of retreat that had now set in. Quickly, Jackson ordered up two brigades to press a counterattack, moving forward his artillery as the infantry advanced.

The transfer of Reynolds’ division had again greatly weakened the Federal left. Lee saw this and realized that here at last was the opportunity for which he had been waiting. The order was sent immediately to Longstreet to deliver the counterstroke. Every regiment, battery, and squadron of both wings of the army were to be employed. By sheer weight of numbers the attack was to be driven home in successive waves of assault, piling one upon the other.

_Note. The artist identified the following points:_

“_1. Thoroughfare Gap through which Genl. Lee’s Army passed._ _2. Rebs line of battle._ _3. The old R.R. embankment behind which the Con. were posted._ _4. The old Stone House on the Turnpike used as a hospital._ _5. Warrenton Turnpike._ _6. Bald face hill._ _7. Henry Hill._ _8. Union line of battle._ _9. McDowell’s corps moving to the left flank to repel Longstreet’s attack which had just commenced._ _10. Sudley Springs road._”

Again, Longstreet had anticipated the order for which he had been preparing since dawn. The long gray lines of infantry, restive for the fray, now swept forward in a furious assault. In advance came Hood’s Texans, their colors gleaming red in the evening sun. Above the thunderous roar of artillery and the noise of battle could be heard the shrill cries of the rebel yell echoing through the Groveton valley. So intense was the excitement that only with the greatest difficulty could the officers restrain their men. Rapidly moving up in support came the divisions of Anderson, Kemper, and D. R. Jones. Across the rolling fields the attack pushed to gain the promontory of Chinn Ridge despite a stubborn defense by the Union brigades of McClean, Tower, and Milroy, while Jackson’s veterans successfully assailed Buck Hill.

On Henry Hill, poignant with memories of the previous year, were now assembled Reynolds’ divisions, Sykes’ regulars, and other available troops. With courage and gallantry that matched the crisis of battle, they hurled back repeated Confederate assaults that continued until dark. The successful defense of Henry Hill made possible Pope’s retreat over Bull Run, by the Stone Bridge and other fords, to the strong defenses of the Centreville plateau.

FOURTH PHASE—CHANTILLY, SEPTEMBER 1.

Considering the Centreville position as unfavorable for attack, Lee sent Jackson by Sudley Ford to the Little River Turnpike in an effort to turn the Federal right and threaten communications with Washington. The movement, however, was anticipated by Pope, and the divisions of Stevens and Kearny were sent to check it. In a sharp contest, fought in a rainstorm at Chantilly on September 1, Stevens and Kearny were killed; but Jackson was repulsed. During the next 2 days Pope retired to the defenses of Washington.

RESULTS OF SECOND BATTLE OF MANASSAS.

Second Manassas offers an interesting contrast to the opening battle which had found two armies of raw, undisciplined volunteers courageously but falteringly battling for supremacy. The raw volunteers had now been replaced by seasoned veterans, hardened by months of strenuous campaigning. The campaign just ended had been one to test to the utmost the endurance and discipline of the men in the ranks of both armies—a test they had met with valor and high honor. In contrast to the rout of First Manassas, the Federal army which now retired upon Washington was a weary but defiant fighting machine. Its defeat had been accomplished by exceptional daring, combined with a skillful coordination of Confederate commands. Gambling with long chances, Lee had succeeded in removing some 150,000 invading troops from deep in Virginia and reversing the threat of impending attack upon the opposing capital.

Commenting upon the battle, Henderson, the English soldier and historian, writes:

... If, as Moltke avers, the junction of two armies on the field of battle is the highest achievement of military genius, the campaign against Pope has seldom been surpassed; and the great counter-stroke at Manassas is sufficient in itself to make Lee’s reputation as a tactician.... It was not due to the skill of Lee that Pope weakened his left at the crisis of battle. But in the rapidity with which the opportunity was seized, in the combination of the three arms, and in the vigour of the blow, Manassas is in no way inferior to Austerlitz or Salamanca.

This brilliant success did much to offset Confederate reverses in the West—the loss of Missouri, the defeats of Forts Henry and Donelson, Shiloh, and the fall of Nashville, New Orleans, and Memphis. Contrary to the inactivity that followed First Manassas, Lee pressed his victory by the first invasion of the North. On September 4, he began moving his troops across the Potomac with the hope of winning the support of Maryland and possibly the recognition of the Confederacy by foreign powers. In the desperately fought battle of Antietam, September 17, at Sharpsburg, Md., however, these hopes were dashed by McClellan, now returned to Federal command.

FEDERAL CONFEDERATE Strength (_approx._) 73,000 55,000 CASUALTIES Killed 1,747 1,553 Wounded 8,452 7,812 Captured or missing 4,263 109 Total 14,462 9,474

_The War After Second Manassas_

From Antietam, Lee retired to Virginia. With the coming of winter snows he bloodily repelled Maj. Gen. Ambrose E. Burnside in the Battle of Fredericksburg, December 13, 1862. In the spring, Confederate arms achieved brilliant success in the defeat of Maj. Gen. Joseph E. Hooker in the Battle of Chancellorsville, May 1-6, 1863. Capitalizing on his victory, Lee again invaded the North. At Gettysburg, July 1-3, he was defeated by Maj. Gen. George Gordon Meade. The next day saw the end of one of the most brilliant and decisive operations of the war with the surrender of Vicksburg to Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant. Its fall cut the Confederacy in two and opened the Mississippi to Federal commerce and control. From the telling force of these simultaneous blows the Confederacy never recovered.

On March 9, 1864, Grant was placed in supreme command of all Federal armies. Now as never before, the full strength and resources of the republic were marshalled for a great offensive to be delivered simultaneously on all fronts. Attaching himself to Meade’s army, Grant crossed the Rapidan on May 4 to launch his overland campaign against Richmond, while Sherman began the famous march that was to carry him to Atlanta and the sea.

In the fiercely contested battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania Court House, May 5-6 and 8-21, respectively, Grant largely succeeded in destroying Lee’s offensive power, forcing his retirement upon Richmond. Repulsed with heavy losses at Cold Harbor, June 3, Grant moved upon Petersburg again to encounter Lee’s army.

Ten months of siege followed as Grant methodically cut the Confederate lifeline. On April 2, Lee evacuated Petersburg with the hope of reaching the Danville railroad and possibly effecting a junction with Johnston’s forces in North Carolina. Grant’s pursuit, however, was rapid and relentless. The cutting of the escape route by the Danville line and the disastrous defeat of a large segment of his army in the Battle of Sayler’s Creek forced Lee to move farther westward to Appomattox Court House. There at dusk, April the 8th, the widening circle of Federal campfires brought realization that the end had been reached. The next day Lee surrendered to the magnanimous terms of Grant. On April 26, Johnston yielded to Sherman and by June all isolated units of the Confederate forces had laid down their arms.

_Guide to the Area_ (SEE MAP ON PAGE 48.)

This guide has been prepared to enable the visitor more readily to identify and appreciate the chief points of historical interest on the two battlefields. While there are other locations of importance on park property and on privately owned adjacent lands, those listed below may be considered the most conspicuous.

Wherever an area, such as Henry Hill and Chinn Ridge, featured prominently in both battles, its story has been told jointly, rather than separately. This has been done in order to avoid unnecessary backtracking. It should be observed that the numbers 1 to 9 have been located on a tour map for the visitor’s convenience.

For the purposes of orientation a visit to the museum should precede a tour of the fields.

1. HENRY HILL.

Covering an area of approximately 200 acres, the top of this plateau embraces parts of the old Henry Farm and of the Robinson tract. It extends roughly northeast from the Henry woods to Lee Highway near the site of the Robinson House. Twice the hill held the key to victory. After hours of heavy fighting in the first battle, its loss to McDowell proved a significant factor in the collapse of Federal resistance, while in the second, its stubborn defense secured the retreat of Pope’s Army over Bull Run.

Some of the points of special interest here include:

_Administration-Museum Building._ On a commanding rise of the hill is located the Administration and Museum Building, which represents the focal center in the interpretation of the area. From the terrace on the north and east sides of the building, a sweeping panoramic view may be had of the valley of Young’s Branch and the hills beyond which constitute the chief scenes of tactical maneuver of the two battles.

_Jackson Monument._ Located approximately 125 yards east of the Administration-Museum Building is the equestrian statue of “Stonewall” Jackson. It was erected by the State of Virginia in 1940, reputedly on the spot where he received his famous nickname. To a large degree Jackson’s character and personality dominated the fighting of both First and Second Manassas.

_Line of Confederate Batteries._ Just north of Jackson’s statue are markers indicating the position of Confederate batteries of 26 guns which engaged the 11 guns of Ricketts’ and Griffin’s Federal batteries at a distance of about 330 yards. With this furious artillery duel the first battle reached its crisis. Today, cannon mark this position.

_Bee Monument._ South of the Jackson statue, about 100 feet, stands a white marble monument erected to the memory of Gen. Barnard E. Bee, who fell mortally wounded at this spot in the first battle. Shortly before, while desperately attempting to rally his men, Bee had won immortal fame with the stirring battle cry which gave Jackson the name of “Stonewall.”

_Bartow Monument._ About 180 feet north of the Jackson statue is a stone block bearing a bronze tablet erected to the memory of Col. F. S. Bartow, commander of the 2d brigade of Johnston’s army, who was killed in the first battle on this spot. At a critical moment in the early phase of the battle, Bee and Bartow had given Evans valiant support.

_Position of Ricketts’ and Griffin’s Guns._ Just south of the Henry House are cannon and markers indicating the advanced position occupied by the Union batteries of Ricketts and Griffin during the first battle. In a surprise attack, which practically annihilated these two gallant batteries, Ricketts was severely wounded.

_Henry House._ About 650 feet northwest of the Administration-Museum Building stands the Henry House which was erected shortly after the war on the site of the famous original structure. During the first battle, the original little house was caught in the line of cross artillery fire which killed its owner, Mrs. Judith Henry. Badly damaged, it suffered further mutilation during the following year. By the end of the second battle the house was a complete ruin.

_Grave of Judith Henry._ In the Henry yard, a few feet west of the house, is the grave of the widow, Judith Henry, enclosed by an iron railing and shrubbery. She is said to have been buried here by Confederate soldiers the day after the first battle. A son and daughter are also interred here. Mrs. Henry’s tragic death is dramatically treated in Stephen Vincent Benet’s poem, “John Brown’s Body.”

_Union Monument._ This pyramidal monument of reddish brown stone, located in the yard on the east side of the Henry House, was erected by Union soldiers in 1865 to the memory of their comrades who fell in the first battle. It is one of the earliest memorial monuments of the Civil War.

2. ROBINSON HOUSE.