Part 2

In the midst of the wild confusion that then ensued, as the fate of the battle hung in the balance, there occurred one of the dramatic moments of the war. Bee, desperately attempting to rally his men, glanced toward Henry Hill where he saw Jackson and his command standing bold and resolute. Catching the inspiration of the moment, Bee leaned forward in his stirrups and with pointed sword shouted to his men, “Look! There is Jackson standing like a stone wall! Rally behind the Virginians!” Thus “Stonewall” Jackson won his famous sobriquet.

It was about this time that Johnston and Beauregard galloped upon the field. In the presence of their commanding officers the men gained new confidence. The line stiffened, formed again, and advanced to the front. Reinforcements from Cocke’s and Bonham’s brigades, at fords farther down Bull Run, were now fast coming up. Quickly upon their arrival they were sent into position to the right and left of Jackson. Johnston soon retired to the Lewis House (“Portici”), where he directed the movement of reinforcements from the rear, while Beauregard took immediate command of the field.

There now occurred a lull between 1 and 2 p. m. as the victorious Federal troops crossed the valley of Young’s Branch and re-formed for a renewal of the attack.

AFTERNOON PHASE.

About 2 p. m., McDowell ordered forward the two splendid, regular batteries of Ricketts and Griffin, directing them to take up an exposed position just south of the Henry House. At a distance of not much more than 300 yards, these batteries were soon engaged in a furious duel with the artillery arrayed in Jackson’s front. For about 15 minutes the din was terrific. Finally, in an effort to gain a better enfilading fire, Griffin advanced three of his guns slightly. The movement proved fatal.

At this moment J. E. B. Stuart made a dashing cavalry charge up the Manassas-Sudley Road, scattering the colorful Fire Zouaves who had been advanced to the support of Ricketts and Griffin. Almost simultaneously the 33rd Virginia regiment moved forward. Mistaken by one of the Federal officers as a battery support, it was allowed to come within 70 yards of Griffin’s guns. Suddenly the regiment delivered a murderous volley, which killed most of the horses and men of both batteries. The immobilized guns were seized by the Virginians, only to be recaptured by a spirited Federal advance. In heated charges and countercharges the guns changed hands a number of times, yet neither side was able to employ them effectively. Their loss to the Federal command was irreparable.

Federal pressure now became so strong that Beauregard decided to attack. As Jackson penetrated the center of the Federal line, the Confederate right swept clear the area in the vicinity of the Robinson House. In a gallant countercharge, however, the Union brigades of Franklin, Willcox, Sherman, and Porter surged forward to reclaim the lost ground. In the attack, McDowell displayed reckless courage by climbing to the upper story of the Henry House to obtain a better view of the whole field.

The battle now raged with increasing severity as both sides fought desperately for possession of the plateau—“the key to victory.” The weight of Federal pressure upon Beauregard’s left and right flanks so increased as to endanger his whole position. It was now about 3 p. m. The scorching rays of the sun beat unmercifully upon the exhausted troops as Beauregard, at this critical stage, ordered yet another general attack all along the line. Just then Fisher’s 6th North Carolina regiment arrived to take position on the Confederate left. With Beauregard leading the charge, the Confederate line advanced to clear the field and regain final possession of the Henry and Robinson Houses.

Despite the loss of the plateau, McDowell’s position was still strong. With his right anchored in the woods in the vicinity of the Chinn House, his line stretched in a great crescent back of the J. Dogan House and the Stone House to a position near the Stone Bridge. However, the right held by Howard’s brigade and Sykes’ regulars had become so extended as to face almost east towards Centreville. Thus extended, it invited an attack which the Confederate command was quick to mount. Reinforcements, sent forward by Johnston, now rapidly moved up. In the lead were Kershaw’s 2d and Cash’s 8th South Carolina regiments followed by Kemper’s battery. Quickly following these troops came Elzey’s brigade, 1,700 strong. This brigade of Johnston’s Army, detrained only a few hours before, had advanced to the sound of firing, led by Kirby Smith. To the weight of these numbers was added still another fresh brigade—Early’s. Coming into position to the left of Elzey’s brigade, Early struck the Federal right in flank and rear.

The combined attack, delivered about 3:45 p. m., proved overwhelming. The Federal line staggered and fell back, retiring across the field in some semblance of order. A brief rally north of Young’s Branch was broken up by Confederate artillery fire. All other attempts to rally the men proved futile. They had had enough. Now they continued homeward by the various routes of the morning’s advance. Bravely covering the retreat were Sykes’ regulars and Palmer’s squadron of cavalry.

As the main body of the Federal army retreated in the direction of Sudley Ford, Keyes’ brigade recrossed at the Stone Bridge closely pursued by a Confederate detachment led by Kemper’s battery. Riding astraddle one of the guns was the venerable “Yankee hater,” Edmund Ruffin, who had fired one of the first shots at Fort Sumter. Dusty and weary he had arrived upon the field in the closing moments of the battle in time to hail Kemper’s battery as it was passing. Eager to get another shot at the enemy, he held precariously to his seat as the battery went jolting past the Stone Bridge and along the pike now littered with arms, accoutrements, haversacks, knapsacks, loose articles of clothing, blankets, drums, and brass musical instruments left by the rapidly retiring troops.

After proceeding a few miles, Kemper’s guns reached an advantageous rise. There they were unlimbered and quickly made ready for firing. The first shot, fired by the elderly Ruffin, hit squarely upon the suspension bridge over Cub Run upsetting a wagon that had just been driven upon it. This served to barricade the bridge to further use by other vehicles. In quick succession more shots were fired. Complete panic now seized the Federal troops as they fled in a wild rout back to Washington. Adding to the confusion were the throngs of sightseers and fugitives who crowded the narrow roads. The roar of the flight, wrote Russell, _The London Times’_ correspondent, was like the rush of a great river. All through the night and the rain of the next day the tide of soldiers and civilians streamed into Washington. Attempts by McDowell to rally the soldiers were in vain.

The exhausted, battle-weary Confederates made no effective pursuit. Early’s brigade and Stuart’s cavalry did succeed in capturing quite a number of prisoners, but the main Union force escaped. July 22 found both armies in the positions they had occupied prior to the 16th.

EFFECTS OF FIRST MANASSAS.

The news of the disaster was first received in the Capital with incredulity and amazement, then with consternation. Throughout the night President Lincoln received spectators of the battle and listened in silence to their descriptions of the engagement.

“For a few days,” writes Channing, “the North was dazed, stocks went down, money went up, and people sat around with their hands folded in despair. Then, almost as by magic, the scene shifted and stern resolve took the place of the hysteria of the Hundred Days since Sumter. Lincoln called for volunteers. The best blood of the North in all ranks of society, in the East, in the Ohio Valley, and on the shores of the Great Lakes responded. The new men went into the conflict with a determination and a spirit that has seldom been seen and never excelled.”

In the South, the news of the victory was received with great elation. Thanksgiving sermons were preached from the pulpits while public officials commemorated the event with congratulatory proclamations. In the ill-considered opinion of many Southerners the war was over, yet seldom if ever has so complete a victory borne such meager results. An overweening confidence and a false sense of security developed in the South a paralysis of enterprise more damaging to it than was the disaster of defeat for the North.

The battle, however, as the English historian Fuller points out, was to have a profound influence on the grand strategy of the war. “First, it imbued the Southern politicians with an exaggerated idea of the prowess of their soldiers and so led them to under-estimate the fighting capacity of their enemy; secondly, it so terrified Lincoln and his Government that from now onwards until 1864, east of the Alleghanies, the defence of Washington became the pivot of Northern strategy.”

Though the men of each army had fought with flashes of steadiness and exceptional courage, there was ample evidence to show the costly result of inadequate training.

FEDERAL CONFEDERATE Strength, approximate 35,000 32,000 CASUALTIES Killed 460 387 Wounded 1,124 1,582 Captured or missing 1,312 13 Total 2,896 1,982

_Winter’s Lull_

Following the conclusion of the first Manassas campaign, the war in Virginia “languished” until the spring of 1862. The North, smarting from the humiliating defeat suffered at Bull Run, now turned with grim determination to the mobilization of its resources and to the training of the great land forces necessary to subjugate the South. Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, fresh from victories in western Virginia, was immediately called to the command of the Federal forces around Washington. Soldierly in bearing and engaging in manner, McClellan proved a popular choice with the Nation and the army. With marked success he initiated a program of organization and training of the great Army of the Potomac. Recruits now streamed into Washington by the thousand. By December, there were 150,000 in training; by spring, over 200,000.

Meanwhile, the Confederate army under Joseph E. Johnston remained encamped at Centreville with outposts along the Potomac. Jackson, with a detachment, was stationed at Winchester. It was during this time that Johnston established a very strongly fortified position consisting of an L-shaped line of earthwork forts and batteries connected by infantry trenches that extended along the eastern and northern crests of Centreville for a distance of approximately 5 miles. Gradually, on the approach of winter, log or board huts were constructed for winter quarters for the troops. These were so located as to permit the troops easy access to the fortifications.

With the worsening condition of the roads the problem of supply became increasingly difficult. It was then that Johnston built a branch railroad from his base at Manassas Junction. This was one of the first railroads ever to be used solely for military purposes.

_Preliminary Operations to Second Manassas_

McClellan’s failure to move against Johnston resulted in a restive public and press. Richmond, rather than Centreville, now became the immediate Federal objective. Learning of an anticipated movement against Richmond via Urbanna, Johnston, on March 9, fell back from Centreville to take up a position south of the Rappahannock, with his right resting at Fredericksburg and his left at Culpeper Court House. This forced a modification of McClellan’s original plan. He thereupon decided to make the movement by water to Fortress Monroe and from there advance up the Peninsula upon Richmond.

On March 17, the Federal army embarked from Alexandria. McClellan had anticipated the use of a force of about 155,000 men. The brilliant operations of “Stonewall” Jackson in the Shenandoah Valley during the next 4 months, however, so alarmed President Lincoln as to cause him to immobilize nearly 40,000 of McDowell’s troops at Fredericksburg to secure the defenses of Washington. This, together with the detention of Banks’ expected reinforcements in the Valley, reduced McClellan’s force to approximately 100,000, thereby materially minimizing his chances of success. Seldom has so small a force as that of Jackson (approximately 16,000) so largely influenced the final outcome of a major military operation.

Johnston, in the meantime, had reinforced Magruder at Yorktown. On May 4 the town was evacuated, and the next day a successful rearguard action was fought at Williamsburg, covering the Confederate withdrawal to Richmond. The Federal army followed by land and water to White House on the Pamunkey where, on May 16, McClellan set up his headquarters. The next day the Federal forces resumed their advance on Richmond.

Gathering a force of some 63,000 men, Johnston then determined to attack. On May 31, in the Battle of Seven Pines, followed by the Battle of Fair Oaks the next day, the Confederates were repulsed, and Johnston was severely wounded. The command of the Army of Northern Virginia now devolved upon Robert E. Lee, a command that he was not to relinquish until the end of the war. Within 2 weeks the defenses of Richmond had been strengthened and the morale of the troops greatly improved.

By June 25, Lee had assembled a force of about 90,000 men, including Jackson’s victorious command from the Valley. The next day he launched his great counteroffensive. In a series of desperately contested operations, known as the Seven Days’ Battles before Richmond, McClellan was forced back upon Harrison’s Landing on the James. Though the campaign was costly in Confederate casualties, Lee saved Richmond and cloaked his army with a sense of invincibility.

_Pope Concentrates Behind the Rapidan_

The failure of Fremont, Banks, and McDowell in the Shenandoah Valley convinced President Lincoln of the desirability of consolidating their armies under a single head. By order of June 26 the “Army of Virginia” was created, and Maj. Gen. John Pope, who had won recent successes in the West, was given the command. Shortly thereafter, Gen. Henry W. Halleck was recalled from the West to be made general in chief of the Federal armies.

To Pope was entrusted the responsibility for covering Washington, protecting the Shenandoah Valley, and so operating against the Confederate communications at Gordonsville and Charlottesville as to draw off heavy detachments from Richmond, thereby relieving the pressure on McClellan. On July 14, Pope ordered an advance on Gordonsville. Lee, anticipating the movement, had ordered Jackson to this point the day before.

On August 7, Jackson, having been reinforced by A. P. Hill, moved toward Culpeper in the hope of capturing the town and using it in a series of operations against Pope. Two days later he fell upon Banks at Cedar Mountain in a sharp but indecisive encounter.

Lee now learned that McClellan had been ordered to evacuate the Peninsula and reinforce Pope. Appreciating the necessity of striking Pope before he could be joined by such heavy reinforcements, Lee moved with Longstreet’s corps to reinforce Jackson. Pope’s force now numbered about 47,000 effectives, while Lee had approximately 55,000.

_Lee’s Operations Along the Rapidan and Rappahannock_

Pope’s center was now at Cedar Mountain, his right at Robertson’s River, and his left near Raccoon Ford on the Rapidan. Thus stationed, his army was directly opposite Gordonsville where Jackson’s force had recently arrived. On Clark’s Mountain (a high hill opposite Pope’s left) the Confederates had established a signal station. From here, stretching for miles, could be seen the white tents of the Federal encampment dotting the Culpeper tablelands. Spurs from Clark’s Mountain paralleled the Rapidan to Somerville Ford, located about 2 miles from Raccoon Ford.

Lee was quick to appreciate the advantage this topography afforded him. Massing his troops behind Clark’s Mountain he might move under its protecting screen, fall upon Pope’s left at Somerville Ford, and cut off his retreat to Washington. The opportunity held bright possibilities of success, and August 18 was set as the date for the initiation of the movement. Unforeseen delays postponed the movement until the 20th. Worse still for the Confederates, Stuart’s adjutant general was captured, bearing a copy of Lee’s order.

Thus warned, Pope withdrew his army behind the Rappahannock. Lee followed closely on the 20th, crossing to the north side of the river. Pope took up an advantageous position where he stood fast during 5 days of feints and demonstrations as Lee sought eagerly for an opening on the right. In the meantime, Stuart had captured Pope’s headquarters. Thus, Lee learned that 20,000 troops, composing the corps of Heintzelman and Porter and the division of Reynolds, were within 2 days’ march of the front. Within 5 days other expected reinforcements would swell Pope’s numbers to about 130,000 men.

The situation was so desperate as to demand a bold expedient. Quickly, Lee made his decision. Jackson, with Stuart’s cavalry comprising about 24,000 men, was to be sent on a wide flanking movement of Pope’s right for the purpose of destroying his communications with Washington. Commenting on this decision, Henderson, the English biographer of Jackson, says “we have record of few enterprises of greater daring.”

With Lee and Longstreet covering the line of the Rappahannock, Jackson began his march from Jeffersonton on August 25. He moved through Amissville and Orlean to bivouac that night at Salem. The next day he pushed on past Thoroughfare Gap and Gainesville to Bristoe. Never did the “foot cavalry” better deserve its name, for in 2 days it had covered approximately 51 miles. That night Jackson sent Stuart and two regiments to Manassas Junction to capture Pope’s great base of supplies. The task was accomplished with little effort.

The next day Jackson left Ewell to cover the rear at Bristoe and moved with the rest of his command to Manassas Junction. There then followed a scene of feasting and plunder the like of which has seldom been witnessed. Knapsacks, haversacks, and canteens were filled with articles of every description. Added to vast quantities of quartermaster and commissary supplies were innumerable luxuries from sutler stores, including expensive liquors and imported wines. An eyewitness writes, “To see a starving man eating lobster salad & drinking rhine wine, barefooted & in tatters was curious; the whole thing is indescribable.” What could not be eaten or carried away was finally put to the torch. With the destruction of these supplies one of the chief objectives of the campaign had been accomplished.

_Second Battle of Manassas_ (SEE MAP ON PAGES 28-29.)

FIRST PHASE—BRISTOE AND MANASSAS, AUGUST 27.

Pope, now advised of the presence of Jackson in his rear, immediately ordered a concentration of his forces in order to crush him. McDowell’s and Sigel’s corps, together with the division of Reynolds, were to move to Gainesville, while Reno’s corps, with Kearny’s division of Heintzelman’s corps, was to concentrate at Greenwich. By these dispositions Pope hoped to intercept any reinforcements coming to Jackson by way of Thoroughfare Gap. With Hooker’s division of Heintzelman’s corps Pope moved along the railroad to Manassas Junction.

On the afternoon of August 27, Hooker attacked Ewell and drove him back upon Bristoe. During the night, Ewell retired to Manassas where he joined the rest of Jackson’s force. Pope now learned for the first time that the whole of Jackson’s command was at Manassas. New orders were issued for a concentration at that point. Porter was ordered to march at 1 a. m. of the 28th from Warrenton Junction and be in position at Bristoe by daylight. McDowell, Sigel, and Reno were to move at dawn upon Manassas Junction, while Kearny was to advance at the same hour upon Bristoe.

About 3 a. m., August 28, Jackson began to move out of Manassas toward Groveton. In order to mystify and mislead Pope, he sent Taliaferro along the Manassas-Sudley Road, Ewell along the Centreville Road via Blackburn’s Ford and the Stone Bridge to Groveton, and A. P. Hill to Centreville and thence along the Warrenton Pike to a position near Sudley Church.

Moving with Kearny’s division, Pope arrived at Manassas Junction at noon, to find the town deserted. Later in the day, word was received that the Confederates had been seen in Centreville. Pope thereupon ordered a concentration at this place in the belief that Jackson’s whole force was there. The corps of Heintzelman and Reno moved along the Centreville Road; Sigel and Reynolds along the Manassas-Sudley Road; King’s division of McDowell’s corps along the Warrenton Pike.

SECOND PHASE—GROVETON, AUGUST 28.

Jackson had but a short time before concentrated north of the turnpike when word was received that King’s Federal column was approaching from Gainesville. There was now need for a quick decision. To allow King to pass unmolested would defeat the purpose of the campaign by permitting Pope to assume an impregnable position on the heights at Centreville. To attack, without assurance as to when Longstreet would arrive, was to invite the assault of Pope’s whole force with possible fatal consequences. Without hesitation he ordered the divisions of Taliaferro and Ewell to advance. A fierce and stubborn fight ensued which resulted in heavy losses on both sides. Finally, about 9 p. m., King withdrew towards Manassas.

In the meantime, Longstreet had reached Thoroughfare Gap at about 3 p. m. of the same day to find his way blocked by Federal troops under Ricketts. Outmaneuvering his opponent by way of Hopewell Gap, he forced him to fall back to Gainesville. That night, without informing Pope of their intentions, King and Ricketts decided to move towards Manassas. This enabled Longstreet to effect an easy junction with Jackson in the afternoon of the following day.

THIRD PHASE—MAIN BATTLE, AUGUST 29-30.