Part 23

At the time of the outbreak of war in the island of Kiushiu in 1877 General Yamagata was at headquarters in Tokio, and it may well be comprehended that there was some anxiety in his mind concerning the behaviour of the new army when confronted by the redoubtable swordsmen of the great southern clan. The heimin of whom the imperial army was largely composed were comparatively unaccustomed to the use of weapons of warfare, and it remained to be seen how they would comport themselves in the face of a peculiarly strong and agile foe. The Satsuma onslaught was famed for its irresistible vigour and determination. It was at least open to question if the men who had only recently begun to handle the bayonet would with it be a match for swordsmen whose tactics were to come to close quarters on every occasion and to some extent despised musketry as an art unworthy of their knightly training. But the outcome of the struggle justified the sanguine anticipations which the military authorities at Tokio had formed regarding the value of the new force, and increased confidence was felt in its future development. It was not the first trial that it had undergone in actual warfare, for some regiments had been through a rather severe campaign,—not in respect of the fighting that they had to do, but in regard to the climate and the character of the country—in the island of Formosa three years before the contest with Satsuma occurred, yet the civil war in Kiushiu was a test of a far more rigorous nature, and one on which the fate of the Government’s scheme of reform in no small degree depended. Suffice it to say that the confidence Yamagata had placed in his military system was amply warranted by events, and as references are to be found elsewhere to the incidents of the campaign it would be superfluous to enter into detail concerning them here.

By 1883 the available strength of the imperial army had risen to some 105,110 men, of all arms, not counting non-combatants, and at the end of the year 1888 there were 150,000 drilled men, with 120 guns, and a cavalry force of 500 sabres, ready for service at short notice, and a serviceable army of 25,000 troops could have been sent away to Korea or China at any time, on three days’ notice being given to the War Department.

In December 1889 Marshal Yamagata, as he had now become,—having previously held the office of Nai-mu-kio or Home Minister, in the Cabinet, was called upon, owing to the resignation of Count Okuma, to form a Ministry, and he continued to fill the post of Minister-President of State until April 1891, when he gave way to Count Matsukata, who had held under him the portfolio of Finance.

The following year, the Marquis Ito having meanwhile become head of the Ministry, a very extensive scheme of army extension and reorganisation was brought forward, encountering no inconsiderable opposition from the Radical party in the House of Representatives, and the year ended with stormy debates in Parliament on questions of military and naval expenditure. Marshal Yamagata was of course mainly responsible for the project as far as it related in detail to the enlargement of the nation’s military resources, but that it had the entire approval and support of the Crown was clear from the imperial rescript which appeared in 1893, when matters had reached a deadlock in the Diet owing to the obstacles placed in the Cabinet’s path by the irreconcilable elements of the Opposition. In the course of his message to the Diet the Emperor declared that “the progressive force of various countries of the world becomes more apparent day by day: at this period if time is squandered in disputes and ultimately the great objects in view become neglected, so that the opportunities of promoting the nation’s welfare and extending its influence are lost, the desire that we cherish in view of meeting the spirits of our ancestors will be frustrated, and the way to reap the fair result of constitutional government will be missed. The items of expenditure referred to in the 67th Article of the Constitution are already guaranteed by the terms of those articles, and therefore must not be a matter of dispute now. As to the military defences of the State, a single day’s neglect may result in a hundred years’ regret. We shall Ourselves economise in the expenditure of Our household, and We call on Our officers to do the same....” His Majesty’s efforts brought about a temporary understanding, and in the meantime affairs in Korea were assuming so threatening a shape that all the energies of the War Office were directed into the channel of urgent and complete preparation for what it was feared could not long be averted, namely, a desperate struggle with China, whose policy had been growing more and more inimical to Japan’s interests in the adjacent peninsula.

The culmination was reached when news arrived in Japan that a large reinforcement of the Chinese army in Korea was on the eve of being sent from Tientsin, and that foreign vessels had been chartered to convey the troops across the Yellow Sea to points on the Korean littoral. The bargain had been that neither Japan nor China was to increase its strength in the peninsula without giving due notice to the other interested power, for Korea, under the existing agreement, was independent, though China still insisted on claiming a rather shadowy suzerainty. Japan ordered her fleet to intercept the Chinese vessels, and hostilities began when the _Naniwa Kan_, a cruiser at that time commanded by the now famous Admiral Togo, fired upon and sank a British-owned steamer which had been chartered for the express purpose of carrying Chinese soldiers to the vicinity of the Korean port of Chemulpo. Admiral Togo’s orders were to prevent a landing, and when he had taken on board the _Naniwa Kan_ all the foreign officers of the transport, the Chinese on board refused to surrender, in spite of fair warning, so he considered that he had no alternative but to put an effectual stop to the vessel’s career. Already large numbers of Chinese had been thrown into Korea, and a first collision between the rival forces took place at Asan, a port to the south of Chemulpo, in the Nam-yang or Empress Gulf. The decisive battle of the 15th September 1894, at Ping-Yang, north of Seoul, at which spot Hideyoshi had fought the Chinese at the end of the sixteenth century, settled the question of the supremacy on Korean soil, and the Chinese withdrew in haste beyond the river Yalu frontier. Marshal Yamagata at this stage arrived from Japan to take command in person of the Japanese army in Manchuria, in the campaign on which it was now about to enter, and a second army, under the command of Marshal Oyama, was called out for the invasion of the peninsula known as the “Regent’s Sword,” at the extremity of which lay Port Arthur, for until this fortress should be captured the Chinese fleet could not be said to have been rendered absolutely useless, whilst its possession would give Japan the control of the Gulf of Pechili and enable her to interrupt communications with the Chinese ports in those waters.

At the end of 1893 the strength of the Japanese army was as follows:—

Peace Establishment 70,892 First Reserve 92,252 Second Reserve 106,020 Yeso colonists 4,104 ------- 273,268

The peace establishment and the First Reserve constitute the First Line on a war footing, so that the forces which Japan was able under Marshals Yamagata and Oyama to place in the field were 163,144 in all. Roughly the peace strength of a Japanese division is 9000, but in time of war its total rises to about 27,000 men, all told. In the Japan and China war, under the arrangements which Marshal Yamagata had made, each division was a complete unit in itself, and, comprised 2 infantry brigades, 1 artillery regiment, 1 engineer battalion, 1 cavalry battalion, 1 train battalion, a medical corps, and an intendant, accountant, veterinary and legal staff.

Each infantry brigade had 2 regiments, and each regiment 3 battalions,—(save in the Guards, which had 2 battalions to a regiment)—a battalion at war strength averaging 800 rifles. The weapon was the Murata rifle of the 1889 pattern (embodying the improvements effected in the original type which was the invention of Captain Murata, as he was then, of the Japanese army, in the early years of the Meiji era,—he is now General Murata) the rifle being a single-loading breech-loader of 8 millimetres calibre. Each man carried 100 rounds of ammunition, and there were 80 rounds per man in the battalion transport and ammunition column. A new magazine rifle—since brought to great perfection—had then just been issued to the Guards and to the Osaka (4th) division. An artillery regiment comprised 6 batteries of 6 guns each, and a cavalry battalion consisted of 2 squadrons of 100 sabres each. The engineer battalion had 2 field companies of about 200 combatants each, and also furnished the bridging and telegraph sections. The train battalion supplied the personnel, ponies, and so forth for all regimental and divisional transport, a pack pony being able to carry about 250 lbs., but during the campaign great use was made of hand-carts, each drawn by 3 coolies, and conveying about 350 lbs. Each division had 3 supply columns and 5 ammunition columns, and in all 8 days’ rations were carried. The medical corps formed 2 bearer companies and 6 field hospitals. The men of the First Reserve formed depots for each corps and augmented the units from peace to war strength, whereas the Second Reserve, on territorial mobilisation, formed additional units for garrison work, and for the preservation of the lines of communication for the army in the field.

It is needful to supply these details in order to show how Marshal Yamagata had taken cognisance, in his scheme, of the requirements of modern warfare, and that the confidence with which Japan entered on the contest with China was thoroughly well based. By Yamagata’s efforts the army of Japan had already been brought to a high standard of efficiency, and it more than fulfilled the expectations that he had been led to form of its capabilities in the field. Its discipline was from the first perfect. Had they been needed, there was a vast reserve of men in Japan who, given medical fitness, were liable to be called out, if between the ages of seventeen and forty, for service in the National Army, but up to that period no demand had ever been made on them, and they had not been organised into a fighting force.

The Japanese headquarter staff, at the beginning of the war, removed from Tokio to Hiroshima, in the south-west, and thence directed operations. The Emperor went likewise to Hiroshima and took up his residence in the barracks without the ancient castle of the former _daimio_ of Aki province, as Dai-Gen-Sui, or Supreme Commander-in-chief of Army and Navy. At his Majesty’s side were Prince Komatsu, Chief of Staff for the army, with General Kawakami, as his assistant, and Admiral Kabayama, as Chief of Staff for the Navy.

It was noted by military critics of the campaign that “the conduct of the war by the Japanese was marked by a very complete decentralisation.” The commanders of armies or detached forces were given definite objectives (one at a time), and then allowed a free hand in carrying out their work, the same system being followed within the armies or their divisions.

The telegraph, of which Japan had learned the value during the Satsuma Rebellion of 1877, was turned to the best account in the war of 1894-5, for orders were sent by cable from Japan to Fusan, and thence by telegraph through Korea to Marshal Yamagata, and for the Second army they were sent by wire to Ping-Yang and thence by steamer to the Liao-Tung peninsula. After the end of December 1894 the line of telegraph was built around the coast to the vicinity of Port Arthur, so that Marshal Oyama was also in direct touch with the imperial headquarters at Hiroshima.

The approximate strength of the Chinese army when it took its stand at Kiu-lien-cheng, on the west bank of the Yalu, was 20,000, and there was a further contingent of 4500 men, who had come south from Tsi-tsi-har, posted ten miles upstream. The advanced guard of Marshal Yamagata’s army arrived at Wiju, on the south side of the river, on the 10th October, and the main body on the 23rd. Just above Kiu-lien-cheng the Yalu is joined by the Ai-ho, and in the angle formed by the two rivers stands a prominent hill called Hu-shan, or Tiger Mount. The Chinese held this as an advanced position in front of their left flank, their main position extending along the right bank of the Yalu as far south as An-Tung-hsien. In front of this main Chinese position the river was broad and deep, and the country on the opposite bank was flat and open, so Marshal Yamagata, realising the difficulty of making a direct attack, determined to capture Hushan first, and then by fording the tributary stream to turn the Chinese left. The attack was planned to take place at daylight on the 25th October. The main obstacle to the advance of the Japanese forces was the principal channel of the Yalu, which at that time of the year was 11 feet deep and about 200 yards wide. The bridge had to be constructed by night, the pontoon equipment at that time with the army was not sufficient, and the water was so ice-cold that the men could only work in very short reliefs. By dawn however, the principal work had been done, and, the attack was delivered, the Chinese abandoning their Hushan positions before 8 A.M., though the main position continued to give trouble. The Japanese bivouacked on the right bank of the Ai-ho above Kiu-lien-cheng, and next morning it was found that their foes had evacuated both that city and An-Tung during the dark hours, and had fallen back, part in the direction of Feng-hwang-cheng, and part towards Siu-Yen.

The maxim that history repeats itself was so accurately borne out in the events of a decade later at Kiu-lien-cheng that the temptation to allude briefly to them at this point becomes irresistible. In the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 the Japanese commander General Kuroki had to force the passage of the Yalu in a precisely similar fashion, the attack being commenced by the crossing of the twelfth division at dawn on the 30th of April, and the Russians vainly attempting to hold the heights facing Hushan against assault. General Sassulitch fell back on the 1st of May, on Feng-hwang-cheng, which the Japanese occupied five days afterwards. In 1894 the troops under Marshal Yamagata entered Feng-hwang-cheng on the 29th October, the fifth day after the commencement of the attack on Hushan, the Chinese having retreated to the Mo-tien pass, thirty-eight miles to the north-west. Two columns were sent by different roads towards Taku-shan, afterwards meeting at Siu-Yen, and General Nodzu executed a brilliant combined movement against Sai-ma-tsui and defeated the Chinese at Tsao-ho-kao, on the 30th of November. Meanwhile General Sung, taking with him Ma Yu-kun as his chief of staff, had gone south by way of Kai-ping to attack the Japanese Second Army, which was reported to be marching on Port Arthur. At this time the Chinese opposing Marshal Yamagata in Manchuria numbered approximately 22,000 men.

After the capture of Port Arthur by the Second Army on the 21st of November, Marshal Yamagata was directed to proceed to the taking of Hai-cheng, which the Chinese were then holding in considerable strength, but his health, which had never been good during his stay in that region, quite broke down, and he was invalided home, his place in the field being taken by General Nodzu. At this period the marshal was so feeble that he could only with difficulty mount his charger, but he held on until the Emperor’s own physician, who had been sent with him to Manchuria, made a resolute appeal to him to desist. Very reluctantly Yamagata returned to Japan, abandoning the hope of winning glory on the field of battle, almost at the moment when fame seemed to be within his grasp.

The end of the war came in April 1895, and Marshal Yamagata had recovered sufficiently to be able to resume his place at the War Office, and even to journey to Europe, to attend the coronation of the Tsar Nicholas II. at Moscow, as the delegate of the Japanese Emperor. He did not succeed in getting as far as London, for he was obliged by illness to return direct to Japan from Russia, after concluding the Treaty of 9th June 1896.

On resuming his duties some months later at Tokio a scheme of expansion of the military forces was elaborated under his supervision which promised to confer upon Japan by the year 1902 a military power just double that which she possessed in the summer of 1895, and providing for an army of not less than 500,000 men, at an annual cost of 26,000,000 _Yen_ (roughly £2,654,000).

In January 1898 the Emperor decreed the formation of a Supreme Military Advisory Council, consisting of four members—viz. Marquis Yamagata, holding the position at that time of Inspector-General of the Army,—Prince Komatsu, Chief of the Staff,—Marshal Oyama,—and Marquis Saigo (since deceased). On the failure of the attempt to form a Party Government, which ended in the resignation of the Cabinet in November 1898, Marquis Yamagata was once more commanded by the Emperor to form a Ministry, and he became Minister-president with Marquis Saigo as Home Minister, Count Katsura as Minister for War, Count Matsukata at the Finance Department, and Baron Aoki at the Foreign Office. The Cabinet so constituted remained in office until September 1900, when Marshal Yamagata made way for Marquis Ito, who, as the retiring Minister-president declared, was far more skilled than himself in matters concerning China, and Chinese questions were then becoming exceptionally prominent.

Marquis Yamagata held during 1904 and 1905 the position at headquarters of Chief of the General Army Staff, and politically he is one of the Gen-Ro, or Elder Statesmen, to whom Japan looks for counsel and guidance in the hour of trial. During the recent war with Russia he was ever at the helm at Tokio, silently arranging and directing everything pertaining to the conduct of the campaign in Manchuria, while his colleague Marshal Oyama was active in the field.

Ten years ago Marshal Yamagata realised to his intense mortification not only that the Government of St Petersburg wished to deprive Japan of the legitimate fruits of her successes in the war with China, but that Russia intended to appropriate Manchuria herself. From that time his thoughts were occupied with the development of his country’s military strength, that at least she might not again be subject to the indignity which she had to suffer in 1895. It has already been shown how he gradually and surely raised the total of Japan’s resources in men and material until she was in possession of an army that would enable her to challenge with success the further advance towards her own shores of a power whose progress southward had ever constituted,—and as Minister Okubo had declared thirty years before,—a grave peril for Japan.

The disposition of Western observers had always been to accept the published figures of the standing army as indicative of the Empire’s military power. Never, perhaps, were figures so altogether deceptive, for the nominal muster of the regular forces bears but little comparison with the real strength which the nation is capable of putting forth in time of war.

Japan’s army is based on conscription, and all male subjects of the Ten-shi become liable when full seventeen, and remain liable until full forty years of age. In actual practice they are never called on until they are twenty, but even then their term of service may extend over twenty years, only three of which it is compulsory that they shall spend with the colours. We have in the Japanese system, therefore, a short service with the colours, but followed by a prolonged liability to be called out in emergencies and annually for practice, and its effects in relation to the military power of a nation are conveniently to be studied in the history of Japan since about the year 1890 when its possibilities first began to be realised by the people at large. At the end of his third year the Japanese soldier of the first selection—which is of men of superior physique—passes into the First Reserve, to which he is attached for four years and four months. But as there is a superabundance of men who are physically fully qualified for the Active army, the conscripts have to draw lots for the three years’ service with the colours, and when one of them is unlucky enough to be debarred from the active service—(this is the view which, as is, of course, only natural, the Japanese youth’s patriotism induces him to take of the fact that he has drawn a blank)—he is commiserated by his friends, and passes to the depot, where he will serve seven years and four months, and thus equal in the duration of his term his more fortunate comrade on whom the lot fell for active service at the outset. At the expiration of their term of seven years and four months the men of both classes are passed into the territorial army for ten years, and thence to the territorial reserve until they reach the age of forty. Up to a certain point the same course is followed with those who were at first rejected as being of inferior physique,—they serve seven years and four months in depot, but they then pass to the Territorial Reserve direct until they are forty years old. One-year volunteers are accepted, as in Germany, provided they are youths of the prescribed educational attainments and undertake to maintain themselves (and to mount themselves in mounted branches of the service) during their term. They then pass for six years and four months into the Active Reserve Army, and next for ten years into the Territorial Army as usual, completing their term in the Territorial Reserve until forty. There is a special plan of service in force in the island of Tsu-shima owing to its strategical position, whereby all the male population may be mobilised, but with the changed circumstances resultant on the altered status of Korea it seems possible that Tsushima may eventually be brought under the operation of the ordinary regulations.

The general effect of the provisions for service was to equip Japan down to the end of 1904 with an army on a peace footing of 8000 officers and 152,000 men, which was capable of being raised on a war footing to 14,000 officers and 630,000 men, but that was before the law increasing the term of service in the Territorial Army to ten years, promulgated in September 1904, came into operation. The term had previously been five years only. The lengthening of the term will have had the result of vastly adding to the possibilities of the army in numbers on a war footing. The budget appropriation for this large army was for the fiscal year ending with March 1906 as nearly as possible £4,000,000.

It may be useful to insert here for the sake of comparison the cost of some other armies to their respective countries:—

Russia £38,330,000 Germany 31,674,000 Great Britain 28,600,000 France 27,000,000 Austro-Hungary 13,150,000 Italy 11,160,000

In Japan the service is universal and compulsory, with exemption only for physical disability. At a rough estimate 410,000 youths reach the prescribed age annually, but less than one-third of this number are selected for the maintenance of the standing army, as men of superior physique, a term which palpably is elastic enough to admit of the choice of precisely the number required from the vast assemblage of youths presenting themselves every year for enrolment.