Part 13

At the beginning of this campaign and until recently many Republicans were disheartened. The menace to our institutions and future in the possible success of the Progressive party and the re-election of ex-President Roosevelt seemed as portentous as was the menace of Bryanism in 1896, in 1900 and in 1908. To some, therefore, it seemed at first as if it might be their patriotic duty to vote the Democratic ticket. Patriotism is ever more than party. But these Republicans now realize the folly of that course and the certainty that the Republican party will maintain its solidarity. We see clearly that the candidacy of Mr. Roosevelt is doomed to defeat, and that only a desire to work injury to the Republican party continues the campaign of the so-called Progressives.

I have examined the published record as to contested seats in the national convention of the Republican party at Chicago, and I have endeavored to ascertain all of the facts. I believe that I have done so. In my judgment no fair-minded person who will take the trouble to read the evidence, who will look impartially at the facts and candidly seek to discover the truth, can doubt the fairness of the procedure or the correctness of the decisions. Most of the contests were wholly unjustifiable, if not fraudulent, and had to be abandoned. Indeed, it was shamelessly boasted by a well-known newspaper that the great majority of the contests had been gotten up in order to create a psychological effect, which, I take it, among plain people would mean the deliberate creation of a false impression. I will read you the language of one of the exemplars of the class of reformers who are too virtuous to remain in the Republican party and who profess to teach the people of this country political morality. The "Washington Times" contains the following in its issue of June 9, 1912: "For psychological effect as a move in practical politics it was necessary for the Roosevelt people to start contests on these early Taft selections in order that a tabulation of delegate strength could be put out that would show Roosevelt holding a good hand. In the game a table showing Taft 150, Roosevelt 19, contested 1, would not be very much calculated to inspire confidence, whereas, one showing Taft 23, Roosevelt 19, contested 127, looked very different. That is the whole story of the large number of southern contests that were started early in the game. It was never expected that they would be taken very seriously. They served a useful purpose, and now the national committee is deciding them in favor of Taft in most cases without real division."

Of the 238 contests finally filed on behalf of ex-President Roosevelt, 164 were abandoned. The contests which were not abandoned were decided on their merits. After studying the facts, I am convinced that the Taft delegates were legally and morally entitled to their seats. Unfortunately, the record is voluminous, and few will take the time or trouble to read the evidence. The cry of fraud is misleading many. But surely when such men as Senator Root and the presidents of Columbia and Cornell universities declare their conviction of the integrity of the procedure and of the decisions, we may well rest satisfied. In his speech notifying President Taft of his renomination, Senator Root said that neither in the facts nor in the arguments produced before the national committee, the committee on credentials, the convention itself, or otherwise, did there appear to be any just ground for impeaching the honesty and good faith of the decisions of the national committee. He further declared to President Taft that his title to the nomination was "as clear and unimpeachable as the title of any candidate of any party since political conventions began." Senator Root's high character, his great services to the nation and to the party, and his lofty sense of personal honor and responsibility, entitle him to have his word and his opinion under such circumstances unqualifiedly accepted by the people of the state of New York.

The preference of the majority of the national convention being clearly for President Taft, should this majority nevertheless have cast him aside and nominated Mr. Roosevelt because of threats of disruption of the party similar to those of 1896, or because in a few states ex-President Roosevelt had secured a larger primary vote than President Taft in hasty contests in which misrepresentation undoubtedly had led many astray? What course did patriotism dictate to the majority of the delegates? Ought they to have surrendered, and, because of clamor and threats of disruption of the party, put aside their own preferences and instructions for President Taft and nominated Mr. Roosevelt? There were reasons why this course would have been an act of folly as well as of injustice.

In the first place, the nomination of an ex-President of the United States for a third term would have been in violation of an unwritten rule established by Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, and followed ever since. The Republican party which, as a matter of sound principle and political ethics, had refused in 1880 to nominate ex-President Grant for a third term, notwithstanding his transcendent claims to the gratitude of the nation, could not stultify itself in 1912 by nominating ex-President Roosevelt for a third term.

The wisdom of maintaining this unwritten rule should be evident. The common sense of thoughtful, candid and patriotic men must convince them that nothing could be more dangerous than to permit any individual, however popular or eloquent, to wield the power of the presidential office for more than two terms. The New York convention of 1788, which ratified the Constitution of the United States, proposed an amendment to the effect "that no person shall be eligible to the office of President of the United States a third time," and this undoubtedly has ever since been the sentiment of the people of this state, although it was defied in 1880 when an attempt was made to force the nomination of ex-President Grant for a third term, notwithstanding the fact that only five years before the Republican state convention had declared in its platform "our unalterable opposition to the election of any president for a third term."

There is not time to discuss the genesis or wisdom of this unwritten rule of political policy, which had never been violated by any political party until the nomination of ex-President Roosevelt by the Progressives. It is now pretended that there never was any such rule or principle of political policy and that Washington and Jefferson were governed solely by considerations of their own personal convenience. Three quotations from Jefferson's writings ought to be sufficient to explode this pretense. I take Jefferson because he is now one of the patron saints of the Progressive as well as of the Democratic party.

In January, 1805, shortly after his re-election, Jefferson declared as follows: "General Washington set the example of voluntary retirement after eight years. I shall follow it. And a few more precedents will oppose the obstacle of habit to any one after awhile who shall endeavor to extend his term. Perhaps it may beget a disposition to establish it by an amendment of the Constitution. I believe I am doing right, therefore, in pursuing my principle." Again in 1807 he wrote to the legislature of Vermont: "I should unwillingly be the person who, disregarding the sound precedent set by an illustrious predecessor, should furnish the first example of prolongation beyond the second term of office." And fourteen years afterwards, in 1821, he published his "Autobiography," in which he said: "The example of four Presidents voluntarily retiring at the end of their eighth year, and the progress of public opinion that the principle is salutary, have given it in practice the force of precedent and usage; insomuch, that, should a President consent to be a candidate for a third election, I trust he would be rejected on this demonstration of ambitious views."

But aside from all principle and precedent, the promises deliberately made by ex-President Roosevelt to the people of the United States rendered his candidacy impossible without what seems to many a breach of faith. The facts speak for themselves.

On the 8th of November, 1904, President Roosevelt expressed to the people of the United States gratitude for his election, and appealed to them for their support and confidence during his second term, undoubtedly having in mind President McKinley's example in 1901, when he had declared that he would not accept a nomination for a third term if it were tendered him, and had pointed out that there were "questions of the greatest importance before the administration and the country, and their just consideration should not be prejudiced in the public mind by even the suspicion of the thought of a third term." President Roosevelt's language in 1904 was as follows: "On the 4th of March next I shall have served three and one-half years, and this three and one-half years constitutes my first term. The wise custom which limits the President to two terms regards the substance and not the form. Under no circumstances will I be a candidate for or accept another nomination." In December, 1907, he reiterated this declaration, and added the following words: "I have not changed and shall not change the decision thus announced." Yet on February 24, 1912, he gave to the press a letter in which he said: "I will accept the nomination for President if it is tendered to me, and I will adhere to this decision until the convention has expressed its preference."

The statesman who had thus pledged his word could not break his promise to the people without sacrificing the good opinion of many citizens. And if the Republican national convention had joined ex-President Roosevelt in a repudiation of these solemn promises, it would have alienated a large body of voters who still hold in reverence the names and examples of Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, and who still believe in political consistency and morality, and it would have put the party on the defensive throughout the campaign upon an issue of plain and simple morals. The Republican party, moreover, could not afford--in fact it would have been hopeless--to ask for the continued support of the country on any such terms.

Another reason why the majority in the Chicago convention should not have cast aside President Taft and nominated ex-President Roosevelt was because to have done so would have been an act of political treachery, ingratitude and dishonor. President Taft had earned and deserved renomination for great and faithful service to the nation and to the party. The custom generally followed had been to renominate a President who had served well and capably. The Republicans of New York had unanimously proclaimed in their platform of 1910, when ex-President Roosevelt himself controlled the state convention and dictated its policy: "We enthusiastically indorse the progressive and statesmanlike leadership of William Howard Taft, and declare our pride in the achievements of his first eighteen months as President of the United States. Each succeeding month since his inauguration has confirmed the nation in its high esteem of his greatness of character, intellectual ability, sturdy common sense, extraordinary patience and perseverance, broad and statesmanlike comprehension of public questions and unfaltering and unswerving adherence to duty." And nothing had occurred during the months intervening between this state convention and the national convention to shake that high and just estimate of the character and ability of President Taft. He had consented to run when he believed he could rely on the loyalty of Mr. Roosevelt as his friend, and subsequent withdrawal would have been a personal humiliation.

In practical achievements, President Taft's administration had been notably successful and efficient, although not spectacular. It may be asserted with confidence that the laws enacted by Congress never had been administered more effectively, honestly and impartially than under President Taft. Without turmoil or agitation, and without threatening Congress, he had accomplished more in three and one-third years than his immediate predecessor in seven and one-half years. He had shown a consistent policy of real progressiveness and constructive statesmanship. In every branch of government he had confirmed President Roosevelt's panegyric of 1908, when he urged the American people to elect Mr. Taft because of his pre-eminent qualifications for the office of President of the United States.

It may be true that after eighteen years of unselfish devotion and conspicuously efficient and faithful service to the American public, as solicitor general, United States circuit judge, governor of the Philippines, secretary of war and President of the United States, Mr. Taft had failed to secure popularity with the thoughtless, the discontented and the revolutionary, and with that part of the press that lives on sensationalism and muck-raking. But such popularity should hardly be the test of qualification for the great office of President of the United States. We know that Lincoln was so unpopular with the unthinking and impatient in 1864 that he despaired of re-election and that he expected defeat at the polls unless the army could save the day and change public opinion by some striking successes.

Popularity with the unreasoning and discontented was easily within the reach of President Taft had he sought it. In view of the prestige of his high office and the reverence it commands, he had only to practice the well-known arts of the demagogue by which crowds are stirred and led astray--as well known to him as to all who read history. He had only to issue from time to time high-sounding declarations about his staunch patriotism, his own virtue, his uncompromising veracity, his self-sacrificing loyalty to duty, the infallibility of his judgment, the purity of his motives, and the corruption and mendacity of his adversaries. He had only to rail at corporations, at the builders of the industries of the country and at bankers and capitalists, in order to secure the applause of envy and discontent. He had only to inveigh against predatory wealth to become at once the idol of predatory poverty. But his self-respect would not allow him to stoop so low and to pander to what is weakest, if not basest, in human nature, and his sense of duty would not permit him thus to degrade the great office of President of the United States.

The ingratitude of republics is proverbial; yet surely it would have been an unparalleled act of ingratitude for President Taft's own party to refuse him the renomination he had earned and deserved. The lesson that the repudiation of President Taft by his own party would have taught the country and future generations would have been demoralizing. It would have constituted a warning to all our present and future public officers that with us Americans conspicuously efficient and faithful public service goes for naught, and that Republican public officers, from the President of the United States down to the lowest, must not expect to be judged by their acts, ability and character, but as they have succeeded in cultivating the applause of the unthinking.

The great issues before the people in the present critical campaign, however, are far more important than the personal qualifications, claims, or merits of the candidates. These issues are: (1) the constitutional right and power of Congress to protect American industries and to preserve our present industrial system; (2) the threatened overthrow of the representative system of government in state and nation by the introduction of the initiative, the referendum and the recall, and (3) the assault upon the administration of justice in American courts.

Upon the tariff question, there is an irreconcilable difference between the principles of the Republican party and those of the Democratic party. The one insists that it is the legitimate duty and function of Congress in levying taxes to protect American industries and wages, whilst the other insists that Congress has neither the right nor the power under the federal Constitution to do so. I shall assume that political platforms, although they may not be binding programmes, certainly are intended to embody a declaration of the political faith and principles in which the respective candidates believe and which they intend to represent. If this be not so, then why are platforms adopted?

The platform of the Republican party unqualifiedly pledges the party and its candidates to a protective tariff with duties so adjusted as adequately to protect American industries and wages. It concedes that readjustments must be made and that excessive rates should be reduced, but it insists that, in order to do so intelligently and fairly, correct information is indispensable. It favors securing this information by an expert commission and a non-partisan tariff board. It seeks the withdrawal of the tariff from politics in order that each industry may be dealt with on its merits by non-partisan commissions. It indicts the Democratic party for its refusal to provide funds for the continuance of such a tariff board and for the reckless and sectional tariff bills passed by the Democratic House of Representatives which wholly disregard the protection of American interests.

Senator Root declared at the national convention that the Democratic party did not want to ascertain the facts upon which a just protective measure could be framed, but intended that there should be no protection for American industries, and he further declared that the Democratic House of Representatives had framed and passed a series of tariff bills for revenue only with complete indifference to the absolute destruction that their enactment would bring upon great American industries. He asserted that "the American people have now to pass, not upon the abuses of the tariff, but on the fundamental question between the two systems of tariff-making."

This challenge the Democratic party met and answered in the first and cardinal plank adopted by its national convention at Baltimore, which pledged the party and its candidates to the ultimate attainment of the principles of free trade, because of the absence of power in the Congress of the United States to protect American labor and American industries. The plank reads as follows: "We declare it to be a fundamental principle of the Democratic party that the federal government, under the Constitution, has no right or power to impose or collect tariff duties except for the purpose of revenue." And there can be no doubt that this declaration was assumed not only to represent the present free-trade policy of the Democratic party but to be in full accord with Governor Wilson's personal views as an out-and-out free trader.

The people of the United States are, therefore, now asked by the Democratic party to vote in favor of the proposition that, no matter what foreign competition there may be, even from Asiatics, the American national government has neither the _right_ nor the _power_ to protect a single industry or a single workman. Such a proposition may well amaze and delight foreign countries, and no wonder they all desire the success of the Democratic party. Every other national government not only has the power to protect its industries, but has again and again exercised that power whenever the interests of its people demanded protection. The power in one form or another is being exercised to-day against American products by almost every government in the world, including the colonies of England, as witness Canada. The power would be exercised by England again to-morrow if it should appear to be for her interest to do so. Yet, no matter that our factories may be closed and our wage-earners thrown out of work as in 1894, 1895 and 1896, no matter how easily Europe and Asia could make our country their dumping-ground and could make a prey of our necessities after closing our workshops and destroying our industries, no matter how beneficial to all classes it may be to have a diversity of industries--the Democratic party, nevertheless, proclaims that our national government is powerless, and that there is neither the _right_ nor the _power_ to enact a tariff except for revenue.

We Republicans firmly believe that if there be one feature or element of right and power within the spirit and scope of the Constitution of the United States, and clearly vested in Congress, it is the right and power to impose duties for the purpose of protecting American industries and American labor. The very first tariff act, approved July 4, 1789, one hundred and twenty-three years ago, declared that one of its purposes, one of its objects, one of its inducing motives, was "the encouragement and protection of manufactures." Washington approved and signed that bill. Presidents Washington, Jefferson, Madison and Monroe--all of them of the generation that framed the federal Constitution--recognized the existence of the power to protect and recommended the protection of American industries. But the American people are now asked in 1912 to vote for a party and a platform which repudiate both the _right_ and the _power_ of Congress to protect American workmen, farmers and manufacturers.

It is impossible in this outline of issues adequately to discuss the principles and policy of a protective tariff. The details of that important and vital subject must be taken up and analyzed at other times. Generalizations would be of little value. The facts are readily at hand, and they demonstrate that the material welfare of the country and of nearly every class and section has been promoted by the protective policy, and it will continue to be so promoted. Although we may now be willing to face free competition with Europeans, we cannot be blind to the menace and danger of free competition with Asiatics. Just across the Pacific ocean, with constantly cheapening freight and passenger rates, are populations of 50,000,000 in Japan, 450,000,000 in China, 300,000,000 in India--800,000,000--who will furnish efficient labor at wages ranging from 10 to 30 cents a day for twelve hours' work on the same kind of machines at which American men and women are now working. Shall we open the flood-gates? Shall we elect as President the historian who, but a few years ago in the quiet and impartial atmosphere of his study, declared to the world his sympathy for needy Asiatics and his opinion that "the Chinese were more to be desired, as workmen if not as citizens, than most of the coarse crew that came crowding in every year at the eastern ports"?