CHAPTER VIII

EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD IN MINOR OPERATIONS

SMALL WARS

Callwell, in his well-known work on this subject, defines the small war in the following terms: “It comprises the expeditions against savages and semi-civilised races by disciplined soldiers, it comprises campaigns undertaken to suppress rebellions and guerilla warfare in all parts of the world where organised armies are struggling against opponents who will not meet them in the open field, and it thus obviously covers operations very varying in their scope and in their conditions.”[50]

The British Empire, “upon which the sun never sets,” is seldom without its small war in some remote part of the globe, and it is safe to affirm that there is never a small war in which the machine gun does not play a prominent part.

Wars against savages or semi-civilised peoples differ fundamentally in principles and tactics from war against a civilised enemy, and the tactics adopted will be governed by the object of the expedition and the tactics and arms of the enemy to be dealt with. Callwell says: “The tactics of such opponents differ so greatly in various cases that it is essential that these be taken fully into consideration. The armament of the enemy is also a point of extreme importance.”

In dealing with machine-gun tactics in small wars, it is obviously impossible to treat with all the situations that may be met with or to attempt to lay down definite rules for their use under all the varying conditions of country, race, and arms before mentioned. It will therefore be sufficient for our purpose to show how machine guns may be used generally in warfare in uncivilised countries, and then to take a single typical campaign to illustrate their employment.

“Against an enemy who fights outside stockades, machine guns are very efficacious; and in any case against all uncivilised people a sudden burst of fire from these is often most paralysing.”[51]

After speaking of the jamming of non-automatic machine guns at Ulundi, Abu Klea, Dogali, and Tofreck, Callwell says: “On the other hand, Maxims, which can be easily handled and moved, have done excellent service in East Africa, in Matabililand, and in the campaigns on the North-West Frontier of India. There can be no doubt that machine guns of an easily portable and thoroughly trustworthy class may be most valuable in small wars, and they will probably be freely used in such operations in the future, especially when the enemy is inclined to attack in mass. In hill warfare these weapons scarcely get a proper chance, as they are not very well suited for picking off individuals and as it is dangerous to thrust them too far to the front with the small parties which are so much used in operations of this class. In bush warfare also the want of a fair target is unfavourable to them, and when the shooting is at short range the detachment is likely to be put _hors de combat_, as it offers such a good target; this happened at Owikokaro. An open field of fire and a well-defined object to aim at are almost more necessary to machine guns than to artillery. On the defensive, machine guns can hardly fail to be valuable. In laager, zarebas, and detached posts of all kinds they are always likely to be of service, and to a certain extent they may take the place of guns for such work. During the operations in Rhodesia in 1896 they were found very useful as a protection to the small laagers left behind by the columns when they moved out for a fight. Two of them did tremendous execution in Chakdara Fort during the siege of that post in 1897. It is interesting to note that at the fight on the Shangani River in Matabililand after the attempt to capture the king had failed, the troops, although they were in a bad position, could not move to a better one for a while, simply because the machine guns would have been thrown out of action during the change of position. Against rushes of Zulus, Ghazis, or other fanatics the effect of such weapons is tremendous, as long as the fire is well maintained. In the excitement of the moment the best infantry may fire unsteadily; but machine guns can be absolutely trusted to commit destructive havoc in the hostile throng, provided that their mechanism does not go out of order.”[52]

The above is interesting as showing the wide field for their use in small arms and yet how narrow the method of tactical employment. It may be summed up in a few words: a good target, a good field of fire, constant readiness for action, and sufficient protection to enable the gun to be handled with confidence.

Machine guns should form an integral part of the arm to which they are attached, and must be used with them to supplement their fire power. In attack they must seek positions from which to bring to bear a concentrated and overwhelming fire on the main body of the enemy, and against savages this must be from the flanks or rear to be successful, as the object is to prevent flight and insure decisive results. Their real value in small wars lies in their enormous defensive powers, which may be employed in clearing the way for columns in enclosed country, in stopping a charge of fanatics whether mounted or on foot, and in preventing small columns on the march from being overwhelmed by superior numbers.

It will be found that, although it is the invariable rule for the disciplined force in a small war to assume the initiative and attack with vigour on every possible occasion, the uncivilised enemy, by reason of his primitive arms and tactics, generally avoids the encounter until he is able to make an attack at a time and on ground of his own choosing. Thus we find the disciplined force thrown on the defensive in the early stages of the expedition and the very heavy losses inflicted then often directly lead to a speedy termination of the campaign. Callwell says: “The tactics adopted by the Zulus and Mahdists when flushed with confidence were best met at a halt in close formation, even on ground where arms of precision could not tell with full effect. In the jungles of Dahomey the sudden hostile attacks on flanks and rear could be confronted most satisfactorily by the troops on the spot acting on the defence until the edge was taken off the hostile appetite for combat.... Where a small force of regular troops is opposed to great hostile masses, no matter how ill-armed or how deficient in morale the masses may be, circumstances render it almost imperative to act on the defensive.”

For this reason alone machine guns form the most valuable arm in encounters of this nature, and their tremendous effect cannot be better illustrated than at Omdurman, where they literally mowed down the attacking masses in great swathes.

The first consideration when employing machine guns in a small war is the method of carrying the gun and its ammunition, which must be suited to the country in which the operations are to take place.

In the majority of cases it will be found that the usual transport of the country is the most suitable, and a tripod-mounted gun can be adapted to almost any form of carriage. In mountainous open country such as the North-West Frontier of India mules or ponies are suitable; in the desert the camel has been used; while in the forests of East Africa machine guns have been carried by porters on their heads, strapped on their backs, or slung beneath a pole by two men. Whatever method is adopted, it is essential that the gun can be brought into action easily and quickly, and that it is at least as mobile as the troops it accompanies.

The operations in Somaliland in 1901-4 are an excellent example of one of our typical small wars, and will serve to illustrate the use of machine guns against a savage enemy in a bush country.

The camel is the transport animal of the country and riding camels were used to carry the machine guns with the infantry of the force. In the first expedition, under Lieut.-Colonel Swayne, there were three Maxim guns--two of which were ·450 bore and one a ·303. On June 2nd, 1901, Captain McNeil, who was left in zareba at Smala to guard the live stock, was attacked by about 3,000 Somalis, who increased to about 5,000 on the 3rd. His force consisted of three British officers and 500 native troops, many of whom were native levies and only 370 of whom were armed with rifles. There were about 3,500 camels, 100 horses, and some cattle and goats in a separate zareba from the men who were above and able to command it. The Maxim, under Lieutenant Younghusband and served by Somalis, was placed on a cairn of stones at the top of the men’s zareba and commanded a good field of fire all round. The ground was fairly open all round, and clear of bushes for about 150 yards from the zareba. Before the camels could be driven in, the enemy’s horsemen appeared and threatened to capture a large head of camels, to prevent which a section under a Jemada was sent out to try to keep off the enemy until these camels could be driven in. Captain McNeil says: “I supported him by turning the Maxim on the nearest horseman.... Some of the horsemen had got round by now a good way out, but by keeping the Maxim on them, supported by long-range volleys from the Punjabis, we did much to check them.”[53]

On June 3rd at about 9 a.m. a very large force of footmen attacked in one long line several ranks deep and enveloped the south and west sides of both zarebas. They came on at a steady pace and opened fire at about 400 yards. Fire was reserved until the enemy were at about 500 yards range, when heavy fire was opened by both rifles and Maxim, with the result that no one got within 150 yards of the zareba, though they advanced most pluckily. 180 dead were found around the zareba, and the enemy’s loss was estimated at 500.

The danger of rushing machine guns up to the front while still mounted is shown in an incident that occurred on June 17th during a successful attack on the Mullah’s villages near Feriddin. During the reconnaissance the mounted corps became somewhat heavily engaged, and Colonel Swayne sent forward the reserve company and the Maxims to bring fire to bear from a commanding spur about two miles to the front. On reaching the spur they came under a heavy fire, and the Maxim camels and some ponies were shot down. The Somalis, however, were able to disentangle the Maxims from the dead camels and bring them into action on commanding ground.[54] Colonel Swayne, in his official report, said: “Mekometers were badly wanted for the Maxims.... The Maxims had a trick of jamming at critical moments, but were quickly set right again. The fault may have been due to the belts.”

When the Maxim gun jams without a breakage of the mechanism, the fault is usually want of experience on the part of the gunner.

During the third expedition the machine guns were increased to eleven and were carried by porters with the infantry.

The disaster to Colonel Plunkett’s force at Gumburu on April 17th was due to ammunition running short. The force, consisting of about 200 men with two machine guns, was attacked by a large force of horse and foot. They at once formed square, and took up a position in an open spot surrounded by dense bush at from 300 to 600 yards’ distance. For some two hours they were able to hold off the enemy, but on the ammunition being exhausted they were overwhelmed.

On April 22nd, 1903, Major Gough’s force of about 200 men with one machine gun was attacked in thick bush by a large force under very similar conditions to Colonel Plunkett. The attack began at 10.30 a.m. from all sides, and was continued with great determination until 2 p.m. Square was formed, and fire opened at very close range (20 to 50 yards), owing to the dense bush. “The Maxim, under Sergeant Gibb, was moved from place to place as occasion arose, the enemy always giving way when it opened fire.”[55]

In the fourth expedition, under General Egerton, the ammunition per machine gun was 30,200 rounds in garrison, 10,400 rounds with the brigade, and 2,200 rounds in second-line transport; 6,000 rounds with each gun was carried ready in belts.

During the action at Jidbali on January 10th, 1904, the force engaged, which consisted of about 2,500, including native levies, the infantry, about 1,299 strong, formed the usual hollow square round the transport. The enemy consisted of the pick of the Mullah’s fighting Dervishes, and were about 6,000 to 8,000 strong. The Dervishes advanced in regular skirmishing order, rushing from cover to cover, and lying down. A few got within 400 yards of the square, _but were unable to face the heavy rifle and Maxim fire that met them_, and this attack failed. Then two determined rushes were made on the front and right flank of the square, _but they were met with such a terrific fire from rifles and Maxims that the charging enemy could not face it_. At 10 a.m. the whole mass of the enemy broke and fled, followed by fire till it was masked by the pursuing mounted troops. Six hundred and sixty-eight dead were counted round the position two days later.[56]

“_Much execution was done by the Maxim worked in the right corner of the square by Sergeant Gibbs, 1st Bn. King’s African Rifles, on the groups of Dervishes taking cover behind the scattered clumps of bushes surrounding the square. One entire group of nine men was wiped out in a moment by this Maxim._”[57]

It will be seen that machine guns are a very useful auxiliary in bush warfare, especially in holding posts and defending squares from the rush of fanatics. They must always march with the main body of the arm to which they are attached, and be used as circumstances require. A high state of efficiency in working the gun, a thorough knowledge of its mechanism, and ability to bring it into action with great rapidity are of more importance in bush warfare than tactical handling, which is usually of the simplest description.

MOUNTAIN WARFARE

“The principle of always having bodies of men in rear or on the flanks, covering by their fire the advance or retirement of the troops nearest the enemy, is specially important in hill fighting. On nearly every ridge and spur positions will be found where this can be done, and advantage can also often be taken of parallel features, from which covering and cross fire may be used with effect.”[58]

It will seldom be possible to make much use of machine guns with the advanced guards, as mountaineers usually oppose the advance by bands of skirmishers who fire from the cover of rocks and scattered sangars, and while affording a bad target to the machine gun, can quickly put it out of action by concentrating their fire upon it. They are also unsuitable for piqueting the heights, on account of the difficulty of getting them into position and of rapidly withdrawing them again. They are, however, very useful to strengthen small fortified posts on the lines of communications, and for the defence of camps by night, being trained by day and the sights prepared as suggested in Chapter VII., page 150. Callwell says: “It is a good plan, if night attacks are at all probable, to train guns and machine guns by daylight upon points where the enemy may be expected to mass, or from which assault is to be anticipated. _This was done at the defence of Chakdara in 1897 with excellent results._”

Machine guns are invaluable to the rear guard of a force retiring, which is an exceedingly difficult undertaking in mountain warfare, because hillmen invariably await this opportunity to swoop down and make a vigorous attack. The very nature of the operations necessitates frequent retirements. Callwell says: “Columns have to visit outlying valleys for punitive purposes, and must then rejoin the main body; and even when penetrating into the heart of a hostile mountain district, the rear of the army, as it passes successively the homes of different tribes and clans, draws these down upon it, and, as a result of the general direction of its march, retires before them.”

_Field Service Regulations_, 1909, speaking of rear guards in mountain warfare, says: “Mountain artillery should usually form part of a rear guard, _and machine guns may be usefully employed_. The withdrawal of the artillery is usually an encouragement to the enemy to press on, and on such occasions machine guns will often find scope for action....” “If the rear-guard commander considers it impossible to reach camp before nightfall, it will generally be advisable for him to halt and bivouac for the night in the most favourable position for defence.” Here, again, machine guns will be most useful in defending the bivouac after dark if trained by daylight to sweep approaches, while the morale effect of its accurate fire in the dark will be considerable. There are many instances from our wars on the North-West Frontier where machine guns might have been used profitably in covering the retreat; but to be successfully employed in such cases, they must be far more mobile and better trained for rapid-fire practice than they have been in the past. Lieut.-Colonel Haughton’s retreat from the Iseri Kandeo Pass is typical of such operations. “A brigade had been sent on detached duty into the Warais Valley, and after completing its work there was rejoining the rest of the army in Maidan. In doing so the brigade had to cross the Iseri Kandeo Pass over the hills which separate the two valleys. As the force quitted its bivouacs the Ghurkas were left as rear guard, while the 15th Sikhs were told off to hold the Kotal, which was about half-way. The main body and baggage moved off early, and the latter reached the maidan almost unnoticed. The Ghurkas, however, were pressed from the commencement of the retirement right up to the top of the Kotal; then they marched on, leaving the 15th Sikhs to cover the retirement. As the Sikhs began to draw in their piquets from the heights above the pass, the Afridis, as was their wont, grew bolder and bolder, and, taking advantage of the cover of a wood hard by, they crept down close to the rear guard. One company as it withdrew was suddenly charged by a crowd of swordsmen.... But those who participated in this rush paid dearly for their temerity, the Sikh company meeting them with steady musketry and being most opportunely reinforced by another company. The carrying off of the wounded was, however, becoming a matter of serious difficulty, so reinforcements were asked for. These arrived in the shape of two companies of Dorsets and of several companies of the 36th Sikhs under Lieut.-Colonel Haughton, who assumed command, and who withdrew his force down the hill without much loss.”[59] It is easy to imagine how machine guns might have been used here, and how their presence might even have rendered the reinforcements unnecessary; but unless they are capable of coming into action and opening fire in thirty seconds, and of packing up and moving off again after ceasing fire in the same time, the rear guard in mountain warfare is no place for them and they had best march with the baggage.

During the expedition to Tibet some trouble arose with the machine guns owing to the extreme cold, which not only froze the water in the barrel-casing of the Maxims, but froze the lubricating oil in the lock and recoiling parts and thus rendered the gun useless. When very low temperatures are encountered in high latitudes, alcohol or spirit should be added to the water to prevent it freezing; and as potable spirit is liable to “evaporate,” a little paraffin oil should be added. Glycerine may be substituted for lubricating oil in temperatures where even Russian petroleum will freeze.

CONVOYS

Callwell defines a convoy as “a column of non-combatants guarded by a comparatively speaking small escort.” The object of this escort is to hold off all hostile parties and to get the convoy to its destination in safety. Escorts will generally have to be reduced to the smallest possible size in order not to deprive the fighting force of men. They will therefore always act on the defensive, while endeavouring to keep moving with the convoy, which will only be halted when compelled to do so for its own safety. When the escort consists of the three arms, machine guns may be used to reduce the number of infantry required very considerably, while adding to the defensive power of those necessary.

In minor operations where every available rifle is required with the fighting force, machine guns will be found invaluable to replace infantry. Their exact position with the convoy must depend upon its composition and length and the number of guns available. The principle of having a machine gun, or where possible a section, at the head and another at the rear end of the line of wagons or pack animals is sound, as these are the vital points, and an attack on the centre can be met by a cross fire from these positions. If the convoy is unduly long, another gun or section may be placed in the centre. Should it be necessary to form laager, the machine guns in the front and rear enable this to be done under their converging fire. Where wagons or carts are used and the enemy is unprovided with arms of precision, machine guns may be mounted on the tops of wagons, so that they can open fire instantly and fire while moving forward with the convoy; this position not only provides them with a good field of fire, but also affords protection to the detachments from a sudden charge home of savages from an ambush.

“The success of an attack upon a convoy usually depends upon the defeat of the protecting troops. This will involve a combat, which will be governed by the principles already laid down in this manual.... If fighting is inevitable, the enemy should be engaged as far from the convoy as possible.”[60]

For this reason machine guns should open fire on any body of the enemy presenting a good target, even at long range, if they are moving to attack the convoy. The presence of machine guns with a convoy will free the infantry to move out wide on the flanks in open country, and to push ahead to piquet hills, clear bush, and occupy heights on the line of march, without exposing the convoy to danger during their absence.

BLOCKHOUSES

Blockhouses have been much used in warfare in uncivilised countries ever since the introduction of firearms, to enable small detachments on a frontier or on the lines of communication to maintain themselves in the midst of the enemy when unsupported by other troops, and also to form a chain of posts across an enemy’s country for the capture or suppression of guerilla bands.

Looking back to the South African War, it appears inexplicable that little or no use was made of machine guns to hold the long blockhouse lines which stretched for so many hundreds of miles in every direction during the latter stages of the war. Time after time the Boers succeeded in breaking through this line, even in places where the blockhouses were within effective range of each other and the intervening space guarded by elaborate barbed-wire entanglements. The reason for this is not difficult to discover. Screened by the darkness, the fire of the small garrisons of these blockhouses was neither sufficiently powerful nor accurate to stop the majority of the enemy from breaking through, even though stopped by the entanglements and compelled to use a single gap. The annihilating and concentrated fire of machine guns which had been laid by day to sweep the entanglements should render the forcing of a similar blockhouse line impossible in the future. Machine guns in detached blockhouses should be sited as low as is compatible with a good field of fire, and should have long narrow loopholes prepared for them for at least two positions on every face. Constant change of position within the blockhouse after firing will prevent the enemy from being able to “snipe” the gunners through the loopholes.

The great variety of conditions and circumstances under which minor operations take place renders it impossible to do more than show how they may be used in certain selected instances. The machine gunner must be prepared to modify and adapt his tactics to suit the special circumstances of the expedition with which he is employed, and he cannot do better than study Callwell’s _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_, which has been so freely quoted in this chapter.

ENCLOSED COUNTRY

This chapter would not be complete without some reference to the use of machine guns in enclosed country such as is found in the United Kingdom. Clery, in his _Minor Tactics_, p. 118, says that cultivated country is the most favourable to the attack, while in defence the country to the front cannot be too open. “In the first, infantry gains a succession of covered positions by means of which it comes on more equal terms with the defence. In the second, the infantry of the defence has a clear field to destroy the assailants as they approach.”

Apart from civil war, the only possible occasion for the use of machine guns in the British Isles is against an invader, and it is well known to students of modern war that the prospects of a successful invasion do not depend upon the strength or weakness of our fleet, but on that of our army for home defence. The duty of a fleet in time of war is to go to sea and destroy the enemy’s ships, and while it is absent on this mission an opportunity for invasion may occur, the success of which will wholly depend upon the force the invader will meet on landing.

The Japanese recently landed in Manchuria in spite of Russia’s superior naval strength; but because it was the case of an island invading a continent, we do not apply the lesson to ourselves, and are content to believe that a continent cannot invade an island.

It is obvious to the military student that no invasion will be attempted unless its success is reasonably certain, and the presence of four divisions of regular troops at home renders such an enterprise extremely difficult, if not impossible, without permanent command of the sea. But these four divisions are not the Home Defence Force, and form that part of our Expeditionary Army for service outside the United Kingdom. We may, therefore, rest assured that as long as we retain command of the sea, no invasion can take place until we are involved in an over-seas war which requires a more or less large portion of our Expeditionary Force--an event which has happened almost every decade.

It will be safe, therefore, to assume that in the event of an invasion we shall have to rely on our Territorial Army to meet the enemy, and it will be doing this force no injustice to assume that they will be compelled to act on the defensive in the face of a highly trained and disciplined Continental Army. Indeed, it is difficult for a soldier to realise how a Volunteer force, trained for fourteen days in the year and unacquainted with military discipline, can hope to meet on equal terms, even if superior by three to one in numbers, the pick of Continental manhood trained under an iron discipline for the minimum of two years.

Be that as it may, it is necessary to realise the difficulties to be faced, not the least of which is the question of _training_, for, as already pointed out, it is absolutely essential to the successful use of machine guns that the personnel should be very highly trained, and this applies to their use in enclosed country even more than elsewhere.

Although as a general principle enclosed country benefits the attacker and is disadvantageous to the defender, this is not always the case with machine guns, and provided the golden rule of “concealment, cover, and surprise” is intelligently applied, enclosed country is particularly suited for the use of machine guns in the defence.

For this purpose machine guns should be trained to work in pairs in mutual support. They must be so mounted that they can be carried by hand for considerable distances into position, and must be capable of firing from a low siting when they must be inconspicuous. If mounted, as at present, on a wheeled carriage, a light tripod may be carried on the carriage, which will render the gun far more inconspicuous and useful.

While all the principles for the tactical handling of machine guns with infantry hold good, there are several points of importance to be noted in using them in the defence in enclosed country. The advance of any formed bodies of the enemy will be confined to the roads; consequently machine guns must endeavour to command all roads leading from the enemy, especially where they become defiles.

The hedgerows, standing crops, woods, and lanes must be used to afford concealment in advancing or retiring from position to position, and scouts must be specially trained in finding the easiest _concealed_ way from field to field by gates, gaps, or through stiles. The way from the road or lane to the selected position must be always marked by sticks or broken branches which are placed to indicate the direction of gates or gaps, or where a turning has to be made. The usual procedure will be for the scouts to work across country on one or both sides of the road. The section commander, who should be mounted, will select the position for the guns, and scouts from each gun will be sent out to guide them to the positions. The carriages and ammunition cart must move up the road to the nearest point to the position, and scouts should select and mark the easiest way to the carriages. Careful co-operation between the guns and carriages will often enable the latter to greatly facilitate movement, by pushing up by-lanes or across fields to a position near the guns. Ammunition will usually have to be carried to the guns by hand, so that great pains must be taken to get the cart as near the position as possible. The selection of the position will be governed by the facilities it presents for surprising the enemy in close formation at effective range. The range must be accurately found, and fire must only be opened by order of the section commander. In selecting a position care must be taken that it offers perfect concealment from view, and that the guns can retire under cover to their carriages. The neighbourhood of conspicuous objects, such as single trees, a gap in a fence, etc., must be carefully avoided, and care must be taken to secure a good field of fire for as great a distance as possible to the front, while the flanks and any cover within effective range which the enemy might occupy must be watched by scouts. It is in this matter of careful reconnaissance, of selecting ground and occupying or watching all neighbouring cover, that the successful use of machine guns in enclosed country mainly depends. The enemy is obliged by the nature of the country to move in close formation to pass defiles, roads, gaps, or to avoid crops, woods, and villages, and it is the intelligent anticipation of where this will occur that gives the machine gun its chance for decisive action. The hedges, orchards, lanes and woods, and other features will afford endless opportunities for bringing _flanking_ fire to bear on the enemy. Nothing is so effective, and the morale effect on an enemy who is enfiladed at close range renders it usually decisive.

Cover will generally be provided by the spade, and ditches require little work to turn them into excellent pits, the only thing necessary as a rule being to excavate a hole in rear for the back leg of the tripod. Where there is a ditch with a hedge in front of it, the ditch should be improved so as to provide a pit for the gun to fire through the hedge about six inches above ground level. If the hedge is too thick to fire through, it should not be cut down, but a hole should be cut in the growth for the muzzle of the gun sufficiently large to aim through. If it is necessary to cut a gap in the hedge, the growth should be cut through close to the ground, but _without removing it_ until the moment for opening fire.

Alternative positions in the same hedgerow should be avoided, as it is certain to be discovered immediately, and the range is probably already known.

The edge of the wood, if it commands suitable ground, is an excellent position for machine guns; but if the carriages remain in the wood they must be provided with cover. When time and material are available, a good field of fire may be obtained by erecting a platform ten to twelve feet above the ground in the trees, and placing a machine gun on this; not only is the field of fire much increased, but the gun will be almost impossible to discover. This was done on one occasion in the Spanish-American War, when it met with considerable success.

When machine guns are used for the defence of villages or farms, they should be placed outside the village or farm buildings well clear of the walls. The salient angle will usually be the most suitable place, a good field of fire being the chief object. The guns should be placed so as to flank one side of the village, and must be most carefully concealed, a pit being usually the best form of cover. Walls should as a rule be avoided, as they are very easily destroyed by artillery fire and always afford a conspicuous target.

When time permits the pits should be deepened and hollowed out in front to afford the firers protection from artillery fire. Similar protection may be provided for the rest of the detachment by making a narrow and deep trench connected with each side of the gun pit. Should it be necessary to defend the village to the last, a second position should be provided in the centre of the village, commanding the main avenues, and the church tower, or roof, may afford a suitable site, provided artillery is not present.

Although machine guns have never been used in England, they were employed by the French in 1871 during General Chanzy’s retreat from the Loire to Le Mans with great success, and this campaign is particularly interesting to us because the country greatly resembles England. Dr. Miller Maguire, in his lecture given at the Royal Artillery Institute on this campaign, quotes the German official account as follows: “The entire country is covered with the densest cultivation of long-standing growth, with vineyards, orchards, and vegetable gardens.... Owing to the extensive subdivision of land customary in this country, every property is surrounded by hedges, ditches, and walls. There are, consequently, numerous positions and isolated points at which even moderate troops could defend themselves behind good cover. Although the superior effect of the chassepot here ceased to avail, _the mitrailleuses were in their true element_, and became a dangerous weapon in the narrow passes.” Dr. Maguire remarks: “I do not know how far you will be inclined to apply those remarks to the circumstances of your own country in the event of invasion. It might be a good lesson to try; for the several arms could be handled between Dover and London step by step.” Later on he quotes from a British officer, who says: “In fact, Kent and Surrey combined, with vineyards instead of hop gardens, would be an exact picture of the country through which the Germans were pushing on.”

There are numerous instances in this campaign where the mitrailleuse caused great loss to the Germans, and enabled the French to delay their advance and hold on to villages and positions with greatly inferior forces.

Remembering that the mitrailleuse of 1870 was a clumsy and primitive weapon, worked by hand and mounted on a field carriage, there is every reason to suppose that the modern automatic machine gun, on its light and mobile tripod, will be still more valuable in fighting in enclosed country.