CHAPTER IV
EMPLOYMENT IN THE FIELD WITH THE PROTECTIVE CAVALRY
Each army will usually be divided into several columns, each preceded by its advanced guard, the whole covered by the Protective Cavalry. The bulk of the latter will be scattered or remain concentrated according to the size of the zone in which it is to operate, the nature of the ground, and the first dispositions of the enemy. The veil thus formed will only be torn aside when the artillery and infantry of the advanced guards open fire.[11]
It is probable that the side which is weak in cavalry will dispense with Independent Cavalry altogether, and will meet the Independent Cavalry of the enemy with their Protective Cavalry supported by machine guns. The Japanese, who were outnumbered by six to one, were unable to use Independent Cavalry, and during the early stages of the war supported their cavalry by infantry. The Russians, who possessed masses of cavalry, used them principally as Protective Cavalry, if we except the raids made by the Division under Lieutenant-General Mishchenko after the fall of Port Arthur. The Protective Cavalry will therefore, in such a case, not only have to prevent the enemy’s Independent Cavalry from obtaining information by penetrating their screen, but will also have the task of obtaining information as to the enemy’s numbers and direction of march. That they are able to do this even in the face of greatly superior numbers has been proved by the Japanese, whose cavalry, outnumbered and badly horsed as they were, succeeded throughout the war in a remarkable degree in penetrating the enemy’s screen and obtaining information. The Russians, on the other hand, in spite of their masses of cavalry, failed not only to destroy the diminutive force opposed to them, but even to penetrate their thin veil or obtain any information of what was taking place behind it.
Are we not in precisely the same position as the Japanese in our numerical weakness in cavalry, and should we not be confronted by the same problem in the event of war with a military nation?
Let us, then, see how the Japanese Protective Cavalry was able to fulfil its mission in spite of the vastly superior numbers of its opponents. In the first place the Japanese cavalry is trained in the orthodox cavalry spirit, which is highly developed; suppleness and power to manœuvre for the delivery of the attack is the chief aim, while the charge is regarded as the culmination of manœuvre. Swordsmanship, horsemanship, and independent scouting are the features of individual training, while only thirty rounds per annum are fired in the musketry course, from the carbine with which they are armed in addition to the sword. The consequence is that the whole cavalry is saturated with a spirit of enterprise and daring, and a firm belief in its superiority to all other arms in manœuvre and offence. It was this spirit and confidence that enabled them, when outnumbered and deprived of their swordsmanship, to retain their dash and mobility, while using their carbines from behind village walls against the hosts they were unable to ride down. It must be remembered that the Japanese had practically no machine guns at the beginning of the war, and those hastily purchased after hostilities broke out were required at Port Arthur. Consequently, the Japanese had to solve the problem of how to oppose the masses of Russian cavalry with their few but highly trained squadrons, and their solution was to hold up the Russian cavalry by fire on every possible occasion, and to be held up by them as seldom as possible. For this purpose they were closely supported by infantry; and it is of interest to remember how our own light infantry were used in much the same way in the Peninsula--the 13th Light Infantry being actually mounted for the purpose. Can we ignore the lesson? Is it not plain that machine guns would not only have done the work of the carbine and rifle far more effectively, but instead of depriving the cavalry of much of their mobility and preventing them from being made full use of--as undoubtedly was the case--they would have enabled them to go anywhere with the certainty of being able to defend themselves against a greatly superior force of cavalry.
The action of Protective Cavalry on a large scale is so similar to that of Independent Cavalry--especially in the matter of patrols and contact squadrons--that it will be unnecessary to reconsider these duties. In speaking of the duties of the Protective Cavalry, _Field Service Regulations_, 1909, Part I., Chapter V., observes: “These functions of the Protective Cavalry will entail principally defensive action, and will necessitate extension over a considerable front; but the commander must dispose his force in sufficient depth to enable it, with the assistance of the advanced guards of the columns in rear, to check any attempt to break through and surprise the main body.”
It is obvious that fire action is here indicated, and a preceding paragraph states that mounted infantry will usually accompany the Protective Cavalry, though it is to be doubted if it will be found possible to provide horses for this purpose in time of war.
Machine guns, however, will provide the necessary fire power without requiring many men or horses, and the use of a few extra batteries of machine guns with the Protective Cavalry would give them all the stiffening and defensive power of infantry without detracting from their mobility as cavalry. If the Japanese have taught us anything, it is this--that our cavalry, small as it is, if properly supported by strong and well-trained batteries of mobile machine guns, will be able to more than hold its own against greatly superior numbers in a European campaign. To attain such an end we should at once organise cavalry machine-gun batteries, and attach two batteries to each brigade in addition to the guns they already possess. This would give each cavalry brigade the fire power of a battalion of infantry (900 rifles), while in no way detracting from their mobility, as they would only occupy the road space of two extra squadrons, and move just as rapidly over any country. The alternative is to follow Colonel Zaleski’s advice and attach two machine guns to each squadron, which would give the same number of guns, but would be likely to detract from the efficiency of both guns and squadrons. We are, however, dealing with existing organisation, and, however much we may desire to increase the efficiency of our Protective Cavalry, we have only one battery of six guns with each brigade instead of the visionary three. Let us see how we may use them to the best advantage.
Supposing the Protective Cavalry to consist of one brigade, they will probably be extended to form a screen over a considerable front. The exact formation and method of advance will entirely depend upon the proximity of the enemy, his strength, and the nature of the country. We will suppose the country open and both flanks exposed and the enemy in the immediate vicinity, the contact squadrons or patrols having gained touch with him. The duties of the Protective Cavalry are the tactical reconnaissance, and the occupation of positions of tactical importance to the infantry and artillery.
With so small a number of machine guns as a single battery, it will be necessary to decide where they may be most usefully employed, and a great deal must depend on the particular situation. If the tactical reconnaissance is incomplete, they may be used in the first instance to hold the enemy in front while the squadrons move round the flanks to complete the information required. If used in this manner, they must be handled with dash, and, working in widely extended pairs--two in the centre and two on each flank--must push forward and try to surprise the enemy in close formation, moving from position to position and never remaining stationary after fire has been opened, provided cover exists to hide movement. Six guns co-operating in a vigorous offensive, unopposed by artillery, can push up to close range and do immense damage, while the enemy should be quite unable to decide what numbers are opposed to him. A ridge, a gully, a road with good hedges parallel to the front, is sufficient to conceal the movement of machine guns; and as they have nothing to fear from cavalry and can always retire if galled by rifle fire, they can dominate the situation if handled according to the principles already laid down for them.
Where the tactical reconnaissance has already been completed and the principal object is to protect the force covered, machine guns will be found most valuable to support the flanks should an attempt be made to turn them, as their mobility enables them to be sent to a distant point with great rapidity, and their concentrated fire at once makes itself felt at a threatened point and turns the scale in a fire fight with astonishing suddenness. This mobility renders them particularly suitable for seizing and holding positions until the main body comes up.
When used for this duty the battery or section commander, as the case may be, should receive definite orders as to the importance of the position he is sent to hold and how long he is expected to remain there. The position should be carefully reconnoitred by scouts before the guns approach it, and steps should be taken at once to entrench the guns and teams against artillery fire if the position is to be held for any time. Alternative positions for each gun, with concealed approaches, should be constructed, and the guns carefully hidden by erecting screens in front of them, or by placing them behind bushes, which are then cut almost through the stem, so that they can be instantly removed to open fire. Ranges must be taken and carefully written down, with their compass bearings to conspicuous marks. The flanks must be protected, and dead ground made good by posting one gun to sweep it. The gun horses and detachment not on duty should be posted well to the flank and rear where they can obtain the best shelter from view and fire. Signalling communication should be established with the rear and flanks when possible.
Very definite instructions must be given as to when and on what targets fire is to be opened, and the temptation to fire at patrols or small bodies of the enemy must be resisted. Fire should only be opened in the first instance by the order of the senior officer present, and in all cases should be reserved as long as possible.
The battery of machine guns may also be used during the cavalry combat as already described in the last chapter, and when used as a reserve on a flank, should take up “positions of observation” if the ground permits, from which they can repulse a flank attack, while remaining ready to move off at a moment’s notice to any point where they may be required.
Machine-gun commanders with the Protective Cavalry must bear in mind that their object must always be to help their cavalry in attaining the end in view, be it reconnaissance, attack, or resistance, and that close co-operation with the cavalry commander is essential. The most brilliant action causing loss or defeat to a portion of the enemy is useless if it does not directly further the object of the Protective Cavalry; and if we are unable to give here many examples from recent campaigns, it is principally due to this want of co-operation and consequent inability to make effective use of the machine guns.
The report made by Captain Golochtchanov, who commanded a detachment of six machine guns attached to the 11th Orenburg Cossacks during the last few months of the war, contains a vivid description of the reconnaissance of the Japanese position made on August 14th, 1905, at Sitasi, by the regiment forming the advanced guard of Major-General Grêkow. “At about 4 a.m. the Russian cavalry attacked the Japanese outposts, consisting of three companies of infantry and two squadrons. While waiting for the situation to be cleared up, the machine guns were kept in reserve. Two and then four were sent against the enemy’s flank; the Japanese retired from position to position. At one o’clock the fight stopped; the Russians had carried three villages and determined the line and direction of the enemy’s trenches. Their task was accomplished. On the Russian side there were only 100 rifles in the firing line, with four machine guns.”[12]
“Instead of marching at a uniform rate and distance in front of the main army it may be advantageous at times for portions of the Protective Cavalry to move rapidly forward to some natural feature, such as a ridge or river, along which it will establish posts of observation, the intervening country being watched by patrols, the line being divided into sections with suitable supports for each. The remainder of the force will continue to maintain a line of observation in rear, until the new line of observation is taken up; it will then concentrate and move up to support the latter, or pass through it to form a more advanced line.”[13]
When this method of advance is used the machine guns working as independent sections should be used to hold important features, such as bridge-heads, defiles, passes, and villages in the line of observation. If positions are carefully selected whence effective fire can be brought to bear on points which the enemy must pass in close order, and the usual procedure as to cover, concealment, and range-taking is observed, the mounted troops may be spared much fatigue and given opportunities for resting men and horses.
USE OF MACHINE GUNS IN A RETREAT
During the battle the Protective Cavalry will be used in the way already described in the previous chapter, in which we also dealt with the Pursuit; we will therefore now see how they may be used to assist a Retreat.
“When retreat appears inevitable the routes to the rallying position should never be so close to the battlefield as to come at once under the fire of the enemy. It should be occupied as soon as possible by some portion of the artillery, and by complete infantry units. _The cavalry and other mounted troops, aided by a strong force of artillery, will meanwhile check the enemy’s advance_, and the remainder of the force, with the exception, if possible, of a rear guard in support of the mounted troops, will move as rapidly as possible to the shelter of the rallying position and there reorganise. Steps should be taken immediately to secure any bridges, defiles, or other vital points on the line of retreat, at which the enemy’s mounted troops might intercept the force. Commanders of retreating troops must recognise that their greatest danger will arise from attacks in flank delivered by the enemy’s mounted troops and horse artillery; if possible, therefore, they should take precautions that _all ground commanding their line of retreat is occupied by flank guards_.”[14] The action of the Protective Cavalry is indicated in the first paragraph quoted in italics, while the second gives the only method by which a retreat can be rendered successful or secure. In no phase of modern war are machine guns so valuable as during a retreat, and it is quite probable that, properly organised and handled, they may make the pursuit so difficult and costly as to render the retreat a far less dangerous undertaking than it has been in the past. It is not difficult to realise that an arm possessing such great mobility, together with rapidity and concentration of fire, before which no closed bodies can exist at effective range, will be able not merely to check and delay pursuing cavalry, but may even prevent any effective pursuit by mounted men alone.
The lack of machine guns on the side of the Russians in the late war renders this point still to be proved by a future campaign; but it is well known that the machine guns with the 1st Siberian Army Corps constantly checked the Japanese pursuit, and more than once rendered a flanking movement abortive.
The moment that it is evident that a retreat is necessary it will be the duty of the Protective Cavalry commander immediately to collect all his cavalry, with a view to checking the enemy’s advance, and at the same time he should apply to the G.O.C. for as many machine guns as he can spare, and this is certainly the occasion when all the mounted machine-gun batteries should be sent to the commander of the rear guard.
The first step will be to allot one or more batteries to the troops forming the two flank guards and to the main guard covering the centre. The general situation at this moment will of course govern their use. “The commander will determine, in accordance with the features of the ground, whether delay is best brought about by the occupation of positions blocking or flanking the enemy’s line of advance and the employment of fire action, or by a vigorous and timely attack by a body of horsemen. Frequently, however, opportunities may be offered for acting wide on the flanks, where even the threat of a mounted attack or a sudden dash from ambush may cause the enemy’s pursuit to be delayed without the force becoming too deeply committed.”[15] In either case the important thing for machine guns to do at this stage is quickly to seize ground from which to bring effective fire to bear across a wide extent of front. Dealing first with the commander of the batteries allotted to the centre, he will consult the O.C. cavalry and arrange with him his plan of action. It is of the first importance to stop the forward movement of the enemy on the direct line of retreat, as this is the easiest line of pursuit and the one upon which the most shaken portion of the troops will be found. The probable course of action for the machine guns here will be to break up into sections and form a line along the nearest feature of ground immediately in rear, from which fire can be brought to sweep the front and check direct pursuit. The more broken the country and the more commanding the ridge or other features, the more effectual will be the check, for at this stage guns will certainly be prominent in the pursuit and shelter from their fire will be very necessary.
The fact that the machine guns are working in pairs on a very wide front should make it exceedingly difficult for artillery to locate them, except singly, and thus it will take them a considerable time to silence more than one or two of the scattered line of guns. Alternative positions and the constant change to a fresh one after opening fire will render the majority of the machine guns capable of remaining in action until closely engaged by the infantry. This will cause considerable delay, and by the time a serious infantry attack develops the machine guns will be able to retire to a fresh position. In anticipation of this, the battery commanders will have sent scouts to the rear directly the guns are in position, and they should personally examine the new line to be taken up, and select the gun positions for each section. One scout should remain in the new position of each section and the other return to the gun horses of his section, to guide them when the moment for retiring takes place.
The gun horses should be as near the guns in action as possible; but should the position be such that this is impossible without exposing the horses to fire, then all the spare rifles of the gun-team must be used to open rapid fire to conceal the fact that the gun is being moved. The guns of each section must arrange with each other to cover their own retirement, but the battery commander must issue the order in the first instance and will arrange which sections move first.
Where the pressure is great and co-operation difficult, it may be advisable to retire by half sections along the whole front at the same moment; thus the right guns of sections may be ordered to retire on a given signal, while the left guns cover them by a heavy continuous fire. If this method of retirement is adopted, it will be necessary for the second position to be within long range of the first, which is not always advisable in covering a retreat. It will seldom be possible to select a concealed position in the early stages of the retreat, but it must be borne in mind that if a concealed position can be occupied, and fire reserved until the pursuing cavalry are at close range, the effect of such a surprise will do much to check the pursuit, and impose such caution on the enemy that they will hesitate to press on without those precautions which necessitate deployments and thus cause much delay.
The machine guns allotted to the flanks should form the supports to the cavalry there; and if two batteries are available on each flank, one should accompany the cavalry to enable it to remain mounted, while they provide the fire action necessary to support it in the attack and to cover its retirement in the face of superior numbers. The detail of such action has already been given with the Independent Cavalry. The other batteries will break up into sections and move parallel to the line of retreat in single file at wide intervals, keeping touch with the cavalry by scouts on the outer flank. The object of this battery is to seize and hold good positions on the flank of the line of retreat until the main body has passed. The scouts of the rear section of this battery should get into touch with the scouts of the flank gun of the centre battery from time to time, to ensure proper co-operation between the various batteries.
The importance of concealed positions from which to ambush the pursuers must not blind machine-gun commanders to the necessity for seizing and holding to the last possible moment, even at the risk of capture, every position from which the retreat can be effectually covered and the pursuit delayed. Should a river or other natural obstacle be encountered on the line of retreat, machine guns must freely sacrifice themselves in covering the retirement of the cavalry across the bridge or beyond the obstacle.
Cavalry is the most costly of all arms, and cannot be replaced during a campaign; machine guns are the least expensive in proportion to their fire value, and the easiest to renew; they must consequently save the cavalry when they can, even if they sacrifice themselves in doing so.
ESCORT TO ARTILLERY
There is one important duty which machine guns are able to perform better than any other arm, and that is escorting artillery, but more especially horse artillery. When cavalry are detailed for this purpose they not only deprive squadrons of much-needed men, but can only provide three rifles in action to every four men of the escort, owing to the necessity of providing horse-holders. In addition to this drawback, the horses provide a costly fire-trap for the shells of the enemy’s guns which may go wide of the battery. For these reasons, where it is possible to spare them, a section of machine guns should be allotted to each battery of artillery when an escort is necessary.
They should march in the rear of the battery when on a road, and on the outer flank when in open country and away from cavalry. The sole object of the machine guns is to afford protection to the battery from cavalry, and to prevent rifle fire from being brought to bear on them from effective range; therefore the section commander must devote his whole attention to this object, and he is not justified in opening fire on any target that does not directly threaten the battery--this especially applies to that stage of the mounted combat immediately before the collision, when the guns are firing on the opposing squadrons.
The section commander will be under the immediate orders of the battery commander, and should be acquainted with his plans and intentions. He should remain with him until the position for action has been selected, when he will immediately seek the best position from which to cover the guns, taking particular care not to mask or limit their radius of fire nor hinder their line of advance or retreat. This will necessitate a careful but rapid survey of the ground in the vicinity of the position, in which good ground scouts, who have been previously trained in this work, will materially assist. The most suitable positions will usually be found well to the front and on the inner flank of the battery from 200 to 600 yards’ distance. It may be occasionally possible to place a machine gun on each flank from which a cross fire can be brought to bear on ground in front of the guns; but such a position on either side of the battery, unless the ground is particularly favourable, has the disadvantage of rendering fire control difficult, and may hamper the fire or movement of the battery. The principal considerations which should govern the choice of a position are as follows:
(1) Good field of fire to protect the battery from attack.
(2) Position clear of the fire and movement of the battery.
(3) Immunity from artillery firing on the battery.
(4) Concealment.
(5) Cover from fire.
There should be no dead ground in front or on the flanks of the battery, and with two machine guns this condition can generally be satisfied. In cases where one flank remains exposed and cannot be protected by the fire of the machine guns, or where a portion of the front or one flank cannot be seen, scouts must be placed well out in this direction, where they can see anything approaching and signal timely warning of it, and a position must be selected beforehand to which to move a machine gun should the warning be given. It has already been pointed out in a previous chapter, and may be repeated here, that machine guns have nothing to fear from cavalry under any circumstances, and when in a selected position with ranges accurately known, as they would be in this case, a single gun properly handled could easily stop a squadron. When selecting the place for the led horses, it must be remembered that fire from the enemy’s guns is likely to search the reverse slopes of the position immediately in rear of the battery.
The machine guns must not be re-horsed until after the battery has limbered up and moved off, as they are then most vulnerable. They should endeavour to come into action before the battery unlimbers--though this will seldom be possible with horse artillery.