CHAPTER IX
MACHINE GUNS IN THE ARMIES OF THE WORLD
AMERICA (UNITED STATES)
GUN.--At present there are three machine guns in use in the United States, viz.:
(_a_) The Gatling.
(_b_) The Maxim Automatic.
(_c_) The Colt Automatic.
(_a_) _The Gatling._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service rifle bullet. It has 10 barrels, and is fed by a rotating cylinder. The gun is mounted on a shielded carriage with limber. The rate of fire is about 600 rounds per minute.
(_b_) _The Maxim Automatic._--This is similar to the one in use in our own service, and takes the ·3 in. U.S. service ammunition.
_Mounting._--For infantry and cavalry, a tripod mounting. For use in fortified works, a two-wheeled shielded carriage.
The transport is by means of pack-animals. A complete outfit consists of five packs, _e.g._ the gun and tripod form one pack, and the remaining four packs carry 1,500 rounds of ammunition and accessories for the gun, including water for filling the water-jacket.
For firing blank it is fitted with an attachment called the “drill and blank-fire attachment.”
(_c_) _The Colt Automatic._--Calibre ·3 in., and takes the service rifle bullet. The gun is fed by means of a cartridge belt, and fires 400 rounds a minute.
The weight is 40 lb., and the gun is mounted either on a tripod mounting or a wheeled carriage.
A “silencer” for the Maxim was tested in March, 1909, and the results compared with those obtained from the gun without the silencer. As regards accuracy of fire there was nothing to choose between the two. The silencer, however, reduced the noise to that of a ·22 in. long cartridge, and when used at night the flash was entirely obliterated.
ORGANISATION.--_Infantry._--One battalion in each regiment has a machine-gun platoon consisting of 1 sergeant, 2 corporals, and 18 privates, and 2 guns.
_Cavalry._--In a regiment of 3 squadrons, 1 squadron has a machine-gun platoon of 3 corporals and 18 privates.
AUSTRIA
GUN.--In 1907 after prolonged trial the Austrians definitely adopted the Schwarzlose. It is a very simple weapon and very reliable, firing 375 rounds per minute from a tripod mounting.
ORGANISATION.--A section of machine guns is attached to each regiment of cavalry and infantry; there are also mountain companies of machine guns.
With infantry the section consists of 2 guns; 10,000 rounds are carried per machine gun. The detachment consists of 14 men per gun, 7 for actually working the gun and 7 to lead the horses. There are 7 horses to each gun, of which 1 carries the gun and 500 rounds, 5 carry from 1,500 to 2,000 rounds each, and 1 carries the shields. There is also a spare horse. For hand transport one man carries 2 belts of 250 cartridges, another the gun and 1 belt, a third the mounting and 1 belt, a fourth 2 belts, a fifth the water-jacket, etc. The shields are left on the horse. It will be seen that when the machine gun is taken forward in this way it has ready for immediate use 1,500 rounds.
With cavalry the section consists of 4 guns without shields. On account of the great independence of cavalry, the machine guns have with them 15,000 rounds each, of which 5,000 are on pack-animals and 10,000 in wagons. These wagons usually march in rear of the column. The detachment, which is all mounted, consists of 9 men per gun with 4 pack-horses (1 for the gun and 3 for ammunition). Hand transport is provided for as with the infantry machine guns.
The mountain machine-gun company consists of 3 officers and 64 other ranks. There are 4 guns carried on pack-horses, with 2 pack-horses per gun for ammunition (4,000 rounds per gun).
TACTICAL (taken from a précis of the Austrian Regulations, 1908; published in _Streffleurs militärische Zeitschrift_, April, 1908).--(_a_) _With Infantry._--During the advance it is well to give some machine guns to the principal units of the covering force, for they add to their resisting power, and in the many phases of the preparatory fight they are sure to have opportunities of effecting surprise. The place for the section leader is then near the O.C. detachment. When the machine guns leave the column it is always advisable to detail a few cavalry to cover them.
To take up a position it is necessary to observe the following:
(1) To manœuvre out of sight of the enemy. This will often necessitate unloading and carrying forward the _matériel_ by hand.
(2) Not to keep the guns too close together, which may cause additional losses. The “position of observation” will play an important part in the machine-gun fight.
The narrow effective zone of the machine guns allows them to fire over the heads of other troops. Such fire will be advantageously employed when machine guns occupy high positions. But it is only allowed at ranges greater than 1,000 yards, and when the troops over whom they are firing are at least 400 yards from the guns. Under these circumstances the use of searching fire is forbidden.
Both in attack and defence it is necessary to remember that machine guns are not suitable for a continuous fight of long duration. If during the preparatory fight the machine guns have found opportunities of opening fire, they ought, when the general engagement has begun, to be withdrawn from the firing line and held ready to act again under certain circumstances of importance.
These circumstances are:
In attack: to act on the enemy’s flank to facilitate the infantry advance; to open fire on the decisive point, whether flank or front, from a dominating position, either over the heads of the infantry or by carrying the machine guns up into the firing line.
In defence: to reinforce threatened points; to stop enveloping movements; to repulse an assault; to take part in a counter-attack.
In most cases these tasks will necessitate the machine guns being at once carried into the firing line to fight side by side with the infantry.
(_b_) _With Cavalry._--The rôle of machine guns with cavalry is thus determined:
(1) To take part in dismounted action: if pushed forward, they allow the number of men dismounted to be limited; if kept in reserve or pushed against a flank, they facilitate the success of the frontal attack.
(2) To add considerably to the offensive and defensive power of patrols by replacing the battalions of chasseurs which used to be attached to the cavalry.
(3) Finally, to take part in the cavalry fight; for this they should be judiciously divided among the troops of the advanced guard, and should make use of their mobility. This will allow them to open fire from well-chosen positions before the moment of contact, and help to obtain the desired result.
The place for the machine-gun commander is near the General. If the machine guns have been well placed in the column, they will--thanks to their mobility, which is equal to that of any cavalry detachment--be able to make use of the considerable time required by a large force of cavalry to get into battle formation.
Whereas with infantry the surprise of the enemy is always effected by making use of the features of the ground, the best method for cavalry guns is to utilise their rapidity of motion and their resemblance to other cavalry units, for which at a distance they are easily mistaken.
The widest power of initiative is left to the commander for the grouping of his units in the fight. Very often he will only bring up near the firing line the horse carrying the gun and one carrying ammunition, in order to be able to escape rapidly. At other times all the horses will be brought up close under cover. At others the whole section will dash up to their position at full speed; the guns will be unloaded at once, and the horses will disappear to the rear. The one important thing is to open fire as a surprise.
To sum up: the Austrian Regulations only confirm the rules already laid down by very competent writers who have published works on the subject. They enunciate in a clear and concise form the principles which should govern the employment of machine guns in various circumstances, laying particular stress on the necessity for constant readiness for action in a position of observation.
In _Les Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_ Lieutenant M. quotes certain Austrian officers who, writing before the publication of the Regulations of 1908, considered that the value of machine guns lay chiefly in their use as a reserve of fire. Lieut.-Colonel Berndt says: “In offence, as in defence, machine guns must be held back as a reserve of fire to be used at the moment when the rapid development of heavy fire is required.” Lieutenant Binder is of the same opinion, and also recommends their being used in the closest co-operation with the infantry. Lieutenant Hayeck-Liprandi, a cavalry officer, fully realises the importance of machine-guns, as relieving cavalry to a large degree of the necessity for dismounted action. He also advocates the attachment of machine-gun sections to regiments at the disposal of the regimental commanding officer.[61]
CHINA
GUN.--The Chinese have bought numbers of Maxims for attachment to their infantry. With cavalry they have adopted the Madsen.
Their organisation is at present in process of evolution, and no official views on their tactical employment have been published hitherto.
DENMARK
GUN.--In 1904 Major-General Madsen, the Danish War Minister, invented the Rekyl (recoil) machine gun. The gun weighs only 13½ lb., is not much longer than the service rifle, and in case of need can be served by one man. It has a rate of fire of 750 rounds per minute with a muzzle velocity of 2,350 ft. per second.
ORGANISATION.--Every Hussar Squadron in the Danish Army is to have a section of three guns attached. The gun is carried on a horse together with 300 rounds of ammunition, and with each gun there is a led horse with reserve ammunition.
TACTICS.--The gun detachment can easily and rapidly follow all the movements of the body of horse to which they are attached, even through woods. It is therefore argued that the possession of this weapon will do away with the necessity for dismounted cavalry action.
FRANCE
GUN.--France has adopted both the Puteaux and Hotchkiss patterns of machine gun without shields. With cavalry the question of mounting has not yet been definitely settled, but experiments have been carried out with wheeled carriages drawn by four horses. The infantry sections have been provided with a tripod mounting (70 lb.), which can be adjusted to two heights, either 1 ft. 6 in. or 2 ft. 6 in. above the ground.
ORGANISATION.--At present (1909) every brigade, both of cavalry and of infantry, has a two-gun section attached. It is intended to provide every regiment with a section as soon as possible.
With cavalry the detachment for each gun consists of 24 men, who are all mounted. The carriage carries 16,500 rounds of ammunition in addition to the gun.
The infantry section is commanded by a lieutenant, who has under him one N.C.O. and 23 men, armed with rifles. There are two gun horses, which each carry a gun, tripod, and one box of ammunition; and eight ammunition horses, which each carry seven boxes, three on each side and one on top. A box contains 150 rounds, so that each section has 8,700 rounds. The “Souchier” telemeter is carried.
TACTICAL.--The French Regulations are at present under consideration, and the tendency seems to be to follow the principles laid down by the Germans.
M. le Commandant Niessel, in his preface to _Les Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_, by Lieutenant M., says: “There is one principle which should dominate the whole subject and never be lost to view. It is that machine guns are condensed infantry, and that therefore it is as infantry that they should be used in battle. Together with accuracy and power of fire, the characteristic which should especially distinguish infantry in battle is their utilisation of every feature of the ground. Machine guns, then, to exert to the full their powers of effecting surprise and developing great intensity of fire, should reach effective and, if possible, close range without being observed.
“Machine guns ought, then, in battle to be carried forward by hand by the detachment, in order to take up positions as much under cover as possible; this does not in any degree lessen their opportunities of offensive action, for there can be no hope of decisive success for the infantry whom they are supporting except in a vigorous offensive.”
GERMANY
GUN.--Germany has adopted the Maxim gun. The guns are mounted on sleighs which are themselves mounted on limbered gun-carriages, being clamped into grooves. They can either be fired from the carriage or be dismounted and fired from the sleigh. The gun on the sleigh can be adjusted to fire from a height of 1 ft. 6 in., 2 ft. 6 in. or 3 ft. 6 in. above the ground by a simple lattice-work arrangement. The gun can easily be dragged to almost any position where men can go, and can be fired by men lying down under cover.
ORGANISATION.--Machine guns have been organised into 16 batteries (called Sections), which are independent, and 216 companies, which are attached to infantry regiments.
The battery consists of six machine guns, drawn by four horses and divided into three sections (called Divisions). There are three ammunition wagons and one battery wagon (1st line). There are three 2nd-line wagons. The detachment consists of:
1 captain (in command); 3 lieutenants; 1 sergeant-major; 12 N.C.O.’s; 36 gunners; 28 drivers; 1 armourer; 1 trumpeter; 1 apothecary (dresser); 70 horses (20 saddle and 50 draught).
The men wear a special greyish-green uniform, and are armed with carbine and bayonet; the carbines are carried in the limbers. 87,300 rounds are carried with each battery.
Each company consists of six guns drawn by two horses, three wagons, and one cart. The detachment consists of:
1 lieutenant (in command); 3 second lieutenants; 9 N.C.O.’s; 74 men; 28 horses (7 saddle, 18 draught, and 3 spare).
All the officers and 3 warrant officers are mounted. The men are armed with automatic pistols. 72,000 rounds are carried with each company, as follows:
With the guns 18,000 With the wagons 42,000 With the reserve cart 12,000 ------ Total 72,000 ======
On going into action each gun is made up to 5,000 rounds. The infantry pattern range-finder is used.
TACTICAL.--_Regulations for Machine-Gun Detachments in the German Army._
_Para. 187._--Machine guns enable commanders to develop at fixed points the maximum volume of infantry fire on the smallest possible front. Machine guns can be employed in any country which is practicable for infantry, and when once they are unlimbered they must be able to surmount considerable obstacles. In action they offer no greater target than riflemen, fighting under like conditions, and they can in proportion to their fire value support far greater losses than infantry.
When movements over the battlefield are contemplated, and the machine guns (unlimbered as soon as hostile fire is expected) are pulled or carried forward, they can utilise all cover which infantry is able to use. Cover that is barely sufficient for a section of infantry can protect an entire machine-gun detachment. The construction of the carriage on which guns, ammunition, and men can be conveyed, and the capabilities of the team, enable machine guns to keep up with mounted troops on the march.
_Para. 188._--The range and striking effect of the machine gun is identical with that of the infantry rifle. The rapid succession of shots and the narrow concentration of the cone of dispersion, together with the possibilities of uniting several guns on a limited front, render it feasible for machine guns to obtain rapidly a decisive success in certain positions, and even at long ranges to inflict heavy losses in a short time on large and deep targets. Machine guns, however, are of small use to a commander fighting a protracted rifle-fire engagement.
_Para. 189._--An engagement with a thin line of skirmishers under good cover should be avoided. It demands a heavy expenditure of ammunition which is not commensurate with the result obtained. During a lengthy rifle-fire action the detachments with their guns should be withdrawn temporarily from their position, so as to save their effect for a decisive moment.
_Para. 190._--The engagement of hostile machine guns that offer a difficult target is by no means the chief duty of machine-gun detachments; in most cases it will be more profitable to leave this to other arms. When engaging hostile machine guns the most accurate information should be sought regarding the enemy’s position.
_Para. 191._--Machine-gun detachments can at all times and under all conditions confidently await the attacks of hostile cavalry. To meet these any formation can be adopted which allows of a well-directed and calmly delivered fire being poured into the advancing cavalry. Both when firing from the carriage and from the gun dismounted the fire must be distributed all along the advancing line of cavalry; special attention must be paid to the supporting lines, to one’s own flanks, and to the defence of the carriages when the guns are separated from them. Machine-gun detachments are able to advance in the open fields without any fear of the enemy’s cavalry, provided the latter is not supported by artillery or infantry, or is not in such force as to be able to attack simultaneously from different sides in several lines.
_Para. 192._--In action against artillery it should be remembered that at long ranges the superiority of fire will always remain with this branch. If machine guns are to engage artillery, the sleighs must be brought as near as possible to it. The rapidity of movement of machine guns due to their being horsed will enable them to start the action from a flank, and thus produce a sensible increase of effect. Scattering the fire from all the machine guns along the entire line of a battery is as useless as it is purposeless.
_Para. 193._--Machine-gun detachments should generally be employed undivided; on special occasions separate sections may be made to act independently. The detachment commander will decide as to the distribution of the ammunition train to the individual sections. The employment of single machine-gun detachments will be seldom advisable. In such cases the senior detachment leader will command the entire force of machine guns.
_Para. 194._--In view of the uses to which machine-gun detachments may be applied, and with the object of increasing their independence of action, it is desirable that a few mounted men should be attached to them for reconnaissance. Otherwise the readiness of machine guns is such that it is only in very obstructed and overgrown country that they require special protection. Here it may be necessary, in order to secure the threatened flanks and rear, and to protect the carriages left behind, to detail small parties of cavalry or infantry. An application for such from a machine-gun commander should be complied with by any infantry or cavalry commander in the vicinity.
_Para. 196._--Machine guns can never replace artillery.
_Para. 197._--Machine guns will always find their chief work to be at the place where their powerful fire effect, together with their mobility (on the march) and the advantage of being able to get across country when separated from their carriage, can best be utilised.
_Para. 198._--For the correct manœuvring of machine guns it is necessary to possess a clear knowledge of the general situation, of the aims of the commander, and of the state of the action. The disposal of the machine-gun detachments rests with the superior command. By attaching machine-gun detachments to stated bodies of troops, the full value of the former in action can only be realised in exceptional cases.
_Para. 199._--All commanders must quickly make their dispositions to suit the situation, and must always realise that neglect and delay are a more serious hindrance to success than an error in the choice of means.
_Para. 200._--At the commencement of an action the commander will proceed to the O.C. troops, or to the commander of the force to which his detachment is detailed, and receive the necessary orders for the impending action. It is his duty, in case of emergency, to act on his own initiative. During the progress of the action he will remain in constant communication with that commanding officer, in order to keep him constantly informed of what he is doing, and in turn to be posted in the progress of the fight.
_Para. 201._--In choosing a position the first condition to fulfil is to obtain the best possible fire effect for the task in hand; then secondly one may think of cover.
_Para. 202._--The choice of every position must be preceded by special reconnoitring, the opportune and skilful performance of which is essential to success. This includes ascertaining what the targets are, where there are suitable fire positions, and the facilities for approach, the nature of the ground to be crossed, and lastly what security is offered against surprises.
_Para. 203._--In the advance and in defensive positions the commander reconnoitres himself. During retirements the commander remains with the detachment so long as it is within effective range of the enemy, but sends back for reconnoitring purposes a senior officer. Before occupying a position the commander, if possible, must have examined it himself.
_Para. 205._--The attention of the enemy must not be previously directed to the position selected. A personal inspection is often to be carried out only on foot, leaving all escort behind.
_Para. 206._--The following points guide the choice of position: an open field of fire; a front lying as far as possible at right angles to the line of fire; plenty of space; possibility of sweeping all the ground right up to the closest range; concealment, and facilities for communication along and behind the line of fire.
_Para. 207._--Positions close to or on a level with a point to which the enemy has ranged are to be avoided as much as possible. Similarly it is not advisable to take up a position in close proximity to prominent objects, still less straight in front of them, as they facilitate the enemy’s ranging. On the other hand, a position in front of a dark background or in a place covered with vegetation hinders the enemy from picking up the target.
Every kind of concealment, even of an artificial nature, offers advantages, because the observation of the enemy is thereby impeded.
_Para. 208._--During the advance and in moving into position security should not be overlooked. On threatened flanks special scouts must be sent out by the officer who is bringing up the troops, especially in close country. These should not ride far ahead, but should bear in mind to keep in touch with the troops. During the advance roads should be used as long as possible.
_Para. 210._--The pace of the advance and the moment of unlimbering depend on the object of the commander, the state of the action, the nature of the country and the state of the ground.
_Para. 211._--The dispositions for taking up a position must be made in time to avoid any delay in opening fire. Every effort must be made to take up a position unobserved, and to open fire by surprise. Both of these are, however, only possible if special attention is paid to the utilisation of cover during the advance to the position, thus keeping the enemy in ignorance of the locality which it is intended to occupy. In the absence of cover, or when immediate entry into action is required, the surprise of the enemy must be effected by rapidity in occupying a position.
_Para. 213._--The most favourable position must be sought for each individual weapon with regard to fire effect and cover. As a rule there is an interval of 20 paces between guns, but the direction and regularity of the intervals in the detachment are not to be insisted upon. It must be considered, however, that the losses caused by the enemy’s fire will be heavier in proportion as the machine guns are posted closer together. Care must be taken that the individual guns do not interfere with one another’s fire. Placing single guns in echelon may offer advantages where the flanks are threatened.
When the nature of the ground or of the target renders a more careful choice necessary for each gun, it is recommended that this be carried out by the No. 1 of the gun.
_Para. 214._--The decision to open fire must not be made too hastily. It is to be borne in mind that the fire can only have a decisive effect when it is directed against troops situated within effective range. The arm to which they belong has little to do with the question; the decisive point in choice of target is first and foremost the momentary tactical importance of that target. Afterwards fire must be turned on to those targets which, owing to their height, depth, breadth, and density, render a high percentage of hits probable.
_Para. 215._--Good results from indirect fire can only be achieved if the range and position of the target are known, or if the fall or the effect of the shots can be observed from a point close to the detachment.
_Para. 216._--Firing over one’s own troops is only permissible when the nature of the ground renders possible the deployment of several firing lines one above the other.
_Para. 217._--Firing by night can only promise success if the guns can be trained by daylight on to points where the enemy is expected, or if well-lit objects are taken as targets, such as bivouacs or camps.
_Para. 218._--From the very beginning of an action it must be remembered that the number of cartridges carried is limited, and that the consumption of ammunition implies an expenditure of power which should only be made when it will meet with success. Should the decision be taken, however, to fire on a given target, the ammunition necessary to attain the object of the action must be expended. Fire with an insufficient effect weakens the morale of the troops, whilst it encourages the enemy.
_Para. 219._--The losses inflicted on the enemy will affect him more if he incurs them in a short space of time, than if they are distributed over a long period; it is advisable therefore in most cases, even in the face of a weaker enemy, to open fire with the whole detachment rather than with one or two sections only.
The expenditure of ammunition necessary for the silencing of the enemy will in both cases be about the same, but in the former case one’s own loss will be appreciably smaller.
_Para. 220._--A change of objective should not be made until the result aimed at against the first target has been fully realised. A frequent change of objective weakens the fire, and should therefore be avoided.
_Para. 221._--A distribution of fire over several objectives cannot be avoided under all circumstances, but it must not resolve itself into an aimless scattering of fire.
_Para. 222._--In every case coolness, marksmanship, and strict fire discipline are necessary to get full value in fire effect. In an engagement, should the majority of those in command be put out of action, fire discipline must still be preserved. With well-trained and well-disciplined troops, the presence of mind of the individual soldier, and the example of stout-hearted and cool-headed men will ensure a successful conclusion to an engagement fought against an enemy in a similar plight.
_Para. 223._--The officer commanding the troops announces the object of the action, and also the objective in a general way.
_Para. 224._--The machine-gun detachment commander selects the positions, determines the range, names the targets in detail together with the nature of attack on them, and orders the opening of fire.
_Para. 225._--The section commander passes on the orders. He decides the place for each gun, also the portion of the objective to be fired at, and the range for each individual weapon. He observes the service of the guns, and is especially responsible that the correct target is fired at and for the fire action of his section.
_Para. 226._--The No. 1 of the gun selects the spot to place his gun, and the most suitable height for it to stand above ground, follows in detail all orders, and ensures (using in case of necessity independent measures) that the centre of the cone of dispersion falls on the target. He is responsible for the service of the gun in detail, and attentively watches the weapon so as to remedy any defects which might interfere with its fire effect.
_Para. 227._--By a correct utilisation of the degree of independence allotted to each individual commander, by a rapid and accurate ascertaining of ranges, by a correct judgment of the influence of the weather on the cone of dispersion, it is possible to avoid an interruption of the fire of the whole detachment for an alteration of the sights. Any such interruption must be especially avoided when it is obvious from the nature of the objective that it will only be in view a short time. Again, when firing at such objectives, no time must be lost by giving a long and detailed description of the target.
A well-trained detachment should be able to get quickly on to the target, and to distribute its fire advantageously on receiving brief words of command. If one part of the enemy is silenced or has vanished, the fire must at once be independently directed on the still visible and active part of the objective.
_Para. 228._--The position of the commander is of importance for issuing commands and controlling the fire. In peace exercises all commanders must issue their orders from the same positions and in the same attitude they would adopt in actual warfare. The commander may allow himself to depart from this rule, and order the subordinate commanders to do the same, in so far as such a step is necessary for instructional purposes. Moreover, it must be strongly insisted upon that no man should expose himself more than is absolutely necessary for the observation of the general situation, the service of the guns, the conveyance of ammunition, and the taking of ranges.
* * * * *
_Para. 242._--In an action of two forces meeting, the advanced guard must secure time and space for the main body to deploy. As the accomplishment of this duty depends essentially on the rapid occupation of favourable points on the ground, the allotment of machine guns to the advanced guard will be highly advantageous. On the arrival of the infantry the machine guns must be withdrawn from the firing line, and kept in readiness for further employment.
_Para. 243._--In an attack on a fully developed and defended front, the machine guns will as a rule be kept back. They constitute a highly mobile reserve at the disposal of the G.O.C., which may be used for the speedy reinforcement of threatened points, for acting against the flanks of an enemy, and for the preparation of an attempt to break his line. The attack in view has a chance of success only when superiority of fire is established. For this purpose machine guns possess ample mobility to enable them to follow infantry advancing to the attack. That they should join in the rushes of the firing line is no more required of them than that they should join in the charge.
Under skilful and judicious leadership they will nevertheless be able to come so close to the enemy as to take part in the decisive fire engagement; the temporary increase of distance from the carriages need not be considered.
It is of exceptional advantage to direct the fire against the point of the enemy’s line selected for the attack from a commanding position, or from a flank, since under these circumstances it is not necessary to cease fire when the infantry continue their advance, and prepare for the final rush. Should such a position be reached at a range which admits of the maximum fire effect (800 yards or under) any further forward movement of the machine guns is wrong; it interrupts the fire effect and entails fresh laying and ranging.
_Para. 244._--In the event of a successful issue of the action, the machine guns must co-operate with the first pursuit by a lavish use of their fire power. As soon as the victory is assured they will be hurried forward into the captured position to support the infantry in their occupation of the same, and to crush the last powers of resistance of the enemy.
_Para. 245._--Should the attack fail, the machine guns must support the retiring troops.
_Para. 246._--In using machine guns in defence, one must consider that the guns are not suitable for conducting a protracted action for any space of time, and that the advantage of the machine guns’ mobility cannot be utilised if a fixed part of the position is handed over to them for defence at the outset. It is to be recommended generally, and particularly in the defence, to keep the guns at first with the reserve, and to utilise them as the need arises--to strengthen the defending line at threatened points, to hinder outflanking, and to repel an attempt at storming the position, or for offensive movements. This does not always exclude machine guns from entering into action at the commencement of an engagement, _e.g._ if it is necessary to command certain important approaches. Also, if a covered retreat for the machine guns is assured, it will be possible to place them to the front or to the side of the main line of defence, so that they can sweep with their fire the country which the enemy will presumably occupy with his artillery.
At times a flanking machine-gun fire can be used to sweep dead ground in front of the line of battle.
_Para. 247._--In all cases where machine guns are placed in positions selected beforehand, cover must be constructed. If the time is not sufficient for this, an attempt must at least be made to arrange some artificial concealment, to improve the field of fire, and to determine ranges.
_Para. 248._--After a successful action machine-gun detachments must be utilised in the boldest fashion, to turn the victory to account during the pursuit. They are highly suitable for this purpose, as they unite great power of fire with rapidity of movement. The pursuit must be continued as long as strength permits. The machine guns will approach to within effective range of the enemy, and hinder every attempt of the adversary to re-form and take up a position. Flanking fire is especially effective. A liberal supply of ammunition must be pushed forward, this being necessary for the energetic maintenance of fire in pursuit.
_Para. 249._--When breaking off an action in the event of an unsuccessful issue, the machine-gun detachment can render considerable service by opposing the enemy, regardless of the possible loss of the guns, and by pouring a vigorous fire into him. For keeping the enemy in check, positions behind defiles with covered lines of retreat are especially suitable.
Special importance must be attached to the provision of sufficient ammunition, to the thorough reconnaissance of the lines of retreat, and to the correct estimation of the moment for beginning to retire, especially when the movement is to be carried out in echelon. To avoid obstruction the ammunition wagons must be moved away at the right moment. Increased attention must be paid to the flanks, since it is from these that danger most threatens during a retreat. If suitable positions can be occupied on the flanks, increased facilities for conducting the retreat will be obtained by utilising them.
_Para. 250._--Machine guns attached to independent cavalry might be used to increase the power of cavalry, mounted and dismounted, and on the offensive and defensive. The duties that will fall on machine guns in this service demand great mobility and the strictest fire discipline.
_Para. 251._--The commander of the independent cavalry will make all decisions regarding the employment of machine guns. He communicates all his plans of action to the machine gun commander, and provides him further with special orders concerning the first entry into action of the machine guns. If the machine guns are not to be used, it is advisable to leave them behind in a suitable covering position.
_Para. 252._--On reconnaissance duty with the cavalry, machine guns will be most frequently employed in breaking down the resistance of the enemy at small posts or defiles which they have occupied, or vice versa--to stiffen the opposition made by the cavalry at such points. On such an occasion even the assistance of a single section with its ammunition will be of use to the cavalry detachment.
_Para. 253._--In the advance of cavalry against cavalry the machine-gun detachments must take up their positions as soon as possible, so as to support first the deployment, and then the attack of the cavalry. The most advantageous position will be well to the front and to a flank of the advancing cavalry, since from there a continuation of the fire is rendered possible up to the moment almost of the charge, and at the same time an outflanking movement of the enemy is prevented on that side. A position secure against direct attack is to be desired, yet a consideration of the effect gained by the position described above precedes all thought of cover. A change of position is almost always out of the question, owing to the rapid development of a mounted action.
_Para. 254._--A wide separation of the sections is not advisable, since several lines of fire hamper the movements of cavalry.
_Para. 255._--In a forward movement of the machine guns when limbered up, decreasing the intervals to less than 10 paces must be avoided, since smaller spaces render difficult the passage of the limbers to the rear.
_Para. 256._--During the fight the detachment commander will have to act on his own responsibility, according to the state of the action. He must not wait for orders, and must always watch the cavalry engagement; he must use every opportunity to join in the issue at stake and make preparation for decisive action in case of either a successful or an unsuccessful termination of the struggle. Under certain conditions it may be advantageous to await events with his guns ready to march.
_Para. 257._--In the event of a favourable issue of the action, it will be his duty to follow the beaten enemy with his fire and to prevent him from offering further resistance.
_Para. 258._--The nature of a cavalry engagement will often render it necessary to keep the carriages close to the guns or to shoot from the wheeled carriages. Since the massing of several carriages in rear of the detachment offers the enemy a favourable opportunity for attack and impedes firing towards the rear, the question will arise whether the ammunition wagons should be kept back in a secure place.
_Para. 260._--The machine-gun detachments attached to the cavalry divisions remain with them in action. They will find occasion to prove of service in the varied duties of cavalry during and especially after action.
_Para. 261._--Also for protecting batteries in position, machine guns can be profitably employed, if infantry are not forthcoming for this duty.
_Extract from “Field Service Regulations, 1908”_
“The fire effect of machine guns is influenced primarily by correct sighting, possibility of observation, size and density of target, and methods of fire.”
“It is further affected by the suddenness with which fire is opened, by the number of machine guns firing at the same target, and by the enemy’s fire. The high rate of fire concentration of the bullet-sheaf, and the possibility of bringing several machine guns into action on a narrow front, enable great effect to be produced in a short time even at long ranges. When the front of the target is broken and irregular, the effect is reduced. A wrong sighting elevation or an imperfect observation of fire may render the fire completely ineffective.”
“Dense lines of skirmishers standing suffer heavy losses at ranges of 1,650 yards and under. At lines of skirmishers lying, good effect is to be expected at 1,100 yards and under, provided that the observation of fire is good. Against artillery in action the fire is similar to that of infantry. Owing to the mobility of machine-gun batteries they are especially adapted for securing the increased fire effect due to _oblique_ fire.”
“At short ranges under hostile fire machine guns can only be brought up and withdrawn under cover.”
* * * * *
The German _Cavalry Drill Book_ of 1909 has some interesting paragraphs on the employment of machine guns, which are here given:
_Para. 497._--Horse artillery and machine guns, by reason of their fire, enhance the offensive and defensive powers of cavalry. In defence and against unexpected opening of fire they form the most effective portion of the force.
_Para. 498._--Horse-artillery fire will often be the first thing to make the enemy disclose his dispositions, and thus is useful for reconnaissance. In conjunction with machine guns it can break down the enemy’s resistance in defiles, and thus save the cavalry the necessity of dismounted action.
_Para. 498._--Artillery and machine guns enable the cavalry, ... especially by fire effect upon their flanks, to distract hostile columns from their line of march.
_Para. 500._--Detached forces of the Division may be allotted artillery and machine guns to increase their powers of offensive action.... The employment of single machine guns is forbidden.
_Para. 501._--The commanders of artillery and machine guns must be kept informed of the situation and of the cavalry commander’s intentions. They remain with him until the employment of their commands has been arranged for; and, if necessary, it is their duty to bring this question of employment to his notice. At later stages they must keep in constant communication with him. Guns and machine guns come into action for the first time by order of the leader.
_Para. 502._--As a general principle, fire is to be opened on those portions of the enemy the defeat of which is likely to influence the decision of the fight. Under anything like equal conditions, a duel with the hostile artillery cannot lead to rapid results. But should the hostile artillery expose itself, the opportunity must be seized with rapidity and energy. It may be also necessary to engage hostile artillery in order to draw their fire from the cavalry.
_Para. 503._--Fire control is facilitated by keeping the batteries together, nor is any great dispersion of the machine-gun sections, as a rule, to be recommended. Many lines of fire cramp the movements of cavalry during the mounted combat. The conditions of the fight, however, or the configuration of the ground, may necessitate dispersions and separate positions.... Machine guns only require an escort when the field of view is very restricted.
_Para. 507._--In the _mounted cavalry combat_ guns and machine guns must be brought into action so as to support, firstly, the deployment; secondly, the attack. Positions for the machine guns, to a flank and in front of the advancing cavalry, all on rising ground, will allow fire to be maintained until immediately before the collision, and will make it difficult for the enemy to envelop a flank. On the other hand, the disadvantage is that any large flank movement takes time, and sometimes so much time that the decisive moment may pass while it is being carried out, and the guns may arrive too late.... It is desirable that artillery positions should be secured from direct attack by the nature of the ground. But if circumstances demand it, artillery and machine guns must come into action on the spot, without regard for cover or other advantages.
_Para. 509._--Unless fresh bodies of cavalry offer a tempting target, fire will be turned on to the hostile batteries and machine guns immediately after the collision of the cavalry masses.
_Para. 510._--During the fight the leaders of artillery and machine guns will for the most part have to act on their own initiative. They must seek every opportunity for intervention, and, according to the course of the fight, must make preparations for action under favourable or unfavourable conditions. On occasions it may be necessary to remain limbered up and ready to move.
_Para. 511._--After a successful attack artillery and machine guns advance rapidly to follow up the beaten enemy with fire, and to prevent his rallying for renewed opposition. If the result be unfavourable, artillery and machine-gun leaders must come to a timely decision whether the circumstances call for a retirement to a covering position, or whether they should not hold on to their fire position even at the risk of losing the guns.
_Para. 512._--Owing to the character of the cavalry encounter, it is often advisable to keep the limbers with the guns. And it may sometimes be well to leave a portion of the second-line wagons and the carts of the machine-gun detachments behind in a place of security, and to order the light-ammunition column to march at the head of the second-line transport. Yet another question may arise for the machine-gun detachments; whether to take the wheeled carriage or only the sleigh mountings into the firing line.
_Para. 513._--If the assault succeeds, guns and machine guns hurry to the captured position to take part in the pursuit.
Should their own attack fail, or should that of the enemy succeed, artillery and machine guns must endeavour to cover the retirement, and, disregarding the hostile artillery, must turn their fire into pursuing riflemen.
* * * * *
In a recent article in the _Jahrbücher für die Deutschen Armeen und Marine_ Captain von Beckmann gives the following summary of the tactical use of machine guns:--
1. Machine guns must take up the smallest possible space, and be capable of quickly coming into action (at rifle ranges). They must be capable of accompanying infantry and cavalry wherever these arms can go.
2. They can never take the place of artillery, though capable, especially at short ranges, of affording effective support to the latter.
3. The fire of one machine gun is approximately equivalent to that of 80 infantrymen. The dispersion of fire is considerably less; therefore while the effect is greater with an accurate sight, it is less if the range is not accurately known.
4. The most suitable targets are those of some size and depth--_e.g._ infantry columns, cavalry in all formations, and artillery when limbered up. At medium ranges, extended firing lines may be fired upon, but little effect can be produced upon men lying down, even at the shortest ranges--though the morale effect may be considerable.
5. Short bursts of heavy fire are especially effective. On the other hand, long-continued fire is unsuitable, owing to the expenditure of ammunition and the heating of the barrel.
6. Artillery in position provided with shields can only be effectively damaged by enfilade or oblique fire.
7. Machine guns may either be employed directly under the orders of the G.O.C. or be attached to certain units. In the first case they will usually act in complete machine-gun units. In the second case they will generally do so only at suitable targets at long and medium ranges. In the later stages they will mostly be used in sections. The use of single machine guns is to be avoided.
8. The intervals between machine guns in action must depend on circumstances. They should not be too small if the guns are to hold their ground for any length of time. When a section (2 guns) is acting alone, the guns must be able to afford effective mutual support in all directions.
9. Ammunition must be carefully husbanded, especially at the longer ranges, while a good supply of ammunition is essential. Even at long ranges, this ammunition will have to be carried by men specially equipped for the purpose.
10. When the enemy is unexpectedly met with while on the march, machine guns will be of special value to the advance guard in rapidly seizing points in order to hold the enemy at a distance. The occupation of such points at wide intervals will often effectively deceive the enemy as to the strength of the force. Machine guns thus employed will be withdrawn as soon as the infantry come up and deploy, so as to be available for other work.
11. The wide extensions of modern armies will often make it impossible for any but mounted troops to be concentrated at decisive points--either to make the most of favourable opportunities, or to ward off an unexpected danger. Mounted machine-gun detachments will be very valuable for such purposes.
12. In the attack of a defensive position deliberately occupied, part of the machine guns will at first be held in reserve, but, according to the latest opinions formed from the lessons of the Russo-Japanese War, the majority of the machine guns will support the advance of the infantry. They are especially effective in keeping down the defenders’ fire during the last stage of the attack when the artillery is no longer able to fire over the heads of the infantry.
13. On the defensive it is advisable that a considerable number of machine guns should be held in reserve, especially with a view to preventing any unexpected turning movements, repelling assaults, delivering counter-attacks, and in case of such reinforcing any threatened points in the line of defence. In fortified positions machine guns may be usefully employed in front of the position to force the enemy to deploy prematurely. His artillery as it comes into action will frequently offer very suitable targets. The majority of machine guns, however, will be placed in the line of defence (or at least immediately in rear of the sections to which they are allotted) as soon as the direction of the enemy’s attack has been ascertained. This presence in the front line will make it possible to reduce the number of men actually in that line and will thus economise troops.
14. In the pursuit machine guns will be especially effective against the flanks and rear of the retiring enemy. Again, in covering a retirement and checking the enemy’s pursuit, machine guns with cavalry and artillery will delay the enemy’s advance and enable their own infantry to break away. In this case the first duty will be to protect their own artillery.
15. With the Independent Cavalry machine guns form a very valuable addition to the effective strength both for defence and offence. Even in reconnaissance work they will be able to break down the enemy’s resistance at certain points (villages) and to increase the tenacity of their own forces in the defence of similar points. Light machine guns carried on the saddle would be of the greatest assistance to smaller bodies of cavalry in such circumstances. Machine guns are also valuable in purely cavalry engagements, especially when it is possible for them to take the enemy in flank. If this be impossible, they can effectively follow up a success, or cover the retirement of their own cavalry. If some of the machine guns act as escort to the artillery, the cavalry escort can be dispensed with. This will increase the effective strength of the cavalry and also give the artillery a wide choice of position and great security, thus increasing its efficiency. Even if at the beginning the cavalry commander himself directs the working of the machine guns, the officer commanding the latter will have to act on his own initiative later on, in accordance with the tactical situation of the moment.
GREAT BRITAIN
ORGANISATION.--Great Britain was one of the earliest countries to adopt machine guns, and the Maxim has been in use for the last twenty years. Machine guns are organised in sections of two guns, and a section forms part of each regiment of cavalry and battalion of infantry, who provide and train the personnel.
The organisation is as follows:--
A SECTION WITH A CAVALRY REGIMENT
---------------------------+--------------+--------------- Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses. ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- Lieutenant 1 | 3 | -- Sergeant 1 | 1 | -- Corporal 1 | 1 | -- Privates 12 | 12 | -- Drivers 8 | -- | 16 Bâtman 2 | -- | -- ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- 25 (1 officer) | 17 | 16 ---------------------------+--------------+---------------
_Equipment._--6 pack-saddles (the two lead horses of each wagon are provided with pack saddlery); 4 G.S. limbered wagons (2 for guns and 2 for ammunition); 2 machine guns with tripods and pack-saddles on limbered G.S. wagons, each drawn by 4 horses.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 16,000 with regimental reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively.
SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION
---------------------------+--------------+--------------- Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses. ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- Subaltern 1 | 1 | -- Sergeant 1 | -- | -- Corporal 1 | -- | -- Privates 12 | -- | -- Drivers | | (1st-line | | transport) 2 | -- | 4 ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 4 ---------------------------+--------------+---------------
_Equipment._--2 machine guns with tripods on 1 limbered G.S. wagon drawn by 2 horses.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 8,000 with regimental reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column; 10,000 with divisional ammunition column for each gun respectively.
TERRITORIAL FORCE: SECTION WITH AN INFANTRY BATTALION
---------------------------+--------------+--------------- Personnel. |Riding horses.|Draught horses. ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- Subaltern 1 | 1 | -- Sergeant 1 | -- | -- Rank and | | File 15 | -- | 2 ---------------------------+--------------+--------------- | | Total 17 (1 officer) | 1 | 2 ---------------------------+--------------+---------------
_Equipment._--2 machine guns on field carriages each drawn by 1 horse.
_Ammunition._--4,000 with the guns; 6,000 with regimental reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column.
SECTION WITH A YEOMANRY REGIMENT
----------------------+------------------+---------------- Personnel. | Riding horses. | Draught horses. ----------------------+------------------+---------------- Subaltern 1 | 2 | -- Sergeant 1 | 1 | -- Corporal 1 | 1 | -- Privates 12 | 12 | -- Drivers 4 | -- | 8 Bâtman 2 | -- | -- ----------------------+------------------+---------------- Total 21 | 16 | 8 ----------------------+------------------+----------------
_Equipment._--2 carts for guns, tripods, and 2 sets of pack-saddlery; and 2 carts for machine-gun ammunition.
_Ammunition._--3,500 rounds with each gun; 6,000 with regimental reserve; 10,000 with brigade ammunition column.
MOUNTING.--There are five English patterns of tripods in use and one Indian. Marks I. and II. English pattern and the Indian pattern are exceedingly clumsy, and have been largely replaced by Marks III., III.A, and IV. Mark III. weighs 49 lb., and consists of a crosshead and pivot mounted on three legs with a saddle for firer, and has elevating and traversing gears. A traverse of 25 degrees can be obtained. The two front legs of the tripod are pivoted in sockets and secured by wing nuts, and can be splayed to lower the gun, and fold up for transport. The legs are fitted with shoes to steady the mounting by gripping the ground. When firing, the ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the gun.
On the pack-saddle the gun and tripod are carried on either side of the saddle on hooks and secured by straps. The tool box is carried on the top of the saddle. With this mounting 4,000 rounds of ammunition are carried in eight boxes, four on each side of the ammunition pack-saddle on a second animal.
Mark III.A tripod weighs 56 lb., and differs from Mark III. as follows:
1. The pivot has a bearing surface to support the rear end of crosshead arm.
2. The hand nut of elevating gear is formed with four small radial holes.
3. The rear leg is telescopic, and consists of an inner and outer tube. The inner tube has a shoe, and the rear end of the outer tube has a bracket for the saddle and a handle to clamp the inner to the outer tube.
The Mark IV. tripod weighs 48 lb., and the mounting consists of a crosshead, elevating gear, and socket mounted on three legs. It has 13 degrees elevation and 25 degrees depression, but by arranging the position of legs 43 degrees and 55 degrees can be had. It has an all-round traverse. The elevating gear is actuated by a hand-wheel, which consists of an inner and an outer screw. The legs are of tubular steel, the lower ends being fitted with shoes to steady the mountings, and the upper ends have a joint with serrations; the rear leg has a joint pin with nut and jamming handle. Joint studs with disc springs and jamming handles are fixed to the front legs, by which the legs are securely clamped in the required position. Numbers are stamped on the legs to show the relative position of the legs to their normal position. The legs are secured by a leather strap for transport. When firing, the ammunition box is placed on the ground on the right side of the gun. The gun can be fired at heights varying from 14½ inches to 30 inches above the ground.
TACTICAL.--Directions for the use of machine guns are found in the various textbooks issued for each arm. Training is dealt with in the _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, 1907, and in the _Training Manuals Appendix_, 1905. The following directions for their employment in the field are from the latter, ch. vi. pp. 157-63:
_Para. 2._--Surprise is a powerful factor in the effective employment of the machine gun; every effort must therefore be made to avoid the enemy’s observations both when advancing to a position and when in action. The machine gun possesses the power of delivering, from a very narrow front, a practically uninterrupted volume of closely concentrated rifle fire, which can be directed against any desired object with the least possible delay. The delivery of such fire cannot, however, be long sustained, because of the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved and the difficulty of replacing it.
It is necessary, therefore, for its effective use, that its movements and fire action should be so regulated as to enable it to open fire rapidly whenever a favourable target presents itself, for the losses inflicted on an enemy will affect him in proportion to the suddenness and rapidity with which they are experienced. As the rôle of machine guns is to assist the particular body of troops to which they belong, the machine-gun commander should be fully acquainted with the orders issued to such troops. He should also carefully watch and conform to their movements, and assist them by every means in his power. As a rule the guns belonging to a unit will be employed singly in order to obviate the concentration of hostile fire against them, the most favourable position being sought for each weapon with regard to fire effect and cover; this, however, should not prevent the guns being used together when the circumstances of the moment demand the adoption of such a course. The massing of guns should be rarely resorted to. When it is desired to bring an overwhelming fire to bear on any locality, it should be accomplished by the concentration of fire from dispersed guns. The selection of a fire position should be preceded by careful reconnaissance on the part of the machine-gun commander. The following points should be looked for:
(_a_) A good field of fire.
(_b_) Concealment.
(_c_) Cover from the hostile fire.
(_d_) Possibilities for advancing to the position unobserved, and facilities for ammunition supply.
(_e_) Security against a covered hostile approach.
If a position affording concealment is not available, one should be selected which from the nature of its background will be difficult for the enemy to locate. As the opportunities for the effective action of machine guns will often be very brief, and as the guns will usually be employed singly, the non-commissioned officer in charge of each gun will, as a rule, have to act on his own initiative in choosing the objective, judging the range, and in deciding when to open fire. As a general rule, machine guns are best adapted for action at effective ranges; at these it is usually possible to distinguish the target, to ascertain its range, and to observe the effects of the fire. When, however, concealment and protection from fire exist, it may sometimes be advisable to bring machine guns into action at decisive range. If a sufficiently large target be offered and the range be known, the concentration and rapidity of their fire will enable guns to be employed, with considerable effect, at long ranges. Machine guns should seldom engage artillery at long rifle range, for in such circumstances superiority of fire will always rest with the latter if the machines are located. Within effective range, however, machine guns, if concealed, should inflict considerable loss on hostile artillery. Engagements with their lines of skirmishers should be avoided, for the risk of disclosing the position of the guns and the heavy expenditure of ammunition involved will rarely be justified by results. Since the gun is not well adapted for keeping up protracted fire, it may be often expedient to withdraw it from action, move it elsewhere, or hold it in reserve for a more favourable opportunity.
The selection of a target upon which to fire should be governed by (_a_) its tactical importance; (_b_) its dimensions and vulnerability. It is essential that due regard to economy of ammunition should be observed. When, however, it is decided to open fire, the ammunition necessary to secure the results sought must be expended without hesitation. “Deliberate fire” will rarely be resorted to. In cases where a favourable target is offered, prolonged “rapid fire” may be employed, but the most suitable description of fire will usually be “rapid” in series of from 25 to 30 rounds.
The range should be taken by a range-finder or ascertained from neighbouring infantry or artillery. Ranging by observation of fire should be employed only when the nature of the soil is very favourable and when no other method is practicable. When a reserve ammunition cart is provided for the machine guns it will be under the orders of the machine-gun commander, who will arrange that it is placed where it can most conveniently supply the guns with ammunition; it should be screened from view, and if possible sheltered from fire. All belts shall be refilled as soon as possible after they are emptied. Should the machine-gun commander consider an escort necessary, he will at once bring the fact to the notice of his commanding officer.
_With Infantry in the Attack_
_Para. 3._--The machine guns will cover the advance of the firing line by engaging the enemy from positions in close support of it. In ordinary open ground it would rarely be advisable to push them into the firing line, where they would offer a conspicuous target to the enemy; but in a broken or enclosed country, where the guns can be brought up under cover, occasions may arise when they can be usefully employed in a forward position. When the ground is favourable the gun may with advantage accompany that portion of reserves told off to cover the advance of the remainder by long-range fire. Machine guns will co-operate with the attacking infantry in the decisive fire action in endeavouring to obtain a superiority of fire. Positions on the flank of the attacking battalions or on commanding ground, if available, should be selected, as they admit of the guns remaining in action whilst the firing line is pushing forward. A position on the flank of the attacking infantry has the further advantages that oblique or flanking fire, which from machine guns is particularly effective, can be brought to bear against the enemy, whilst guns so placed are less likely to draw fire upon the attacking infantry. A change of position during the decisive fire action interrupts the fire and entails fresh laying and ranging, and therefore should be seldom resorted to unless an increased fire effect is to be obtained. At the decisive stage of the attack, fire of the greatest intensity should be continued as long as is compatible with the safety of the advancing firing line. In the event of the attack succeeding, the guns should be pushed forward at once in order to pursue the retreating enemy with their fire. In the event of failure, every effort should be made to cover the retirement of the firing line. They will assist in repelling counter-attacks to which the firing line may suddenly become exposed, and in the protection of the flanks against cavalry or counterstroke. They may be employed to give effect to holding attacks or feints, by rapid fire directed against successive portions of the enemy’s line; also to make good positions secured in the course of an action.
_In the Defence_
_Para. 4._--It is more important to shield machine guns from artillery fire than to obtain a long range for them. Their position, therefore, should be always concealed, and cover from fire should be provided. They are best utilised to sweep with their fire spaces which are particularly exposed, but which the enemy is compelled to cross; to flank salients, cover obstacles, deny the passage of roads and defiles, or to guard the flanks of the position. It will be at times expedient to retain the guns in reserve until the enemy reaches effective ranges. In such cases, emplacements should be prepared previously and covered approaches provided. Machine guns may also be held as a reserve of fire to check the advance of hostile reinforcements, to meet turning movements, or to prepare and cover the counter-attack. When their retirement is not likely to be compromised, machine guns may be utilised in positions in front of the main line to delay the enemy’s advance.
_In Pursuit and Retreat_
_Para. 5._--In pursuit machine-gun commanders should act with great boldness, and it should be their endeavour to come into action against the enemy’s flanks at decisive range. In retirements they should avoid close engagements, and should take up successive fire positions, from which to delay the enemy’s advance and protect the flanks of the rear guard.
_With Advanced and Rear Guards and with Outposts_
_Para. 6._--With an advanced guard machine guns may often be pushed forward to assist in dispersing small bodies of the enemy who might delay the advance; they may also be employed in opposing the enemy’s advance and in preventing the occupation of important positions until the arrival of the main body. With the outposts they may be used to sweep the approaches, and to dominate certain points which an enemy, in advancing, is likely to pass or to occupy.
_With Cavalry_
_Para. 7._--As a general principle machine guns should be employed to supplement the fire action of cavalry. During the cavalry combat they may be suitably employed in protecting the flanks or in directing an oblique fire against the hostile cavalry. When the charge is successful they should press forward and engage the hostile cavalry at close range. In event of defeat they should form rallying points and endeavour to check the enemy’s pursuit. In reconnaissance, or other detached duties, the machine guns should be retained by the commander of the unit as a reserve, ready to move to any point where their presence may be required. They may be utilised for such purposes as to induce the enemy to expose his position; to drive in hostile patrols; to check the pursuit of victorious cavalry; to delay the enemy’s infantry, etc. When their fire has achieved its object they should be withdrawn temporarily. In other circumstances their action should be guided by the principles set forth in the case of infantry.
_From_ “FIELD SERVICE REGULATIONS,” _Part I., Operations_, 1909
The machine gun possesses the power of delivering a volume of concentrated rifle fire which can be rapidly directed against any desired object. Rapid fire cannot be long sustained, owing to the expenditure of ammunition involved, and it is therefore necessary that the movements and fire action of the weapons should be regulated so as to enable them to open fire immediately a favourable opportunity arises. Surprise is an important factor in the employment of machine guns, which should be concealed, and whenever possible provided with cover from fire. The massing of machine guns is likely to attract hostile artillery fire. For this reason it is usually better to employ them in pairs in support of the particular body of troops to which they belong. When an overwhelming fire on a particular point is required it can be provided by concentrating the fire of dispersed pairs of guns. The guns of two or more units may, if required, be placed under the command of a specially selected officer and employed as a special reserve of fire in the hands of a brigade commander. Machine guns are best adapted for use at effective infantry ranges, but when good cover from view and fire exists they may be usefully employed at close infantry ranges.[62]
_With Outposts_
Machine guns with outposts may be employed to sweep approaches, and to cover ground which an enemy in advancing may be compelled to pass or occupy.[63]
_During the Battle_
Machine guns will be especially valuable in bringing a sudden fire to bear from such positions, both in order to cover a further advance and to assist in defeating counter-attacks. Machine guns can normally support an attack most efficiently from well-concealed positions provided with good cover, and within effective infantry range of the enemy. Occasionally, when good opportunities for a concealed advance present themselves, they may be established within close infantry range of the objective.[64]
_From_ “CAVALRY TRAINING,” 1907
Machine guns afford a means of developing fire without dismounting men from the squadrons. During the cavalry fight they will usually be massed under one commander, but may be employed in pairs when necessary. They will co-operate with the horse artillery, the great volume of fire which they are able to bring to bear from a narrow front being particularly effective. Their presence with the artillery will often admit of the latter dispensing with any other escort.[65]
_Position of Machine Guns_
During the approach march the machine guns will usually accompany the artillery, to whom they may act as escort when necessary.[66]
_From_ “INFANTRY TRAINING, 1908” (AMENDMENT, AUGUST, 1909)
_General Characteristics_
1. The machine gun possesses the power of delivering rapidly from a narrow front a volume of closely concentrated fire which can be controlled easily, be turned readily in any desired direction, or be distributed by traversing.
2. The effective range of machine guns is the same as that of the rifle; they are therefore not suited for employment in place of artillery. On the other hand, the effect of machine-gun fire at effective infantry and close infantry ranges is very great, and at close infantry ranges it may, with favourable conditions, be annihilating. Machine guns are very suitable for the development of covering fire within the limits of effective rifle range. They can accompany the troops to which they may be attached over any country.
3. The action of the mechanism is liable to temporary interruption by jams. Machine guns should not therefore be used singly under normal conditions. They are organised in sections of two guns, which should rarely be broken up.
4. Machine guns are essentially weapons of opportunity. The expenditure of ammunition involved and the nature of the mechanism make long periods of rapid fire unsuitable. The power of the gun is best used to develop unexpected bursts of fire.
_The Organisation and Training of Infantry Machine-Gun Sections_
1. The strength and composition of a machine-gun section are shown in War Establishments. An infantry machine-gun section is an integral portion of an infantry battalion, but two or more sections may be brought together by the brigade commander and used under the command of a brigade machine-gun officer.
The two non-commissioned officers and twelve privates shown in the establishment will be trained as first-class machine gunners. Two non-commissioned officers and twelve men will be trained, as opportunity offers, as second-class machine gunners to replace casualties among first-class machine gunners.
2. A subaltern officer, other than the assistant adjutant, will be selected in each battalion to command and train the machine-gun section, under the orders of the commanding officer. Should a brigade commander desire to train the machine guns of his brigade to act together when massed, an officer, who is not the machine-gun officer of one of the battalions of the brigade, may be selected to supervise the firing practice and to conduct the brigade training of machine-gun sections.
3. Officers, non-commissioned officers, and men detailed for machine-gun training should be changed as little as possible; the two non-commissioned officers and twelve men trained as first-class machine gunners will fire the practices prescribed in the Musketry Regulations with one of the companies of the battalion,[67] but will at other times be at the disposal of the machine-gun officer for instruction.
4. Details as to the mechanism of the gun, and the drill of machine-gun sections are contained in the handbook of the gun. Instructions as to the course of firing are contained in the Musketry Regulations.
5. The preliminary training, which may be carried out in the neighbourhood of barracks, will consist in instruction in the mechanism of the gun; in the drill and methods of laying, ranging, and firing; in packing and unpacking with limbered wagons.
6. As soon as the men of a section are thoroughly conversant with the mechanism, are able to recognise without delay the cause of any failure and to remedy it at once, and can drill and handle the gun with precision, their further training will be carried out in open country away from barracks. During this training the sections should be practised in bringing the gun into action; in fire discipline; in fire control; in laying and ranging in every variety of country; in utilising natural cover when advancing into action; and in constructing cover from both view and fire. The men should also be trained in range-finding, judging distance, and in the use of field-glasses.
7. When the section is proficient in these branches of training, the commanding officer will arrange for it to be trained with one or more companies which have reached the more advanced stages of company training, in order that it may be practised in co-operating with other troops and in dealing with such situations as would confront it in war. The periods of preliminary training should be arranged so that the section may be ready for this training, without hurrying through the more elementary work. To enable this to be done it will usually be necessary to begin the preliminary training during the winter training season.
_General Principles of the Employment of Infantry Machine Guns_
1. The normal duty of the infantry machine gun in war is to assist infantry in every way by its fire, but it may be given an independent rôle at any time, if the tactical situation makes it advisable to do so.
2. The effective use of a machine gun depends largely upon the skill with which it has been brought into action. Surprise and concealment are very important factors in its employment; for the effect of the gun is much increased by sudden bursts of fire from concealed positions. The tripod mounting makes it possible to take advantage of small features of the ground to obtain cover and to escape an enemy’s observation. In order to develop the power of the gun to the utmost the fullest use should be made of natural and artificial cover.
3. The depth of the beaten zone of the machine gun is small as compared with that of collective rifle fire. This makes the effect of small errors in sighting for elevation proportionately greater. A section of machine guns cannot therefore be relied upon to make its fire effective when first opening fire, at distances beyond about 1,000 yards. If observation of fire is possible, elevation may be rapidly corrected, and the fire of the two guns may in that case be very effective up to 2,000 yards, or up to the limit of observation. If there is no observation it will be necessary to employ several guns and expend a large quantity of ammunition in order to obtain adequate assurance of effect beyond about 1,000 yards.
4. By massing the machine guns of a brigade the assurance of fire effect at ranges beyond 1,000 yards is increased, and it is easier to control and direct fire. At shorter ranges massed machine guns may form a conspicuous target, and the control of more than two guns then becomes difficult. Occasions will, however, often arise when the massed guns of a brigade can be brought into action in a well-concealed position within the limits of effective rifle range. Under such circumstances massed guns may produce great effect both in attack and defence.
5. The general considerations which govern the selection of a target for machine guns are--its tactical importance, its range, and its vulnerability.
Machine guns should seldom engage artillery with direct fire beyond effective rifle range, for in such circumstances superiority of fire will always rest with the artillery if the machine guns are located. Within effective range machine guns, if concealed, should inflict considerable loss on artillery, while oblique fire may be usefully employed up to the limits of long rifle range.
Engagements with thin lines of skirmishers should be avoided unless the range is accurately known, as the risk of disclosing the position of the gun and the expenditure of ammunition involved will rarely be justified by results.
6. It is very important that fire should not be opened until there is a reasonable probability of obtaining the desired result. A section commander must have a thorough knowledge of the capabilities of his guns to enable him to decide when he is justified in opening fire.
7. Machine guns should as a rule only open fire upon targets which are sufficiently large and dense to promise an adequate return for the ammunition expended. Special circumstances may, however, warrant the opening of fire upon less favourable targets. When a machine-gun commander has decided to open fire, the ammunition necessary to secure the results sought should be expended without hesitation.
8. If there is no satisfactory indication of effect, and no special justification for firing at long range exists, it will usually be better to withdraw from action and to await opportunities for effective intervention.
9. A machine-gun commander should be given definite orders as to his action, but should be allowed full liberty, within the limits assigned to the commander of the body of troops with whom he is co-operating, in carrying out his orders. He should be kept informed of all changes and developments of the situation which may affect his action. Initiative and enterprise are essential to the effective handling of machine guns.
10. Machine guns will usually be sufficiently protected by the dispositions of the troops with whom they are acting. Should a machine-gun commander find himself in an exposed position, he should consult the nearest infantry commander, who is responsible for providing a suitable escort, if in his opinion one is necessary.
11. When a machine gun is in action only those numbers required to work the gun should be with it. Spare numbers, when not employed as range-finders, ground scouts, ammunition-carriers, or on similar duties, should be in covered positions in the vicinity. Groups of men close to machine guns do not facilitate the working of the gun, and make a vulnerable target.
The limbered wagons will be unloaded in positions where they are screened from the enemy’s fire and observation.
The commander of the machine-gun section will select a covered position for his small-arm ammunition cart, as close to his guns as possible. (see Section 174).
_Choice of Fire Positions_
1. Reconnaissance is of special importance in the handling of machine guns. Before bringing his guns into action the brigade machine-gun officer if the machine guns are brigaded, or the battalion machine-gun officer if the sections are working independently, accompanied by range-takers and orderlies, should usually be well in advance of his guns, where he can observe the action of the body of infantry with which he is co-operating. He should carefully reconnoitre suitable fire positions and make all preparations for bringing his guns rapidly into action. During this reconnaissance the machine guns should normally be placed in concealed positions. In any case they should not follow the machine-gun commander so closely as to expose their movements. Alternative positions to which the guns may be moved to meet changes in the situation or to avoid artillery fire should always be prepared.
2. The choice of a fire position must depend upon the tactical requirements of the situation, and upon the object in view; for example, it must depend upon whether it is desired to use covering enfilade or flanking fire, or to act by surprise.
A commanding position is favourable for the development of covering fire, while for other purposes the gun should be sited as low as is compatible with obtaining the necessary field of fire.
3. A clear field of fire, facilities for observation, a covered approach, concealment and cover for the guns and their detachments, and facilities for ammunition supply are advantages to be looked for in a good fire position, but one position will rarely unite them all. In arranging for the concealment of the guns it is important to consider the background. The neighbourhood of landmarks and the tops of prominent features should be avoided.
4. Their power of all-round traversing and their great effect against deep targets make machine guns specially suitable for position on a flank, whence they can bring enfilade fire to bear. A position in the firing line is rarely suitable, as the fire of the guns may be masked and the enemy’s fire drawn on the firing line.
5. The interval between guns in action should be as large as is compatible with effective control, but the front occupied by the massed guns of a brigade should rarely exceed 150 yards.
_Machine Guns in Attack_
1. Since machine guns are unsuited for maintaining a continuous fire, they will usually best assist the infantry by withholding their fire during the earlier stages of the battle, so as to be able to intervene at more critical periods. Machine guns allotted to a protective detachment will, however, always be employed so as best to assist the detachment in its special duties (_Field Service Regulations_, Part I., Chap. V.).
2. It will depend upon the general situation whether the machine guns should be placed under the control of the brigade machine-gun officer or left with the battalions to which they belong. When the facilities for concealment and control at effective range are good, and the brigade is engaged in a decisive attack, the best results will usually be obtained by unity of command. By a timely concentration of fire machine guns may thus be the deciding factor in the struggle for superiority of fire.
When control is difficult, or when the brigade is extended over a wide front, it will usually be better to leave guns with their units.
3. It will often be advisable to employ both methods and to leave their machine guns with the battalions which are first extended, while those of reserve battalions are placed under the command of the brigade machine-gun officer.
4. Although machine guns can move with deployed infantry under fire, they should rarely attempt to keep pace with attacking infantry. When they have gained a position from which they can effectively support their infantry in the struggle for fire superiority and in the assault, they should only be moved for good and sufficient reasons. The difficulties of ranging and of concealment on the move usually outweigh the advantages of decreasing the range.
5. Machine guns will usually find opportunities for employment in the attack in assisting the advance of their infantry by means of covering fire; in protecting attacking infantry against counter-attack or against cavalry; in assisting the infantry in the fire fight, and in preparing for the assault by sudden bursts of converging fire against the objective of the attack. They will also be of value in securing localities which have been seized during the advance, and can assist local reserves in acting as points of support to the attack.
_Machine Guns in Defence_
1. In defence, as in attack, the fire of machine guns should usually be withheld until the more critical stages of the battle. Premature opening of fire is liable to expose the position of the machine guns to the enemy’s artillery.
2. Machine guns may either be dispersed to command approaches, defiles, exits from woods, etc., by which the enemy may advance, to occupy advanced posts, and to bring enfilade fire to bear upon salients and upon the ground in front of weak parts of the position, or they may be massed and employed under the orders of commanders of sections.
3. When the guns are massed the alternative positions, Sec. 167 (D) 1, should be such that the firing line can be assisted during the crisis of the fight, and the advance of local and decisive counter-attacks can be covered and prepared. When covered approaches can be provided, massed machine guns should usually be withdrawn, after they have achieved their immediate object, and should await another favourable opportunity for action.
ITALY
GUN.--The Perino machine gun has been adopted. The barrel is surrounded by a cooling tube containing water, and the gun fires the same cartridge as the infantry rifle. It is regulated to fire 425 rounds a minute, and has a maximum rate of 500 rounds. It can be fired continuously with the automatic action, or intermittently. It is loaded by a ridged metal clip containing 25 cartridges, 10 of which clips are formed into a magazine. It is claimed that this clip is superior to the belt on account of the ease with which it can be recharged. The gun weighs 27 kilograms, which will be reduced to 23 in future manufacture. It is mounted on a provisional tripod, which is of a good pattern, but is said to be too heavy, and the weight is to be reduced to 20 kilograms.
The gun can be fired from any height above the ground by moving the legs of the tripod.
The mechanism is strong and simple, the range is the same as the rifle, and it is very accurate at all ranges.
The Perino machine gun was adopted on the recommendation of a Commission, who tested it against the Maxim and reported it to be more efficient.
They recommended the following organisation:
ORGANISATION.--Four machine guns are attached to each regiment of cavalry and infantry, and two guns to each Alpine battalion. The detachments recommended are:
For cavalry: 1 N.C.O., 5 men, 7 horses, per gun.
For infantry: 1 N.C.O., 4 men, 2 mules, per gun.
_Ammunition._--No details have been settled as to the amount or method of carrying.
TACTICAL.--No official instructions for the tactical handling of machine guns have yet been issued.
JAPAN
GUN.--The Japanese have adopted the Hotchkiss,[68] the barrel of which is air-cooled, having seven radiating gills on the breech to absorb the heat. The bore is ·256, being the same as the rifle; the weight is 70 lb. It is regulated to fire at a maximum rate of 600 rounds a minute. It is loaded by brass clips containing 30 cartridges inserted into the left side of the gun. The empties are ejected on the right side. The gun is sighted up to 2,187 yards, with a tangent sight, and is mounted on a tripod weighing 40 lb., which has an all-round traverse, and can be adjusted to fire from two heights. Shields were used in the late war, but were discarded on account of the weight. It is probable that detachable shields, large enough to cover the detachment, will in future be issued with machine guns for use as the situation requires.
The Japanese machine gun is of home design and manufacture, and belongs to that class in which the mechanism is actuated by the action of gas pressure operating upon a plunger or piston and not by the direct force of recoil as in the Maxim. It uses the same ammunition as the infantry rifle (murata calibre ·256), and is rated as firing 600 rounds a minute. Two forms of mountings are employed, the tripod and the wheeled; the former for fortress use, and the latter for mobile troops. Referring to the plate, a gas vent _m_ communicates with a gas chamber _c_ attached laterally to the barrel. The pressure in the gas chamber is regulated, within limits, by the nut _d_, which varies the capacity of the chamber. The piston-rod _A_ is acted upon by the gas pressure at its forward end, and is driven to the rear against a strong spiral spring _o_, which moves the piston end forward after the gas pressure has ceased to act. The reciprocating motion of the piston-rod actuates the mechanism, which is entirely enclosed in the housing, and performs the various operations of feeding, firing, and ejecting through a suitable train of gearing. Cooling is effected by the radiator _R_, a circumferentially grooved mass of metal attached to the barrel. The cartridges are mounted on a strip of sheet brass from which clips are punched and bent round the cartridges to hold them in position. A series of holes along the edges of the brass strip engage the teeth of pinions which feed the strip forward as the piston _A_ moves backward and forward. The cartridges are fired from their clips by fingers, and drop into position when the bolt is withdrawn. Thirty cartridges are mounted on one strip, which is fed into the slot _s_, from the left side. The trigger must be kept down by pressure all the time, otherwise the spring _o_ cannot operate to return the block forward. The gun is provided with a shoulder piece and gunner’s seat, as shown. The gun alone weighs about 73 lb., and with tripod 115 lb. It is sighted to 2,000 metres. The gun is stated to work very satisfactorily, and, owing to the positive motions, jamming does not occur easily.
ORGANISATION.--At the close of the war each of the two cavalry brigades was equipped with 6 machine guns and each infantry regiment with 3 guns, and it was contemplated to increase the allowance to 6 guns for each regiment, infantry or cavalry. The guns are served by infantrymen who are extra-regimental and selected from men having mechanical knowledge.
Guns are organised as follows:
_Infantry._--Batteries of 6 guns, each subdivided into 3 sections; each infantry regiment has one battery attached to it.
The personnel of the battery consists of 1 captain (or lieutenant), 1 W.O., 1 bugler.
Each gun has 1 commander (sergeant or corporal), 1 firer, 1 loader, 3 ammunition carriers.
TACTICAL.--Tactically, the guns are used primarily for defence, and reserve their fire for short ranges up to 600 or 800 metres. On the defensive line of the Third Army after the battle of Mukden many machine-gun emplacements were noted. These consisted mainly of blinded casemates, 8 ft. wide, 10 ft. deep, and 3 ft. 6 in. high, and from 18 to 24 in. of overhead cover. Importance is attached to concealing the guns, and it was claimed that none had been knocked out by Russian artillery. In the cavalry brigades the machine guns were organised into sections of 2 guns under an officer, so that sections could be detached with squadrons.
In the First Cavalry Brigade, General Akiyama, 4,000 rounds per gun per day was the greatest rate of fire attained. Machine guns were popular in the Japanese army, and were highly spoken of by the officers.[69]
_Cavalry._--Each cavalry brigade has an 8-gun battery, which is divided into half batteries of 4 guns each. The personnel of the battery consists of 1 captain, 2 subalterns, 1 W.O. (sergeant-major), 2 N.C.O.’s, 2 trumpeters. The gun detachments are the same as for infantry, with 3 mounted men per gun in addition.
TRANSPORT. _Infantry._--30 horses, 6 of which carry guns and tripods, and 24 carry the ammunition. One ammunition horse follows each gun, and the remaining 18 under the W.O. form the battery ammunition column. Each ammunition horse with the guns carries 15,000 rounds in two boxes, and each horse with the ammunition column 2,160 rounds in four boxes.
_Cavalry._--Guns and tripods are carried on horses with 32 ammunition horses, each carrying 2,400 rounds.
Total establishment: 3 officers; 87 rank and file.
NOTE.--The organisation during the war was as follows:
Each cavalry brigade had a battery of 6 guns (Hotchkiss pattern made in Japan). These were mounted on a heavy limbered carriage with pole draught and 4 horses; these carriages were clumsy, heavy, and conspicuous, and weighed 15 hundredweight. There was a fixed shield on each carriage and a rough tripod was also carried.
_Tactical_
The Japanese have issued a well-illustrated drill book for the use of machine-gun batteries, with cavalry and with infantry respectively, with a view to enable them to manœuvre accurately and easily in all situations. Their tactics are at present (1909) under revision, and it is understood that there are likely to be many changes introduced owing to the lessons of the late war.
The following is the most recent summary of the principles of their tactics:
Machine guns are used as batteries, but may be broken up into sections or even single guns. It is thought wrong to employ “slow” fire, and 800 yards is considered the most useful range. Well-hidden lines of skirmishers and other machine guns are unsuitable targets, and they are never to be used to replace artillery or to fire at artillery at long range, though they may do so at close range or from the flanks or rear. Concealed positions are recommended, and the use of alternative positions advocated, and change of position should be made on the initiative of the commander. Wide intervals between the guns should be used, but the battery front should not exceed 110 yards. The guns should be used on the flanks or rear of the enemy when possible. All ranges should be measured.
Machine guns should be used in the attack just before the final assault, and in the defence when repelling the assault or to reinforce a threatened flank. In both attack and defence they are to be held back, and fire reserved for the crisis of the action.
Use with the advance guard is not desirable as a rule. It is strongly advocated with a rear guard, owing to their intense fire, rapidity in ceasing fire (breaking off action), and mobility. The officer commanding machine guns must be accurately acquainted with the plans of the G.O.C., but must act on his own initiative in forwarding the general scheme according to the situation. Communication with the G.O.C. is considered vital. The guns are considered especially valuable in covering the retreat of infantry. Concealment from the enemy while manœuvring and surprise by sudden fire are considered essential to their success.
_Regulations with the Infantry, 1907_
_Art. 67._--In the offensive the battery is at first kept in reserve; but when its intervention becomes necessary during the general engagement, to prepare the assault on a point in the enemy’s position, they will be given orders to come into action.
The employment of machine guns is especially advantageous to prepare an infantry attack. They can co-operate with this attack even under heavy fire, without, however, being obliged to follow the infantry. The battery ought often to change its position, at the discretion of its commander, to lend its support to the infantry. The battery will, if possible, take up a dominating position or will establish itself on a flank in order to open fire on the selected point of attack, in such a way as not to be marked by its own infantry.
_Art. 69._--In the offensive in case of success: The machine guns will rapidly and boldly move to a favourable position to pursue the enemy with their fire and to make their infantry powerless to attempt a counter-attack. The energetic action of the machine guns after the position has been carried will force the enemy to scatter.
_Art. 70._--In the offensive in case of failures: The machine guns will sacrifice themselves, if necessary, to cover their infantry. They will break down the morale of hostile troops by riddling them with fire without care for their own losses, and will thus facilitate the retreat of their own infantry.[70]
_Machine Guns in the late War_
All officers are enthusiastic about machine guns. All agree that their chief rôle is defence, even at night, and they are extremely useful in attack. During the battle of Mukden machine guns were used very much in the attack by the Japanese, but it seems that the casualties of the machine-gun detachments were very heavy indeed; one commander thought them especially useful in pursuit.[71]
_Remarks by Lt.-Gen. Sir C. J. Burnett, K.C.B._
The value of machine guns is fully recognised. I had a long conversation with the brigade machine-gun officer. He has six machine guns formed as a separate detachment, extra-regimental, and attached to the brigade. Two guns under an officer form the subdivision of his command, and can be detached at will, but no machine gun is ever employed singly. The guns are usually kept at the disposal of the brigadier, and have been used more in defence than attack; they seldom open at long ranges unless on an exceptionally good target. It is rather the rule to reserve the machine-gun fire for decisive ranges. In many actions which cavalry officers described to me, the practice has been to allow the enemy to come within 600 yards before opening fire, and then suddenly to overwhelm him. The principle with such well-trained troops is sound, for the morale “knock-out” of a 10-per-cent. loss suffered in a few minutes is far greater than a similar loss spread over the advance from 1,000 to 600 yards, and the expenditure of ammunition is less. Concealment is an essential feature of the Japanese machine-gun tactics, and the officer told me he had not a single gun put out of action by opposing artillery. The guns have shields; the manipulators of the machine guns are very expert, and there is now seldom a jam. Like a good _chauffeur_, the Japanese machine gunner knows all the peculiarities of the weapon he fires, and can almost tell by instinct when anything is going wrong. Four thousand rounds is the most that has been fired in a day by three machine guns of the 1st Cavalry Brigade; the number is now increased to six. Throughout the Japanese Army the machine guns introduced during the war are very popular, and instead of three per regiment, six per regiment are being provided.
_Report by U.S.A. Officers on Russo-Japanese War_
These guns were highly thought of in the Japanese Army, and the propriety of attaching them to the infantry was never questioned. Four or six guns per battery and one battery per regiment were usually suggested, although good arguments have been heard for eight guns in a battery, and the wish for twelve was sometimes expressed.... On the outbreak of war the Japanese expected largely to limit the use of the machine gun to the defensive, but experience soon taught them to widen its field, and later it was used to great advantage on the offensive. Their rapid fire frequently silenced the fire of the Russian infantry, and caused the latter to crouch down in their trenches. When the guns stopped firing the Russians could be seen again popping their heads above the parapet. If the flanks of a line be weak, these weapons can be used advantageously to strengthen them. Six guns were generally recommended for a battery, thus permitting an assignment of two per battalion. One officer of high rank, however, who was heard to discuss this question ably, said he preferred eight guns, and that he would divide these into two equal sections and assign each section to a battalion, thus leaving the third battalion without any. His idea was to use these guns both on the offensive and defensive. On the offensive he would send them forward among the first lines of the battalion to which they were attached, or reinforce these lines by the guns at an early stage of the action. In this way he would use them as a substitute for infantry reinforcements. This system will enable the regimental commander to hold the third battalion much longer intact for a decisive effort when an opportunity offers. Officers who have had experience with machine guns were opposed to using them singly, saying that never less than two should be at any position not only to obtain volume of fire, but also because a gun can so easily be put out of action. In order to reduce the losses among the men from shrapnel fire to a minimum, they recommend that the guns in a platoon be separated by 20 metres and the platoons by 100 to 200 metres. Artillery fire is looked upon as the most dangerous foe of the machine gun, and in fact the most effective use of the latter on the offensive presupposes the enemy’s artillery has been silenced, or at least that its attention is well occupied by friendly batteries. The machine gun is believed to be especially useful in mountainous districts, where the elevated ground often discloses the close formation of the enemy. The Japanese frequently fired it from an elevated position over the heads of their infantry, and in this way, as their battalions advanced, they at times kept down the fire from the Russian trenches.
An officer who commanded one of these batteries at the battle of Mukden, and who later was detailed to lecture to the attachés with the First Army, said that on one occasion there he continued this fire until the advancing infantry had arrived within 30 metres of the enemy’s position. It is claimed the fire should almost invariably be directed against the opposing infantry. The gun is comparatively heavy, and when in action the battery is advancing with the infantry it is sometimes difficult to keep up with the latter, and moreover the men carrying the gun offer a good target; and for these reasons the guns should frequently remain in position as the echelons make their rushes, provided cover is provided and a free field of fire secured. It is not essential that they should be at all times immediately on the line occupied by the infantry, although when the latter, after a considerable advance, meets with determined opposition, some guns should be brought up. This will give a feeling of confidence, and if need be help to check a counter-attack. When advancing under fire, it is often a good plan to move one gun at a time. Battery commanders report good results when firing at long ranges--that is, between 1,200 and 1,800 metres. One thousand five hundred shots per gun is the greatest number I heard of being fired in one hour. These guns were sometimes attached to outposts. The loss among men serving machine guns is usually great, and this requires that a large number be trained in each regiment to use them. One officer of experience with these weapons thought all officers and men selected to work with them should be trained at division headquarters, or at some other central point, in order to secure uniformity of instruction and service.
On a previous occasion I reported that the shield was not generally desired. I wish to modify this statement, as further investigation showed that while different views were entertained on this subject, the consensus of opinion was favourable to the retention of the shield. The objections to it are that it offers a good target and is more or less difficult to handle on the offensive. Some officers were in favour of using it on the defensive, but not on the offensive. In general, however, it was thought that both on the offensive and defensive it gives material cover and adds confidence and composure. The guns were almost invariably transported on pack-ponies, except, of course, when effecting changes of position under heavy fire, when they were carried by hand. It is understood wheels were occasionally used in some parts of the army, but I never saw the guns transported that way....
Machine guns were also added to the cavalry after the outbreak of the war, there being six to each brigade, divided into sections of two guns under one officer. Sections may be attached to squadrons as required. The guns are used primarily for defence, and their fire reserved for short and mid ranges....
Machine guns played an important part in the siege of Port Arthur, being freely used by both sides. The Japanese gun was a single-barrelled gun of home manufacture, while the Russians used mainly the Maxim automatic. The Russian guns were used with telling effect against the Japanese in the numerous bloody assaults, being trained to cover all the approaches with a murderous fire.
PORTUGAL
On mobilisation machine-gun foot batteries are formed, the personnel being provided from the division to which the batteries are subsequently attached. Each battery consists of 6 guns, and is commanded by a captain. It is subdivided into 3 sections of 2 guns each, commanded by a subaltern.
The gun is provided with a shield and has a tripod mounting, the whole being carried on a wheeled carriage on the march. When coming into action the gun and tripod are taken out of the carriage and carried into position by 4 men.
The weight of the gun, tripod, and shield, amounting to about 175 lb., is unevenly distributed and renders rapid marching impossible, as it must be carried as one piece owing to the complicated attachment of gun and tripod.
The tripod is heavy and rather high, making the gun conspicuous in action, and on steep slopes the mounting is unstable.
The elevating and traversing gear do not give sufficient scope.
The cartridge belt contains 250 rounds. Each section (2 guns) has an ammunition wagon carrying 14,000 rounds for each gun.
RUSSIA
GUNS.--Rexar and Maxim, but the former are being discarded and Maxims alone will be used in future. They are sighted up to 2,000 yards.
ORGANISATION.--Each regiment (4 battalions) has 4 machine guns, and it is intended to increase this to 8 in the future.
The detail of the personnel to each battery of 4 guns is as follows: 2 officers, 50 N.C.O.’s and men, and 35 horses if the guns are on wheeled carriages (36 horses if the guns are carried on pack-horses).
The detachment is armed with the carbine.
For each gun 13 belts of ammunition are carried, each belt containing 450 rounds.
The weight of the gun is 68 lb., and of the tripod 45 lb.; the total weight carried by the pack-horse being 198 lb.
SPAIN
has 6 groups of Maxim and Hotchkiss guns, which have been recently subdivided into 2 sections. Two new sections were raised in September 1908.
The 14 sections are attached to the infantry brigades.
Pack transport has been adopted.
SWITZERLAND
There are 4 companies, each having 8 guns, which are subdivided into sections of 2 guns each.
The detachments are mounted and the guns are allotted to the cavalry.
The Maxim is the gun adopted by the Swiss Army, and in the Regulations three kinds of machine-gun fire are recognised, viz.:
(1) _Salvoes, for range-finding._--The 2 guns of a section fire short salvoes of 20 to 25 rounds alternately to get the right range.
(2) _Quick fire._--This is the normal method, and consists in firing about 100 rounds at a time.
(3) _Rapid fire by individual guns._--Each gun fires as rapidly as possible; used only as a last resort, or against a specially favourable target.
The section (2 guns) is regarded as the unit, and the spirit of the Regulations is that the machine guns are particularly for use with cavalry, and must possess to the full the mobility and dash of that arm.
Dismounted action for the cavalry is not favourably regarded, and the machine guns are expected to relieve the cavalry of this duty.
PRINTED BY HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD. LONDON AND AYLESBURY.
FOOTNOTES:
[1] Lieutenant A. E. Phillips, in the _Journal U.S.A. Cavalry Association_, July 1909.
[2] The Germans consider its fire value equal to 120 rifles.
[3] Balck’s _Modern European Tactics_.
[4] These are still in use in the Territorial Army.
[5] _Journal of U.S.A. Cavalry Association_, July 1909.
[6] United States Official Report of Russo-Japanese War.
[7] See pages 12 and 13.
[8] See Chap. VII., “Cavalry Training.”
[9] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 226.
[10] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I.
[11] _Cavalry Training_, 1907.
[12] _France Militaire_, April 15th, 1905.
[13] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, p. 218.
[14] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. chap. vii. p. 133.
[15] _Cavalry Training_, 1907, chap. vii. p. 229.
[16] Captain F. Culmann in _R.U.S.I. Journal_, August, 1909.
[17] _Infantry Training_, 1905, p. 116.
[18] The Austrian regulations say 1,000 yards.
[19] Captain von Beckmann.
[20] _Times History of the War in South Africa._
[21] A Japanese machine gun fired 25,000 rounds in one day in Manchuria.--AUTHOR.
[22] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I. p. 119.
[23] _Mitrailleuses à l’Etranger_, par Lieut. M.
[24] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[25] Captain Niessel in _Enseignements techniques de la guerre Russo-Japonaise_.
[26] Captain von Beckmann.
[27] Von Ullrich.
[28] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[29] Von Ullrich, War Correspondent of _Gazette de Cologne_.
[30] British Officer’s Report, Russo-Japanese War.
[31] _Ibid._
[32] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83.
[33] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 83.
[34] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 85.
[35] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 84.
[36] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 86.
[37] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, pp. 87-9.
[38] Between 400 and 500 is the usual rate of fire.--AUTHOR.
[39] See _Handbook for ·303 Machine Guns_, pp. 88-9.
[40] See map; the Japanese name for this work is Ban-ru-san Nishi Hodai.
[41] See _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 153.
[42] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[43] _Ibid._
[44] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[45] Von Ullrich.
[46] _The Great Siege_, by W. Norregaard.
[47] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 140.
[48] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., p. 141.
[49] A great many machine guns were added to the forts from the fleet early in June.--AUTHOR.
[50] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice._
[51] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909.
[52] _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_, p. 441.
[53] Official Report.
[54] Official History of operations in Somaliland.
[55] Major Gough’s Official Report.
[56] Official History of the operations in Somaliland.
[57] From Staff Diary of 1st Brigade.
[58] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, p. 173.
[59] Callwell’s _Small Wars, their Principles and Practice_.
[60] _Field Service Regulations_, Part I., 1909, Sect. 157.
[61] This system was adopted; see paragraph _re_ Organisation, p. 189.
[62] Section 7.
[63] Section 77, Para. 4.
[64] Section 150, Para. 5.
[65] Section 150, Para. (iv).
[66] Section 149, Para. (v).
[67] They should fire with their own companies if it can be arranged that they complete the various parts of the range practice on approximately the same date.
[68] The Hotchkiss loses accuracy after 600 rounds, and becomes red-hot after 14,000 rounds.
[69] U.S.A. Official Reports on Russo-Japanese War.
[70] _Revue d’Infanterie_, March, 1908.
[71] Officer’s report, U.S.A., Russo-Japanese War.
TRANSCRIBER’S NOTE
Obvious typographical errors and punctuation errors have been corrected after careful comparison with other occurrences within the text and consultation of external sources.
Except for those changes noted below, all misspellings in the text, and inconsistent or archaic usage, have been retained.
Pg 57: ‘moral action’ replaced by ‘morale action’. Pg 70: ‘should aways’ replaced by ‘should always’. Pg 114: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. Pg 119: ‘M. Ulrich’ replaced by ‘M. Ullrich’. Pg 125: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. Pg 133: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. Pg 152: ‘same fate befel’ replaced by ‘same fate befell’. Pg 173: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. Pg 183: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. Pg 220: ‘moral effect’ replaced by ‘morale effect’. Pg 222: ‘he held in’ replaced by ‘be held in’. Pg 258: ‘the moral “knock-out”’ replaced by ‘the morale “knock-out”’.