CHAPTER XII

THE EASTERN QUESTION

(1876-1878)

In January, 1876, the gradual spread of the insurrection in Turkey led to the concoction by the three Imperial Powers of the so-called 'Andrassy Note,' and the great question was whether England would consent to take part in its presentation, in view of her traditional attitude towards Turkey. Lord Derby, in a letter to Lord Lyons, stated that Bismarck was very anxious that we should do so, and explained that although 'one can trust none of these Governments, it is as well to give them credit for acting honestly until the reverse is proved,' and he was therefore in favour of such a course himself. In a letter[17] addressed to Mr. Disraeli, asking for his views on the subject, Lord Derby remarked that: "It is too late to stand on the dignity and independence of the Sultan; a Sovereign who can neither keep the peace at home, nor pay his debts, must expect to submit to some disagreeable consequences." Lord Lyons, on being consulted, concurred with Lord Derby's views.

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_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Jan. 14, 1876.

I hardly see how England is to avoid supporting the Andrassy Note. If we stand aloof we shall stand alone. If our secession produces no effect and the Turks still accept, we shall be in the same foolish position France was in 1840; with this serious inconvenience, that if the Andrassy plan fails in pacifying the Herzegovina, we shall be blamed for the failure, as having caused it by breaking up the unanimity of Europe. If the Turks do not accept, they will be ready enough to throw the responsibility upon us, and to call upon us to get them out of the scrape into which they will get with the other Powers. I think that by consenting we should leave the Powers least excuse for attacking Turkey, or at all events, least excuse for pushing on without consulting us. I should not be for qualifying our support too much, for, if we do, the failure of the plan, which is in my opinion more than probable, will still be attributed to us, and a support, given as it were against our will, and restricted to the least possible amount, will be treated very much as opposition. I say all this because you ask me to tell you what I think: but there are two important elements for forming an opinion which I lack. I mean a knowledge of public opinion in England, and a knowledge of the real feelings of the three Empires towards each other.

The despatch from Odo Russell looks as if Bismarck was preparing for the possibility of a quarrel with Russia. Ever since 1870 he has been very naturally trying to turn every opportunity of dividing England from France to account. But since you joined Russia in insisting upon peace last year, and still more since the purchase of the Suez Canal shares, he has no doubt formed a higher opinion of England, and conceived the idea that she still has the will and the means to play a foremost part in European politics. Like everybody else, he feels sure that if there is a quarrel between Russia and Germany, France will side with Russia. In order to prevent his enemy being all powerful at sea, he must have the English fleet not merely neutral, but on his side. The only advantage he can offer to England is support on the Eastern Question, and it is on this question that he would have the best chance of embroiling her with Russia. What part he means Austria to play, I find it more difficult to guess. That he intends some day, and by some means, to annex German Austria to the German Empire I make no doubt, but I suppose he is in no hurry to add so large a Roman Catholic and Southern population to the electors of the Diet of the Empire.

The worst service we could render France at present would be to set up a separate understanding with her in opposition to Germany.

The French Government was desperately anxious that England should not separate herself from the other Powers, partly from fear that such action would cause European complications, and partly because it was particularly desirous of getting credit with Russia for having brought English opinion round to Russian views. Her Majesty's Government finally decided to join in the Andrassy Note, although it would appear from Lord Derby's language, that the Cabinet were not unanimous on the question.

Meanwhile French internal politics remained in the same confused and unsatisfactory state which had prevailed for so long. The divisions amongst the Conservatives had made Monarchical Government in any form impossible, and yet they refused to acquiesce, even temporarily, in the moderate form of Republic which had been established, and seemed bent upon doing all they could to exchange their King Log for a King Stork in the shape of a Red Republic. The elections which took place in the beginning of the year 1876 resulted in large Republican majorities both in the Senate and in the Chamber, and in the case of the former, this result was singularly unfortunate for Marshal MacMahon, as it deprived him of the power of forcing a dissolution. A letter from Lord Lyons to the Prince of Wales, who was on his way back from India, summarizes the French internal situation.

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Paris, March 7, 1876.

I cannot give your Royal Highness a very satisfactory account of French politics, although I do not take so gloomy a view of them as many Frenchmen do. The large number of advanced Republicans in the new Chamber of Deputies, the not inconsiderable number of Ultra-Radicals, and the complete defeat of the Moderate Conservatives in the Elections not unnaturally frighten the upper classes of Frenchmen. But in fact so many of the members are quite new men, that one cannot foresee how parties will group themselves. The Chambers meet to-morrow, and in about a month's time it will be possible to form an opinion as to how things are likely to go. So long as Marshal MacMahon is at the head of the State and of the army, there can be no fear of any serious disturbance of material order; and if he is at the same time firm and conciliatory with the new Chamber, and willing to take a Ministry from the more moderate members of the majority, he will very probably be rewarded by finding how tame demagogues can become in office. I understand the Marshal insists upon having Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs whom he knows and in whom he has confidence, but that he is willing to let the other Departments be filled by men taken in the ordinary way from the majority.

So far we have not this year been disturbed, as we were last spring, by rumours of war, and agriculture and commerce are flourishing in France, and the revenue goes on increasing.

Of the Egyptian Financial Question Your Royal Highness will learn all particulars on the spot. Neither that, nor the Herzegovina question are settled at this moment, but we must hope that they are on the eve of being settled.

One of the new features in the French political situation was the recovery by Gambetta of his former influence, and as he was now a person of considerable influence, Sheffield was utilized for the purpose of eliciting his views. The late Mr. George Sheffield, who acted as Lord Lyons's private secretary for over twenty years, was a well-known figure in the political and social world of Paris, and included in his acquaintance most people both there and in London who were worth knowing. Not only did he enjoy much personal popularity, but as he was known to be completely in Lord Lyons's confidence, he was the recipient of much confidential information, and generally believed to be a model of discretion. One of his peculiarities was that, in spite of much practice, he spoke very imperfect French with an atrocious accent, but this circumstance never appeared to prejudice him in any way, and it may incidentally be noted that the possession of what is called a good French accent is a much overrated accomplishment in France itself. Frenchmen rarely wish to listen; they desire to talk themselves and to be listened to; to them, as a rule, a foreigner is a foreigner and nothing more, and whether he speaks French well or ill, they seldom notice and rarely care.

Gambetta, having secured a listener in the person of Sheffield, was no doubt delighted to expound his views on the situation. First of all, speaking on the subject of Bonapartist successes at the elections, he said that Bonapartism would die out as soon as it was realized that a moderate Republic was firmly established. He expressed great delight at the fall of Thiers (Thiers had once described him as a _fou furieux_), and said that under him no real self-acting Republic could ever have been formed, that it would have fallen to pieces at his death, and indeed that the best thing Thiers could do for the Republic would be to die. For Marshal MacMahon's entourage he had a great dislike, but for the Marshal himself much respect, and he aspired to be Prime Minister under him--a post to which he considered that he was fully entitled, but which the Décazes, Broglie, the Marshal's secretaries and the Maréchale and her friends would do their best to prevent him obtaining. He professed confidence in being able to keep the extreme Radicals in order; said that the Red Flag was as obnoxious to him as the White Flag; that he was not inclined to grant a general amnesty to the Communists, and that he would not agree to the re-establishment of the National Guard. He also professed himself to be in favour of Free Trade, and asserted that the commercial Treaty concluded by Napoleon III. accounted for many of the Bonapartist successes.

Gambetta's aspiration of serving under the Marshal was never fulfilled, the above-mentioned entourage being presumably too strong for him; but the upper classes in France continued to look forward to the future with undiminished apprehension. French capital, reversing the present process, began to pour steadily into England, and it was stated that the rich Radicals were not the last in sending their money abroad.

'Marshal MacMahon's position,' wrote Lord Lyons at the end of March, 'does not improve. He has so little political knowledge or ability that, as events have shown, he exercises little or no personal influence in politics. There is also a jealousy springing up with regard to Emmanuel d'Harcourt and other people about him who are supposed to direct his political conduct. The officers now at the head of the army would follow the Marshal very far in any Conservative direction, but it may be questioned whether they would submit patiently to being placed under a Radical Minister of War--Gambetta for instance. It is the Marshal's political intelligence that is doubted. No one has a word to say against his disinterestedness, his honour, or his courage.'

Marshal MacMahon, a simple and amiable soldier, who knew nothing about politics, was credited with an overwhelming admiration for the capacity of his private secretary, Emmanuel d'Harcourt. Upon one occasion, the question of applying for the extradition of a criminal who had fled to America was being discussed in his presence. 'Well,' said the Marshal, 'we must telegraph at once to San Francisco.' 'Pardon, M. le Maréchal,' interposed d'Harcourt, 'Washington, not San Francisco, is the capital of the United States.' The Marshal was so astounded at the profundity of his private secretary's knowledge that he was only able to ejaculate: '_Ce diable d'Harcourt! il sait tout!_'

Many stories were told of his engaging simplicity of character, of which the following will serve as an instance. Upon one occasion he was inspecting a military academy, and was informed that there was present a young Arab chieftain of distinguished lineage to whom it would be desirable to address some words of encouragement. The young man was brought up, whereupon the following brief colloquy ensued:--

Marshal: '_Ah! c'est vous qui êtes le nègre?_'

Arab Chief: '_Oui, M. le Maréchal._'

Marshal: '_Eh bien, mon garçon, continuez!_'

By a curious combination of circumstances, Marshal MacMahon, with his inadequate political and intellectual equipment, was still able for some time to fill the place of a constitutional sovereign, and virtually the French were living under a constitutional Monarchy, with an Executive possessing large powers, rather than under a Republic. This state of things, however, could not last for long, and it seemed as if the choice lay between the youthful Prince Imperial and the establishment of a really Radical Republic.

In one respect the French had every reason to congratulate themselves, namely, upon the re-organization of their army, and some of the political consequences which were likely to result from this increased and increasing military strength are pointed out in the following letter.

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_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Sept. 26, 1876.

As soon as General Conolly finishes his visits to the Autumn Manoeuvres and makes his reports, it may perhaps be desirable for me to send you some observations on the political consequences of the great progress the French Army is making. All the officers of Foreign Armies and the English officers especially who have been out with the French troops this autumn, seem to agree in regarding the improvement as being undoubted and very considerable. In short, it may not unreasonably be expected that in about three years from this time, the French Army will be in such a state, that France will count for as much or nearly as much, in the balance of power in Europe, as she did before 1870.

The different phases of public opinion since the peace of 1871 may be described as follows. At first, rage and mortification produced a wild and unreasoning cry for revenge. This was followed by a depression almost amounting to despair. In this state of things the rumours of an intended attack by Germany in 1875 produced nearly a panic. Since that time hope and confidence have gradually returned. The general sentiment now is that France is safely 'biding her time.'

Under the influence of this sentiment, the French acquiesce patiently in the present apparent eclipse of French power; they disapprove of any attempt on the part of the Government to put itself prominently forward in European politics; they desire to preserve peace and tranquillity in Europe at almost any price; they wish to disarm suspicion, and to be allowed three or four years more to recruit their strength. Their policy consequently is to adjourn as far as possible all questions.

Their ultimate object in all they do, is to recover their lost Provinces; but however confident they may be of recovering in a few years their old position in the world, I do not believe that they contemplate, as the immediate result, an attack upon Germany. I do not think that they at all foresee a time at which they could run the risk of making such an attack singlehanded. What they do intend, is to put forward with vigour their own views with regard to the numerous questions they now leave more or less in abeyance, and to contract if possible foreign alliances on equal terms.

One of the questions with regard to which they will be disposed to change their tone very considerably will be that of Egypt.

Another may possibly be that of the Newfoundland Fisheries, if we do not succeed in effecting some sort of settlement of it in the meantime.

A third may be the extension of their possessions in Cochin China, and of their protectorate of Annam.

With regard to alliances, that which they will first seek will no doubt be the alliance of Russia, and in a case of great emergency, they would make great sacrifices of Western interests to obtain it.

They will desire to keep on good terms with England, so far at all events as to avoid throwing her into the arms of Germany, but as they are not likely to conceive hopes of obtaining effectual assistance from England towards recovering Alsace and Lorraine, they will not be so eager for an English as a Russian alliance.

Another contingency to be kept in view is that a new President or a new Dynasty, desirous of consolidating themselves by a little military glory, may be led to direct an attack upon whatever quarter it may be easiest to do so.

I will not however go on with mere speculations of this kind. Of the truth of the conclusions to which I have come, I entertain very little doubt. In two or three years France will not be in the same accommodating frame of mind in which she is now, and will have very much more powerful means than she has now of enforcing attention to her wishes. All questions therefore in which the influence of France is hostile, should be settled as quickly as possible. The restoration of the strength of France may be found useful in redressing the balance of power, but, anyhow, it should be taken into account in all political calculations.

It was not long before these anticipations were justified, but for the present, relations between England and France remained on a friendly footing, no doubt much to Bismarck's displeasure, who, at this period, was continually urging us to take Egypt and not to do anything else. As a matter of fact, if we had seized Egypt in 1876, it would not have had the immediate effect of embroiling us with France. On the contrary, all those who had a pecuniary interest in Egypt thought that they would gain by our taking possession of the county, while the great majority of Frenchmen looked upon the thing as inevitable, and thought it better to put a good face upon the matter. Any contradiction of the supposed English designs upon Egypt, however sincere and positive, met with no credence at all.

There is an instructive extract on the subject, contained in a letter of Lord Derby of December 6, 1876.

It is evidently useless to say that we don't want Egypt and don't intend to take it: we must leave our friends to be convinced by the event. I have no doubt that everybody out of France would be glad that we should seize the country. Russia would like it, as making us an accomplice in her plans. Germany would like it still more, as ensuring our being on uncomfortable terms with France for some years to come. Italy would see in it a precedent and a justification for seizing Tunis; Spain, the same, in regard to Morocco. But you may be assured that we have no such designs and are not going to run into adventures of this kind.

There can be no possible doubt as to Lord Derby's sincerity; indeed, he was so constitutionally averse from an adventurous foreign policy, that a year or two later, Lord Salisbury said of his ex-colleague that he could never have brought himself to annex the Isle of Man. It is interesting to note that, in the above forecast of international brigandage, Tunis and not Tripoli was allotted to Italy, the designs of France in the former direction not apparently being suspected.

Before the end of 1876 the experiment of trying to work the institutions of a Constitutional Monarchy in France under an elective chief magistrate had very nearly come to a deadlock. The Left were determined to get real power into their hands and not to allow themselves to be thwarted by the conservative tendencies of the Marshal and his personal friends. On the one hand, the Marshal stoutly maintained that he would have Ministers of his own choice in the Departments of War and Foreign Affairs, whereas the Left, so long as they had a majority in the Chamber of Deputies, were, under Constitutional Government, clearly entitled to decide the matter. But the question was complicated, because the Marshal, as well as the Ministers, was in a position to resort to resignation of office, and a severe Ministerial crisis ensued. Ultimately, the Marshal succeeded in keeping his Minister of War and his Minister for Foreign Affairs, but he was forced to accept, as Prime Minister, M. Jules Simon. The latter, although an able and conciliatory man, had been a member of the Revolutionary Government of National Defence, and having been forced to yield so far to his opponents, it seemed not improbable that the Marshal before long would be obliged to have recourse to Gambetta himself. Gambetta, as has been shown, had lately become much more moderate in his views, but in the opinion of many people he still represented the Red Spectre, and it was believed that his assumption of office would mean Communism, Socialism, equal division of property, judges appointed by election for short periods, the prohibition of marriage, and the suppression of religion. The desire of the Bonapartists was that the Government should fall into the hands of the extreme Left, in the hope that the people, from fear of the above contingencies, would clamour for the Empire; but what was more remarkable was, that many Orleanists as well as moderate and timid Conservatives wished to drive the Marshal to a dissolution in the hope of a reaction. There could have been no better proof of their short-sightedness and incapacity, for the mass of the electors were not in the least likely to make fine distinctions, and if really afraid of the Republic would certainly vote for nothing short of the Empire.

The Conference which had assembled at Constantinople in the autumn in the hope of settling the Eastern Question, with Lord Salisbury as one of the British representatives, broke up in January, 1877, and it became clear that war between Russia and Turkey was unavoidable. Lord Derby, who was the reverse of sanguine by temperament, had never entertained any hopes of its success, and was quite determined that, whatever happened, there should be no British intervention. 'I am amused,' he wrote to Lord Odo Russell,[18] 'by your description of the Russo-German suspicions entertained against us; these fellows make us act as they would act in our place. They can neither deal straightforwardly themselves, nor give anybody else credit for doing so.

'If you are asked what steps England is going to take next, your true answer should be "none." We shall wait, say little, and pledge ourselves to nothing.'

The break up of the Conference filled the French with alarm.

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_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Feb. 5, 1877.

It is believed here that Bismarck is determined to produce at least such a scare as he did two years ago, if not to do more. The idea provokes some anger, but more fear. Nevertheless, the danger is greater now than it was last time; for although France is very far from being ready for even a defensive war, she does feel so much stronger than she did in 1875, as not to be willing to bear quite as much from Germany as she would have borne then.

The impressions prevalent here are:

That Bismarck is very much disappointed by the result of the Constantinople Conference, which he had hoped would have ended by setting all Europe by the ears.

That he is very much irritated by the cordiality which existed between the English, French, and Russian Plenipotentiaries, and by the considerable part taken by Chaudordy in the proceedings.

That he is very much annoyed by the number of Socialist votes given in the recent German elections, and is eager to destroy Paris as the hotbed of socialism.

That he wants a cry to make the Germans pay their taxes willingly.

That he looks with an evil eye upon the material prosperity of France.

That he considers the Exhibition of 1878 as a sort of defiance of Germany, and is ready to go great lengths to prevent its taking place.

These are French views, not mine; but I do agree with the conclusion which the greater and the wiser part of the French nation draw from them: namely that it behoves France to be more than ever prudent and cautious, and more than ever careful not to give Germany any pretext for a quarrel.

France is certainly not at all likely to oppose Russia in anything that country may undertake in the East; but she is still less likely to give her any military assistance there. She might not be able to resist the bait, if Russia held it out, of an offensive and defensive alliance against Germany, but in that case she would more than ever want her own forces on this side of Germany. This contingency, however, is too improbable to be worth considering.

It is quite true that France has a large force on her Eastern Frontier, and that she is hard at work there, but considering the difficulty of guarding that frontier, such as it has been left by the Treaty of 1871, her objects may well be supposed to be purely defensive.

Lord Salisbury is to arrive this evening and to go on to London without stopping.

It is interesting to note that Lord Salisbury, while at Constantinople, formed a very poor opinion of the capacity of Sultan Abdul Hamid--an opinion which he must have had occasion to revise later on. 'Salisbury reports ill of the new Sultan; calls him a poor weak creature, from whom no help is to be expected. But his judgment is the result of a single interview.' So wrote Lord Derby to Lord Odo Russell.

The French representative, Chaudordy, had been very active; his zeal had alarmed his own countrymen, and was supposed to have aroused the indignation of Bismarck, but one of the singular features of the Constantinople Conference seems to have been the action of the representatives of the small Powers such as Spain, Belgium, and Holland, who did their utmost, and not entirely without effect, to spirit the Turks up to resistance. In March there was much coming and going at Paris on the part of Ignatieff and Schouvaloff, who were thought to be endeavouring to secure what Russia wanted without war, and the former proceeded on a special mission to London, but the negotiations with the Turks broke down, and war was declared before the end of April. Letters from Lord Derby describing the state of feeling in England dwell upon the action of Gladstone, who, according to Schouvaloff, 'was much more Russian than the Russian Government,' and whose language was, 'only suited to a Panslavonic Society.'

The outbreak of the war between Russia and Turkey was extremely distasteful to the French for various reasons. They were convinced that it had been instigated by Bismarck, and that it would result in the overwhelming preponderance of Germany on the continent, and were equally convinced that it would lead to a great extension of English influence in the Mediterranean including an occupation of Egypt; consequently, Décazes, who was anything but a straightforward politician, and anxious beyond everything to hunt with the Russian hounds, and run with the English hare, was constantly expressing fears that if an English force was sent to the East, the opportunity would at once be seized by Bismarck for falling upon France. A congenial opportunity for this intriguer arose over the question whether Egypt should be called upon to render pecuniary and military assistance to Turkey, and an unsuccessful attempt was made to persuade the Khedive that if he refused to comply, he would be protected. By these means Décazes would have secured the treble advantage of making himself agreeable to Russia, of pleasing the French bondholders, and, to a certain degree, of thwarting England in Egypt. Unluckily for him, the scheme miscarried; but in spite of ardent professions of neutrality, he contrived to render services to Russia which were of some considerable service.

He used his influence to obtain a loan for her in Paris; his agents in Egypt supported the Russian threats to blockade the Suez Canal, and the effect of the Franco-Russian understanding was to force Germany to make greater sacrifices in order to retain the friendship of Russia by furthering Russian policy in the East. One of the methods by which the Germans sought to ingratiate themselves with Russia took the remarkable form of insisting (as the British Ambassador at Constantinople pointed out) that Russian subjects who remained in Turkey during the war, should not only be entitled to remain there undisturbed, but permitted to enjoy all the privileges of the capitulations, this being apparently the German conception of neutrality.

The double game which Décazes was playing was not, however, popular in France. It was felt that his intrigues with Russia tended to throw England into the arms of Germany, and his enemies asserted that he was too fond of speculation to be a thoroughly satisfactory Minister. However, an internal political crisis of an exceptionally important nature in May diverted French attention from all foreign questions for the time being.

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_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, May 16, 1877.

The Marshal has been getting more and more uncomfortable about M. Jules Simon's giving way in the Chamber of Deputies to the more advanced Left, and now, as you will have learnt from my telegrams, he has turned him out. It is believed that if matters came to extremities, the Marshal will bring out a thoroughly reactionary Ministry which he has _in petto_. The Duc de Broglie, Prime Minister, General Ducrot, Minister of War, and so on. This would necessitate a dissolution, for which the consent of the Senate would be necessary. But it is very doubtful whether the country is ripe for anything of the kind, and whether the result might not be the return of a still more radical Chamber than the present; and then either the Marshal must retire and hand the Government over to Gambetta or some one still more advanced in opinion, or make a real _coup d'état_ by means of the army.

However he will no doubt try to form a Ministry rather more Conservative than the last and still able to get on somehow with the present Chamber of Deputies; but this will be difficult.

One of the Marshal's grounds of dissatisfaction with M. Jules Simon was that he would not, or could not, get from the Chamber powers which would enable the Government to restrain the press from attacking Germany in the dangerous manner in which it has written against that country lately.

The action of the Marshal in turning out Jules Simon, who was supported by a majority in a recently elected Chamber, and replacing him by the Duc de Broglie, who was extremely unpopular, might well be described as a very strong measure. Décazes, who was supposed to be in the plot, remained in office, and there was therefore not much probability of a change in foreign policy; but it was evident that there were now only two real parties in France--the Republicans and the Bonapartists. The possible restoration of the Empire filled with dismay Lord Derby, who considered that the last six years had witnessed a great purification both of public and private life in France, and that if the French were going back to a 'Government of adventurers, adventuresses, and priests,' it would be a grave misfortune for Europe; and he was most anxious to let it be known that there was no sympathy in England for Bonapartist intrigues.

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_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, May 18, 1877.

There are of course among the Right, many who, wisely or unwisely, rejoice that Marshal MacMahon has broken with the Left, but there is hardly any one who does not think the moment ill chosen, the reasons assigned insufficient, and the mode adopted unskilful. Décazes is represented, or misrepresented, as having been at the bottom of the whole thing.

He came up to me last night, and asked if I had not something to say to him about the sentiments he had expressed to me with regard to the dangers to English interests in Western Europe. He also expressed anxiety to know how the question of the wine duties was getting on in England. He is, I suppose, anxious to have something to show that he is successful in cultivating intimate relations with England.

While he seems so desirous of frightening us about Holland, he shows no inclination to admit that we have any interests at all in the East. In fact his plan seems to be to involve us in a quarrel with Germany, while he keeps safely aloof: to curry favour with Russia by taking to himself the credit of keeping our forces out of the East; to prevent any increase of our power in the Mediterranean, and to be well with us, but, if possible, better still with Russia. Still, on the whole, I am glad he remains in. I should not have been sorry to have Broglie himself as Minister for Foreign Affairs, but we might have a much more embarrassing Minister than Décazes, and he is easy going and conciliatory in most matters. Only we must not be surprised if he repeats to Russia, and Russia repeats to Germany, anything likely to impair our relations with Germany.

The other Ministers would almost seem to have been chosen for the express purpose of defying the majority of the Chamber. Broglie, of whom I have a high opinion, is especially unpopular. I suppose the notion has been to put as far as possible representatives of all shades of the Right into the Cabinet, in order to be able to form a coalition strong enough to obtain a vote in the Senate for dissolution. It is not certain that such a vote could be carried, the Conservative majority in the Senate being only 2 or 3 on ordinary occasions.

Décazes took advantage of the occasion actually to suggest a secret alliance with England for the protection of Holland and Belgium, and stated that if it were ever signed, he should communicate to no single person except the Marshal himself. It is hardly credible that he could have been in earnest in making this suggestion, for not only are Foreign Secretaries not in the habit of making secret treaties unknown to their chiefs and colleagues, but Lord Derby was the last person who would be likely to enter into an enterprise of this description. In the meanwhile Bismarck, as an impartial friend, was warning Lord Odo Russell that Décazes was only waiting for an opportunity to throw England over, in order to prove his devotion to Russia, and there was little doubt as to which alliance he would prefer if he could have his choice.

Exercising his right, Marshal MacMahon prorogued the Chambers, and it being foreseen that there would be a general election in the autumn, his Government set to work at once in preparing for the fight by getting rid of as many Republican functionaries as possible, in accordance with well-established custom.

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_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, May 25, 1877.

Neither the private history of the dismissal of Jules Simon, nor the attitude of the successful party, is calculated to give one good hope for the future.

The Marshal is supposed to have been mainly influenced by M. de St. Paul, a Bonapartist and intimate friend of his, of whom he sees a great deal; by Monsignor Dupanloup, Bishop of Orleans; by the aides-de-camp and people about him, and (it is whispered) by Madame la Maréchale. Fourtou may have been in the plot, but I believe Broglie was taken by surprise. Décazes wanted to get rid of Jules Simon and Martel, but to put temporarily in their places some members of the Left, who would have got on for a time with the Chamber. Jules Simon had proved a complete failure as Prime Minister; he had neither the confidence of the Marshal nor even that of the Cabinet, and he had lost all influence in the Chamber. He would very soon have fallen of himself if he had been left alone.

The language of the Right tends to accredit the supposition which will be most fatal to them in the country. They speak and act as if the question was one between the aristocracy and the canaille. In fact they wound the sentiment of equality which is the strongest political and social sentiment in France, and consequently the present crisis is beginning to be looked upon as the last struggle of the old society against the new.

As regards the great question as to what is to be done when the Marshal finds himself finally defeated by the Chamber, the party now triumphant talk of the use of military force. The Marshal has often declared to his friends that nothing shall induce him to resort to an extralegal use of force, but the wilder spirits of the party say that if the Marshal will not use the army, a general will be found with less scruple, and they hint at Ducrot. But this would be falling into the most fatal of all systems, that of military _pronunciamentos_. The Marshal himself might do a great deal with the army, and would probably keep it together, but it does not by any means follow that any one general seizing power in Paris would be submitted to by the rest. It is believed that even now, General Berthaut, the Minister of War, was with difficulty induced to remain in office, and yielded only to the Marshal's special request, on condition that he should be relieved in the autumn.

It is however to be hoped that all this talk about military _coups d'état_ is simply talk; and that we shall get out of this difficulty quietly at last. In the meantime the upper ten thousand in Paris are indulging themselves in all sorts of illusions, and the Paris shopkeepers are dreaming of the restoration of a Court and of a great expenditure on luxuries.

The Chambers met again in June, and although the country was perfectly quiet, the scenes which took place in the Chamber of Deputies were a sufficient indication of the fury with which the politicians regarded each other. The violent and disorderly conduct was chiefly on the side of the Right, there being a certain number of Bonapartists who provoked disturbances with the object of discrediting Parliamentary Government as much as possible.

On the other hand even the moderate men on the Left began to talk of revolutionary measures to be adopted when they got back into power again, such as the suspension of the irremovability of judges, the impeachment of Ministers, and the dissolution of religious congregations. On June 22, the dissolution was voted by the Senate by a majority of twenty. It was decided that the elections should be held in three months' time, and both parties made their preparations for an uncompromising fight, Marshal MacMahon beginning the campaign with an order of the day to the army which smacked disagreeably of a _coup d'état_, not to say a _pronunciamento_. Subsequently, having been assured of the support of the Comte de Chambord--a somewhat questionable advantage--he proceeded on an electoral tour in the South.

The general election took place in October, and resulted in the crushing defeat of the Marshal and his Ministers in spite of the labours of prefects, magistrates, mayors, policemen, and priests, who had all been temporarily converted into electioneering agents. The exasperation of parties reached an almost unprecedented point, and Décazes admitted that the country was in a state of moral civil war. The partisans of the Government talked of a second dissolution, of proclaiming a state of siege during the new elections and conducting them with even more administrative vigour than the last. The Republicans announced their determination to annul the elections of all the official candidates and to impeach the Ministers and even the Marshal himself, if he did not retire or name a Ministry having their confidence. As for the Marshal himself, he found little support at this crisis from the monarchical parties, except on the part of the Orleanists, who saw that he must be kept in at all hazards; but the Orleanists had recognized that France, for the moment at least, was Republican, and their press owned openly that to persist in Personal Government instead of reverting to Constitutional Government was to march to certain disaster. The Marshal, in fact, found himself confronted with two alternatives: either he must accept Gambetta's demand to submit or resign; or he must run the risk of getting rid of his difficulties by means of a _coup d'état_.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Oct. 26, 1877.

The prospect does not grow clearer, though I see, or at all events like to fancy I see, a cooling down of the fury which prevailed a week ago.

The Marshal is supposed to be a man of one idea, and his one idea at the present moment is said to be that he is bound to remain at his post.

This idea might lead him to name a Ministry from the majority, but then he would have to dismiss all the Fourtou prefects, whom he solemnly promised to stand by.

On the other hand, the idea might carry him on to a _coup d'état_.

The plan devised by his opponents, and indeed by some of his friends, for getting him out of the scrape, is that the Senate should refuse to support him in extreme measures, and that he should then declare (which would indeed be true) that he had never promised to stay in opposition to both branches of the Legislature.

Communications which have been going on between the Elysée and the Duc d'Audiffret Pasquier, the President of the Senate, are said to have shown that the Senate cannot be depended upon either to vote a second dissolution, or to carry on the Government in conjunction with the Marshal, and without the Chamber of Deputies.

I register as rumours, strongly requiring confirmation, that the Marshal has summoned the Chasseurs d'Afrique to reinforce the garrison of Paris; that in consequence of disagreements between Grévy and Gambetta, the Republicans offer the Presidency of the Republic to General Chanzy, the Governor-General of Algeria; that the more moderate Liberals have hopes of bringing in the Duc d'Aumale as President, if MacMahon should actually retire.

As the population is disarmed and there is no National Guard, there can be no need to increase the numbers of the garrison of Paris. If any fresh troops were really brought up, it would be from mistrust of the spirit of those already here.

Gambetta must have departed very far from his usual political tact, if he has set up claims in opposition to Grévy. Grévy would be quite alarming enough, and to establish the doctrine that the President must be a general would bring France to the level of a South American Republic.

It would be a curious result of an election, in which the Orleans or Right Centre Party has met with a signal defeat, that an Orleans Prince should be placed at the head of the State.

The proper course for the Marshal to have adopted was to have accepted the position of a Constitutional President; to have appointed a Ministry which would have obtained a majority in the Chamber; and to have restrained it from excesses by the exercise of his legitimate authority, and by means of the power of the Senate. Instead of this, however, he first attempted to form a Ministry of the same colour as the old one; then tried to meet the Chamber with his old Ministers, and finally fell back upon perfectly unknown people who carried no weight at all, and who professed to represent no party. To this Ministry the Chamber refused to pay any attention, and after many threats in the Elysée organs to violate all laws; to collect and spend money without the sanction of Parliament, to suppress newspapers, and to proclaim a state of siege, the Marshal surrendered ignominiously in December, and accepted a Ministry in which M. Dufaure was President of the Council, and M. Waddington, Minister for Foreign Affairs. Thus, what should have been a natural and proper consequence of the elections was converted into an humiliating defeat, and there had been such a series of solemn declarations, none of them adhered to, that all confidence in the Marshal had disappeared. Of the more important members of the new Government, M. Dufaure was a lawyer with Conservative leanings. M. Waddington, who had been educated at Rugby and Cambridge, was intimate with Lord Lyons and the Embassy generally, but it was doubtful whether his connection with England would prove an advantage, as he might find it necessary to demonstrate that he was not too English. M. Léon Say, the Minister of Finance, was supposed to be a Free Trader; and M. de Freycinet, who was destined to take part in many subsequent administrations, had been Gambetta's Under-Secretary of State for War, and was looked upon as Gambetta's representative in the Cabinet.

On December 17, MacMahon gave Lord Lyons his version of the history of the crisis.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Dec. 18, 1877.

I went to the weekly evening party at the Elysée last Saturday. The Marshal took me aside, saying: 'I want to tell you why I did it.' He proceeded to tell me that he had been led to remain in office and make a Parliamentary Ministry, by a warning he had received from abroad that if he retired, or if he established a clerical Ministry, war would be the inevitable consequence.

So far the Marshal: what follows may be mere gossip.

On the afternoon of December 12, the Marshal had quite determined _d'aller jusqu'au bout_; either to obtain from the Senate a dissolution of the Chamber of Deputies, or to give in his resignation. He was in consultation with General Rochebouet, who was at the time Prime Minister, about drawing up a message in this sense, when a letter was brought in, the bearer of which sent in a message begging that the Marshal would receive him at once. The letter was either written by the German Emperor, or at all events it convinced the Marshal that the bearer was sent to give him a message direct from His Imperial Majesty. The Marshal accordingly received him alone, and he said he was a Prussian officer who had been sent by the Emperor to entreat the Marshal to remain at the head of the Republic, at all risks, and on any conditions; and not to establish a Government which could be represented as being clerical. The message is said to have represented that the Emperor himself was most anxious for peace, but that he should not be able to restrain 'other people,' if a clerical or a radical Government were allowed to be established in France.

This sounds so like gossip that I should hardly have thought it worth while to repeat it, if it had not tallied rather curiously with the statement the Marshal himself volunteered to make to me about his motives.

The 'other people' are supposed to be neither more nor less than one other person--Prince Bismarck--and the message is represented as having been sent by the Emperor William without the knowledge of the Chancellor, or of the German Ambassador here.

Prince Bismarck's enemies, and they are of course numerous enough here, like to argue from appearances that he has quite lost the confidence of the Emperor, and some of them, who profess to have peculiar means of obtaining information, say that he made three conditions with the Emperor, as those on which alone he could continue to serve him. 1st, that he should have _carte blanche_ in the Government; 2nd, that the Empress should reside at Coblentz or Baden rather than at Berlin; and 3rd, that certain people, of whom he gave a list, should be removed from Court. As a natural consequence, Bismarck's illness is attributed to his not having obtained the consent of his Imperial Master to his conditions; and it is said that he will not recover until his terms are complied with. This story of the conditions appears to me to be a very outrageous one, and I am quite unable to say whether there is any admixture of truth in it. Those who recount it, love to draw from it prognostications of the fall of the Great Chancellor.

Whether the story of the Marshal's mysterious visitor was true or not, his defeat marked a decisive epoch in French internal politics; the Republic was now firmly established and cannot be said to have been in any dangers since, unless the vagaries of the impostor Boulanger be excepted.

Ever since the beginning of the war between Russia and Turkey, Lord Derby had continually asserted that it was practically no concern of ours, and that he was quite determined not to be drawn into any intervention whatsoever. But as the Turkish resistance collapsed, and as it became more and more evident that there was nothing to prevent the Russians from exacting any terms they chose, unless some form of intervention took place, Her Majesty's Government decided to call Parliament together. Lord Derby was anxious to explain that this action had no sinister significance.

* * * * *

_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._

Dec. 21, 1877.

You are not unlikely to be asked the meaning of Parliament being called together earlier than usual. The explanation is simple. We see a growing excitement on the question of the war; we are menaced by an agitation friendly but troublesome, having for object to drive us into war, and with a counter movement on the other side. We think that much useless talk will be stopped; the real opinion of the country be tested, and the Ministry relieved from the annoyance of perpetual criticism which it cannot reply to, if every peer and M.P. can say what he has got to say at Westminster, rather than at a county dinner or borough meeting.

Those who have confidence in us will not be sorry to hear our views explained by ourselves; those who have not, will have no further opportunity of talking mysteriously about the country being committed to this, that, or the other, without Parliament having a voice in the matter. For it is clear that if we meant to act on our own responsibility, and leave Parliament no choice except to ratify or to condemn what we had done, we should not shorten by one-half the interval that remains during which only such action is possible.

It is possible that there may be in France some renewal of suspicions as to English designs on Egypt. If so, you may dispel them by the most decided language you can use. We want nothing and will take nothing from Egypt except what we have already, and what other Powers share equally with us. We shall continue to work in harmony with the French, and hope and expect the same from them.

Lord Derby was the most cautious and unenterprising of men, and he already perhaps felt some suspicions as to the soundness of his colleagues in the Cabinet; but the assurance to be given to the French Government with regard to Egypt seems, on the face of it, somewhat gratuitous, if not rash. The situation in Turkey might have resulted in our being forced to go to Egypt at short notice, and only five years later he, Lord Derby, found himself a member of a Liberal Government which had been forced to adopt that very course.

When the British Parliament met in January, the war was already practically ended, and the commissioners were treating for an armistice and for the preliminaries of peace. The Queen's Speech announced that although neither the Russians nor the Turks had infringed the conditions on which the neutrality of England depended, it might be necessary to ask for money and to take precautions, and on January 23, the Mediterranean fleet was ordered to pass the Dardanelles and to proceed to Constantinople. This action brought about the resignation of both Lord Derby and Lord Carnarvon, but upon the countermanding of the order to the fleet, Lord Derby resumed office. On January 28, the basis of the peace negotiations having been communicated, the Government asked for a vote of six millions, and in consequence of alarming intelligence, received from Mr. Layard the British Ambassador at Constantinople, the fleet was again ordered definitely to proceed to that city. Political excitement reached its climax, and light-hearted Jingoes, quite incapable of realizing the inadequacy of British military resources, proclaimed their readiness to fight any possible adversary.

If it eventually became necessary for England to take active steps to secure her interests in the East, it was quite clear that no assistance whatever could be expected from France. M. Waddington took an early opportunity to assure Lord Lyons most emphatically that France wanted nothing for herself, and that she desired no acquisition of territory either in the Mediterranean or elsewhere; but whilst he disclaimed any desire of this nature, he showed in a most unmistakeable manner that an occupation of Egypt by England would create a bitter feeling in France which would long impair the friendly relations between the two countries. Speaking most confidentially, M. Waddington said that it was all important to France that England and Russia should not be involved in hostilities, and that France should not be left _tête-à-tête_ with Prince Bismarck, whether the latter played the part of an enemy or a tempter. In fact, the French Government, like its predecessor, was disquieted by a notion that Bismarck intended to propose to France some arrangement respecting Belgium and Holland, which would dismember those States, assigning of course to Germany the lion's share of the spoils, and it seemed to be apprehended that France would be called upon to choose between acquiescing in such an arrangement or incurring the active enmity of Germany. The fear of the French that they might become involved was so strong that Waddington was alarmed even at the idea of committing his Government to the British declaration as to the invalidity of treaties concluded without the participation of the Powers; but, in spite of this timorous spirit, and although the Treaty of San Stefano was not signed until March 3, Lord Derby informed Lord Lyons on February 2, that, the support of Austria having been obtained, Her Majesty's Government were determined to secure a Conference, and it was hoped that Italy and France would also exercise at least a benevolent neutrality. The uncertainty of the position was shown in Lord Derby's language with regard to Constantinople. 'I hardly know what will happen if the Russians insist on showing themselves at Constantinople. It is not a case we could make a _casus belli_ of, but I think it would in that case be desirable that the Neutral Powers should be present too--that is their fleets--both as a demonstration, and to keep order if necessary. The war being over, such a proceeding could not be misconstrued, as it certainly would have been before. All this, however, is uncertain.'

Judging by subsequent experiences, Lord Derby would have spent a long time in securing the presence of the International fleets at Constantinople, and would have experienced still more trouble in persuading them to take any action. The Russians fortunately stopped short of Constantinople, and a Conference being now a practical certainty, Lord Lyons was invited to act as the British representative.

* * * * *

_Lord Derby to Lord Lyons._

February 6, 1878.

The Conference will probably come off, and it may come off soon, though there is a chance of delay from differences as to the place of meeting.

I find the feeling of the Cabinet unanimous, and I fully share it, that you are the fittest person to attend the Conference on our behalf. Indeed, I know of no one in whom I should have equal confidence for a duty of that kind. Nothing has been said to the Queen, but I have no doubt of Her Majesty's consent.

May I ask you if, considering the importance and difficulty of the work, you will be prepared to sacrifice your personal convenience so far as to accept the office if offered? I fear the sacrifice will be considerable, but let up hope that the result will repay your trouble.

To most people, an invitation of this character, conveyed in so flattering a manner, would have had an irresistible attraction; but Lord Lyons was one of those persons to whom notoriety was indifferent, if not obnoxious, and who much preferred to confine himself to doing his own business in a practical and unostentatious spirit. He, however, felt it his duty to accept, hoping vainly all the time that the Conference would never take place at all.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Feb. 8, 1878.

I wish to offer you my best thanks for your letter of the day before yesterday. Your proposal to appoint me to represent England at the Conference is very flattering in itself, and nothing could be more gratifying than the terms in which it is made.

You were so kind as to speak of the sacrifice of my personal convenience, but that consideration I will set entirely aside. There are feelings of much greater weight which make me shrink from the task, and it appears to me to be a task peculiarly difficult, and one of which the result is, to say the least, extremely doubtful. I may say, too, without any affectation of modesty, that I do not think myself well qualified for it.

Still these are after all personal considerations which I ought not to allow to interfere with any public duty which I may be called upon to discharge. If therefore the Queen and the Government should determine upon entrusting this mission to me, I should undertake it heartily and zealously, and do my best to justify their confidence.

Of course nothing can be settled until we know the rank and number of the Plenipotentiaries of other Powers, the place of meeting, and other particulars, which may have a material influence in the selection of the Representative or Representatives of Her Majesty.

If however the progress of events should ultimately lead to my being chosen, I should be very grateful if you would allow me the opportunity of conferring with you upon various matters, before any definite arrangements are made. There is one to which I attach so much importance that I will mention it at once. I trust that you will allow me to choose myself the staff to accompany me on the occasion. My efficiency and comfort would depend mainly on this.

Apart from a disinclination to leave his own work, Lord Lyons probably considered that the outlook for England at a Conference was by no means reassuring. The issue of the Conference really depended upon the military position in which England and Austria would apparently stand, should the Conference itself break up _rê infectâ_, and at the end of February the English position looked to be none too favourable, for it depended upon the fleet having access to the Black Sea. If we were able to stop the Russian communications by sea, the Russians would be at the mercy of Austria by land, supposing Andrassy's boasts to be well founded; but we had no absolute security against the Russians occupying Gallipoli at any moment, and no semblance of a security of their not occupying the Black Sea exit of the Bosphorus, for the Turks were at their mercy, and, as pointed out by Mr. Layard, they were quite capable of making any arrangement with Russia, since they considered that they had been betrayed and abandoned by England. Neither, it might be added, was there any security that Austria would stand firm, for there was always the chance of her being bought off with Bosnia and the Herzegovina.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Derby._

Paris, Feb. 26, 1878.

As to the Conference itself all seems more than ever in doubt. Unless the Austrians are determined to go to war and are visibly ready, and unless we are equally determined and equally ready on our side, and unless the Russians are convinced of this, there can be no chance of their making any concessions. Then, what will the Austrians want? To bolster up the Turks, to waste energy in trying to place under them again this or that district delivered by the Russians, would be a very losing game. There must, I suppose, be some new Principality or Principalities. If anything like a national feeling and a national Government can be established in them, their danger will be from Russia, and Russia will become their natural enemy, unless they are thrown into her arms by a hostility on the part of Austria, which will make them feel that Russia alone is their defence against Turkey. Then there are the Straits, and the difficulty of placing the Turks, or whoever is to hold them, in a position to guard them against a Russian _coup de main_ at least. Ignatieff seems to be already working the connection between Egypt and the Porte, with a view to getting money out of Egypt for Russia. I am inclined to think that the more radically Egypt is severed from the Porte, and the less our free action with regard to it is hampered by collective guarantees or collective Protectorates the safer we shall be.

The correctness of these views has since been amply demonstrated by the history of the Balkan States. The opinion about Egypt, however, was probably not at all to the taste of Lord Derby, who appeared to rejoice in divided responsibility.

Lord Lyons himself was summoned to London early in March in order to confer with the Government respecting his procedure at Berlin, and judging from his letters to various correspondents, the course which Her Majesty's Government proposed to adopt was in a state of considerable uncertainty. It was, however, a source of much satisfaction to him that he would have the co-operation of Lord Odo Russell, who was an intimate friend, and in whose judgment he felt complete confidence. He also got his way about his staff, which was to include amongst others, Malet, Sheffield, and Mr. (now Sir William) Barrington.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Odo Russell._

London, March 13, 1878.

My only comfort about this awful Congress or Conference is that you will be my partner in it. I hope, if it does come off after all, that we may get over it without doing harm to our country or to ourselves. I wanted them to set me aside and take advantage of the transfer to Berlin to put it into your hands; and I still think this would be the best plan; but they say that after their announcement of my appointment to Parliament, they cannot cancel it. Sir Robert Peel has moved a resolution that I am not a fit person to represent England at the Conference. I shall console myself if he carries it. He grounds his motion upon 'my well-known opinions.' I suppose he takes my opinions from a wholly unauthorized and incorrect account of them which appeared in a letter in the _Daily Telegraph_ yesterday. Some people suppose he wrote the letter himself in order to have a peg to hang his motion on. I don't think your difficulties at the Conference will arise from strong preconceived opinions of mine. I shall try and get our instructions made as precise as possible. Could you give me some hints as to the particular points which should be decided before we begin? You will know how far certain solutions in our sense will be feasible or not. It is worse than useless that we should be told to aim at impossibilities, and have to yield: though there may be of course conditions, which if not admitted, will render it necessary for us to retire from the Conference altogether.

I am sure you will be the greatest help and comfort to me, and I hope I may be a help to you. Please tell me anything you wish me to do or say here.

Lord Odo Russell appears to have been equally in the dark as to the intended policy of Her Majesty's Government.

* * * * *

_Lord Odo Russell to Lord Lyons._

Berlin, March 16, 1878.

The feelings you express concerning the Conference are so entirely my own that I need say no more, and only hope that Lord Derby will give you a better qualified assistant than I can be with regard to Oriental Affairs, of which I do not really know enough to be of any use to you or to the country, beside such authorities as Ignatieff, Lobanoff, Calice, Radowitz, Busch, etc., etc.

You ask if I could give you some hints as to the particular points which should be decided before you begin.

I would do so with the greatest pleasure, if I only knew what the policy of Her Majesty's Government is likely to be in Congress. All I know about it at present is contained in Lord Derby's despatch of May 6, and as far as Constantinople and the Straits are concerned, I fancy Russia will be conciliatory.

You ask further how far certain solutions in our sense will be feasible or not.

I wish I could answer your question, but can only beg of you to tell me first whether we accept the consequences of our neutrality, or whether we contest them: whether we are going to reject the Turko-Russian Treaty, as we rejected the Berlin Memorandum, or whether we are going to accept now what we refused then.

Russia is now in possession of Turkey. Germany supports Russia.

France and Italy have no wish to quarrel with Russia or Germany, and will not offer any serious opposition to the Turko-Russian Treaty.

Austria may object to two things: the proposed limits of Bulgaria, and the prolonged occupation of Russian troops.

If Russia is well disposed, she will consent to a smaller Bulgaria and to a shorter occupation.

If she doesn't, Austria must choose between a diplomatic defeat, a compromise, or war to turn Russia out of Bulgaria. Bismarck will exert all his personal influence in favour of a compromise to keep the three Emperors' Alliance together before Europe in Conference assembled.

The annexation of Armenia and the war indemnity are questions which Russia will scarcely consent to submit to the Congress at all.

What then is our attitude to be? Please let me know as soon as you can, and I will do my best to answer your questions.

If we go in for Greek interests we shall have the cordial support of Germany and Austria, I think--but Greek interests are in direct opposition to Turkish interests, if I am not greatly mistaken.

On hearing of your appointment I wrote to you to congratulate myself and to beg of you to grant us the happiness of taking up your quarters at the Embassy, and also to advise you to bring a numerous and efficient staff, as I have not hands enough at Berlin for an emergency.

The letters of Lord Odo Russell at this period show that he was completely in the dark as to the intentions of Her Majesty's Government, and that he was quite unable to get any answer as to what was to be their policy with regard to the Treaty of San Stefano. He himself was convinced that the three Empires had already settled what the result of the Congress was to be, and that they simply intended to communicate it to Greece, Roumania, and other Powers for whom they wished to manifest their contempt, such as France and England, _à prendre ou à laisser_. Under these circumstances, it became doubtful whether it was worth while for England to go into a Conference at all and court unnecessary humiliation, serious as the responsibility would be if such a course were decided upon.

There can be no doubt that much of the prevailing uncertainty was due to Lord Derby, who with great difficulty had contrived to keep pace with his more enterprising colleagues, and whose over-cautious temperament had prevented the adoption of any really definite policy. But Lord Derby, unable to stand the shock of seeing a few thousand Indian troops sent to the Mediterranean, resigned office on March 28, and the advent of Lord Salisbury at the Foreign Office marked a new departure in British Foreign Policy.

Lord Salisbury's circular of April 1, 1878, was intended to show that the Treaty of San Stefano threatened the interests of Europe, and that the whole, and not parts of it, as proposed by Russia, should be submitted to the Congress. It pointed out that the creation of a big Bulgaria, stretching over the greater part of the Balkan Peninsula, and with ports on the Black Sea and the Ægean, would give Russia a predominant influence; that the proposed annexations in Asia Minor would give Russia control over political and commercial conditions in that region, and that the exaction of an indemnity which it was impossible for Turkey to provide, would enable Russia either to exact further cessions of territory or to impose any other conditions which might be thought advisable. The logic was sound, and at all events Lord Salisbury succeeded in producing a definite British policy, which his predecessor had signally failed to do.

When Lord Lyons returned to Paris at the beginning of April the question of whether there was to be a Congress or not was still in suspense. French opinion was rather more in favour of England on the Eastern Question than had been expected, but there was no sign of anything more than passive sympathy, and Waddington, who was particularly sensitive on the subject, intimated, not obscurely, that the good will of France depended upon England not acting independently of her in Egypt. It looked, in fact, as if England would be left to bell the cat, although Lord Salisbury's circular, as was generally admitted, had immensely raised British prestige on the continent. The suspicion felt in France as to Russian intentions was shown by the failure of agents of the Russian Government to negotiate a loan at Paris for thirty millions sterling, and Lord Salisbury's letters in the early part of April show that, while there were symptoms of yielding in Europe, there appeared to be no prospect of those concessions with regard to Asia Minor to which Her Majesty's Government attached great importance.

On the whole, the French Government was apparently anxious to act as far as possible with England, without committing itself too much, since the idea of a Russian naval station in the Mediterranean was highly obnoxious; but Waddington was hampered, amongst other causes, by the proceedings of Gambetta, who was disporting himself in some of the European capitals with the object of forming, or appearing to form, relations with foreign statesmen, which would enable him to put forward a claim to become eventually Minister for Foreign Affairs. Waddington always in private repudiated responsibility for what Gambetta said or did, but the latter was now so important a personage that it was necessary to keep on good terms with him and to submit to a patronage which must have been irksome to French Ministers.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, April 24, 1878.

The negotiations for the simultaneous withdrawal of the fleet and army from Constantinople proceed very slowly. We are making no difficulties, but the Russians cannot make up their minds about details, and are probably trying to screw some concessions out of the luckless Turks. I shall be very glad to see the arrangement succeed, because our fleet is doing no possible good there at this moment. Whatever value it had, disappeared as soon as the peace was signed. But as the Russians seem to be afraid of it, we must make the most of it. Possibly, in their secret hearts, they entertain very much the same opinion as to the position of their armies.

The general negotiations do not improve. Russia gives me the impression of a Government desperately anxious for peace, and driven on by some fate towards war. Andrassy undoubtedly means to have Bosnia; but whether he will be satisfied with that I am not so certain. It is a possible policy for him to throw the Danube over altogether; to secure an outlet for his produce by a railway to Salonika, and to accept a simultaneous extension southward in parallel lines of Austrian and Russian possession--whether in the form of actual territory, or of vassal states. In that case, he will throw us over, and his course will be easy enough if he can square the Hungarians. But that may be a difficulty. Do you gather any information about his objects?

Is it your impression--as it is mine--that the French are supremely anxious to push us into war?

Lord Lyons's reply to these inquiries gives the reasons why the French views with regard to an Anglo-Russian conflict had undergone an alteration.

* * * * *

Paris, April 26, 1878.

I owe you many thanks for your letter of the day before yesterday.

You ask me whether it is my impression that the French are extremely anxious to push us into war.

Confidence in their returning military strength, and the apparent success of their endeavours to conciliate Germany have calmed their fears of Bismarck. They are no longer nervously desirous that the forces of England should be kept in the west, as a necessary check upon the great Chancellor's supposed designs upon Holland, upon Belgium, or upon France herself. On the other hand, they have given up counting upon Russia as an ally against Germany, and have abandoned Décazes's policy of courting her and espousing her interests. The result of all this is that they are willing enough that the main force of England should be employed at a distance from home.

They have been reassured about Egypt, and they think that if England is engaged in hostilities with Russia, she will be less disposed and less able to interfere with France or to separate from her in Egyptian affairs. They have lost their great fear, which was that England, instead of opposing Russia, would seek a compensation for herself in the annexation of Egypt. Thus another of the reasons which made them desire that England should abstain from all action has disappeared.

There are, moreover, the patriots, who look far ahead, who do positively desire that England should go to war with Russia. Their calculation is that Austria and Italy would sooner or later be drawn into the war on the English side, and that then, Germany and Russia being isolated, France might join the rest of Europe against them, and recover Alsace and Lorraine. These are said to be the views of Gambetta and his friends.

There is, however, one feeling which pervades the great mass of Frenchmen. They wish England to take the chestnuts out of the fire for them. They are quite determined not to go to war themselves for anything less than Alsace and Lorraine, but they do wish to exclude Russia from the Mediterranean, and they are very willing that the danger and the burthen of effecting this should be incurred by England.

With these views their newspapers go on patting us on the back, and may continue to do so, as long as we seem to be ready to act alone; but they would change their note, if they saw any risk of France being drawn into the war with us, until _after_ Austria and Italy had joined us.

I know of nothing to confirm Odo Russell's information that in return for the consent of Germany and Russia to exclude Egypt, etc., from the deliberations of the Congress, Waddington engaged to support Germany and Russia in everything else. What appeared on the surface was that this exclusion was made openly by France a _sine qua non_ of her attending the Congress, that she communicated the condition simultaneously to all the Powers, and did not at all ask for the assent to it as a concession. If there is only Bismarckian authority for the bargain stated to have been made by Waddington with Germany and Russia, I think it _mérite confirmation_. The one object of Bismarck seems always to be to sow dissensions between France and any other Power that she may seem to be approaching.

Notwithstanding the Comte de St. Vallier's assertion to Odo Russell, Mr. Adams is quite certain that it was M. de St. Vallier himself who reported to Mr. Waddington that Odo had communicated to the Emperor William, Prince Bismarck, etc., a telegram from Mr. Adams on the subject of the sympathies of France with England. In fact Mr. Waddington who is an old schoolfellow and friend of Mr. Adams, read to him parts of the private letter from M. de St. Vallier in which the report was contained, and indeed one of the phrases he cited from the letter was _le telegramme Adams_ as the source of the communication made by Odo Russell.

The Prince of Wales arrived this morning and I have been all the afternoon at the Exhibition with him, which obliges me to write in such haste, that I cannot be brief.

I have just seen Hobart Pasha, who goes on to England to-morrow morning and will try to see you.

I doubt whether Waddington or the Austrian Ambassador here get any information about Andrassy's real views and objects.

The Russians seem to be hard at work trying to make the execution of the Treaty of San Stefano a _fait accompli_. _Beati possidentes._

Lord Salisbury's suspicions as to the pressure being put upon the unfortunate Turks by the Russians were confirmed by an interesting letter from Mr. Layard to Lord Lyons, in which the much-denounced Abdul Hamid appears in quite a new light.

* * * * *

Constantinople, May 1, 1878.

I am not surprised that Waddington should care nothing about Armenia. The question is a purely English one, but to us a vital one. The Treaty of San Stefano puts the whole of Asia Minor virtually at the mercy of Russia and insures her influence over Mesopotamia and perhaps ultimately over Syria, which would probably not be pleasant to the French. This immense addition to the power of Russia in Asia, and the command that she obtains, if the Treaty be carried out, of routes to India and Central Asia, is a matter of serious import to England. But probably there is no European Power which does not envy us the possession of India, and would not secretly rejoice at the prospect of our losing it. I believe this feeling to be particularly strong with Frenchmen. But if we intend to preserve our Empire as it now is, we must be prepared to deal with this question of Russian aggrandisement in Asia Minor and drive them back. Our only way of doing so, is by making use of the Mussulman population. The idea of an autonomous Christian Armenia to form a barrier to Russian advance is one of those absurdities which are cropping up daily amongst our sentimental politicians, who know nothing of the matters upon which they pretend to lay down the law.

The Grand Duke Nicholas, before going, made an ultimate attempt to bully the Sultan into surrendering Shumla, Varna and Batoum; but His Majesty held firm and His Imperial Highness failed to get a promise out of him on the subject. It is curious that whilst our ignorant and unscrupulous newspaper correspondents are systematically writing down the Sultan and denouncing him as a poor weak creature incapable of having an opinion of his own, he has shown far more firmness than any of his Ministers. Had it not been for him, it is highly probable that the ironclads would have been given over to the Russians, and more than probable that the Grand Duke would have been allowed to occupy Buyuk Dere and the entrance to the Bosphorus. The Russians threaten to seize Varna, Shumla and Batoum by force, but I much doubt whether they will venture to do so, as right is not on their side. Shumla and Varna are not to be given up to Russia, but to the Bulgarian Principality when constituted: and the arrangements for the final settlement of the Russian frontier in Asia are to be made within six months of the conclusion of the 'definitive' not the 'preliminary' Treaty.

I am anxiously waiting to hear whether the simultaneous withdrawal of our fleet and the Russian forces can be arranged. It is of the utmost importance to the Turks to get the Russians away from San Stefano, but I cannot understand how the Russians could consent to give up so advantageous a position, unless they found that if they remained there they would be exposed to considerable danger from a joint attack by the English fleet and the Turkish forces.

Layard, who was a fighting diplomatist, and possessed the rare quality of knowing what he wanted, had long chafed at the irresolute action of the British Government, and was all in favour of making a resolute stand against Russian aggression. Throughout the war, he had continually complained of the apathy and indecision of the British Cabinet, and attributed these deficiencies to divided counsels and to the advanced age of Lord Beaconsfield. Now, with Lord Salisbury installed at the Foreign Office, he plucked up hope again.

'Salisbury,' he wrote to Lord Lyons, 'seems to know what he wants--which is a great contrast to his predecessor. If he is firm, we shall, I think, triumph in the end, and remove a great danger from Europe and ourselves. Were it not for that double-dealing, untrustworthy fellow Andrassy, we might perhaps accomplish all that we require without war. Andrassy's proceedings give rise to a strong suspicion that the secret understanding between the three Emperors still exists. The Sultan is persuaded of it, and I have found that his instinct in such matters is usually right.'

On May 11, Lord Salisbury wrote to Lord Lyons saying that Count Münster (German Ambassador in London) had assured him that the object upon which the French were bent in the Mediterranean was Tunis. 'Do you hear anything of the sort?' he asked Lord Lyons, and added the highly important statement: 'It is of course an extension of French territory and influence of which we should not have the slightest jealousy or fear. But I am not assuming in any way that the Porte would wish to give it up. I should only like to have your opinion how far France would wish to have it.'

To this Lord Lyons replied:--

Ever since I can remember, the Italians have suspected the French, and the French have suspected the Italians of designs upon Tunis. Bismarck's mention of it at this moment is probably only one of his usual devices to sow distrust of France. I have never found that the acquisition of Tunis recommended itself to French imagination, and I don't believe it would be taken as anything like a set-off against English acquisitions in Egypt or Syria. I believe our principal interest in Tunis arises from its being a source of supply of provisions to Malta. When Décazes wished to set us against the supposed Italian designs upon it, he used to talk of its being dangerous to us to have Malta in a vice between Sicily and an Italian Tunis, but it never seemed to me that the peril was very clear.

* * * * *

England is very popular here at this moment, and the Prince of Wales's visit has been a principal cause of this, but the French have no intention to fight with us or for us. They back us up in asserting the sanctity of Treaties, and they certainly desire that the _status quo_ may be maintained in the Mediterranean, until France is a little stronger.

It will be remembered that only a few years earlier the German Government had informed the French Government through Count Arnim that it would not tolerate the establishment of anything in the nature of a French Protectorate in Tunis; so that if the French were now really entertaining any designs of that nature, it was pretty obvious that it could only be the result of a hint from Berlin. The question of Tunis, however, was shortly overshadowed by greater issues. On May 16, Lord Salisbury transmitted to Paris a long document which formed the basis of the so-called Anglo-Turkish Convention. The proposals embodied subsequently in the convention were contained in a private letter to Mr. Layard, dated May 10, and the latter was directed not to proceed with the negotiations until further instructions were received, as the necessity for the convention depended upon the nature of the reply which Count Schouvaloff was to bring back from St. Petersburg. Whatever may have been said at the time in denunciation of the occupation of Cyprus and the Asia Minor Protectorate, it can hardly be denied that Lord Salisbury had a good case logically, as is shown by the following letter.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

May 22, 1878.

Until I see Schouvaloff to-morrow I shall know little of the probabilities of our acting on that private letter to Layard of last week, of which I sent you a copy. If, however, we do so, it seems to me that we have a very good logical case--Is logic any use in diplomacy?--against any objections the French may raise.

By the Tripartite Treaty of April 25, 1856, we had a right to call on them to help us in restraining Russia from appropriating Turkish territory. They have loudly and constantly asserted that no military action is to be expected on their part. In Europe we can meet the consequences of that desertion by the help of Austria, Greece, the Rhodope mountaineers and others. But in Asia we are abandoned wholly to ourselves. The French have left us to face and guard against the consequences of that Russian encroachment which they undertook to join with us in resisting. Does it lie in their mouth, if we say that such encroachments, if persisted in, require special precautions? that we cannot turn the Russians out by ourselves, and that abandoned by our ally, who should have made the task easy to us, we have no choice except to mount guard over the endangered territory and take up the positions requisite for doing so with effect? I do not see what answer the French would have.

But you will probably reply that my reasoning is idle trouble, because logic is of _no_ use in diplomacy.

The French would have had no real cause for complaint if they had discovered the contents of the proposed Anglo-Turkish Convention, for as Lord Salisbury had already pointed out, he had been careful 'to turn the eyes of desire away from Syria,' the only portion of Asia Minor in which France was interested; but Waddington had been making declarations against any of the Powers helping themselves to Turkish territory, and although these declarations were meant only to apply to Bosnia and Herzegovina, he would probably have used much the same language if he had learnt that England was thinking of occupying any portion of the Turkish Empire. Logic may not be of much use in diplomacy, but it is of still less use in influencing public opinion, and an appeal to the Tripartite Treaty, after it had been set aside so long, would have come rather late in the day. As, however, the necessity for providing for British interests and British safety in Asia was indisputable, Lord Salisbury was justified in contending that those Powers who disliked the only methods which were within our reach, should give us such help as would enable us to dispense with them.

Upon the return of Schouvaloff from St. Petersburg, it turned out, as Lord Salisbury had anticipated, that Russia was prepared to make concessions in Europe, but scarcely any in Asia. Layard was, therefore, directed to negotiate the Anglo-Turkish Convention.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, May 29, 1878.

I send you two memoranda, or rather two separate versions of the same paper, which will explain fully the nature of the propositions which Schouvaloff brought back to me, and the extent to which we have been able to accept his proposals. The upshot of the matter has been that the Czar yields substantially all we want in Bulgaria and as to the Greek provinces, but sticks to his text as to Montenegro, Bessarabia, and the Armenian conquests, except Bayazid.

I have informed Schouvaloff that against these Asiatic acquisitions it will be necessary for us to take precautions; and while taking from him a formal engagement that Russia will not extend her position in Turkey in Asia, we shall ourselves give to Turkey a guarantee to the same effect. We shall accept these terms as soon as he receives from St. Petersburg authority to take them in the redaction on which we have ultimately agreed. At the same time we have taken our measures to secure ourselves against the consequences of the Asiatic advance. Layard received on Saturday telegraphic directions in the sense of the private letter which I addressed to him a fortnight ago, and of which I sent you a copy, and with great vigour and skill he procured the signature of an agreement on Sunday last. We do not intend that this fact shall be made public until the Congress, as the agreement is made wholly conditional on the retention of Batoum and Kars. But whether we shall succeed in these good intentions remains to be seen. Our past performances in that line do not justify any very sanguine hope.

As there seems no chance of the Porte ceding Bosnia, and as it is necessary to keep Austria with us in the Congress, we have offered to support her in any proposal she makes in Congress on the subject of Bosnia, if she will support us in questions concerning the limits of occupation and organization of Bulgaria. It is not necessary to tell Waddington this, but, as we have advanced a step since he last asked us the question, it is important to avoid language inconsistent with it.

One cannot help suspecting Lord Salisbury's sense of humour as being responsible for the stipulation, that, if the Russians abandoned to the Turks their conquests from them in Asia Minor, the occupation of Cyprus should come to an end and the Anglo-Turkish Convention become null and void. On the following day (May 30), the so-called Anglo-Russian agreement was signed, and the enterprising Mr. Marvin, who had been temporarily employed at the Foreign Office on the cheap, handed it over to the _Globe_ newspaper, thus creating a political sensation of the first order.

The agreement with Russia being now completed, and an invitation to the Congress in suitable terms having been accepted, Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury decided to go to Berlin themselves, instead of sending Lord Lyons.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

June 5, 1878.

I feel that I owe you many apologies for my rudeness in not writing to you on Saturday night to announce to you the decision of the Cabinet--and to thank you for the very kind and cordial way you had placed yourself at our disposition in the spring to perform what was a very ugly duty. The Cabinet was rushed to the decision which it took, partly by the consideration to which you advert, that the threads of the last two months' negociations were more completely in our hands than by any process of communication they could be in yours--but also by the fact that we have dangerous questions looming at Paris--and we cannot afford to have you absent from your post.

My excuse for my negligence is the prosaic one that I had not a moment of time. The agonies of a man who has to finish a difficult negociation, and at the same time to entertain four royalties in a country house can be better imagined than described.

The Convention at Constantinople has been signed with expression of lively gratitude on the Sultan's part. I am sorry that your impressions of the mood in which the French are likely to receive the news when published, are still so gloomy. However, we must hope for the best. We have assembled a powerful fleet at Portsmouth and we shall have six or seven first-rate ironclads to do what may be necessary in the Mediterranean, besides smaller ships. And our relations with Bismarck are particularly good. So I hope our friends at Paris will confine themselves to epigram.

If we can, we shall keep the matter secret till we get at Congress to the part of the Treaty of San Stefano (Art. XIX) which concerns the Asiatic annexations. I do not know whether d'Harcourt has any inkling, but ever since his return from Paris his manner has changed.

Lord Lyons hailed the decision of Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury as a 'deliverance from a nightmare which had weighed upon him since March,' and found a sympathizer in Lord Odo Russell, who had never expected much good from the Congress if the Three Emperors' League was revived, and who doubted whether the British public would be contented with an amended San Stefano Treaty. The probable action of Waddington, who was to be the French representative at Berlin, is foreshadowed in the following letter.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, June 4, 1878.

I am very glad that you and Lord Beaconsfield have determined to go yourselves to the Congress. The matters to be treated are too grave to be left to subordinates, and they could hardly be treated properly by any one who had not had a minute acquaintance day by day with the recent communications with Russia and Austria.

Waddington will, I think, be a satisfactory colleague in some respects, but in others I am afraid you will have difficulties with him. His English blood and his English education tell both ways. On the one hand, he is more straightforward than most Frenchmen; he understands and shares many English feelings, and he sees the force of English arguments, or perhaps I should rather say, of arguments put forward in an English way. But, on the other hand, he feels strongly the necessity of guarding against the tendency in France to suspect him of an English bias. He will be disposed to join in resistance to exaggerated Russian pretensions with regard to Roumelia and the Danube. His personal sentiments are strongly in favour of Greece. He has a certain sympathy with Christian as against Mussulman, but he does not carry this to an immoderate or unpractical extent. There is, however, one point on which you may find him very stiff. He is most strongly opposed to any change in the relative position of the Great Powers in the Mediterranean, and he would, I am afraid, be quite as unwilling to see England extend her influence in that sea, as he would be to see Russia do so. It is in order to prevent any alteration in the _statu quo_ in the Mediterranean, more than from any other reason, that he has made the participation of France in the Congress conditional on the exclusion of all questions not directly arising out of the war between Russia and Turkey, and has positively mentioned Syria and Egypt as countries to be excluded from the discussion. He would not perhaps be disinclined to let these questions come up, if he thought he should obtain the support of other Powers in resisting any change made outside of the Congress.

At any rate, public feeling in France would probably be too strong to allow him to acquiesce in any redistribution of territory or influence in favour of England. But I expressed my opinion on this point so fully to you and Lord Beaconsfield in the interview I had with you just before I left England, that I have nothing more to say about it. The horrible event[19] which took place at Berlin the day before yesterday has, however, thrown so strong a light upon one phase of French opinion, that I feel bound to direct your attention to it. It seems very shocking that while the Emperor William is suffering from the wounds so wickedly inflicted, people here should be speculating upon the consequences of their being fatal, but so it is. The French believe that the maintenance of the present military system in Germany depends upon the Emperor William, and that even if His Majesty's successor had the same determination as His Majesty himself to keep it up, public opinion in the country would make it impossible for him to do so. What foundation there may be for this supposition, I do not pretend to determine; but that it influences the French is certain. Anything which makes them believe the life of the Emperor to be precarious, diminishes the restraint which the fear of Germany imposes upon them, and renders them more stiff in asserting their own views and pretensions, and less averse from contemplating the possibility of supporting them by more than words.

There are, in my opinion, strong arguments to be brought in favour of our taking measures to be in a position to resist Russia by our own means, if other Powers will give us no help in doing so; but as you said in a former letter, logic is perhaps not of much use in diplomacy, and seems to me to be of still less use in influencing public opinion. I doubt our logic doing much to reconcile the French to our exercising a separate protection over Turkey in Asia, or occupying a Turkish island in the Mediterranean. I am afraid you will think I have become more nervous than ever, and more prone to the common error among diplomatists of exaggerating the importance of the country in which they are themselves stationed, but anyhow I have not seen any reason to change my views as to the feelings prevalent in France.

The Parliamentary session at Versailles is about to close. Thanks to the Exhibition, it has been a very tranquil one, but we must be on the look-out for squalls when the Chamber meets again in the autumn. Gambetta has hitherto restrained his followers from opposing the Ministry, and from proposing radical measures, but it is doubtful whether he will be able, even if willing, to restrain them after the end of the Exhibition. Some unexpected incident might even produce a crisis before. At any rate the elections of a portion of the Senate, which will take place early next year, may remove the check which the Conservative majority in that House has hitherto put upon the Chamber of Deputies. The Marshal does not talk of making any more attempts at resisting the will of the majority, but I understand that he does not talk very seriously of retiring as soon as the election is over.

It may perhaps be worth while to mention that Waddington finds the influence of Gambetta over the Government very irksome, and is not fond of having it alluded to.

The Congress met at Berlin in the middle of June, and the awkward question of whether Waddington should be informed of the Anglo-Turkish Convention or not was debated. Lord Lyons knew perfectly well that the French would be furious when they heard of it, and that the greater the surprise, the greater would be their indignation. The lines laid down for Waddington's guidance at the Congress were that France desired:

1. Peace.

2. Neutrality.

3. The necessity of the consent of all the Powers to any modifications of the Treaties.

4. The exclusion of Egypt, Syria, the Holy Places, and other topics foreign to the Russo-Turkish War.

These points were certainly not favourable to England receiving any support from France in defending her menaced interests in Asia Minor, as the absolute neutrality of France was the point most insisted upon. In fact France was so obviously anxious to stand aloof, that one suggestion was made that she should be asked to co-operate with us in Asia Minor on the assumption that such co-operation was sure to be refused. This, however, was considered to be too hazardous a course, and it was eventually decided to say nothing to Waddington for the time being, lest he should make the Anglo-Turkish Convention an excuse for not attending the Congress at all. The secret, unlike the Anglo-Russian agreement, seems to have been well kept, and cannot have been known to the Russians, or they would have utilized it for the purpose of sowing discord between the British and French representatives. Finally, on July 6, Lord Salisbury told the whole story to Waddington in a private letter.

In this letter Lord Salisbury pointed out that, as far as the Russian annexations in Asia Minor were concerned, we were in a completely isolated condition, since Austria was only willing to take part in restoring the Porte to a certain independence in Europe, while France had clearly intimated that she had no intention of engaging in war for the purpose of maintaining the stipulations of the Treaty of 1856. The result was that England was compelled to act alone, as her interests were too great to allow the _status quo_ in Asia Minor to be completely destroyed, and consequently the onerous obligation of a defensive alliance with Turkey had been undertaken in order to provide against future Russian annexations beyond the frontier assigned under the present negotiations at Berlin. As this engagement could not be carried out from such a distance as Malta, the Sultan had made over Cyprus to England during such period as the defensive alliance might last. The conditional nature of the Convention, and the restraint shown by Her Majesty's Government in rejecting more tempting and advantageous offers are dealt with in the following passages.

We have entered into an agreement which is now embodied in a formal Convention at Constantinople, that whenever the Russians shall, for whatever reason, return to their Asiatic frontier as it existed before the last war, we will immediately evacuate the island; and that intermediately we will annually pay the Sultan whatever is ascertained to be the surplus of revenue over expenditure.

I am telling Your Excellency no secret when I say that we have been very earnestly pressed, by advisers of no mean authority, to occupy Egypt--or at least to take the borders of the Suez Canal. Such an operation might have been very suitable for our interests and would have presented no material difficulties.

No policy of this kind however was entertained by Her Majesty's Government. We had received an intimation from the French Government that any such proceeding would be very unwelcome to the French people, and we could not but feel the reasonableness of their objection under existing circumstances.

We have therefore turned a deaf ear to all suggestions of that kind.

We have been likewise recommended to occupy some port on the coast of Syria, such as Alexandretta, but we felt that, however carefully guarded, such a proceeding might, in the present condition of opinion with respect to the Ottoman Empire, be construed as indicating an intention to acquire territory on the mainland of Western Asia; and we did not desire to be suspected of designs which will be wholly absent from our thoughts. We have therefore preferred to accept from the Sultan the provisional occupation of a position less advantageous indeed, but still sufficient for the purpose, and not exposed to the inconveniences I have mentioned. How long we shall stay there I cannot tell. But I think there is just ground of hope that the Russians will find in a short time that the territory they have acquired is costly and unproductive; that the chances of making it a stepping-stone to further conquests is cut off, and that they will abandon it as a useless acquisition. In that case our _raison d'être_ at Cyprus will be gone and we shall retire.

I have adopted this form of conveying the matter to you, as the Convention being entirely within the Treaty competence of the two Powers, requires no official communication. But it would have been inconsistent with the feelings of friendship existing between our two countries, and with my gratitude for your courteous procedure towards me personally, to have allowed you to hear it first from any other source.

There can be little doubt as to the identity of the 'advisers of no mean authority,' for Bismarck had been urging upon England for some time the occupation of Egypt, obviously with the main intention of creating discord with France, and Her Majesty's Government deserved all the credit claimed by Lord Salisbury for resisting these overtures. It is, however, somewhat difficult to follow Lord Salisbury's reasonings for preferring Cyprus to Alexandretta. It was plain that the occupation of either of these places would cause irritation, and as subsequent events have shown, Cyprus has never been of much use to us, and besides being crushed under the burden of the tribute annually paid to the Turkish Government, is inhabited chiefly by Greeks who do not appear to thoroughly appreciate British rule. Alexandretta, on the other hand, might, under our control, have developed into a highly important seaport and become the starting-place for the Bagdad railway; whereas, as a matter of fact, it has now practically passed into the hands of the Germans.

M. Waddington did not remain long in sole possession of his exclusive information, for on July 8, the Anglo-Turkish Convention was made known to the world, and the general impression produced was that Lords Beaconsfield and Salisbury had effected a brilliant _coup_. In France, however, the news caused quite unjustifiable indignation, and the prudent Lord Lyons telegraphed to Lord Salisbury on July 10, advising him to get the final acts of the Congress signed as quickly as possible, lest Waddington should be directed to come away without putting his name to anything.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 12, 1878.

Your telegram of last night was a great relief to me, but I shall not feel quite happy till I hear that all is actually signed. I am happy to find that Gambetta and the Ministerial Parties, who are violent on the subject of the Convention, are not having things all their own way in the press. No newspaper can be said to defend England altogether, but the more sensible papers are against any active opposition on the part of France. Gambetta and Waddington are not friends, and Gambetta will no doubt attack Waddington and try to upset him. This may lead to serious difficulties in France.

It is no use to shut one's eyes to the fact that at this moment, there is a great and general irritation in France against England. It is too soon to foresee what turn public opinion will take eventually, but at the present moment, we must not forget to take this irritation into account in our dealings with this country.

The general feeling was so unsatisfactory, that he felt compelled to write to Mr. Knollys[20] urging that the Prince of Wales, who was acting as President of the British Section of the International Exhibition, should postpone a contemplated visit to Paris, and enclosing articles in the press of an abominable character directed against His Royal Highness. Irritation over the Anglo-Turkish Convention was not confined to one party, but existed in every class from the _haute société_ downwards. The Conservatives and their press utilized it as a means of attacking the Republic, complained of the effacement of France, and asserted that she had been duped by her former ally, while the Republican opposition, headed by Gambetta, charged Waddington with having made a shameful surrender to England.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 16, 1878.

The first explosion of French wrath, on the appearance of the Convention of the 4th of June, was even more violent than I anticipated. It was well that you had the Minister for Foreign Affairs under _your_ influence, and at a distance from that of the excited spirits here. Now the first force of the eruption is spent and the lava cooled down. I am afraid only on the surface, but any way, it must be the surface which cools first. At all events the strong language is in great measure abandoned. In the first place, as no one now recommends any immediate action on the part of France, the French are beginning to see that they cut a sorry figure by barking without biting. In the second place, they conceive that the alliance of the Three Empires is as close as ever, and they think that if they quarrel with England, they will be giving a triumph to Bismarck and find themselves face to face with him without any friend on their side. Lastly, I would fain hope that some of them are beginning to take a really reasonable view of things, and to see that we had absolutely nothing left for it, but to act for ourselves, as they would not or could not help us.

Still we shall have some trouble with them, and shall probably find them for some time suspicious, jealous, and hard to deal with.

Egypt may be our first difficulty. With or without a hint from home, French agents there will be seeking to trip us up. It seems to me that our task there will be a delicate one. On the one hand, it will no doubt be desirable to soothe French vanity as far as possible; but, on the other hand, anything like a defeat or a retreat in Egypt, might very much impair the prestige which the position which we have taken with regard to Asia has given us. I wish Rivers Wilson had already been installed as Minister of Finance when the Convention of the 4th June was made public.

Another ticklish question is that of the Newfoundland Fisheries. I am very anxious to know what, if anything, passed between you and Waddington on the subject at Berlin. The present moment does not seem a very happy one for resuming negotiations, and at all events it might be well to keep the matter, if possible, in the calm atmosphere of London, and at a distance from the heat of the political weather here.

I have been indirectly in communication with Gambetta, and have reason to hope he is being brought, or is coming of himself, round about the Convention. What I am immediately afraid of is his nevertheless trying to upset Waddington. I should regret Waddington's fall on all grounds, and it would be extremely awkward to have a successor in the office brought in on the pretext that Waddington had not been stiff enough with regard to England. The candidates for his place are said to be Freycinet, the present Minister of Public Works, who was Gambetta's Sub-Minister for War in 1870 and 1871; M. Duclerc, one of the Vice-Presidents of the Senate, who passes for a moderate man, but who has no knowledge of foreign affairs, and Gambetta himself. I suppose, however, Gambetta would be an impossibility with the Marshal, and that he himself would feel that he was compromising his prospect of greater things hereafter, by taking a subordinate office now.

M. Waddington, upon his return from Berlin, realizing doubtless that his position had been shaken, though from no fault of his own, intimated his intention of writing a despatch in which Her Majesty's Government would be called upon to give to the French certain assurances with regard to Egypt and Tunis. As it was desirable that this request should not be made in too peremptory a manner, he was exhorted to make his communication in such a way as would make it easy for Her Majesty's Government to return a cordial answer. The difficulty about giving the assurances was pointed out by Lord Salisbury.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

Foreign Office, July 20, 1878.

What M. Waddington said to you is very much what he said to me at Berlin, though the lurid touches about war have been filled in afterwards.

The precise answer to be given to his promised despatch must of course depend very much on the terms in which it is framed. But he may be certain that we shall answer it not only with the desire of cultivating to the utmost possible extent our good relations with France, but also with the aim of making his own personal task more easy, as far as it is in our power to contribute to that result.

The matter to which he has called your attention, as he did ours at Berlin, was difficult to make the subject of binding assurances, because the contingencies under which those assurances would receive a practical application are difficult to foresee.

If France occupied Tunis to-morrow, we should not even remonstrate. But to promise that publicly would be a little difficult, because we must avoid giving away other people's property without their consent, and also because it is no business of ours to pronounce beforehand on the considerations which Italy would probably advance upon that subject. In the same way, with respect to Egypt, we have stated distinctly more than once that we do not entertain any intention of occupying it; and that statement we are perfectly willing to renew. But, having done that, and having expressed our anxiety to work with France in Egypt, we have said as much as would be seemly or possible. We can hardly pledge the Khedive as to what he means to do, without in reality assuming a voice in his concerns which we do not, according to any international right, possess.

These considerations make me rather anxious that M. Waddington in his proposed despatch should avoid putting categorical questions which we might not be able to answer precisely as he wishes, and yet which we could not avoid answering without seeming to exhibit precisely that coolness which he very properly and justly deprecates, and any appearance of which we are as anxious as he is to avoid. I think that his despatch--if I might suggest it--would more properly take the form of a statement, in general terms, of the territorial points on the African coast in which France takes an interest, leaving us to make such assurances as we think we can properly give, and which we will certainly make as cordial as we can.

To French influence in Egypt we do not offer any objection; and we have never taken any step calculated to oust it. But any detailed engagements as to questions of administration could not be taken without imprudence; for each step must be taken as the necessity for it arises. The two great points are to keep the Khedive on the throne, and to get the financial obligations satisfied. For these objects, the two countries will, I hope, co-operate heartily.

I am a little anxious as to the form he gives his despatch, for if he makes it too peremptory, he may produce that very appearance of estrangement which it is our common object to avoid.

I will write to you more fully about the Newfoundland Fisheries when I have had time to study the papers. My conversations with him have put me fully in possession of the French case. I am not so certain that I know all the points of the English case.

An opportunity fortunately occurred of conciliating one personage who might have given a great deal of trouble, and afforded an instance of the influence which can occasionally be brought to bear upon advanced democrats when judiciously applied.

* * * * *

_Lord Lyons to Lord Salisbury._

Paris, July 21, 1878.

The Prince of Wales leaves Paris for London to-night. As his arrival at Paris to attend the English concerts at the Exhibition had been publicly announced, I did not think that it would be advisable that it should be postponed, but I have been a little nervous about it. So far however there has been no contretemps, and the visit has been politically useful.

The Prince invited Gambetta to breakfast with him yesterday. It was His Royal Highness's own idea, but I thought it judicious. I have not the least doubt that if the Prince of Wales had not been civil to Gambetta, the Russian Embassy would have asked any Grand Duke who came here to show him particular attention, in order to bring him over to Russia. The success of such a manoeuvre has I think been effectually guarded against.

Gambetta appears to have spoken to the Prince strongly in favour of an alliance between France and England--to have declared himself more or less reconciled to the Convention of June 4th--and to have spoken in the most disparaging terms, not so much of the Foreign Policy of Russia, as of the institutions, the Government, and the administration of that country. I hear from other quarters that Gambetta was extremely pleased with the interview. I am assured also that the Prince of Wales acquitted himself with great skill. The Prince thought, and so did I, that it was better that I should not be at the breakfast. The Embassy was represented by Sheffield. The occasion of the invitation to Gambetta was his having been very obliging and useful in matters connected with the Exhibition.

To-day Waddington met the Prince of Wales at luncheon at the Embassy.

So far, then, things look well, but I am assured the calm does not extend far below the surface. Gambetta has the southern temperament, and his language is a good deal influenced by the impression of the moment. He has postponed, but he has not really given up, his attack on Waddington. He will still, if he continues in his present mood, try to turn him out in October, when the Chambers reassemble.

The thing which would have most effect in reconciling the French to our acquisition and protectorate, would be to make them practically advantageous to the holders of Turkish and Egyptian Bonds.

When M. Waddington eventually presented his despatch, or rather despatches, for there were two, they were apparently found unobjectionable in tone; but on the ground that the one referring to Tunis was not 'couched in more diplomatic language,' it was suggested to him that he should rewrite it in language more suitable for publication subsequently; this he declined to do, but promised not to publish it at all. The chief object presumably of these communications was: in the first place to obtain assurances from England with regard to Egypt, and in the second place to make Lord Salisbury's statement about Tunis appear as an invitation to the French to appropriate that country. M. Waddington, quite naturally, did not wish it to be thought that he had come back empty handed from Berlin at a time when the Great Christian Powers were helping themselves liberally at the Turk's expense.

* * * * *

_Lord Salisbury to Lord Lyons._

July 24, 1878.

Waddington's two despatches were left with me yesterday. They are very friendly in tone and will not, I think, be difficult to answer. The answers however must be delayed some days, as the Cabinet does not meet till Saturday.

Intermediately, I demur a little to the quotations that he makes from my conversation. The general tenor is quite accurate, but his vivacious French by no means renders the tone of my communication, and what is of more importance, to the rights and claims of other Powers, Turkey and Italy especially. What I told him was that if a state of things should arise in which there was no other obstacle to his occupying Tunis but our objection, that objection would not be made. I made the observation for the purpose of showing him that we had no Mediterranean aspirations--and did not desire to disturb the balance of power in that sea. Our eyes were bent wholly on the East. But he makes me talk of Tunis and Carthage as if they had been my own personal property and I was making him a liberal wedding present.

I do not know whether he will be inclined to put his quotations from my conversations into a more general form. I think it will save the possibility of misunderstanding later; and will also dispense with the necessity of a correction on my part, as he has reported the general drift and terms of my observations with perfect fidelity.

The reception of the Anglo-Turkish Convention in France may be said to have been the first of a series of difficulties which unfortunately impaired the relations between France and England during many years, but which have now happily almost entirely disappeared. The irritation aroused in France was completely unjustified, and almost incapable of explanation, unless the secrecy which surrounded the negotiation of the Convention may be considered an adequate cause. No French interests were prejudicially affected; and the maintenance of secrecy really relieved France from a considerable difficulty, for a premature disclosure might have prevented the participation of France in the Congress; but oddly enough, the Anglo-Turkish Convention appeared to be the only matter relating to the Congress in which the French took any interest, and so much indignation did some patriots show that it was even seriously suggested that by way of inflicting a surprise upon England, France should seize Chios, or Rhodes, or Crete. In fact, at one time, Crete appeared to possess considerably greater attractions than Tunis, in spite of the latter's proximity to Algeria.

Probably the real explanation of this display of temper was that the French felt their strength to be returning, and were in no mood to put up with what they erroneously considered to be a slight, whether intentional or unintentional.

One frantic jeremiad from Constantinople over the Treaty of Berlin may be quoted before the subject is dismissed. Layard, who had been already greatly scandalized by the publication of the Anglo-Russian agreement, wrote:--

What do you think of the Treaty of Berlin? It appears to me that if ever an apple of discord was thrown amongst nations, this is the one. I see in it the elements of future wars and disorders without number, and an upsetting of all the principles of justice and right which have hitherto governed the relations and intercourse of states. Force and fraud have triumphed, and when Turkey has been completely destroyed and cut up under the new system, it will probably be applied with similar successful results to other countries. Russia has gained, with the assistance of Germany, all and more than she wanted, and the interests of England and of other Powers were sacrificed in order to enable Bismarck to recruit his beery stomach by drinking some mineral waters. It is all very well to sit round a green table and to cut up an Empire on a map. It is a very different thing to put what has been so easily settled into execution. I anticipate no end of trouble and bloodshed for years to come in this unhappy country. We have not yet recovered here from the effect of the publication of the unfortunate memorandum which so completely destroyed the great and commanding position that we had acquired.

There is not much here about Peace with Honour.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 17: Jan. 7, 1876.]

[Footnote 18: Jan. 24, 1877.]

[Footnote 19: Nobiling's attempt to assassinate the German Emperor.]

[Footnote 20: Now Viscount Knollys.]