Logic, Inductive and Deductive
Chapter 22
THE "OPPOSITION" OF PROPOSITIONS.--THE INTERPRETATION OF "NO".
Propositions are technically said to be "opposed" when, having the same terms in Subject and Predicate, they differ in Quantity, or in Quality, or in both.[1]
The practical question from which the technical doctrine has been developed was how to determine the significance of contradiction. What is meant by giving the answer "No" to a proposition put interrogatively? What is the interpretation of "No"? What is the respondent committed to thereby?
"Have all ratepayers a vote?" If you answer "No," you are bound to admit that some ratepayers have not. O is the CONTRADICTORY of A. If A is false, O must be true. So if you deny O, you are bound to admit A: one or other must be true: either Some ratepayers have not a vote or All have.
Is it the case that no man can live without sleep? Deny this, and you commit yourself to maintaining that Some man, one at least, can live without sleep. I is the Contradictory of E; and _vice versa_.
Contradictory opposition is distinguished from CONTRARY, the opposition of one Universal to another, of A to E and E to A. There is a natural tendency to meet a strong assertion with the very reverse. Let it be maintained that women are essentially faithless or that "the poor in a lump is bad," and disputants are apt to meet this extreme with another, that constancy is to be found only in women or true virtue only among the poor. Both extremes, both A and E, may be false: the truth may lie between: Some are, Some not.
Logically, the denial of A or E implies only the admission of O or I. You are not committed to the full contrary. But the implication of the Contradictory is absolute; there is no half-way house where the truth may reside. Hence the name of EXCLUDED MIDDLE is applied to the principle that "Of two Contradictories one or other must be true: they cannot both be false".
While both CONTRARIES may be false, they cannot both be true.
It is sometimes said that in the case of Singular propositions, the Contradictory and the Contrary coincide. A more correct doctrine is that in the case of Singular propositions, the distinction is not needed and does not apply. Put the question "Is Socrates wise?" or "Is this paper white?" and the answer "No" admits of only one interpretation, provided the terms remain the same. Socrates may become foolish, or this paper may hereafter be coloured differently, but in either case the subject term is not the same about which the question was asked. Contrary opposition belongs only to general terms taken universally as subjects. Concerning individual subjects an attribute must be either affirmed or denied simply: there is no middle course. Such a proposition as "Socrates is sometimes not wise," is not a true Singular proposition, though it has a Singular term as grammatical subject. Logically, it is a Particular proposition, of which the subject-term is the actions or judgments of Socrates.[2]
Opposition, in the ordinary sense, is the opposition of incompatible propositions, and it was with this only that Aristotle concerned himself. But from an early period in the history of Logic, the word was extended to cover mere differences in Quantity and Quality among the four forms A E I O, which differences have been named and exhibited symmetrically in a diagram known as: The Square of Opposition.
A______Contraries______E |\ /| | \ s | | C e | | o i | | n r | | t o | S r t S u a c u b \ i b a \ d a l \/ l t /\ t e / d e r / i r n a c n s r t s | t o | | n r | | o i | | C e | | / s | |/ \| I____Sub-contraries____O
The four forms being placed at the four corners of the Square, and the sides and diagonals representing relations between them thus separated, a very pretty and symmetrical doctrine is the result.
_Contradictories_, A and O, E and I, differ both in Quantity and in Quality.
_Contraries_, A and E, differ in Quality but not in Quantity, and are both Universal.
_Sub-contraries_, I and O, differ in Quality but not in Quantity, and are both Particular.
_Subalterns_, A and I, E and O, differ in Quantity but not in Quality.
Again, in respect of concurrent truth and falsehood there is a certain symmetry.
Contradictories cannot both be true, nor can they both be false.
Contraries may both be false, but cannot both be true.
Sub-contraries may both be true, but cannot both be false.
Subalterns may both be false and both true. If the Universal is true, its subalternate Particular is true: but the truth of the Particular does not similarly imply the truth of its Subalternating Universal.
This last is another way of saying that the truth of the Contrary involves the truth of the Contradictory, but the truth of the Contradictory does not imply the truth of the Contrary.
There, however, the symmetry ends. The sides and the diagonals of the Square do not symmetrically represent degrees of incompatibility, or opposition in the ordinary sense.
There is no incompatibility between two Sub-contraries or a Subaltern and its Subalternant. Both may be true at the same time. Indeed, as Aristotle remarked of I and O, the truth of the one commonly implies the truth of the other: to say that some of the crew were drowned, implies that some were not, and _vice versa_. Subaltern and Subalternant also are compatible, and something more. If a man has admitted A or E, he cannot refuse to admit I or O, the Particular of the same Quality. If All poets are irritable, it cannot be denied that some are so; if None is, that Some are not. The admission of the Contrary includes the admission of the Contradictory.
Consideration of Subalterns, however, brings to light a nice ambiguity in Some. It is only when I is regarded as the Contradictory of E, that it can properly be said to be Subalternate to A. In that case the meaning of Some is "not none," _i.e._, "Some at least". But when Some is taken as the sign of Particular quantity simply, _i.e._, as meaning "not all," or "some at most," I is not Subalternate to A, but opposed to it in the sense that the truth of the one is incompatible with the truth of the other.
Again, in the diagram Contrary opposition is represented by a side and Contradictory by the diagonal; that is to say, the stronger form of opposition by the shorter line. The Contrary is more than a denial: it is a counter-assertion of the very reverse, [Greek: to enantion]. "Are good administrators always good speakers?" "On the contrary, they never are." This is a much stronger opposition, in the ordinary sense, than a modest contradictory, which is warranted by the existence of a single exception. If the diagram were to represent incompatibility accurately, the Contrary ought to have a longer line than the Contradictory, and this it seems to have had in the diagram that Aristotle had in mind (_De Interpret._, c. 10).
It is only when Opposition is taken to mean merely difference in Quantity and Quality that there can be said to be greater opposition between Contradictories than between Contraries. Contradictories differ both in Quantity and in Quality: Contraries, in Quality only.
There is another sense in which the Particular Contradictory may be said to be a stronger opposite than the Contrary. It is a stronger position to take up argumentatively. It is easier to defend than a Contrary. But this is because it offers a narrower and more limited opposition.
We deal with what is called Immediate Inference in the next chapter. Pending an exact definition of the process, it is obvious that two immediate inferences are open under the above doctrines, (1) Granted the truth of any proposition, you may immediately infer the falsehood of its Contradictory. (2) Granted the truth of any Contrary, you may immediately infer the truth of its Subaltern.[3]
[Footnote 1: This is the traditional definition of Opposition from an early period, though the tradition does not start from Aristotle. With him opposition ([Greek: antikeisthai]) meant, as it still means in ordinary speech, incompatibility. The technical meaning of Opposition is based on the diagram (given afterwards in the text) known as the Square of Opposition, and probably originated in a confused apprehension of the reason why it received that name. It was called the Square of Opposition, because it was intended to illustrate the doctrine of Opposition in Aristotle's sense and the ordinary sense of repugnance or incompatibility. What the Square brings out is this. If the four forms A E I O are arranged symmetrically according as they differ in quantity, or quality, or both, it is seen that these differences do not correspond symmetrically to compatibility and incompatibility: that propositions may differ in quantity or in quality without being incompatible, and that they may differ in both (as Contradictories) and be less violently incompatible than when they differ in one only (as Contraries). The original purpose of the diagram was to bring this out, as is done in every exposition of it. Hence it was called the Square of Opposition. But as a descriptive title this is a misnomer: it should have been the Square of Differences in Quantity or Quality. This misnomer has been perpetuated by appropriating Opposition as a common name for difference in Quantity or Quality when the terms are the same and in the same order, and distinguishing it in this sense from Repugnance or Incompatibility (Tataretus in Summulas, _De Oppositionibus_ [1501], Keynes, _The Opposition of Propositions_ [1887]). Seeing that there never is occasion to speak of Opposition in the limited sense except in connexion with the Square, there is no real risk of confusion. A common name is certainly wanted in that connexion, if only to say that Opposition (in the limited or diagrammatic sense) does not mean incompatibility.]
[Footnote 2: Cp. Keynes, pt. ii. ch. ii. s. 57. Aristotle laid down the distinction between Contrary and Contradictory to meet another quibble in contradiction, based on taking the Universal as a whole and indivisible subject like an Individual, of which a given predicate must be either affirmed or denied.]
[Footnote 3: I have said that there is little risk of confusion in using the word Opposition in its technical or limited sense. There is, however, a little. When it is said that these Inferences are based on Opposition, or that Opposition is a mode of Immediate Inference, there is confusion of ideas unless it is pointed out that when this is said, it is Opposition in the ordinary sense that is meant. The inferences are really based on the rules of Contrary and Contradictory Opposition; Contraries cannot both be true, and of Contradictories one or other must be.]