Chapter 19

ARISTOTLE'S CATEGORIES.

In deference to tradition a place must be found in every logical treatise for Aristotle's Categories. No writing of the same length has exercised a tithe of its influence on human thought. It governed scholastic thought and expression for many centuries, being from its shortness and consequent easiness of transcription one of the few books in every educated man's library. It still regulates the subdivisions of Parts of Speech in our grammars. Its universality of acceptance is shown in the fact that the words _category_ ([Greek: kategoria]) and _predicament_, its Latin translation, have passed into common speech.

The Categories have been much criticised and often condemned as a division, but, strange to say, few have inquired what they originally professed to be a division of, or what was the original author's basis of division. Whether the basis is itself important, is another question: but to call the division imperfect, without reference to the author's intention, is merely confusing, and serves only to illustrate the fact that the same objects may be differently divided on different principles of division. Ramus was right in saying that the Categories had no logical significance, inasmuch as they could not be made a basis for departments of logical method; and Kant and Mill in saying that they had no philosophical significance, inasmuch as they are founded upon no theory of Knowing and Being: but this is to condemn them for not being what they were never intended to be.

The sentence in which Aristotle states the objects to be divided, and his division of them is so brief and bold that bearing in mind the subsequent history of the Categories, one first comes upon it with a certain surprise. He says simply:--

"Of things expressed without syntax (_i.e._, single words), each signifies either substance, or quantity, or quality, or relation, or place, or time, or disposition (_i.e._, attitude or internal arrangement), or appurtenance, or action (doing), or suffering (being done to)."[1]

The objects, then, that Aristotle proposed to classify were single words (the _themata simplicia_ of the Schoolmen). He explains that by "out of syntax" ([Greek: aneu symplokes]) he means without reference to truth or falsehood: there can be no declaration of truth or falsehood without a sentence, a combination, or syntax: "man runs" is either true or false, "man" by itself, "runs" by itself, is neither. His division, therefore, was a division of single words according to their differences of signification, and without reference to the truth or falsehood of their predication.[2]

Signification was thus the basis of division. But according to what differences? The Categories themselves are so abstract that this question might be discussed on their bare titles interminably. But often when abstract terms are doubtful, an author's intention may be gathered from his examples. And when Aristotle's examples are ranged in a table, certain principles of subdivision leap to the eyes. Thus:--

Substance Man } COMMON { Substance ([Greek: ousia]) ([Greek: anthropos]) } NOUN { (_Substantia_) -------------------------------------------------------------- Quantity Five-feet-five } { ([Greek: poson]) ([Greek: tripechu]) } { (_Quantitas_) } { Quality Scholarly } { Permanent ([Greek: poion]) ([Greek: grammatikon])} ADJECTIVE { Attribute (_Qualitas_) } { Relation Bigger } { ([Greek: pros ti]) ([Greek: meizon]) } { (_Relatio_) } { -------------------------------------------------------------- Place In-the-Lyceum } { ([Greek: pou]) ([Greek: en Lykeio]) } { (_Ubi_) } ADVERB { Temporary Time Yesterday } { Attribute ([Greek: pote]) ([Greek: chthes]) } { (_Quando_) } { -------------------------------------------------------------- Disposition Reclines } { ([Greek: keisthai]) ([Greek: anakeitai]) } { (_Positio_) } { Appurtenance Has-shoes-on } { ([Greek: echein]) ([Greek: hypodedetai])} { (_Habitus_) } VERB { Action Cuts } { Temporary ([Greek: poiein]) ([Greek: temnei]) } { Attribute (_Actio_) } { Passion Is cut } { ([Greek: paschein]) ([Greek: temnetai]) } { (_Passio_) } {

In looking at the examples, our first impression is that Aristotle has fallen into a confusion. He professes to classify words out of syntax, yet he gives words with the marks of syntax on them. Thus his division is accidentally grammatical, a division of parts of speech, parts of a sentence, into Nouns, Adjectives, Adverbs, and Verbs. And his subdivisions of these parts are still followed in our grammars. But really it is not the grammatical function that he attends to, but the signification: and looking further at the examples, we see what differences of signification he had in his mind. It is differences relative to a concrete individual, differences in the words applied to him according as they signify the substance of him or his attributes, permanent or temporary.

Take any concrete thing, Socrates, this book, this table. It must be some kind of a thing, a man, a book. It must have some size or quantity, six feet high, three inches broad. It must have some quality, white, learned, hard. It must have relations with other things, half this, double that, the son of a father. It must be somewhere, at some time, in some attitude, with some "havings," appendages, appurtenances, or belongings, doing something, or having something done to it. Can you conceive any name (simple or composite) applicable to any object of perception, whose signification does not fall into one or other of these classes? If you cannot, the categories are justified as an exhaustive division of significations. They are a complete list of the most general resemblances among individual things, in other words, of the _summa genera_, the _genera generalissima_ of predicates concerning this, that or the other concrete individual. No individual thing is _sui generis_: everything is like other things: the categories are the most general likenesses.

The categories are exhaustive, but do they fulfil another requisite of a good division--are they mutually exclusive? Aristotle himself raised this question, and some of his answers to difficulties are instructive. Particularly his discussion of the distinction between Second Substances or Essences and Qualities. Here he approximates to the modern doctrine of the distinction between Substance and Attribute as set forth in our quotation from Mansel at p. 110. Aristotle's Second Essences ([Greek: deuterai ousiai]) are common nouns or general names, Species and Genera, _man_, _horse_, _animal_, as distinguished from Singular names, _this man_, _this horse_, which he calls First Substances ([Greek: protai ousiai]), essences _par excellence_, to which real existence in the highest sense is attributed. Common nouns are put in the First Category because they are predicated in answer to the question, What is this? But he raises the difficulty whether they may not rather be regarded as being in the Third Category, that of Quality ([Greek: to poion]). When we say, "This is a man," do we not declare what sort of a thing he is? do we not declare his Quality? If Aristotle had gone farther along this line, he would have arrived at the modern point of view that a man is a man in virtue of his possessing certain attributes, that general names are applied in virtue of their connotation. This would have been to make the line of distinction between the First Category and the Third pass between First Essence and Second, ranking the Second Essences with Qualities. But Aristotle did not get out of the difficulty in this way. He solved it by falling back on the differences in common speech. "Man" does not signify the quality simply, as "whiteness" does. "Whiteness" signifies nothing but the quality. That is to say, there is no separate name in common speech for the common attributes of man. His further obscure remark that general names "define quality round essence" [Greek: peri ousian], inasmuch as they signify what sort a certain essence is, and that genera make this definition more widely than species, bore fruit in the mediaeval discussions between Realists and Nominalists by which the signification of general names was cleared up.

Another difficulty about the mutual exclusiveness of the Categories was started by Aristotle in connexion with the Fourth Category, Relation ([Greek: pros ti] _Ad aliquid_, _To something_). Mill remarks that "that could not be a very comprehensive view of the nature of Relation which would exclude action, passivity, and local situation from that Category," and many commentators, from Simplicius down to Hamilton, have remarked that all the last six Categories might be included under Relation. This is so far correct that the word Relation is one of the vaguest and most extensive of words; but the criticism ignores the strictness with which Aristotle confined himself in his Categories to the forms of common speech. It is clear from his examples that in his Fourth Category he was thinking only of "relation" as definitely expressed in common speech. In his meaning, any word is a relative which is joined with another in a sentence by means of a preposition or a case-inflection. Thus "disposition" is a relative: it is the disposition _of_ something. This kind of relation is perfect when the related terms reciprocate grammatically; thus "master," "servant," since we can say either "the master of the servant," or "the servant of the master". In mediaeval logic the term _Relata_ was confined to these perfect cases, but the Category had a wider scope with Aristotle. And he expressly raised the question whether a word might not have as much right to be put in another Category as in this. Indeed, he went further than his critics in his suggestions of what Relation might be made to include. Thus: "big" signifies Quality; yet a thing is big with reference to something else, and is so far a Relative. Knowledge must be knowledge of something, and is a relative: why then should we put "knowing" (_i.e._, learned) in the Category of Quality. "Hope" is a relative, as being the hope _of_ a man and the hope of something. Yet we say, "I have hope," and there hope would be in the category of Having, Appurtenance. For the solution of all such difficulties, Aristotle falls back upon the forms of common speech, and decides the place of words in his categories according to them. This was hardly consistent with his proposal to deal with separate words out of syntax, if by this was meant anything more than dealing with them without reference to truth or falsehood. He did not and could not succeed in dealing with separate words otherwise than as parts of sentences, owing their signification to their position as parts of a transient plexus of thought. In so far as words have their being in common speech, and it is their being in this sense that Aristotle considers in the Categories, it is a transient being. What being they represent besides is, in the words of Porphyry, a very deep affair, and one that needs other and greater investigation.

[Footnote 1: [Greek: ton kata medemian symploken legomenon hekaston etoi ousian semainei, e poson, e poion, e pros ti, e pou, e pote, e keisthai, e echein, e poiein, e paschein.] (Categ. ii. 5.)]

[Footnote 2: To describe the Categories as a grammatical division, as Mansel does in his instructive Appendix C to Aldrich, is a little misleading without a qualification. They are non-logical inasmuch as they have no bearing on any logical purpose. But they are grammatical only in so far as they are concerned with words. They are not grammatical in the sense of being concerned with the function of words in predication. The unit of grammar in this sense is the sentence, a combination of words in syntax; and it is expressly with words out of syntax that Aristotle deals, with single words not in relation to the other parts of a sentence, but in relation to the things signified. In any strict definition of the provinces of Grammar and Logic, the Categories are neither grammatical nor logical: the grammarians have appropriated them for the subdivision of certain parts of the sentence, but with no more right than the logicians. They really form a treatise by themselves, which is in the main ontological, a discussion of substances and attributes as underlying the forms of common speech. In saying this I use the word substance in the modern sense: but it must be remembered that Aristotle's [Greek: ousia], translated substantia, covered the word as well as the thing signified, and that his Categories are primarily classes of words. The union between names and things would seem to have been closer in the Greek mind than we can now realise. To get at it we must note that every separate word [Greek: to legomenon] is conceived as having a being or thing [Greek: to on] corresponding to it, so that beings or things [Greek: ta onta] are coextensive with single words: a being or thing is whatever receives a separate name. This is clear and simple enough, but perplexity begins when we try to distinguish between this nameable being and concrete being, which last is Aristotle's category of [Greek: ousia], the being signified by a Proper or a Common as distinguished from an Abstract Noun. As we shall see, it is relatively to the highest sense of this last kind of being, namely, the being signified by a Proper name, that he considers the other kinds of being.]