Part 1

LOGIC AS THE SCIENCE OF THE PURE CONCEPT

TRANSLATED FROM THE ITALIAN OF

BENEDETTO CROCE

BY

DOUGLAS AINSLIE

B.A. (OXON.), M.R.A.S.

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED

ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1917

[Benedetto Croce's Philosophy of the Spirit, in the English translation by Douglas Ainslie, consists of 4 volumes (which can be read separately): 1. Aesthetic as science of expression and general linguistic. (A first ed. is available at Project Gutenberg. A second augmented ed. follows.) 2. Philosophy of the practical: economic and ethic. (In preparation) 3. Logic as the science of the pure concept. 4. Theory and history of historiography. (In preparation) Transcriber's note.]

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE

The publication of this third volume of the _Philosophy of the Spirit_ offers a complete view of the Crocean philosophy to the English-speaking world.

I have striven in every way to render the Logic the equal of its predecessors in accuracy and elegance of translation, and have taken the opinion of critical friends on many occasions, though more frequently I have preferred to retain my own. The vocabulary will be found to resemble those of the _Æsthetic_ and the _Philosophy of the Practical,_ thereby enabling readers to follow the thought of the author more easily than if I had made alterations in it. Thus the word "fancy" will be found here as elsewhere, the equivalent of the Italian "fantasia" and "imagination" of "immaginazione"; this rendering makes the meaning far more clear than the use of the words in the opposite sense that they occasionally bear in English; this is particularly so in respect of the important distinction of the activities in the early part of the _Æsthetic._ I have also retained the word "gnoseology" and its derivatives, as saving the circumlocutions entailed by the use of any paraphrase, especially when adjectival forms are employed.

I think that this Logic will come to be recognized as a masterpiece, in the sense that it supplants and supersedes all Logics that have gone before, especially those known as formal Logics, of which the average layman has so profound and justifiable mistrust, for the very good reason that, as Croce says, they are not Logic at all, but illogic--his healthy love of life leads him to fight shy of what he feels would lead to disaster if applied to the problems that he has to face in the conduct of life. It is shown in the following pages that the prestige of Aristotle is not wholly to blame for the survival of formal Logic and for the class of mind that denying thought dwells ever in the _ipse dixit._ Indeed, one of the chief boons conferred by this book will be the freeing of the student from that confusion of thought and word that is the essence of the old formal Logic--of thought that rises upon the wings of words, like an aviator upon his falcon of wood and metal to spy out the entrenchments of the enemy.

One of the most stimulating portions of the book will, I think, be found in Croce's theory of error and proof of its necessity in the progress of truth. This may certainly be credited to Croce as a discovery. That this theory of the uses of error has a great future, I have no doubt, from its appearance at certain debates on Logic that have taken place at the Aristotelian Society within the last year or two, though strangely enough the name of the philosopher to whom it was due was not mentioned. A like mysterious aposiopesis characterized Professor J. A. Smith's communication to the same Society as to the development of the ethical from the economic activity (degrees of the Spirit) some years after the publication of the _Philosophy of the Practical._

It is my hope that this original work, appearing as it does in the midst of the great struggle with the Teutonic powers, may serve to point out to the Anglo-Saxon world where the future of the world's civilization lies, namely in the ancient line of Latin culture, which includes in itself the loftiest Hellenic thought. It is sad to think that the Germans have relapsed to barbarism from the veneer of cultivation that they once possessed, particularly sad when one comes upon the German names that must always abound in any treatise on the development of thought. Their creative moment, however, was very brief, and the really important names can be numbered on the fingers of one hand, that of Emmanuel Kant being corrupted from the Scots Cant. Of recent years the German contribution has been singularly small and unimportant, such writers as Eucken being mere compilers of the work of earlier philosophers, and without originality. The foul-souled Teuton will need a long period of re-education before he can be readmitted to the comity of nations upon equal terms--his bestiality will ask a potent purge.

In conclusion, I can only hope that the fact of this work having been put into the hands of readers a decade earlier than would in all probability have been the case, had I not been fortunate enough to make a certain journey to Naples, will be duly taken advantage of by students, and that it will serve for many as a solid foundation for their thought about thought, and so of their thought about the whole of life and reality in the new world that will succeed the War.

DOUGLAS AINSLIE.

THE ATHENAEUM, PALL MALL,

_March_ 1917.

ADVERTISEMENT

This volume is, and is not, the memoir entitled _Outlines of Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept,_ which I presented to the Accademia Pontiana at the sessions of April 10 and May 1, 1904, and April 2, 1905, and which was inserted in volume xxxv. of the _Transactions_ (printed as an extract from them by Giannini, Naples, 1905, in quarto, pp. 140).

I might have republished that memoir, and made in it certain corrections, great and small, and especially I might have enriched it with very numerous developments. But partial corrections and copious additions, while they would have injured the arrangement of the first work, would not have allowed me to attain to that more secure and fuller exposition of logical doctrine which, after four years' study and reflection, it now seems to be in my power to offer. I have therefore resolved to rewrite the work from the beginning on a larger scale, with a new arrangement and new diction regarding its predecessor as a sketch, which in a literary sense stands by itself, and only making use of a page, or group of pages, here and there, as suited the natural order of exposition.

Owing to this connection between the present volume with the above-mentioned academic memoir, it will be seen in what sense it may be called, and is called, a "second edition." It is a second edition of my thought rather than of my book.

B. C.

NAPLES,

_November_ 1908.

PREFACE TO THIRD ITALIAN EDITION OF THE _LOGIC_

On reprinting the present volume, after an interval of seven years, I have reread it with attention to its literary form, but have made no substantial changes or additions to it; because the further development of that part which deals with the logic of Historiography has been collected in a special volume, forming as it were an appendix. This is now the fourth volume of the _Philosophy of the Spirit._

It seemed to many, upon the first publication of this volume, that it chiefly consisted of a very keen attack upon Science. Few, above all, discovered what it was: _a vindication of the seriousness of logical thought,_ not only in respect to empiricism and abstract thought, but also to intuitionist, mystical and pragmatistic doctrines, and to all the others then very vigorous, which, including justly combated positivism, distorted every form of logicity.

Nor, in truth, did its criticism of Science favour what is known as a philosophy "detesting facts": indeed, the chief preoccupation of that criticism was meticulous respect of facts, which was neither observed nor observable in empirical and abstract constructions and in the analogous mythologies of naturalism. The character of this _Logic_ might equally be described as affirmation of the concrete universal and affirmation of the concrete individual, as proof of the Aristotelian _Scientia est de universalibus_ and proof of Campanula's _Scientia est de singularibus._ In this manner those empty generalizations and fictitious riches which are removed from philosophy in the course of treatment, there appear more than amply, infinitely compensated for by the restitution to it of its own riches, _of the whole of history,_ both that known as human and that known as history of nature. Henceforward it can live there as in its own dominion, or rather its own body, which is co-extensive with and indivisible from it. The separation there effected by philosophy from science is not separation from what is _true knowledge in science,_ that is from the historical and real elements of science. It is only separation from the schematic form in which those elements are compressed, mutilated and altered. Thus it may also be described as a reconnection of it with what of living, concrete and progressive exists in those sciences. If the destruction of anything be aimed at in it, that can clearly be nothing but abstract and anti-historical philosophy. This _Logic_ must thus be looked upon as a liquidation of philosophy rather than of science, if abstract science be posited as true philosophy.

That point is dwelt upon in the polemic against the idea of a general philosophy which should stand above _particular philosophies,_ or the methodological problems of historical thought. The distinction of general philosophy from particular philosophies (which are true generality in their particularity) seems to me to be the gnoseological residue of the old dualism and of the old transcendency; a not innocuous residue, for it always tends to the view that the thoughts of men upon particular things are of an inferior, common and vulgar nature, and that the thought of totality or unity is alone superior and alone completely satisfying. The idea of a general philosophy prepares in this way consciously or otherwise for the restoration of Metaphysic, with its pretension of rethinking the already thought by means of a particular thought of its own. This, when it is not altogether religious revelation, becomes the caprice of the individual philosopher. The many examples offered by post-Kantian philosophy are proof of this. Here Metaphysic raged so furiously and to such deleterious effect as to involve guiltless philosophy in its guilt. The latent danger always remains, even if this restoration of Metaphysic does not take place, for if it never becomes effective because it is carefully watched and restrained, the other draw-back persists, namely, that that general philosophy, or super-philosophy or super-intelligence desired, while it does not succeed in making clear particular problems, which alone have relation to concrete life, nevertheless in a measure discredits them, by judging them to be of slight importance and by surrounding them with a sort of mystical irony.

To annul the idea of a "general" philosophy is at the same time to annul the "static" concept of the philosophic system, replacing it with the dynamic concept of simple historical "systemizations" of groups of problems, of which particular problems and their solutions are what remain, not their aggregate and external arrangement. This latter satisfies the needs of the times and of authors and passes away with them, or is preserved and admired solely for æsthetic reasons when it possesses them. But those who retain some superstitious reverence for "General Philosophy" or "Metaphysic" have still a superstitious reverence for what are known as static systems. In so doing they behave in a rational manner, for they cannot altogether free themselves from the claims of a definitive philosophy which is to solve once and for all the so-called "enigma of the world" (imaginary because there are infinite enigmas which appear and are solved in turn, but there is not the Enigma), and is to provide the "true system" or "basis" of the true system. Nevertheless I hope that good fortune will attend the doctrine of the concept here set out, not only because it seems to me to afford the satisfaction proper to every statement of truth, namely, to accord with the reality of things, but also (if I may so express myself) because it carries with it certain immediate and tangible advantages. Above all, it relieves the student of philosophy of the terrible responsibility--which I should never wish to assume--of supplying the Truth, the unique eternal Truth, and of supplying it in competition with all the greatest philosophers who have appeared in the course of centuries. Further, it removes from him together both the hope of the definitive system and the anxious fear of the mortal doom which will one day strike the very system that he has so lovingly constructed, as it has struck those of his predecessors. At the same time it sets him out of reach of the smiling non-philosophers who foresee with accuracy and are almost able to calculate the date of that not distant death. Finally, it frees him from the annoyance of the "school" and of the "scholars"; "school" and "scholars" in the sense of the old metaphysicians are no longer even conceivable, when the idea of "systems" having-their "own principles" has been abolished. All dynamic systems or provisory systemizations of ever new problems have the same principle, namely, Thought, _perennis philosophia._ There has not been and never will be anything to add to this. And although the many propositions and solutions of problems strive among themselves to attain harmony, yet to each, if it be truly thought, is promised eternal life, which gives and receives vigour from the life of each of the others. This is just the opposite of what takes place with static systems which collapse, one upon the other, only certain portions of good work surviving them in the shape of happy treatment of special problems which are to be found mingled with the metaphysic of every true philosopher. And although there is no longer a field left over to these scholars who merely faithfully echo the master, like adepts of a religion, there is yet a wide field always open to the other type of scholar, men who pay serious attention and assimilate what is of use to them in the thought of others, but then proceed to state and to solve new problems of their own. Finally, the life of philosophy as conceived and portrayed in this _Logic,_ resembles the life of poetry in this: that it does not become effective save in passing from _different_ to _different,_ from one original thinker to another, as poetry passes from poet to poet, and imitators and schools of poetry, although they certainly belong to the world, yet do not belong to the world of poetry.

B. C.

_September_ 1916.

CONTENTS

FIRST PART

THE PURE CONCEPT, THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE _A PRIORI_ LOGICAL SYNTHESIS

FIRST SECTION

THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS

I

AFFIRMATION OF THE CONCEPT

Thought and sensation--Thought and language--Intuition and language as presuppositions--Scepsis as to the concept--Its three forms--Æstheticism--Mysticism--Empiricism--_Redactio ad absurdum_ of the three forms--Affirmation of the concept.

II

THE CONCEPT AND THE PSEUDOCONCEPTS

Concept and conceptual fictions--The pure concept as ultra- and omnirepresentative--Conceptual fictions as representative without universality, or universals void of representations--Criticism of the doctrine which considers them to be erroneous concepts, or imperfect concepts preparatory to perfect concepts--Posteriority of fictional concepts to true and proper concepts--Proper character of conceptual fictions--The practical end and mnemonic utility--Persistence of conceptual fictions side by side with concepts--Pure concepts and pseudoconcepts.

III

THE CHARACTERISTICS AND THE CHARACTER OF THE CONCEPT

Expressivity--Universality--Concreteness--The concrete-universal and the formation of the pseudoconcepts--Empirical and abstract pseudoconcepts--The other characteristics of the pure concept--The origin of multiplicity and the unity of the characteristics of the concept--Objection relating to the unreality of the pure concept and the impossibility of demonstrating it--Prejudice concerning the nature of the demonstration--Prejudice relating to the representability of the concept--Protests of philosophers against this prejudice--Reason of their perpetual reappearance.

IV

DISPUTES CONCERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONCEPT

Disputes of materialistic origin--The concept as value--Realism and nominalism--Critique of both--True realism--Resolution of other difficulties as to the genesis of concepts--Disputes arising from the neglected distinction between empirical and abstract concepts--Intersection of the various disputes--Other logical disputes--Representative accompaniment of the concept--Concept of the thing and concept of the individual--Reasons, laws and causes--Intellect and Reason--The abstract reason and its practical nature--The synthesis of theoretical and practical and intellectual intuition--Uniqueness of thought.

V

CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND

THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION

The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept--Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept--Inexistence of subdivisions of the concept as logical form--Distinctions of the concepts not logical, but real--Multiplicity of the concepts; and logical difficulty arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it--Impossibility of eliminating it--Unity as distinction--Inadequacy of the numerical concept of the multiple--Relation of distincts as ideal history--Distinction between ideal history and real history--Ideal distinction and abstract distinction--Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their significance--Identical, unequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.--Universal, particular and singular. Comprehension and extension--Logical definition--Unity-distinction as a circle--Distinction in the pseudoconcepts--Subordination and co-ordination of empirical concepts--Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the concept--The series in abstract concepts.

VI

OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES

Opposite or contradictory concepts--Their diversity from distincts --Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic--Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct--Nature of opposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with distincts--Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, as concept from concept--The dialectic--Opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept itself--Affirmation and negation--The principle of identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation of it--Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of opposition. False application of this principle also--Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of distincts--Its reduction to the absurd--The improper form of logical principles or laws--The principle of sufficient reason.

SECOND SECTION

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT

I

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT

Relation of the logical with the æsthetic form--The concept as expression--Æsthetic and æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of the concept: propositions and judgments--Overcoming of the dualism of thought and language--The logical judgment as definition--Indistinction of subject and predicate in the definition--Unity of essence and existence--Pretended vacuity of the definition--Critique of the definition as fixed verbal formula.

II

THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE SYLLOGISM

Identity of definition and syllogism--Connection of concepts and thinking of concepts--Identity of judgment and syllogism--The middle term and the nature of the concept--Pretended non-definitive logical judgments--The syllogism as fixed verbal formula--Use and abuse of it--Erroneous separation of truth and reason of truth in pure concepts--Separation of truth and reason of truth in the pseudoconcepts.

III

CRITIQUE OF FORMAL LOGIC

Intrinsic impossibility of formal Logic--Its nature--Its partial justification--Its error--Its traditional constitution--The three logical forms--Theories of the concept and of the judgment--Theory of the syllogism--Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic--Mathematical Logic or Logistic--Its non-mathematical character--Example of its mode of treatment--Identity of nature of Logistic and formal Logic--Practical aspect of Logistic.

IV

INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND PERCEPTION

Reaction of the concept upon the representation--Logicization of the representations--The individual judgment; and its difference from the judgment of definition--Distinction of subject and predicate in the individual judgment--Reasons for the variety of definitions of the judgment and of some of its divisions--Individual judgment and intellectual intuition--Identity of individual judgment with perception or perceptive judgment, and with commemorative or historical judgment--Erroneous distinction of individual judgments as of fact and of value--The individual judgment as ultimate and perfect form of knowledge--Error of treating it as the first fact of knowledge--Motive of this error--Individual syllogisms.

V

THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT AND THE PREDICATE OF EXISTENCE

The copula: its verbal and logical significance--Questions relating to propositions without a subject. Verbalism--Confusion between different forms of judgments in the question of existentiality--Determination and subdivision of the question concerning the existentiality of individual judgments--Necessity of the existential character in these judgments---The absolutely and the relatively inexistent--The character of existence as predicate--Critique of existentiality as position and faith--Absurd consequences of those doctrines--The predicate of existence as not sufficient to constitute a judgment--The predicate of judgment as the totality of the concept.

VI

INDIVIDUAL PSEUDOJUDGMENTS. CLASSIFICATION AND ENUMERATION

Individual pseudojudgments--Their practical character--Genesis of the distinction between judgments of fact and judgments of value; and critique of it--Importance of individual pseudojudgments--Empirical individual and individual abstract judgments--Formative process of empirical judgments--Their existential basis--Dependence of empirical judgments upon pure concepts--Empirical judgments as classification--Classification and understanding--Substitution of the one for the other, and genesis of perceptive and judicative illusions--Abstract concepts and individual judgments--Impossibility of direct application of the first to the second--Intervention of empirical judgments as intermediate--Reduction of the heterogeneous to the homogeneous--Empirical abstract judgments and enumeration (mensuration, etc.)--Enumeration and intelligence--The so-called conversion of quantity into quality--Mathematical space and time and their abstractness.

THIRD SECTION

IDENTITY OF THE PURE CONCEPT AND THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT THE LOGICAL _A PRIORI_ SYNTHESIS

I

IDENTITY OF THE JUDGMENT OF DEFINITION (PURE CONCEPT) AND OF THE INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT