Part 33

On the 7th of December Mr. Graham addressed the convention in opposition to this ordinance. The speech which he delivered on this occasion was, perhaps, the noblest effort of his life. It breathes the true spirit of American freedom. It is the product of a mind deeply imbued with the great principles of civil liberty, and which had devoutly meditated upon all those safeguards which the wisdom of successive generations had thrown around it. His wide acquaintance with history had made him familiar with every device by which liberty may be sapped and undermined; his exalted estimate of its value and dignity had developed this acquaintance into a special sense by which he could detect any design hostile to it, under any pretense or subterfuge, however specious or skillful.

From the beginning of the war the current of power set steadily from the Confederate States to the Confederate Government; and with each year of the war, the current flowed on with increasing tide. Within its just bounds, no man yielded a heartier allegiance to that government than Mr. Graham; but on the other hand, no man stood ready to oppose a firmer resistance when that government overstepped those bounds. The war had been begun and was then prosecuted for the maintenance of great principles, and it was his fixed purpose that civil liberty should not, at the South as at the North, be engulfed in its progress. In the year 1862 a minister of the gospel--a man of learning and of irreproachable character--was arrested in the county of Orange, under a military order, sent to Richmond, and cast into prison. He was not in the military service of the Confederate States, and therefore not amenable to military law. As a proceeding against a citizen, such an arrest, without charge made on oath and without warrant, was in violation of all law; while his deportation beyond the limits of the State, for trial by military tribunal, was in contempt of the dignity and sovereignty of the State. Mr. Graham, being then Senator from Orange, introduced a resolution demanding a return of the prisoner to the State, which was passed at once. On introducing the resolution, he expressed the opinion that the proceeding was without the sanction of the Confederate Executive, or of the Secretary of War. The sequel proved this supposition to be correct. The prisoner was sent back with a disavowal of any knowledge of the proceeding on the part of the President or the Secretary, until the confinement of the prisoner in the military prison at Richmond. The Secretary frankly admitted the erroneous nature of the arrest and imprisonment, and disclaimed all intention to interfere with the rightful jurisdiction of the State. On the 22d of January, 1863--upon the incoming of the message with the accompanying documents, touching the case--Mr. Graham paid a merited tribute to the enlightened comprehension of the relations existing between the Confederate Government and the States, evinced by these sentiments, and in the further remarks submitted by him, he took occasion to re-state the great principles of personal liberty--daily more and more endangered in the course of the war--and to impress them upon the public mind by apt comments upon the case to which the public attention was then so strongly directed. This was the first, and is believed to have been the last case, in which military power was used to override civil law.

In December, 1863, Mr. Graham was elected to the Confederate Senate by a majority of two-thirds of the Legislature. He took his seat in May, 1864. There was then need of the best counsel. The brilliant successes which had crowned our arms in the early years of the war, had been replaced by a succession of disasters. The battle of Gettysburg and the fall of Vicksburg had brought us apparently to the brink of ruin. As the year 1864 rolled on, the prospect became darker and darker, and at the end of the year the situation was to the last degree critical. Our territory had been cut in twain, and we were beleaguered by land and by sea. Within the area which acknowledged the Confederate Government, there was great exhaustion of all kinds of military supplies, and a like exhaustion of all the elements for the support of human life. General Lee was only able to oppose the front of General Grant by extending his line until it was ready to snap from excessive tension. To strengthen his force from the white race was impossible; conscription there had reached its limit. General Sherman had swept through Georgia, and the broad track of desolation which he left behind him too truly told the story of our helplessness. It was known that each Confederate soldier was opposed by as many as five Federal soldiers; the former scantily fed, clothed and shod; the latter supplied with every comfort and many luxuries. (The odds were seven to one, says _Stephens' History of the United States_.) It was plain there was no longer any hope of a successful prosecution of the war. In the midst of a dense gloom which shrouded the country on every side, a ray of light dawned in the proposed peace conference at Hampton Roads. Mr. Graham had endeavored to reach this form of intercourse from the commencement of the session. He was not without hope of a peaceful termination of hostilities; not so much from his estimate of the statesmanship of President Davis and his Cabinet, as from the extremity of the case which left no other alternative. The conference took place on the 3rd of February, 1865. The terms offered by Mr. Lincoln were, that the seceded States should return to the Union under the Constitution, in the existing state of affairs, with slavery as it was, but liable to be abolished by an amendment to the Constitution. He pledged himself to the utmost exercise of the executive powers in behalf of the South. The demand of the Commissioners was for independence. There could be no middle ground, and the conference ended. Upon the return of the Commissioners, Mr. Davis and Mr. Benjamin made public speeches in Richmond, to fire the Southern heart anew; but the event proved how little sagacity they brought to the direction of affairs at that supreme hour. The speeches fell still-born. [French intervention in Mexico was the South's opportunity; Seward's object in the Hampton Roads Conference was to ascertain if Southern statesmanship knew how to play its advantage.--_Ed._]

One principle had actuated Mr. Graham from the beginning of the war; to sustain the Government in its struggles for independence until it should be demonstrated that our resources were inadequate for that end; and when that should be seen and acknowledged, to seek, if possible, a peaceful solution. How well he sustained it is matter of history. He sustained it in every way in which his talents and his means could be made available. He sustained it by his counsels in the State and in the Confederate Government. He sustained it by blood more precious in his eyes than his own--all his sons, five in number, who had attained the age of eighteen, entered the army, and were in the army to the end.

The inadequacy of our resources, particularly of the population from which our soldiers were drawn, had now been demonstrated. It was known to Congress; it was admitted by General Lee in his proposition to conscribe slaves; it was proclaimed from the steps of the Capitol by Mr. Benjamin: "Unless the slaves are armed," he said, "the cause is lost." Every expedient had been tried; the extremest measures had been put in operation; "by means of conscription, impressment laws, and the suspension of the _habeas corpus_, the whole population, and all the resources of the country, had long before been placed at the command of the President for prosecution of the war." All had been found unavailing.

One resource, in the opinion of some, remained--the conscription of negroes. A bill for this purpose was introduced into Congress. It was opposed by Mr. Graham upon the ground that it was unconstitutional, as well as inexpedient and dangerous. His sagacious mind saw that this was a measure, not of safety, but a measure born of the wild promptings of despair. On the 21st of February it was indefinitely postponed, though it was subsequently taken up and passed.

If ever negotiation was to be resorted to, it was clear the time had come. We know but little of what passed in the Confederate Congress at that time. Its proceedings were had in secret session; nor is it now known whether the journals of the body escaped destruction. All that we know is derived from what was published by the members after the fall of the Confederate Government. Among these publications is a paper contributed by Mr. Oldham, then Senator from Texas, to _DeBow's Review_, in October, 1869, which gives us some information of the proceedings of the Senate at that time. A few days after the conference at Hampton Roads, he informs us, a committee consisting of Messrs. Orr, Graham and Johnson, was appointed to confer with the President, and ascertain what he proposed to do under the existing condition of affairs. In a few days they made a verbal report through Mr. Graham. "Among other things," I quote Mr. Oldham's words, "they stated that they had inquired of the President his views and opinions in regard to proposing to the United States to negotiate for peace upon the basis of the Confederacy returning to the Union, and that he had answered that he had no power to negotiate a treaty upon such a basis; that his authority to make treaties was derived from the Constitution, which he had sworn to support and that such a treaty would operate as an abrogation of the Constitution, and a dissolution of the government; that the States alone, each acting for itself, in its sovereign capacity, could make such a treaty. Mr. Graham said, he gave notice that he would, in a few days, introduce a resolution in favor of opening negotiations with the United States upon the basis of a return to the Union by the States of the Confederacy; that he did not give the notice at the instance or under the instruction of the committee, but upon his own responsibility. The notice was received in such a manner that he never offered his resolution."

I never saw the paper from which the foregoing quotation is made, and was a stranger to this passage of Mr. Graham's life until within the last forty days. I read it with a feeling of profound relief. I have ever regarded him from my earliest years, with the warmest admiration and the most affectionate respect; but his failure, as I thought, to take some action looking to peace after the Hampton Roads conference--when the plainest dictates of humanity so clearly demanded it--left upon my mind the painful impression that he had been wanting to himself in that, the most important, crisis of his life. There is a deep-seated conviction that the blood which was shed after that conference might have been saved. That the waste of the fruits of past centuries of toil--a waste which consigned so many of the present and future generations to want and misery--might have been avoided. It is with gratitude I reflect that not a tittle of responsibility for this bloodshed and waste lay at his door. And when the inevitable hour came to him, I doubt not the thought that he had done what he could to arrest a war attended with such terrible and useless sacrifice, was one of the sweetest reflections of his whole life.

Congress adjourned about the 16th day of March. Impressed with the imminence of the emergency, Mr. Graham stopped but one day at home--that day being the Sabbath--and on Monday proceeded to Raleigh to confer with the Governor. The conference was long and earnest. Mr. Graham laid before the Governor the views of the President, the state of the armies, and earnestly recommended that the Legislature should be convened. He sustained his advice by the opinion of General Lee, and that of many good and able men with whom he had been associated. He ended by telling him that Richmond would fall in less than thirty days, and that event would be followed probably by a rout or dispersion of General Lee's army for want of food, if for no other cause. The Governor was surprised by his statement of facts, and incredulous in some degree as to his conclusions. He agreed to consider the subject, and convened the Council on that day week. Hearing nothing of their action, in a few days Mr. Graham visited Raleigh again. The Governor informed him that on the day appointed, a bare quorum of the Council attended, and being equally divided, he had not summoned the Legislature. He said that Mr. Gilmer, with whom Mr. Graham had advised him to consult, had suggested to him to solicit an interview with General Sherman on the subject of peace. Mr. Graham remarked that if such an interview were held, Mr. Davis should be apprised of it. To this the Governor at once assented. Mr. Graham suggested further that if that course were taken, he (the Governor) should be in a condition to act independently of the President, and convene the Legislature. To this proposition the Governor manifested reluctance; but finally agreed to call the Council of State again. But while negotiation halted, the march of General Sherman's army decided events. In a few days no resource was left but an unconditional surrender. With the part borne by Mr. Graham at that trying time, a gifted authoress of North Carolina has made the public already familiar in the captivating pages of her work, _The Last Ninety Days of the War_.

There is no part of Mr. Graham's life in which the calm wisdom, for which he was so distinguished, shone more conspicuously than in the closing months of the civil war. When independence was demonstrated to be hopeless, he sought peace; but even then, only in channels admitted to be in accordance with the great principles of our government.

In his opinion, that peace ought to be sought by the State after the failure of the conference at Hampton Roads, he was sustained by our entire delegation in Congress, and a large proportion of the leading citizens of the State. Yet so anxious was he not only to avoid any appearance of conflict among the Confederate States, but to conform to all that the most punctilious deference for the Confederate Government might require, that he did not move in the matter until after a conference with the President, and then only in the track pointed out by him. The President disclaimed all power of making a treaty, which would abrogate the Government, and declared that the "States alone, each acting in its sovereign capacity, could make such a treaty." In the line of action here indicated the State could not be put in a false position; nay, her honor would be put beyond all cavil. It was known that we had no power to arrest General Sherman's march. General Johnston confronted him, and all felt convinced that whatever his great military genius could accomplish would be done. But it was also known that his gallant army was outnumbered six to one. A surrender in a few days would be inevitable. Burning capitals, desolated homes, famine and destruction of life, followed Sherman's march. Was it not worth the effort to put a stop to such frightful calamities? What Mr. Graham urged was that the people might be allowed to determine their fate for themselves. Such a course was in strict conformity to the fundamental principles of our Government. A convention of seven Governors had precipitated the war when peace counsels seemed to be in the ascendant. Was not Mr. Graham justified in the opinion that executive powers which had been so destructively exerted in the beginning, might be beneficently exerted in the end?

In an address delivered by Governor Vance before the Southern Historical Society, at White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, August 18th, 1875, occurs the following statement:

"Soon after the failure of the Fortress Monroe or Hampton Roads conference, I was visited by Governor Graham (whose death we so recently deplore) who was then a Senator of the Confederate States. After giving all the particulars of that conference which had not appeared in the papers, and the prevailing impressions of congressional circles, about Richmond, etc., he informed me that a number of leading gentlemen there, despairing of obtaining peace through Mr. Davis, and believing the end inevitable and not distant, had requested him to visit me and urge me, as Governor of North Carolina, to take steps for making separate peace with Mr. Lincoln, and thus inaugurate the conclusion; that he agreed to lay their request before me without promising to add his personal advice thereto. I asked who those gentlemen were, and, with some reluctance, he gave me their names, chiefly Senators and Representatives in the Confederate Congress. I asked why these gentlemen did not begin negotiations in their own States with the enemy, and if they would come out in the papers with this request to me. He said they could not take the initiative, they were so surrounded at home, and so trammeled by pledges, etc., as to render it impossible! I declined the proposition of course."

It is with reluctance that I advert to this statement. Had it been given to the press with a sponsor less entitled to consideration, I should have been disposed to let it float with the tide. But it presents itself under imposing circumstances; it proceeds from one who, at the time referred to, was at, the head of the government in North Carolina; it is contained in an address made before a society whose object it is to preserve the memorials of that time. The statement thus passes into history. It will not be waived. It peremptorily challenges attention.

[Mr. McGehee here enters into a rather labored argument to show that Vance was mistaken; it would have been sufficient simply to have published Graham's letter to Swain, written shortly after the conversation, and therefore a better exponent of what actually took place. It appears that Graham as Confederate Senator had far better means of knowing the real condition of the Confederacy than Vance had, and he, doubtless, as was his duty, gave him the whole truth. Even without the vindication of his letter, I should be very slow to believe that he ever advised Vance on his own responsibility to undertake separate negotiations with the enemy. For the consideration of a matter so delicate, serious, and dangerous, doubtless, he, as well as Vance, would wish the assembled wisdom of the State. And what he really advised, as his letter shows, was to call the Legislature together, so that, in secret session, upon full information, it might consider if the State and the several States of the Confederacy should as States make any propositions to the enemy.--ED.]

After the Hampton Roads conference he had no longer any hope of a peaceful solution through the action of President Davis; from thenceforth he turned his thoughts to the accomplishment of the same end through the action of the States. The subject is often recurred to, but not an intimation can be found of any plan, except that of the States acting in conjunction. Very soon united action on the part of all became an impossibility; conquering armies had dismembered the Confederacy--had left indeed but two States that could act in concert. But his plan still embraced these two. March 26th, he writes as follows to Governor Swain: "I went to Raleigh to have an interview with the Governor on the subject-matter referred to in your letter. The result was a convocation of the Council of State to assemble to-morrow. The Legislature of Virginia has taken a recess until the 29th instant, and I think it very important that that of North Carolina should be in session as early as possible. The war is now nearly reduced to a contest between these two States and the United States!" In his letter of the 8th of April, which contains, as I think has been shown, the true account of the interview between Mr. Graham and Governor Vance, Mr. Graham says: "I told him I should attend the session of the General Assembly, and, if desired, would address them in secret session; that I had confidential conversations with a committee of the Virginia Legislature, which had taken a recess for ten days, and that it was important to act in concert with that body."

The surrender left the State under the control of the Federal generals and under the military law. According to the theory of the administration, all civil government had ceased; all the offices were vacant. The government, for a time, was such as a conquering army administers in a subjugated country. At length, to inaugurate a civil government the precedent for the admission of territories was partially adopted. A provisional Governor was appointed with power to call a convention. In execution of his powers the Governor made appointments to the vacant offices and issued a call for a convention. Mr. Graham was nominated for the convention; but it being announced by the executive, that persons unpardoned would not be allowed to take their seats, he withdrew from the canvass.

A constitution--the old constitution with some alterations--was adopted. Mr. Graham opposed its ratification. From his action at this time many of his best friends dissented. They admitted with him that a convention called, not by the people, but by a power _ab extra_ and under limitations of suffrage unknown to the constitution, was an anomaly in American institutions. But certain changes were regarded as inevitable after the war, and, if the administration, then wielding supreme power over us, should rest satisfied with the changes thus made, it was conceived by them to be the wiser course to raise no question as to the manner in which the convention was called. But in Mr. Graham's view many of the ablest men in the State concurred, and the constitution was defeated. Certainly it seems more in accordance with the spirit of a great patriot to make continual claim, even if ineffectual, in behalf of the principles of government established by our fathers. Any mitigation which an abandonment of those principles might have obtained would have been but temporary; the principles themselves were for all time.

The Reconstruction measures were now passed. The former government was swept away. The whole power over the question of suffrage, that question which lies at the foundation of all representative government, and which, under the old constitution belonged to the States, save that Congress might pass uniform naturalization laws, was assumed and exercised by Congress. Suffrage was adjusted upon a new basis; all the black race was enfranchised, and a large portion of the white race was disfranchised. Under this adjustment, a new convention was called, and a new constitution adopted, the constitution under which we now live.

These measures, so extreme in their nature, were regarded while they were yet in progress by a large part of our people with a feeling little short of consternation. The government seemed wholly changed; the constitution irrevocably wrenched, if not destroyed. A profound apathy fell upon the minds of the people. A vast number ceased to take any cognizance of public affairs. They seemed to regard them, as removed forever beyond their control. In this state of things a convention of the conservative party of North Carolina was called. It met on the 5th of February, 1868, in Tucker Hall, in the city of Raleigh, and was presided over by Mr. Graham, who made the principal speech of the occasion.