CHAPTER XVIII

THE FUTURE

The past history of Weihaiwei is not such as to justify very high expectations of a dazzling future. It has never tasted the sweets of commercial prosperity and perhaps it is hardly likely to do so in days to come. Its situation near the eastern extremity of Shantung is such that the ports of Chefoo and Tsingtao are almost inevitably bound to intercept the greater part of the trade that might otherwise reach it from west or south, while ocean-borne merchandise is not likely to find its way into the northern provinces of China through the gateway of Weihaiwei when there are ports, more favourably situated as distributing centres, a few scores of miles further westward. Weihaiwei has a valuable asset in its harbour, which is superior to that of Chefoo, though its superiority is hardly so great as to neutralise its several disadvantages. Yet the very unsuitability of the port for purposes of commerce tends to increase its potential value as a naval base--if, indeed, all naval bases do not become obsolete in the rapidly-approaching era of aerial warfare. The Chinese naval officer of the future may congratulate himself on the fact that here can arise no conflict of naval and mercantile interests, such as is bound to occur from time to time in ports like Hongkong. The deep-water anchorage of Weihaiwei is not large enough to accommodate a squadron of battleships as well as a fleet of ocean liners, and if Weihaiwei were to develop into a great naval port it is difficult to see how in any circumstances it could show much hospitality to merchant shipping.

The naval authorities of China, therefore, would have it "all their own way" in one of the best harbours of north China. They could build forts, carry out big-gun practice in the neighbouring waters, land men and guns for martial exercises at all points along the coast, establish naval depôts and dockyards on the island and the mainland, all at a minimum of cost and without in any appreciable degree interfering with vested interests ashore. All this was recognised by the Chinese Government long ago, when Weihaiwei was, as a matter of fact, a military and naval station second only in importance to the Manchurian fortress of Port Arthur.

The conspicuous and not inglorious part played by Weihaiwei during the Sino-Japanese war of 1894-5 has already been mentioned. Many of the guns which, it was vainly hoped, would effectually protect the approaches to the eastern entrance to the harbour, are still lying amid the ruins of a chain of forts extending from the village of Hai-pu to that of Hsieh-chia-so. The fine military road that connected the forts is now in many places barely traceable, for its masonry has been carted away by unsentimental Chinese farmers for use in the construction of dwelling-houses, and here and there the road itself has actually been ploughed up and made to yield a scanty crop of sweet potatoes,--for even so does the prosaic spirit of agricultural enterprise avenge itself upon the pomps and vanities of wicked warfare. But forts can be reconstructed, heavier and more modern guns can be purchased, military roads can be rebuilt; and this is what doubtless will take place when China has decided to undertake the task of creating a fleet of warships and of re-establishing Weihaiwei as a naval base.

But, the bewildered reader may ask, where does Great Britain come in? Is not Weihaiwei a British Colony? If forts are to be built, will they not be British forts; if war-fleets are to ride at anchor in the harbour of Weihaiwei, will they not be British fleets? The answer to this is that the British Government had given up all idea of fortifying Weihaiwei even before the result of the Russo-Japanese war and the fall of Port Arthur had drawn attention to the merely temporary nature of the occupation of Weihaiwei. Moreover, Weihaiwei is not officially recognised as an integral portion of the King's "dominions beyond the seas"; it is occupied and administered by Great Britain, but its inhabitants--as we have already seen[421]--are not, with technical accuracy, to be described as British subjects. Weihaiwei has never been ceded to the British Crown, and when it is restored to China the British Crown will suffer no diminution of lustre, though doubtless unjustifiable murmurs will be heard concerning the damage to British prestige. As to when rendition is to take place, this is entirely a matter for international agreement; though it will be remembered that the date of the expiration of the original Russian lease of Port Arthur will not take place until March 1923.[422]

As the trade of Weihaiwei is (at least from the point of view of European mercantile interests) almost a negligible quantity, it may be said that the place is useful to Great Britain only as a summer resort for her warships stationed in Far Eastern seas: and it may be observed that as the port is totally unfortified the interests of the British Navy would hardly suffer if the whole of the mainland territory were unreservedly restored to China and only the island of Liukung and the right to use the waters of the harbour retained in British hands. An arrangement of this kind, however, would only be welcomed by China so long as she was without a navy of her own.

A question that is often asked by Western visitors to Weihaiwei is one that does not directly concern the Government either of China or of Great Britain. Are the people of Weihaiwei pleased with British rule? Would they be glad or sorry to pass once more under the yoke of Chinese administrators? That the people appreciate the benefits directly or indirectly conferred upon them by the British occupation there is no reason to doubt.[423] That trade--external and internal--is brisker, that the people are more prosperous, that money circulates more freely and more abundantly, that roads and other means of communication have been greatly improved--all these things are fully realised. But though the shopkeepers and contractors on the island and in Port Edward would undoubtedly vote--if they had the chance--for the perpetuation of present conditions, I have no doubt that if the matter were to be decided by a secret ballot among all the people of the Territory a very great preponderance of votes would be given for the resumption of Chinese rule.

It is perhaps unnecessary to cast about for reasons why this should be so. Many Europeans ridicule the notion that the Chinese possess the virtue of patriotism. Even if there be no patriotism (a very rash assumption after all) there is certainly a strong racial feeling in China: and when race and nation are one it may perhaps be plausibly argued that racial sentiment and patriotic sentiment come to be interchangeable terms. Granting that patriotism or some analogous sentiment does exist among the people of China, surely no Englishman need look further for a reasonable cause why the evacuation of Weihaiwei should be welcomed by the people.[424] The Chinese of Weihaiwei do not like to be ruled by foreigners any more than the average Englishman would care to see Spanish rule--let us say--established in the Isle of Wight, quite irrespective of the merits or demerits of the foreign rulers and their system of government.

Too much stress should not be laid on the alleged racial antipathy between White and Yellow, inasmuch as there is no strong basis for the too common view that the people of East and West are so differently constituted that they must always remain spiritually and intellectually sundered. What is often mistaken for a barrier of race is in many cases, I believe, merely a barrier of language. The number of men--Chinese or English--who can be said to have a scholarly knowledge of the two languages is still astonishingly small.[425] Yet there is unfortunately little doubt that the antagonism between Europe and Asia, whether the causes be racial or merely political, is in some respects steadily growing stronger, and it is difficult to see how we can expect that antagonism to diminish so long as present political conditions subsist. Asiatics, rightly or wrongly, are acquiring the notion that European dominion in the East has been due not to any intrinsic superiority (biological, intellectual or moral) of the white races, but chiefly to temporary and (speaking unphilosophically) accidental circumstances that will soon cease to exist. One noble Asiatic nation has definitely and probably for ever freed herself from "the White Peril," and it is not unnatural that other nations in Asia should aspire to do the same.

"The real cause of unrest," it has been recently said,[426] "is not Indian at all, but Asiatic. The unrest is the most visible symptom of that resentment of prolonged European domination which is affecting the whole continent of Asia. For 300 years the tide of European dominion has flowed eastward, but the ebb has now set in. Liao-yang and Mukden, the driving back of the legions of the Tsar, gave it a stimulus far more potent than if Bengal had been administratively divided into forty pieces. It would probably have arisen even if Japan had still remained in chain-armour, and had never emerged from the control of her Tycoons and her Samurai. It became inevitable from the day that steam and quick transit broke down the barriers of India's isolation, and her yielding people began to cross the seas. It is part of a great world-movement, the end of which no man can foresee. No concessions, however sweeping, will conjure it. We have to reckon with its continued--and most natural--increase and growth, and to shape our course accordingly."

This is not very pleasant reading for English--or indeed for European--ears, but if the facts are as stated there is nothing to be gained by ignoring them.

Setting patriotism and racial prejudices aside, there are other reasons why British rule could never become really popular in Weihaiwei or in any part of China. With every wish to rule the people according to their own customs and their traditional systems of morality, it is not always possible to do so without a surrender of much that a European considers essential to good order and a proper administration of justice. The different views of East and West on a matter so fundamental as the rights and duties of individuals as compared with the rights and duties of the family or clan are alone sufficient to give rise to a popular belief that the foreign courts do not always dispense justice. Then the Chinese believe that our courts are much too severe on many offences that they consider venial, and not severe enough on offences such as burglary, piracy and armed robbery. They also detest our insistence, in certain circumstances, of the _post-mortem_ examination of human bodies. Again, they totally fail to understand why men who have been charged with a crime and whose guilt in the eyes of the "plain man" is a certainty should sometimes get off scot-free on account of some technicality or legal quibble. If Englishmen are sometimes driven to think that "the law is an ass," we may be sure that the Chinese are, at times, even more strongly inclined to the same opinion.

If one were to ask a native of Weihaiwei what were the characteristics of British rule that he most appreciated one would perhaps expect him to emphasise the comparative freedom from petty extortion and tyranny, the obvious endeavour (not always successful) to dispense even-handed justice, the facilities for trade, the improvement of means of communication. It was not an answer of this kind, however, that I received from an intelligent and plain-spoken resident to whom I put this very question. "What is it we like best in our British rulers? I will tell you," he said. "Our native roads are narrow pathways, and very often there is no room for two persons to pass unless one yields the road to the other. When our last rulers--the Japanese--met our small-footed women hobbling along such a path they never stepped aside to let the women pass, but compelled them to clamber along the stony hillside or to stand in a ditch. An Englishman, on the contrary, whether mounted or on foot, always leaves the road to the woman. He will walk deliberately into a deep snowdrift rather than let a Chinese woman step off the dry pathway. We have come to understand that the men of your honourable country all act in the same way, and this is what we like about Englishmen."

It may seem strange that a native should draw attention to a trivial matter of this kind rather than to some of the admirable features--as we regard them--of British administration, yet there is very little just cause for surprise. A year or two ago the correspondent of a great newspaper indulgently referred to Weihaiwei under British rule as affording a conspicuous example of the ability of individual Englishmen to control--without fuss or display of force--large masses of Orientals. Let it be granted that the English people, or rather some Englishmen, are endowed with the twin-instincts to rule with justice and integrity and to serve with industry and loyalty--for it is only the union of these two instincts or qualities in one personality that distinguishes the good administrator: but to regard Weihaiwei as an example of the English power of successfully ruling hordes of alien subjects shows a misapprehension of the facts. Englishmen, Irishmen and Scotsmen have carried out such splendid administrative work in other parts of the world that there is no need to give them credit for work which they have not done. What makes the people of Weihaiwei law-abiding, peaceful, industrious, punctual in the payment of taxes, honest in their dealings one with another is not some mysterious ruling faculty on the part of the three or four foreign administrators who are placed over them, but something that has existed in China from a time when the ancestors of those administrators were painted savages and England was not even a name: it is filial piety, it is reverence for law and respect for those in authority, it is the cult of ancestors,--it is, in short, Confucianism. "The same readiness with which we serve our father," says one of the Chinese classics, "we should employ in serving our Ruler, and the reverence must be the same for both. To honour those who are in a high position and to respect those who are in authority is our first duty." Again, we are told that "Confucius said, the Ruler is served with observance of _hsiao_ [filial piety] and elders are served with such submission as is due from a younger brother to his elder brothers, which shows that the people should make no distinction."[427]

If the Weihaiwei Government deserves any commendation at all it is only for its acceptance of Confucian principles as the basis of administration. Confucianism, indeed, is the foundation of the civil law that is administered in the British Courts, Confucian customs are wherever possible upheld and enforced by the officials in their executive and judicial capacities, and it is by the recognition of Confucianism that the Government has been able to dismiss its armed force. Philostratus, about seventeen hundred years ago, wrote a book in which he tells us how Apollonius of Tyana was one day walking with his friend and disciple Damis when they met a small boy riding an enormous elephant. Damis expressed surprise at the ease and skill with which the youngster could control and guide so huge a beast; but Apollonius succeeded in convincing him that the credit was due not to the small boy's skill, but to the elephant's own docility and self-control. Should we be far wrong if we were to regard the people of Weihaiwei as the elephant and the local Government as the little boy that rode it? Perhaps, indeed, the parallel might be applied to British dependencies greater and more important than Weihaiwei.

The people of this corner of China are so ill-acquainted with the politics of their country--for there is no local newspaper, and if there were it would have but few readers--that they possess but the haziest notion of the probable destiny of their port in the event of its rendition to China and the creation of a modern Chinese navy. But indeed even Europeans could hardly enlighten them as to the probabilities of the future of Weihaiwei unless they were furnished with some clue to the solution of a much vaster problem--the future of China herself.

It is most earnestly to be hoped for China's own sake that her rulers do not seriously intend, at present, to place naval expansion in the forefront of their numerous schemes for reform. The subject is one upon which a section of the native Press has become somewhat enthusiastic, and the recent visit to England of a Chinese Naval Commission, under the leadership of an Imperial prince, naturally leads one to suppose that the Government is actually about to undertake the exceedingly difficult, dangerous and most costly work of securing for China a place among the Naval Powers. Many of China's Western sympathisers--especially those who have not lived in the East--probably regard this as the best possible proof that China is "pulling herself together" and is already far advanced on the road of regeneration. But there is hardly a man among China's foreign friends and sympathisers resident in the East who does not regard the navy scheme with dismay and disappointment. At some future date the Chinese may be fully justified in acquiring a great navy, but to build a really serviceable modern fleet at the present time is to invite a financial and political disaster of appalling magnitude. Even if the project comes to nothing it is a bad omen for the future that the Chinese Government should give it serious consideration at a time when all the energies and resources of the Empire should be devoted to internal reform and development. If China's responsible rulers do not realise the precarious position into which the country has drifted and the pressing necessity of administrative reform, they are not fit to hold the helm of the State. Common sense--if they are devoid of the higher qualities of statesmanship--should tell them that until the existing departments of Government have been thoroughly reorganised, corruption stamped out, and a spirit of loyalty and patriotism infused into all ranks of the Civil Service, the creation of a great spending department, such as an Admiralty or Naval Board, will merely add enormously to the financial burdens of the country without providing it with any reliable safeguard or protection in the event of war.

The unfortunate thing is that every warning of this kind received by China from her foreign friends is received by her with doubt and suspicion. She has realised that in one foreign war after another her military and naval weakness has led her--or has helped to lead her--through the dark shadows of defeat and humiliation, and she is intensely desirous of making such provision for her own protection that in future foreign wars she may not be foredoomed to disaster. When she is advised to content herself, for the present, with a small though well-equipped army and the most modest of coast-defence fleets, she suspects that her advisers wish to keep her in a state of perpetual weakness, so that they may continue to help themselves, from time to time, to treaty-ports, trade privileges, sites for churches and other missionary buildings, mining and railway concessions and cash-indemnities. At the present time the Power which she regards with a more friendly eye than any other is undoubtedly the United States of America--the only Great Power that has occupied none of her territory and the one against which she believes herself to have least reason for complaint. A few years ago many Western dwellers in China were inclined to predict that a powerful offensive and defensive alliance would be entered into by China and Japan, or that Japan would assume the hegemony of the Far East and having created a reformed China would draw upon the immense resources of that country to help her in establishing the supremacy of the Yellow Race in the Eastern hemisphere. One does not often hear this view expressed to-day, not only because of the repeated occurrence of serious disputes between the Chinese and Japanese Governments with reference to Manchurian and other problems, but also because it is now seen that the growth of a really strong and progressive China cannot be regarded without grave alarm by the far-seeing statesmen of Japan. The whole of the Japanese Empire, be it remembered, might be packed into one of China's provinces; the population of Japan is only about one-tenth that of China, and her natural resources are meagre compared with those of her huge neighbour. If the development of China proceeds on the same proportionate scale as that of Japan (and the Japanese themselves realise that this is no impossibility), it is difficult to see how Japan can reasonably hope to maintain her present international position.

We have heard a great deal lately about the momentous change in the European balance of power caused by the great advance of Germany in population and wealth: let us give a loose rein to our imaginations and suppose that the German Empire by skilful diplomacy or other means has further succeeded in annexing Austria, Denmark, Belgium and Holland, and by successful warfare has reduced France, Italy and Russia to a state of military imbecility. The position of Great Britain in these circumstances would, to say the least, be precarious and unenviable. If she did not become the "conscript appanage" of a "stronger Power" (to use the warning words of a British Cabinet Minister) she would at least be in a state of chronic peril, and subject to periodical panics that might end in the disorganisation of all industry and the demoralisation of the people. England's position as opposed to that of a vastly-magnified Germany would be similar in many ways to that which Japan would occupy relatively to a reformed, united and progressive China. Indeed, Japan would be in a worse case than England: for England has beaten one Napoleon, and, by again championing the cause of the down-trodden states of a heterogeneous Europe, she might conceivably beat another; whereas Japan would perhaps find herself faced not by a single powerful tyrant, under whose dominion vassal states writhed and groaned, but by a vast homogeneous people who through careful discipline and wise statesmanship had learned to sink provincial rivalries in a splendid realisation of racial solidarity and national patriotism.

Thus we need not be surprised if during the years of China's education and growth Japanese diplomacy in respect of Chinese affairs is to some extent characterised by petulance, hesitation, vacillation, and occasional displays of "bluff."[428] The policy of Japan must necessarily hover between two extremes: she does not wish to see China partitioned, for this would mean a strengthening of European influence in Asia which might be disastrous to Japanese interests; nor does she wish to see China become one of the Great Powers of the world, for this would inevitably lead to her own partial eclipse. China is now well aware of the delicate position of the Japanese Foreign Office, and it is on the whole improbable that she will readily consent to a Japanese alliance, even if she finds herself seriously menaced by the armed strength of Europe--happily a most unlikely event. She knows that the differences of opinion between Japan and the United States are not yet a forgotten chapter in international politics,[429] and this fact, perhaps, will make her all the readier to throw herself into the arms of the great American Republic. It is well to remember, however, that racial and industrial rivalries between China and America may some day become dangerously acute. Even now, while such rivalries loom no larger in the political firmament than a man's hand, there are whispers of storms to come. Meanwhile, China is beginning to realise that the most wide-awake of modern states does not propose to hamper her own freedom by watching over a nation that has hitherto been regarded as the most somnolent in the world. Even the strong matronly arms of the United States might grow weary of carrying about so bulky an infant as a China that only woke up in order to experience the luxurious delight of going to sleep again. The Chinese dimly understand that until they have raised themselves out of their present condition of political helplessness they cannot expect to get more from the United States or from any other Great Power than amiable professions of goodwill.

But China has not yet fully grasped the truth that military and naval strength is not the only qualification--or the principal one--that will win the respect and support of the Western Powers. If she will honestly devote herself to the work of internal reform, to the thorough reorganisation of her administrative, judicial and fiscal systems, and to the loyal fulfilment of her treaty obligations, it is as certain as anything in politics can be that she will be doing far more for her own protection against foreign interference than if she were to construct a dozen coast-fortresses and naval bases and a fleet of thirty "Dreadnought" battleships. Her military weakness will not invite aggression: it might do so if she were friendless, and matched against a single ruthless strong Power or group of allied Powers, but the state of international politics at the present day is such that an orderly and progressive China is absolutely certain to find herself backed by at least two mighty friends the instant that her legitimate interests are wantonly attacked by any aggressive or adventurous foreign state.

On the other hand, if the Government adheres to its present course of alternate radicalism and conservatism and continues to play with reform schemes as if they were ninepins and foreign treaties as if they were packs of cards, the new fleet and naval bases will not only be of no avail to the country in her hour of need but will serve to hasten a catastrophe in which the dynasty, at least, will in all probability be overwhelmed and foreign intervention will once more become a painful necessity. We saw in a former chapter that to charge the Chinese, as a people, with a proclivity to untruthfulness, or at any rate to assign such untruthfulness, if it exists, to Confucianism, is erroneous and unjust. But let it be admitted at once that the charge of insincerity in politics is one that can without unfairness be brought against the Chinese Government--as, indeed, it can be brought against some other states that have had less excuse for their conduct than China.

In her transactions with Western Powers she has too often shown want of straightforwardness, duplicity, even treachery. Not only does she try to play off one Power against another (a game that is played with more or less assiduity by every government in the world) but she makes promises which she does not intend to fulfil except under compulsion, she adopts an attitude that is now arrogant and now cringing, she is alternately dilatory and hasty, she is often hypocritical, and her perpetual changes of external and internal policy are a source of the greatest embarrassment to the governments and merchants of foreign lands and a source of gravest danger to herself. Nothing distresses the sincere friends and well-wishers of China so much as the manner in which she palters with her international obligations, unless it be her haphazard and erratic attempts at administrative reform--now hesitating and half-hearted, now extravagant and ultra-progressive.

As regards her foreign relations one is tempted to assert that Obstruction, Prevarication and Procrastination seem to be the three leading principles of Chinese statesmanship. Those who know how sound China is at heart, how able, industrious and intelligent are her sons, and how well fitted their great country is in many ways to play a grand part in the history of the world and in the development of civilisation, are perhaps even more ready than others to denounce the Manchu government of China for its gross mismanagement of the internal and external affairs of the nation, its pitiful misuse of splendid material and its shameful waste of magnificent opportunities.

It is obvious to every foreigner who knows China well that the first and most urgent necessity is the thorough reform of the entire Civil Service in all its branches. So long as offices are bought and sold, so long as salaries are so meagre that they must necessarily be supplemented in irregular ways, so long as revenue and expenditure accounts go through no proper system of audit, so long as bribery and the "squeeze" system are practically recognised as necessary features of civil administration--so long will it be utterly futile to attempt far-reaching reforms in other directions. When these abuses have become things of the past the general progress of the country will be swift and sure, but not till then. It may be that they will never be abolished until the new Provincial Assemblies--the most striking development of Chinese political life that has been witnessed since the opening of the country to foreign intercourse--have compelled the central government to admit the popular representatives to an active share in the real business of administration.

A question was recently asked in the British House of Commons[430] as to whether the Chinese Government had taken any steps to carry out the provisions of Article VIII. of the Mackay Treaty relating to the abolition of the _Likin_ system. The reply was that China had not yet done anything in the matter except in so far as to express a desire to enter into negotiations for an increase of the Customs tariff in return for the abolition of likin.[431] "In view, however, of the failure of the Chinese Government to carry out other important provisions of the Treaty of 1902, His Majesty's Government are not at present disposed to give this proposal their support; more especially in view of the fact that new likin stations are being established in China, and that foreign trade is being subjected to likin exactions of greater frequency and amount."

Probably the most important of the other unobserved provisions of the Mackay Treaty, to which Mr. McKinnon Wood referred, was the second article, in which China undertook to reform her currency. Financial reform (including a reorganisation and readjustment of the system of internal taxation as well as the establishment of a uniform national coinage) is, next to the thorough cleansing of the whole machinery of administration, the most urgently necessary of all the tasks that confront the Government, yet though nearly eight years have elapsed since the Mackay Treaty was signed, the only indications that the Chinese Government has given any serious consideration to this vitally important problem have consisted in the despatch of a costly Mission to enquire into the financial systems of other countries and in the periodical issue of Imperial Edicts which promise the standardisation of the coinage and other useful reforms but have not as yet been followed up by practical measures. Not to dwell upon the commercial interests of the great foreign communities of Hongkong, Shanghai and Tientsin, which are most seriously hampered by the apathy of the Chinese Government in the matter of currency reform, there can be very little doubt that if the present policy of "drift" is adhered to, the country will be gravely menaced by the peril of bankruptcy. The wiser heads among the Chinese officials know perfectly well that an inability to meet their foreign liabilities will inevitably result in the loss of the economic independence of their country, yet they hesitate to introduce the drastic financial reforms without which China cannot hope to make real progress or to assume a dignified position in the councils of nations.

Provincial independence in matters affecting currency and finance is still to a great extent unchecked; local officials still make large temporary profits out of the excessive issue of copper coin; the most elementary laws of economics are ignored; innumerable native banks are allowed to issue notes against which are held cash reserves that are generally inadequate and sometimes (so it is whispered) non-existent.[432] If China would declare her intention of engaging the services of a European or American Financial Adviser--the best and ablest she could get--the mere announcement would do more to re-establish her financial reputation than a hundred plausibly-worded Imperial Decrees. Yet even the ablest of advisers would accomplish little of permanent value unless he were given a free hand to deal with official corruption in high places and safeguarded against petty jealousies and underhand intrigues; and judging from the present temper of Chinese officialdom it is very doubtful whether any satisfactory guarantees of this kind would or could be given.

The Chinese, not unnaturally, resent the suggestion that they should apply to a foreign government for the loan of a guide and teacher, or that among all their millions of population they possess no able statesmen of their own; but what they should understand is this, that though there may be and probably are hundreds of Chinese officials who in intellect, energy, and devotion to duty (if not in actual experience) are quite as fully qualified to reorganise the finances of the country as any foreigner could be, yet it is inconceivable in the present state of Chinese politics that any native official, however capable and energetic, would be able to withstand and overcome the conservative forces that would certainly oppose him as soon as he began to assail the fortresses of corruption. A foreign adviser might be denounced to the Throne in memorial after memorial and yet possibly retain his position and authority; a Chinese minister who attempted to initiate reforms worthy of the approval of foreign experts would probably be overwhelmed by his enemies before a single important measure had been carried into effect.

One of the strongest reasons why the Chinese Government is reluctant to invoke the assistance of a foreign Financial Adviser is that such a step might lead to the introduction of foreign capital on an immense scale, and its gradual monopolisation of industry and exclusive exploitation of the national resources. Many recent events have shown that the Chinese people--even more than the Government--are exceedingly averse from throwing China freely open to foreign capital, even when the want of capital obviously retards the material development of the country. This attitude, though naturally enough it excites the indignation of foreign financiers and traders, who are apt to regard the matter solely from the economic standpoint, is probably only temporary, and not unjustifiable when we remember the enormous power wielded by capital in these days, not only in commerce and industry but also in international politics. Sir Alfred Lyall truly points out that the European money-market is to Asia a "most perilous snare," and that the more any Asiatic Government runs into debt with European financiers, or has permitted the investment of foreign capital within its territory, the more it falls under the stringent, self-interested and inquisitive "political superintendence" of the capitalist state.[433]

That China cannot expect to develop her resources fully and rapidly without the help of European and American capital is doubtless true enough: but in view of her somewhat precarious political condition it may be that she is acting not unwisely in restricting the inflow of foreign capital to the irreducible minimum, and if she has reason to believe that the recommendations of a Financial Adviser would include the free admission of alien capital, her hesitation to avail herself of foreign expert advice may perhaps be easily explained. Chinese apprehensions on this subject might perhaps remain for ever unrealised, but at least they can hardly be said to be totally unreasonable.[434]

Next to finance there is perhaps no department that calls more peremptorily for foreign supervision than that of forestation. The dearth of timber throughout the greater part of north China has caused a serious deterioration of the climate within historic times, and is largely responsible for the denudation of once fertile lands and the periodical recurrence of famines. Forestry is an unknown science in China, and without foreign expert assistance it is unlikely that reforestation will be undertaken seriously and methodically. In legal and judicial matters, education, railways, municipal government, the army, hospitals, technical institutions, and other important matters, some considerable progress has already been made with or without direct foreign assistance, though it seems obvious that until the national finances and the Civil Service have been thoroughly reorganised every effort made in the direction of other reforms must to some extent be crippled.

The Chinese are naturally most anxious to secure the abolition of the foreign rights of extra-territorial jurisdiction. They feel very keenly the undignified position of their country in respect of the fact that they alone, of the great nations of the world, have no judicial authority over the foreigners who reside within their territorial limits, and they know that the reasons why they are in this undignified position are that their laws are to some extent inconsistent with Western legal theories, that many or most of their judicial officers are corrupt, that torture is sometimes resorted to as a means of extorting confessions, and that their prisons are dens of filth and disease. Knowing that until these matters are remedied it will be impossible to persuade the Western Powers to relinquish jurisdiction over their own nationals, the Chinese have devoted a good deal of attention during recent years to the reform of their judicial procedure and--under Japanese and other foreign advice--to the production of a new legal code.[435] Time will show whether the importation of a brand-new legal system into a country like China will effect all the good that is expected of it. There is a very serious danger that by adapting Western legal notions to a country in which the native legal system (however faulty in practice in some respects) has for many centuries been closely intertwined with the traditions and customs that govern the lives of the Chinese people, the Government may be applying a treatment that will act as a solvent of the bases of the entire social organism. Even the abolition of foreign consular jurisdiction might be bought too dearly if it necessitated a surrender of doctrines and principles which, as we have seen in the foregoing chapters, have formed the foundation of the social and political system of China throughout the whole of her known history.

If in the matter of finance the Chinese Government would unquestionably do well to act on the advice of the best foreign expert it can get, it is by no means so certain that it would be wise to follow foreign counsel, with tacit obedience, in all matters affecting social, administrative, or even judicial reform. That changes are urgently needed in certain directions goes without saying; but in view of the impossibility of carrying out extensive legal reforms in China without simultaneously affecting the social organism, perhaps in serious and unexpected ways, it will be well for the stability of the State if amid the contending factions into which the intelligent sections of the country are sure to be divided there may always be one party in the land whose programme will be summed up in the words "Back to Confucius!" That such a call will ever be literally obeyed is quite improbable and certainly undesirable; but it is earnestly to be hoped that however drastic may be the social and political changes that China is destined to undergo her people may never come to regard Confucianism, with all that the term implies, merely as a fossil in the stratum of a dead civilisation.

In the course of the foregoing chapters an attempt has been made to show that there is much fundamental soundness in many of China's social institutions, much that it is to the interest of China herself and of the whole world to respect and conserve. It is difficult to say whether China stands at present in greater danger from her own over-enthusiastic revolutionary reformers or from her well-meaning but somewhat ignorant foreign friends who are pressing her to accept Western civilisation with all its political and social machinery and its entire religious and ethical equipment. If ever a State required skilful guidance and wise statesmanship, China needs them now: but wise statesmanship will not consist in tearing up all the old moral and religious sanctions that have been rooted in the hearts of the Chinese people through all the ages of their wonderful history.

FOOTNOTES:

[421] See p. 85.

[422] In Article iii. of the "Port Arthur and Talienwan Agreement" between Russia and China it is provided that "the duration of the lease shall be twenty-five years from the day this treaty is signed [March 27, 1898], but may be extended by mutual agreement between Russia and China." It may be noted that the British, German and Russian treaties with respect to the leases of Weihaiwei, of the Kowloon Extension (ninety-nine years), of Kiaochou (ninety-nine years) and Port Arthur (twenty-five years), all stipulate that Chinese war-vessels, whether neutral or not, retain the right to the free use of the several leased harbours. It is a right that seems to be seldom exercised. The ultimate "sovereignty" of China over the various leased territories is specially safeguarded in the treaties relating to Kiaochou and Port Arthur, and has been admitted in respect of Weihaiwei.

[423] See pp. 93 _seq._

[424] It has been urged in some quarters that the occupation of Kiaochou by Germany and that of Weihaiwei by Great Britain are specially objected to by the Chinese on the ground that Shantung, through its associations with Confucius, Mencius, Chou Kung and other ancient sages, is China's Sacred Province, and one that ought to remain inviolate. There is no reason to suppose that this notion has any basis in fact. The Chinese undoubtedly regard certain districts in the south-west of Shantung with immense reverence, more particularly the district of Ch'ü-fou, which contains the temple and tomb of Confucius, but no pre-eminent sanctity attaches to the province as a whole. The province of Shantung, indeed, did not exist as such in Confucius's time. If China's provinces were to be arranged in order of sanctity or inviolability it is probable that both Honan and Shensi would, for historical reasons, take precedence of Shantung.

[425] There are many Chinese who speak English fluently, and the number is increasing daily, but as a rule such persons have devoted so much time to the acquirement of a totally alien tongue, and "Western learning" generally, that they have been obliged to neglect the culture of their own country. (One of the greatest dangers ahead of China is the possibility that her foreign-educated students may, through ignorance, grow contemptuous of the intellectual achievements of their ancestors, and that Chinese culture may consequently suffer a long, though probably it would not be a permanent, eclipse.) There are also some Englishmen who can speak Chinese fluently, but very few of them have had the time or inclination to acquire a sound knowledge of Chinese literature. Thus it too often happens that an educated Englishman and an educated Chinese whose natures are such that they might become intimate friends, fail to become so through inability to exchange ideas in the region of politics, philosophy, literature or art. A German and an Englishman, even if they disagree on the subject of naval armaments, may find themselves at one in the matter of the music of Mozart or the psychological condition of the mind of Hamlet. Between an Englishman and a Frenchman a friendship may spring up on the basis of a common admiration for the prose of Flaubert or Anatole France or the philosophy of Bergson. But though there are now many Chinese who can discourse fluently on evolution or the conservation of energy, how many Western students of Chinese would bear themselves creditably in a conversation with a Chinese scholar on the ethics of Chu Hsi or the poetry of Su Tung-po? In the vast majority of cases, conversation between a Chinese and an Englishman (unless the relation between them is that of teacher and pupil) is very apt to degenerate into the merest "small talk" and exchange of civilities, and it is obvious that friendships can hardly be built up on so slender a foundation as this. But among those Europeans and Chinese who have successfully surmounted the barrier of language there is, I believe, nothing to prevent the growth of sincere friendships. Yet it should be observed that a recognition of the possibility of intimate social intercourse between European and Chinese does not necessarily imply an acceptance of the view that the races may safely and successfully intermarry. This point must be emphasised, for my own views on the subject have been to some extent misapprehended by a very friendly critic in _The Spectator_ (August 22, 1908, p. 268). This question is really one for biological experts, and no definite answer has yet been given to it, though Herbert Spencer, we know, was strongly of opinion that the white and yellow races should not mingle their blood. From the physiological point of view the question is, of course, in no way concerned with any fanciful theories as to one race being "higher" than another. (For Herbert Spencer's views see the Appendix to Lafcadio Hearn's _Japan: an Interpretation_.)

[426] See an able article on "Britain's Future in India," in _The Times_ of June 28, 1909.

[427] These translations are from Dr. De Groot's _Religious System of China_, vol. ii. p. 508.

[428] In her purely commercial relations with China, Japan's policy will of course continue to be consistent and strenuously active. It is a vital necessity to Japan that she should enjoy a large share of China's foreign trade.

[429] "It is, I think, an error to assume that elimination of the school and immigration questions will mean complete restoration of the former Japanese-American _entente_. This never can be restored in the shape which it previously assumed. Conditions never will revert to the situation which gave it vitality. It is perhaps not going too far to say that relations of America and Japan are only now becoming serious, in the sense that they directly include propositions about which modern nations will, upon due provocation, go to war.... The genesis of a collision between Japan and the United States of America, if it ever occurs, will be found in conditions on the mainland of Asia." (_The Far Eastern Question_, by T. F. Millard (T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 60-61.)

[430] The question was asked by Captain Murray, M.P., and answered by Mr. McKinnon Wood, in September 1909.

[431] The "Mackay" Commercial Treaty between Great Britain and China was signed at Shanghai on September 5, 1902. _Likin_ is an internal tax on merchandise in transit.

[432] A good general view of the nature of the grave difficulties that stand in the way of currency reform may be gained from a perusal of H. B. Morse's _The Trade and Administration of the Chinese Empire_ (Shanghai, 1908). See especially pp. 166-9. Another recent work well worth consulting is T. F. Millard's _The Far Eastern Question_ (T. Fisher Unwin, 1909), pp. 316 _seq._

[433] _Asiatic Studies_ (Second Series, 2nd ed.), pp. 374-5, 376-7.

[434] The following remarks by Lafcadio Hearn on the question of the admission of foreign capital into Japan are not inapposite. "It appears to me that any person comprehending, even in the vaguest way, the nature of money-power and the average conditions of life throughout Japan, must recognise the certainty that foreign capital, with right of land-tenure, would find means to control legislation, to control government, and to bring about a state of affairs that would result in the practical domination of the Empire by alien interests.... Japan has incomparably more to fear from English or American capital than from Russian battleships and bayonets." (_Japan: An Interpretation_, p. 510.) Urgent economic considerations have, of course, compelled Japan not only to admit foreign capital in enormous amounts, but even to make heavy sacrifices in order to obtain it: but if any other course had been open to her she would gladly have adopted it.

[435] Article xii. of the Mackay Treaty reads thus: "China having expressed a strong desire to reform her judicial system and to bring it into accord with that of Western nations, Great Britain agrees to give every assistance to such reform, and she will also be prepared to relinquish her extra-territorial rights when she is satisfied that the state of the Chinese laws, the arrangement for their administration, and other considerations warrant her doing so."

INDEX

[Chinese words that appear in the text of this book and in the index have been given their Pekingese sounds in accordance with Wade's system of transliteration.--R.F.J.]

Aberdeen (Hongkong), Scare at, 366

Aboriginal tribes of Shantung, 38 _seq._

Aden, Weihaiwei compared with, 17

_Adiantifolia Salisburia_, 168, 381

Administration of Weihaiwei, 7-9, 28, 80 _seq._, 429 _seq._

Adoption of heirs, 151, 203, 205, 231, 284 _seq._

Africa, Suicide of Widows in, 225

Agriculture, 16, 56, 79, 90, 91, 153-4, 164, 166, 180 _seq._

Ai-shan-ch'ien (village), 54

Ai-shan Miao (temple), 54 (1), 385-6

_Alceste_, H.M.S., 1, 156

Allen, Grant, _quoted_, 251, 287 (2), 319, 365 (1), 379 (5), 384

Amitabha Buddha, 404

Amputations, Chinese superstitions regarding, 281

Ancestor-worship, 119, 126, 134-5, 186-7, 192, 196, 251-2, 258 _seq._, 263, 276 _seq._, 301 _seq._, 318 _seq._, 328 _seq._, 331 _seq._, 342

Ancestral spirits not malevolent, 286-7, 341 _seq._

Ancestral tablets, 135, 236-7, 277 _seq._, 277-9, 282 _seq._, 339-40

Anhui, Province of, 334

Annals, Chinese official, of Weihaiwei and neighbourhood, 26, 35-6, 37, 46, 52 _seq._, 56, 58, 59 _seq._, 168-9, 289 _seq._, 300, 362-3, 390-1, 402

Appeal Court of Weihaiwei, 100-1

Armadas sent against Japan, 44-5

Arnold, Matthew, _quoted_, 329

Ashtoreth, Moon-goddess of Hittites, 191 (4)

Aston, Dr., _quoted_, 319, 341, 373, 388

Astronomical knowledge in early China, 40 _seq._, 59 _seq._

Australia, Folk-lore of, 299

Aztecs, 420

Barbarians of eastern Shantung, 38 _seq._, 42

Barnes, Lt.-Col., 83

Barton, Mr. S., 79

Bat'uru, a Manchu military distinction, 71

Beacon-fires, 19

Beehive tombs, 257-8

Bernard, Mr. E. R., quoted, 308 (_footnote_)

Betrothals, 203 _seq._

Bishop, Mrs., _cited_, 377 (2)

Black's _Folk-Medicine_ quoted, 287-8, 291 (1), 375 (1), 377

Bohemia, Folk-lore of, 298-9, 376 (1), 382

Bower, H.M., _cited_, 379 (5)

Box, Rev. A., _quoted_, 180 (3), 183 (2), 185 (3), 366 (1), 371 (1) 377 (1)

Boy Scouts of the Weihaiwei School, 90

Brenan, Byron, _quoted_, 15 (1)

Bridge to Fairyland, 21-3

Brigands, 55, 60, 62, 90

British and Chinese officials, Relations between, 87-9

British Columbia, Betrothal customs in, 206

British rule at Weihaiwei, 1 _seq._, 7-9, 77 _seq._

Brooms, Demons afraid of, 190 (1), 296

Bruce, Major (now Lt.-Col.), 83

Buddha, Images of, 397, 400-2, 406

Buddhism, 10, 334, 351, 352, 357, 381, 398 _seq._

Burial customs, 6-7, 254 _seq._, 276 _seq._, 367

Burial-grounds, 135, 254-75

Burial of evoked souls without the body, 281 _seq._

Burial of the living, 225, 274, 367

Burma, 156 (2)

"Burning of the Books," 20

Burton's _Anatomy of Melancholy_ quoted, 164

Caird, Edward, _quoted_, 329

Canal suggested at Shantung Promontory, 19

Canonisation of saints and deities, 335, 337, 338 _seq._

Canton, 421

Capital, Foreign, in China, 446-7

Carlyle, Thomas, _quoted_, 328

Cats, Beliefs regarding, 292-4

Ceylon, 80

Chang-chia-shan (village), 18, 382, 398

Ch'ang-fêng (village), 97

Ch'ang-kuang prefecture, 44

Chao-shih-shan (hill), 21

Character of people of Weihaiwei, 168 _seq._

Charities in China, 70, 73-4

Charms, 173-4, 187, 188, 194, 198, 346, 358

Chatterton Hill, G., _quoted_, 224, 306 (1)

Chefoo, 14, 24, 78, 426

Chemulpo, 14

_Chên-jên_ of Taoism, 355

Chêng-ch'i Shan, _see_ Mount Macdonald

Ch'êng Huang (city god), 364-71

Ch'êng-shan-tsui, _see_ Shantung Promontory

Ch'êng-shan-wei, 46 _seq._, 51, 53, 63

Chi-ming-tao ("Cock-crow Island"), 25, 52

_Chi-t'ien_ (sacrificial land), 122, 135, 258-9

Chiang-chia-chai (village), 158

_Chih-hui_, 47 _seq._, 70

Children of Weihaiwei, 129, 179, 183-4, 245-53

Chin dynasty, 59

_China's Millions_ (missionary journal), 316-7, 336

Chinan-fu (capital of Shantung), 407

Chinese drama, 130 _seq._

Chinese Regiment, The, 28, 82-7

Ching-hai-wei, 53

Ching-wei (a mythical bird), 38

Ch'i Ch'ung-chin, 70

Ch'i K'uang (village), 18

Ch'i, State of, 17, 42 _seq._

Ch'iao-t'ou (village), 14, 53, 129

_Ch'ien-hu_, 47

Ch'ien Li-k'ou (village), 18

Ch'ien Lung, Reign of, 65

Ch'in dynasty, 20, 43

Ch'in Shih Huang-ti (the "First Emperor"), 20 _seq._, 42, 43

Ch'ing dynasty, 62

Ch'ing Chou (one of the nine provinces of Yü), 39

Ch'ing-chou-fu, 407

Ch'ing-fêng-t'êng, a Chinese medicinal herb, 177

Ch'ing-ming Festival, 70, 185-7, 255-6

Cho-ch'i Shan, _see_ Mount Macdonald

Chou dynasty, 20, 43

Christendom, Pagan survivals in, 182 _seq._, 186

Christianity, 104, 157, 302-3, 305 _seq._, 314 _seq._, 333, 407, 412, _and see_ Missionaries

Christian Science, 176

Chronicles, Chinese, _see_ Annals

Chrysanthemum wine, 192

Chuang Tzŭ (Chinese philosopher), 351 (1), 354

_Ch'un Ch'iu_ (the "Spring and Autumn Annals"), 34

Ch'ü Yüan (ancient statesman of Ch'ü), 188

Cicero _quoted_, 174 (4)

Cinderella of the British Empire, The, 2

City-god, 364-71, _and see_ Ch'êng Huang

Civil authority, Chinese respect for, 47, 434-6

Civil Service of Weihaiwei, 97-101

Climate of Weihaiwei, 28, 63, 81-2

Club, United Services, at Weihaiwei, 25

Coffins, 121, 290-1

Coffin-nails, Superstitions regarding, 290-1

Coffin-wood, Chinese and other superstitions regarding, 290-1

Cold Food, Festival of, 185-6

Comets, 59, 62, 63, 65, 66, 67

Commercial probity of Chinese, 138

Commissioner of Weihaiwei, 28, 79, 80, 81, 98

Concubinage in China, 169, 214 _seq._

"Confucian Pencil," 31

Confucianism, 10, 11, 109, 116, 123, 300-50, 434-6, 449, _and see_ Confucius

Confucianism not unreligious but untheological, 330

Confucius, 11, 34-5, 42, 271, 272, 300, 301 _seq._, 311 _seq._, 321, 324 _seq._, 347, 352-4, 430, 449, _and see_ Confucianism

Conservatism of Weihaiwei, 6-11

Convention relating to Weihaiwei, 2, 29-30, 57, 77-8, 428

Conybeare, F. C., _quoted_, 320 (2)

Cook, A. B., _cited_, 378 (2)

Corpses, Superstitions regarding, 292 _seq._, 295 _seq._

_County Folk-lore_ quoted, 176 (1), 179 (1), 180 (3), 291 (1), 294, 379, 386 (1), 387(2)

Courtesy of Orientals, 169 _seq._

Cox, Rev. Sir G. W., _quoted_, 374

Crime and lawlessness, Comparative freedom from, 87, 99, 158 _seq._, 434-5

Cross-roads, Superstitions regarding, 376-7

Currency question, 443 _seq._

Cypress trees, 262, 263, 264, _and see_ Evergreen trees

Dalny, 14 (_footnote_)

Davenport's _China from Within_ quoted, 316 (2), 336 (1)

Davis, O. K., _quoted_, 348

Davis, Sir John, _quoted_, 331

Davison, Charles, _quoted_, 67 (1)

Dead, Festivals of the, 191, 192, 292, 369

Dead, Marriages of the, 6, 204 _seq._

Dead men and ghost-lore, 276 _seq._

Deer in Weihaiwei, 166

Dennys's _Folk-lore of China_ quoted, 27, 175 (2), 177 (1), 191 (4), 287 (2), 291 (1), 292 (2), 294 (1), 377 (1), 380(2)

Devils, 173 _seq._

Devonshire folk-lore, 291 (1)

Diodorus Siculus _quoted_, 402 (1)

District headmen, 95, 156, 289

District magistracies, 15 _seq._, 53

District Officer's Department, 53, 54, 97, _and see_ Wên-ch'üan-t'ang _and_ South Division

Divisions, North and South, of Weihaiwei, 97-8, 104, 114 _seq._, 129

Dog, Heavenly, 174

Dogs, Superstitions regarding, 292-3

Doolittle's _Social Life of the Chinese_ cited, 291 (1)

Dorward, Maj.-Gen. Sir A., 79

Douglas, Sir Robert, _quoted_, 104, 312, 313, 352 (2), 387 (3)

Dragon, Chinese, 36, 37, 385-91, _and see_ Lung Wang

Drama in China, 130 _seq._

Driver, Prof. S. R., 365 (1)

Drought-demon, 295-9

Droughts, 16, 52, 60 _seq._, 81, 90, 297, 346

Drowning, Superstitions regarding, 287-8

Du Bose _quoted_, 331, 348

"Dwarf-catchers," 49

"Dwarfs," _see_ Wo-jên _and_ Japanese

Dyaks of Borneo, 376 (1)

Dynastic histories of China, 35

Earthquakes, 55, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 67

Eclipses, 68, 418-22

Edkins, Dr., _quoted_, 334, 417-8

Education, 172 _seq._, 195, 333

Egypt, 318, 320, 387 (2)

Egypt, Funeral trees in, 264 (1)

Eliot, Sir Charles, _quoted_, 329, 335 (2), 341

Elixir of Life, 20, 22, 24, 32

Epidemics, 56, 64, 67

Ethics, Confucian, 301 _seq._, 307 _seq._, 328 _seq._, 352-3

Ethics, Taoist, 352 _seq._, 354 _seq._

Ethnography of Weihaiwei, 38 _seq._

Evergreen trees, Significance of, 121-2, 262-4, 378

Evil spirits, 289 _seq._, 292

Excalibur, A Chinese, 362-3

Export trade of Weihaiwei, 90, 164 _seq._

"Expulsion from the clan" (_ch'u tsu_), 159

Expulsion of disease, Magical, 183, 192, 375 _seq._, 384

Extra-territorial jurisdiction, 447-8

Fairs, Country, 129 _seq._

Family organisation, 112 _seq._, 135 _seq._

Families, Antiquity of Chinese, 134 _seq._

Famines, 16, 36, 55, 56, 59 _seq._

Fang Chi (village), 401

Farnell's _Evolution of Religion_ cited, 321, 338, 416 (2)

Feathers and rain, Supposed connection between, 295 _seq._, 298-9

_Fên-chia_ (Family division), 149 _seq._, 218-9

Fên-shu_ (deed specifying details of division of family property), 149 _seq._

Fêng-lin (village), 129

Fêng-shui (geomantic superstition), 119-20, 181, 198, 203, 251, 264-70, 333, 387

Ferguson's _Tree and Serpent Worship_ cited, 379 (5)

Festivals at Weihaiwei, 178 _seq._

Fichte _quoted_, 329

Fiji Islanders, Religious ideas of, 251 (3)

Filial Piety, 196, 199, 200, 272-5, 342 _seq._, _and see_ Ancestor-worship

_Filial Piety, Classic of_, quoted, 271-4

Financial position of China, 443 _seq._

Fir-trees, 121-2, 167, 262-4, 378, _and see_ Evergreen trees

"First Emperor, The," 20 _seq._, 43

Fish, Large, seen at Weihaiwei, 24, 26, 27, 62, 65

Fitzgerald Range, 31

Five Sacred Hills, 71, 73, 74, 391 _seq._, 396

Fleet, Ships of British, at Weihaiwei, 25-6, 81-2, 429

Floods, 16, 36, 52, 55, 56, 59 _seq._, 81

Flora of Weihaiwei, 167

Flowers' Birthday, 185

Flying corpses, 295 _seq._

Fo-erh-ting (Buddha's Head), 32

Folk-lore, 34 _seq._, 155 _seq._, 173 _seq. and passim_

_Folk-lore_ quoted, 183 (2), 184 (1), 281 (1), 298 (3), 299, 377 (2), 379, 380

_Folk-lore Journal_ quoted, 264 (1), 291 (1), 294, 298 (2), 379

Food of the people, 164 _seq._

Foot-binding, 195

Forestation, 17, 447

Forke's translation of _Lun Hêng_ cited, 40 (2), 271 (1), 297 (3)

Fortifications of Weihaiwei, 27, 56, 78, 426-9

Foundation Sacrifices, 365 _seq._

Four Famous (Buddhist) Mountains, 394

Frazer's _Golden Bough_ quoted, 183 (2), 186 (1), 187 (3), 294 (2), 295, 375 (1), 376 (1), 377 (3), 379

_From Peking to Mandalay_ cited, 47

Frugality of people of Weihaiwei, 79

Fruit, Magic, 25

Fruit-growing in Weihaiwei, 164-5

_Fu_ (Prefecture), 15, 16

_Fu-mu-kuan_ (father-and-mother officials), 9, 15, 98, 122-3, 345-6

Fu-sang (name of mythical land in the East), 21, 24-5, 419

Fusō, Japanese name for Fu-sang

Fustel de Coulanges _cited_, 142, 319 (2)

Future of China, 125-6, 135 (5), 138 (1), 240 _seq._, 307, 426 _seq._

Gambling, 171

Game-birds, 165-6

Gardiner, S. R., _quoted_, 200-1

Garrison of Weihaiwei, 82 _seq._

German action in China, 57, 58

Ghosts, 173 _seq._, 276 _seq._, 286 _seq._, 289 _seq._

Gibbon's _Decline and Fall_ quoted, 182 (2)

Gibraltar, 80

Giles, Prof. H. A., _quoted_, 188, 301-2, 305, 308, 313, 348 (2), 349, 351

Giles, Lionel, _quoted_, 303, 305, 311, 327

Ginkgo tree, _see_ Maidenhair tree

Gloucestershire, Dragons in, 387 (2)

Glover, T. R., _cited_, 319 (2), 320 (2, 3), 378 (1)

God, Definition of, 330-1

God of the City, 364-71

God of War, _see_ Kuan Ti

God of Wealth, 360-1

Goddess of Mercy, _see_ Kuan Yin

Goh, D., _cited_, 319 (4)

Golden Age of China, 39

_Golden Bough, The_, _see_ Frazer

Golden Rule, The, 352

Golf links at Weihaiwei, 25, 29

Gomme's _Folk-lore Relics_ quoted, 186 (2), 193 (1), 293, 365 (1), 412 (1)

Government of Weihaiwei, British, 7-9, 28, 80 _seq._, 429 _seq._

Grape-cultivation, 165

Graveyards, 254-75

Great auk, China not a, 307

Great Wall of China, The, 21, 365

Greece, Ancient, 373, 396-7

Griffis, Dr. W. E., _quoted_, 304, 307, 322, 379 (5), 387 (4)

Groot, Dr. De, _quoted_, 6, 7, 17, 174 (3), 185 (1), 192 (1), 219, 262, 263, 271, 277, 278, 279, 280, 283, 287 (1), 291 (1), 292, 298 (1), 380 (2), 387 (3, 4), 435

Ground-nuts, 164

Guisers, 184 (1)

Hachiman (Japanese deity), 362

Hai Chuang (village), 78

Hai-hsi-t'ou (village), 289

Hailstorms, 59, 61-2

Hallam _quoted_, 310

Halley's comet, 59, 63

Han dynasty, 59, 79 (1)

Han Fei Tzŭ (philosopher), 351 (1)

Han Kao Tsu, (Emperor Kao Tsu of the Han dynasty), 43

Han Wu Ti (Emperor Wu of the Han dynasty), 23

_Han-pa_ (drought-demon), 295 _seq._

Happy marriages in China, 195-6, 244-5

Harbour of Weihaiwei, 25 _seq._, 28, 78, 426 _seq._

Hare, Mr. G. T., 79

Harriers, Weihaiwei, 82

Headmen, 155, 289, 336, 371-7, 382, 386

Hearn, Lafcadio, 341, 349, 431, 447 (1)

Hearth-god, 193, 372

Hebrews, Serpent-worship among, 387

Hegel _quoted_, 329

Hell, Christian attitude towards idea of, 323-4

Hells of Buddhism, 402

Hemp, Folk-lore connected with, 179

Herd-boy and Spinning Maiden, Chinese legend of, 190

Herodotus _quoted_, 315, 316, 365 (1)

Heroes and other celebrities of Weihaiwei, 69 _seq._

High Court of Weihaiwei, 99-100

Hill-Tout's _British North America_ cited, 206

Hills of Weihaiwei, 30-3, 78-9, 391-8

Hills, Sacred, of China, 71, 73, 74, 116, 391 _seq._, 396

_Historians' History of the World_ quoted, 35

History of Weihaiwei, 38 _seq._

Ho the Astronomer, 43

Ho Ch'ing (village), 391

Holcombe, Chester, 352 (4)

Holidays at Weihaiwei, 178 _seq._

Hongkong, 77, 80, 81, 366

Honour, Commercial, among Chinese, 138 _seq._

Hooker _quoted_, 330

Hot springs, 29, 98, 400

Hotels at Weihaiwei, 26, 28

House of Lords, The Chinese, 349-50

Hsi and Ho (astronomers), 40-2

Hsi-yü-ting (hill), 31

_Hsien_ (magisterial district), 14 _seq._, 48, 53

_Hsien-jên_ (mountain recluses), 32

_Hsün-chien_ (Chinese deputy-magistrate), 30, 53-4, 367-8

Hua Shan (one of the Five Sacred Hills), 73

Huai Nan Tzŭ (philosopher), 351 (1)

Huai-ts'ui-lou (tower on city walls), 30, 31

Huang Ch'êng-tsung, 75-6

Huang K'o Ssŭ (temple), 401

Human flesh, Eating of, 61, 64

Human sacrifices, 365-6

"Hundred-grass lotion," 189-90

Hunting at Weihaiwei, 82

Huo Ch'ien (village), 391

Hydrophobia, 176-8

Idolatry, 320-1, 335 _seq._, 337, 340, 348, 412, 414 _seq._

India, Unrest in, 432

Individualism, 135 _seq._, 344

Insincerity in politics, Chinese, 441

Irish folk-lore, 281 (1), 296 (1), 375

Isis and Horus, 320

Isles of the Blest, 24-5

Jade-Imperial-God, 32, 391 _seq._, 396, 398

Jamaica, 80

James, Prof. William, _cited_, 324

Japan and Japanese, 40, 44, 48, 56, 70, 87 (1), 348, 373, 375-6, 379, 387 (4), 432, 438-9

Japan, Abortive Chinese attempts at invasion of, 44-5

Japan, Confucianism in, 304-5

Japanese ancestor-worship, 341-2, 348

Japanese "spiritualism," 175 (2)

_Jên-chieh_ (Festival of Living Men), 192, 369

Jesuits in China, 334

Jih-tao (Sun Island), 30

_Jih-yüeh-ho-pi_ (atmospheric appearance), 64

Joan of Arc, 338 (1)

_Ju Hsüeh_ (Director of Confucian studies), 47

Jung-ch'êng city and district, 13, 14, 16, 18, 19, 24, 43, 44, 47, 51, 53, 98, 180 (1), 301, 369-71, 390

_Jung-ch'êng hsien chih_ (Annals of Jung-ch'êng), 37, 56, 168-9, 402

Jurisdiction of courts in Weihaiwei, 98-101

Juristic Person (_Persona ficta_), Evolution of, 156 _seq._

Kakasu Okakura _cited_, 356

K'ang Hsi, The Emperor, 51

K'ang Hsi Dictionary, 40, 297 (2)

Kempson, Rev. F. C., _quoted_, 324

Khond tribes of India, 382-3

Ki-ming island, _see_ Chi-ming-tao

Kiaochou, 14, 17, 57, 58, 428

Kingsmill, T., _quoted_, 352 (3)

Kitchen-god, _see_ Hearth-god

Knox, Prof. G. W., 353-4

_Kojin_ (Japanese deity), 193 (1)

Korea, 1, 20, 39, 40, 183 (2), 377

Kowloon, 77, 428 (2)

Ku Hung-ming _quoted_, 311

Ku-mo Shan, 31

Ku Shan (hill and temple), 399-402

Ku-shan-hou (village), 129

Ku Shêng-yen, 70

Ku-yü hills, 78-9

Kuan Ti (God of War), 27, 338, 362-4

Kuan Yin, 336, 357, 385, 404, 414-5

Kublai Khan, 44-5

_Kuei Chieh_ (Festivals of the Dead), 191, 192, 292, 369

_La-pa-chou_ (Twelfth-month gruel), 192

Lai-tzŭ, 43

Lancashire folk-lore, 377

Land-tax, 64, 65, 96-7

Land-tenure, 55, 127-54

Lang, Andrew, _quoted_, 318 (1)

Lantern-dances, 184

Lantern Festival, 182-4, 409

Lao Chün, 391

Lao Mountains, 73

Lao Tzŭ (The Old Philosopher), 40 (1), 351 _seq._, 391

Lao-ya Shan, 31

Laoism, 356

Lawyers, Absence of, 102, 104

Le Roy _cited_, 326 (1)

Lease of Weihaiwei to Great Britain, 29, _and see_ Convention

Legal system of China, Reform of, 448

Legge, Professor, _cited_, 39, 41 (1), 271 (1), 297 (1), 300 (1), 302 (2), 311, 312, 313, 316, 321, 340, 345 (2), 353

_Li Ch'un_ (Beginning of Spring), 180 _seq._

Li Hung-chang a serpent-worshipper, 387 (3)

Li-k'ou hill, 32

Li Tzŭ-ch'êng, 50

Lighthouses, 19

Likin tax, 443

Lin-chia-yüan (village), 165, 381, 383

Lincolnshire, Folk-lore of, 176 (1), 179 (1), 379, 387 (2)

Literature, God of, 361-2

Litigation, 98 _seq._, 102-26

Liu, Mr. and Mrs., 26-8

Liukungtao, 12, 25 _seq._, 30, 47, 48, 50, 78, 79

Lockhart, Sir James H. Stewart, 79

Locusts, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 396

Lowell, Percival, _Occult Japan_ by, _quoted_, 175 (2)

Lu, Earl of, 69

Lu, the native state of Confucius, 42

Luchu Islands, 1

Lucky and Unlucky days, 295 (2)

_Lun Hêng_ of Wang Ch'ung _cited_, 40 (2), 271 (1), 297, 347 (1)

Lung Wang (Dragon King), 289, 336, 385-91

Lyall, Sir Alfred, _cited_, 339, 365 (1), 446

Lyra, H.M.S., 1, 56

Ma-t'ou, _see_ Port Edward

Macdonald, Mount, 32, 166, 397-8

Macgowan's _Sidelights on Chinese Life_ quoted, 109, 201 (2), 342 (2), 414, 423, 424

Mackay Treaty, 443-4, 448 (1)

Mad dogs, Cures for bites of, 176-8

Madagascar, Mirror superstition in, 295

Magdalen College, May Day at, 413

Magisterial courts at Weihaiwei, 98 _seq._

Maidenhair tree, 168, 381

Maine's _Ancient Law_ cited, 136 (1)

Malay States, Superstitions and folk-lore of, 175 (1), 298 (1), 379, 422 (1)

Manchu dynasty, 50-1

Manchu invasion of China, 50-1

Mandalay, 365

_Mang-shên_, 180-2

Mang-tao village and tree, 383-4

Market villages, 129

Marriage customs, 169, 203 _seq._, 232 _seq._

Marriages between the dead, 6, 204 _seq._

Martin, W. A. P., _quoted_, 332-3, 352

Maspero _cited_, 356, 379 (5)

McKibben, Rev. W. K., _quoted_, 354

Meadows _quoted_, 321

Mencius, 34, 300, 343 (1), 430 (1)

Mêng-chia-chuang (village), 134

Mexico, Religious customs and beliefs in, 186, 375, 388

Micius (Chinese philosopher), 347 (1)

Middlemen in Chinese marriages, 204, 206

Midsummer, Folk-lore relating to, 189

Military precautions against Japanese, 44 _seq._

Milky Way, Different names for, 318 (1)

Millard, T. F., _quoted_, 440 (1), 445 (_footnote_)

Ming dynasty, 31, 44, 46, 50-1, 6

Mirage, 30

Mirrors, Superstitions regarding, 294-5

Missionaries, 11, 57, 58, 122, 123-4, 302 (2), 315 _seq._, 331 _seq._, 336, 353 _seq._, 407, 412

Mo Tzŭ, _see_ Micius

Mock suns (parhelia), 60

Modernists, 326 (1), 413

Mohammedanism, 407

Mongol dynasty, 44, 257-8, _and see_ Kublai Khan

Montaigne's Essays _quoted_, 312 (2), 322

Montesquieu _quoted_, 344 (1)

"Moon" (month) in China, 59-60

Moon-worship, 182 _seq._, 191

Morse, H. B., cited, 444 (1)

Mortgages of Land, 145 _seq._

Mou Chou (district), 44

Mou-p'ing, Marquisate of, 43

Mou-tzŭ country, 43

Mountain-shrines, 395-8, _and see_ Hills

Mountain-worship, 391-8

Mountains, Celebrated, of China, 35-6, 71, 73, 74, 391 _seq._

_Mu yü_ (Buddhist "wooden fish"), 190-1

Mugwort, Magical use of, 188-9

Müller, Max, _cited_, 319, 321, 334 (2), 352 (2), 353, 414, 416-7

Mutilations of human body, Chinese abhorrence of, 281

Nagasaki, 14

Nai-ku-shan (hill), 30, 76

Names of persons and villages, 163-4

Nature, Chinese love of wild, 32-3, 393 _seq._

Navy, The Chinese, 426 _seq._, 436 _seq._

"New Fire," 186

New Guinea, Treatment of children's corpses in, 251

New Territory of Hongkong, 77

New Year Festivities, 178-9, 193-4

New Zealand Hearth-god, 193 (1)

Newman, Cardinal, 328

Newspapers, Absence of, in Weihaiwei, 436

Ning-hai city and district, 14, 16, 44, 53, 180 (1), 301

_Ning-hai-chou Chih_ (Annals of Ning-hai), 37, 300, _and see_ Annals

Nobushige Hozumi _quoted_, 341, 348, 373

North Division of Weihaiwei, 97 _seq._, 129

Northumberland folk-lore, 180 (3), 185 (2), 293

Nun, Story of a Buddhist, 405-6

Ocean spirits, 21-2

"Oie-hai-oie," 1

Oman's _Cults, Customs and Superstitions of India_ quoted, 225

Opium in Weihaiwei, 171-2, 357

Order-in-Council, Weihaiwei, 8, 99, 100

Ordinances of Weihaiwei, 80-1

Orkney and Shetland folk-lore, 184 (1), 293, 294

_Orpheus_ of S. Reinach _quoted_, 379 (5)

Oxford, Rev. A. W., _quoted_, 315 (1), 319, 378 (2)

_Pa kua_ (mystic diagrams), 181

Pai-hu, 47

Palestine, Human sacrifices in, 365 (1)

Pao-hsin (village), 382

Parhelia (mock-suns), 60, 63, 67, 68

Parker, Prof. E. H., _quoted_, 137 (1), 334 (2), 335, 355 (1)

_Patria potestas_, 149 _seq._

Patriarchal theories, 15, 16, 149, 156, 209 _seq._, 252-3

Patriotism in China, 429 _seq._

Peasantry of Weihaiwei, Hardihood of, 68-9

Pedigree-scrolls, 279

Pei k'ou Pass (also village and temple), 18 (1), 168 (1)

Peking, 81, 392

Pennant's _Tour in Scotland_ cited, 293

Persecutions by Christians, 308-9

Peru, Religious and other customs in, 186, 225, 418

Pestilences, 55, 64, 68, _and see_ Epidemics

Petitions to officials at Weihaiwei, 114 _seq._

P'êng-lai (name of fairy islands), 21, 24-5

Philanthropy shown by Chinese, 70, 73-4

Philostratus _quoted_, 435-6

Philpot's _The Sacred Tree_ cited, 379 (5), 380

Pi Kao, 70

Pine-trees, 262, _and see_ Evergreen trees

Pirates, 44 _seq._, 48 _seq._, 52, 55, 61

_Planchette_ in China, 174 _seq._

Poets and poetry of Weihaiwei, 30, 72, 73, 74

Poisonous influences of the fifth month, 188-9

Police of Weihaiwei, 83, 98, 101, 158 _seq._

Polygamy in China, 214

Pootoo (sacred island), 394, 414

Population of Weihaiwei, 28, 29, 79, 128-9

Port Arthur, 2, 14, 56, 57, 428

Port Edward, 27, 28, 29, 79, 97, 172, 385, 429

Prayer, Confucius's attitude towards, 327

"Pro-Chinese," 125

Promontory, _see_ Shantung Promontory

Prosperity of Weihaiwei under British rule, 90, 94-5

Psychic research, 175

Pu-yeh city and district, 43

Public works at Weihaiwei, 93-4

Queen of Heaven, The Chinese, 336, 385

Rain, Curious superstitions regarding, 295-9

Rain, Prayers for, and rain-charms, 31, 187, 336, 346

Rainfall, 16, 18, 81

Rationalism in China, 334

Recluses, Taoist, 32, 393 _seq._

Recreation, Means of, at Weihaiwei, 26, 29

Red, a lucky colour, 174, 178, 179, 376

Reform movements, 9-11, 173, 436 _seq._, 449

Regiment, Weihaiwei, 28, 82-7

Reinach's _Orpheus_ cited, 379 (5)

Religion, Definitions of, 328-30

Religions of China, 23, 27-8, 31, 32, 69-70, 129 _seq._, 254 _seq._, 276 _seq._, 300, 351, 385, _and see_ Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, etc.

Revenue and expenditure of Weihaiwei, 93-7

Ritchie, D. G., _quoted_, 135, 317 (1)

Rivers, _see_ Streams

Robbers and brigands, 55, 62, 90

Robertson, J. M., _quoted_, 186

Rome, Church of, in China, 334 _seq._

Rome, Religion in, 373, 378

Russian action in China, 57

Sacred Edict, The, 123-4

Sacred hills of China, _see_ Hills, Sacred

Sacred trees, 375, 377-81

Sacrifices, Human, 365 _seq._

Saints of Christendom, 335, 337, 381-2

_San Chiao_ (Three Religions of China), 407

_San Kuan_ (Taoist divinities), 361

Sati, 224-5, _and see_ Widows

Scenery of Weihaiwei and neighbourhood, 17, 18, 25, 395 _seq._

Schleiermacher _quoted_, 329

Scholarly hermits of China, 72-3, 393 _seq._

School, European, at Weihaiwei, 28, 90

Scolds, Female, in Weihaiwei, 197 _seq._

Scott, Sir Walter, 314

Scottish folk-lore, 184 (1), 291 (1), 293, 294, 296, 298

Sea-monsters in Chinese legend and history, 24, 26, 27, 62, 65

Secretary to Government of Weihaiwei, 79, 98

Seoul (Korea), Spring customs at, 183 (2)

Serpent-worship, 387 _seq._

_Shan Hai Ching_ ("Hill and Sea Classic"), 38, 40 (2), 42, 297

Shan-shên (mountain-spirits), 166, _and see_ Hills, Sacred, of China

Shansi (Shan-hsi), Province of, 346

Shang Chuang (village), 18

Shanghai, 14 (1), 142 (2)

Shanghai folk-lore, 180 (3), 183 (2), 185 (3), 371 (1), 377 (1)

_Shang Fên_ ("Going up to the Tombs"), 187, _and see_ Ancestor-worship

Shang Ti, 392, 395

Shantung, Area and subdivisions of, 16

Shantung Promontory, 14, 18-25, 40 _seq._, 53, 56, 60, 78

Shantung Province, Alleged special sanctity of, 430 (1)

_Shantung T'ung Chih_ (official Annals and Topography of Shantung), 56

Shên, an ancient worthy of Wên-têng, 69

Shên-nung, The Emperor, 39, 180

Shêng-chia-chuang (village), 69

Shêng-tzŭ (village), 14, 53

Shetland Islands, Folk-lore of, 184 (1), 291 (1)

_Shih Ching_ quoted, 206, 297

Shih Huang Ch'iao (Bridge of the "First Emperor"), 19 _seq._

Shinto, 319 (4), 341

_Shu Ching_ (a Confucian classic), 34-5, 39, 40, 41

Shuang-tao (village), 97

Shun, The Emperor, 39, 392

Sidney, Sir Philip, 314

Silk industry, 59, 141 (1), 162, 166

Sino-Japanese war, 2, 56, 87 (1), 428

Skating, 81

Skeat's _Malay Magic_ quoted, 175 (1), 298 (1), 379 (1, 5), 422 (1)

Small-pox in Weihaiwei, 193

Smith, A. H., _quoted_, 225 (2), 321-2, 331-2, 334

Snipe, 165-6

Sociological interest of Weihaiwei, 133 _seq._, 155 _seq._, 195 _seq._

Solomon, King, 22

_Sophora Japonica_, 168, 381, 383

Souls, Festivals of, 191, 292, 369

South Division of Weihaiwei, 97 _seq._, 104, 114 _seq._, 129

_Spectator_, _The_, quoted, 333, 431

Spencer, Herbert, 315, 316, 341, 431

"Sphere of Influence," British, 78

Spiders, Folk-lore connected with, 191

Spiritualism, Chinese, 174 _seq._

Sport at Weihaiwei, 82, 165-6

Spring Festivals, 180 _seq._

Spring Ox, 180-2

Ssŭch'uan, Chinese official Annals of, 36

Ssŭ-ma Ch'ien (Chinese historian), 35

St. George and the Dragon, 387 (2)

St. Helena, 80

Straits Settlements, 80

Streams of Weihaiwei, 18

Su-mên-tao (island), 42

Suicides, 219, 221 _seq._

Sulphur springs at Weihaiwei, 29

Summer at Weihaiwei, 66

Sun, Chinese legends relating to the, 21, 40 _seq._, 60-1

Sun-worship, 185

Sung dynasty, 44, 59

Sung-lin-Kuo-chia (village), 163

Sung Ting hill, 31

Swettenham's _Malay Sketches_ quoted, 175 (1)

Switzerland, Holy trees in, 379

Sympathetic magic, 176, 416

_Ta-jên_ (term of respect), 15, 16, 106-7

Taku, 14

Ta K'un-yü hills, 79

Ta-lan-t'ou (village), 78

_Ta lao-yeh_ (term of respect), 15, 106 (2)

Ta-sung-wei, 53

T'ang dynasty, 44, 59, 398-9

_T'ai P'ing Huan Yü Chi_ quoted, 21, 22, 43, 46

_Tao_, Meaning of, 352, 354-5

_Tao Tê Ching_, 351 _seq._, 355

_Taoism_, 10-11, 32, 173 _seq._, 333, 351-84

Taoism, Supreme God of, 32, 391 _seq._

Taoist "Pope," 358

Taoist priesthood, 357 _seq._

T'ao Lang-hsien, 50

Taxation under British rule, 93-7

Temperature of seasons at Weihaiwei, 81-2

Temples, 23, 26, 27, 60, 78, 79, 129 _seq._, 135, 258, 279, 301, 357 _seq._, 391 _seq._, 399 _seq._

Tengu, _see_ T'ien Kou

Têng-chou, 16, 40, 44

Tennyson, 411-12

Tertullian, 323

Thackeray _quoted_, 325 (1)

Theatricals, 130 _seq._, 183-4

Thermal springs, 29, 98, 400

_Ti_, a Chinese word for God, 339-41

Tiao-wo hill, 31

Tiger, Manchurian, 160

_Times_, _The_, quoted, 432

Ting, Admiral, 2

Ting Pai-yün, 73

_T'ien Hou_, Queen of Heaven, 336, 385

_T'ien Kou_ (Heavenly Dog), 174

Tombs, Festivals of, 186-7, 255-6, _and see_ Ch'ing-ming

Torture in Chinese courts, 309-10

Tou Shan Ssŭ (Buddhist temple), 402

Trade of Weihaiwei, 28, 94-5, 129, 164 _seq._, 426 _seq._

Transmigration of souls, 403-4

Tree-worship, 261-2, 375, 377-81

Trees, 17, 18, 167-8

Truthfulness, Chinese and Confucian conceptions of, 105, 108-12, 310-17

Tsai Li Sect or Society, 358

Ts'ai Shên (God of Wealth), 360-1

Tsao Shên, _see_ Hearth-god

Ts'ao-miao-tzŭ, 129

Tsingtao, 426

_Tso Chuan_, 35

_Ts'un Kuei_ (village regulations), 160 _seq._

Tung-lai Prefecture, 43, 44

Tutelary local deities, 364-77

T'u Ssŭ, 47

T'u Ti (local deity), 155, 336, 371-7, 382, 386

Tylor's _Primitive Culture_ quoted, 177, 186, 251 (3), 252, 261, 287 (2), 319 (2), 320, 341 (2), 365 (1), 375, 377, 378, 381, 382, 403, 411, 418, 419, 420, 422, 423

Tyrell, George, _quoted_, 326 (1), 329

Uji-gami of Japan, 373

United States and China, 440 _seq._

Untruthfulness of Chinese, Alleged, 108-12, 310-17

Upanishads of India, 330

Urn-burial, Sir Thomas Browne's, _quoted_, 239 (1), 264 (1)

Vaeddas of Ceylon, 252

Vampires, 298

Vedas of India, 330-1

Vientian, Dances at, 131-2

Village-life and Land tenure, 127 _seq._, 155 _seq._

Village tutelary gods, 155, 336, 371-7

Villages of Weihaiwei, 79, 127 _seq._, 155 _seq. and passim_

Vine-cultivation, 165

Vivian, Philip, _quoted_, 304-5

Wade, Sir Thomas, _quoted_, 329

Walter, Mr. R., 79

Wang-chia-k'uang (village), 18

Wang Ch'i-jui, 74-5

Wang Ch'ung (Chinese philosopher) _quoted_, 40 (2), 271 (1), 297, 347 (1), 422

Wang Hsien-wu, a Pirate, 50

Wang Yüeh, 71

War, God of, _see_ Kuan Ti

Water, Lack of running, 18

Watters, T., _quoted_, 183 (2)

Wealth, God of, 360-1

Weather, Methods of forecasting, 179

Weeping over corpses, Superstition regarding, 295 _seq._

_Wei_, meaning of, 12-13

_Wei_ (military district), 12, 13, 46 _seq._, 52-3, 54, 55

Wei _Chiang-chün_, 70

Wei To (Buddhist divinity), 404

Weihaiwei Convention, 2, 29-30, 57, 77-8, 428; meaning of name, 12-3; Order-in-Council, 8, 99, 100; scenery of, 17, 18, 25, 395 _seq._

_Weihaiwei Chih_ (Chinese Annals of Weihaiwei), 37, 46, 168, 289 _seq._, 362-3, 390-1

Weihaiwei City, 29, 47, 78, 129, 362, 367-8

Weihaiwei, Future of, 426 _seq._

Weihaiwei Police, 83, 98, 101, 158 _seq._

Weihaiwei Regiment, 28, 82-7

Weihaiwei School, 28, 90

Wên-ch'ang (Taoist divinity), 361-2

Wên-ch'üan-chai, 53, 54, 382

Wên-ch'üan-t'ang, 53, 54, 70, 98, 165, 400

Wên-têng city and district, 13, 14, 16, 23, 43, 44, 48, 53, 63, 69, 98, 180 (1), 301

Wên-têng, Legendary origin of name, 23

Wên-têng Magistrate, 30, 61, 64

Wên-têng, Marquis of, 69-70

Wên-têng Shan (hill), 23, 69

_Wên-têng Hsien Chih_ (Annals and Topography of Wên-têng), 36, 37, 46, 56, _and see_ Annals

White-clouds, Mr., 73

Widow-immolation, 204 _seq._, 219 _seq._, 225 _seq._

Widows, 217 _seq._

Wild-fowl at Weihaiwei, 165-6

Williams, Dr. Wells, 316 (2), 331, 334 (2), 335, 336, 421

Willow-wreaths as rain-charms, 187, 346

Wiltshire, Folk-lore of, 281 (1)

Winter at Weihaiwei, 81-2

Witches, Chinese, 21-4, 174, 176

Wives, Purchase of, 211 _seq._

Wo-jên ("Dwarfs," a term applied to Japanese), 46, 48, 70

Wo Lung Shih (names of rocks), 19

Wolves, 56, 57, 166

Women, Chinese, 103, 112, 113, 150 _seq._, 168-9, 195-216, 217-45

Wordsworth _quoted_, 394

_Wu fu_ (five degrees of relationship), 143

_Wu Yüeh_ or _Wu Yo_, _see_ Hills, Sacred

Wylie's _Notes on Chinese Literature_ cited, 313 (3)

Yamêns, Chinese, 55

_Yang_ and _Yin_, _see_ Yin-yang

Yang Ku (the Valley of Sunlight), 41-2

Yang-t'ing (village), 129, 385

Yao, The Emperor, 39, 40, 392

Yao-yao hill, 31

Yellow and White races, Alleged antipathy between, 430 _seq._

Yin-ma-ch'ih ("Drink-horse-pool"), 24

Yin-yang (in ancient Chinese philosophy), 262 _seq._, 276, _and see_ Fêng-shui

York Powell, F., _quoted_, 319-20

Yorkshire, Graveyard superstitions of, 291, 386 (1)

Yorkshire, Holy trees in, 379

Yung Lin, Suicide of, 223 (1)

Yü, The Emperor, 20, 39, 392

Yü-chia-k'uang (village), 18, 398

Yü I (earliest recorded inhabitants of eastern extremities of Chinese Empire), 38 _seq._

Yü P'êng-lun, 70

Yüan (Mongol) dynasty, 44, 45, 59, 257

Yüan Shu-fang, 72

PRINTED BY HAZELL, WATSON AND VINEY, LD., LONDON AND AYLESBURY, ENGLAND.

Transcriber's Notes

Obvious errors of punctuation and diacritics repaired.

Inconsistent hyphenation fixed.

P. 351: Taoism and Buddism -> Taoism and Buddhism.

P. 404: pecular sanctity -> peculiar sanctity.