CHAPTER XX.

1845–1846.

THE OREGON CONTROVERSY—DANGER OF A WAR WITH ENGLAND—NEGOTIATION FOR A SETTLEMENT OF THE BOUNDARY—PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE.

Among the subjects involved in the foreign relations of the country, when Mr. Buchanan became Secretary of State, and which demanded his immediate attention, one of the most important and critical was the title to the territory of Oregon, that had long been in dispute between Great Britain and the United States. The northern boundary of this region of country, which should have separated British America west of the Rocky Mountains from the dominion of the United States, had not been settled by the treaty negotiated at Washington between the two powers in 1842, because Lord Ashburton had no instructions to deal with it. As far back as the administration of President Monroe, an extension of the 49th parallel of latitude to the Pacific, as the boundary, was offered by the United States to England, but it was declined. The British claim was founded on the assertion that the title of the United States, which was derived through the Louisiana and Florida treaties, was not exclusive as to any part of the territory; and since it was for the interest of the Hudson Bay Company to follow the Columbia River to the ocean, and since the English asserted an actual and previous occupation as well as the Americans, it became desirable for England to have a right of joint occupation established, until the boundary between the two national possessions should be finally settled. A convention was entered into in 1827, establishing such a joint occupation until notice of its termination should be given by either of the two powers. This concession on the part of the United States, made in the interest of peace, left an open question between the two governments, both claiming the whole territory. But what was “the whole” of Oregon? On the American side of the controversy, the region claimed extended to a line that would be marked by the parallel of 54° 40′ north latitude. This would have carried the American title on the Pacific coast far above the Strait of Fuca and Vancouver’s Island, and would have made an irregular boundary, not coinciding in latitude with the northern boundary of the United States east of the Rocky Mountains. On the other hand, the claim of England brought her down to the mouth of the Columbia River, which has its source nearly at the 50th parallel, and flows in a circuitous course of about eight hundred miles, first to the south, and then to the west, until it reaches the Pacific. The joint occupation agreed upon in 1827, had become inconvenient, and indeed dangerous for both nations. A very uneasy feeling sprang up in our Western States and among the settlers who were pushing into this territory, and who looked to the United States for titles to the land, and for the protection due from the sovereign power. Popular opinion about our right was not likely to be founded in intelligent investigation, but it was sure to find its way into the political action of the Democratic party. The political body which nominated Mr. Polk as its candidate for the Presidency, proclaimed our title to be “clear and unquestionable.” Mr. Polk considered himself as elected under an imperative popular instruction to assert this claim, and in his inaugural address he put it forth in very strong terms as extending to the parallel of 54° 40′. This was the attitude of the matter when Mr. Buchanan became Secretary of State.

Notwithstanding the strong personal convictions of the President and the Secretary of State of the validity of this claim as it was asserted in Mr. Polk’s inaugural address, deference for the action of former administrations and a desire to avoid a rupture with England, led the President to authorize Mr. Buchanan to offer the 49th parallel as the boundary. This offer was made to Mr. Pakenham, the British Minister at Washington, on the 10th of July, 1845. Without referring this offer to his own government and awaiting instructions, Mr. Pakenham replied on the 30th of July, that “after this exposition of the views entertained by the British government respecting the relative value and importance of the British and American claims, the American Plenipotentiary will not be surprised to hear that the undersigned does not feel at liberty to accept the proposal offered by the American Plenipotentiary for the settlement of the question.” He closed his note by expressing his “trust that the American Plenipotentiary will be prepared to offer some further proposal for the settlement of the Oregon question, more consistent with fairness and equity, and with the reasonable expectations of the British government.” These were very unfortunate expressions, since they implied, under the circumstances, that the American Government had begun the negotiation by asserting a claim that was untenable, and had followed its assertion with an unfair and inequitable offer. Had this language of the British plenipotentiary become public at that moment, the consequences would have been an uncontrollable excitement throughout this country. Careful, however, to keep open the door for mutual concessions, Mr. Buchanan, before he answered Mr. Pakenham’s note, wrote to Mr. McLane, who had succeeded Mr. Everett as United States Minister in London, an elaborate despatch, tracing the diplomatic history of the Oregon question, and suggesting, with much skill, the modes in which an unfortunate result might be avoided. Indefatigably industrious, and employing no pen but his own, he gave to his official papers a polish, the marks of which remain on the original drafts, attesting the extreme care that he bestowed upon them. Mr. McLane was instructed to make known the contents of this despatch to the British ministry, in case they made inquiries of him.

The offer of the 49th parallel having been withdrawn, Mr. Buchanan, on the 30th of August, addressed a note to Mr. Pakenham, in which he reasserted the American claim to what he regarded as “the whole of Oregon,” and made an elaborate and exhaustive exposition of its grounds. There are few papers on the diplomatic records of our Government more able and searching than this exposition of the American claim to the territory of Oregon. Thoroughly master of his subject, and fully convinced of the validity of the claim which he was asserting, Mr. Buchanan wrote this paper with a dignified force that was not unlikely to command the assent of impartial persons, when the document should become public. Writing to Mr. McLane afterwards, he said: “this note of Mr. Pakenham (July 30th) became the subject of grave deliberation by the President. Upon a full consideration of the whole question, and after waiting a month, he deemed it to be a duty which he owed to his country to withdraw his proposition (of the 49th parallel), which he had submitted, and to maintain the right of the United States to the whole of Oregon. This was done by my note to Mr. Pakenham of the 30th of August last.”

But the note of August 30th could not become public while the negotiation was pending, or before the meeting of Congress in December. In the mean time, Mr. Pakenham endeavored to have the American offer of the 49th parallel restored. “Judging from late conversations with Mr. Pakenham,” Mr. Buchanan again writes to Mr. McLane, “he is now anxious that this withdrawal should be withdrawn, and that the negotiation might proceed as if our offer were still in force. But the President will not consent to change his position and to recall what has already been done. He will not renew his former offer, nor submit any new proposition; and it must remain for the British government to decide what other or further steps, if any, they may think proper to take in the negotiation. The President has adopted this determination after two cabinet councils, and he deems it necessary that this should be communicated to you, in order that you may clearly understand his purpose.”

The correspondence was submitted by the President to Congress, in December (1845), and its publication was immediately followed in this country by a considerable change of feeling in those quarters where the course of the administration was watched with most jealousy, and where war was most dreaded. In the House of Representatives, where the war feeling of the Northwest found expression, some violent speeches were made. In the Senate there was a moderate tone, but steps were taken looking to the termination of the joint occupation, and to an inquiry into the state of the national defences. These movements had an ominous appearance. In the diplomatic department, however, the negotiation went on quietly.

On the 23d of December, Mr. Buchanan made the following brief minute of a cabinet consultation held on that day, at which the President said:

If Mr. Pakenham inquires if a new proposition made by them would be respectfully considered, I would refer him to the correspondence—your last note of the 30th August, and say it has been at your option, with a perfect liberty to propose any proposition you thought proper, and you had no reason to conclude from what had occurred here that the Government would not have treated such a proposition with respectful consideration when made. You have made no new proposition, and the question, therefore, stands on its present attitude.

December 23, 1845.—I took down the foregoing from the lips of the President, in the presence of the cabinet.

Four days afterward an interview took place at the State Department, of which I find the following account in Mr. Buchanan’s hand-writing:

On Saturday afternoon, 27th of December, 1845, Mr. Pakenham called at the Department of State. After some brief preliminary conversation on other topics, he informed me that he had received instructions from his government relative to the Oregon question; without at the time informing me what they were. He then proceeded to express his desire that I should recall the withdrawal of our offer to settle the Oregon question by the 49th parallel of latitude, and suffer the negotiation to proceed on that basis, expressing the belief that it might then result in a satisfactory manner. I informed him that he had made one proposition to Mr. Calhoun, which had been rejected; that I had made a proposition which had been rejected by him and then withdrawn; that the whole negotiation had been submitted to Congress with the President’s message; and after all this, it was too late to expect that the President would now retrace his steps. That what had been done must be considered as done.

He then said that if he were now to make a new proposition, he had no means of knowing whether it would be accepted: if he made a proposition it might be rejected.

I replied that the whole field was open to him, as it had been in the beginning; that it was as free to him as it had been to him at first, or was to me afterwards, to make any proposition he thought proper; that all I could say was that any proposition he might make would be respectfully considered by the President; but I said no more.

He then observed that as I was not willing to go further (as I understood him), he would, under his instructions, present me the offer of the British government to arbitrate the question. He said it was drawn up chiefly in the very language of Lord Aberdeen.

I then received the communication from him, and read it over carefully. As soon as I had completed its perusal, he urged its acceptance strongly; expressed his great desire for the preservation of peace between the two countries, and said that it was impossible that war should grow out of such a question between two great nations. He said he was not worth much in the world; but would give half what he was worth to see the question honorably and amicably adjusted between the two nations.

I stated the strong desire, both on the part of the President and myself, that the question might be amicably and honorably adjusted. That we had every disposition that this result might be attained. I observed, however, that if ever this was accomplished, I thought it must be by negotiation, and not by arbitration; and especially such an arbitration as he proposed. That both the President and myself were firmly convinced of the validity of our title up to 54° 40´; and yet his proposition to arbitrate assumed the right to a portion of the territory on the part of Great Britain, and left it to the arbitrator alone to decide in what manner the territory should be divided between the parties. That this alone, I thought, would be a sufficient reason for the rejection of his proposition, even if others did not exist, of which he must be aware from our previous conversations on the subject; but I would consult the President, and give him an answer with as little delay as possible. He intimated rather than expressed a wish that his answer might be communicated to him in time for the packet (Monday). I told him that a proper respect for the British government required that the answer should be well considered; that the cabinet would not meet again before Tuesday, and I could not encourage him to expect the answer before Saturday next. He said he had no doubt my answer would be well considered. He hoped that in it I would not assert a claim to the whole territory, and Saturday next would be in time.

He then branched off, and said that the proposition was to refer the question to a state as well as a sovereign; he said that this had been done on purpose to get clear of the objection to crowned heads. I asked him to whom he thought it might be referred if not to a sovereign. He suggested the Republic of Switzerland, or the government of Hamburg or Bremen. I told him that whilst my own inclinations were strongly against arbitration; if I were compelled to select an arbitrator, it would be the Pope. That both nations were heretics, and the Pope would be impartial. This he appeared at first to take seriously,—he said the Pope was a temporal sovereign; but I thought he was disinclined to select him as an arbitrator. He perceived, however, that I was not in earnest, and suggested that the reference might be made to commissioners from both countries. I told him I thought it was vain to think of arbitration; because, even if the President were agreed to it, which I felt pretty certain he was not, no such treaty could pass the Senate. That the pursuit of arbitration would only involve the question in new difficulties. He then suggested the mediation of a third power in the adjustment of the question. I told him that was an idea which he had never suggested before, and on which I could say nothing. He observed that this, together with his suggestion of commissioners, came from himself and had not been embraced in his instructions. He said that a mediator who would interfere might share the fate of the man who interfered between two other men who were fighting, when both fell upon him and gave him a sound drubbing.

He remarked that the affair might remain just where it was, and the British government would not disturb it. He did not entertain serious apprehensions of war.

He then told me that he had met Judge Douglas at Mr. Cox’s party the other evening, and had a good deal of conversation with him about his bill.

He objected to a promise of a grant of lands to actual settlers in Oregon, and to the erection of forts by the Government within it, as violations of the treaty. I told him I had formed no decided opinion as to the promise of grants of land; but as to the forts, it was very clear, in my opinion, that we had a right to erect them. We did not purpose to erect fortifications capable of enduring a siege in civilized warfare; but merely stockade forts to protect our emigrants from the savages. That the Hudson’s Bay Company had erected many such forts, and we surely had the right under the treaty to do what they had done. He observed that the settlers might do this themselves as the Company had done. I replied that they were too poor; that this Company had the entire government in its hands; and surely we might do what they had done. I observed that this was ever the way with Great Britain, she was always fettered by monopolies; and if it were not for the Company they would at once give us our rights to the whole country up to 54° 40′. He said that the Hudson’s Bay Company had rights in Oregon which must be protected; but I understood him to admit that they did interpose an obstacle in the way of the settlement of the question. He said the British government would be glad to get clear of the question on almost any terms; that they did not care if the arbitrator should award the whole territory to us. They would yield it without a murmur. I said I had no doubt of this. They never played the part of the fox: but always of the lion. They would preserve their faith inviolate. He said they wished for peace; but intimated that this was not our wish. I asked him why we should desire war. Would not their superiority at sea give them command of the coasts of Oregon. Yes, he said, that was true, but the war would not be confined to that region. That he would willingly make a bargain to fight it out with us there, if we would agree to that.

On the 26th of February (1846), Mr. Buchanan addressed an elaborate official despatch to Mr. McLane, explaining fully the reasons which had led the President to decline to make the boundary of Oregon a subject of arbitration, and suggesting what it would be practicable for the President to agree upon, if proposed by the British government. Mr. McLane was authorized to make known to Lord Aberdeen the contents of this despatch; and between its date and the 1st of June, Sir Robert Peel’s government determined to send to Washington the project of a convention which is described in a despatch addressed to Mr. J. Randolph Clay on the 13th of June, and which is given below. The despatch of February 26th, to Mr. McLane, was accompanied by a private letter of the same date. On the 6th of June, another private letter to Mr. McLane informed him of the President’s purpose to submit Lord Aberdeen’s project to the Senate, and the despatch of June 13th to Mr. Clay gives the result.

[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. LOUIS McLANE.]

WASHINGTON, Feb. 26, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR:—

The brief space left to me before the departure of our messenger to Boston shall be devoted to writing you a private letter...... By my despatch you will be made distinctly acquainted with the ground which the President has determined to maintain on the Oregon question; and I do not perceive, after what has passed, how he could do more than submit a British proposition, based on the parallel of 49°, to the Senate. From all I can learn, there is not the least doubt but that either of the two propositions specified in my despatch would receive the previous sanction of a constitutional majority of that body. I say the previous sanction, for reasons which I have not the time to give you. All that I apprehend is, that the British government, in their offer, may insist on the perpetual free navigation of the Columbia. This would indeed be truly embarrassing; and all your diplomacy should be exerted to prevent it. The President would not present such a proposition to the Senate, unless he should greatly change his mind; and if he should, I do not believe that two-thirds of that body would give it their sanction.

I am convinced that the Oregon question is rapidly reaching that point when it must, if ever, be peaceably settled. Although what I have said to you of the present disposition of the Senate is strictly true, it is uncertain how long this may continue. Public opinion on this subject is far in advance of Congress. I am convinced that if the question should remain open until the Congressional elections next fall, this would be clearly evinced...... In Great Britain they form their judgment of popular opinion from what they read in the newspapers, chiefly Whig, of our large commercial cities. This you know to be a mistake. The commercial interest which, in a great degree controls these papers, has a direct interest in the preservation of peace, and especially with Great Britain. The strong and irresistible public opinion throughout the vast interior of our country, which controls the action of the Government, is but little, if at all, affected by the considerations which influence the mercantile community. General Cass and Mr. Allen, who are both candidates for popular favor, the one immediately and the other prospectively, will not consent to accept the parallel of 49°. The two Senators from Indiana, the two from Illinois, and one from Missouri (not Colonel Benton), occupy the same ground.

Mr. Calhoun, from a variety of circumstances, came to the Senate with a flush of popularity, which might have rendered him highly useful, both to himself and to his country; but, already, it is nearly all gone. He at once took open and bold ground against the notice, and propagated his opinions with that degree of zeal which belongs to his character. He succeeded in inducing a small number of Democrats in the House, chiefly Virginians, to vote against the notice; and such is now the weight of public opinion in its favor, that it is said he would vote for it himself, but for the awkward dilemma in which this would place his friends in the House. The truth is, that the discreet friends of peace clearly perceive that the question must be settled peaceably within the year, or war may be the consequence. In some form or other it will pass the Senate by a large majority; and many anticipate an almost unanimous vote. I do not believe this. I have always liked Mr. Calhoun very much, and am truly sorry that he did not adopt a wiser course. He must have been the great man of our party in the Senate. Colonel Benton’s conduct and speech on the Oregon question are entitled to warm commendation. Your son Robert is winning laurels for himself in the Maryland legislature. He is indeed a fine fellow, and a worthy chip of the old block.

I have for years been anxious to obtain a seat on the bench of the Supreme Court. This has been several times within my power; but circumstances have always prevented me from accepting the offered boon. I cannot desert the President, at the present moment, against his protestations. If the Oregon question should not be speedily settled, the vacancy must be filled; and then farewell to my wishes.

...... Please to remember me in the kindest terms to Mrs. McLane, and believe me, as ever, to be, sincerely and respectfully,

Your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

[BUCHANAN TO McLANE.]

(Private and Confidential.) WASHINGTON, June 6, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I have but little time to scribble you a private letter before the closing of the mail to go by the Great Britain.

The President has determined to submit Lord Aberdeen’s project to the Senate. He had no alternative, as you know, between this and its absolute rejection.

The proviso to the first article would seem to render it questionable whether both parties would have the right to navigate the Strait of Fuca, as an arm of the sea, north of the parallel of 49°; neither does it provide that the line shall pass through the Canal de Arro, as stated in your despatch. This would probably be the fair construction.

The article relating to the possessions of British occupants south of 49° is vague and indefinite; and in order to prevent disputes between the two governments hereafter, as to the extent of these possessions, it would seem to be a prudent precaution to provide some means of ascertaining the rights of these occupants respectively. There is no reciprocal provision in the treaty for American settlers north of 49°. There may be none there; but yet such a provision would give the convention a fairer appearance.

The right of the Hudson’s Bay Company to the navigation of the Columbia presents the important difficulty. It is considered doubtful by the President and several members of the cabinet whether under the terms of the projet this right would not expire upon the termination of the existing charter of that company in 1859.

The President’s message will reiterate the opinions expressed in his annual message in favor of our title to 54° 40´; but in consideration of and in deference to the contrary opinions expressed by the Senate, his constitutional advisers, he submits the projet to them for their previous advice. He may probably suggest some modifications.

What the Senate may do in the premises is uncertain. There undoubtedly is in that body a constitutional majority in favor of settling the question on the parallel of 49° to the Straits of Fuca. The question of the perpetual navigation of the Columbia is and ought to be the point of difficulty. Should the Senate modify this article so as to limit the right to the termination of the existing charter of the Hudson’s Bay Company, I can scarcely suppose that the modification would be rejected by the British government.

I sincerely hope that you may not think of leaving London until the question shall be finally settled; and I am happy to learn from Robert that your continuance in London will not be prejudicial to your private interest at home.

With my kindest respects to Mrs. McLane, I remain sincerely and respectfully your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

[MR. BUCHANAN TO JOHN RANDOLPH CLAY, ESQ.]

No. 2. DEPARTMENT OF STATE,} WASHINGTON, }

SIR:—

The Oregon question may now be considered as settled. On the 6th instant Mr. Pakenham presented to me the project of a convention for its adjustment: and the President, after mature deliberation, determined, in pursuance of several precedents adopted in the early history of our Government, to submit it to the Senate for their previous advice. This was done by a confidential message on the 10th instant, of which I transmit you a copy.

On the 12th instant the Senate adopted a resolution by a vote of 37 to 12, of which the following is a copy:

“Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring) that the President of the United States be, and he is hereby, advised to accept the proposal of the British government accompanying his message to the Senate, dated 10th June, 1846, for a convention to settle boundaries, etc., between the United States and Great Britain, west of the Rocky or Stony Mountains.”

The convention will be signed by the plenipotentiaries on Monday next: and in the course of the next week will doubtless be ratified by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.

The terms are, an extension of the 49th parallel of latitude to the middle of the channel which separates the continent from Vancouver’s Island, thence along the middle of this channel and the Strait of Fuca, so as to surrender the whole of that island to Great Britain.

The navigation of the Columbia is conceded, not to British subjects generally, but to the Hudson’s Bay Company and those trading with it. To this concession there is no express limitation of time; but it was believed by the Senate, that under the true construction of the projet this grant will expire on the 30th May, 1859, the date of the termination of the existing license to that Company, to trade with the Indians, etc., on the North-west Coast of America.

I need not enumerate the other less important particulars.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

While in December 1845 many political friends and opponents in all parts of the country were reading with approbation the correspondence on the Oregon question, so far as it had been published, an approbation which appears from a great multitude of private letters addressed to Mr. Buchanan, he thus wrote confidentially to Mr. McLane:

“I should this day [December 13th] have been on the bench of the Supreme Court, had it not been for the critical state of our foreign relations. I very much desired the position, because it would have enabled me to spend the remainder of my days in peace. I have now been on the stormy deep nearly a quarter of a century. Besides, I sincerely wished, if possible, to prevent my name being even mentioned in connection with the next Presidency.”

The vacancy on the bench of the Supreme Court of the United States was occasioned by the death of Mr. Justice Baldwin. According to an invariable custom the appointment should be made from the Pennsylvania circuit. There were persons who desired, not without a mixture of motives, that Mr. Buchanan might receive it; for his transfer to the bench would, it was assumed, bring into the Department of State a gentleman whose friends were exceedingly anxious to have him in that position. Others wished Buchanan to be out of the cabinet, without much reference to the question of who was to be his successor. There came about a kind of intrigue, to produce a public belief that he was to be appointed a judge, in order that it might be considered as a foregone conclusion and appear to be called for by the general voice. Some of Mr. Buchanan’s friends, of both political parties, believing that he had eminent qualifications for the judicial office, urged him to accept the offer, if it should be made to him; others, who had just as strong convictions that he would be a great acquisition to the bench, were not willing to have him retire from political life, and were earnestly opposed to his leaving the Department of State at that time. The great body of the discreet friends of the administration took the same view. The matter was kept open for a long time, and meanwhile Mr. Buchanan, uncertain of his own future, had to go on and manage the foreign relations of the country, in which, besides the Oregon question, the state of things consequent upon the proposed annexation of Texas and the other difficulties with Mexico, of which I shall treat hereafter, became extremely perplexing. That he would have preferred the safe retirement of the bench to anything that political office could give him, and that he would have renounced all further connection with politics if he had received this appointment, cannot be doubted. Having had occasion thus far to estimate the qualities of his mind and character, I may here express the opinion, that he would have been a highly useful and distinguished judge. If this change in the course of his life had taken place, he would never have become President of the United States, and his biography, if written, would have been only that of a man who had been very eminent in political life to the age of forty-six, and had then passed the remainder of his days in the tranquillity of a judicial career, giving more or less proof of the versatility of his powers. He believed that it would be a gain of happiness to escape from the stormy conflicts of the political sphere. But public men can rarely do more than “rough-hew their ends;” to entirely “shape” them is not given to mortals. The following interesting letters from his friend King give, by reflex, all that can now be known concerning his feelings in regard to this disappointment:[91]

[HON. WM. R. KING TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, January 25, 1846.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

Your friendly letter gave me both pleasure and pain. Pleasure, in the renewed assurance of your friendship; and pain, to perceive that the course of the President towards you has not been entirely characterized by that delicacy and confidence which is certainly due to your position, and to the important services you have rendered to him and the country. Let me entreat you, however, to act with great deliberation and prudence. Do not suffer yourself to be operated upon by professing, or even by real friends, to act hastily. I am not of the opinion that any slight was intended by the President. He no doubt gave the true reason for having nominated Judge —— without consulting you, as he knew you were opposed to his selection.[92] It is not, I think, of sufficient importance to produce a quarrel; and the President must be too well aware of the strength you give to his administration to desire your withdrawal. Your doing so at this most important juncture would be to give the staff into the hands of your enemies; who would desire nothing better to prostrate you with. Your able correspondence with Pakenham has justly turned the eyes of the country towards you as a talented and safe helmsman to guide the ship of State. This your enemies know and feel. Do not, I again entreat you, by your own act, aid them to defeat your future prospects. Probably I have dwelt more on this matter than it merits; if so, I feel assured you will attribute it to the true motive, my anxiety to see you elevated to a station you are so well qualified to fill, with honor to yourself and advantage to the country....

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, February 28, 1846.

MY DEAR FRIEND:—

I read your kind letter attentively, and then committed it to the flames, as you requested. The refusal of the President to place you on the Bench of the Supreme Court, after you had manifested a willingness to accept of the situation, surprises me greatly. I had supposed, independent of a desire to gratify you, to whom he owes so much, he would have seized with avidity on the opportunity thus afforded him to get freed from the importunities of persons of doubtful qualification, none of whom could venture to complain of your being preferred to him. I have turned it over and over in my mind, to see if I could discover any motive for his refusal other than that assigned by himself, viz., that you were too important to his administration in the post you now occupy to enable him to dispense with your services. If this was in truth his sole reason, he should have frankly and unreservedly placed before you the difficulties and embarrassments your abandonment of the State Department would involve him in; how necessary you were to enable him to carry on the Government successfully, and at the same time have expressed his willingness to meet your wishes if persisted in. If such had been his course, I know you too well to doubt for a moment but that you would have relinquished the judgeship, and continued your invaluable services as a member of the administration. This, however, you must still do; you owe it to the country; you owe it to yourself. You can form no idea of the reputation you have acquired, even in Europe, by the able and masterly manner in which you have presented our claim to Oregon, never before perfectly understood, either in Europe or America. You certainly occupy at this moment, in public estimation, a more enviable position than any other distinguished man of our country, and your prospects for the future are brighter than those of any one I know. Do not, I beg you, mar those prospects by abandoning your place at this critical period of our foreign relations. Finish the work you have so ably begun. Settle the Oregon question by an equitable compromise, and whatever a few hot heads or selfish aspirants may say, your reputation will rest upon a foundation broad and strong, the approval of a virtuous and intelligent people at home, and the wise and good of every land. You know I am no flatterer. I speak in all sincerity, and say nothing but what is strictly true.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, March 28th, 1846.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

The last steamer brought me your very acceptable letter of the 26th February. The publication of my correspondence with M. Guizot has been well received by all parties in Paris, and has put at rest forever all speculation as to the correctness of my despatch. Even M. Guizot himself manifests a greater degree of cordiality than formerly, and made it a point to attend a ball I gave on the 22d February, although he is not in the habit of going to parties. I knew the course I pursued would, so far from committing me with any one here, produce a salutary result; and it was not taken in passion, or because I am “thin skinned.” My position was never better than at this time with all in power here, from the king down to the lowest official. Present me kindly to my friend, Mr. Trist, and tender him my thanks for the interest he has manifested for me. The postponement of the election of Senator for Alabama will, as you say, enable me to enter the field with a fair prospect of success, and I am free to declare that I should be truly gratified to be reinstated in the Senate. It is possible, however, that the Governor may be operated upon by those on the spot, who aspire to the situation, and dread my return, to call the legislature together this spring, and before I can possibly be present. This my friends Bagby and others should prevent. A called session would involve unnecessary expense, without an adequate advantage, or, in fact, any advantage whatever, so far as the public is concerned. My arrangements are such that I cannot, with convenience, return to the United States before the last of July. I am anxious, however, to conform to the wishes of the President in the appointment of my successor, and will either hasten or retard my surrender of my place, as to him may seem best. Should he prefer to delay the appointment of my successor until after the adjournment of Congress, I could return on leave of absence, as he once kindly permitted me to do, and leave my Secretary, Mr. Martin, as chargé des affaires. He is, as you know, well qualified to discharge the duties, and on his account I should be pleased to give to him the advantages of the position. You will confer with the President and let me know what course will be most acceptable to him, and I will then make my request accordingly. If a vacancy occurs at Turin by the resignation of Wickliff, could you not lend a helping hand to Dr. Martin? The place will not, I presume, be sought for by any of the prominent politicians, and Martin’s information and experience peculiarly fits him to be useful. He is, withal, very poor; and even if my successor consented to retain him here, his condition would be greatly altered for the worse, as with me he lives without expense. Serve him if you can; at any rate, save us from that miserable toady ——.

I altogether approve of the President’s refusal to submit the Oregon question to arbitration, as proposed by the British government. The objections enumerated by you are all sufficient, but, in addition, it could not escape your observation that, by the terms of submission, whether referred to a crowned head or to private individuals, the result would, in all probability, have been to deprive us of all the country north of the Columbia, simply upon the ground that actual possession should not be disturbed. Information on which I can rely convinces me that Lord Aberdeen, when he directed the offer to be made, did not expect it to be accepted. His object was, first, to induce the European governments to believe that they were anxious to settle the question upon just terms, and, secondly, to gain time, as they calculated on Sir Robert Peel’s measure inducing the American people to force their Government to give way on the Oregon question that they may receive the advantages it holds out to them.[93] I know the calculation is altogether erroneous, and that, as you say, the people are ahead of the Government on the question. Still, such is the impression made in England by Pakenham’s despatches, the speeches of some of our prominent men, and the tone of our opposition press generally. I have my doubts whether Pakenham is as yet instructed to make a proposition for a compromise, but it will be made; and will, I think, be such as we should not hesitate to accept, unless the perpetual navigation of the Columbia is insisted upon. This I would not grant without an equivalent in the navigation of the St. Lawrence; but there seems to be a propriety in allowing the use of the river for a term of years, not to exceed ten, to enable the Northwest Fur Company gradually to withdraw an interest which has grown up under the treaty of joint occupancy. The President will certainly act with prudence by submitting the proposition, whatever it may be (unless altogether inadmissible), to the Senate, for the advice in advance of that body. Cass, Allen and Company will find that no political capital can be made by arraying themselves against an arrangement which makes the 49th parallel the boundary, but yielding the whole of Vancouver’s Island, and the use for a few years of the Columbia River. The good sense of the whole country will approve of such a settlement. I am not at all surprised to hear that Calhoun is anxious to free himself from the odium of voting against the notice, regardless of the dilemma in which he has involved his devoted adherents in the House. If the Senate amends the House resolutions, my life upon it, they will receive Calhoun’s vote; and all chivalry will exclaim: Behold the great statesman, whose wise and prudent course has alone saved the nation from the horrors of war. The speech of Colonel Benton was excellent, and proves him to be a statesman indeed. Still, I do not, I am sorry to say, approve of his opposition to an increase of our navy. If we hope to command the respect of the powers of Europe, we must put ourselves in a position not only to repel all aggression, but, if needs be, to act on the offensive. They are all jealous of our rapid growth and prosperity, and would, if they dared, unite to retard or destroy it. We should hasten to repair our forts, build some new ones, and add to our little navy ten or twelve war steamers.

Such preparation, although it involves expense, would in all probability save us millions, as it would effectually put down all attempts to wrest the Island of Cuba from Spain, or to establish a monarchy in Mexico. I highly approve of the views taken by Bancroft; he promises to make an able and efficient Secretary of the Navy, and I hope he will retain his place and give up, if he has thought of it, all idea of a foreign mission. —— —— is here on his return home; he is no doubt an amiable man, but weak beyond description. Such a representative at such a court was calculated to do us a positive injury; we require to have there one of our ablest men. Berlin is of much less importance; in truth, to keep a minister there is scarcely worth the expense. Donalson is a good appointment; I wish it had been for St. Petersburg. I am fully aware that diplomatic situations are in great demand, and that the President is worried with applications from second and even third-rate men for the most important stations. I trust, however, that no commonplace men may be sent to London, Paris or St. Petersburg. My residence abroad has convinced me that the respect in which our country is held very much depends on the character and standing of its representative; and I greatly doubt the policy of making removals when the incumbent possesses talent and information, and from a long residence has acquired facilities for obtaining useful information which a new man, whatever his ability, it may be will require years to obtain. This I know runs counter to your theory of rotation in office; which may be correct as respects office at home, but should not, I think, apply to those held abroad. I once gave you my opinion of Wheaton. I see no reason to change that opinion. He is peculiarly well qualified to represent his country with advantage. Could he not be sent to St. Petersburg? He has grown old in diplomacy without growing rich, and at his period of life will find it exceedingly difficult to engage in any pursuit, other than that he has so long followed, with a prospect of securing to his family a decent support. I should feel truly gratified if you would bring him to the attention of the President. I am much gratified to learn that harmony prevails in the Cabinet; a break up would do much mischief. Retain your place regardless of all minor annoyances. The country requires your services to bring to a successful termination the important and delicate question of Oregon. You have the confidence of all parties; and I heartily believe that in the present state of things the President could not find a man capable of supplying your place. Stay where you are, settle the Oregon question, and great shall be your reward. Tender my respects to my friends Sturgeon and General Cameron, also to Walker, Mason and Benton.

Your friend sincerely,

WILLIAM R. KING.

P.S.—Present me most respectfully to the President and his accomplished lady.

W. R. K.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, April 30, 1846.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

I thank you for your long and friendly letter. Engrossed as your time must be by cares of State, official duties and social intercourse, I feel flattered in having engaged so much of your attention. On the 16th of this month Paris was thrown into a state of great excitement by an attempt made to assassinate the king at Fontainebleau, where he had been spending a few days with his family. Two shots were actually fired into the _char à banc_ (an open carriage), in which he was returning from a hunting party, in company with the queen, Madame Adelaide, and several other members of the royal family. Fortunately, no one received the slightest injury. The ladies were terribly frightened, but the king showed his usual coolness and disregard of danger. The wretched assassin was instantly seized by the attendants. He turned out to be a former employé of the government, who, having lost his place, had brooded over the injustice he conceived had been done him until he determined to kill the king to revenge himself. Lecomt, for that is the name of the miserable man, has been subjected to several examinations, but nothing has transpired to connect him in any manner with any of the political parties of the country. Although the _Journal des Debats_, the semi-official paper, whatever disclosures Mr. Guizot may make, has, and as I think, most imprudently, contended that it was political. Be that as it may, it has certainly called forth the better feelings of the French generally in favor of their wise, prudent and pacific old monarch, which will add strength to his government and give permanency to his dynasty. I hastened on his return to Paris to tender him my congratulations on his extraordinary and most providential escape; for Lecomt is said to be one of the best shots in France. The old man bears a charmed life. Would it not be well for the President to address him with his own hand a letter of congratulation at his fortunate escape from the hands of the base assassin? It would, I know, be well received, and in the present state of our relations with England, we should treat France with marked courtesy. Trifles in themselves are of great importance here. I am somewhat surprised at Lord Aberdeen’s course on the Oregon question, especially as he has openly expressed a desire to settle it on amicable terms. That arbitration would be rejected, he must have known when he instructed Pakenham to make the proposition; and it strikes me that the motive for making it was to gain time, pass their free trade measures, and avail themselves of the effects it would have in the United States, to obtain more favorable terms than had been offered by us—or should negotiation fail and war ensue, they would be able to prejudice the European governments against us by showing that they had tendered arbitration, which was rejected. I must think, however, that as soon as the resolutions, to give the notice to put an end to the existing treaty, shall have passed the Senate, a proposition for a compromise will be made; but whether it will be such as ought to be accepted by us, is more than doubtful. My information leads me to believe it will not be. Still it will open the door for negotiation, and however extravagant, should not be promptly rejected, but with proposed modifications. If Pakenham has common sense, he must long before this have well understood that a proposition to fix the line at 49° to the Straits; the whole of Vancouver’s Island; part of Puget Sound; the navigation of the Columbia; with indemnity to the North West Fur Company, would never be acceded to by us, be the consequences what they may. Should such an extravagant offer be made, be assured Mr. P. will have a wide margin given him for modifications; and in the end he will settle down on Vancouver’s Island and the navigation of the Columbia for a term of years. You already know my opinions on this subject, and further I would not go, war or no war. Be not surprised, if the conducting of this negotiation falls into the hands of the Whigs, unless speedily settled. I do not think many months will pass over before Lord John Russell will be at the head of affairs in England, and Lord Palmerston in the Foreign Office. Now, I am not of the number who believe that the return of the Whigs to power will throw additional obstacles in the way of the adjustment of our difficulties, and I trust, should the change take place, we shall have no alarm speeches from those Senators who recently expressed such heart-felt pleasure that Lord John had failed to form a ministry. When shall we learn prudence in our national councils? You are, I am sorry to see, dissatisfied with your position; and I am no less wearied with mine. Most sincerely do I wish that we had both remained in the Senate. You, however, have much to reconcile you to the change; having acquired increased reputation by your able correspondence with Pakenham; nor must you on any account abandon your post, until that affair is finally settled. The war spirit of Cass, Allen, etc., must not deter the President from making, if practicable, a fair compromise. In such a course he will be sustained by the good sense of the country. When I wrote you to consult the President relative to my return home, it was simply because I was desirous to subject him to no inconvenience in the selection of my successor. The state of my private affairs renders it imperative that I should be at home in September. I can remain here until the first of that month, but not longer; and I wish you so to inform the President. Any mode he chooses to adopt to enable me to execute my purposes, will be perfectly satisfactory, and my object in writing thus early, is to know what course will be adopted, that I may make my arrangements accordingly. I shall not fail to procure a breast-pin, or ring, or something of the kind, and present it Mrs. Walsh in your name. It should have been done before this, but I have been suffering from lumbago, which has confined me to the house. I am now, however, nearly well. Poor McLane has for many weeks been suffering severely from some affection...... He is still in the hands of his physician, but much better. He stands deservedly high in England, with both Whig and Tory. Lord Landsdown, who will be the president of the council, if the Whigs get into power, was in Paris a few days past, and spoke to me of McLane in the most exalted terms. Catlin has, I understand, applied to Congress, to purchase his Indian gallery. It should not be lost to our country, as it will be if Congress refuses the purchase, for he has offers from England, which he is only prevented from accepting by his anxious desire that his own country should possess it. It is richly worth what he asks for it, and you would be doing a service to a most estimable man if you would take the trouble to enlist some of your friends in favor of the purchase. As Grund gives up the consulate at Antwerp, why not appoint Vesey? He is honest and capable, and withal a good and true American in all his principles. Mrs. Ellis thanks you for your kind remembrance of her. Present my kindest regards to the Bentons, Bagbys, Pleasontons and Beans.

Your friend sincerely,

WILLIAM R. KING.

P. S.—Say to my friend, Col. Benton, that exalted as was my opinion of his statesmanlike qualities, his courage on the Oregon question has raised him still higher in my estimation. Richly does he deserve his well earned popularity. But for my stiff fingers, which almost disable me from holding my pen, I would write to him and express more fully the respect and regard I entertain for him. I wish you would call his attention to Catlin’s proposition to dispose of his gallery of Indian portraits and curiosities. I do not think it should be lost to our country.

W. R. K.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

PARIS, July 15th, 1845.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

I have this moment received your letter of the 23d June, brought out by the Great Western. I have at once availed myself of your suggestion, and asked officially for my recall. I hope to embark for the United States on the 15th of September, or, at farthest, by the first of October. I am most anxious to see you, and, as far as I have any influence, to prevail on you to abandon all idea of the judgeship, and to continue in your present position, where you have rendered such important services to our country, and justly elevated yourself in the estimation of all whose good opinion is worth having.

As for ——, envy and vanity are his controlling passions, his praise or his censure are alike worthless, and you should treat them with contempt. You speak of three sections of the Democratic party in the Senate, headed by Cass, Benton and Calhoun. Cass may have a small party composed almost exclusively of the old followers of Benton; but I am at a loss to understand who they are who now constitute the late Colonel’s party. It seems to me, able general as I admit he is, that all his men have deserted, and unless he can enlist recruits from the Whig ranks, he must be his own standard-bearer. Calhoun’s followers are beginning to look over the left shoulder, and even his fidus Achates, D. H. Lewis, will very soon turn his back on him. Calhoun is politically dead. The Oregon question and the Mexican war have already proved fatal to many distinguished leaders, Democrat and Whig, so that you will find the field open for the Presidency, unless you place yourself on the shelf by accepting of the judgeship. I am much pleased to learn that the best possible relations exist between you and the President. Use your influence to prevent him from selecting improper persons to fill the missions to London, Paris and St. Petersburg. They are most important positions, and should be filled by the first men of our country, and not by mere seekers of office, or by those who erroneously suppose that they can enrich themselves by the outfit and salary. I speak from my own experience when I say that no American minister can live even respectably in Paris for less than fifteen thousand dollars a year. Congress should look to this, and give such compensation as will enable the country to avail itself of the services of the best qualified, who are but too often destitute of private fortune. Mrs. Ellis still continues to be your warm advocate for the Presidency. She requests me to present her best respects. Mr. Martin is much pleased with diplomacy, but has great apprehension lest he should not find his position as Secretary altogether as desirable with my successor; and he is looking forward with hope to an appointment as chargé des affaires, either at Turin, or some other place. Could you not aid him? He is, as you know, exceedingly poor, and not very provident, and an increase of salary would be important to him. Present my best respects to my friends, the Pleasontons, Taylors, and old associates in the Senate.

Faithfully your friend,

WILLIAM R. KING.

[KING TO BUCHANAN.]

LIVERPOOL, Oct. 1, 1847.

DEAR BUCHANAN:—

On the 15th of September, I presented my letters of recall, and took leave of his Majesty, the King of the French. He was pleased to express great regret at parting with me, and a hope that nothing had occurred during my residence at his court which had given me dissatisfaction. I assured him such was not the case, and that I should ever cherish towards him and his amiable family the kindest feelings for the uniform courtesy and cordiality he and they had manifested towards me. He abounded in professions of friendship for myself personally, and for my country; but Louis Philippe is full of duplicity, and professions cost him but little. I left Paris on the 16th, and hastened to Liverpool to embark on board the splendid iron steamer, the Great Britain. On the 22d we took our departure. The day was fine, the wind fair, and we proceeded on our voyage at the rate of twelve miles an hour. The passengers, 180 persons, were all in high spirits, and flattered themselves with a short and agreeable voyage. Most lamentably were our hopes blasted. In an evil hour the captain determined to take the dangerous northern passage. Why, it would be difficult to tell, as the wind was equally fair for the southern. Night came on dark and gloomy. The breeze freshened, almost approaching to a gale; still he kept on his way at the same rapid rate, although he now acknowledges that he had mistaken his reckoning and was, in fact, ignorant of his situation. A little before eleven the ship struck on the ledge of rocks which surround Dundee Bay, north of Ireland. The shock was indeed terrific, and the ladies, many of whom had retired for the night, rushed from their rooms, frantic with alarm. Among them was Mrs. Ellis. Believing that the ship must go to pieces in a few minutes, I frankly told her her danger. To my astonishment, she became calm and composed, and during the whole trying scene displayed extraordinary composure. To our extraordinary speed we probably, under Providence, owe our escape from a watery grave. The good ship cleared the reefs and imbedded herself in the sand, where as the tide was receding, she sunk deeper and deeper, maintaining an upright position. Our hope now was that her great strength would enable her to resist the waves, which thundered against her side and dashed over her lofty decks, until the dawn of day; for should she break up in the darkness of the night, on a rocky shore, with a heavy sea, all were convinced that few, if any, could be saved. Long indeed appeared that terrible night, but day at length dawned, and the tide being out, we found we were but a short distance from the dry land. The boats were lowered. I placed Mrs. Ellis in the first that left the ship, and saw her make the shore in safety. My nephew and myself followed as soon as all the ladies were landed, and joined her in a miserable cabin where she had taken refuge from the rain. No lives were lost. I procured a conveyance for Down Patrick, where we rested for the night. The next day we arrived at Belfast and took the steamer for Liverpool. Being unable to procure a passage in any of the steamships which leave in this month, I shall sail to-morrow in the packet ship New York, with the prospect of a passage of at least thirty days, but I trust it will be a safe one.

Your friend sincerely,

WILLIAM R. KING.

[HON. RICHARD RUSH TO MR. BUCHANAN.]

SYDENHAM, NEAR PHILADELPHIA, December 16, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR:—

...... I have this morning been turning once more to your note of the 30th of August on the Oregon question, in answer to the British minister’s of the 29th of July. I had, to be sure, read it on its first appearance with the greatest attention; and it would be unjust to withhold longer from you my poor tribute to its value. Its demonstration of our title is so full, as to leave nothing further to be said; so clear that our whole country can now fortunately understand it; and it is in a spirit so fair, and in a tone of patriotism so high and just, that every American has solid ground to feel proud of it. I rejoice that the country has found so powerful an exponent of her rights as is recorded in this most able state paper; and, as one of her sons formerly striving to defend those rights abroad, gladly award to you both my tribute and my share of the public thanks, for this comprehensive, final and triumphant vindication of them which your pen has accomplished.

Perhaps, in propriety and prudence, I ought here to stop. I know how rash it generally is, in those not behind the curtain, to be venturing opinions before those who are; yet while writing I cannot avoid adding my belief, founded upon as much only as is known to the public, that war is at hand. I rest on the courageous spirit of Britain, which we must not undervalue, as it is the root of our own: and from a belief in the stability of her resources—more than is entertained by all of our friends. These are no reasons why we should fear her, but only for being on the look out; and we shall all, when the extremity comes, owe you, my dear sir, a heavy debt for making our right so manifest in the eyes of this great nation. But Britain, I believe, has a firm conviction (such are the different eyes with which nations look) that she has rights in that country; and, by my estimate, she will not, as things stand, yield them north of the Columbia, but appeal to the sword, and very soon—unless an arbitration, or a mediation should arrest the appeal.

I pray you to excuse these presumptuous forebodings, in which I truly hope I may be wrong, but in the faith of which I am at present deeply imbued; and to believe me to be, with the most unfeigned and friendly respect,

Yours most faithfully,

RICHARD RUSH.

[RUSH TO BUCHANAN.]

SYDENHAM, near PHILADELPHIA, August 26, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I hardly know how to thank you sufficiently for your obliging favor of the 22d instant and the documents you have so kindly sent me respecting the Oregon negotiation. All have arrived safely, as well those by Mr. Sword as the separate one from you by mail; and now I have in hand everything I could wish.

My attention was specially directed to the protocol of the 24th of September, 1844, recording the break-up between Mr. Calhoun and Mr. Pakenham, and I can understand the hopeless prospect it seemed to leave to the new administration. When I used to brood over that protocol last winter, and recall what passed in Mr. Gallatin’s negotiation in ’26 and in mine of ’24, and weighed the long inflexibility with which England had adhered to the Columbia as her basis; and remembered also, as I freshly could and did, the solemnity—I have no doubt sincerity too at that time—with which Huskisson used to tell me that he and their whole cabinet thought _even that line_ a great concession to us, I did not see how war was to be avoided after the President’s bold and brilliant message when Congress opened. One of the Paris papers, the _Constitutionnel_, speaking of the settlement of the dispute, said that the English journals pretended that England had given to the United States a lesson of wisdom and moderation; but they might add, said the same paper, that “the Government of the United States, on its part, has given to all powers in relation with England a lesson of firmness.” This is the truth. I again own, that I did not think England would have yielded as much as she has; and although it appears from Mr. McLane’s communications that terms something better might have been finally obtained, but for the Senate, history will be justified in pronouncing the President’s course under the complications of the occasion (Mexico and everything else) wise and advantageous for the country, and one to draw a just fame to himself and the administration. England had got very near to her fighting point, and the settlement marks a great epoch in our annals—one not unlike, under some parallels that might be drawn, the war of 1812 in its acceleration of our national character.

The last article in the last _Edinburgh Review_, headed “Colonial Protection,” is an argument for us touching the West India trade with England, its principle covering full reciprocity as to our _shipping_ as well as traffic, though the Reviewers do not utter the former word; and now that the Whigs are in, it may be hoped that they will think so, and that Sir Robert Peel will co-operate with them, as on the sugar question. Sir Robert having done so much already, might now set about pushing Lord John Russell into farther liberality! What a curious spectacle this would present in the British parliament; yet things more remarkable have been happening there lately, and much more so than if they were at length to admit our tobacco almost duty free.

I am gratefully sensible to the friendly invitation you give me to your hospitable roof while going on with the investigation I spoke of, though am now through your kindness supplied with sufficient materials. Whether I shall venture upon another volume or not, I am quite undetermined. Sometimes I feel half inclined; then again the other scale kicks the beam. The latter is the case whenever I think of Hannah More’s comment upon Pope, who when quoting the line from him which says the greatest art in writing is “_to blot_,” says there is a greater—“the art _to stop_.”

If I live as long as my mother, who was out here this week at 86, in good health, I shall have time to make up my mind. Excuse this flight, as well as so long a letter, and pray believe in the friendly and perfect respect and esteem with which I am, my dear sir,

Sincerely yours,

RICHARD RUSH.

Mr. McLane, at his own request, was recalled from London after the settlement of the Oregon question, and Mr. Bancroft, who had been Secretary of the Navy, in October, 1846, became Mr. McLane’s successor. The following private letters may fitly close the present chapter:

[MR. BUCHANAN TO HON. GEO. BANCROFT.]

WASHINGTON, October 6, 1846.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I cannot suffer you to depart from the country without saying from the heart, God bless you! May your mission be prosperous, and Mrs. Bancroft and yourself happy! I sorely regret that we have lost your services in the Navy Department, and still more that we have lost your society; and this I do, without any disparagement to your successor, whom I highly esteem. My feelings, both in regard to Mrs. Bancroft and yourself, are warmly entertained by Mrs. Polk, with whom I have recently held a conversation on the subject.

The two most important objects of your mission will be to have the duties on tobacco diminished, and to obtain a relaxation of the present arrangement regulating our trade with the British West Indies and American provinces. Free trade is now the order of the day, and I am not without hope that these objects may be accomplished. I have omitted to instruct you on the former subject on your own suggestion. I desire that you should enjoy all the credit of the movement. I think a despatch embracing all the statistical and other information on the subject, with your own views, might do both the country and yourself much good.[94] In regard to the latter subject, I have not had sufficient time to give it a thorough investigation.

There is still much sickness in Washington, though not of a dangerous character. The centre of the city, F Street and the avenue, is comparatively healthy. Both Marcy and Mason have had intermittents,—they were, however, at the cabinet to-day. Miss Annie[95] appears to be entirely well, and is again as gay as a lark. Miss Clem.[96] is still very weak, and has not yet left her chamber, unless she has done so to-day.

With my kindest regards for Mrs. Bancroft, I remain, as ever, sincerely and respectfully,

Your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

[BANCROFT TO BUCHANAN.]

October 8, 1846.

MY DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—

My heart sunk within me as I read your letter containing new evidences of your friendship and regard; because it made me feel more sensibly how much I lose in parting from immediate co-operation with you. Your hint about tobacco I shall adopt, and will make it my special business to collect all the details. On the other subject also, which is of less immediate necessity, I propose to enter upon its consideration fully, first, however, submitting to you the paper which I may prepare. You must always deal with me frankly, giving me advice as freely as you would to a younger brother. You may be sure of my acting with caution; and I shall always aim to carry out your views in the manner that I think will be most satisfactory to you. I shall hope to hear from you very often privately, as well as officially.

Your parcels came yesterday safely to me, about an hour after I wrote to you.

Mrs. Bancroft joins me in expression of the most cordial regard.

Ever most truly yours,

GEORGE BANCROFT.

[BANCROFT TO BUCHANAN.]

LONDON, November 3, 1846.

MY DEAR MR. BUCHANAN:—

I must add a line to you if it be but to remind you personally of me. To-night I shall see a good deal of Lord Palmerston. The tone in England is, towards us, one of respect. Public opinion is in favor of letting us alone, and people are beginning to say that it would be a blessing to the world if the United States would assume the tutelage of Mexico. This country is neither in the disposition, nor in the ability, to interrupt its friendly relations with us. The good understanding between the British cabinet and the French is quite broken up, and they use in the newspapers and in private very harsh language towards each other. But by the next steamer I shall know more.

The paper at Springfield, Mass., which I named to you for the publication of the laws was the “_Hampden Post_,” the old Democratic newspaper with which I fought many a hard battle against the worst sort of malignant Whigs.

“Give my love to Mr. Buchanan,” says Mrs. Bancroft. So give my love to Clementina and Annie, say I, and wish them all happiness and abundant health. I wish them good husbands and you a good wife.

Ever faithfully yours,

G. BANCROFT.

[FROM MR. CALHOUN.]

FORT HILL, August 30, 1845.

MY DEAR SIR:—

I enclose a letter to ——, the minister appointed by the Dominican Republic to our Government, which I will thank you to have forwarded to his address.

He informs me that Mr. Hogan’s report will shortly be made. I hope if it should be favorable, the administration will not fail to recognize the independence of the republic, as soon as it can be done according to what has been usual in such cases. St. Domingo is, perhaps, the most fertile and best of all the West India Islands. It was lost to civilization and commerce through the insane movements of France during her revolution. Should the Dominican Republic sustain itself, it opens a prospect of restoring the island again to the domains of commerce and civilization. It may one day or another be one of the great marts for our products. It can sustain a population of many millions. It belongs to us to take the lead in its recognition.

I have good reason to believe that our recognition would be acceptable to both France and Spain......

I regret to learn that the prospect is so discouraging in reference to the settlement of the Oregon question by the parties. I regard it as very important that it should be settled. If it should not be, there is great danger of its leading to a rupture between the two countries, which would be equally disastrous to both. It is beyond the power of man to trace the consequences of a war between us and England on the subject of Oregon. All that is certain is, that she can take it and hold it against us, as long as she has the supremacy on the ocean, and retains her Eastern dominions. The rest is left in mystery.

As to my going again into the Senate, I do not contemplate to return ever again to public life. I am entirely content with the portion of the public honors which have fallen to my share, and expect to spend the rest of my days in retirement, in my quiet retreat near the foot of the mountains. I find ample and agreeable occupation both of mind and body.

With great respect, yours truly,

J. C. CALHOUN.

NOTE ON THE OREGON QUESTION.

Mr. Justin McCarthy, in his “History of our own Times,” passes very lightly over the Oregon controversy, leaving his readers to infer that the only element of danger was the popularity which any President would have gained by forcing England into a war. Nearly the whole of his “history” of this question is condensed into the following sentences: “The joint occupancy was renewed for an indefinite time; but in 1843 the President of the United States somewhat peremptorily called for a final settlement of the boundary. The question was eagerly taken up by excitable politicians in the American House of Representatives. For more than two years the Oregon question became a party cry in America. With a large proportion of the American public, including, of course, nearly all citizens of Irish birth or extraction, any President would have been popular beyond measure who had forced a war on England. Calmer and wiser counsels prevailed, however, on both sides. Lord Aberdeen, our foreign secretary, was especially moderate and conciliatory. He offered a compromise which was at last accepted.”

A true understanding of any past controversy between England and the United States is of importance in the future, not only that justice may be done to individual statesmen, but that the methods by which war has been averted and mutual respect and good feeling have been preserved, may have a salutary influence in all time to come. This is the chief value of the history of such international controversies. The truth is, that in this Oregon matter there were undoubtedly popular tendencies in this country, which, if they had been yielded to, might have enabled any President to force a war upon England, if he had been disposed to have one. But it is not true that there was anything precipitate or peremptory in the call for a final settlement of the boundary, or that the American Government was disposed at any time to go further in compliance with the popular demand than it was bound to go, by a proper regard for the rights of the country and the interests of the settlers in the national domain, who looked to it for protection. Moreover there was at one time quite as great a probability that a war on this question of Oregon would find backers in England, as there was that it would be popular in America. There were interests and passions in both countries that had strong tendencies to provoke a war: and the war would have occurred at a time when, to repeat the words of Mr. Webster, it “would have kindled flames that would have burned over the whole globe.”

When the President’s message of December, 1845, communicating to Congress the correspondence down to that period reached England, the British press became excessively violent and even abusive. Worse things could not have been said of any government or people than were said of the American nation and their rulers; and it is just as true, historically, that a war would have been popular in England, as it was that it would have been popular in America. In the House of Commons there were by no means wanting strong proofs of an unnecessary excitement.

In estimating the causes which produced the real peril of a war, it would not be just to overlook the loose, not to say careless, manner, in which the negotiation was at first conducted by and through the British minister in Washington. His rejection of Mr. Buchanan’s offer of the 49th parallel, without a reference to his own government, made in terms that were not well considered—that were in fact scarcely respectful—put it out of the power of the President to do anything but to reassert the American claim, and to leave the British government to renew the negotiation by other steps, or to take the consequences of a termination of the joint occupancy. It is not to be questioned that Lord Aberdeen’s subsequent course became moderate and conciliatory. But in the earlier stages of this business, Sir Robert Peel’s ministry had on hand a most serious domestic question. To borrow the pithy words of Mr. McCarthy himself, used in reference to that question: “Peel came into office in 1841 to maintain the corn laws, and in 1843 he repealed them.” It was in fact with Peel one long struggle between his former connections and the new opinions forced upon him by the circumstances in which he was placed; and although, in dealing with the relations between England and this country, in the earlier part of his ministry, there were manifested great care, prudence, and conciliation, it is quite certain that in the later controversy about Oregon, which had not been settled by the treaty of 1842, the British foreign office did not act at first with the same attentive circumspection, and was not represented at Washington with anything like the same ability and wisdom, as it was in the time of Lord Ashburton’s special mission. And how was it that public opinion and official persons in England were brought to a sense of the peril in which both nations stood in 1845–6? So far as salutary influences could be exerted on this side of the Atlantic and be felt in either country, great merit is due to two of our statesmen, Mr. Buchanan and Mr. Webster; the one having the duty of conducting the negotiation to a peaceful issue; the other the duty of watching it, and of using all his influence at home and abroad to produce caution, moderation, and a just sense of the responsibility that would rest upon those in either country who should unnecessarily lead the two nations into a war.

To Mr. Buchanan the praise is due, that he conducted the negotiation throughout with skill and firmness, with entire good temper, and without any wish to gain for the President or himself the cheap popularity that might have followed their propitiation of the war spirit among their countrymen. Mr. Webster’s admonitions, uttered with his accustomed solemnity, both on the popular platform and in the Senate, were addressed alike to both governments and both nations; but they were chiefly designed to affect opinion and feeling in England, and this design was, in a considerable degree, accomplished.

Footnote 91:

William R. King of Alabama. He was a Senator in Congress from that State for a period of nearly twenty-five years, from 1819 to 1844. He resigned his seat in the Senate and accepted the mission to France, to which he was appointed in April, 1844, by President Tyler. He was an accomplished statesman of broad and liberal views. A strong friendship had existed between him and Mr. Buchanan, from the time when the latter entered the Senate. Mr. King was at first under the impression that Mr. Buchanan had declined the judgeship, and on the 1st of January he wrote to express his gratification that the matter had taken this turn. But in fact the appointment was never offered.

Footnote 92:

This does not refer to Mr. Justice Grier, who became the successor of Judge Baldwin.

Footnote 93:

This refers to the measure for free trade in corn.

Footnote 94:

Mr. Bancroft informs me that he subsequently advised Mr. Buchanan not to open a negotiation for a reduction of the British taxes on tobacco, knowing that it would be a useless effort to endeavor to persuade England to change that part of her financial system.

Footnote 95:

The niece of Mrs. Madison.

Footnote 96:

Miss Clementina Pleasonton.