CHAPTER VIII.

1832–1833.

NEGOTIATION OF TREATIES—COUNT NESSELRODE—HIS CHARACTERISTIC MANAGEMENT OF OPPOSING COLLEAGUES—THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS—HIS SUDDEN ANNOUNCEMENT OF HIS CONSENT TO A COMMERCIAL TREATY—WHY NO TREATY CONCERNING MARITIME RIGHTS WAS MADE—RUSSIAN COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE AMERICAN PRESS—BARON SACKEN’S IMPRUDENT NOTE—BUCHANAN SKILFULLY EXONERATES HIS GOVERNMENT—SENSITIVENESS OF THE EMPEROR ON THE SUBJECT OF POLAND.

The serious business of negotiation began soon after Mr. Buchanan’s arrival in St. Petersburg. He was charged with the duty of proposing a commercial treaty with Russia, and also a treaty respecting maritime rights. It would be impossible to attempt to carry my readers through the maze of notes, protocols, and despatches which resulted in the successful accomplishment of the main object of this mission. A brief account of the principal persons concerned in the negotiation, and a narrative of its general course, together with a few of its most striking incidents, will perhaps be interesting.

At the head of the Russian chancery at this time was Count Nesselrode, the great minister, who, in 1814, as the plenipotentiary of the Emperor Alexander, signed the treaty between the Allied Powers and Napoleon, which wrested from the latter the empire of France and the kingdom of Italy, and confined his dominion to the island of Elba. Nesselrode, too, in the same capacity, along with Lord Castelreagh and Prince Talleyrand, concluded the second treaty of Paris between the Allied Powers and France, after the final overthrow of Napoleon at Waterloo, the treaty which restored the Bourbons to their throne. This distinguished person was the son of a nobleman of German descent, who had been in the service of the Empress Catharine II., and therefore, as well on account of the traditions of his house, as of his remarkable abilities and erudition, he must have been an interesting person to meet. He was, with all his practical astuteness, a man of moderate and rational views. He appears to have taken kindly to Mr. Buchanan from the first; but he was not predisposed to a commercial treaty with the United States, and, indeed, he had not bestowed much attention upon the subject. It had not been his habit, or the habit of any of the Russian statesmen, during the long wars in which Russia had been engaged prior to the year 1815, to look much beyond the confines of Europe and those portions of the East which were involved in the European system. Still, however, Count Nesselrode was open to conviction upon the importance of a commercial treaty with the United States; and it will appear in the sequel that the treaty was at length carried in the cabinet, against strenuous opposition, by his very dexterous management, seconded by Mr. Buchanan’s skilful course and ample knowledge of the subject.

Baron Krudener, who was at this time the Russian Minister at Washington, but who was at home on leave of absence when Mr. Buchanan came to St. Petersburg, was opposed to all commercial treaties. So was Count Cancrene, the minister of finance. He was an embodiment of the old traditionary policy of Russia, which did not favor close or special commercial alliances. From the time of the Empress Catharine, the relations between Russia and this country had always been friendly; but there had been no treaties concluded between the two countries, since the Government of this Union had taken its present form, down to the year 1824. The convention negotiated in that year by Mr. Middleton, and ratified in 1825, was quite inadequate to reach the various interests of trade that had since grown up, and was still less adapted to promote an increase of the commerce between Russia and the United States. To make a treaty which would answer these great purposes; establish the principle that would entitle either party to require an equal participation in the favors extended to other nations; provide for the residence and functions of consuls and vice-consuls; regulate the rates of duties to be levied oil the merchandise of each country by the other, so far as to prevent undue discrimination in favor of the products of other countries; and fix the succession of the personal estates of citizens or subjects of either country dying in the territories of the other; all this constituted a task to be committed on our side to able hands, considering the obstacles that had to be removed. Mr. Buchanan was at the age of thirty-eight, when he undertook this labor. Although he was without official experience in diplomacy, I think it evident that he had been a student of the diplomatic history of his own country and of public law to a considerable extent; and what he did not know of the trade between Russia and the United States before he left home, he made himself master of soon after he arrived at St. Petersburg. He spoke of himself in a letter quoted in the last chapter, as a tyro in diplomacy, with no weapons but a little practical common sense, knowledge, and downright honesty, with which to encounter the most adroit and skilful politicians in the world. It will be seen that he found the encounter a hard one. But his manners were conciliatory; his tact was never at fault, so far as I can discover; and it is evident that he was a favorite in all the circles of Russian society into which he entered. He found that his weapons, good sense, knowledge of his subject, and a certain honest tenacity of purpose, were sufficient for all the demands of his position. When he first reached St. Petersburg, his knowledge of the French language was quite imperfect, but he soon acquired sufficient facility in speaking it for the ordinary purposes of conversation. Count Nesselrode did not speak English well, but he could converse in that language, although he did not like to trust himself to it entirely. Mr. Buchanan’s French was perhaps rather better than the count’s English. They do not seem in their intercourse to have used an interpreter, but in one or the other language they got on together very well.

After Mr. Buchanan’s arrival and the necessary formalities had been gone through according to the rigid etiquette of the Russian court, he wrote privately to General Jackson on the 22d of June (1832) in regard to the prospects of his mission, as follows:

[MR. BUCHANAN TO GENERAL JACKSON.]

ST. PETERSBURG, June 22, 1832.

. . . . . . . . . .

I am not without hope of succeeding in the negotiation, though I can say nothing upon the subject with the least degree of certainty. I entertain this hope chiefly because I am now fully convinced it is their interest to enter into a treaty of commerce with us. In a casual conversation the other day with Baron Krudener I explained my views of the great advantages Russia derived from our commerce with St. Petersburg, and how much, in my opinion, the agriculture and the general prosperity of the colonies on the Black Sea would be promoted by encouraging American navigation in that quarter. Yesterday I had another conversation with the baron from which it was evident he had been conversing with Count Nesselrode upon the subject; and the impression which I have received from him is rather favorable. Still it is of a character so vague that I place but little reliance upon it. I shall see Count Nesselrode at one o’clock to-day, and will keep this letter open until after our interview.

3.30. I have just returned from Count Nesselrode’s, and from our interview I entertain a hope, I may say a good hope, that I shall be able to conclude both treaties with this government. I am sorry I shall not have time to prepare a despatch for Mr. Livingston to be sent by Captain Ramsay. He shall hear from me, however, by the first _safe opportunity_.

[There is one subject to which I desire briefly to direct your attention. I should write to the department about it, but my views are not yet sufficiently distinct to place them there upon record, and besides there is not now time. In case a treaty should be made with this government on the subject of maritime rights, its provisions ought to be framed with great care, because it will probably be a model for similar treaties with other nations. In looking over the project in my possession, I find one provision which it strikes me the cabinet ought to re-examine. It is the proviso to the first article. This proviso was not introduced into our earlier treaties. It first found a place in that with Spain and has since been copied into our treaties with Colombia, Central America and Brazil.

Why should this limitation exist? I shall allude to my views by presenting a supposed case, for I have not time to do more.

Suppose Great Britain, which does not recognize the principle that “free ships make free goods,” and Russia to be engaged in war after the treaty, the United States being neutral.

1. Would it not be greatly for our interest (more particularly as from our character we shall generally be a neutral nation) if our ships could carry the goods of Englishmen to Russia and all over the world, without these goods being subjected to capture by the armed vessels of Russia?

2. Would not great embarrassments arise if Russian vessels of war, after ascertaining that a vessel belonged to a citizen of the United States, which is all they could do under the general principle, should then under the proviso be permitted to inquire into the ownership of the cargo, and if they suspected it belonged in whole or in part to English subjects, to seize and take it before a prize court?

3. This proviso could only have been introduced to force England into the adoption of the rule that “the flag covers the cargo;” but how can it produce that effect? It will render the property of an Englishman as insecure on board an American as a British vessel; it being equally liable to seizure in either. But let the rule be general, let our flag protect the cargo, no matter who may be the owner, and then English merchants will have the strongest inducements to employ our navigation.

4. Would not the promise make the treaty itself a felo de se, whenever Russia shall be at war with a nation which does not recognize the general rule?

5. If England should at any time be neutral and we at war, the general rule adopted between us and Russia will not prevent us from capturing our enemies’ goods on board British vessels.

6. These suggestions become of much more importance when we consider that we may have similar treaties with many nations.

These crude remarks are merely intended to direct your attention to the subject. I consider it very important and should like to hear from the department in relation to it as soon as possible. We shall first take up the treaty of commerce, I presume; indeed Count Nesselrode has asked for my views in writing on that subject.

It might be of consequence to me to have a copy of our treaty with Turkey.]

In haste, I am, with the greatest respect,

Your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

P. S. Please remember me to the members of your cabinet and also your family.

2d P. S. Captain Ramsay, for whom I had obtained a courier’s passport, will not go to-day; but I have fortunately just heard of a vessel about sailing for Boston, by which I send this.

At a little later period, Mr. Buchanan formally submitted to Count Nesselrode the propositions which he had been instructed to make as the basis of a commercial treaty, and those which related to the subject of maritime rights, or the rights of neutrals during war. Nothing definite was arrived at on either topic until the 8th-10th of October. On that day, Mr. Buchanan received a note from Count Nesselrode, requesting him to call at the Foreign Office on the succeeding Monday. What followed was certainly a most remarkable occurrence. The count began the conversation by asking whether the answer which he was about to make to the American propositions would be in time to reach Washington before the next meeting of Congress. Mr. Buchanan replied that it would not, but said that it might reach Washington within a fortnight after that period. The count then asked if the answer could be sent immediately. Mr. Buchanan replied that if, as he hoped, the answer should be favorable, he would take measures to send it at once. The count then stated reasons, which had led the emperor to decline the American proposition for concluding a treaty of commerce and navigation between the two countries, but made no allusion to the proposed treaty concerning maritime rights. Here there was a dilemma, for which Mr. Buchanan was not prepared by anything that had preceded; for although he was well aware of the interior opposition to a commercial treaty in the Russian cabinet, and was not very sanguine of success, he had placed his hopes on Count Nesselrode’s ability and disposition to overcome that opposition. That the emperor had come to an unfavorable decision, and that Count Nesselrode had been directed to communicate it, was rather an unexpected event. Nesselrode, however, contrived to make Mr. Buchanan understand that the emperor had yielded in this matter to the opinions of Count Cancrene, the minister of finance, and of M. de Blondorff, the minister of the interior, and that the result had not been in accordance with his, Nesselrode’s, judgment. Such an occurrence could hardly have taken place in an English cabinet, still less would it have been communicated to a foreign minister; but in Russia it was perhaps not uncommon for the prime minister to be overruled by his colleagues. But Count Nesselrode knew a way to get over all such difficulties; and he proceeded in a very characteristic manner to accomplish what he intended. He went over anew the whole ground, encouraging Mr. Buchanan to develop again the reasons which made a commercial treaty desirable for both countries and finally requested him to put them in the shape of a formal note. He then assumed a very confidential tone, which may be best described by Mr. Buchanan’s own account, given in his despatch of October 19–21, to the secretary of state.

“Towards the conclusion of the interview he laid aside altogether, or at least appeared to do so, the wary diplomatist, and his manners became frank and candid. He made the request and repeated it, that I should submit a new proposition for the conclusion of a commercial treaty, and accompany it by an abstract of the explanations which I had just made, impressing it upon me to advert especially to the trade with the Black Sea, and the moral influence, to use his own expression, which such a treaty might have on the people of the United States. I told him I should do so with pleasure. He then requested me to send it as soon as I conveniently could and he would immediately submit it to the emperor, and give me an answer before the departure of the last steamboat, which was to leave St. Petersburg on Wednesday, the 19–21 instant. He afterwards asked me whether I intended to send the note to Washington which he had delivered to me, by the next steamboat; and from his manner it was easy to perceive that he wished I would not. I replied that I should certainly delay sending it until the last steamboat, hoping that in the meantime I might receive a better one......

Some conversation, not necessary to be repeated, was held on other subjects, and I took my leave much satisfied with the interview and arguing from it the most happy results, should Count Nesselrode possess sufficient influence to carry his own wishes into effect, against those of Count Cancrene.”

In a short time after Mr. Buchanan’s new communication had been sent to Count Nesselrode, a further step was taken in what might almost be called a diplomatic intrigue. Baron de Brunnow, a counsellor of state, and the confidential friend of Count Nesselrode, called upon Mr. Buchanan, and informing him that he came by the count’s request, said that Mr. Buchanan’s views contained in his note were perfectly satisfactory to the count, and that they were so clearly and distinctly expressed that they could not be misapprehended, and that the count would be happy to become the medium of presenting them to the emperor, and would use his influence to have them adopted. But in order that nothing might appear which would show that Count Nesselrode had requested Mr. Buchanan to submit a new proposition for a commercial treaty, the baron desired Mr. Buchanan to modify the language of his note, so that it would not appear to be written in compliance with any wish which the count had expressed. Perceiving the struggle which was about to ensue in the cabinet between Nesselrode and Cancrene, Mr. Buchanan at once agreed to change the phraseology of his note. Baron Brunnow requested that it might be done immediately, as it was Count Nesselrode’s intention to have the note translated into French on that day, and to go with it to the emperor on the next morning, so that an answer might, if possible, be obtained before the departure of the next steamboat. Baron Brunnow made no secret of Count Cancrene’s opposition to all commercial treaties, but said that Count Nesselrode saw no objection to such a one as Mr. Buchanan had proposed; that he had repeated Mr. Buchanan’s observation that “statesmen often found it expedient to yield even to honest prejudices for the purpose of promoting the public good,” and had said that he had no doubt such a treaty would produce a beneficial effect on the American trade with the Black Sea.

This mode of facilitating Count Nesselrode’s movements being arranged, the conversation between Mr. Buchanan and Baron Brunnow turned upon the proposed treaty concerning maritime rights, of which an account will be given hereafter. Excepting the interchange of formal notes relating to the commercial treaty, nothing further occurred until the 31st of October, when Mr. Buchanan calling at the Foreign Office by appointment, found Count Nesselrode “in fine spirits and in the most frank and candid mood.” But he said that it would be impossible to conclude the treaty before the end of a fortnight. In making the arrangements for sending to the United States the new notes which had passed, the count expressed the strongest desire that the British government should not obtain any knowledge that such a treaty was in contemplation; and for this reason he offered to send Mr. Buchanan’s despatch for Washington by a Russian courier, to be delivered to Mr. Vail, the American chargé in London. Mr. Buchanan preferred another channel of communication with Mr. Vail, and through that channel his despatch was sent off on the following day. The attitude in which it left the whole affair of the commercial treaty was thus summed up by Mr. Buchanan:

“For several weeks before the receipt of Count Nesselrode’s first note, I had but little expectation of concluding a commercial treaty. Mr. Kielchen, lately appointed consul at Boston by this government, informed me, some time ago, that Count Cancrene had resolved never to consent to the conclusion of such a treaty with any power whilst he continued in the ministry, and his influence with the emperor, particularly on commercial subjects, was universally admitted to be very great. He has the character of being an obstinate man; and I scarcely allowed myself to hope, either that he would change, or be defeated in his purpose. I feel the more happy, therefore, in being able to congratulate you upon our present favorable prospects.”

Nothing was heard from Count Nesselrode for nearly a month; but on the evening of November 21st Mr. Buchanan met him at a party. The count took Mr. Buchanan aside, and told him that he believed he was now ready for him, and proposed to send him a project of a treaty of commerce which should be founded on the provisions of the American treaties with Prussia, Sweden and Austria. Long interviews and oral discussions of this project then took place at the Foreign Office between Mr. Buchanan, Count Nesselrode, Baron Brunnow and Baron Sacken. In these discussions Mr. Buchanan evinced the most thorough acquaintance with the whole subject, and gave the Russian statesmen information which was new to them and greatly surprised them. At length all the details of the treaty were settled, and by the 17th of December it was prepared for signature in duplicate, in the French and English languages. Still the treaty was not yet signed. For the purpose of expediting the matter, Mr. Buchanan made a suggestion that as the emperor’s fête day, or his saint’s day, was to be celebrated on the 18th December, N. S., that it should be signed on that day. Count Nesselrode was pleased with the suggestion, and said that Mr. Buchanan’s wish should be gratified, if possible. Baron Sacken doubted if it would be practicable, but the count said it must be done, and that Mr. Clay, the American Secretary of Legation, could assist them in making the copies. This occurred on the 13th of December, N. S. It was not, however, until Mr. Buchanan was in the presence of the emperor, at his levée on the morning of the 18th, that he felt finally assured that the treaty would be signed, although Count Nesselrode had informed him on the 15th that he was authorized to sign it. What occurred at the emperor’s levée will be best told by Mr. Buchanan himself:

On Tuesday morning, the 18th, we went to the emperor’s levée; and on this occasion a singular occurrence took place in relation to the treaty.

The strictest secrecy had been preserved throughout the negotiation. Indeed I do not believe an individual, except those immediately concerned, had the least idea that negotiations were even pending. A rumor of the refusal of this government to make the treaty had circulated two months ago, and I was then repeatedly informed in conversation, that it was in vain for any nation to attempt to conclude a treaty of commerce with the Russian government, whilst Count Cancrene continued to be minister of finance. Count Nesselrode had on one occasion intimated a desire that the British government should not obtain a knowledge that negotiations were proceeding, and this was an additional reason on our part for observing the greatest caution.

It ought to be remembered, however, that this intimation was given before information had reached St. Petersburg of the conclusion of the late treaty between France and England in relation to the Belgian question. The diplomatic corps, according to the etiquette, were arranged in a line to receive the emperor and empress; and Mr. Bligh, the English minister, occupied the station immediately below myself. You may judge of my astonishment when the emperor, accosting me in French, in a tone of voice which could be heard by all around, said, “I signed the order yesterday that the treaty should be executed according to your wishes;” and then immediately turning to Mr. Bligh asked him to become the interpreter of this information. He (Mr. Bligh) is a most amiable man, and his astonishment and embarrassment were so striking that I felt for him most sincerely. This incident has already given rise to considerable speculation among the knowing ones of St. Petersburg; probably much more than it deserves.

I ought to remark that when I was presented to the emperor, I understood but little, I might almost say no, French; and there was then an interpreter present. Supposing this still to be the case, the emperor must have thought that an interpreter was necessary, and he was correct to a certain extent, for I have not yet had sufficient practice to attempt to speak French in the presence of the whole court. I trust this may not long be the case; but I still more ardently hope I may not very long continue in a situation where it will be necessary to speak that language.

There can be no doubt but that all which occurred was designed on the part of the emperor; and what must have rendered it still more embarrassing to Mr. Bligh was, that one object of Lord Durham’s mission is said to have been the conclusion of a commercial treaty with Russia.

After the emperor had retired, Mr. Bligh, in manifest confusion, told me he feared he had been a very bad interpreter, and asked me what kind of a treaty we had been concluding with Russia, to which I replied it was a treaty of commerce.

Count Nesselrode was not present at the moment, and from his manner when I informed him of the incident, I believe he had not previously received any intimation of the emperor’s intention to make such a disclosure.

The count and myself afterwards proceeded from the palace to the Foreign Office and there signed the treaty. The only persons present were Baron Brunnow and Baron Sacken. On this occasion but little worthy of repetition occurred. They all exhibited the greatest cordiality and good will, and the count emphatically declared that he believed we had that day completed a work which would result in benefits to both nations.

On taking my leave, I expressed no more than I felt, in thanking him for his kind and candid conduct throughout the whole negotiation, and he paid me some compliments in return......

Thus, sir, you have in my different despatches a faithful history of the whole progress of the negotiation up to its termination. Independently of the positive advantages secured to our commerce by the treaty, and of the stipulation prohibiting Russia from granting favors to any other nation at our expense, there is another consideration which deserves attention. I think I cannot be mistaken in asserting that if the feelings of the Russians towards our country in the days of the Emperor Alexander were of a kindly character, which I have no reason to doubt, they have undergone some change since the accession of his present majesty. In a future despatch I may probably state my reasons for this impression. The very fact, however, of concluding the present treaty and thus distinguishing us from other commercial nations, connected with the time and manner in which his majesty thought proper to announce it, will have a powerful influence favorable to our country among the members of a court where every look and every word of the emperor is noted and observed almost as if he were a Divinity. I may say that I have already experienced a change: even Count Cancrene, in a conversation with Baron Steiglitz of this city, has expressed his assent to the treaty, observing at the same time that the United States formed an exception to his general principles on this subject. He added a compliment to myself of such a character as I know I do not deserve, and therefore I shall not repeat.[32]

In announcing to the Secretary of State (on the 20th of December, 1832, N. S.) the conclusion of the commercial treaty, Mr. Buchanan said:

“I have now the pleasure of transmitting to you a treaty of commerce and navigation, which was signed on Tuesday last, the 18th instant, between the United States and Russia, by Count Nesselrode and myself. I congratulate the President, that after many fruitless attempts have been made by our Government to conclude such a treaty, it has at last been accomplished.

“Like yourself, I confess, I did not entertain sanguine hopes of success when I left Washington. The despatch of Mr. Randolph upon this subject was indeed very discouraging. The difficulties in prospect, however, served only to inspire me with a stronger resolution to accomplish, if practicable, the wishes of the President. This I trust has been done without the slightest sacrifice, in my person, of either the dignity or the honor of the country. Should my conduct throughout this difficult, and in some respects extraordinary negotiation, receive his approbation and that of the Senate, I shall be amply compensated for my labors.”

That Mr. Buchanan was not equally successful in concluding a treaty concerning maritime rights is a matter that admits of easy explanation. In the communication which was made to him by Count Nesselrode in October (1832), there was conveyed a respectful refusal to make the commercial treaty. At the interview which took place afterward between Baron Brunnow and Mr. Buchanan, at the house of the latter, after they had arranged for re-opening the negotiation concerning a commercial treaty, there was a conversation on the other subject, which was thus reported by Mr. Buchanan to the Secretary of State:

After our conversation ended on this subject,—I referred to that portion of the note of Count Nesselrode which declined our offer to conclude a treaty on maritime rights, and said that the President would probably not be prepared for this refusal. I told him that on the 28th August, 1828, N. S., a few months before the election of General Jackson, Baron Krudener had addressed a communication to the Department of State which gave a strong assurance that the emperor was willing to conclude such a treaty. That when General Jackson assumed the reins of Government in the month of March following, he had found this communication on file, and that was the principal reason why he had given Mr. Randolph instructions to conclude a treaty concerning neutral rights. I was therefore surprised no allusion whatever had been made to this important letter in the note of Count Nesselrode, and that he had passed it over as though it had never existed, whilst he referred to the note he had addressed to Mr. Middleton so long ago as the 1st of February, 1824, for the purpose of explaining the views of the imperial government at the present moment.

I then produced the communication of Baron Krudener to Mr. Brent of the 16–28th of August, 1828, and read it to Baron Brunnow. After he had perused it himself, he expressed his surprise at its contents, and said he did not believe a copy of it had been transmitted to the Foreign Office; that he could say for himself he had never seen it before. He thought the baron must have gone further than his instructions had warranted; and that instead of expressing the willingness of the emperor to _adopt by mutual agreement_, the principles concerning neutral rights proposed by the United States, he ought merely to have expressed the _concurrence_ of the emperor in those principles and his desire to preserve and protect them. He added that these rights were best maintained by the power of nations, and we had nobly defended them during our late war with England. I replied, that was very true, and the United States were becoming more and more powerful every year, and had less and less occasion to rely upon treaties for the maintenance of their neutral rights.

I afterwards remarked that I thought the count, from the tenor of his note, had probably overlooked one circumstance of importance in considering this subject, as he had placed the refusal chiefly on the ground that it would be useless for only two powers to conclude such a treaty between themselves. That the fact was, the United States already had treaties of a similar character with several nations, which I enumerated, and that if Russia had concluded this treaty, in case she should hereafter unfortunately be engaged in war with any of these powers, the property of her subjects would be secure from capture by their ships of war, on board of American vessels. He replied that as to Prussia, Sweden, and Holland there was little danger of any war between them and Russia; and that we had no such treaties with the maritime powers with whom Russia was likely to be engaged in hostilities.

(Evidently, as I supposed, alluding to England and France.)

In the course of the conversation, I regretted that I had never seen the note addressed by Count Nesselrode to Mr. Middleton in February, 1824, and that there was no copy of it in the archives of the legation here. He then said he would take pleasure in sending me a copy, and thought he might assure me with perfect confidence, from the feelings of Count Nesselrode towards myself, that he would be happy to send me at all times copies of any other papers I might desire from the Foreign Office.

He at first proposed to repeat this conversation to Count Nesselrode. I replied I had no objection. It was not intended by me as an attempt to renew the negotiation at the present time; but merely to make some suggestions to him in free conversation. Before he took leave, however, he said he believed that as his mission to me had been of a special character, he would report nothing to the count but what had a relation to the commercial treaty—except that I desired to have a copy of his note to Mr. Middleton; but that after the other subject was finally disposed of, he thought I ought to mention these things to Count Nesselrode myself. I told him I probably might, that what I had said to him on this subject, had been communicated in a frank and friendly spirit, and I considered it altogether unofficial. No doubt he repeated every word.

What is here related occurred in the autumn of 1832, and the subject of maritime rights was not again alluded to until the following spring. Writing to General Jackson a private letter on the 29th of May, 1833, Mr. Buchanan said:

I fear I shall not be able to conclude the treaty concerning maritime rights, though I shall use my best exertions. My late attempt to introduce the subject was not very successful, as you will have seen from my last despatch.

I have now, after much reflection, determined on my plan of operations. It would not be consistent with the high character of our Government, or with what I am confident would be your wishes, that I should make another direct official proposition, without a previous intimation that it would be well received; and we might thus be subjected to another direct refusal so soon after the last. It is therefore my intention to present my views of the subject in the form of an unofficial note, and to express them with as much clearness and force as I am capable [of]. I shall not in this note seek a renewal of the negotiation; though I shall leave it clearly to be inferred that such is my desire. If they should not move in the business afterwards, it would neither be proper nor dignified to press them further.

I am convinced they are endeavoring to manage England at present, and that this is an unpropitious moment to urge them to adopt principles of public law which would give offence to that nation. Besides, Russia has now a large navy, and but a small commercial marine; and it is not for such a power as she now believes herself to be, to desire to change the law of nations in such a manner as to abridge her belligerent rights. The principle “that free ships shall make free goods,” will always be most popular with nations who possess a large commercial marine and a small navy, and whose policy is peaceful. But I shall do my best. I hope this question may be determined by the beginning of August, as I should then have the opportunity of seeing something more of Europe, and yet reach the United States about the end of November. By the last accounts, my mother’s health was decidedly better, so that on that ground I need not so much hasten my return.

I have received many letters which give me strong assurances that I shall be elected to the Senate. I confess, however, that I feel very doubtful of success. The men in Pennsylvania, who have risen to power by the popularity of your name, while in heart they are opposed to you, will do every thing they can to prevent my election. The present governor is greatly influenced by their counsels, and his patronage is very great and very powerful. Besides, the Nullifiers and their organ, the _Telegraph_, will show me no quarter. Thank God! I know how to be content with a private station, and I shall leave the Legislature to do just as they please......

Our excellent consul here is in very bad health from the severity of the climate. His physician says that he must travel, and that immediately: but I entertain some doubts whether he has sufficient strength left for the purpose. It is said, however, that he was restored once before by a change of climate, when in an equally weak condition. He purposes to set off in a few weeks, and Mr. Clay, who will have little else to attend to, will do his business cheerfully during his absence. I sincerely wish he could obtain a situation in a milder climate. It would be a most happy circumstance for the commerce of the United States if all our consuls were like Mr. G. After sending my note to Count Nesselrode, I intend to visit Moscow for a few days, as he is to be absent himself. I beg to present my respects to your family, and to Messrs. Barry, Taney, McLane and Woodbury.

The simple truth is, that the Russian government, since the intimation made by Baron Krudener just before General Jackson became President, had changed its mind in regard to the subject of maritime rights. The reason for declining to make the treaty in 1832–33, as explained by Count Pozzo di Borgo to Mr. Buchanan, in Paris, accords entirely with what Mr. Buchanan had learned at St. Petersburg.[33] The attitude of the Belgian question, and the relations of Russia towards England, precluded the acceptance of the American proposal to establish by treaty between Russia and the United States the principle that “free ships make free goods.”

All of Mr. Buchanan’s official duties at St. Petersburg were not, however, so entirely pleasant as the negotiation of the commercial treaty. While this negotiation was in its early stage, Baron Sacken, who had been left by Baron Krudener as Russian chargé d’affaires at Washington, made to the Secretary of State a somewhat offensive communication, complaining of certain articles in _The Globe_, the official paper of the American Government, concerning the conduct of Russia towards Poland. The complaint was doubtless made in ignorance of the fact that although the _Globe_ was the official gazette of our Government, the President had no control over or responsibility for its editorial articles, or the articles which it copied from English or French journals. The freedom of the press in this country was not understood by Russian officials; and although it does not appear that Baron Sacken’s act was directed from St. Petersburg, there can be no doubt that in making the complaint he did what he believed would be acceptable to his superiors at home. He, however, considerably overshot the mark, in the tone and manner of his communication to the Department of State, and it became necessary for the President to direct Mr. Buchanan to lay the matter before the Russian government. This was done by a despatch from Mr. Livingston, courteous but firm, pointing out the impossibility of exercising in this country any governmental constraint over the press, and making very clear the offensive imputation of insincerity on the part of the President contained in Baron Sacken’s note. This occurrence was not known at St. Petersburg, at least it was not known to Mr. Buchanan, while the negotiation of the commercial treaty was pending. On the receipt of Mr. Livingston’s despatch, which was written early in January, 1833, Mr. Buchanan had an interview with Count Nesselrode on the subject, of which he gave the following account to the Secretary of State:

February 26th, 1833.

On yesterday at 2 o’clock, P. M., I had a conference with the count. I inquired if he had yet received from Washington the answer of Mr. Livingston to Baron Sacken’s note of the 14th of October last; to which he replied in the affirmative. After expressing my regret that anything unpleasant should have occurred at Washington in the intercourse between the two governments, whilst everything here had been proceeding so harmoniously, I observed:

That Baron Sacken himself, in his note to Mr. Brent, had admitted that the President, throughout the whole course of his administration, had constantly expressed a desire to be on friendly terms with Russia. But the President’s feelings had not been confined to mere official declarations to the Russian government; they had been expressed, in strong terms, before the world in each of his annual messages to Congress, previous to the date of Baron Sacken’s note. Besides they had been always manifested by his conduct.

The baron [I said], with a full knowledge of these facts, had addressed this note to Mr. Brent, which was not only offensive in its general tone, but more especially so in imputing a want of sincerity to the President, and in effect charging him with tacitly encouraging the abuse of the emperor by the American newspapers, whilst he was professing friendship towards the Russian government. Such a charge was well calculated to make a strong impression upon General Jackson, a man who, during his whole life, had been distinguished for sincerity and frankness. When, after Mr. Clay’s departure, I had perused this note, with which his excellency had been good enough to furnish me, I was convinced the President could not pass it over in silence; and I had since been astonished not to have received, until very recently, any communication on the subject.

I had now discovered that the reason of this delay was an anxious desire on the part of the President to avoid everything unpleasant in the intercourse between the two countries; and had formed an expectation that Baron Sacken himself, after reflection, would have rendered it unnecessary to bring the subject before the imperial government. In this hope the President had been disappointed. Nearly two months had transpired before Mr. Livingston answered his note. In the meantime, a fair opportunity was afforded him to withdraw it, and a verbal intimation given that this would be more agreeable to the President than to take the only notice of it which he could take with propriety. Mr. Livingston had supposed that, under the circumstances, the baron would have felt it to be his duty to visit Washington, where, at a verbal conference, the affair might have been satisfactorily adjusted. In this opinion he found he was mistaken. At length, on the 4th December, he addressed the baron this answer, which places in a striking light the most offensive part of his note, the charge of insincerity. Even in it, however, the President’s feelings of amity for Russia and respect for the emperor are reiterated.

After this answer, Mr. Livingston waited nearly another month, confident that a disavowal of any offensive intention would, at least, have been made. This not having been done, he has sent me instructions, under date of the 3d January last, to bring the subject under the notice of the imperial government; and it is for that purpose I have solicited the present interview.

The count expressed his regret that any misunderstanding should have occurred between Baron Sacken and Mr. Livingston; it was evident the former never could have intended anything offensive to the President, as he had taken the precaution of submitting his note of the 14th of October to Mr. Livingston in New York before it was transmitted to the Department, who not only made no objection to it at the time, but informed him it should be answered in a few days. The count then asked if Mr. Livingston had not communicated this circumstance to me in his despatches. I replied in the negative, and from my manner intimated some doubt as to its existence; when he took up the despatch of Baron Sacken and read to me, in French, a statement of this fact. He said, if Mr. Livingston had at that time objected to any part of the note, the baron would have immediately changed its phraseology. I replied that the President at least had certainly never seen the note previous to its receipt at the Department; and it appeared to me manifestly to contain an imputation on his sincerity, and was besides offensive in its general character. He did not attempt to justify its language, but repeated that he thought Baron Sacken never could have intended to write anything offensive to the President. If he had, it would have been done in violation of his instructions. That the feelings of the emperor as well as his own were of the most friendly nature towards the Government of the United States, and that, in particular, both the emperor and himself entertained the highest respect and esteem for the character of the President. That neither of them would ever think of sanctioning the imputation of insincerity or anything that was dishonorable to General Jackson, and he was very sorry Baron Sacken had written a note the effect of which was to wound his feelings.

As the count did not still seem to be altogether satisfied that the note attributed insincerity to the professions of the President, I then took it up and pointed out in as clear and striking a manner as I could, the most offensive passages which it contained. After I had done, he repeated in substance what he had said before, but without any qualification whatever, expressing both his own sorrow and that of the emperor, that Baron Sacken should have written a note calculated to wound the feelings of General Jackson, or to give him any cause of offence. He added, that the baron either already had left, or would soon leave the United States; and he had no doubt, that soon after the arrival of the treaty and of Baron Krudener at Washington, all matters would be explained to the satisfaction of the President; by whom, he trusted, this unpleasant occurrence would be entirely forgotten.

With this explanation, I expressed myself perfectly satisfied, and assured him I should have great pleasure in communicating it to the President.

He then observed that, judging from the despatch of Baron Sacken, this unfortunate business seemed to have been a succession of mistakes. That Mr. Livingston, through Mr. Kremer, had pointed out to the baron the exceptional parts of his note; but whilst he was engaged in correcting them, and before sufficient time for this purpose had been afforded, he had received Mr. Livingston’s note of the 4th of December.

In the course of the interview, the count read me several detached paragraphs from Baron Sacken’s despatch, and from their character I received the impression that he had become alarmed at the consequences of his own conduct, and was endeavoring to justify it in the best manner he could.

We afterwards had some conversation respecting the publications in our newspapers, in which allusion was made to the explanations I had given him on this subject in December. He stated distinctly that they were now fully aware of the difficulties which would attend any attempt to interfere with the press under our form of Government.

In obedience to your instructions, I now read to him the greater part of Despatch No. 5, and explained the nature of the only connection which our Government has with the official paper. After having done so, I asked him to consider the consequences of an unsuccessful attempt on the part of the administration at Washington to control the _Globe_; and told him that in that event, the editor, by publishing it to the world, would make both the emperor and the President subjects of abuse throughout the Union. The press was essentially free in our country. Even the Congress of the United States had no power to pass any law for the punishment of a libel on the President. This subject was exclusively under the jurisdiction of the several States.

That, it was true, editors were often influenced by the counsel of those whom they respected, therefore I had communicated his request to General Jackson, that he would advise the editor of the _Globe_ to desist hereafter from offensive publications against Russia, but even this would be a delicate matter to proceed from a person holding the office of President of the United States. I then informed him that I had been much pleased, some weeks since, to observe in the St. Petersburg _Journal_ an official contradiction of some of the acts attributed to the Russian government of Poland; that I had sent the paper which contained it to the Department of State, and had no doubt it would be extensively published in the United States. He expressed great satisfaction that I had taken the trouble, and said it would be very agreeable to them to have this contradiction circulated throughout our country.

It is scarcely worth repeating that he objected, in a good-natured manner, to the designation of Baron Sacken’s note in the despatch as “a formal note,” observing that a formal note always commenced with “the undersigned,” and not the first person. This was intended to be an informal note, and that was the reason it had been submitted to Mr. Livingston before it was transmitted to the Department of State.

I congratulate you that this unpleasant affair has had such an auspicious termination. We shall, I think, hear no more complaints from this quarter, on the subject of publications in the American newspapers, especially if the editor of the _Globe_ should be a little more circumspect in his course hereafter.

In regard to the subject of Polish affairs, the treatment of which by the _Globe_ was the occasion of Baron Sacken’s imprudent note, it will be seen hereafter that the emperor was peculiarly sensitive to the comments of the foreign press. Mr. Buchanan, who had the best opportunity for observation while he was in St. Petersburg, formed the opinion that the personal attacks upon the emperor, on account of the conduct of his government towards the Poles, with which the English, French, and American journals abounded, were to a certain extent unjust; that the inveterate national hatreds with which the Russian and Polish races regarded each other, were at the bottom of most of the difficulties with which the emperor had to contend; and that the fact that Russian officers were intrusted with power in Poland over a race whom they hated and by whom they were hated in turn, inevitably led to many of the cruelties and oppressions with which the world outside of Russia resounded, and which were charged upon the emperor personally, as if he had designed them. Buchanan did not palliate or excuse the conduct of the Russian government towards the Poles; nor does he seem on any occasion, when it was proper for him to refer to it, to have allowed any one to suppose that he defended it. But in writing to his own Government or to his friends at home, he did not hesitate to say that he thought many of the causes which produced the oppression that so roused the indignation of the world, lay deep in the national hatred between the two races, and were not to be imputed to an arbitrary and cruel temper in the emperor.

He looked upon the despotism which he saw with the calm eye of an observer who could comprehend its character and trace its operations, without doing injustice to the reigning monarch. He saw a vast nation entirely incapable of any thing like constitutional liberty, and governed by the absolute will of one man, to obey whom was at once a point of religion, loyalty and patriotism. Between the nobility and the throne, there was no middle class, capable of thinking or acting upon any political subject; and the nobility, as a rule, were capable and desirous of no other political training, ideas or aspirations than such as would fit them for the part of useful servants of an emperor whom they adored, and of a system which constituted their country the most peculiar and the least free of any in Europe. The statesmen who were formed under such a system were, as might naturally be expected, accomplished in many ways, subtle and often powerful reasoners; and they were not seldom among the ablest men of the age. When they were made to understand how completely, as Mr. Buchanan said, they and we were “political antipodes,” they found no difficulty in yielding to the necessity of respecting a state of things in America which was so unlike any thing that they knew at home. At first, Count Nesselrode could not understand how a government could have an official organ, and yet disclaim responsibility to a foreign power for what that organ said in its editorial columns. But when it was explained to him that the American Government did disclaim that responsibility, and was obliged to do so by the nature of its political institutions, he did not make it his business to argue the point, but gracefully accepted the explanation and put an end to the whole of the misunderstanding.

It must be confessed, however, that while Mr. Buchanan fully and firmly carried out his instructions and procured all the admission that his own Government desired, in regard to Baron Sacken’s note, it was a pretty fine distinction that his Government had to draw. It was perfectly true that the _Globe_ was the official gazette of the American Government, and yet that its editorial columns could not be legally controlled by the President. Still it might be a question whether an American administration should have had an official organ, with which it was connected on such terms that the editor or conductor was just as independent of its influence or its power, as if he published a newspaper that was not connected in any way with the Government. Both at home and abroad, the editorial columns of the _Globe_ were liable to be regarded as speaking the sentiments of the administration; and when it became necessary to disclaim that they did so, the explanation, although made upon undeniable facts, was an awkward one to make. Mr. Buchanan certainly felt it to be so, for in writing to the Secretary of State, after he had obtained from Count Nesselrode all the disavowal that was desired, he said:

I have time but for few remarks upon this strange interview.

It serves to show how indispensable it is that our minister to this country should be kept advised of every proceeding in the United States which may affect the relations between the two nations. He has indeed a most difficult part to perform. He must be cautious in the extreme, and is under the habitual necessity of concealing his real sentiments. It is utterly impossible for these people to realize the state of affairs in the United States. We are political antipodes, and hence the great difficulty of maintaining those friendly relations which are so important to the interests of our country. I know not when the despatch was received containing a copy of Baron Sacken’s note to Mr. Brent, or what influence it might have had upon the negotiation had it reached him [Nesselrode] at an earlier period. Of this, however, I feel confident, that, if a copy of this note had been transmitted [to me] immediately after its receipt, this unpleasant interview might have been avoided altogether....

I would suggest the policy of advising the editor of the _Globe_ to abstain at least from severe editorial paragraphs respecting the emperor of Russia. Neither the cause of Poland nor of human liberty could suffer by his silence in a country where there are so many faithful sentinels, and I should, _by all means_, advise the publication of a strong editorial paragraph in the _Globe_, expressing a proper sense of the good feelings of the emperor of Russia, evinced towards the United States in making us an exception to his general policy by concluding the commercial treaty. If this should be done, and more particularly if the President should, even in the slightest manner, allude to the circumstance in his inaugural address, it would be very grateful personally to the feelings of the emperor.

I have felt it my duty to take measures, though they may be expensive to the Government, of having the semi-weekly _Globe_ transmitted to me through the post-office from London. Will you be particular in giving directions that it shall be regularly forwarded from New York by every packet. It is true it will be read at the post-office here; but should it contain anything offensive, I shall know it almost as soon as this government and before the Russian minister at Washington can have an opportunity of transmitting any inflammatory commentaries. I assure you, I feel the delicacy of my position; but knowing your distinguished abilities and long experience, if I could but only attract your special regard to this mission, I think, between us, we might, in perfect consistency with the high and independent character of our own country, keep his imperial majesty in a state of better feeling towards us than almost any other nation. We have much to gain by such a course and nothing to lose.

I requested Mr. Vail, some time ago, to send me the semi-weekly _Globe_ by mail from London. Although this may be expensive to the Government, it cannot be avoided, and it is absolutely necessary that I should receive it. It would seem, however, that the department has ceased forwarding them to London. Will you be kind enough to give directions that they shall be sent, in a separate parcel, by every Liverpool packet from New York.

Footnote 32:

It should be said here that the whole course of this negotiation shows that the details of the treaty were entrusted largely to Mr. Buchanan’s discretion. At that time, indeed, it was impracticable for an American minister in Europe, and especially at St. Petersburg, to be guided from day to day, or even from month to month, by the Secretary of State. The Atlantic had not then been crossed by steam. I have gone through with the minute discussions which took place between Mr. Buchanan and the Russian Foreign Office, but have not deemed it necessary to display them to my readers. They evince on his part a thorough acquaintance with the whole subject, and a remarkable power of carrying his points.

Footnote 33:

See _post_ an account of Mr. Buchanan’s conversation with Pozzo di Borgo in Paris.