CHAPTER V.

1827–1829.

GREAT INCREASE OF GENERAL JACKSON’S POPULARITY—“RETRENCHMENT” MADE A POLITICAL CRY—DEBATE ON THE TARIFF—BUCHANAN ON INTERNAL IMPROVEMENTS—THE INTERESTS OF NAVIGATION—THE CUMBERLAND ROAD AGAIN DISCUSSED—INELIGIBILITY OF A PRESIDENT.

The 20th Congress, which assembled in December, 1827, opened with a great increase in the forces of the opposition. The elections in the autumn of 1826 evinced an extraordinary growth of General Jackson’s popularity. Mr. Adams found himself in a minority in both branches of Congress. In the House, the opponents of his administration numbered 111 members, its friends 94. It is quite probable, however, that but for the indiscretion of certain members who have ranked as friends of the administration, the angry and criminating discussion of the subject of “retrenchment,” which was deprecated by the wisest men of the opposition, but into which they were forced, would not have occurred. It was precipitated by the defiant attitude of two or three members who should have allowed the cool leaders of the opposition to strangle it, as they were at first disposed to do. But once commenced, it drew into bitter strife the excited elements of party and personal warfare, and went on through nearly a whole session with little credit to some who participated in it, but in the end to the great and not altogether just damage of the administration.

It happened that on the 22d of January (1828) a member from Kentucky, Mr. Chilton, an earnest “Jackson man,” who had formerly been a clergyman but was now a politician, introduced in the House certain resolutions instructing the Committee of Ways and Means to report what offices could be abolished, what salaries reduced, and other modes of curtailing the expenses of the government. It is apparent that this could not have been a step taken by concert with the leaders of the opposition. A party that was daily growing in strength, and that was almost morally certain to overthrow the party of the administration, and to elect the next President, could have had no motive for shackling themselves with a legislative measure reducing the number of offices or the salaries of the officers that must be retained. They could not know in advance how they could carry on the government, and it would be mere folly for them to put laws on the statute-book framed while they were not charged with the duties of administration, and suggested only as a topic for exciting popular discontent against those who were responsible neither for the existing number of offices nor for the salaries paid to them. “Retrenchment,” as a popular cry, was not a movement which the leading men of the opposition in the House of Representatives either needed or desired to initiate. Mr. McDuffie, the chairman of the Committee of Ways and Means, and a vehement opponent of the administration, objected to Mr. Chilton’s resolutions at the outset. So did Mr. Buchanan; and the latter often said, in subsequent years, that they would have been crushed out of all consideration, if the friends of the administration had left them in the hands of its opponents. They were moved by an inconsiderable member, who was one of the stragglers of the opposition forces, and they were met by administration members who were about equally inconsiderable, in a tone of challenge and defiance. In vain did Mr. McDuffie and Mr. Buchanan contend that the present was no time to discuss the expenditures of the government. In vain did the most considerable and important friends of the administration deprecate an unprofitable, intolerant, and useless debate. The mover of the resolutions would not be silenced, and the few indiscreet supporters of the administration, who demanded that their discussion should go on, would not permit them to receive their proper quietus by the application of “the previous question.” Never was a deliberative body drawn, in spite of the unwillingness of its best members on both sides, into a more unseemly and profitless discussion.

Among the friends of General Jackson who deprecated and endeavored to put a stop to this discussion was Mr. Edward Livingston of Louisiana, the oldest member of the House, and a person of great distinction. He made an earnest appeal to the House to end the whole matter by referring the resolutions to a committee without further debate. This was not acceded to by the friends of the administration, who wished to continue the discussion. Mr. Edward Everett, then a young member from Massachusetts, moved an adjournment after Mr. Livingston’s effort to terminate the whole discussion, in order to make a speech, which he delivered on the 1st of February. Mr. Buchanan said in reply to him: “This debate would have ended on Thursday last, after the solemn appeal for that purpose, which was made to the House by the venerable gentleman from Louisiana, had not the gentleman from Massachusetts himself prevented it by moving an adjournment. That gentleman ought to know that he can never throw himself into any debate without giving it fresh vigor and importance.”

In the course of this speech, Mr. Buchanan made some allusion to the alleged “bargain and corruption” by which Mr. Adams had been made President; and he thus touched upon the only important consideration that could be said to belong to the circumstances of that election:

“Before, however, I commence my reply to that gentleman, I beg leave to make a few observations on the last Presidential election. I shall purposely pass over every charge which has been made, that it was accomplished by bargain and sale or by actual corruption. If that were the case, I have no knowledge of the fact, and shall therefore say nothing about it. I shall argue this question as though no such charges had ever been made. So far as it regards the conduct which the people of the United States ought to pursue, at the approaching election, I agree entirely with the eloquent gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Randolph] (I cannot with propriety call him my friend), that it can make no difference whether a bargain existed or not. Nay, in some aspects in which the subject may be viewed, the danger to the people would be the greater, if no corruption had existed. It is true, that this circumstance ought greatly to influence our individual opinions of the men who now wield the destinies of the Republic; but yet the precedent would be at least equally dangerous in the one case as in the other. If flagrant and gross corruption had existed, every honest man would start from it with instinctive horror, and the people would indignantly hurl those men from the seats of power, who had thus betrayed their dearest interests. If the election were pure, there is, therefore, the greater danger in the precedent. I believe, in my soul, that the precedent which was established at the last Presidential election, ought to be reversed by the people, and this is one of my principal reasons for opposing the re-election of the present Chief Magistrate.

“Let us examine this subject more closely. General Jackson was returned by the people of this country to the House of Representatives, with a plurality of electoral votes. The distinguished individual who is now the Secretary of State, was then the Speaker of this House. It is perfectly well known, that, without his vote and influence, Mr. Adams could not have been elected President. After the election, we beheld that distinguished individual, and no man in the United States witnessed the spectacle with more regret than I did, descending—yes, Sir, I say descending—from the elevated station which you now occupy, into the cabinet of the President whom he had elected.

“‘Quantum mutatus ab illo.’

“In the midnight of danger, during the darkest period of the late war, ‘his thrilling trump had cheered the land.’ Although among the great men of that day there was no acknowledged leader upon this floor, yet I have been informed, upon the best authority, that he was ‘primus inter pares.’ I did wish, at a future time, to see him elevated still higher. I am one of the last men in the country who could triumph over his fallen fortunes. Should he ever return to what I believe to be correct political principles, I shall willingly fight in the same ranks with him as a companion—nay, after a short probation, I should willingly acknowledge him as a leader. What brilliant prospects has that man not sacrificed!

“This precedent, should it be confirmed by the people at the next election, will be one of most dangerous character to the Republic. The election of President must, I fear, often devolve upon this House. We have but little reason to expect that any amendment, in relation to this subject, will be made to the Constitution in our day. There are so many conflicting interests to reconcile, so many powers to balance, that, when we consider the large majority in each branch of Congress, and the still larger majority of States, required to amend the Constitution, the prospect of any change is almost hopeless. I believe it will long remain just as it is. What an example, then, will this precedent, in the pure age of the Republic, present to future times! The people owe it to themselves, if the election must devolve upon this House, never to sanction the principle that one of its members may accept, from the person whom he has elected, any high office, much less the highest in his gift. Such a principle, if once established, must, in the end, destroy the purity of this House, and convert it into a corrupt electoral vote. If the individual to whom I have alluded, could elect a President and receive from him the office of Secretary of State from the purest motives, other men may, and hereafter will, pursue the same policy from the most corrupt. ‘If they do these things in the green tree, what shall be done in the dry?’

“This precedent will become a cover under which future bargains and corrupt combinations will be sanctioned, under which the spirit of the Constitution will be sacrificed to its letter.”

It is not needful to describe the topics of this discussion. Mr. Chilton’s resolutions, after being somewhat amended, were sent to a Select Committee on Retrenchment. The result was a majority and a minority report, of which six thousand copies were printed and circulated through the country. I turn from this subject to matters of more importance.

Mr. Buchanan’s position in this Congress required him to exert his powers as a debater more than ever before. The House of Representatives was at this time a body in which real debate was carried on upon some subjects, however the discussion on “retrenchment” may be characterized. Its discussions on the tariff, commencing on the 4th of March and terminating on the 15th of May, were conducted with great ability. Among the best speeches on the tariff bill of this session, there is one by Mr. Peleg Sprague of Maine, and one by Mr. Buchanan. Both exhibit a great deal of research. Mr. Buchanan’s speech, begun in Committee of the Whole on the 2d of April, in answer to Mr. Sprague, is an excellent specimen of business debate. The details on which these two gentlemen differed, and on which the debate between them and others chiefly turned, are of little interest now; nor does any tariff debate afford much development of permanent principles. So varying are the circumstances which from time to time give rise to an application of the doctrines that are indicated by the terms “free-trade” and “protection.” Still there may be found in this tariff speech of Mr. Buchanan, matter which is of some interest in his personal history as an American statesman, because it shows that he had now risen to the rank of a statesman, and because it gives his general views of what had at this time become known as “the American System.”

Mr. Buchanan, on this occasion, felt that he was combating a disposition to favor certain interests at the expense of others. In the debate on the tariff of 1824, when Mr. Clay developed his views on the subject of protection, and Mr. Webster found fault with the details of a measure which he said could not be properly characterized as an American System, Mr. Buchanan had shown that while he was ready to accede to a tariff for the incidental protection of our own manufactures, he was not disposed to carry the doctrines of protection so far as to injure the agricultural classes; but that in imposing the duties necessary to defray the expenses of the government, he should take care to benefit indirectly both the manufacturing and the producing interests. In 1828 the proposed alterations of the tariff aimed at a more uniform operation of the customs duties upon all the great interests of the country. A motion made by Mr. Sprague, to strike from the bill an additional duty of five cents per gallon on molasses, and twenty-five dollars per ton on hemp, led to a discussion on the navigating interests, as affected by such an amendment, and the whole subject of what was meant by protection and “the American system” came up afresh. The following extracts from Mr. Buchanan’s speech afford fair specimens of his manner of dealing with this subject:

I shall cheerfully submit to the public judgment whether the bill, although I dislike the minimum principle which it contains, does not afford sufficient protection to the manufacturers of woolens. I think it does; but I wish to be distinctly understood, in relation to myself, that I always stand ready, in a fair spirit, to do everything in my power to promote the passage of a just and judicious tariff, which shall be adequate for their protection; and that, for the sake of conciliation, and to effect this purpose, I am willing to sacrifice individual opinion to a considerable extent.

What, Sir, is the American System? Is it the system advocated by the gentleman from Maine, which would build up one species of domestic industry at the expense of all the rest, which would establish a prohibition and consequent monopoly in favor of the woolen manufacturer whilst it denied all protection to the farmer? Certainly not. The American System consists in affording equal and just legislative protection to all the great interests of the country. It is no respecter of persons. It does not distinguish between the farmer who plows the soil in Pennsylvania and the manufacturer of wool in New England. Being impartial, it embraces all. There is, in one respect, a striking difference between the farmer, the merchant, and the manufacturer. The farmer eating the bread of toil, but of independence, scarcely ever complains. If he suffers, he suffers in silence; you rarely hear him, upon this floor, asking redress for his grievances. He relies with that confidence which belongs to his character upon the justice of his country, and does not come here with importunate demands. The case is different in regard to the manufacturer and the merchant. When they feel themselves aggrieved—when they require the aid of your legislation, then complaints ring throughout the country, from Georgia to Maine. They never cease to ask, until they obtain. And shall this contented and uncomplaining disposition of the great agricultural interest, be used as an argument upon this floor against affording it relief? I trust not.

The gentleman from Maine has shown himself to be a true disciple of the Harrisburg Convention School. Even that convention, although the chief objects of their regard appeared to be wool and woolens, recommended further protection to iron, hemp, flax, and the articles manufactured from them, and to domestic distilled spirits. The gentleman from Maine has moved to strike from the bill additional duties which it proposes upon the importation of foreign hemp and molasses; and in his speech, he has argued against any additional duties either upon iron, or steel, or flax, or foreign spirits. In his opinion, therefore, the American System can embrace no other interest except that of the growers and manufacturers of wool.

[Here Mr. Sprague explained. He said his observations upon the other items, besides those he had moved to strike from the bill, were only intended to illustrate what would be their effect on the navigating interest.]

Mr. Buchanan resumed. I perceive, from the gentleman’s explanation, I did not misunderstand his argument. If this be the American System, I should like to know it as soon as possible; for then I shall be opposed to it. I venture to assert that, if those with whom the gentleman from Maine usually acts upon this floor have embraced the opinions which he has avowed, it is a vain, a culpable waste of time to proceed further with this discussion. Let the bill at once go to the tomb of all the Capulets. If the New England manufacturer must be protected, whilst the Pennsylvania farmer is abandoned—if this be the American System, instead of being a mourner at its funeral, I shall rejoice that it has met the fate which it deserved, and has been consigned to an early grave.

The Legislature of Pennsylvania has given us what, in my opinion, is the correct version of the American System. They have declared that “the best interests of our country demand that every possible exertion should be made to procure the passage of an act of Congress imposing such duties as will enable our manufacturers to enter into fair competition with foreign manufacturers, and protect the farmer, the growers of hemp and wool, and the distiller of spirits from domestic materials, against foreign competition. The people of Pennsylvania do not ask for such a tariff as would secure to any one class, or to any section of the country, a monopoly. They want a system of protection which will extend its blessings, as well as its burdens, as equally as possible over every part of the Union; to be uniform in its operation upon the rich as well as the poor.” They have therefore instructed their Senators, and requested their Representatives, “to procure, if practicable, the establishment of such a tariff as will afford additional protection to our domestic manufactures, especially of woolen and fine cotton goods, glass, and such other articles as, in their opinion, require the attention of Congress, so as to enable our citizens fairly to compete with foreign enterprise, capital, and experience, and give encouragement to the citizens of the grain-growing States, by laying an additional duty upon the importation of foreign spirits, flax, china ware, hemp, wool, and bar iron.”

This resolution speaks a language which I am proud to hear from the Legislature of my native State.

If it be the disposition of a majority of the members of this committee to strike out of the bill iron, hemp, foreign spirits and molasses, no Representative from the State of Pennsylvania, who regards either the interest or the wishes of his constituents, will dare to vote for what would then remain. The time has forever past when such a measure could have received our sanction. We shall have no more exclusive tariffs for the benefit of any one portion of the Union. The tariff of 1824 partook much of this character; it contained no additional duty on foreign spirits or molasses, and only added five dollars per ton to the duty on foreign hemp. So far as the grain-growing States expected to derive peculiar benefits from that measure, they have been, in a great degree, disappointed.

What was the course which gentlemen pursued in relation to the woolen bill of the last session? I endeavored to introduce into it a small protection for our hemp and domestic spirits. We were then told that my attempt would endanger the fate of the bill; that the period of the session was too late to introduce amendments; and that if we would then extend protection to the manufacturers of wool, a similar protection should, at a future time, be extended to the agricultural interest of the grain-growing States. My respectable colleague [Mr. Forward] has informed the committee that he voted for the bill of the last session under that delusion. How sadly the picture is now reversed! When an interest in New England, which has been estimated at 40,000,000 of dollars, is at stake, and is now about to sink, as has been alleged, for want of adequate protection, it seems that gentlemen from that portion of the Union would rather consign it to inevitable destruction than yield the protection which the present bill will afford to the productions of the Middle and Western States. If they are prepared to act upon a policy so selfish, let them at once declare it, and not waste weeks upon a bill which can never become a law.

The gentleman from Maine endeavored to sustain his motives by attempting to prove that, if the duties proposed by the bill should be imposed upon hemp and molasses, it would injure, nay, probably destroy the navigation of the country. Indeed he pronounced its epitaph. It is gone! Five cents per gallon upon molasses, and twenty-five dollars per ton upon hemp will sink our navigating interest; will sweep our vessels from the ocean! When I compare the storm of eloquence and of argument which the gentleman has employed to strike out hemp and molasses from this bill, with the object to be attained, he reminded me—

“Of ocean into tempest tost To waft a feather or to drown a fly.”

An additional duty of five cents per gallon on molasses and twenty-five dollars per ton upon hemp will consign the navigation of the country to inevitable and almost immediate destruction! This is the kind of argument which the gentleman has thought proper to address to the committee.

The gentleman from Maine has said that our navigation goes abroad unprotected to struggle against the world; and he has expatiated at length upon this part of the subject. I trust I shall be able to prove, without fatiguing the committee, that no interest belonging to this or any other country ever received a more continued or a more efficient protection than the navigation of the United States. I heartily approve this policy. I would not, if I could, withdraw from it an atom of the protection which it now enjoys. I shall never attempt to array the great and leading interests of the country against each other. I am neither the exclusive advocate of commerce, of manufactures, or of agriculture. The American System embraces them all. I am the advocate of all. When, therefore, I attempt to show to the committee the protection which has been extended by this government to its navigation, I do it in reply to the argument of the gentleman from Maine, and not in a spirit of hostility to that important interest.

Mr. Buchanan then entered upon an elaborate historical examination of the care for the interests of our navigation that had been exerted by Congress from 1789 to the time when he was speaking.[23] On the subject of the navy, as likely to be affected by measures that were complained of for a tendency to depress the commercial marine, he said:

“The gentleman from Maine has used a most astonishing argument against any further protection to hemp and flax and iron. We ought not further to encourage our farmers to grow flax and hemp, nor our manufacturers to produce iron. And why? Because you will thus deprive the navigating interest of the freight which they earn, by carrying these articles from Russia to this country. Can the gentleman be serious in contending that, for the sake of affording freight to the ship-owners, we ought to depend upon a foreign country for a supply of these articles? This argument strikes at the root of the whole American System. Upon the same principle we ought not to manufacture any article whatever at home, because this will deprive our ships of the carriage of it from abroad. This principle, had it been adopted in practice, would have left us where we were at the close of the American Revolution. We should still have been dependent upon foreign nations for articles of the first necessity. This argument amounts to a proclamation of war, by our navigation, against the agriculture and manufactures of the country. You must not produce, because we will then lose the carriage, is the sum and substance of the argument. Am I then to be seriously told, that for the purpose of encouraging our ship-owners, our farmers ought to be deprived of the markets of their own country, for those agricultural productions which they can supply in abundance? I did not expect to have heard such an argument upon this floor.

“By encouraging domestic industry, whether it be applied to agriculture or manufactures, you promote the best interests of your navigation. You furnish it with domestic exports to scatter over the world. This is the true American System. It protects all interests; it abandons none. It never arrays one against another. Upon the principles of the gentleman, we ought to sacrifice all the other interests of the country to promote our navigation. This is asking too much.

“The gentleman from Maine seems to apprehend great danger to the navy from the passage of this bill. He appears to think it will fall with so much oppression upon our navigation and fisheries, that these nurseries of seamen for the navy may be greatly injured, if not altogether destroyed.

“In regard to the value and importance of a navy to this country, I cordially agree with the gentleman from Maine. Every prejudice of my youth was enlisted in its favor, and the judgment of riper years has strengthened and confirmed those early impressions. It is the surest bond of our Union. The Western States have a right to demand from this government that the mouth of the Mississippi shall be kept open, both in war and in peace. If you should not afford them a free passage to the ocean, you cannot expect to retain them in the Union; they are, therefore, as much, if not more, interested in cherishing the navy than any other portion of the Republic. The feeling in its favor contains in it nothing sectional—it is general. We are all interested in its preservation and extension. Unlike standing armies, a navy never did, nor ever will, destroy the liberties of any country. It is our most efficient and least dangerous arm of defence.

“To what, then, does the argument of the gentleman lead? Although iron, and hemp, and flax, and their manufactures, are essential to the very existence of a navy, yet he would make us dependent for them upon the will of the Emperor of Russia, or the King of Sweden. A statesman would as soon think of being dependent on a foreign nation for gunpowder, or cannon, or cannon-balls, or muskets, as he would for the supply of iron, or flax, or hemp, for our navy. Even if these articles could not be produced as cheaply in this as in other countries, upon great national principles, then domestic production ought to be encouraged, even if it did tax the community. They are absolutely necessary for our defence. Without them, what would become of you, if engaged in war with a great naval power? You would then be as helpless as if you were deprived of gunpowder or of cannon. Without them, your navy would be perfectly useless. Shall we, then, in a country calculated by nature above all others for their production, refuse to lend them a helping hand? I trust not.

“The gentleman from Maine has said much about our fisheries, and the injurious effects which the present bill will have upon them. From this argument, I was induced again to read the bill, supposing that it might possibly contain some latent provision, hostile to the fisheries, which I had not been able to detect. Indeed, one might have supposed, judging merely from the remarks of the gentleman, without a reference to the bill, that it aimed a deadly blow against this valuable branch of our national industry. I could find nothing in it, which even touched the fisheries. They have ever been special favorites of our legislation. I shall not pretend to enumerate, because the task might seem invidious, the different acts of Congress affording them protection. They are numerous. The gentleman has, in my opinion, been very unfortunate in his complaints that they have not been sufficiently protected. From the origin of this government, they have been cherished, in every possible manner, by our legislation. For their benefit we have adopted a system of prohibitions, of drawbacks, and of bounties, unknown to our laws in relation to any other subject. They have grown into national importance, and have become a great interest of the country. They should continue to be cherished, because they are the best nurseries of our seamen. I would not withdraw from them an atom of the protection which they have received; on the contrary, I should cheerfully vote them new bounties, if new bounties were necessary to sustain them. They are the very last interest in the country which ought to complain.

“The gentleman, whilst he strenuously opposed any additional protection to domestic iron, and domestic hemp, surely could not have remembered, that the productions of the fisheries enjoy a monopoly of the home market. The duties in their favor are so high as to exclude foreign competition. We do not ask such prohibitory duties upon foreign iron, flax, or hemp. We demand but a moderate increase; and yet the fisheries, which are protected by prohibitory duties, meet us and deny to us this reasonable request.”

That Mr. Buchanan’s opposition to the administration of Mr. John Quincy Adams was not carried on in the spirit of a partisan is evinced by his action on an appropriation asked for to enable the Executive to continue and complete a system of surveys, preparatory to a general plan of internal improvements. There was much opposition to this appropriation, especially on the part of those who denied the power of the General Government to make such public works as were then classed as “internal improvements.” Mr. Buchanan met their objections as follows:

Mr. Buchanan expressed his dissent from the opinions avowed by the two gentlemen who had preceded him. The true question ought to be distinctly stated. The act of 1824 sanctioned the policy, not of immediately entering upon a plan of internal improvement, but of preparing for it, by obtaining surveys, plans, and estimates in relation to the various roads and canals that were required throughout the country. The sum of $30,000 had been appropriated, not for a single year, but for a specific purpose, which purpose had not yet been accomplished. Many surveys were now in progress, which were not more than half completed, and the question was whether the House would withdraw the means of completing them. A discussion of the general policy of the plan was out of place on an appropriation bill. Whatever might be decided as to carrying such a system of internal improvement into effect, these surveys were of great advantage to the American people. Should that system never be adopted, this mass of information could not fail to be useful. The constitutional question of power did not fairly arise on a proposal to employ the engineers already at the disposal of the War Department, in a particular manner.

Should the time ever arrive when we have more in the Treasury than we know what to do with, the argument of the gentleman from Virginia [Mr. Barbour] might have some force. But the question now was, whether the House would arrest these surveys? Mr. B., for one, would not do it. He would give the administration the sum now asked, and would hold them responsible for its application.

There is no more interesting part of Mr. Buchanan’s early Congressional career than his course on the subject of the Cumberland Road. We have seen that when he first had occasion to act on this subject as a member of Congress, he was inclined to accept the doctrine that Congress had power to establish this road, and to levy tolls for its support. But he had not then closely examined this subject. Mr. Monroe’s message vetoing the Cumberland Road bill of 1822 produced in Mr. Buchanan’s mind a decided change. At a subsequent session, he endeavored, but without success, to have the road retroceded to the States through which it passed, on condition that they would support it by levying tolls.[24] In 1828–29 he renewed this effort, and on the 29th of January, 1829, he made an elaborate speech upon the whole subject, which is of sufficient interest and importance to warrant its reproduction entire. As a constitutional argument it is valuable; and for its independent attitude towards the people of his own State, it is exceedingly creditable to him as a public man.

Mr. Buchanan said that the bill and the amendment now before the committee presented a subject for discussion of the deepest interest to the American people. It is not a question (said Mr. B.) whether we shall keep the road in repair by appropriations; nor whether we shall expend other millions in constructing other Cumberland roads—these would be comparatively unimportant; but it is a question upon the determination of which, in my humble judgment, depend the continued existence of the Federal Constitution in anything like its native purity. Let it once be established that the Federal Government can enter the dominion of the States; interfere with their domestic concerns; erect toll-gates over all the military, commercial, and post-roads within their territories, and define and punish, by laws of Congress, in the courts of the United States, offences committed upon these roads,—and the barriers which were erected by our ancestors with so much care, between Federal and State power, are entirely prostrated. This single act would, in itself, be a longer stride towards consolidation than the Federal Government have ever made; and it would be a precedent for establishing a construction for the Federal Constitution so vague and so indefinite, that it might be made to mean anything or nothing.

It is not my purpose, upon the present occasion, again to agitate the questions which have so often been discussed in this House, as to the powers of Congress in regard to internal improvements. For my own part, I cheerfully accord to the Federal Government the power of subscribing stock, in companies incorporated by the State, for the purpose of making roads and canals; and I entertain no doubt whatever but that we can, under the Constitution, appropriate the money of our constituents directly to the construction of internal improvements, with the consent of the States through which they may pass. These powers I shall ever be willing to exercise, upon all proper occasions. But I shall never be driven to support any road, or any canal, which my judgment disapproves, by a fear of the senseless clamor which is always attempted to be raised against members upon this floor, as enemies to internal improvement, who dare to vote against any measure which the Committee on Roads and Canals think proper to bring before this House. It was my intention to discuss the power of Congress to pass the bill, and its policy, separately. Upon reflection I find these subjects are so intimately blended, they cannot be separated. I shall therefore consider them together.

“Before, however, I enter upon the subject, it will be necessary to present a short historical sketch of the Cumberland Road. It owes its origin to a compact between the State of Ohio and the United States. In 1802, Congress proposed to the convention which formed the constitution of Ohio, that they would grant to that State one section of land to each township, for the use of schools; that they would also grant to it several tracts of land on which there were salt springs; and that five per cent. of the net proceeds of the future sale of public lands within its territory should be applied to the purpose of making public roads, ‘leading from the navigable waters emptying into the Atlantic to the Ohio, to the said State, and through the same.’ The act, however, distinctly declares that such roads shall be laid out under the authority of Congress, ‘with the consent of the several States through which the road shall pass.’ These terms were offered by Congress, to the State of Ohio, provided she would exempt, by an irrevocable ordinance, all the land which should be sold by the United States within her territory, from every species of taxation, for the space of five years, after the day of sale. This proposition of Congress was accepted by the State of Ohio, and it thus became a compact, the terms of which could not be changed without the consent of both the contracting parties. By the terms of the compact, this five per cent. of the net proceeds of the sales of the public land was applicable to two objects; the first, the construction of roads leading from the Atlantic to the State of Ohio; and the second, the construction of roads within that State. In 1803, Congress, at the request of Ohio, apportioned this fund between these two objects. Three of the five per cent. was appropriated to the construction of roads within the State, leaving only two per cent. applicable to roads leading from the navigable waters of the Atlantic to it.

“In March, 1806, Congress determined to apply this two per cent. fund to the object for which it was destined, and passed ‘an act to regulate the laying out and making of a road from Cumberland, in the State of Maryland, to the State of Ohio.’ Under the provisions of this act, before the President could proceed to cut a single tree upon the route of the road, it was made necessary to obtain the consent of the States through which it passed. The Federal Government asked Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia for permission to make it, and each of them granted this privilege in the same manner that they would have done to a private individual, or to a corporation created by their own laws. Congress, at that day, asserted no other right than a mere power to appropriate the money of their constituents to the construction of this road, after the consent of these States should be obtained. The idea of a sovereign power in this government to make the road, and to exercise jurisdiction over it, for the purpose of keeping it in repair, does not, then, appear to have ever entered the imagination of the warmest advocate for Federal power. The federalism of that day would have shrunk with horror from such a spectre. There is a circumstance worthy of remark in the act of the Legislature of Pennsylvania, which was passed in April, 1807, authorizing the President of the United States to open this road. It grants this power upon condition that the road should pass through Uniontown and Washington, if practicable. The grant was accepted upon this condition, and the road was constructed. Its length is one hundred and thirty miles, and its construction and repairs have cost the United States one million seven hundred and sixty-six thousand one hundred and sixty-six dollars and thirty-eight cents; whilst the two per cent. fund which we had bound ourselves to apply to this purpose, amounted, on the 30th of June, 1822, the date of the last official statement within my knowledge, only to the sum of one hundred and eighty-seven thousand seven hundred and eighty-six dollars and thirty-one cents, less than one-ninth of the cost of the road. This road has cost the United States more than thirteen thousand five hundred dollars per mile. This extravagant expenditure shows conclusively that it is much more politic for us to enlist individual interest in the cause of Internal Improvement, by subscribing stock, than to become ourselves sole proprietors. Any government, unless under extraordinary circumstances, will pay one-third more for constructing a road or canal, than would be expended by individuals in accomplishing the same object.

“I shall now proceed to the argument. Upon a review of this brief history, what is the conclusion at which we must arrive? That this road was made by the United States, as a mere proprietor, to carry into effect a contract with the State of Ohio, and not as a sovereign. In its construction, the Federal Government proceeded as any corporation or private individual would have done. We asked the States for permission to make the road through the territories over which their sovereign authority extended. After that permission had been obtained, we appropriated the money and constructed the road. The State of Pennsylvania even annexed a condition to her grant, with which the United States complied. She also conferred upon the agents of the United States the power of taking materials for the construction and repair of this road, without the consent of the owner, making a just compensation therefor. This compensation was to be ascertained under the laws of the State, and not under those of the United States. The mode of proceeding to assess damages in such cases against the United States was precisely the same as it is against corporations, created by her own laws, for the purpose of constructing roads.

“What, then, does this precedent establish? Simply, that the United States may appropriate money for the construction of a road through the territories of a State, with its consent; and I do not entertain the least doubt but that we possess this power. What does the present bill propose? To change the character which the United States has hitherto sustained, in relation to this road, from that of a simple proprietor to a sovereign. To declare to the nation, that, although they had to ask the States of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Virginia, for permission to make the road, now, after it is completed, they will exercise jurisdiction over it, and collect tolls upon it, under the authority of their own laws, for the purpose of keeping it in repair. We will not ask the States to erect toll-gates for us. We are determined to exercise that power ourselves. The Federal Government first introduced itself into the States as a friend, by permission; it now wishes to hold possession as a sovereign, by power. This road was made in the manner that one independent sovereign would construct a road through the territories of another. Had Virginia been a party to the compact with Ohio, instead of the United States, she would have asked the permission of Maryland and Pennsylvania to construct the Cumberland Road through their territories, and it would have been granted. But what would have been our astonishment, after this permission, had Virginia attempted to assume jurisdiction over the road in Pennsylvania, to erect toll-gates upon it under the authority of her own laws, and to punish offenders against these laws in her own courts. Yet the two cases are nearly parallel.

The right to demand toll, and to stop and punish passengers for refusing to pay it, is emphatically a sovereign right, and has ever been so considered amongst civilized nations. The power to erect toll-gates necessarily implies, 1st, The stoppage of the passenger until he shall pay the toll; 2d, His trial and punishment, if he should, either by force or by fraud, evade, or attempt to evade, its payment; 3d, A discretionary power as to the amount of toll; 4th, The trial and punishment of persons who may wilfully injure the road, or violate the police established upon it. These powers are necessarily implied. Without the exercise of them, you could not proceed with safety to collect the toll for a single day. Other powers will soon be exercised. If you compel passengers to pay toll, the power of protecting them whilst travelling along your road is almost a necessary incident. The sovereign, who receives the toll, ought naturally to possess the power of protecting him who pays it. To vest the power of demanding toll in one sovereign, and the protection of the traveller’s person in another, would be almost an absurdity. The Federal Government would probably, ere long, exercise the power of trying and punishing murders and robberies, and all other offences committed upon the road. To what jurisdiction would the trial and punishment of these offences necessarily belong? To the courts of the United States, and to them alone. In Ohio, in New York, in Virginia, and in Maryland, it has been determined that State courts, even if Congress should confer it, have no jurisdiction over any penal action, or criminal offence, against the laws of the United States. Even if these decisions were incorrect, still it has never been seriously contended that State courts were bound to take jurisdiction in such cases. It must be admitted, by all, that Congress have not the power to compel an execution of their criminal or penal laws by the courts of the States. This is sufficient for my argument. Even if the power existed, in State courts, they never ought, unless upon extraordinary occasions, to try and to punish offences committed against the United States. The peace and the harmony of the people of this country require that the powers of the two governments should never be blended. The dividing line between their separate jurisdictions should be clearly marked; otherwise dangerous collisions between them must be the inevitable consequence. In two of the States through which this road passes, it has already been determined that their courts cannot take jurisdiction over offences committed against the laws of Congress. What, then, is the inevitable consequence? All the penal enactments of this bill, or of the future bills which it will become necessary to pass to supply its defects, must be carried into execution by the Federal courts. Any citizen of the United States, charged with the most trifling offence against the police of this road, must be dragged for trial to the Federal court of that State within whose jurisdiction it is alleged to have been committed. If committed in Maryland, the trial must take place in Baltimore; if in Pennsylvania, at Clarksburg.

The distance of one hundred or two hundred miles, which he would be compelled to travel to take his trial, and the expenses which he must necessarily incur, would, in themselves, be a severe punishment for a more aggravated offence. Besides, the people of the neighborhood would be harassed in attending as witnesses at such a great distance from their places of abode. These, and many other inconveniences, which I shall not enumerate, would soon compel Congress to authorize the appointment of justices of the peace, or some other inferior tribunals, along the whole extent of the Cumberland Road.

Can any man lay his hand upon his heart and say that, in his conscience, he believes the Federal Constitution ever intended to bestow such powers on Congress? The great divisions of power, distinctly marked in that instrument, are external and internal. The first are conferred upon the General Government—the last, with but few exceptions, and those distinctly defined, remain in possession of the States. It never—never was intended that the vast and mighty machinery of this Government should be introduced into the domestic, the local, the interior concerns of the States, or that it should spend its power in collecting toll at a turnpike gate. I have not been presenting possible cases to the committee. I have confined myself to what must be the necessary effects of the passage of the bill now before us. By what authority is such a tremendous power claimed? That it is not expressly given by the Constitution, is certain. If it exists at all, it must, therefore, be incidental to some express power; and in the language of the Constitution, “be necessary and proper for carrying that power into execution.” From the very nature of incidental power, it cannot transcend the specific power which calls it into existence. The stream cannot flow higher than its fountain. This principle applies, with peculiar force, to the construction of the Constitution. For the purpose of carrying into effect any of its specific powers, it would be absurd to contend that you might exercise another power, greater and more dangerous than that expressly given. The means must be subordinate to the end. Were any other construction to prevail, this Government would no longer be one of limited powers.

The present case affords a striking and forcible illustration of this principle. Let it be granted that you have a right, as proprietor, by the permission of the States, to make a road through their territories, can it ever follow, as an incident to this mere power of appropriating the public money, that you may exercise jurisdiction over this very road, as a sovereign? If you could, the incident is as much greater than the principal, as sovereign is superior to individual power. It does follow that you can keep the road in repair, by appropriations, in the same manner that you have made it; but this is the utmost limit of your power. What, Sir? Exclusive jurisdiction over the road, for its preservation, and for the punishment of all offenders who travel upon it, and that as an incident to the mere power of expending your money upon its construction! The idea is absurd.

Under the power given to Congress “to establish post offices and post roads,” the Federal Government possess the undoubted right of converting any road already constructed, within any State of this Union, into a post road.

Let it also be granted, for the sake of the argument, that they possess the power, independently of the will of the States, to construct as many post roads throughout the Union as they think proper, and to keep them in repair; does it follow that they can establish toll-gates upon such roads? Certainly not. What is the nature of the powder conferred upon Congress? It is a mere right to carry and to protect the mails. It is confined to a single purpose—to the transportation of the mail, and the punishment of offences which violate that right. This is the sole object of the power—the sole purpose for which it was called into existence. Over some post roads, the mail is carried once per day, and over others once per week. With what justice can it be contended that this right of passage for a single purpose—this occasional use of the roads within the different States for post roads—vests in Congress the power of closing up these roads against all the citizens of those States, at all times, until they have paid such a toll as we think proper to impose. Let me present the naked argument of gentlemen before their own eyes. Congress have the right, under the Constitution, “to establish post offices and post roads.” As an incident they possess the power of constructing post roads. As another incident to this right of passage for a single purpose they possess the power to assume jurisdiction over all post roads in the different States, and prevent any person from passing over them, unless upon such terms as they may prescribe. This would, indeed, be construction construed. I would like the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Mercer) to furnish the committee with an answer to this argument. If I were to grant to that gentleman a right of passage, for a particular purpose only, over a road which belonged to me, what would be my surprise and my indignation, were he to shut it up, by the erection of toll-gates, and prohibited me from passing unless I paid him toll.

Should Congress act upon the precedent which the passage of this bill would establish, it is impossible to foresee the dangers which must follow, to the States and to the people of this country. Upon this branch of the question, permit me to quote the language of Mr. Monroe, in his celebrated message of May, 1822, denying the constitutional power of Congress to erect toll-gates on the Cumberland Road. “If,” said he, “the United States possessed the power contended for under this grant, might they not, on adopting the roads of the individual States for the carriage of the mail, as has been done, assume jurisdiction over them, and preclude a right to interfere with, or alter them? Might they not establish turnpikes, and exercise all the other acts of sovereignty above stated, over such roads, necessary to protect them from injury, and defray the expense of repairing them? Surely, if the right exists, these consequences necessarily followed, as soon as the road was established. The absurdity of such a pretension must be apparent to all who examine it. In this way, a large portion of the territory of every State might be taken from it; for there is scarcely a road in any State which will not be used for the transportation of the mail. A new field for legislation and internal government would thus be opened.” Arguments of the same nature would apply with equal, if not greater force, to those roads which might be used by the United States for the transportation of military stores, or as the medium of commerce between the different States. I shall not now enlarge upon this branch of the subject, believing it, as I do, to be wholly unnecessary.

There is another view of this subject, which I deem to be conclusive. The Constitution of the United States provides that “Congress shall have power to exercise exclusive legislation, in all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles square) as may, by cession of particular States, and the acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise the like authority over all places purchased by the consent of the Legislature of the State in which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings.” This is the only clause in the Constitution which authorizes the Federal Government to acquire jurisdiction over any portion of the territory of the States; and this power is expressly confined to such forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings, as the States may consider necessary for the defence of the country. You will thus, Sir, perceive with what jealousy our ancestors conferred jurisdiction upon this Government—even over such places as were absolutely necessary for the exercise of the power of war. This power,—which is the power of self-defence—of self-preservation—the power given to this Government of wielding the whole physical force of the country for the preservation of its existence and its liberties—does not confer any implied jurisdiction over the smallest portion of territory. An express authority is given to acquire jurisdiction, for military and for naval purposes, and for them alone, with the consent of the States. Unless that consent has been first obtained, the vast power of war confers no incidental jurisdiction, even over the cannon in your national fortifications. How, then, can it be contended, with the least hope of success, that the same Constitution, which thus expressly limits our power of acquiring jurisdiction, to particular spots, necessary for the purpose of national defence, should, by implication, as an incident to the power to establish post offices and post roads, authorize us to assume jurisdiction over a road one hundred and thirty miles in length, and over all the other post roads in the country. If this construction be correct, all the limitations upon Federal power, contained in the Constitution, are idle and vain. There is no power which this Government shall ever wish to usurp, which cannot, by ingenuity, be found lurking in some of the express powers granted by the Constitution. In my humble judgment, the argument in favor of the constructive power to pass the sedition law is much more plausible than any that can be urged by the advocates of this bill, in favor of its passage. I beg gentlemen to reflect, before they vote in its favor.

I thank the gentleman from Ohio (Mr. Vance) for having reminded me of the resolution passed by the Legislature of Pennsylvania, at their last session, which authorizes the Federal Government to erect toll-gates upon this road, within that Commonwealth; to “enforce the collection of tolls, and, generally, to do and perform any and every other act and thing which may be deemed necessary, to ensure the permanent repair and preservation of the said road.”

I feel the most unfeigned respect for the Legislature of my native State. Their deliberate opinion, upon any subject, will always have a powerful influence over my judgment. It is fairly entitled to as much consideration as the opinion of this or any other legislative body in the Union. This resolution, however, was adopted, as I have been informed, without much deliberation and without debate. It owes its passage to the anxious desire which that body feel to preserve the Cumberland Road from ruin. The constitutional question was not brought into discussion. Had it been fairly submitted to that Republican Legislature, I most solemnly believe they would have been the last in this Union to sanction the assumption, by this Government, of a jurisdiction so ultra-Federal in its nature, and so well calculated to destroy the rights of the States.

But this resolution can have no influence upon the present discussion. The people of the State of Pennsylvania never conferred upon their Legislature the power to cede jurisdiction over any portion of their territory to the United States, or to any other sovereign. If the Legislatures of the different States could exercise such a power, the road to consolidation would be direct. If they can cede jurisdiction to this Government over any portion of their territories, they can cede the whole, and thus altogether destroy the Federal system.

Even if the States possessed the power to cede, the United States have no power to accept such cessions. Their authority to accept cessions of jurisdiction is confined to places “for the erection of forts, magazines, arsenals, dockyards and other needful buildings.” Mr. Monroe, in the message to which I have already referred, declares his opinion “that Congress do not possess this power; that the States, individually, cannot grant it; for, although they may assent to the appropriation of money, within their limits, for such purposes, they can grant no power of jurisdiction, or sovereignty, by special compacts with the United States.”

I think it is thus rendered abundantly clear that, if Congress do not possess the power, under the Federal Constitution, to pass this bill, the States through which the road passes cannot confer it upon them. I feel convinced that even the gentleman who reported this bill (Mr. Mercer) will not contend that the resolution of the Legislature of Pennsylvania could bestow any jurisdiction upon the Government. I am justified in this reference, because that resolution is, in its nature, conditional, and requires that the amount of tolls collected in Pennsylvania shall be applied, exclusively, to the repair of the road within that State; and the present bill contains no provision to carry this condition into effect. The gentleman cannot, therefore, derive his authority to pass this bill from a grant the provisions of which he has disregarded.

This question has already been settled, so far as a solemn legislative precedent can settle any question. During the session of 1821–2, a bill, similar in its provisions to the one now before the committee, passed both Houses of Congress. The vote, on its passage in this House, was eighty-seven in the affirmative, and sixty-eight in the negative. Mr. Monroe, then President of the United States, returned this bill to the House of Representatives, with his objections. So powerful, and so convincing, were his arguments, that, upon its reconsideration, but sixty-eight members voted in the affirmative, whilst seventy-two voted in the negative. Thus, Sir, you perceive, that this House have already solemnly declared, in accordance with the deliberate opinion of the late President of the United States, that Congress do not possess the power to erect toll-gates upon the Cumberland Road. That distinguished individual was the last of the race of Revolutionary Presidents, and, from the soundness of his judgment and the elevated stations which he has occupied, his opinion is entitled to the utmost respect. He was an actor in many of the political scenes of that day when the Constitution was framed, and when it went into operation, under the auspices of Washington—“all which he saw, and part of which he was.” He is, therefore, one of the few surviving statesmen who, from actual knowledge, can inform the present generation what were the opinions of the past. The solemnity and the ability with which he has resisted the exercise of the power of Congress to pass this bill prove, conclusively, the great importance which he attached to the subject.

During that session, I first had the honor of a seat in this House; I voted for the passage of that bill. I had not reflected upon the constitutional question, and I was an advocate of the policy of keeping the road in repair by collecting tolls from those who travelled upon it. After I read the constitutional objections of Mr. Monroe my opinion was changed, and I have ever since been endeavoring, upon all proper occasions, to atone for my vote, by advocating a cession of the road to the respective States through which it passes, that they may erect toll-gates upon it and keep it in repair.

There was a time in the history of this country—I refer to the days of the first President of the United States—when the Government was feeble, and when, in addition to its own powers, the weight of his personal character was necessary fairly to put it in motion. Jealousy of Federal power was then the order of the day. The gulf of consolidation then yawned before the imagination of many of our wisest and best patriots, ready to swallow up the rights of the States and the liberties of the people. In those days, this vast machine had scarcely got into regular motion. Its power and its patronage were then in their infancy, and there was, perhaps, more danger that the jealousy of the States should destroy efficiency of the Federal Government than that it should crush their power. Times have changed. The days of its feebleness and of childhood have passed away. It is now a giant—a Briareus—stretching forth its hundred arms, dispensing its patronage, and increasing its power over every portion of the Union. What patronage and what power have the States to oppose to this increasing influence? Glance your eye over the extent of the Union; compare State offices with those of the United States; and whether avarice or ambition be consulted, those which belong to the General Government are greatly to be preferred to the offices which the States can bestow. Jealousy of Federal power—not of a narrow and mean character, but a watchful and uncompromising jealousy—is now the dictate of the soundest patriotism. The General Government possesses the exclusive right to impose duties upon imports—by far the most productive and the most popular source of revenue. United and powerful efforts are now making to destroy the revenue which the States derive from sales at auction. This Government is now asked to interpose its power between the buyer and seller, and put down public sales of merchandise within the different States—a subject heretofore believed to be within the exclusive jurisdiction of the State sovereignties. Whilst the Federal Government has been advancing with rapid strides, the people of the States have seldom been awakened to a sense of their danger. In the late political struggle, they were aroused, and they nobly maintained their own rights. This, I trust, will always be the case hereafter. Thank Heaven! whilst the people continue true to themselves, the Constitution contains within itself those principles which must ever preserve it. From its very nature—from a difference of opinion as to the constructive powers which may be necessary and proper to carry those which are enumerated into effect—it must ever call into existence two parties, the one jealous of Federal, the other of State power; the one anxious to extend Federal influence, the other wedded to State rights; the one desirous to limit, the other to extend, the power and the patronage of the General Government. In the intermediate space there will be much debatable ground; but a general outline will still remain sufficiently distinct to mark the division between the political parties which have divided, and which will probably continue to divide, the people of this country. Jealousy of Federal power had long been slumbering. The voice of Virginia sounding the alarm has at length awakened several of her sister States; and, although they believe her to be too strict in her construction of the Constitution and her doctrines concerning State rights, yet, they are now willing to do justice to the steadiness and patriotism of her political character. She has kept alive a wholesome jealousy of Federal power. If, then, there be a party in this country friendly to the rights of the States and of the people, I call upon them to oppose the passage of this bill. Should it become a law, it will establish a precedent under the authority of which the sovereign power of this Government can be brought home into the domestic concerns of every State in the Union. We may then take under our own jurisdiction every road over which the mail is carried; every road over which our soldiers and warlike munitions may pass; and every road used for the purpose of carrying on commerce between the several States. Once establish this strained construction of the Federal Constitution, and I would ask gentlemen to point out the limit where this splendid government shall be compelled to stay its chariot wheels. Might it not then drive on to consolidation, under the sanction of the Constitution?

Is there any necessity for venturing upon this dangerous and doubtful measure? I appeal to those gentlemen who suppose the power to be clear, what motive they can have for forcing this measure upon us, who are of a different opinion? Can it make any difference to them whether those toll-gates shall be erected under a law of the United States, or under State authority? Cannot the Legislature of Pennsylvania enact this bill into a law as well as the Congress of the United States? Nobody will doubt their right. I trust no gentleman upon this floor will question the fidelity of that State in complying with all her engagements. She has ever been true to every trust. If she should accept of the cession, as I have no doubt she would, I will pledge myself that you shall never again hear of the road, unless it be that she has kept it in good repair, and that under her care it has answered every purpose for which it was intended.

I know that some popular feeling has been excited against myself in that portion of Pennsylvania though which the road passes. I have been represented as one of its greatest enemies. I now take occasion thus publicly to deny this allegation. It is true that I cannot vote in favor of the passage of this bill, and thus, in my judgment, violate the oath which I have taken to support the Constitution of the United States. No man can expect this from me. But it is equally true that I have heretofore supported appropriations for the repair of this road; and should my amendment prevail, I shall vote in favor of the appropriation of one hundred thousand dollars for that purpose which is contained in this bill.

At a late period in the second session of this Congress, February 6, 1829, a resolution was introduced by Mr. Smyth of Virginia, proposing to amend the Constitution so as to make every President ineligible to the office a second time. Whether this was aimed at General Jackson, who had been elected President in the autumn of 1828, and was to be inaugurated in about thirty days, or whether it had no special object, it was generally regarded as a subject for the discussion of which the remaining time of this Congress was entirely insufficient. Upon a motion to postpone the resolution to the 3d of March, Mr. Buchanan said:

He should vote in favor of the postponement of this resolution until the 3d of March. He did not think that the great constitutional question which it presented ought to be decided, without more time and more reflection than it would be possible to bestow upon it at this late period of the session. We had heard the able and ingenious argument of the gentleman from Virginia (Mr. Smyth) in favor of the proposition, whilst no argument had been urged upon the other side of the question. He said that a more important question could not be presented in a republic, than a proposition to change the Constitution in regard to the election of the Supreme Executive Magistrate. “It is better to bear the ills we have, than fly to others that we know not of,” unless the existing evils are great, and we have a moral certainty that the change will not be productive of still greater evils. The Constitution has been once changed since its adoption, and it is now generally admitted that the alteration was for the worse, and not for the better. This change grew out of the excitement of the moment. It provided against the existence of an evil which, probably, would not again have occurred for a long period of time; but in doing so, it has rendered it almost certain that the election of a President shall often devolve upon the House of Representatives. Had the Constitution remained in its original form; had each elector continued to vote for two persons, instead of one; it could rarely, if ever, have occurred that some one candidate would not have received a majority of all the electoral votes. By this change, we have thus entailed a great evil upon the country.

The example of Washington, which has been followed by Jefferson, Madison and Monroe, has forever determined that no President shall be more than once re-elected. This principle is now become as sacred as if it were written in the Constitution. I would incline to leave to the people of the United States, without incorporating it in the Constitution, to decide whether a President should serve longer than one term. The day may come, when dangers shall lower over us, and when we may have a President at the helm of State who possesses the confidence of the country, and is better able to weather the storm than any other pilot; shall we, then, under such circumstances, deprive the people of the United States of the power of obtaining his services for a second term? Shall we pass a decree, as fixed as fate, to bind the American people, and prevent them from ever re-electing such a man? I am not afraid to trust them with this power.

There is another reason why the House should not be called upon to decide this question hastily. It is a great evil to keep the public mind excited, as it would be, by the election of a new President at the end of each term of four years. Under the existing system, it is probable that, as a general rule, a President, elected by the people, will once be re-elected, unless he shall by his conduct have deprived himself of public confidence. This will, in many instances, prevent the recurrence of a political storm more than once in eight years. These are some of the suggestions which induce me to vote for the postponement of this resolution to a day that will render it impossible for us to act upon it during the present session of Congress. We ought to have ample time to consider this subject before we act.