Part 11

The British Government left the settlement of the details of that portion of the agreement which had reference to the navigation of the Mano River to be settled between the Liberian Government and the Government of Sierra Leone. The colonial government imposed such restrictions that no understanding was ever arrived at. However, a joint commission for the demarcation of the Anglo-Liberian frontier was appointed and in 1903 proceeded with its work. In due time the boundary was satisfactorily settled by this commission. This boundary, however, very soon gave rise to a serious difficulty and to a flagrant aggression. By the delimitation, the town and district of Kanre-Lahun fell to Liberia; Colonel Williams, the Liberian Commissioner, hoisted the Liberian flag at that town which, at the time, was occupied by a detachment of the Sierra Leone Frontier Force; curiously enough, the British force was not withdrawn.

In 1904 the British Government complained to the Liberian Government that the Kissi were making raids into British territory in consequence of a war between Fabundah, a chief of the Kanre-Lahun District, and Kah Furah, a Kissi chief, and asked permission for the entrance of British troops into Liberian territory for the purpose of repressing the disorder which, it was said, threatened British interests. The request was granted; British troops advanced to the Mafisso where they established a post. In November the British Vice-Consul sent word to the President of Liberia saying that the chief Kah Furah had been driven out of the Kissi country, and that the people, at the invitation of the military authorities, had elected a new chief, and had pledged themselves not to receive Kah Furah among them again. The Liberian Government assumed that the matter was at an end and that the British force had been withdrawn. In 1906 Mr. Lomax, the Liberian Commissioner for the French frontier, was instructed to proceed to this point; he reached Kanre-Lahun in December, and found Waladi, a town in Liberian territory, garrisoned by a Sierra Leone force. While Mr. Lomax was at Kanre-Lahun, complaints were made against him by the Chief Fabundah and others. These complaints were examined in the presence of Governor Probyn, Sir Harry Johnston, Mr. Lamont, and leading military officers, and Mr. Lomax justified himself completely, except in a single case where damages of five pounds were suggested and paid. Later on, British officers sent in complaints that the escort with Mr. Lomax were plundering the country. It was impossible in such districts and under such circumstances to prevent some petty thieving. Mr. Lomax, however, accepted the complaints and paid the damages claimed. With a view to permanently settling the country under Liberian rule, Mr. Lomax ordered a local election to be held. Three chiefs were chosen--Fabundah for the lower section, Gardi for the Bombali section, and Bawma for the Gormah section. Fabundah, who before had been exercising jurisdiction over the Bombali, was dissatisfied. The Sierra Leone authorities promised to support him against the Liberian Government; they placed a frontier force at his disposal for the purpose of ruining the chiefs who were favorable to Liberian control or who had received commissions from the President; efforts to arouse opposition and dissatisfaction were made; Lomax was hounded from the district; the chief, Gardi, was driven from the country, his town was plundered, and his brother made a prisoner in Kanre-Lahun.

In 1908 attempts had been made in Europe to settle difficulties pending with Great Britain and France. Mr. F. E. R. Johnson, the Liberian Secretary of State, who had been sent to arrange these matters, found conditions threatening. In London the British Government stated that it had no designs against Liberia, but that they believed the French were planning encroachment, and that, if Liberia lost territory to France, Great Britain would find it necessary to take a new piece of territory contingent to Sierra Leone in her own defense. Matters appeared so serious that President Barclay was advised to come to Europe himself; he arrived in London on the 29th of August, accompanied by T. McCants Stewart, and there met Mr. Johnson. He told the British Government of his fears regarding further aggression upon Liberian territory and expressed the desire that Great Britain and America should jointly guarantee the independence and territorial integrity of the Republic. The reply was that Great Britain would on no account enter into any such guarantee; if the Liberian Government obtained a settled frontier with France, and inaugurated certain reforms, there would be little danger of any one’s troubling it; if the reforms desired by England were not undertaken, nothing would save it from the end which threatened. At the same time London refused to treat of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River difficulties until after the troubles with France had been arranged. In France, as will be shortly seen, the Liberian envoys met with no success; a treaty was indeed arranged by means of which the Republic was robbed of a large amount of valuable territory. The envoys were again in London in September to take up the matters of the Kanre-Lahun and Mano River negotiations. The British officials now demanded that Fabundah should come entirely under the jurisdiction of the British Government, and that the frontier line on the northwest should be so altered as to place his territory within the British colony; the area thus demanded contained something like 250 square miles of territory. At no time had the area actually in charge of Fabundah amounted to any such quantity; the Liberians demurred at the largeness of the territorial claim--the British officials themselves stated that they were surprised at its extent, but insisted upon receiving the entire amount. No decision was actually reached, the matter being postponed until the delimitation of the new Franco-Liberian boundary should be achieved.

Great Britain’s claim to this region was based upon the flimsiest pretext. It is true that she had had relations with Fabundah before the boundary had been delimited; it is true that, previous to that date, she had had a force in Kanre-Lahun; however, when the boundary was actually fixed, Kanre-Lahun was clearly within Liberian territory, and no objection whatever was made to the Republic’s taking possession and to the withdrawal of the Sierra Leone force. When, later on, Great Britain sent soldiers into the area, it was done on the pretext that intertribal difficulties in the region threatened British interests; permission was given as a favor to Great Britain and with the expectation that, as soon as the difficulty had been adjusted, the British force would be withdrawn. Such was not the case; once in Kanre-Lahun, it remained there; Major Lomax was hounded from the country; the Liberian customs officer, Mr. Hughes, was ordered to abandon his post of duty and to surrender the customs house to the British commander. This act of occupation was bad enough; but soon Great Britain demanded that the army of occupation should be paid by the Liberian Government before it would evacuate the district; no such understanding had been arranged, and the claim was unjustified and ridiculous; the frontier force of Sierra Leone was not increased, nor put to any extra expense in the matter. In asking for a new boundary line which should cut out Fabundah’s territory, flagrant injustice was committed; it is true that the boundary which had been arranged cut the land controlled by the chief; about one-twenty-fifth of his territory was on the British side, the remaining twenty-four-twenty-fifths being in Liberia; if a new line were to be drawn, it should have given the one-twenty-fifth to Liberia and reduced the Sierra Leone territory. The matter dragged along for months. December 8, 1909, President Barclay accepted a proposition to exchange or sell the district in dispute; the legislature refused to accept the proposition. In May, 1911, however, an agreement was finally arranged; the British authorities took over the Kanre-Lahun District, an area of extraordinary wealth and dense population; in return for this valuable and most needed area, Liberia received a piece of country lying between the Morro and Mano Rivers, which had formerly been a part of the Colony of Sierra Leone; this territory is almost without population, densely forested, and practically worthless. Even so, it is little likely that the Republic will be left in peaceful possession of it. On some pretext, in the future, Great Britain will no doubt regain it.

THE FRENCH BOUNDARY QUESTION.

When Maryland was added to the Liberian Republic, it possessed lands acquired by deeds of purchase and treaties as far east as the San Pedro River, sixty miles east of the Cavalla; this country was occupied by Kru tribes, and its eastern boundary practically marked their limit; it was hence not only a geographical, but an ethnographical boundary. For years no one questioned Liberia’s right to the whole area, and on maps and in repeated descriptions of the country its rights were recognized. In 1885, however, the French Government claimed that the French possessions extended continuously from the Ivory Coast westward beyond the Cavalla River and Cape Palmas as far as Garawé; at the same time it suggested certain shadowy claims to Cape Mount, Grand Bassa, and Grand Butu;--in other words, points at intervals along the whole coast of the Liberian Republic; these claims were based on agreements stated to have been drawn up between native chiefs and the commanders of war vessels. In 1891 the French Government officially communicated to Great Britain her intention of taking possession of and administering the district mentioned as far as Garawé; she modified her claim, however, in such a way as to extend her rights only to the Cavalla River. In 1891 a French commissioner was authorized to treat with Liberia in this matter. He claimed that the French had deeds to Grand Cesters, dating to 1788, and to Garawé, dating to 1842; he referred to other shadowy rights and mentioned treaties which, he asserted, chiefs in the neighborhood of the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers had made with French authorities; asked to produce these documents, he admitted that he did not have them with him. The French Government asked that Liberia should recognize the right of France from the Cavalla River to the San Pedro, saying that, if this recognition were granted, they might not revive their old claims. Liberia urged that the treaty formed with her by the French Government in 1852 clearly recognized her rights to the region in question; a French war map, dated 1882, was shown, on which Liberia’s area was clearly shown to extend to the San Pedro River; at the same time Liberia asked that the whole matter should be referred to arbitration. Arbitration was refused; a treaty drawn up by France was offered for approval in August, 1892; the Liberian legislature refused absolutely to ratify it, and the Liberian Government appealed to the United States for assistance and advice. The country was greatly aroused over the manifest injustice of its powerful neighbor. Especially in Maryland, feeling ran high. A printed appeal was issued to the world. In it occurs the following passage:

“We appeal to all the civilized nations of the world.--Consider, we pray you, the situation. Having been carried away into slavery, and, by the blessing of God, returned from exile to our fatherland, are we now to be robbed of our rightful inheritance? Is there not to be a foot of land in Africa, that the African, whether civilized or savage, can call his own? It has been asserted that the race is not capable of self-government, and the eyes of many are watching the progress of Liberia with a view to determining that question. We only ask, in all fairness, to be allowed just what any other people would require--free scope for operation. Do not wrest our territory from us and hamper us in our operations, and then stigmatize the race with incapacity, because we do not work miracles. Give us a fair chance, and then if we utterly fail, we shall yield the point. We pray you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence in our behalf. We have no power to prevent this aggression on the part of the French Government: but we know that we have right on our side, and are willing to have our claims to the territory in question examined. We do not consent to France’s taking that portion of our territory lying between the Cavalla and San Pedro Rivers; nor do we recognize its claims to points on our Grain Coast which, as shown above, our government has been in possession of for so long. We protest, too, against that government’s marking off narrow limits of interior land for us. We claim the right to extend as far interiorward as our necessities require. We are not foreigners: we are Africans, and this is Africa. Such being the case, we have certain natural rights--God-given rights--to this territory which no foreigners can have. We should have room enough, not only for our present population, but also to afford a home for our brethren in exile who may wish to return to their fatherland and help us to build up a negro nationality. We implore you, the civilized and Christian nations of the world, to use your influence to have these, our reasonable requirements secured to us.” But neither the official appeal to the United States nor the unofficial appeal to the Christian nations of the world availed. France seized the territory and threatened to refuse to recognize rights beyond Grand Cesters on the seaboard, and Boporo in the interior. After fruitless remonstrance, the Republic was forced to yield and a treaty was accepted on December 8, 1892. By it the Cavalla River was recognized as the boundary between France and Liberia, from its mouth “as far as a point situated at a point” about twenty miles south of its confluence with the River “Fodedougouba” at the intersection of the parallel 6° 30′ north and the Paris meridian 9° 12′ west; thence along 6° 30′ as far as 10° west, with the proviso that the basin of the Grand Cesters River should belong to Liberia and the basin of the Fodedougouba to France; then north along 10° to 8° north; and then northwest to the latitude of Tembi Kunda (supposed 8° 35′), after which due west along the latitude of Tembi Kunda, until it intersects the British boundary near that place. But the entire Niger Basin should be French; Bamaquilla and Mahommadou should be Liberian; Mousardou and Naalah, French.

LATER FRENCH DIFFICULTIES.

Notwithstanding this delimitation, difficulties with the French continued. In 1895 French posts along the northern border began to crowd in upon the Republic. The town of Lola, in Liberia, was attacked by Senegalese soldiers; these were repulsed and two French officers were killed. Aggressions continued until, finally, in 1903, Liberia begged that a final delimitation might be arranged, as the old had proved completely unsatisfactory. In 1904 F. E. R. Johnson and J. J. Dossen were sent to France to arrange matters. On their way, they called at the British Foreign Office and asked their aid and interest in bringing about an understanding. Arrived in Paris, it was quickly found that the French were planning to possess themselves of all the territory situated in the basin of the Cavalla and the Upper St. Paul’s Rivers; the British Foreign Office expressed sympathy, but did nothing more. In 1905 several efforts were made toward bringing about an agreement. Dr. Blyden was sent to France, but accomplished nothing; in November Sir Harry Johnston was asked to treat with the French Government which, however, refused to recognize him as an official negotiator. In 1907 Secretary Johnson was commissioned to treat with the French Government, but found its attitude most hostile and unfriendly. President Barclay himself was summoned to Europe; taking T. McCants Stewart with him, they joined Johnson, and interviewed the French officials. A treaty was submitted to them by which Liberia would be deprived of a large portion of her territory situated in the richest and most prosperous districts of the Republic. It was in vain that the Liberian commissioners remonstrated; the French were inflexible. The English Government had refused to deal with the commissioners in regard to the British boundary difficulty until they had come to some arrangement with France. In this unhappy condition of affairs, the commissioners decided to consult the American Ambassador in Paris; they asked that the United States should assist Liberia and prevent her being robbed of so large a portion of her territory, and should use her influence in bringing the French Government to submit the whole matter in dispute to arbitration. Ambassador White replied that he doubted whether the United States would aid Liberia in this crisis; he advised President Barclay to accept the treaty, urging that, if he failed to do so, the French would make further encroachments, and the Republic would meet with greater losses. As the case seemed hopeless, the commissioners accepted the treaty. It involved the delimitation of a fixed boundary by an international commission. Liberia engaged two Dutch officials as her commissioners. They were on hand ready to fix the boundary in February, 1898, but were kept waiting until May by the dilatoriness of the French commissioners; in order to have a permanent boundary fixed, the Republic made great concessions and lost valuable regions. It was willing, however, to sacrifice much for peace.

Of course the sacrifice was without result. At the present time the whole question of the Franco-Liberian boundary is again open, and from the points urged by the French Government it is evident that it aims at new acquisition of territory and new restriction of the power of the little Republic.

We stand at the threshold of a new era; new political theories are being advanced; new interpretations are being given to the principles of international law; larger fulfilments of national obligations are being required of individual nations; new duties are being thrust upon us. They cannot be shirked, we must keep pace with world requirements. Regeneration and reform must be our watchword. The people must see that they become so. The process must operate from within outwards, or else influences from without will compass our ruin.--E. BARCLAY.

THE FRONTIER FORCE.

When President Barclay was in London, the British Government demanded that certain internal reforms should take place in the Republic before it would discuss a final settlement of either the Mano River or Kanre-Lahun difficulties. Shortly after the President’s return to Monrovia, Mr. Braithwait Wallis, Consul-General of Great Britain to Liberia, issued a memorandum on the subject--apparently under the fear “lest we forget”. This memorandum, which bears the date of January 14, 1908, occupies four printed pages, and condenses into that brief space an astonishing amount of venom and insolence. A few quotations will show its spirit:

“Your Excellency will remember then being informed that a critical moment had arrived in the history of the Republic, that however it might have been twenty or even ten years ago, the time had now gone by when Liberia could re-enact the part of a hermit kingdom, and that she must not lose a moment in setting herself seriously to work to put her house in order, or be prepared at no distant date, to disappear from the catalogue of independent countries. His Majesty’s Government, as Your Excellency is aware, have absolutely no designs against either the independence or the integrity of the Republic. Their only desire is that a country which, on one of its frontiers, marches with an important British Colony, and with which not only that Colony, but Great Britain itself, has large and growing commercial relations, should have such a stable or effective Government as will conduce to its own prosperity, and remove any danger of its losing its independence. His Majesty’s Government do not consider that the Government of the Republic is either stable or effective. Improvement has indeed resulted from the appointment of two Customs Officers, and the Customs revenue of the country has largely developed. But it is also considered as absolutely essential, if such improvement is to continue and to extend to other branches of the Government, that the finances of the country be placed, at any rate for the time being, in the hands of an European financial expert, and that at least three more European Customs experts be appointed. And further, no Government can be said to have a stable basis, when it is without any means of enforcing its authority. His Majesty’s Government, therefore, considers that it is essential that a trustworthy police, under European officers, should be at once established. With regard to the appointment of a financial expert, who could advise and assist the Secretary of the Treasury, in the financial affairs of the Country, Mr. Lamont has already been appointed Financial Adviser to the Republic. He is, however, only so in name, but should now be made so in actual fact. His Majesty’s Government further consider that the Liberian judiciary ought to undergo drastic reform.” Mr. Wallis recapitulates the reforms demanded in the following statement: (a) the appointment of a financial expert, who will place the finances of the country on a sound footing, and will advise the Secretary of the Treasury on financial matters. (b) The establishment of an efficient, well armed, and well disciplined police force under competent European Officers; and one that will command the respect of the Powers. (c) The appointment of at least three more European Customs experts. (d) The reform of the judiciary. “If the Liberian Government carry out the reforms herein indicated within SIX MONTHS, counted from the date of Your Excellency’s return to Monrovia from England, His Majesty’s Government will on their side be happy to assist in carrying them into effect in the same way as they have recently been assisting in the work of re-organizing the Liberian Customs. They will further be happy to suspend pressing the monetary and other claims which they have against Liberia, and will endeavor to come to a settlement, on a mutually satisfactory basis, on the long outstanding question of the navigation of the Mano River and the trouble on the Anglo-Liberian Frontier.”

In other words, Great Britain was quite willing to assume the whole running of Liberian affairs; she would be glad to manage her financial matters, to train and handle her frontier force, to collect her customs duties, and manage them, to interfere with, and control her government completely. She hinted at what she might do if these reforms were not carried into effect; she ended with a querulous complaint regarding advantages which German shipping was said to be securing to the disadvantage of British interests. This truly extraordinary document was signed in the following highly dignified fashion:

I have the honor to be, with great truth and regard Sir, Your Excellency’s most obedient, humble servant, BRAITHWAIT WALLIS, HIS BRITANNIC MAJESTY’S CONSUL.