Part 12

"Asked the other day by a Hunker friend if I thought it prudent to take a man of Gen. Dix's class, I replied, most certainly to take one such. If past positions on the slavery question as it existed among Democrats, are to be the grounds of a classification, it is proper and necessary to represent the divisions to which Genl. Dix belonged as well as others. Can it be done anywhere else as well as in New York? He will be in line with the majority of the party and the entire government in that State, which the minority of the party there, if that classification be the criterion, will still be amply represented in other members of the cabinet, whereas if he be not taken, and the section to which he belongs be not represented elsewhere, as we may presume it will not, the results will be regarded by the country as a practical exclusion of that interest.

"It seems to be, therefore, desirable to take a man of Genl. Dix's relations; and to take one or more of the States-rights Democrats from States in which they stand with a majority of the party, and to represent the other great interests, as there will be abundant room to do, in the rest of the cabinet. A strong administration cannot be made by combining negations. If it be formed, as it should be, by men who have a predominant regard to its unity and success, the more its members have of the confidence and favor of the interests and States they are respectively taken to represent, the better. Of course I mean only men of qualifications and character, and of fitness in these respects and from their Democratic antecedents--and the objection to whom is merely the part they had in the recent Democratic divisions North and South. Let unfriendly critics, if they please, call such a cabinet mosaic. If the joiner work be good, as I believe it may be, and the materials be of the right general character, I do not care how firm the texture or strong the colors of the parts. It will dovetail the party together for a basis on which the administration may stand securely. Certainly, I assume that in this there will be no violation of principle and honor to shock the confidence of the country. Those who think there is, and have acquiesced thus far, might feel some delicacy that their scruples arise for the first time when they are asking for themselves and on this ground a monopoly of the fruits of the wrong. Restitution to the true owner would be more becoming. If the party that elected Gen. Pierce be an alliance of those who cannot honestly act together, it ought to be dissolved; but if it could honestly unite, there can be no objection to proclaiming the intention to continue that union, or to carrying it out in the most effectual way.

"At the late election, the large popular majorities as well as large electoral votes were in the great States of New York, Pennsylvania, and Ohio. Notwithstanding the clamor about the identification of Scott with Seward, the South did not do equally well, except in States where personal antipathies to that interest or personal commitments of Whig leaders produced systematic defections. No administration or party can stand without the support of at least two of the great free States. And the conceded abandonment at the outset of the canvass of either of the two largest, especially if it be the first in electoral votes, and of metropolitan action or opinion, usually loses one or both of the others. No man has been elected President against the vote of New York in the six successive elections since it has been cast unitedly and by the people; nor, indeed, ever but in a single instance, the circumstances of which scarcely constitute it an exception. Her vote has been often an unnecessary addition to his majority--and a hopeful contest for it would often enable the other States to do without her; but it is not easy to measure the force of her conceded or apprehended loss, representing, as her population does, elements that affect the equilibrium of so many other States.

"The interest, headed by Gov. Seward, which nominated Scott, is a powerful minority in these great States. Carrying almost the whole Whig party against an existing Whig administration and the influence of the great Whig leaders, it may, as an opposition and surviving those leaders, absorb the third party, now almost holding the balance of power, without disintegrating itself. It will be likely to try the experiment. The defection from it last fall, tho' encouraged by the commanding patronage of the administration and the name of Mr. Webster, was scarcely more than one--certainly not two--per cent., and was confined to a few localities. If the previous State elections had not practically decided the contest, that defection would have been inconsiderable. Hereafter, not only are these disturbing causes stilled, but it will have the cementing influence of a common opposition.

"The characteristics of this interest, in our State politics, have been profligate jobbing and reckless enterprise and expenditure. The only effectual barrier to its predominance has been in the radicals. They include the prominent men who, with Wright, Hoffman, and Flagg, fought all our great financial contests; and a majority of the masses who maintained their measures, although large numbers of the latter were--temporarily, as I believe--detached by the divisions of 1848 and bound with the opposite interest about half of the entire party. While the questions on which they separated were occasional and temporary, questions of honest financial policy and administration are ever present. Indeed, in our time the chief political duty seems to be to protect the people from plunder under the forms of legislation and in the abuse of administration.

"On all these questions, as well as doctrines of States'-rights, free trade, and in most general views of government, the radicals of New York (as I should have remarked while speaking of the relations between them and the State-rights Democrats of the South in a composite cabinet) sympathize with the radical Democracy of the South; and, indeed, are the only unflinching coadjutors the latter have had in New York.

"Agreeing in what is the only safe reliance of constitutional rights, as well as the cardinal point of the Democratic faith--embracing, as each does, the flower of the Democratic youth, enterprise, and energy in its own region--without discussing individual views of the course of either, antecedent to the general reunion of the party, and admitting, if you please, that they are somewhat alike in the boldness with which they maintain their opinions, and repel aggressions on what they deem to be their rights--it is obvious that there are points of sympathy between them which make it easy and natural for them to fraternize, when out of the presence of any immediate course of difference, as they did all through the late Baltimore convention and in its result.

"The radicals of New York include as much talent, courage, enterprise, and fearless devotion as can be found in any party. They have the advantage of being, on an average, half a generation younger than the other. These circumstances, as well as those I have before mentioned, mark them as the future of the Democracy of New York. Since Silas Wright's death they have given their affections to no providential man. They fell into the support of Genl. Pierce with alacrity at the convention, and with generous enthusiasm in the canvass, because they recognized in him qualities in common with those of their lamented leader, attested as well by the warm regard generated between them in former years by mutual sympathies, as by the whole career of the survivor.

"As a matter of mere party calculation, I do not think it wise, with reference to the reconstitution and reconsolidating of the party on a comprehensive basis, to leave them the only large and powerful class not represented in the cabinet; nor, in undertaking to represent them, to pass over a statesman of great merit and in all respects unobjectionable, unless because he is one of their number. The administration will, I believe, ensure their support by its principals and measures. But looking to the condition of domestic politics, in New York and the other great States on which the strength of the party mainly depends, I do not think it would be a mistake to add the cordiality that comes from a sense of equality and reciprocity in party relations and the energetic and efficient co-operation which will result. There are other considerations, but my letter has already reached an unconscionable length, my apology for which is, that writing my thoughts as they arose while writing they would not stop, and I could not--I have set them down frankly, not without some delicacy, at seeming so much to advise, but remembering that nobody need follow, while I would be unwilling to mislead. If I can contribute any information or suggestion to the general stock which you have a right to advise, and He whose province it is to judge must needs gather from all quarters, my end will be attained. I am too sensible of the difficulties of filling up a cabinet on principles which seem essential, or any general principal and at the same time securing the highest individual fitness, worth and weight and a reasonable concurrence of our friends in the various localities,--to be willing to increase them. A just and firm policy will solve them, as nearly as is ever attainable in such cases, to the satisfaction of the country. With the best wishes of one who may speculate safely because he is without the responsibility of acting--and who, except as a citizen, a Democrat, and a friend of the new administration, has, and can have, no interest in the result, though not exempt from the influence of sympathies of opinion and association in attempting to take a fair view,

"I remain truly your friend, (Signed) "S. J. TILDEN."[19]

TILDEN TO FRANKLIN PIERCE

"HARRISBURG, _Feb. 23d, 1853_. "_Confidential._

"MY DEAR SIR,--A little matter of business, which called me here for a day, has brought me again in contact with Gov. Bigler, and his impressions are so strong on a point I casually mentioned to you in New York that I think it not improper to repeat his suggestion more formally. It is that, in case you have decided to take Mr. Campbell[20] into your cabinet, you should, if practicable, put him in the Interior or Navy, rather than the Post-Office. The Gov. says the Catholics are very numerous in this State--enough to make it probable that, in many instances, they may become candidates for appointment as postmasters--and enough to awaken little neighborhood jealousies respecting them. He deems it undesirable that Mr. C., as the head of the department, should be called upon officially to decide on these cases, and be exposed to the suspicion of appointing from religious partiality, or to the necessity of doing injustice in order to avoid that imputation. It is worth considering whether these views have not more force than your own observation in the different condition of things existing in New England would induce you at first to give them. In expressing them, the Gov. can have no motive but the welfare of your administration and of the party here, and his observation of the state of opinion here is entitled to a consideration. He seems to entertain these ideas so strongly, and so much to _desire that they shall_ be presented to you, that I take the liberty of drawing your attention once more to them;--not to press them upon you, but that your mind may pause upon them and take their exact measure before you conclude the question.

"I am not sure that my engagements will permit me to be in Washington at the inauguration; but I hope, at any rate, to have the pleasure of seeing you soon after.

"With great respect, "I remain, truly, "Your friend."

"_His Exy. Franklin Pierce_."

We have here a continuation of suggestions which Mr. Tilden felt called upon to present to President Pierce to guide him in his dispensation of his patronage in the State of New York. It makes one sad to think what an opportunity was lost by this President, and through him by the country, from his failure to see the wisdom of this advice and to adopt it. Had Mr. Pierce respected the public opinion of the State of New York and properly recognized the political sentiments and sympathies of the majority there, as he did in the Southern States, the presumption is that the Nullification party would have been as effectually disarmed under his administration as it was by President Jackson a quarter of a century before. Franklin Pierce, however, was a different man from Andrew Jackson, and the conditions under which he received his nomination did not leave him a free agent.

It was only at this stage of Pierce's administration that Tilden began to indulge in the deplorable error of walking by sight and not by faith. He did not believe, nor did he ever again seem to comprehend, that in the slave States all other questions even the Constitution of our government and the integrity of our territory, were subordinate throughout the South to the preservation and extension of slavery; that every person who ventured publicly to express a doubt of the wisdom of allowing slavery to extend to the free Territories was pronounced there a _suspect_, and was proscribed as a person who tainted every one who associated with him politically. The Nullifiers saw, and saw correctly, that the anti-slavery sentiment could only be resisted in America as heresy was resisted by Louis XIV. in France--by crushing the heretics or driving them from the country. To reason with Pierce in favor of dispensing his patronage in the State of New York in accordance with the public opinion of the State, was as idle as the lambs reasoning with the wolf in the fable.

The following notes, though without address, were without doubt prepared by Tilden and addressed to Pierce or to some one for his perusal. By the paging of the MS., it appears that thirteen pages, which have not been found, preceded those which are here submitted to the reader.

ADDITIONAL NOTES ON THE ALLOTMENT

[OF OFFICES UNDER THE PIERCE ADMINISTRATION]

"The Collectorship, the Sub-Treasuryship, and in a less degree the Naval Office, have State as well as city aspects. I have therefore set down the Secretary of State and the foreign missions in connection with them.

"Considered in a State aspect, see how much more the Hunkers (Hard and Soft) get, in every view of this allotment, than the Barnburners, who are more than equal in numbers and power to both of them united.

"Considering the Collectorship singly in that aspect, the same result is obvious.

"Be not misled by the apparent predominance of the Hunkers in the city. Up to the moment of the schism in 1848, the Radicals had five-sixths of the masses and nearly the whole party organization. Their old associates have been returning to them ever since. In 1851 the Radicals had a majority of the delegates to the State convention, and there was but a small majority against them in the General Committee of that year. At the last election of General Committee in 1852, they carried a majority; and at the last trial in the Tammany Society their majority was five to one. I grant that a large majority of the party went for Cass in 1848, but I do not think a majority are now in the leadership of Schell, Sickles, etc., or included in the distinctive class of Hards. I entertain no doubt whatever, if the appointments are such as not to affect the question anyway, the Radicals will remain in permanent possession of the organization. The truth is that four-fifths of the rank and file follow the organization, by whichever leaders it is wielded. All this, however, is matter of opinion; I do not claim for it the assent of your judgment, although I have never been known hitherto to over-calculate the strength of those among whom I belong.

"But permit me to say that this point is below the importance and dignity of the general question before you. The most controlling aspects of the case are State aspects and general aspects. If you vest the most powerful and influential trust in the State of New York in a politician of the most vulgar sort--or narrow views, prospective in all save the promise by which that trust is secured, a schemer for personal ends by desperate and fraudulent means, that almost revolted the party at the last election--nay, if you fail to take most ample and certain guaranty against the predominance of any such influence, in the known, tried, and elevated character of the man you select, your appointment cannot fail to be discreditable and disastrous in its results. You should rest that corner of your administration on the sense and moral power of the community, by an appointment which should appeal to them, and draw approval from all disinterested persons. Do this, and you will rise above the altitude of mere politicians; and no disaffection which their disappointments will create can raise a ripple on the surface.

"There is one other consideration. I have recounted to you on a former occasion the series of surrenders by the Radicals to the Softs through which the Union movement of the New York Democracy has been thus far carried on. I could not adequately express to you the painful personal embarrassments by which its recent steps have been marked--the embroiling of old personal relations--and the difficulties with which it has been achieved. These were our main motives to ask in the selection of a Cabinet officer from New York some recognition of the radicals. Again they yielded, and they have looked forward to the most prominent local appointment in the State as a case in which what they felt to be justice--long deferred--would be accorded to them. The impression--whether well or ill founded--has existed that such would be the course of things. I confess that I have shared in that impression. Instead of there being any cause for shrinking or hesitation, I think the occasion ought to be _desired_ to fulfil an expectation so right and reasonable. I clearly think that it is needed. I know I speak the sentiments of the strong men among the radicals when I say that the personal interests, desires, or gratification of Gen. Dix, or any other man whom they have honored, are as dust in the balance in the true gravity of this question. I believe Gen. Dix is the last man who would dissent from this opinion. At any rate, I take the responsibility of expressing it in the name of all his supporters.

"A clear, conspicuous recognition, in a case in reference to which expectation has [been] excited, and which concerns more than the gratification of a single individual, is what is needed. The controlling men of the radicals in all parts of the State are independent men--in condition as in character. They are weary with debating questions of their own equality with the rest of their party. They have not proposed to proscribe anybody. The question has constantly been whether they should be proscribed. They do not rely on instructions contrary to the disposition and whole anterior conduct of the individual intrusted with the power. Such reliance would be an illusion inconsistent with all ordinary experience; and a choice which should imply it will utterly fail of inspiring confidence or producing any valuable effect.

"The programme should be accomplished to this actual condition of facts and sentiments.

"It is with a clear sense and earnest feeling outrunning my power of adequate expression, in the haste in which I write, that I put you in possession of these ideas. I do so only because I think I comprehend the case better than can easily be done from a distance; and because I deem it important that you should be appraised of the sentiments of a powerful class on which the success of the administration, so far as New York is concerned, largely depends. A desire that you should do what is wise for it and for yourself is not less my motive than a desire that you should be just to the class to which I myself belong. I confide entirely in your disposition to do what is fair and right to all; and have a grateful sense of the kindness and consideration with which you have treated me personally. These very sentiments impel me to address you with earnest frankness in respect to a matter, a mistake in which cannot, in my judgment, be easily, if at all, retrieved.

"Very truly, "Your friend, "S. J. TILDEN."

J. VAN BUREN TO ISAAC FOWLER, POSTMASTER OF NEW YORK CITY

"NEW YORK, _Mch. 21st, 1853_.

"MY DEAR FOWLER,--Yours of yesterday is recd., and I have read it to Kennedy and Waterbury, who have started to get letters--they feel confident that the Mayor will write; Dix is at Rye, but has written, I think, to Tilden. Havemeyer writes for nobody this day. I enclose a note of my own, which, with Marcy friendly, ought to cover ground enough.

"I yesterday wrote O'Sullivan by Benton--also Temple; you will have seen my letters before this. If I had known last week I could be of service I might have run on. Now I start for Albany at 1.15, where I have 3 causes amongst the first 10 in the Court of Appeals, and they now have a rule that they will not strike off or reserve on the first day. If I can get away the last of the week I will run on to Washington, but then I suppose it will be too late. Tallcott came on with Tilden to Philadelphia, and brings accounts corresponding with those in your letter. If I had known exactly how matters stood I would not have alluded in my letter to Temple to my previous letter to Tilden; if he has not read the President my letter to him he may strike out that part, or say that Tilden was afraid the abruptness of it might not be understood, and so retained it. There is nothing in either letter that should be misapprehended between honest men--the President is entitled to frankness and plain-dealing, and so are we.

"In regard to my visiting Washington, I see no good I could do, except to satisfy the President and Govr. Marcy that we mean to deal with them not only fairly but liberally. This can as well be done by yourself, Tilden, Richmond, O'Sullivan, Crosswell, Temple, Cassidy, and any other friends with whom I have no secrets, and without whom I should be powerless, if disposed to differ from them. Marcy must be perfectly aware of this, and I am sure the President is. I am not surprised to hear from all our friends that Marcy behaves well--his natural disposition, old associations, good sense, and obvious policy all combine to take him to the side of sound men, and if he is prudent the party can be made very strong in this State. It is curious, but true, that I have said from the first that the only fear I have about him is that he will be too violent on the hard shells! It is a singular fear for me to have, but it is because such a course would weaken M.'s influence with Pierce, and excite sympathy with the hard shells. That M. would be just to our people I have never doubted since he was selected.