Category: Philosophy & Ethics

Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation Reprinted from Green's Philosophical Works, vol. II., with Preface by Bernard Bosanquet

The present volume consists of the late Professor Green's lectures on the 'Principles of Political Obligation,' together with a chapter on the different senses of the term 'Freedom,' taken from a course directly connected with the former. The work thus re-issued is a reprint o...

Chapters

1. Part 1

The present volume consists of the late Professor Green's lectures on the 'Principles of Political Obligation,' together with a chapter on the different senses of the term 'Free...

2. Part 2

121. We must admit _(a)_ that the idea of the state as serving a common interest is only _partially_ realised, even by the most enlightened subject, though so far as realised it...

3. Part 3

1. Since in all willing a man is his own object, the will is always free. Or, more properly, a man in willing is necessarily free, since willing constitutes freedom, [1] and 'fr...

4. Part 4

10. It may be said perhaps that we are here pressing words too closely; that it is of course understood, when it is asked whether a man has power over his will, that 'power' is...

5. Part 5

21. By 'practical reason' we mean a consciousness of a possibility of perfection to be realised in and by the subject of the consciousness. By 'will' we mean the effort of a sel...

6. Part 6

6. The condition of a moral life is the possession of will and reason. Will is the capacity in a man of being determined to action by the idea of a possible satisfaction of hims...

7. Part 7

20. (2) A true theory of 'jus naturae,' a rationale of law or ideal of what it should be, is not to be had by inquiring how far actual law corresponds to, and is derived from, t...

8. Part 8

33. Is there then no limit to the 'jus' which the state may exercise? With Spinoza this is equivalent to the question, is there no limit to the 'potentia' which it can exercise?...

9. Part 9

42. All the more fruitful elements in Spinoza's political doctrine are lacking in that of Hobbes, but the principle of the two theories is very much the same. Each begins with t...

10. Part 10

53. Again, it was held that in a state of nature men were 'free and equal.' This is maintained by Hobbes as much as by the founders of American independence. But if freedom is t...

11. Part 11

63. It is evident from the chapter (XIX.) on the 'dissolution of government' that he did not seriously contemplate the conditions under which such an act could be exercised. Wha...

12. Part 12

75. The test of the dominance of the general will in assemblies of the people is an approach to unanimity. 'Long debates, discussions, tumult, indicate the ascendency of particu...

13. Part 13

86. But the Austinians, having found their sovereign, are apt to regard it as a much more important institution than--if it is to be identified with a determinate person or pers...

14. Part 14

96. But whether or no in any qualified sense of 'sovereign' or 'jus,' a sovereign that is not so 'de jure' is possible, once understand by 'sovereign' the determinate person or...

15. Part 15

107. We come next to the question of the possible duty of resistance in cases where no law, acknowledged or half-acknowledged, written or customary, can be appealed to against a...

16. Part 16

118. From this common source morality and political subjection in all its forms always retain two elements in common, one consisting in antagonism to some inclination, the other...

17. Part 17

129. It is thus that actions of men, whom in themselves we reckon bad, are 'overruled' for good. There is nothing mysterious or unintelligible in such 'overruling.' There is not...

18. Part 18

140. It is in this sense that a slave has 'natural rights' They are 'natural' in the sense of being independent of, and in conflict with, the laws of the state in which he lives...

19. Part 19

149. The rights which may be treated as independent of the state in the sense explained are of course those which are commonly distinguished as _private_, in opposition to _publ...

20. Part 20

160. We have then in war a destruction of human life inflicted on the sufferers intentionally by voluntary human agency. It is true, as we saw, that it is not easy to say in any...

21. Part 21

169. It is nothing then in the necessary organisation of the state, but rather some defect of that organisation in relation to its proper function of maintaining and reconciling...

22. Part 22

[1] 'Social right,' i.e. right belonging to a society of persons recognising a common good, and belonging through membership of the society to the several persons constituting i...

23. Part 23

194. On the same principle may be justified the consideration of extenuating circumstances in the infliction of punishment. In fact, whether under that name or another, they are...

24. Part 24

204. According to the view here taken, then, there is no direct reference in punishment by the state, either retrospective or prospective, to moral good or evil. The state in it...

25. Part 25

213. (1) Appropriation is an expression of will; of the individual's effort to give reality to a conception of his own good; of his consciousness of a possible self-satisfaction...

26. Part 26

224. The admission of freedom of trade follows from the same principle. It is a condition of the more complete adaptation of nature to the service of man by the free effort of i...

27. Part 27

235. So much for the peculiarity of family rights, as distinct from other rights. The distinction is not merely a formal one. From the fact that these rights have persons for th...

28. Part 28

246. Question (2) is one that does not admit of being answered on any absolute principle We must bear in mind that all rights--in idea or as they should be--are relative to mora...