Chapter 13

THE OUTPOST COMPANY.--The Outpost Company is the Outpost infantry unit, the company commander providing Piquets, Supports, and Detached Posts as required. Upon receiving his orders the commander will move his command, with due precautions against {135} surprise, to the allotted ground where the men will be halted under cover. Before proceeding to the part of the line assigned to him the commander of the Outpost company will detail a force to precede his advance and cover his operations, and the force so pushed forward will not be withdrawn until his Piquets have entrenched themselves. By the map he can decide the number of Piquets he will require, in accordance with the number of roads to be watched, the facilities for resistance, and the requirements for patrolling. The extent of frontage allotted to an Outpost company depends upon the number of avenues of approach (roads and tracks, and open, unfenced country) to be watched, and under ordinary circumstances a frontage up to 1,500 or 2,000 yards may be allotted to a company with 4 platoons at fighting strength. Each Piquet should consist of a complete unit and should be posted on a good defensive position. The Support (or Supports, if more than one is detailed for the company frontage) should also be composed of a complete unit, and should generally be posted 400 to 800 yards in rear of the Piquets, with good lines of approach to each. _Detached Posts_ may be required, to watch an extreme flank, or to occupy a position in front of the Sentry line, where the enemy might otherwise collect unseen for the attack or initiate steps for hostile reconnaissance. A further use is to deal with traffic through the line, where a main road has no Piquet upon it. The Outpost company commander must inform his Piquet commander, and his immediate superior, of his position, as all reports received by the Piquets require to be sent to him, and his superior commander will need to keep in communication with him at all times. The first duty of a Piquet commander (who is almost invariably a Platoon commander) is to consolidate his position by entrenchment and by all available means, and to prepare a range card, so that the enemy may not approach without heavy loss; and if the Piquet has a Support ordered to reinforce it in case {136} of attack, the entrenchments must be constructed to accommodate the supporting troops (including the Sentry Groups thrown out, if these have been ordered to withdraw to the Piquet in case of a heavy attack). The commander must impress on all men of his Piquet the importance of gaining a clear mental picture of their surroundings while daylight lasts, so that they may the more easily find their way about by night. On his way to the position the Piquet commander will decide from the map what roads he has to watch and where sentries will need to be posted, and he will provide from his platoon, patrols and sentries (with the necessary reliefs for the patrols), will detail the various duties, and will make the necessary sanitary arrangements. His sentries should be posted as expeditiously as possible, and his patrols sent out at once. The number of patrols to be furnished depends upon the nature of the country, and as each patrol requires two reliefs, their number should not be greater than circumstances demand. The duties of infantry patrols are to search the ground and buildings, etc., for about 2,000 yards in front of the sentry line, to find out whether the enemy is there or not, and if the enemy is found to be close at hand to watch his movements and report frequently. The number of Sentry Groups depends upon the nature of the country and the height of the line of observation, but between them the groups must be answerable for the whole of the ground in front of their Piquet (up to its junction on the left and right with neighbouring Piquets). A Sentry Group consists of 6 men under a N.C.O. (2 on duty and 4 off), and groups are usually posted not more than 400 yards from their Piquet, and hold their ground unless ordered to withdraw. If invisible from their Piquet a connecting sentry should be posted by the Piquet commander. Sentry Groups required for night dispositions only will not be posted until after dark. In order to prevent the men of the Piquet being unnecessarily disturbed at night the N.C.O. and {137} men of each relief must be made to bivouac together, apart from other reliefs and from the remainder of the Piquet. A sentry will always be posted over the Piquet, to watch the Sentry Groups and connecting sentries, and ready to alarm the Piquet at any moment of need. Patrols consist as a rule of a complete unit of 3 to 8 men under a N.C.O., and should be formed of men trained as scouts, although it will sometimes be possible to use only single scouts for this purpose, owing to the vigilance of the enemy. Standing patrols may also have to be furnished, if required to watch some special point, particularly at night, or at the junction of roads converging towards the Piquet line, at cross roads, etc., when they are out of sight of the sentries. The Piquet will stand to arms, every man in his allotted place, an hour before dawn, and will remain alert until the patrols (which are invariably sent out about that time) have reported absence of movement by the enemy. Outposts are generally relieved at dawn, so that the force is doubled at the hour of danger. All troops in the Outpost Line must entrench themselves, if posted as sentries, or in the Piquet or Support positions, and must be ready at any moment to resist a sudden attack. A detachment of Royal Engineers will usually be available to superintend the consolidation of the main position.

DAY AND NIGHT WORK.--By day, the work of an Outpost Line will consist in Reconnaissance of the approaches for some miles by the Aircraft and mounted troops and cyclists, while infantry, with artillery and machine guns, hold the Line of Resistance. By night, the mounted troops will be withdrawn, except such "Cossack Posts" (standing patrols of mounted troops) and "Vedettes" (mounted sentries), as it may be deemed necessary to leave established in front of the line, while Aircraft will have much difficulty in discerning movement. The whole work of observation and resistance therefore falls on the infantry, who may be in their day {138} position or may be withdrawn to the reverse slope of a ridge, in order to obtain a sky line by night upon which to train their rifles.

Neglect of the Principles of War is almost inevitably followed by disaster, and Protection is the first of the Tactical Principles. During the later stages of the Franco-Prussian War a French force of the strength of a brigade was billeted in the _Chateau of Chambord_ (December 9, 1870), which stands in a large park, near Blois. No outpost precautions were taken, and the Chateau was captured by two companies of Prussian infantry. The minor disasters suffered by British arms in the South African War were almost entirely due to neglect of the warnings contained in the official text-books. In spite of the established superiority of the Boers in mobility and vigilance the most elementary precautions against surprise were frequently neglected. At _Tweefontein_ (December 24, 1901) a force of Yeomanry was surprised in an unprotected camp by a mobile force of Boers, and heavy losses were suffered. The mystic atmosphere of Christmas Eve was insufficient protection against the militancy of Christian De Wet.

BATTLE OUTPOSTS.--When a battle dies down at night, or when the forces are in close proximity and a battle is imminent, the whole of the troops must be kept in readiness for instant action. Protection by Outposts in the normal formation is generally impossible and can only be provided by patrols, who keep touch with the enemy without causing unnecessary alarms or looking for purposeless encounters, and by sentries over the Forward Troops, which take the place of the Piquets. The troops must be ready at any moment to repel attacks with bullets and bayonets. Unless otherwise ordered, the patrols should refrain altogether from aggressive action and should confine their operations to secret observation of the enemy.

It is, however, essential that touch with the enemy {139} should be maintained as advances, withdrawals, and other surprise movements, are usually prepared and often carried out under cover of darkness when hostile troops are within striking distance. In the American Civil War, by losing touch with the Northern Army, the Southern Army permitted it to escape although it had been very severely mauled. During the Third Battle of Ypres (July 31-November 6, 1917) the Allies renewed the attack on a six-mile front from Zonnebeke to Langemarck (the junction of the Franco-British Armies in Flanders). This action, known as the _Battle of Broenbeck_, or _Brombeek_ (October 9, 1917), was marked by the successful repulse of counter-attacks by the 1st Battalion Royal Newfoundland Regiment through the correct employment of Battle Outposts. Germans massing for the counter-attack in Taube Farm were pinned by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, while a message sent to the supporting artillery caused the annihilation of the enemy; another attacking force was destroyed by Lewis-gun and rifle fire, before it was launched. A defensive flank was also formed under heavy fire, and from this flank a further counter-attack was similarly dealt with. The casualties of the Newfoundlanders throughout this battle were 50 killed, 14 missing, and 132 wounded out of a total strength of 500 all ranks, and the losses inflicted by them probably exceeded 800.

After the _Battle of Fredericksburg_ (December 13, 1862) the Army of the Potomac under Gen. Burnside eluded the vigilance of Gen. R. E. Lee, who had defeated it on December 13, 1862. Burnside withdrew (December 15, 1862) across the Potomac to Stafford Heights with the whole of his army, under cover of a heavy storm. If special orders had been given by the Outpost commanders for constant and vigorous patrolling, and if scouts had been instructed to penetrate the Federal lines from time to time at all risks, Burnside could have been attacked at a disadvantage while on the move and should have been driven into the Potomac. {140} During the battle itself a Confederate Brigade was surprised in its own front line through failure to patrol a triangular wood which jutted out in front of the position and screened the brigade on the left with which touch was not maintained. At all times of action with enemy forces all ground to the front or flank must be kept under close observation, or surprise may lead to disaster.

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TACTICAL RECONNAISSANCE

Reconnaissance during battle has been dealt with under "Influences on the Battle" and in other lectures, and owing to the close connection between the two subjects a number of points concerning reconnaissance in general have been noted in dealing with Protection. It has also been seen that observation by Aircraft, Patrols, and Sentries is essential to Protection both in Position Warfare and the War of Manoeuvre, and that Reconnaissance is the essence of Protection. There remain, however, two forms of Reconnaissance that have not yet been considered, namely: the Reconnaissance of a Position with a view to attacking it, and the Reconnaissance of an unoccupied position with a view to occupying it for defence.

RECONNAISSANCE FOR ATTACK.--The first of these is the constant duty of all commanders in the line during Position Warfare, and it is carried out by Patrols and Raiding Parties, who provide information which supplements the photographs and reports of the Air Service, and enables a commander to arrive at a decision. In a War of Manoeuvre reconnaissance by the Air Service is equally important, and it is supplemented by the work of the Patrols of the Advanced Guard, but principally by that of specially selected Intelligence Officers, working in conjunction with, or independent of, the Vanguard. Such officers would be in possession of information which it might not be possible to reveal to the commander of the Patrols of the Vanguard, and their special training would give an added value to their report. The chief {142} points to be ascertained concerning a hostile position are:--

I. The extent of the position occupied.

II. Weak points of the position.

III. Points, the capture of which would facilitate enfilade or reverse fire, and would thus render the rest of the position untenable.

IV. Best line of attack.

V. Supporting positions, for covering, converging, enfilade, and traversing fire.

It should be possible to gather this information without alarming the enemy, or giving notice of impending attack.

Information on further points can be gained by fighting, and _Reconnaissance by Raids_ is a common feature of Position Warfare. By such means additional information can be gained, as to:--

VI. Names of regiments holding the position, judged from identity discs, badges, buttons, etc.

VII. Whether preparations are being made for an attack (discoverable by ear as well as eye), or bombardment, etc. (from examination of shell dumps, etc.).

VIII. Position of machine guns (Pill-boxes or other), mortars, etc.

IX. Condition of intervening ground and of the wire entanglements.

X. Effects of recent bombardments.

XI. Moral of the enemy.

RECONNAISSANCE FOR OCCUPATION.--In the Reconnaissance of a Position with a view to occupying it for the purposes of receiving attack, the points to be noted are:--

I. The best line for the establishment of a series of mutually supporting tactical points to be held by the infantry.

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II. The best means of protecting the flanks.

III. The best position for the artillery and machine guns.

IV. The tactical key to the position.

V. The line from which attack may be expected.

VI. The best line for the counter-attack.

VII. The positions for the supports and reserves.

and, additionally, in the case of a War of Manoeuvre:--

VIII. The best position for the cavalry.

IX. Alternative positions in rear from which, after reorganisation, to recapture the front line, with the best line of withdrawal to them.

Additional information would be required in Position Warfare as to the best lines for avenues communicating from the old to the new position, and as to the time required to consolidate the new position against attack (including the conversion of the parados into parapet, etc.).

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NIGHT OPERATIONS

There are several reasons why darkness is preferable to daylight in certain military operations. Secrecy is usually the aim of all movement, and the increased power of observation due to the advent of the Air Service has caused an increase in the necessity for certain movements being made during the hours of darkness. In all Night Operations (except marches undertaken by night to avoid the heat of the day) surprise is the main object; secrecy of preparation is therefore essential, and steps must be taken to prevent discovery of the intended movement, and to prevent the information leaking out through the indiscretion of subordinates. Orders will be communicated beforehand only to those officers from whom action is required, and until the troops reach the position of assembly no more should be made known to them than is absolutely necessary. It may even be advisable, in order to deceive spies, that misleading orders should originally be given out. Secrecy of intention as well as of preparation is essential. Frederick the Great is reported to have said, "If I thought my coat knew my plans I would burn it!"

NIGHT MARCHES.--Night Marches are the movement of columns in march formation, and their object may be merely to avoid the heat of the day; but they are also one of the chief means by which a commander can outwit, deceive, and surprise the enemy--the principal aim of the strategist--by outflanking his position, by anticipating him in the occupation of a locality, or by eluding him by the secret withdrawal of a force which appeared to be in a situation favourable to his plans. {145} Forces may also be secretly concentrated to decide the issue of a battle that is imminent, or of a battle that has begun in daylight. Long marches of this nature rarely culminate in an attack, and when shorter movements are made with such an object in view, the "March" may be said to terminate when the Position of Assembly is reached, and from that point to become an "Advance" or an "Assault." There are certain essentials to success:--

I. _Direction_ towards the objective must always be maintained. The route must therefore be reconnoitred beforehand, and marked by the Advanced Guard during the march, and if there are any intricacies in the route, such as deviations from a well-defined road, local guides should be secured. Across open country a general direction can be maintained by means of the stars, and when these are not visible, by the compass. (See Chapter VIII., "Manual of Map Reading.")

II. _Protection_ against surprise attacks must be provided by Advanced, Flank, and Rear Guards, but (except in the obvious case of columns of mounted troops only) mounted troops will not be employed in this service. The Advanced Guard will be small, and will usually consist of Patrols within 100 yards of the column, followed by connecting files, with the rest of the Advanced Guard in collective formation. The Rear Guard will also be smaller and nearer than during a daylight march. Flanks will usually be protected by small bodies holding tactical positions, posted by the Advanced Guard, and withdrawn by the Rear Guard.

III. _Secrecy_ must be maintained, and orders issued as late as possible, and the preparations carried on without ostentation. The march {146} itself must be conducted in absolute silence and without lights of any kind. Care must be taken to prevent or muffle sounds, and horses likely to neigh must be left with the train. In the case of a march to elude the enemy, Outposts will remain in position until daylight and will be secretly withdrawn, to rejoin the column at the first opportunity, and bivouac fires, etc., will be kept burning.

IV. _Connection_.--Every commander must have and must maintain a fixed place in the column, and an orderly officer must be detached from each unit to headquarters, so that instructions may be conveyed to such commanders at all times. Units must be closed up, and the usual distances lessened or dispensed with, and connection must be maintained between units and their sub-divisions. The pace should be uniform, but not more than 2 miles an hour can be expected on a dark night, including halts. The time and periods of halts should be arranged before starting, and units must regain any distance lost before halting. After crossing or clearing an obstacle the column should advance its own length and then be halted until reported to be closed up again, and staff officers should be detailed to superintend these matters. In addition to these general principles there are certain axioms, which must become "rules of thumb" with all concerned:--

An officer must march in rear of each unit.

All ranks must be informed what to do in case of alarm or attack.

Fire will not be opened without orders.

Magazines will be charged, but no cartridge placed in the chamber.

There must be absolute silence, no smoking, no lights.

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When halted, men may lie down in their places, but must not quit the ranks.

NIGHT ADVANCES.--Night advances are the movement of deployed troops to gain ground towards the hostile position with a view to delivering an assault at dawn. They may take place as a preliminary to an engagement, or to continue one already begun with increased prospects of success. In the first case they are usually the sequel to a Night March, and in either case they are generally followed by an attack at dawn. Surprise is the main object, even when they are undertaken for the purpose of gaining ground difficult to cross in daylight, from which to renew an engagement, as frequently happens during a campaign in a War of Manoeuvre, while such advances are common features of Position Warfare. In any case the ground won must be consolidated immediately, as a counter-attack at or before dawn may always be expected, and if the ground offers difficulties for entrenching, the necessary materials must be carried by the troops. Successive advances of this nature may enable the troops to reach a jumping-off place for the final assault, and such advances may be made on successive nights, the ground won being defended meanwhile against counter-attacks. Unless troops are already deployed for the advance, a Position of Assembly will need to be selected, with a further Position of Deployment; but these positions sometimes coincide. The deployment will be, as a rule, into shallow columns on a narrow frontage at deploying intervals, in order that the final deployment of the leading columns into the Forward Troops of the Attack may take place without delay when the moment for the assault arrives. On reaching the objective of the advance these columns would deploy into line, and each unit would entrench itself on the new position. As it is essential for success that _direction_ should be maintained and _connection_ preserved, the ground over which the advance is to be made must be {148} examined beforehand and landmarks noted, and touch must be kept by means of ropes or any available device. Care must also be taken in consolidating the position that the entrenchments have a general alignment towards the enemy and that they are so sited as to protect from enfilade fire.

Night Assaults.--Night Assaults are delivered by troops already deployed into attack formation. It is an established tactical principle that "when the conditions of the fire-fight are likely to be favourable, it is probably better to accept the inevitable casualties that must result from a struggle for fire supremacy, rather than adopt the undoubted hazards of a night assault." These conditions are frequently so unfavourable in Position Warfare, owing to the strength of consolidated positions and to the increasing accuracy and density of artillery fire, that assaults are made of necessity in the hours of darkness, in preference to those of daylight. During the _Battle of the Somme_ (July 1-17, 1916) a night advance was made by seven divisions on a front of about 4 miles. The troops moved out in the early hours of July 14, for a distance of about 1,400 yards, and lined up in the darkness below a crest some 300 to 500 yards from the enemy's trenches. Their advance was covered by strong patrols and their correct deployment had been ensured by white tapes laid out on the ground earlier in the night of July 13-14. The whole movement was carried out unobserved and without touch being lost in any case. The assault was delivered at 3.25 a.m., when there was just sufficient light to be able to distinguish friend from foe at short range, and along the whole front attacked the troops were preceded by an effective artillery barrage. They swept over the enemy's first-line trenches and consolidated their position in the defences beyond.