Part 2

While the men rested, the leaders of the expedition met in an evening council to review the progress of the march. First, measures were adopted to correct disorders in the columns resulting from the weariness of the march. More important, however, was the election of Col. William Campbell to serve as temporary commander of the combined volunteer units. In recognition of Col. Charles McDowell’s seniority, he was entrusted on October 1 with a mission to General Gates’ headquarters to request a permanent commander. He was instructed to ask for the assignment of either Gen. Daniel Morgan or Gen. William Davidson of the American Continental Army. McDowell’s regiment was turned over to his brother, Maj. Joseph McDowell.

SYCAMORE SHOALS M^cKINNEYS GAP GILLESPIES GAP QUAKER MEADOWS GILBERT TOWN COWPENS BROAD RIVER KINGS MOUNTAIN RANGE BATTLEGROUND

Unknown to the patriot expedition, Major Ferguson’s army in the meantime had hurriedly left Gilbert Town. Two messages that he received made this withdrawal advisable. In the first, received September 25, Lt. Col. J. H. Cruger, commander of the British post at Ninety-Six, requested Ferguson to intercept a band of Georgia patriots under Col. Elijah Clarke. This group was reported to be moving northward to join the main body of mountain men. In the second message, English agents in the Watauga settlements furnished Ferguson with the first warning of the rising of his formidable back-country enemy.

Ferguson immediately sent couriers in all directions to enlist the support of the Tories within the nearby region. Others were sent to call back all Tories who had been temporarily furloughed. On September 27 he headed south in the direction of Ninety-Six, reaching the Green River on September 30. There he received further information concerning the movements of the mountain men from Chambers and Crawford who had several days before deserted the patriot army.

From this point Ferguson sent an urgent message to Cornwallis at Charlotte calling for reinforcements. Ferguson also informed Cornwallis of his intention to hasten toward Charlotte with the hope that his pursuers would be deceived into the belief that Ninety-Six was the destination of his retreat. This communication was received by Cornwallis after the battle, too late to be of any help. A second message sent to Colonel Cruger requesting 100 men, brought no better results—only the terse reply that his garrison totaled but half that number.

The following morning Ferguson left the vicinity of the mountains and marched his corps 12 miles to Denard’s Ford of the Broad River. Moving at 4 p. m. on October 2, Ferguson crossed the river, marched 4 miles, and lay all night in an armed camp. On October 3, he hastened his march eastward toward Charlotte along a route to the north of the main Broad River. Near Buffalo Creek, he camped at the plantation of a loyalist named Tate. Here he rested his men and awaited expected reinforcements and further information concerning the movements of the patriots.

Ferguson was now becoming anxious about the safety of his army. In another message to Cornwallis on October 5 from Tate’s plantation, which was 50 miles from Charlotte, he advised his commander:

I am on my march towards you, by a road leading from Cherokee Ford, north of Kings Mountain. Three or four hundred good soldiers, part dragoons, would finish the business. ⌈Something⌉ must be done soon. This is their last push in this quarter and they are extremely desolate and ⌈c⌉owed.

_The Pursuit to Kings Mountain_

The American patriot force meanwhile had moved cautiously southward down Cane Creek toward Gilbert Town on October 3. The following day, they learned that Ferguson had withdrawn from the town. At the time, he was miles away, camping at Tate’s plantation. Although the mountain men were disappointed that they could not engage Ferguson at Gilbert Town, they did not permit this to dampen their hopes. They now took up a relentless pursuit of his retreating army.

By the evening of October 4 they had pushed farther southward and camped near Denard’s Ford on the Broad River. At this point they temporarily lost Ferguson’s trail. Continuing southward, however, on October 5 they completed a march of 12 miles and rested that night at Alexander’s Ford on the Green River. On October 6 they pressed forward another 21 miles to reach the Cowpens. This point in South Carolina was so named because of the extensive cattle enclosures owned there by Hiram Saunders, a wealthy Tory. Ferguson’s hope that the mountain men would be misled and continue southward toward Ninety-Six was a false one. From the Cowpens, the route of the frontier army was to be generally southeastward toward the Broad River and then north and east to Kings Mountain.

Along their route to the Cowpens, the mountain men were favored by good fortune. They received accurate information from patriot supporters in the region regarding the country through which Ferguson’s corps had passed in its retreat toward Kings Mountain and Charlotte. Their spirits were also spurred by Col. Edward Lacey, of South Carolina, who visited the patriot camp on the Green River to report that a large body of North and South Carolina militia was ready to join the expedition at the Cowpens.

As early as September 23, Col. James Williams, of South Carolina, with the permission of North Carolina patriot authorities, had issued a call for patriot recruits from the border of both States. His appeal was headed: “A call to arms: Beef, bread, and potatoes,” and resulted in the assembling of 400 men. Included were the forces under local militia leaders, such as William Hill, Edward Lacey, James Hawthorne, Frederick Hambright, William Chronicle, and William Graham. When on the afternoon of October 6, these forces were united with Colonel Campbell’s command at the Cowpens, the combined volunteer army numbered approximately 1,790 men.

At the Cowpens the report of a patriot spy named Joseph Kerr that Ferguson was only a few miles ahead in the vicinity of Kings Mountain, confirmed earlier rumors of the British force’s position. To overtake Ferguson without delay, the leaders of the patriot expedition chose from their various commands a select group of stalwart fighting men, all mounted, who immediately rode ahead during the night of October 6 towards Kings Mountain. The exact strength of this advance party is not known, but it is certain to have exceeded 900 men.

By this time, Ferguson’s army was already encamped upon the top of King’s Mountain. From Tate’s plantation, his route on October 6 for 16 miles followed the old Cherokee Ferry Road between Buffalo and Kings Creek. He crossed a branch of Kings Creek near Whisnant’s mill site and continued along the old Ridge Road to the main branch of Kings Creek. Fording this creek, Ferguson bore off in a northeastward direction toward what is known today as Hambright’s Gap. Later in the day, he led his force through this gap toward the vital ridge of Kings Mountain, about three-quarters of a mile beyond.

The decision to post his army on the top of this ridge represented a change of his plan to push forward and join Cornwallis at Charlotte. It was a decision hard to understand when it is realized how close he was to the security of the main British army. It is generally believed, however, that Ferguson made the decision deliberately and with the definite intention of meeting the patriots in battle. That he felt secure in this position is shown from his letter of October 6 to Cornwallis, which stated: “I arrived to day at Kings Mountain & have taken a post where I do not think I can be forced by a stronger enemy than that against us.” Ferguson was also known to be a vain man. Operating with the largest independent command of his military career, it is probable that he could not resist the temptation to seek for himself the glory of still another victory.

Meanwhile, the picked group of mountain men rode through the night toward their objective under the cover of a drizzling rain. To keep the flint locks of their weapons dry, bags, blankets, or even hunting shirts were wrapped around them. To add to their difficulties, a number of Campbell’s men lost their way in the darkness. By the morning of October 7 they were rounded up and the progress of the march was delayed very little.

The Americans approached the scene of the battle with great caution. Their path was along the same route as that followed by Ferguson on the preceding day. They passed near his campsite at Tate’s plantation where they expected to find a covering-force on the east bank of the Broad River. To avoid possible discovery at this point, they crossed the river at Cherokee Ford, 2½ miles below. By the forenoon of October 7 the men and their horses showed the effects of the tiring overland march from the Cowpens. Despite the suggestion by a number of the leaders that a halt be called, Colonel Shelby is reported to have replied: “I will not stop until night, if I follow Ferguson into Cornwallis’ lines.”

It was not long before the patriots learned definitely that Ferguson was but a few miles ahead, posted on Kings Mountain. Constantly on the alert for Tories who could be expected to warn him of their approach, they followed the Ridge Road past present-day Antioch Church. From this point they proceeded in a northerly direction to an old colonial road leading from North Carolina to what is now York, S. C. This road, which ran in a southeastward direction, led them over Ponder’s Branch and a tributary of Kings Creek to Hambright’s Gap, not far from the site of the coming battle.

Kings Mountain ridge, upon which the encounter soon occurred, extends 600 yards in a northeasterly direction and forms but a small part of the 16-mile Kings Mountain range. The summit of the ridge, which was stony, stood about 60 feet above the surrounding country and was 60 to 120 feet wide. One of its main disadvantages was that the tree line stood almost to its top. This enabled an expert rifleman to fire effectively from ample cover on either side of the ridge upon individuals on its crest.

About a mile from the ridge the patriot leaders called a halt, the horses were hitched, and final battle instructions given the men. They were formed into 2 lines, each consisting of 2 columns, and were ordered to proceed on foot. Each detachment was to take a preassigned position at the base of the ridge to complete the encirclement of Ferguson’s corps. The right flank column was composed of detachments under Major Winston, Colonel Sevier, and Major McDowell, with Winston’s force at the head of the column. The right and left center columns were commanded respectively by Colonels Campbell and Shelby. The left flank column included the forces of Major Chronicle, Colonel Cleveland, and Colonel Williams, with Chronicle’s force at the head of the column. As the march on the ridge began, Major Winston was detached with a number of men from Wilkes and Surry Counties to make a long detour to the right. It is believed that the purpose of Winston’s assignment was to close quickly Ferguson’s most logical line of retreat from the ridge.

Facing the advancing frontiersmen, Ferguson had a force of 1,104 men. These included, in his Provincial Corps, some 100 Rangers who had been selected from the King’s American Rangers, the New Jersey Volunteers, and the Loyal American Regiment. The remainder of his force consisted of about 1,000 Tory militia. His officers included Capt. Abraham de Peyster, second in command, and Lt. Anthony Allaire, adjutant, both from New York. Dr. Uzal Johnson, of New Jersey, was surgeon for the British force.

_The Battle of Kings Mountain_

After passing through Hambright’s Gap, the frontier detachments moved rapidly into their preassigned positions around the ridge. Seeking cover in the wooded ravines, the patriots advanced, and Campbell and McDowell hurriedly passed through the gap at the southwestern end of the ridge. They took positions respectively on the southeastern and eastern slopes. Sevier formed along the western slope, while Shelby took position on the northwestern slope. Meanwhile, the other patriot detachments were forming along the bottom of the ravine leading around the northern and northeastern base of the ridge.

Ferguson’s main camp was near the northeastern end of the ridge, but his picket line extended along the crest nearly to its southwestern end. About 3 p. m., as the patriots began to encircle the ridge, Ferguson’s pickets sounded the alarm and engaged the advancing mountaineers in a brief skirmish. Then, as they reached their positions, Campbell and Shelby almost simultaneously opened the main attack. From the crest the Tories and Provincials replied with a burst of trained volley firing. But Campbell’s and Shelby’s men moved steadily up the slope Indian fashion, from tree to rock. For 10 to 15 minutes they maintained their attack, while the other patriot detachments moved into position around the ridge.

While the trained Tory force “depended on their discipline, their manhood, and the bayonet,” the mountain men relied upon their skill as marksmen. According to an eyewitness account of this phase of the battle “the mountain appeared volcanic; there flashed along its summit and around its base, and up its sides, one long sulphurous blaze.” Ferguson believed steadfastly in the effectiveness of the bayonet charge, but the terrain at Kings Mountain proved “more assailable by the rifle than defensible with the bayonet.”

As the two patriot commands neared Ferguson’s lines, the Tories charged and drove them down the slope at the point of the bayonet. Though they had no bayonets, the patriots rallied at the foot, and the unerring markmanship of their deadly Kentucky rifles forced their pursuers to retire. Slowly following the retreating Tories and Provincials, Campbell’s and Shelby’s men were again driven down the rugged incline by the Tory bayonets. Taking cover behind trees and rocks, the two patriot commands again forced the Tories to retreat toward the crest.

Much of the volley firing of the Provincials and Tories, with their muskets and a possible scattering of Ferguson breech-loading rifles, was aimed too high. It passed harmlessly over the heads of the two patriot detachments, which now pushed even higher toward the crest. As the Tories began their third bayonet charge upon Campbell and Shelby, they were suddenly attacked along the northern and eastern slopes by the other patriot detachments. Moving to meet the patriot attack from these quarters, the Tories allowed Campbell and Shelby to gain and hold the southwestern summit.

Now completely surrounded, Ferguson’s disorganized and rapidly decreasing force was gradually pushed toward its campsite on the northeastern end of the ridge. In this desperate situation, with attacks and counterattacks raging on all sides, the piercing note of Ferguson’s silver whistle urging his forces on continued to be heard above the shooting and shrill whoops of the mountaineers. Suddenly, Ferguson attempted to cut through Cleveland’s lines near the northeastern crest, but was struck from his horse by at least eight balls fired by the mountain sharpshooters. He died a few minutes later.

Captain de Peyster assumed command and attempted to rally the confused surviving Tories and Provincials, but his efforts were useless and he ordered a surrender. During the bloody 1-hour engagement that raged along the heavily wooded and rocky slopes, the mountaineers gained a complete victory. They were veterans of countless frontier clashes, even though untrained in formal warfare and, with a slight loss of 28 killed and 62 wounded, had killed, wounded or captured Ferguson’s entire force.

Order and quiet were not immediately restored to the rugged battlefield. A number of patriots continued to fire into the group of defenseless Tories, because it was not known that a surrender had begun. Others fired upon the Tories to avenge the merciless slaughter of Col. Abraham Buford’s patriot force by Col. Banastre Tarleton’s British raiders at the Waxhaws in South Carolina, on May 29, 1780.

While Dr. Uzal Johnson of Ferguson’s corps tended the wounds of patriots and Tories alike, others buried Ferguson’s body and those of the Tory dead on the battlefield. Of the patriots killed in the engagement, only four—Maj. William Chronicle, Capt. John Mattocks, William Rabb, and John Boyd—are buried there. They share a common grave at the site of the Chronicle markers.

The patriots rested on the battleground overnight. On Sunday morning, October 8, they started the homeward march. One week later they reached Bickerstaff’s plantation near Gilbert Town with their prisoners. The frontiersmen had not dared delay their march, for they feared Cornwallis would send Colonel Tarleton in pursuit to avenge Ferguson’s defeat. At Bickerstaff’s, a court martial was held and 30 Tories were condemned to death; of these, 9 were hanged and the remainder spared. Since an investigation showed that these 9 Tories had robbed, pillaged, and committed more serious crimes, the patriots believed they were justified in this action. They also wished to retaliate for similar types of rude justice rendered so often in the past by the British.

The patriot detachments reached Quaker Meadows on October 15 with the prisoners. From this point they were marched northward toward Virginia; this was in accordance with the instructions of October 12 from General Gates, the American commander in the South. On October 26, Colonel Campbell entrusted Colonel Cleveland with the safekeeping of the prisoners and, with Colonel Shelby, called upon General Gates to determine the fate of the remaining Tories.

Meanwhile, the volunteer army melted away. Most of its members lost no time in returning to their home settlements. As the number of troops guarding the prisoners declined, escape became easy. After a long period of indecision, the remaining Tory prisoners were finally moved to Hillsboro, N. C., and exchanged. The mighty army of mountain men, whose very existence confounded Ferguson, now vanished as quietly as it had gathered.

_The Meaning of the Victory_

The lifting of the spirits of the patriots in the Carolinas and the renewal of their will to resist the British invader were important and immediate effects of Ferguson’s defeat at Kings Mountain. News of this decisive victory spread rapidly through the region, bringing out stronger patriot militia forces in North Carolina and from nearby Virginia. It also revived patriot guerrilla warfare in South Carolina. Tories in the Carolinas became greatly discouraged and disorganized. The British did not immediately sense the importance of this sharp improvement in patriot morale and were inclined to discount the loss of the relatively small Tory force under Ferguson. At the headquarters of the British forces in New York it was even denied that the battle had taken place.

The unexpected success of the patriots at Kings Mountain caused a delay of almost 3 months in Cornwallis’ northward advance. This was a serious loss of time which had a far-reaching effect upon his campaign in 1781. The immediate turn of events in the war in the South that came with the victory at Kings Mountain forced Cornwallis to abandon his foothold at Charlotte, in the unfriendly territory of North Carolina. Fearful that the patriots would try to regain control of key posts in South Carolina, he retreated to Winnsboro, in the upper part of that State. Here he took up a defensive position during the first part of the winter of 1780-81 to await reinforcements sent south by General Clinton. Although ill during most of this period, Cornwallis attempted to regain the support of his former Tory allies in the region and to plan a second invasion of North Carolina.

Patriot leaders took advantage of his enforced halt at Winnsboro and organized a new offensive in the South. At Charlotte, early in December 1780, Gen. Nathanael Greene replaced General Gates as American commander in the South, with the resolve to “recover this country or die in the attempt.” Greene divided his small, ill-equipped army into two partisan forces and directed them to distract Cornwallis by threatening Camden on his right and Ninety-six on his left. This daring plan gave Greene the military initiative in the Carolinas during 1781.

It led to the notable patriot victory at the Cowpens, on January 17, and was followed by the strategic American withdrawal across North Carolina, which dissipated Cornwallis’ strength and strained his supply line. On March 15 Cornwallis overtook Greene and forced him from the field at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse, but British losses were so serious that Cornwallis retired to Wilmington, N. C., for rest and new supplies. All of these actions were important links in the chain of events after Kings Mountain which led Cornwallis along the road to Yorktown. From Wilmington, Cornwallis undertook his dramatic campaign in Virginia which ended with his surrender on October 19 to General Washington’s victorious American and French forces at the siege of Yorktown. The 6 years of war in the American Revolution were over and American independence was assured.

The Kings Mountain expedition and engagement illustrate the characteristic vigor of the untrained American colonial frontiersman in rising to the threat of border invasion. These events are memorable as examples of the personal valor and resourcefulness of the American frontier fighter, particularly the Scotch-Irish, during the Revolution. The battle is a stirring record of the mountain man’s unerring marksmanship. It was truly a hunting-rifle victory.

_Patriot Commanders at Kings Mountain_

The patriot leaders at the Battle of Kings Mountain were of Irish, Scotch, Welsh, English, French, and German ancestry. Six militia colonels and two militia majors, who were in command of the eight detachments which surrounded the battle ridge, are selected for particular mention. The list includes Isaac Shelby, John Sevier, and William Campbell, without whom there would have been no expedition to Kings Mountain. Others of importance in the list are Benjamin Cleveland, Frederick Hambright, James Williams, Joseph McDowell, and Joseph Winston.