CHAPTER VI.

Richard Bond, the Messman--Sikh Grass-cutters--Choice of Camps--General Lloyd's Opinions--Lieut.-Colonel Irvine and Sir H. Maddock--Position at Sobraon--Brigadier E. Smith's Plan--Colonel Irvine's Plan--Goolab Singh's Policy--Sir Robert Dick's Division--Major-General Gilbert's Division--Sir Harry Smith's Division--Brigadier A. Campbell--Sir Joseph Thackwell--Brigadier Scott--British Batteries--Rockets--Sikh Batteries--Assault on the Sikh Entrenchments--Brigadier Stacey--Captain Cunningham's Account--The 10th Foot--Lieut.-Colonel Franks--Sikh Entrenchments stormed--Sirdar Sham Singh destroys the Pontoon--Sikh Retreat cut off--Great Loss of the Sikhs--Peace Principles inapplicable to India--Sikhs driven across the Sutlej--Tej Singh.

ON the 30th of January, 1846, about noon, we moved out and proceeded a distance of two miles, expecting to meet the Sikh cavalry, who were encamped by the bridge of boats, but after having waited for two or three hours we were doomed to be again disappointed.

On the 1st of February, our mess-waiter, Richard Bond, died, he had been for some weeks past in bad health, yet, being anxious not to be separated from his regiment, in which he had served for many years, the poor man accompanied us from Cawnpore, and though apparently of an Herculean frame, an insidious malady gained upon him; and on the 1st of February poor Bond was numbered among those who have been. _Mors sola fatetur quantula sint hominum corpuscula._ He was an old and meritorious servant: and as a member of the Mess Committee at this period, I feel happy in paying this passing tribute to his memory.

Whilst on an out-line picquet on the 2nd, I heard most distinctly the Sikh drums from the camp in our right front, about six o'clock in the afternoon. During the day also my patrols brought in five grass-cutters in the employ of the enemy. After having questioned them I released them with a warning not to appear near our camp again. This was by no means an uncommon ruse de guerre, while pretending to cut grass they were in fact spying out the land.

On the 7th of February, our regiment again changed ground, from the right to the extreme left. The whole army was encamped in a line nearly parallel to the river Sutlej, from which it was distant not more than a mile and a quarter, and in some parts even less. It is a rule in forming a camp, not to make it within reach of the fire of the enemy's guns; and at the same time to shew as extended a front as possible, both for the purpose of overawing the adversary, and of watching his movements. The same rule applies on having crossed a river, to avoid exposure to the fire of the enemy who occupies the bank which you have quitted.

In reference to the choice of camps, I may perhaps be excused if I again refer to the able and very scarce work on the Art of war by the well known author of the "Seven Years' War in Germany."

"The choice of camps," he says, "depends on two principles: the one geometrical and the other the effect of genius. The first consists in calculating the distance relative to the number and species of troops which compose the army; the other in seeing all the combinations that may be formed on a given piece of ground, with a given army, and in the choice of that precise combination which is most advantageous. This unacquirable and sublime talent is much superior to the other, and independent of it. Great geniuses have a sort of intuitive knowledge; they see at once the cause and its effect, with the different combinations which unite them--they do not proceed by common rules successively from one idea to another, by slow and languid steps. No, the _whole_ with all its circumstances and various combinations is like a picture, all together present to their mind: these want no geometry, but an age produces few of this kind of men; and, in the common run of Generals, geometry and experience will help them to avoid gross errors.

"The perfection of our art would be, no doubt, to find a construction or an order of battle equally proper for all kinds of ground. But this being impossible, the only thing remaining for them to do is to find such a construction and such a formation of the troops as may, with the greatest simplicity, and, consequently velocity, be adapted to those numberless circumstances which occur. This should be the constant subject of their studies, but can never be obtained without geometry."

February the 8th. Sunday. Dined at half-past six, with my brother officers, at the mess of the 3rd Light Dragoons. They are encamped on our right, at the distance of about a quarter of a mile. As in the field, so at the mess-table, the Lieutenant-Colonel of this fine corps, Colonel White, C.B. (now aide-de-camp to the Queen), appeared to be beloved by his officers; indeed they have no small reason to be proud of one, so universally esteemed and respected by the cavalry division of the army of the Sutlej.

The battle was at hand: already were preparations making to meet those gallant men, the Sikhs, in mortal combat. On the evening of the 9th, Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, of the engineers, came into the camp, having been sent to the frontier at the recommendation of Sir Herbert Maddock, Deputy-Governor of Bengal. Troops had been detached from the army to meet the large convoy coming from Delhi, with ammunition and stores; for the operations against the enemy at Moodkee, Ferozeshah, and Aliwal, had exhausted the greater part of our gun ammunition. Indeed, as I have already observed, that on the 22nd of December, 1845, when Tej Singh came before Ferozeshah, the British had no shot left. The force under Brigadier Campbell, however, brought up 4,300,000 rounds of musket ball cartridges, and twelve 12-pounders, with shot and other missiles, otherwise my gallant friend, Sir Harry Smith, would not have had the means of fighting the splendid battle of Aliwal.

And now we come to the 10th of February, the day on which the memorable battle of Sobraon, the crowning battle of the Sikh campaign of 1845-46 was fought, and which most persons expected would be the last.

The fate of the Punjaub seemed to hang by a thread; from the 22nd of December, 1845, to the 28th of January, 1846, no military operations had occurred till Sir Harry Smith gained the battle of Aliwal. The Sikhs' strongly entrenched position at Sobraon still remained to be taken; defended as it was by 30,000 regular troops, besides being equally strong by nature and art. By nature, as situated on the banks of the river, in the form of a half moon, having many and great impediments in its front; by art, the triple form of the entrenchments, bristled with a triple row of guns, which must be silenced before an entrance could be effected; a bridge of boats in its rear, by which the besieged might retire if they chose; and, moreover, batteries commanding the rear of the flanks of the entrenchment, which enabled them to fire upon any troops attempting to storm the works: added to which, the men could come over the pontoon bridge to assist in serving the guns in the works; and this they actually did.

Major-General, Sir Harry Smith, after the battle of the 28th of January, in which he had lost 589 killed and wounded, joined His Excellency, the Commander-in-Chief, on the 8th of February. It was judged expedient to wait for his arrival before the attack on Sobraon could be safely made. Part of the siege train, too, had arrived, to ensure the safety of which, it may be recollected, was the principal object in detaching Sir Harry Smith.

A plan had been proposed by the late Brigadier E. Smith, C.B., Chief Engineer, but when the nature of the proposed attack was explained to Lieutenant-Colonel Irvine, a senior officer, who had been sent by Sir T. Herbert Maddock, to join the army, which he had only reached on the 9th, the day before the battle, he is said to have taken a different view.

It is recorded, that in the year 1776, Sir W. Howe, in a despatch on the American entrenchments, wrote: "If I could have made approaches I could easily have taken the enemy's entrenchments."[27]

Whether Colonel Irvine proposed to make approaches I cannot say; certain it is, that it was agreed to follow the plan laid down by Brigadier Smith, Colonel Irvine being of opinion that it would be better to leave the conduct of the affair in the hands of the officer who had formed a digested plan. Had Brigadier Smith been superseded, a delay of two or three days at least must have ensued. Now, without knowing the exact cause for the delay, it is stated in the "Blue Book" that certain proposals had been made by the Lahore Durbar, or by some of the principal chiefs. Some say, that the celebrated Goolab Singh of Cashmere had made certain offers, to which an answer was required in three days. An officer of artillery remarked to the Commander-in-Chief, that the remainder of the supplies, stores, etc., from Delhi, would reach camp in two days. Lord Gough, in his Despatch of the 13th of February, says:--"Part of my siege train having come up with me, I resolved, on the morning of the 10th, to dispose our mortars and battering guns," etc.[28] This waiting of two days or more would have consumed more time than it was thought politically right to expend. We must remember that an answer was required in three days. Now, if Goolab Singh was the real proposer of these terms, it would seem that it could not answer to grant them. Perhaps he undertook to pay us the expenses of the war, to reduce the Sikh army, and to accept a British Resident at Lahore; these conditions, or something like them, must have been proposed.

Such offers could not have satisfied the government of India, because, when after the treaty of 1846, we took a slice of the Punjaub (Jullundur), and allowed the Sikh Durbar to keep up an army of 32,000 men, they raised more, either openly or covertly; hence, if they acted thus under our own eye, while holding the reins of government at Lahore, it is not unreasonable to conclude that they would follow up the plan _in extenso_ in our absence, for a Resident would have been no adequate check.

Goolab Singh was evidently playing a game for himself: if he could be the means of saving the country, then Cashmere ought to be his reward; but, when affairs went in a contrary direction, he was forced to be no longer an actor on the scene. But, distrusting Goolab Singh, and supposing him to have been a traitor to his country, yet might he not be meditating the destruction of the English? He had his own troops with which he could turn the scale against us. Thus, whatever were the terms, or the nature of the terms, they were clearly less than we could accede to.

Colonel Irvine, as I have remarked, instead of acting as Chief Engineer, became an aide-de-camp, and partly a spectator.

The reader will doubtless imagine, and justly so, that we had more shot and shell on the road to join us; but time--that important element in our lives, which when once lost cannot be recalled--time, in military matters is everything. This was a well-known saying of Napoleon's, and the truth of it is evident to less able soldiers. The old plan, therefore, and not the new mode of attack, was the order of the day.

Owing to the peculiar form of the enemy's entrenchment, it was decided that the battering-train and disposable field-artillery should be put in position in an extended semi-circle, embracing within its fire the works of the Sikhs. On the morning of the 10th, a heavy mist prevented the intended cannonade from beginning at daybreak as was proposed. It must be borne in mind, that, strictly speaking, the attack on a strong entrenched position is usually made in the same way as upon a fort or outwork: for forts are, sometimes, surrounded by entrenchments, thus making the fort a kind of citadel, as it were, though it may not be so called technically.

This mist, though unfavourable for artillery is often favourable for troops, for enabling them to form under cover near such works and entrenchments.

Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division was placed on the margin of the river Sutlej, ready to commence the assault. The 7th Brigade belonging to this division, and led by Brigadier Stacey, was to head the attack, supported by the 6th Brigade of the same division, at a distance of two hundred yards. A reserve which was entrenched at the village of Rodawalla, was in readiness to move forward if required.

In the centre, Major-General Gilbert's division was deployed for support or attack, with its right resting on Little Sobraon. With regard to this division, it has been stated by an officer of an infantry corps, that it was not intended that it should attack in the first instance, but it so happened that Major-General Gilbert[29] with that decided conduct which marked all his actions, finding that the left attack on the enemy's right had not succeeded, determined at once to make his attack in front.

As I have before observed, there were impediments in the front, of which we were ignorant; they were in the nature of an embankment, and when our troops came up, this embankment, lying between them and the entrenchment, prevented the British from easily mounting it and entering the enclosure; the only means, therefore, by which they could effect this, was by moving to the right and left of this impediment. It will not be a matter of surprise therefore, that a little confusion occurred, and that our troops were in some slight degree jammed together. But we must defer the result to its proper place, and proceed with the order for the movements of the other troops.

Major-General Sir Harry Smith's Division was formed near the village of Guttah, with its right thrown up towards the Sutlej. It was determined to threaten by feigned attacks, the enemy's horse, under Rajah Lall Singh Misr, which was stationed on the other side of the river. There was a ford at Hurrekee Ghât at which were drawn up the 16th Lancers, who would thus have been enabled to cross over and attack the Sikh cavalry, if circumstances had called for aid. Besides, as there was a ford there, the enemy might have thought of crossing himself, for the purpose of attempting to turn our left flank.

Brigadier A. Campbell took up an intermediate position, between the divisions of Major-General Gilbert's right, and Major-General Sir Harry Smith's left. Campbell's brigade was to the rear of Sir Harry's division, the better to effect this object, for it is desirable, on occasions like these, not to place the cavalry within reach of cannon shot.

Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell, K.C.B. commanding the cavalry division, had under him Brigadier Scott, C.B.,[30] who held a reserve in the first brigade on our left, ready to act as circumstances might render necessary. Brigadier Scott, as well as the Major-General, had commanded cavalry in the Affghan campaign, when Ghuznee was taken, in July 1839, and proceeded to Cabool; so that, should the presence of Sir Joseph Thackwell have been required in any other part of the field of action, he had as his second in command, an officer whom he well knew, and in whom he could place the most implicit confidence, for it must always be recollected that it is of great advantage to have an officer in the field, who has had experience in Indian warfare. It cannot be supposed that an officer just come from Europe can all at once, be prepared to command a brigade composed of Lancers, Dragoons, and native Cavalry. Surely a little experience is requisite. Besides in India, from the nature of the service, a Lieutenant-Colonel often commands a Brigade; while in Europe that command would generally devolve upon a Major-General.

Our battery of 9-pounders, twelve of which had been reamed up to 12-pounders, opened their fire near Little Sobraon, a village a short way in advance, between Major-General Gilbert's and Major-General Sir Harry Smith's divisions. Our artillery was thus placed,--five 24-pounder howitzers on our right, three 12-pounders (reamed) on the right of the 29th Foot, No. 19 battery on the left of Major-General Gilbert's right brigade; then between General Gilbert's left and the 62nd Foot there were six 8-inch howitzers, and six 5-1/2-inch howitzers; on the left of the 62nd Foot there were eight 8-inch howitzers and five 18-pounders flanked by the 9th Foot and the 26th regiment of Native Infantry. On the extreme right there were forty-eight guns and howitzers, besides twelve guns, etc. on the right and left of Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division. In fact Major-General Sir Harry Smith's division was wheeled up to its left, so as to throw a flanking fire into the enemy's left. Also, Major-General Sir Robert Dick's division on the left, wheeled up to its right, so as to fire into the enemy's right.

Owing to the mist before mentioned, it was half-past-six A.M. before the whole of our artillery fire was brought into full play; the object of this fire was to silence the enemy's guns and to destroy their works before we assaulted the place. There was also a rocket battery. It must be remembered that the enemy had upwards of a hundred guns to fire against our sixty-two guns and the rocket battery. Rockets, the reader must be aware, were formerly much used in Indian warfare among the native armies. They were tried at Hattrass in 1817, with the force under the command of the late Major-General Sir W.S. Whish, K.C.B., but there was too much wind. On the present occasion the wind was not unfavourable. As the enemy's camp on the other side of the river was set on fire, the means by which that important service was effected may be disputed.

We must bear in mind that the Sikh guns were like those of a fortress, protected by walls, not _en barbette_, _i.e._ open all round. Besides this there was a triple line of trenches. The Sikhs also had two batteries on the other side of the river. When these batteries were silenced, the gunners came over by the bridge of boats, to the works on our side, to aid and to replace the gunners who had been killed or wounded. The bridge was said to be mined in case of accident, that is to say, if they were pursued in the retreat they could have blown it up to prevent our pursuing them.

It is clear that the mist had delayed the practice of the batteries, but still the artillery played upon the enemy's works for two hours. A more powerful battery would have been desirable; and it is said that this was Colonel Irvine's reason for proposing the delay. However, in all battles, there are two main points of consideration; first the military delays, and then the political delays, we know are sometimes dangerous. No doubt a casual observer would have exclaimed, "Why not wait for more guns? Recollect Ferozeshah; you tarried fifty days for this attack, during which time the enemy strengthened his position. You have more guns, more shot and shell coming up. Recollect also, you fell short of shot on the 22nd of December at Ferozeshah!" The late Captain J.D. Cunningham, of the Engineers, who was present at the battles of Aliwal and Sobraon, wrote thus: "The officers of artillery naturally desired that their guns, the representatives of a high art, should be used agreeably to the established rules of the engineers; or that ramparts should be breached in front and swept in flank, before they were stormed by defenceless battalions; but such deliberate tediousness of process did not satisfy the judgment or the impatience of the commanders, and it was arranged that the whole of the heavy ordnance should be planted in masses opposite particular points of the enemy's entrenchments, and, that when the Sikhs had been shaken by a continuous storm of shot and shells, the right, or weakest part of the position, should be assaulted in line, by the strongest of the three investing divisions, which, together mustered nearly 15,000 men," the enemy being 30,000 men.[31]

A military friend of mine, Major W. Hough, of the Bengal establishment, formerly a deputy Judge-Advocate, and author of some most valuable works on Military Law, and other subjects, has suggested that the attack in column is the more usual mode of assault, and has adduced many proofs that such a system has been at different periods acted upon, both in ancient and modern warfare.

Now let us look at the other side of the picture. Proposals had been made by the Sikh Sirdars, some say by Goolab Singh, which were refused. Had Goolab Singh's troops mutinied and refused to obey his orders, he would have said that he was helpless; it was possible that these same troops might be anxious to join Sham Singh in the entrenchments, a movement which it was the great object of the British chiefs to prevent.

As to the artillery, which is not surpassed by any artillery in the world, in celerity of movement, in precision of fire, or in any of the qualities which render this branch of the service illustrious, they could not perform impossibilities. They were deficient in that indispensable desideratum, shot. To have continued firing till all our shot was expended, and thus have exposed our want of it to the enemy, would have been very unwise; for, had the infantry failed in the attack, they might have retired, and our artillery resumed their fire. Hence it was that the British artillery ceased for a while to send forth its missives of death.

After two, or two and a half hour's firing, and at about nine o'clock, Brigadier Stacey's Brigade, supported on either flank by two batteries of Foot and a troop of Horse Artillery, moved to the attack in good order, with Brigadier Stacey at their head. This gallant officer was armed with sword and buckler, the most effective weapons for such an attack, where you may come into personal contact with men who, after the custom of their country, are armed in this peculiar manner.

'Ἁμφἱ σἁρ 'ὡμοισιν βἁλετο ξἱφος ἁργυρὁηον, ----αὑτἁρ ἑπειτα σἁκος μἑγα τε στιβαρὁν τε. _Homer. Iliad_ III. lines 334-5.

The troops marched in line. Captain Cunningham[32] says:--

"The left division of the British army, advanced in even order, and with a light step to the attack; but the original error of forming the regiments in line instead of in column, rendered the contest more unequal than such assaults need necessarily be. Every shot from the enemy's lines told upon the expanse of men, and the greater part of the division was driven back by the deadly fire of muskets and swivels and enfilading artillery.

"On the extreme left, the regiments effected an entrance amidst the advanced banks and trenches of petty out-works, where possession could be of little avail, but their comrades on the right were animated by the partial success; they chafed under the disgrace of a repulse, and forming themselves instinctively into wedges and masses, and headed by an old and fearless leader, they rushed forward in wrath." Major-General Sir Robert H. Dick, K.C.B. and K.C.H., was mortally wounded close to the trenches whilst cheering on his men; but we must reserve to a future page a further mention of this brilliant and noble officer.

The artillery took up positions to aid these divisions at a gallop. Brigadier Stacey's Brigade drove the Sikhs in confusion before them, within the area of their encampment. The 10th Foot, headed by their dauntless leader, Lieut.-Colonel T.H. Franks, entered; and here the work of carnage commenced, for now it was that hundreds of our indomitable foe fell under the withering fire of this gallant corps, Lieut.-Col. Franks having particularly cautioned his men not to fire until within the works of the enemy.

Let the reader pause and imagine the thunder of 120 guns on both sides reverberating for a length of time

"As if the clouds their echo did repeat,"

and he will have but a very faint conception of the mighty grandeur of those awe-inspiring sounds. Never shall I forget the majesty of the whole scene.

"No pen can write, no pencil trace the sound."

Seeing that Brigadier Stacey's Brigade might incur the whole weight of the attack, the centre and right divisions were ordered to advance. The centre division experienced great difficulty, for the mound in front was a very serious impediment. The Sikhs, sword in hand, strove to regain the points of the entrenchments which they had lost: it was not until the cavalry of the left wing under Major-General Sir Joseph Thackwell advanced and dashed into the entrenchments, in single file, through the openings effected by the pioneers in the mound, re-forming as they passed; and finally the full weight of three divisions of infantry with every available field-gun had been brought to bear against the resolute enemy, that victory crowned our efforts. The work was gloriously achieved. The insult offered to the British arms was avenged; and England stood triumphant.

For the important services which Brigadier Scott rendered in this action in leading his brigade into the enemy's entrenchment, he was honoured with the gratifying distinction of being appointed aide-de-camp to Her Majesty the Queen. At the taking of Ghuznee, July 23rd, 1839, Sir Joseph Thackwell and Brigadier Scott were employed in destroying the enemy who had escaped from the fort; they were, therefore, not novices at their work.

At Sobraon, our cavalry could not pursue the enemy as he retreated across the river; and, to have proceeded by Hurrekee Ghât, the nearest ford, would have been too late. The veteran Sirdar, Sham Singh, who commanded in the entrenchments, was engaged at his devotions when he first heard of the attack. As he must have known that our stores had not all arrived, for the Sikhs had accurate intelligence of our movements, he did not anticipate an attack from us so soon. Summoning his chiefs, Sham Singh reminded them of the great stake at issue, and bade them fight nobly and exterminate the infidel Feringhees (English). He assured his officers and men that the way of glory lay before them; and, to prevent their retreating, boldly commanded the two centre boats of the bridge to be cut away, so that his army could not pass over the pontoon. The order was obeyed; and, when forced to fly, the enemy in vain attempted the bridge, and were constrained to take to the river. Encumbered with arms, many attempted to swim across the river, which had risen seven or eight inches a day or two before; but all their efforts were unavailing. Hundreds and hundreds were drowned, or fell under the fire of our guns.

The press in England have condemned this general slaughter of our defenceless foe; but the answer, in extenuation, is, I believe, that the Sikhs had cruelly and relentlessly cut to pieces our wounded men at Ferozeshah.

If we regard the morality of the measure, we must not, at the same time, overlook the consequences which would have ensued from our sparing this resolute foe; for, at this time, we had yet to cross this river; and we were by no means certain but that we should have to fight another battle.

Messrs. Cobden and Co. must discover some golden rule for keeping the peace in India; for it would be a hard matter to find a single Sikh chief who is not ready to fight. The Rajpoot would laugh and say: "Sirs, it is my trade, as the calico line is yours; we were born soldiers." This universal Peace Association is, I have no doubt, a very amiable fraternity; yet let not its members, being deceived themselves, try to deceive others. The world still lieth in wickedness. Some divines understand the words of our Saviour, when he said, "I came not to send peace upon the earth, but the sword," to signify, there are very many religions in the world, and these will give rise to fighting. The Sikh would say: "You English have come and conquered the best and fairest portions of India, and now you are trying to annex the rest of the country; can you wonder that every man's hand is lifted up against you?"

Even Mr. Cobden must allow that to fight _pro aris et focis_, is not a very despicable employment. Until all nations and lands are prepared to join the league--until the time that all standing armies shall be dispensed with--and until right and might can keep their place--away with such empty talk! We must fraternize at home before we can hope to do so abroad. The natives of India do not understand those fine-drawn distinctions of our European policy. They know that the strongest will attack them if they can, and that the only plan of defence is to maintain armies.

The continent of Europe may be likened to India in one respect. Comprising various sovereignties, as in India, there are many independent princes. The native chief, like Alexander the Great, sighs when no more conquests are to be made! India, besides, is not a commercial country, like Europe; and all its inhabitants cannot plough or work at a trade. India has been, for centuries, the arena of strife. From the year 1187, when Delhi was seized by a Mahomedan conqueror, to the present year, anarchy, rapine, and war, have been stalking over the land. Thrice three thousand times blessed will be that period when every man of every nation shall have "turned his sword into a ploughshare, and his spear into a pruning-hook!" Until then, in order to ensure peace, let us be armed for war.

In Europe a sovereign loses a portion of his dominions, when it is taken by a monarch more powerful than himself. The league of the Holy Alliance contracted by four kings, in 1815, has not been able to preserve peace. The principle of _uti possidetis_, or, "as you are," of 1815, is not recognised in 1854. The Russians and Austrians have attacked Hungary, and Hungary has fought for her independence. The Neopolitans have sent an expedition to Sicily, and the Sicilians have sighed for independence. The French are masters of Rome, and Rome has longed for a republic, and thus we might multiply examples. Independence, the natural right of all countries, cannot generally be obtained except by war.

But _revenons à nos moutons_, the Sikhs again succumb. The battle of Sobraon has been fought and lost by them: at noon on the 10th of February, not a living Sikh remained on the left bank of the Sutlej.

At about two o'clock P.M., I rode leisurely through the enemy's entrenchments, and witnessed the horrible slaughter that had taken place; even at that time, a few determined artillerymen occasionally sent a ball across the river, to the dismay of our plundering camp followers. A mine, too, would now and then explode, and hurl the heedless and inquisitive into eternity, for the entrenchment was completely undermined; and during the following night and morning, explosions were every now and then heard in the camp.

During the action, the 9th Lancers advanced at about eleven o'clock A.M., under a heavy fire, in two lines, for the purpose of charging the enemy, when I commanded the left troop of the second squadron; after a time, however, as no opportunity to charge was allowed, we again fell back. The 9th Lancers left their camp at four o'clock A.M., and returned to it between five and six o'clock P.M., not a little tired, as the reader may imagine.

Thus the day, which rose so bright upon the landscape, after the mists of the early morning had been dispelled by the brilliant rays of the sun, was darkened by a battle and slaughter and death, ere the shades of evening closed upon it. The indomitable Sikhs, whose bravery was but the more aroused by the defeat at Aliwal, and whose feelings had been harrowed by the sight of the corpses of their unavenged comrades slain in that battle, who were still borne along the stream, and who had entered upon the contest with the resolve to conquer or die, these brave fellows were now lying in hundreds, or rather in thousands upon thousands, on the field of carnage, or floating along the sweeping flood of the Sutlej, while others fled in wild confusion before their victorious foe. But where were now their leaders?--the men who had instigated the revolt, and who with dastardly duplicity sought their private interests by simulated friendship with both parties? Where was Tej Singh, the chief commander of the Sikh forces? When the British opened the assault, Tej Singh commanded the entrenchment, but as soon as we had effected breaches in the mound, and the fire from his batteries began to slacken, when his followers were falling thick around him, when the British, led on by their gallant commanders, fought resolutely for every inch of ground, Tej Singh, instead of manfully leading on fresh troops, and animating them by his example, like a base traitor, again deserted his post; he fled at the first brush, and, as at the battle of Ferozeshah, abandoned his troops, and, in their destruction, sought, and effected his own escape; Goolab Singh, who had played his cards so well, was at the side of the Maharannee, counselling the adoption of such measures as would virtually promote his own interests; while the intriguer, Lall Singh, lay with his cavalry higher up the river in a careless, unmilitary position, conscious of being closely watched by the English.

Far different was the conduct and deportment of Sirdar Sham Singh, of Attaree. In accordance with the vow so solemnly made to his men that he would die in the conflict, and thus offer up himself as a propitiatory sacrifice for his country's weal to appease the wrath of Govind, he clothed himself in a white garment, as one who had devoted himself to death, and calling upon all around to follow him, he unflinchingly led on his rapidly thinning ranks, with the assurance of the Gooroo's eternal reward to those who should fall in defence of their country; and, at last, covered with wounds, the fine old veteran sunk down a lifeless corpse, amidst the slaughtered bodies of his brave followers.

The Commander-in-Chief estimated the loss of the Sikhs in this decisive battle at from 12,000 to 15,000 men; while that on the side of the British was, 320 killed, and 2,063 wounded, making our total loss 2,383.[33]

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 27: Field of Mars, 1801.]

[Footnote 28: War in India, Despatches of Lords Hardinge and Gough. Second Edition. London, 1846; p. 116.]

[Footnote 29: Afterwards, Major-General Sir Walter Raleigh Gilbert, Bart., G.C.B. (since deceased).]

[Footnote 30: Lieutenant-Colonel, 9th Lancers, and formerly Lieutenant-Colonel in the 4th Light Dragoons, from which, like the author, he was removed into his present corps, when the 4th was put on the English establishment, on its return from Bombay in 1842. Colonel and A.D.C. to the Queen.]

[Footnote 31: History of the Sikhs, p. 319.]

[Footnote 32: History of the Sikhs, p. 325.]

[Footnote 33: See Appendix XI.]