CHAPTER III.

Nidampore--Christmas-day--Munsorepore--Kotla Mullair--Phurawallee--Bussean--Surrender of Wudnee--Cession of Ferozepore--Bhaga Poorana--False Alarms--Roree Bukkur--Sir John Littler--Sir H.M. Wheeler--Ferozeshah--Aliwal--Sikh Forces--British Forces--Sikh Entrenchment--Returns of Killed and Wounded--Sir H. Hardinge--Battle of Ferozeshah--Sudden Attack by Tej Singh--His Blunder--Appearance of a field of Battle--Fate of the Wounded.

TO resume our route. On December the 24th, Colonel Campbell's force marched to Nidampore, a small village; a distance of nine miles. Here we halted, with the prospect of spending a quiet Christmas Day. On this day, however, we received intelligence, in camp, of the battle of Ferozeshah, which had taken place on the 22nd of December; and that the Sikhs, driven from the field, had retired across the Sutlej. This day, therefore, instead of breathing peace and love, was employed in preparations for war with our determined foes: unlike the Romans at the siege of Jerusalem, when no operations were undertaken against the Jews on their Sabbaths and Holy days. In Europe, however, and indeed all over the world in the present age, all days are alike in regard to war. The heathen Sikhs, who keep sacred no day in the week, might attack us on any day, and at any hour; so that it was necessary in self-defence that we should be prepared for the enemy. Accordingly the services of the armourer-sergeant and his men were put in requisition to sharpen swords and lances, and all was ready for starting the next morning.

On the 26th, our troops began their march to the village of Munsorepore, a distance of ten miles, through a country abounding in jungle, which rendered it necessary to observe great caution on the march; and flanking parties were sent out to prevent a surprise. Our route lay through two villages, which appeared to be thinly peopled: the walls of the houses were in a state of decay, and altogether they presented a desolate and deserted appearance. This, however, was not extraordinary; for as the Sikhs had been located on the south side of the Sutlej for fourteen days, it was to be expected that the people would abandon their homes and fly to the desert.

On the 27th of December, our troops marched to Kotla Mullair, a distance of sixteen miles. This town is very long and densely built; the main street being peculiarly narrow.

On the 28th we marched to Phurawallee, the country of the Nabah Rajah, twelve miles over a flat country, and by an unmade road, but by no means bad. This was Sunday; and still no public service. Last night, a private of the Lancers shot himself dead; such an event is happily of rare occurrence, and it produced a deep impression upon both men and officers.

There was a report abroad in the bazaar to-day, that another battle had taken place; but there was no foundation for the rumour. The Sikhs, it will be seen, did not meditate fighting again so soon.

On the 29th, we proceeded to Bussean, a long twelve miles' march through a flat and open country. The detachment had under its charge 4,300,000 rounds of ball (musketry) cartridges. This would give for 20,000 infantry, 215 rounds per man; and, as it is said that one shot in 100 kills, there were rounds sufficient to destroy 43,000 of the enemy. Independently of this, we had round-shot, shrapnell, canister and grape.

Our next march was to Wudnee or Budnee, fifteen miles and a half, by a very sandy route, which was consequently quite unfit for hackeries.

On the road, the commanding officer received an Express from the Governor-General, ordering us to take the fort of Wudnee, should we find it occupied by Sikh troops. Captain Rose, of the Lancers, was accordingly sent in advance of our force, to surround the Avails with his troop. To his great regret, the garrison offered no resistance, and about 5,000 rupees, and a few half-starved horses were given up to us. Two companies of the 59th Regt. of Native Infantry were left in charge of the fort.

Only a few days before, the whole of this district had been under the sway of the Maharajah of Lahore; but by the proclamation of the Governor-General it was now incorporated with the British dominions.

About ten years previous to these events, the demise of the female chief of Ferozepore without issue, gave us possession of that place; the rule in such cases being, that the estates of those chiefs who die without heirs become escheats. Thus this city fell to the East India Company. Runjeet Singh had previously objected to cede to us any of the ferries; but we had now for some time past been permitted to make use of them, both here and along the course of the river. On the cession of Ferozepore, however, his jealousy was aroused anew, and studiously fostered by his officers, at our occupation of a territory so near his own capital; and his chiefs constantly urged upon him the necessity of excluding us. Thus, with the possession of Ferozepore, we had gained the ferry at that place, and subsequently also secured one opposite to Loodianna.

This was an important point, for by it we obtained the right to cross whenever we chose. The Sikhs, however, as we have seen, were not prevented from crossing over to us. It was a very anomalous position for the British rule to be placed in, for, while we were protectors of the estates of four Sikh Rajahs, the estates of other chiefs were under the government of the Lahore Durbar. It is obvious that the circumstance of the Sikhs having a right to visit the estates of those chiefs who owed allegiance to the Durbar, and none to the British government, must have been a source of considerable inconvenience and annoyance, to say the least of it. Hence there is no doubt, that they sent over guns and ammunition to the left or south bank of the Sutlej, long before they crossed themselves, and when they did venture over, we confiscated the said estates.

To return to our narrative. On the 31st of December, the detachment under Colonel Campbell marched twelve miles to Bhaga Poorana, a small native village in the possession of the Alloo-walla Rajah, who held lands on both sides of the Sutlej. Here the Colonel received an order from the Commander-in-Chief to proceed to Loodianna, instead of to Ferozepore, the object of which change we could not in the least understand. In the evening, while we were at mess, we were suddenly disturbed by the report that some thousands of Sikhs were approaching our camp, and indeed had actually entered it. Our dessert was left untouched upon the table; the whole regiment was soon mounted, and drawn up at the head of their lines. After waiting about half an hour, and seeing no enemy, all retired to bed. In less than half an hour after, we had a second false alarm, from the firing of some sentries, belonging to the picquets of the Native Infantry corps. Such mistakes, with all their concomitant annoyances, are by no means unfrequent. An alarm has been occasioned by a few bullocks crossing a nullah near a camp during a dark night. In such a case, a Sepoy sentry receiving no answer to his challenge, "Who come dare?" (who goes there?), fires his piece, and the whole camp taking this as a signal of danger, is instantly in motion.

A false alarm of this kind occurred at Roree Bukkur, in Scinde, when the Bengal column under Major-general Sir Willoughby Cotton, was _en route_ to Candahar, in February, 1839. The musket of one of the sentries went off by accident; the others immediately fired, whereupon the whole of the troops turned out.

Looking at the map, it would seem as if the recent "Express" to move on Loodianna had in view to command the road from Delhi, though just then no convoy was, it is believed, on the road from that city. Again, troops had been marched from Loodianna, and Runjoor Singh had not then crossed. The sudden appearance of the Sikhs in the neighbourhood of our frontier, threatened the two advanced posts at Ferozepore and Loodianna, both on the south bank of the Sutlej, and distant from each other about seventy miles. Major-General, now Sir John Littler, commanded at the former place; and, when summoned on the 23rd of December, 1845, to join the Commander-in-Chief, had about 10,000 troops. He left a small force at that post, and joined head-quarters at about 1 o'clock, P.M. At Loodianna, Colonel, now Sir Hugh Massy Wheeler, K.C.B., commanded. At Subathoo, fourteen miles up the hills, the Honourable Company's 1st European regiment was stationed. Loodianna is about equi-distant from Subathoo and Moodkee.

The battle of Ferozeshah, on the 21st and 22nd of December, 1845, has been the subject of discussion both as to the time and form of making; the attack. In regard to time, it is the opinion of the French marshal, Marmont, in his "L'Esprit des Instructions Militaires," p. 151, that "it is best to begin a battle early in the morning if certain of success; but if uncertain, in the middle of the day." Some assert that it was not necessary to commence the attack on the 21st, and that it would have been far better to have deferred it till early the next morning. Then again it is maintained, that had the attack been deferred till the morning of the 22nd, Tej Singh would have joined the main body of the Sikhs. However, early next morning the attack was renewed, and the rest of the entrenchments soon taken. It also appears that Tej Singh did actually come up before Ferozeshah at nine o'clock in the morning--at an hour when the British had possession of the place--and Major-General Littler was ordered to hold it at all risks.

I have before said that the cavalry were taken off in the direction of Ferozepore, with the exception of the 3rd Dragoons. Here, again, I may remark on the absence of the 9th Lancers, which was a general subject of regret among the officers present in the battle; a regret which I have heard repeatedly expressed both at the time and since. It is not possible to calculate the value of the services which this strong corps might have rendered in the hour of need; instead of which they were marching backwards and forwards between Ferozepore and Loodianna. Yet it is very probable that Tej Singh may have been aware that the 9th and 16th Lancers, and other corps, were on their march to join the main army, and hence have hastened his retreat.

Another objection to delay was the great scarcity of water; there being, it is said, no water at Ferozeshah, except in the village held by the enemy, and but little in the villages near it. Others, again, assert, that had the troops fallen back a little they would have found a supply of water, and that the Sikhs, moreover, would then most probably have come out of their entrenchments, and attacked the English on even ground.

At the battle of Aliwal, which took place subsequently, namely, on the 28th of January, 1846, the Sikhs did leave the little entrenchment which they had thrown up, and took up a position, their right resting on a village of the same name; their left on a circular entrenchment; and their centre on some heights. Again, it is whispered that the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were desirous of making an immediate attack, in order to prevent the Sikhs from marching upon Ferozepore or Loodianna. Of Loodianna, however, there was no danger, because they would naturally attack that place by crossing at Philoor; there was far more reason to have expected an attack upon Ferozepore, for three good reasons.

1st. Because the Sikhs had fallen back to Ferozeshah, only a few miles from Ferozepore.

2ndly. Because, as has been before stated, Runjeet Singh's Chiefs were very averse to the English having possession of Ferozepore, from which there is a direct road to Lahore, their capital; and

3rdly. Because, by their retrograde movements from Moodkee, the Sikhs joined the other infantry.

The object in not attacking till the next morning, would have been to gain information respecting the nature and strength of the enemy's entrenched position at Ferozeshah. The late Captain P. Nicolson, the assistant political agent, is said strongly to have recommended an attack on the rear of the enemy's entrenchment. Major Broadfoot, when he reached the spot, where Major-General Littler joined about noon, exclaimed, "We will now drive them out of that entrenchment."

It is said that there was a great deal of jungle about Ferozeshah, but that the ground immediately around was open. By a brief delay, it might have been ascertained that the rear was undefended by guns. It is not to be supposed that the Sikhs would have thought of an advance beyond their then position, until they had gained a victory.

Again, it is broadly asserted that the Sikhs would never have left their entrenchments, and might have strengthened them, had any delay taken place.

The Sikh force is said to have been as follows:

Battalions. Corps. Guns. French Brigade Infantry, 4 Regular Cavalry, 2 26 Buhadoor Singh's do. 4 do. 1 16 Mertab Singh's do. 4 do. 1 18 -- -- -- 12 4 60

The Infantry were 7,200 men.

Irregular Cavalry. Charaganee Horse 4,500 Orderly do. 3,500 Lall Singh's do. 1,800 Heera Singh's do. 3,500 Moolraj's do. 550 Bala Singh's do. 200 Nehing's do. 1,000 Utter Singh's do. 700 Pindeewalas 900 Dogras[14] 200 ----- 16,850

4 Corps of Regular Cavalry, about 2,000 Irregular Horse, " 16,850 ------ 18,850 Infantry 7,200 ------ Total 26,050 ------

Artillery Field Guns 60 Heavy Guns 28 --- 88 --- Zumbooruks (Camel Guns) 250 ---

The above force, with 3,000 detached Infantry, and the greater part of the Irregular Horse, marched to Ferozeshah, for the purpose of holding Moodkee; reaching this place in the evening, they fought the battle of the 18th of December, with a force of 17,000 or 18,000 men.

The British force at Moodkee was about 13,000 men, and 48 guns, 36 of which were horse artillery: the action was sudden, and there was no regularity; the corps moved off in echelon, but owing to the dust, confusion, and lateness of the day, some infantry corps fired into each other. I have heard that a native infantry corps fired by mistake into H.M. 50th foot. Many of the officers, and all those of the staff who were killed, were shot by Sikh soldiers from the branches of trees, where they had stationed themselves. The Horse Artillery and Cavalry opened the encounter; but the dust which these troops raised, caused the Infantry, which came up last, to grope as it were in the dark, and to make serious mistakes.

The Sikhs having been defeated at Moodkee, called upon the troops before Ferozepore, and the Nuggur Ghât to join them, which made their force as under:

Battalions. Infantry. Cavalry. Guns. 10 Additional, 6,000 Additional, 500 Additional, 55 12 Before 7,200 Before 2,000 Before 60 ----- ----- Heavy Guns 28 13,200 2,500 --- ------ ----- 143 ---

This, including the 16,850 Irregular Cavalry, gives 32,550 men, of whom the Regular troops were 15,700 men; and, deducting the seventeen guns taken at Moodkee, the enemy ought to have had 126 guns at Ferozeshah, besides the 250 Zumbooruks. These were not very great odds against the British as to numbers.

The number of British killed and wounded was 2,419; namely, 2,269 non-commissioned officers and privates, and 150 officers, which gives one officer to every fifteen men; and as the usual proportion is one to twenty, or twenty-five, this was the greatest proportional loss in the four battles.

At Ferozeshah, including the Sikh force detached to Moodkee, there were 13,200 infantry; deducting, say 1,200 killed and wounded at Moodkee, there remained, say 12,000 men; to these add an additional reinforcement of 6,000 men and we have 18,000 infantry, which appears to have been the amount of the Sikh forces in the entrenchments at Ferozeshah on the 21st of December 1845; also 126 guns, of which twenty-eight were heavy guns, which likewise agrees with the returns; the enemy's cavalry could scarcely have exceeded 8,000 or 10,000 men. The entrenchment was about a mile in length, and half a mile in breadth, but as there was a village within those limits, the space for the troops was of course greatly diminished by it.

It will be for the military reader to form his own judgment, as my experience does not warrant me in giving an opinion of the motives and actions of my superiors. I have trusted a great deal throughout my accounts, to officers who were actually present in this remarkable campaign. It is curious to note the opinions of others. One thing however seems tolerably clear, that the only mode by which a really true account of any battle can be given, is to obtain a statement from some competent officer of each corps, troop, or company of artillery, etc., actually present in the field.

The practice, in this respect in the Indian army is this: each brigadier reports to the major-general commanding his division, upon the efficiency and prominent services of each regiment in his brigade, noting also the disposition of each corps; the major-general in a similar manner makes a report to the Adjutant-General for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, of the state of each of his brigades, and the particular services rendered. It is from these divisional reports that the Commander-in-Chief draws up his despatches.

It is obvious, that after a great battle, particularly if there be a pursuit of the enemy, no correct return of the killed and wounded can be given for two, three, or four days; for those who are killed lie on the field, and those who are wounded will get into a village, if near, and remain concealed there.

The Sikhs having thus, as we have stated, drawn their various forces from Moodkee, Ferozepore, and Nuggur Ghât, concentrated them at Ferozeshah, and formed their entrenchments, which in several places they threw up breast high.

Lieutenant-General Sir Henry Hardinge, the Governor-General, who was second in command, shared all the fatigues and dangers of the army with the Commander-in-Chief. Orders had been despatched to Sir John Littler to join head-quarters immediately. He accordingly left only a small garrison at Ferozepore, and, with a body of about 5,000 men and twenty-one guns, effected the junction, about noon on the 21st of December. Measures for a general attack were at once planned; but a considerable delay occurred, and much time was lost, as we have stated, in consequence of the conflicting views of competent officers, as to whether it was desirable to make an immediate attack, or to defer it till the following morning. The former was ultimately resolved upon.

The British marched in even ranks, and commenced the action with a brisk fire of artillery at a distance of about a mile from the enemy. The Sikhs made a gallant defence. The British artillery advanced steadily till they were within a few hundred yards of the entrenchment; but the Sikhs kept up an incessant fire from their heavy guns; in consequence of which our infantry were ordered to advance, and, in the face of a murderous fire, to take the batteries. Night put a stop to the carnage, but not to the awful state of confusion which prevailed in the British camp, which arose partly from the severe losses and the scattering of the different regiments, with the uncertainty as to whether any advantage had been gained, and partly from the incessant firing kept up during the whole night by the Sikhs upon the wretched soldiers who were lying wounded upon the field of battle, or who were cowering around their scanty fires, worn out with cold, fatigue and excruciating thirst.

Sir Henry Hardinge, finding that a large Sikh gun occasioned much annoyance to our troops, brought up the 80th Foot, who soon took it. He then passed among the different European corps, which greatly cheered and reanimated them under their intense sufferings. It was a night of terrific suspense and anxiety to the two British Chiefs, both of whom nobly resolved to fight and conquer, or perish in the attempt. The British lion was roused, and his vast strength was all centred in one final attempt. The die was cast. The Governor-General gave the word, and Britons struck home the death-blow.

The village of Ferozeshah appears to have been held during the night of the 21st of December, partly by the British and partly by the Sikhs. One of our divisions under the gallant Major-General, Sir Harry Smith, kept up a fire during the greater part of the night. The other divisions bivouacked at some distance, no one knows where. Had a concerted movement been necessary, it would have been quite out of the question; for, by some mistake or oversight, no place of rendezvous had been fixed on. I am told that the men belonging to two or three of the European corps got clubbed together, and were so found the next morning; nay, even the whereabouts of the Commander-in-Chief himself could not be found. A certain Major-General was anxious to communicate with him, and an engineer officer, who had just been with Sir Hugh Gough, offered to shew him the road; but, to his surprise, he could not find it: either His Excellency had moved his position, or the night was too dark to enable the officer to trace his way back.

The morning light revealed the fact that the Sikhs were still masters of a large portion of their entrenchments; the British retaining only that part where they had bivouacked during the night.

The Commander-in-Chief now drew up his forces; the Infantry forming into a line supported on either side by the horse artillery. His Excellency took the command of the left wing, the Governor-General of the right. The engagement opened with a brisk cannonade from the centre. The Sikhs renewed the deadly fire from their heavy guns, screened by their masked batteries, scattering death and destruction among the British troops. Both the left and right wings of infantry advancing under their able commanders, charged the Sikhs at the point of the bayonet, and took possession of the village of Ferozeshah.

At this juncture, when victory seemed to be decided for the British, Tej Singh, the commander-in-chief of the Sikh army, suddenly appeared on the field with his army of reserve, consisting of 30,000 men, and a large park of light guns. He charged into the midst of the British troops, and attempted to recover the entrenchment, but without success. He then opened a fire upon us from his guns, but, unhappily, all our shot were expended. It was one of those unexpected cases which demand the greatest promptitude and judgment; and our artillery are said to have fired blank ammunition.[15]

The British cavalry had been ordered by a certain staff officer, in the Adjutant-General's department, to move off to Ferozepore. This, I suppose, must have been before Tej Singh came up. It is also reported that Tej Singh conceived that this move was made in connection with some deeply concerted plan, with the intention of getting into his rear. Whatever may have been his opinion, he contented himself with firing a few shots from his light guns--none other had he--by which a few of the British were killed and wounded. Had the cavalry not been ordered off, the whole of which, I understand, moved away, with the exception of that noble regiment the 3rd Light Dragoons, who had previously, in this same action, performed prodigies of valour in charging batteries and entrenchments,--acts unparalleled in cavalry tactics,--Tej Singh might have been attacked to advantage. Thus much is certain; that the officer above alluded to was allowed to retire from the service. The whole affair of the morning of the 22nd cannot be either unravelled or explained; and I have discussed the matter with many officers who were present on that occasion, but have never met with one who could solve its mysteries. It savours more of romance than of reality. "Truth is strange--stranger than fiction." Goolab Singh, now Maharajah of Cashmere, speaking to a European officer, of Tej Singh's advance, as above described, observed that: "Tej Singh committed a great blunder; he should never have gone near you, but should have marched at once upon Delhi!"

Many, however, are of opinion, that the sudden attack of Tej Singh, with his 30,000 troops, was a mere feint. It was well known that he was in correspondence with Captain Nicolson; and it is even affirmed, that he had privately furnished an officer with a plan of the intended operations of the Sikh army. It was his object to ingratiate himself with both parties. His position as leader of the army demanded that he should make the attack; while at the same time he foresaw that the British would ultimately triumph in the Punjaub, and that it would be for his interest to make friends of them. Therefore, after firing a few shots, the Commander-in-Chief of the Sikhs fled from the field of battle, at the very moment when the failure of the enemy's ammunition, and the departure of their cavalry to Ferozepore, gave him an advantage which might have turned the tide of victory in his favour. After the desertion of their general, the Sikhs made several ineffectual attempts, to recover the entrenchment, but before night-fall, were compelled to retreat across the Sutlej.

The view of a field of battle awakens the noblest sympathies of our nature. Even the stern Napoleon has had his cold heart touched by such a scene. The first survey is overwhelming; and the heart of even the stoutest soldier shrinks within him, and sickens at the sight. On a nearer inspection, we find the dead and the dying, friend and foe, lying side by side; their furious contest suddenly cut short by the cold hand of death--while the cries and moans of the wounded till our ears with sounds of lamentation and woe, and our hearts with pity and commiseration.

We lament the fate of the slain, and grieve that his career is ended; yet it is the death of the brave soldier who has gloriously discharged his duty to his country, and whose fame remains imperishable, that calls forth our deepest grief, admiration and gratitude. "_Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori._" Well did Lord Hutchinson, in reporting the death of the brave and lamented Abercrombie, express the feelings of a soldier, when he said: "His name shall be embalmed in the memory of a grateful country."

Thoughts of a future state are powerfully impressed upon the mind, as the eye wanders over the battle-field of the slain. As we gaze upon those who have distinguished themselves, not only as the liege soldiers of their king, but as the faithful soldiers of the King of kings, our heart insensibly finds relief. While the spark of life yet flickers in the mortal tenement, we watch by the side of our wounded comrade, and, like king David, we fast and weep, and say: "Who can tell whether God will be gracious to me that he may live;" but when the dread fiat has gone forth, and the spirit no longer dwells within its house of clay, like David we restrain our grief, and looking beyond the grave, exclaim in faith: "Wherefore should I weep? Can I bring him back again? I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me."

Before quitting the field of slaughter, I would make a few remarks respecting the wounded. The fate of the private soldier is often very hard: by the loss of limbs he is rendered useless for life as a soldier, his means of subsistence are curtailed, and what is yet dearer to him, his military career is blighted for ever. The officer may do duty again if he lose an arm, or what is almost the same thing, if he be wounded and unable to have the ball extracted. This was the case with my father, who, having been hit in both shoulders at the battle of Waterloo, did duty in his most gallant regiment the old 95th, now the Rifle Brigade, for nearly three years after, although, as the ball remained in the shoulder, the left arm was rendered useless.[16] Some officers even continue in the service after they have lost a leg, and receive a good pension. This is the case with Field-Marshal the Marquis of Anglesey.

The disabled rank and file are what is styled "invalided," that is to say, they are sent to England and elsewhere, where they obtain a pension, fixed and determined by a board of officers.

The late Queen's Inspector-General of Hospitals in Bengal, states a fact which ought to be generally known, "The number of those who are wounded and die in consequence, cannot be ascertained fully under the lapse of a year, because there are cases in which a gun-shot through the lungs has superinduced affections of the brain, fevers, etc." It is likewise worthy of remark that gun-shot wounds are more dangerous than sabre cuts.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 14: The Jummoo Chief is called Dogra.]

[Footnote 15: When Sir Archibald Campbell, who commanded the expedition against Ava, in 1824-26, headed a Portuguese brigade of infantry in the Peninsular war, he was informed upon one occasion, that only a few rounds of shot were left. He immediately ordered a charge in line, his object being to conceal his want of ammunition.]

[Footnote 16: See Appendix IX.]