CHAPTER I.

Voyage to India--Advantages of Sailing with Troops on Board--Regulations at Sea--March from Cawnpore to Meerut--Return from Nougawa Ghât to Meerut--March to Ferozepore--Cantonments at Kurnaul--Colonel Campbell's Force--Number of Cattle required on a March--Sunday--Rev. W.J. Whiting, M.A.--Distribution of Prize-Money--Advanced Guard--Governor-General--Major Broadfoot and Captain Nicolson--Suspicions of the Sikhs--Sir David Ochterlony--The Sikh Army--The Battle of Moodkee--Tej Singh.

THE circumstances of a voyage to or from India are so well known, from their frequent occurrence, that I will not even allude to them. Our voyage, however, offered some variety to the usual monotony of a mere passenger ship, from our having troops on board. This naturally gave rise to numerous incidents which afford topics of interest, especially to military men. We, of course, had regular parades both for the sake of discipline, and to ascertain that the men were sober and clean. The men had, too, specific duties assigned to them--keeping watch, etc.

The object of placing the troops in watches, in time of peace, is, that they may assist in pulling and easing the ropes. They are confined to duties on deck only. If there should be an old sailor among them he may, of course, occasionally reef and unfurl sail. It is obvious that the addition of some fifty or sixty men to the crew of a merchant vessel of 600 or 700 tons burthen, is a great advantage in bad weather, as it enables almost the whole of the ship's crew to be employed aloft. In case of necessity a soldier or two will also assist the man at the wheel, or those at the pumps, by order of the quarter-master, or of the officer on duty, or of the captain himself.

Another advantage from having soldiers on board is in the case where the crew might be inclined to mutiny; when they would be restrained by the military. The troops being told off in watches, those on the morning watch assist in cleaning, or, what is called _swabbing_, the quarter-deck; but the rules for merchant ships are very imperfect in this respect.

Having troops on board necessarily adds much to the safety of the vessel.

It will probably be in the recollection of many of my readers, that two ships taken up in Australia as transports, were wrecked on the Great Andamans, islands on the east side of the Bay of Bengal, in the year 1844. These vessels would have been totally lost, but for the assistance rendered by the officers and men of the 80th Foot, the regiment which so nobly distinguished itself, the following year, at the battle of Ferozeshah, where many of those brave fellows who helped to save these vessels, yielded up their lives for their country.

To ensure regularity and a perfect understanding between the commanding officers of troops and captains of ships, a copy of rules for the guidance of the commanders of merchant-ships, should be given to the officer commanding the troops; and a copy of the regulations for troops of Her Majesty's forces, and the East India Company's service, given to the commander of the ship. The captain of a free-trader is not allowed to flog his men; but he may stop a sailor's grog and his pay for any crime of which he has been guilty. He may also put a culprit in irons, and lose the man's services.

Without stopping to describe my first impressions of India, or the countries which I traversed, after landing upon its far-famed shores, I will proceed at once to Cawnpore, where I found that my regiment was quartered, and where I first joined it.

On the 17th of October, 1845, my regiment, the 9th Queen's Royal Lancers, set out on its march from Cawnpore to Meerut, a distance of 266 miles. The Artillery received orders, at the same time, to hold themselves in readiness to proceed to the north-west. We reached Meerut on the 12th of November, and encamped near the lines of the 16th Lancers, to await further orders. We stayed only a few days in this place, which is situated in the province of Delhi. It is a very large town, of some antiquity, lying about forty miles to the north-east of the city of Delhi, and is one of our principal civil and military stations.

On the 23rd, our corps received orders to march the next day to Umballa, a large military station, a distance of 126 miles. We accordingly set out on the morning of the 25th, and marched to Sirdhana, eleven miles. On the 26th we encamped on the right bank of the river Hindon, at Nougawa Ghât, nineteen miles from Meerut. On the 27th, just as the corps was about to proceed onwards--for the trumpet to boot and saddle had already been sounded--we received a sudden order, by an express camel, to return and encamp on our old ground at Meerut. On the 28th, the regiment halted; the following day it re-crossed the river, and encamped at Sirdhana; and on the 30th returned to Meerut.

Here we were quartered till the 10th of December, when the Queen's Royal Lancers received an unexpected and peremptory order, at half-past eight P.M., to march immediately to Umballa. We accordingly again set out for Sirdhana, which we reached the next morning; and whilst at Shamlee, four marches from Meerut, and twenty-eight miles from Kurnaul, we received, between three and four o'clock P.M., an express direct from the Commander-in-Chief, with the following important intelligence:--

"That the 9th Lancers were to proceed at once to Ferozepore, agreeably to an enclosed route; and that the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry, which were to leave Meerut the same day as the Lancers, were to proceed thither also: the whole to be under the command of Colonel Campbell, of the latter corps."

On reaching Kurnaul, we halted on the 18th, in order to make preparations for forming a depôt at Umballa; to which place all the superfluous heavy baggage, and the young horses, were immediately sent, under the charge of Cornet R.W. King, with instructions to rejoin head-quarters as soon as he had reported himself to the officer commanding at Umballa.

At this time, it was not yet known at Kurnaul that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej--an event which took place as early as the 13th of this month.

I may here remark, that the extensive cantonments of Kurnaul had been abandoned about three years before, by order of Lord Ellenborough, then Governor-General. The officers' bungalows were now nearly all roofless, and the neat little church going to decay. In 1852 it was entirely dismantled, and the materials conveyed to Umballa, to assist in building a station-church there. The immense parade-ground, large enough to allow for the exercise of 12,000 men, is about the best in India.

The route of the 9th here changed; for instead of proceeding to Umballa, we marched as follows:--

On the 19th of December to Suggah, 10 miles. " 20th " Khol, 14-1/2 " " 21st " Pehoah 14 "

These three villages were in the protected Sikh states: the two former are small and insignificant; the latter is larger, and of more importance.

The whole tract of country, on either side of our line of march, was one continued jungle, and as level as a bowling-green.

The force under the personal command of Colonel Campbell, exclusive of officers, amounted at this time to 2,833 men, with twelve iron twelve-pounders, each drawn by an elephant. Brass guns of this description are usually drawn by ten, or even twelve, bullocks; brass eighteen-pounders by fourteen bullocks; and brass twenty-four-pounders by eighteen bullocks. An iron twenty-four-pounder is drawn by twenty-six bullocks; an iron eighteen-pounder by twenty-two bullocks; and an iron twelve-pounder by eighteen bullocks. Singly, therefore, that noble animal, the elephant, will draw a gun for which ten or even more bullocks are allowed.

These and the following remarks regarding cattle, are given for the purpose of showing the number used in dragging guns and carrying loads. By the regulations of the service in Bengal, it is directed that no elephant shall be taken into the service under twelve years of age, nor under seven feet in height. A committee is appointed to examine and report whether the animals are fit for service; but it not unfrequently happens that infantry or cavalry officers, or both, are put upon these committees, who know nothing at all of the matter. Sometimes, however, the animals are so palpably inefficient and diseased, that, as one of the committee-officers exclaimed, "This camel speaks for itself." No elephant is employed unless the committee can report that he is capable of carrying at least 20 maunds of 80 sicca weight, or 1,600 pounds = 14 cwt. 32 lbs.

Camels admitted into the service by a committee, must never be under five, nor more than nine, years old; and capable of carrying a load of at least 6 maunds, or 480 lbs. Bullocks are admitted into the service not under five, nor above eight, years of age. Draught-bullocks must be fifty inches in height; those for carriage, not under forty-eight inches. The former must be capable of carrying 210 lbs. avoirdupoise weight, besides the gear. The comparative value of these animals will be seen by the following scale:--

An elephant carries 1,600 lbs. A camel " 480 " A bullock " 210 "

In wet weather a camel, which, in dry weather, carries six maunds of tents, etc., will carry only four maunds, one-third being allowed for the difficulty which the camel finds of keeping on his legs in wet ground.

A six-pounder gun is drawn by six horses, and when bullocks are used, by six of these animals. This shows the relative value as to draught. Now a single elephant pulled along by himself one of the iron twelve-pounder guns, or, as they were more properly styled, "nine-pounders _reamed_ up to twelves," which may be thus explained. Knowing that the Sikhs used guns of large calibre, the Government had ordered that these guns should be sent to the Delhi magazine, to be re-cast and reamed up for the occasion; and they did good service. They were a fraction lighter by this process than the nine-pounders were before.

On the 21st of December our troops halted at Pehoah. It is a large town, containing a succession of brick-built houses, the high walls of which, without any apertures, face the back streets, being evidently intended as a defence against marauders.

It will be seen, by reference to the map, that the original route by which the troops were ordered to march to Umballa, would have caused us to make a considerable _détour_, indeed, one of about thirty or thirty-five miles, for Umballa is nearly direct north of Kurnaul, while Ferozepore is north-west.

The Sunday at Pehoah was not kept as is customary on the Lord's-day in cantonments. We had no chaplain with us; and hence divine service was not performed. It would appear proper that, in the absence of the chaplain, some officer should take his place. This is the case in several European regiments, where the commanding or some superior officer reads the service to the troops. As on board of ship, when there is no chaplain, the purser reads the service, so I think, in the army, the paymaster should discharge this duty. A graduate of either University, if there be one in the corps, would be, from his education and training, the most desirable person to read a selection of prayers from the church service. A chaplain accompanied the Bengal and Bombay columns, which went to Afghanistan in 1838-39.

We have a noble instance of voluntary dedication to the duties of chaplain to an army on active service, in the case of the Rev. W.J. Whiting, M.A., during the second Sikh campaign. The arduous and invaluable services which this excellent clergyman rendered during that campaign called forth the grateful thanks of the Governor-General, the Commander-in-Chief, the Bishop of Calcutta, and the Court of Directors. He has left an indelible impression, on all engaged in that war, of the importance of his benevolent, as well as spiritual ministrations.

By the warrant for prize-money for the navy, dated 1846, naval chaplains share in the prize money. There appears to be no positive regulation for army chaplains; but the analogy between the two services will point out the propriety of its existing in the latter case; and the warrant being by royal authority, no doubt ought to exist on the subject. It is pleasing to hear that the Rev. George Robert Gleig, M.A., Chaplain-General to the Forces, formerly a subaltern during the Peninsular war, and author of several entertaining and instructive military works, has not only received his medal, with two bars, but has worn it at Court over his canonicals, and does wear it at all times in the pulpit.

By the navy warrant, passengers on board a man-of-war, if they desire to join in an action, receive a share of the prize money. The navy prize rules are fairer than those of the army. The army rules were made--I am speaking of India--by the Prize Committees, assembled at Seringapatam, Agra, etc., in 1799 and 1803; and, being composed of senior officers, they took good care of their own grade, while the juniors got a very disproportionate share.

I return from this digression to the bellicose signs of the times. Colonel Campbell's detachment marched, on the 22nd December, to Goelah, sixteen miles distant. Here, in consequence of rumours that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej, and having heard, in the afternoon, a distant noise resembling the sound of cannon (which subsequently turned out to be the explosion of mines), Colonel Campbell ordered all the troops under his immediate command to join and march together.

On the following morning the advanced guard consisted of a troop of the Royal Lancers--the light companies of the 43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry--some sappers and miners--and four 12-pounders. The main body consisted of the 9th Lancers--43rd and 59th regiments of Native Infantry--and six 12-pounders. The rear-guard consisted of a troop of the 9th--one company from each of the Infantry regiments--and two 12-pounders: Captain Spottiswoode, 9th Lancers, an able and most intelligent officer, acting as major of brigade. Here was a respectable force of nearly 3,000 men and twelve guns, or four to each thousand men, being above Napoleon's proportion, which was only three to 1,000.

It will be seen that we began the campaign with an artillery very inferior to that of the Sikhs. In fact, if calibres are reckoned, we, probably, were in the minority as one to three. I shall, in the sequel, prove these facts. But to proceed:

It will appear strange to the European reader when he hears that the whole tract of country between the Sutlej and the Jumna, including the protected Sikh states, which were under our control, as well as our protection, had been in the possession of the East India Company since the year 1809, or for thirty-six years before this period; and that, nevertheless, troops marching to join the army, in a direct line, sixty miles off, were not even aware that the Sikhs had crossed the Sutlej; and that, moreover, two battles had been fought, that of Moodkee, on the 18th, and that of Ferozeshah on the 21st and 22nd of December, the latter being one of the most deadly contested actions ever fought in India. I have before stated that the 9th Lancers had been ordered from Meerut, and did march on the 25th of November; that this line corps, being unfortunately ordered back, did not leave Meerut the second time until the 11th of December. Here was a loss of sixteen days: hence it is clear, that, as the regiment heard firing, or sounds arising from the explosion of powder mines on the 21st of December, it would have been present in the battles of Moodkee and Ferozeshah, had not its march been countermanded.

Now the order to return to Meerut was received on the 27th of November. To what circumstance was this to be attributed? The Sikhs did not cross the Sutlej until the 13th of December, or sixteen days after the 27th of November; and, allowing the order for the return to be dated the 25th of November, there certainly was not any crossing of the Sikhs at that time. It is positively stated, by a staff officer, that Lord Hardinge did not send the order. Although a Governor-General can send such an order direct, yet all military men here know that the Commander-in-chief is the channel for transmitting such orders. At the same time it is an established rule in the Indian army that a Commander-in-chief cannot order any troops on service without the sanction of the Governor-General, or of the government. Even in the common biennial or triennial relief the order is prefaced with the words: "With the sanction of government." The Governor-General being, in the present instance, on the field, was, _de facto_, the government. As Louis XIV. said: _L'état? C'est moi._

Great uncertainty if not mystery prevailed in our army as to the probability of the Sikhs crossing the Sutlej. The Blue Book comes to our aid in deciding upon such a probability. It was argued that in 1843 the Sikhs did threaten to cross, but thought better of it and forebore; and therefore they might do the same now. But all the politicals knew well enough that the Punts and Punchees were no longer under the control of the Durbar as they were in 1843, but were more likely than not, to act in open defiance of it.

There were two officers, however, of great political talent, whose official position enabled them to know more of the feelings of the Sikhs, and of the probability of such a step than most others; one was Major G. Broadfoot of the 34th Madras Native Infantry, who had held the office of British Agent for Sikh affairs since November 1844, and who had acted as engineer in the celebrated defence of Jellalabad, the heroes of which obtained the well merited Roman distinction of a mural crown; the other was Captain P. Nicolson, 28th Bengal Native Infantry who had been appointed his assistant. Captain Nicolson was in Affghanistan in 1838-39, and was deputed to conduct the traitor Dost Mahomed Khan to Calcutta, and afterwards to Saharunpore. This officer had had seven years' experience of the politics of the Affghans and the Sikhs. At this juncture he was with Major General Sir John H. Littler at Ferozepore. He was in the daily receipt of intelligence from Lahore, and knew that the Sikhs would cross, for he wrote to Calcutta on the 9th of October, 1845, that "he believed the Sikhs would cross." What! because Major Broadfoot knew that the Sikhs had made an empty threat to cross in 1843, was it therefore improbable, that, being encamped for a long time, on the right bank of the Sutlej, menacing the Durbar at Lahore, from whence they marched in defiance of their government and of their chief, whom they compelled to join them, they would execute their threat under these circumstances?

Major Broadfoot was the Governor-General's agent, and as such was the officer to whom he looked for intelligence, Captain Nicolson was his subordinate; the Major doubted the Captain's intelligence, because he had received no other information to induce him to believe that the rebellious and infatuated Khalsa (or royal) troops would dare to cross. If they threatened to cross in 1843 without carrying that threat into execution, why might they not do the same in 1845? But this was not good logic; the inference was against him; because in 1843 they were obedient to the Durbar, and in 1845 they acted in defiance of it.

It would be useless at this distant period to enter into the discussion which arose in India, and was afterwards taken up with much warmth in England, as to the correctness of the views entertained by these officers on the crossing of the Sutlej by the Sikhs. The relative views of those two officers were then and are still sustained by their respective friends; but as far as we can individually offer an opinion, and as it seemed to many at the time, there is great difficulty in arriving at a decision as to the rights of the question at issue. It is true that Major Broadfoot, as the superior officer, might be presumed to be in a position for obtaining access to sources of information from which his subordinate was debarred. In a military point of view, this position must always carry its due weight in the scale of probable authentic intelligence, and should have a preponderating influence in ultimate proceedings, especially in such a country as India, and among such a people as we were then dealing with.

On the other hand, it is by no means uncommon for a subordinate in an important position, to have access directly, and indirectly, to authentic intelligence from which his superior may be shut out, and such a subordinate, knowing his duties and his means of intelligence, can constantly elicit facts in a variety of ways, especially from a hostile source, from which his superior is excluded.

Now, in reference to the position of Captain Nicolson at this juncture, and for a long period antecedent, we are decidedly of opinion that his information and impressions were correct: at the same time we do not consider that the admission of this circumstance can warrant any one to seek, or in justice desire, to disparage the opinions of Major Broadfoot. He, no doubt, had strong grounds for arriving at the conclusion that he did, as the information upon which he acted coincided with his own predilections, and for persisting in these views, even in the face of equally strong opinions on the part of Captain Nicolson.

Officers will, and must, differ on points like the one at issue; but we do not hesitate to say, that Major Broadfoot's views have subjected him to no small share of obloquy and censure. It is, however, important to bear in mind, that in no country, and among no class of people in the world, is there so much cause for a difference of opinion as among military men in India, especially on such a question as that under consideration. The character of the Sikhs, their former empty and vacillating tactics, made the crossing of the Sutlej a matter of uncertainty, even up to a few days of their actual transit; and, to the very last moment, some of their own people were doubtful on the point. This has always been a piece of oriental policy.

It cannot be denied, that the Sikhs had considerable cause for provocation. The sequestration of the two Sikh villages near Loodianna, by the British government, early in November, was the culminating point, and left no doubt of our aggressive intentions on the minds of the Sikhs. Their suspicions had long been awakened by our proceedings--by the rumours of boats preparing at Bombay, to form pontoons across the Sutlej--of our equipping troops in Scinde, for a march on Mooltan--and reinforcing our frontier stations with men and ammunition. They persuaded themselves that the policy of our government was territorial aggrandizement, and that war was inevitable. This feeling was shared by the mass of the Sikh population. The Durbar sitting at Lahore, however, knew well enough that the British government would not take the initiative; but it had completely lost the confidence and allegiance of the army by its internal dissensions, and the supine weakness and luxurious indolence of the chiefs of the Punjaub. The Sikh soldiery used to assemble in groups round the tomb of Runjeet Singh, vowing to defend with their lives all that belonged to the commonwealth of Govind--that they would never suffer the kingdom of Lahore to be occupied by the British strangers, but stand ready to march, or give the invaders battle on their own ground.

Thus, led on from one step to another, the Sikhs declared war on the 17th of November, and by an overt act broke the solemn treaty of alliance with our government; they crossed the Sutlej on the 13th of December, and on the 14th took up a position in the immediate vicinity of Ferozepore.

This treaty of alliance between the British government and the Maharajah had been concluded in April, 1809; being occasioned by the aggressions of Runjeet Singh upon the territories of the chiefs of the Cis-Sutlej provinces, who claimed the British protection.[1]

In Sir David Ochterlony's proclamation,[2] which was issued at the same time, it was especially stated, "That the force of cavalry and infantry which may have crossed to this side of the river Sutlej, must be recalled to the other side, to the country of the Maharajah. This communication is made solely with the view of publishing the sentiments of the British, and of ascertaining those of the Maharajah. The British are confident that the Maharajah will consider the contents of this precept as redounding to his real advantage, and as affording a conspicuous proof of their friendship; that with their capacity for war, they are also intent on peace."

There can be no question, that so long as Runjeet Singh held the government, this and subsequent treaties would have remained inviolate. He knew the power and influence of the English well enough to desire their friendship, rather than their enmity. But this was not the case with his successors, whose policy was guided by views of self-aggrandizement, rather than by the weal of their people, by which they lost their hold over them.

Up to this time, the British had adopted only precautionary measures for the protection of their frontier states. The Governor-General, Lord Hardinge, had joined the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Hugh Gough, at Umballa, early in December; and as soon as the rumour gained ground, that the Sikh forces were marching towards the Sutlej, the troops in the upper provinces received marching orders, and all were speedily on the move. The corps stationed at Umballa, Loodianna, and Ferozepore, amounted to about 30,000 men, with 70 field-guns; and as Ferozepore, which was then occupied by Sir John Littler, was the most exposed, the troops from Umballa were sent to his support, and only a small garrison was left at Loodianna, in order that as large a body of available men as possible, should be placed at the disposal of Sir H. Gough to give battle to the Sikhs, should they carry out their threat of crossing the Sutlej.

This, as we have seen, they actually did on the 13th; but so great was the influence which Captain Nicolson exercised over some of their chiefs, that he prevailed upon Lall Singh to divide his forces; and it was only a division of the Sikhs which fought at Moodkee on the 18th of December.

The Sikh army numbered from 35,000 to 40,000 men, with 50 pieces of heavy artillery, besides a reserve force stationed near Loodianna, to act according to circumstances. The army of invasion consequently more than doubled that of the British. Notwithstanding the jealousy, mistrust, and treachery which prevailed in the Sikh army, in one thing they were agreed, that they would rid the commonwealth of Govind, of their hated British allies; and that in order to accomplish this, it behoved every individual to act as if the result depended upon himself alone. The Sikhs were commanded by Tej Singh, an officer of considerable talent. They took up an entrenched position at Ferozeshah, an inconsiderable village about 10 miles from Ferozepore and the same distance from Moodkee.

General Sir John Littler was, as we have stated, lying at Ferozepore with a garrison of about 10,000 men. As the Sikhs appeared to threaten the town, the gallant general immediately led out his men, and offered them battle; this they declined, mainly it would appear, from the double dealing and artful conduct of Lall Singh and Tej Singh, who, uncertain as to the result of the present movement, were anxious to remain friends with both parties.

The head-quarters of the Commander-in-Chief were at Umballa about 150 miles from Moodkee. His Excellency[3] broke up his camp on the 11th, and by forced marches arrived at the village of Moodkee on the 18th. The Governor-General was a little in advance of his Excellency, and rode over to Loodianna to inspect the troops. Finding that post secure from an attack, he dispatched about 5,000 of the garrison to guard the important grain depôt of Bussean.

On the 18th of December, the Commander-in-Chief, with the Umballa division of the army arrived at Moodkee, and was immediately joined by the Loodianna division. On reaching Moodkee there was no longer any doubt as to the whereabouts of the Sikh forces. Orders were immediately issued by the deputy adjutant-general to a brigadier, that he should be ready for duty next day; in other words, that he should command the advance guard. This was about twelve o'clock in the day, when the officers were in the mess tent at _tiffin_. Two young officers of the 16th Native Grenadiers overheard the order: "You are brigadier for to-morrow; the army will march early in the morning to attack the Sikhs, who are known to be ten miles off." They were still discussing the glorious prospect of an encounter with the Sikhs, when orders arrived in camp for "all hands to turn out," Major Broadfoot having received intelligence that the Sikhs were near. The order had been sent by Lord Hardinge,--every inch a soldier, but who at that time had not yet been appointed second in command to the Commander-in-Chief.

The cavalry and horse artillery darted off to the right front; the infantry followed; it was a short affair. Lord Gough did not at first credit the report: "The Sikhs are coming!" Like a true Irish soldier, he would have a view of them before he could make up his mind--but he was soon convinced of the reality of the rumour. Major Broadfoot, galloping up to their position, was fired on; both the Governor-General and the Commander-in-Chief were, it is said, at one time nearly captured. The Governor-General, on the other hand, promptly put the troops in motion: being himself an old Peninsular officer, he was an excellent judge of the matter. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief could not have done otherwise, but there was not time to send to him: the urgency of the occasion satisfies the mind of all military men; by a delay the Sikhs might have attacked the British.

Napoleon and other great generals "always anticipated the attack." They who attack have the advantage of deciding on the form of attack; those who await it, have no certainty where it may be made.

The battle of Moodkee was, as we have said, a short affair. The Sikhs headed by Lall Singh, opened with a heavy cannonade, but were answered by a brisk fire from the English; the enemy's rear was then attacked by a brilliant cavalry movement which routed him; and night put a stop to the carnage. The Sikhs were defeated with a loss of 17 guns. That of the British was very great; they had 215 killed, and 657 wounded. Among the killed were Sir Robert Sale and Sir John McCaskill. It is doubtful whether the addition of the 9th Lancers would have been of service at the battle of Moodkee, because there was no extended field for cavalry movements: at Ferozeshah, however, they would have been of eminent use, for on the the second day (December 22nd,) Tej Singh advanced with a large force of horse artillery; and I have heard it deeply regretted by officers present in this action, that we were not at hand to complete the rout of the brave Sikhs.

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1: See Appendix I.]

[Footnote 2: See Appendix, II.]

[Footnote 3: The Commander-in-Chief is always so styled; the Governor-General never.]