Part 32

But they cannot get at us, says Lindbergh, citing the difficulty of air-borne invasion by Greenland or South America. Nobody imagines an exclusively air-borne invasion of America is possible. But if the British lose the war before we complete our two-ocean navy in 1947, sea power goes to the Germans. Lindbergh at no time discussed this all-important fact. Nor the fact that a defeated Britain, like defeated France, would be yoked into the Nazi war machine to be used against the last enemy, ourselves. Does he really believe that if this happens within the next year or eighteen months, much less in shorter time, we shall be able alone to repel a German attack on this hemisphere, an attack supported by all the navies and warplanes left on earth except our own? We have already set forth the fact that after conquest of Britain Germany would possess shipping to transport millions, twenty to thirty thousand tanks, five or six times the number of warplanes we shall be able to produce in eighteen months, and the most formidable army the world has ever seen, driven by the indomitable will of Hitler to conquer the globe or die.

Leave aside, though, the possibility of direct invasion of the continental United States, and let us discuss with Lindbergh the possibility of German invasion of South America. He declares this, too, would be impossible “in opposition to the armed forces of Brazil backed by our own Army, Navy and Air Corps.” But it is 4,258 miles from New York to Pernambuco, Brazil, the place nearest to us where the Germans might want to land, while it is only 3,847 miles from New York to London. Lindbergh advocates that we should attempt to defend Pernambuco though it is 400 miles farther from New York than London, which he says we should not defend because, among other things, of the difficulty of sending an expeditionary force so far. Does Lindbergh truly think Pernambuco easier and more worth while for us to defend than London? Does he really believe after Germany had conquered Europe and Britain that Brazil or any other South American state would oppose Germany or invite us to help it fight Germany?

But he demands to know, how can we defeat Germany if we do go to war? He knows the answer to that better than anyone. We can defeat Germany only by obtaining mastery of the air over Germany, then destroying the German air force; once the Luftwaffe is destroyed, the impact of that blow alone may cause the first crack in the military and civilian morale of Germany and lift the morale of the conquered peoples to aid in expelling their conquerors. Let me reiterate that the conquered peoples will never revolt until they see the possibility of successful revolt and that will come only with the first serious military setback of the Germans.

Would we have to send an expeditionary land army? We probably shall have to send our best units, and do it quickly, to prevent German seizure of the West African ports and islands affording springboards to America. Our troops would be useful now in North Africa and the Near East. Wherever contact with the enemy can be had, we should be represented as strongly as possible. It is also likely that we shall need to send an A.E.F. to the continent, although not necessarily as large as in the last war. If we can get air superiority, it will mean the war is practically won. I should expect Germany then to crack up.

Even if she did not break down at once, the demoralization entailed by loss of control of the air would be so great that landings on the continent should be feasible at almost any place the Allies chose. Lindbergh persistently asks where we could land an expeditionary force. The answer is that if we get there in time we shall have an excellent base of operations across the seas, Great Britain. From there the coast of Nazi Europe presents hundreds of opportunities for invasion, once the Nazi air force is eliminated.

Lindbergh demands to know how long it would take to win if we think, contrary to his judgment, that we can win. I should think it would take a minimum of three years after we enter the war, maybe four, possibly five or six. It can be accomplished only by expanding our present aircraft production program, which has orders now for 80,000 planes, to whatever dimensions prove necessary. This depends on how many planes the Germans are able to produce from their own and conquered factories, including all the facilities of their conquests in the East. We shall certainly have to think in terms of hundreds of thousands of planes. We and the British will have to supply the pilots and crews and ground crews for these planes, and it may be that our Air Corps will number upwards of a million before we are through. We have the men and the machines to do it.

“How much would it cost in American lives?” Lindbergh demands. Who can tell? We know only that until the Germans went into Russia the casualties in this war had been inconsiderable compared with the last war. As long as combat was confined to the air and the sea, the numbers of combatant lives lost were in the thousands compared with the hundreds of thousands of soldier lives lost in comparable periods in the land fighting of the last war. The bombardment of civilians has been ghastly, but the number of lives lost has been on the whole surprisingly small--41,900 persons killed in Britain from January 1940 to June 1941. It has even been asserted that in Britain, despite the hardships, war has so elevated the tone, the spirit of the population, that death by disease has declined until the gain has made up for the loss of life by bombardment. The relatively small number of deaths is explained by Mr. Churchill as the result of air raid precautions. After the bloodiest month of the Battle of Britain, September 1940, Mr. Churchill made a remarkable analysis.

“We are told,” he said, “by the Germans that 251 tons of explosives were thrown upon London in a single night, that is to say, only a few tons less than the total dropped on the whole country throughout the last war. Now we know exactly what our casualties have been. On that particular Thursday night 180 persons were killed in London as a result of 251 tons of bombs. That is to say it took one ton of bombs to kill three-quarters of a person. We know, of course, exactly the ratio of loss in the last war, because all the facts were ascertained after it was over. In that war the small bombs of early patterns which were used killed ten persons for every ton discharged in the built-up areas. That is, the mortality is now less than one-tenth of the mortality attaching to the German bombing attacks in the last war....

“What is the explanation? There can only be one, namely the vastly improved methods of shelter which have been adopted.... Whereas when we entered this war at the call of duty and honor we expected to sustain losses which would amount to 3,000 killed in a single night and 12,000 wounded, night after night, and made hospital arrangements on the basis of a quarter of a million casualties merely as a first provision; whereas that is what we did at the beginning of the war, we have actually had since it began, up to last Saturday, as a result of air bombing, about 8,500 killed and 13,000 wounded.” This was after three months of the Blitz; today with the figure of 41,900 as the total dead, the Prime Minister’s point is all the stronger as he concluded: “This shows that things do not always turn out as badly as one expects.” Mr. Churchill might have been speaking directly to Lindbergh.

Q. _But if air bombardment is as ineffective as these figures of Churchill indicate, how do you expect us to be able to beat Germany by winning air superiority and destroying the German air force? Isn’t there a discrepancy in your argument?_

A. No, because Britain has come off so lightly precisely because the Germans never have gotten air supremacy over Britain. If they ever did, it would mean they would win the war, just as if we ever get air supremacy over Germany, it will mean that we will win the war. Air supremacy means you can come over in the daytime, and bomb with precision. Antiaircraft guns are unable to prevent bombing. If there are no fighters to beat off the bombers, the bombers can do just about as they like. They can dive-bomb and destroy any objective they choose with about ninety per cent accuracy. If the Luftwaffe is ever destroyed, British and American planes can annihilate the entire German war industry and then what will it avail Hitler to be the conqueror of all Europe, or of Asia, too?

The R.A.F. has never been out to bomb civilians. The Germans have proved how useless civilian bombing is against a brave people. The R.A.F. has preferred the more difficult job of bombing military objectives and already it has affected the Reich’s war-making capacity. British bombs on the invasion ports had much to do with Hitler’s postponement of his trip to England. With the addition to the R.A.F. of hundreds of thousands of American machines, and with our own hundreds of thousands in the American Air Force, there is no reason to doubt that eventually the German military apparatus can be smashed.

Q. _What damage have the Germans done to the British war machine; or to the buildings of London? Lindbergh insists Britain is already beaten to her knees._

A. Exactly! Well, you have seen the loss of civilian life, amazingly small. Now Mr. Churchill has given us an interesting estimate on the damage to London. He said: “Statisticians may amuse themselves by calculating that after making allowance for the working of the law of diminishing returns, through the same house being struck twice or three times over, it would take ten years at the present rate, for half of the houses of London to be demolished. After that, of course, progress would be much slower. Quite a lot of things are going to happen to Herr Hitler and the Nazi regime before ten years are up.... Neither by material damage nor by slaughter will the people of the British Empire be turned from their solemn and inexorable purpose.” Does Lindbergh really think the British are beaten?

But you may object, surely we shall not have to suffer bombing of our civilian population. No, not if we enter the war in time to keep it on the other side of the ocean. The oddest thing of all about the Lindbergh policy is that it would wait for the war to come to us, so that the bombs should fall on our homes, not on the homes of our enemies. He represents precisely the fatal “Maginot line policy” which he so decries in the French. He advises us to sit behind our Maginot Atlantic and dream of our security until the Germans break through.

Finally Lindbergh demands that we “define our war aims,” and tell “how we are to impose our ideology on Germany, Russia, Italy and Japan.” We do not wish to “impose our ideology” on anyone. All we wish at the moment is to preserve our nation, keep from becoming slaves of the Nazis, and prevent Hitler from imposing his ideology upon us. We want only to make the world safe for the United States, which means also for the friends and allies of the United States, and if victory is ours we shall attempt to include in the circle of security all the nations of good will on earth. If this means “policing the earth,” let it mean that. The first step to organize common security was taken when men agreed to have a police force and for it sacrificed their individual right to exercise individual justice, and agreed to pay taxes for the protection. We are just now vigilantes trying to rid the community of bandits.

It is a troublesome matter and after it is settled we may have sense enough to organize at least for transient tranquillity and hope against hope that education may help us to permanent peace. I have not much hope of that myself, but if we, the United States of America, were to put our heart into the effort, I would have hope. Unless we do there is no hope at all.

Q. _But how many lives could it cost America?_

A. Nobody can say how many lives it will cost us to preserve our liberty and independence. Maybe surprisingly few, maybe heart-breakingly many. But is this a matter for bargaining? Does Lindbergh ask us to say: “We, the United States of America will give so and so many American lives in order to preserve our national independence, our institutions, our children’s lives and our liberty, but we will give so many and no more? If it costs more, we will surrender! If it takes two years to win, we will make the trade; if it costs ten, we give in!” If that is our attitude, we are beaten before we begin. It is not America’s attitude. It was Vallandigham’s, but not America’s.

Index

Abetz, Otto, 243, 251

America First Committee, 311, 345, 346, 361-362, 367

American Expeditionary Force, 278, 293, 314, 333, 371

Anabaptists, 56

Angell, Sir Norman, 193-194

Anti-Semitism, in Germany, 13-14, 64-65,82, 360 in Lindbergh’s philosophy, 361-362

Assassinations, political, 60-79, 239

Atlantic Charter, 184, 185-187, 200-202,227, 333-334

Atrocity stories, 79-83

Australian armed forces, 155

Austria, Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10 independence guaranteed, 7-8 seizure of, 27

Baltic states, fate of, 193, 227-228

Baruch, Bernard, 170

Bayes, William D., 43

_Berliner Illustrierte_, 42

Bernstein, Henri, 148-149

Bezbozhnik Society, 99

Birdsall, Paul, 286

Black Guards, 15, 39, 56, 62-63, 83

Blood Purge (June 30, 1934), 12, 32, 34, 39-40, 64, 78

Blum, Leon, 267, 279

Brest-Litovsk treaty, 58, 107

British Expeditionary Force, 21-22

British Intelligence Service, 66-68

British Navy, and American safety, 276 Churchill’s tribute to, 168-169 as a fighting force, 152-156

Bucharest treaty, 58

Cagoulard movement, 243, 251-259

Canada, and the war effort, 152, 154, 155, 204

China, 320, 366 war economy, 109

Churchill, Randolph, 26, 166, 172, 176, 177-178

Churchill, Winston, 139-183 address to French people, 284 Atlantic meeting with Roosevelt, 184-185 aversions, 176-177 as a bricklayer, 178-179 characteristics, 144, 148-151 on effect of air bombardment, 372-375 gift of prophecy, 148 military judgment, 156-161, 182-183 opinion of Roosevelt and the New Deal, 145-148 opinion of United States, 144-145 as a painter, 179 place in history, 139 popularity in England, 139-142 principal interests, 166-183 realist and idealist, 142-144 secret of success, 163-166 as a speaker, 171-174 speeches on defense of Britain, 151-153, 160, 164-166 as a writer, 163-164, 169, 170, 179

Ciano, Count, 7

Clapper, Raymond, 350

Cole, G. D. H., 141-142

Communism, compared with England’s wartime socialism, 231-233 compared with Nazism, 84-87 economic failure in Russia, 116-134 in France, 241, 249-250 in Germany, 13-14, 214-215 in Spain, 98 threat of revolution in Europe, 101-103 in the United States, 273-274

Compiègne armistice, 283

Conant, James B., 323

Conscientious objectors, 321-324

Cooper, Hugh, 107

Corrigan, Douglas, 353-355

Crete, battle of, 153, 158, 303

Croix de Feu, 250

Curie, Eve, 281, 318

Czechoslovakia, 51-52 occupied by Germany, 27-28

Darlan, Admiral, 266-268, 272

Darre, Walther, 54, 309

_Das Kapital_, 85

Deloncle, Colonel Eugene, 243

Deuxième Bureau, 243, 251-256

Dneiper dam, 107-108

Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10

Dunkirk, evacuation of, 21, 22, 151, 152, 303, 316

Duranty, Walter, 90

Dusseigneur, General, 243, 251

Einstein, Albert, 323

England, at war, 139-183 defense against Hitler, 300-306 and wartime socialism, 231-233

Fayard, Arthème, 252-253

Faymonville, Colonel, 135

Fifth Columnists, 339-376

Finland, 100, 105, 175, 364-366

Fish, Hamilton, 344-345

Foreign trade, effect of Nazi slave labor on, 192-197, 208-212 and Nazi economy, 53-54

France, compared with America, 273-280 declining birth rate, 234, 263, 277-278 future under Nazis, 283-284, 290-291 hope for, 281-282 indemnity and reparations to Germans, 285-292 Maginot line complex, 234, 240, 274-275, 296, 375 reasons for fall of, 30, 234-273 venality of press, 234, 280-281

French Army, equipment of, 234-235 morale of, 235-238 treason in, 238-262

Franco, General, 264

Fuller, Colonel Horace M., 20

de Gaulle, General, 266, 315 recognition of government, 292

Garvin, J. L., 174

Gaxotte, Pierre, 252-253, 256

George, General, 243

Georgiev, Vlada, 63, 77

German Air Force, strength of, 299, 333, 359, 372-374

German Army, 16, 297 Hitler’s ascendancy over, 8-9, 17-34

German people, attitude toward America, 329-331 character of, 55-58, 217-218, 226-227, 282 Hitler’s relation to, 36-38

Germany, 1-87 Communism in, 15-16, 214-215 deindustrialization vs. military occupation, 219-226 postwar reconstruction, 56-58

Gestapo, 15, 62, 67-68, 228, 243 in Holland, 67 murder monopoly of, 79, 83-84 and Nazi economy, 53-54 political position of, 74-76 in Spain, 25, 356

Goebbels, Joseph, 8, 15, 33, 163 and propaganda, 80, 243, 330-331 as a public speaker, 37

Goering, Hermann, 14-16, 24, 32, 163, 359

Glass, Senator Carter, 51

G. P. U., 70-71, 83-85, 119-120, 133, 228 political position of, 74-77

Greece, 158-159

Hackett, Francis, 43-44

Haushofer, Karl, 17

Hayes, Carlton J., 357

Hemingway, Ernest, 97

Hess’s flight to England, 15, 161-163

Hillenkoetter, Lieutenant-Commander, 20

Himmler, Heinrich, 15, 64, 67, 163, 243

Hitler, Adolf, 1-69 assassination attempts analyzed, 60-69 attack on Russia, 23, 30, 110-111, 160-161 compared with Hohenzollerns, 263-264, 328 and homosexuality, 34-35 impressions of, 1-3, 10-12, 43-51 military mistakes, 19-30 and Mussolini, 4-10 and Napoleon, 17, 30, 113-114 occupation of Czechoslovakia, 27-28 personal bravery, 30-33 physical appearance, 1-3, 43-44 plans for invasion of Britain, 300-305 principal interests, 167 as a public speaker, 37-41 relation to German people, 35-36, 60 reoccupation of Rhineland, 24-26, 148, 226 responsibility for war, 12-14 successors to, 14-17 seizure of Austria, 8-10, 27 treatment if beaten, 58-60 and the United States, 306-309 as war lord, 17-19 and women, 36-37 and world conquest, 37, 190-199, 202-209, 213-214, 323-325

Homosexuality, 33-35

Hoover, Herbert, 344-345

Huntziger, General Charles, 235-238

Hutchins’ Four Freedoms, 309-313

Imro, 77-78

Irish neutrality, 144, 305-306

Jankowsky, Frau Marie, 81-83

Japan, 112, 316 publishes Axis peace terms, 199, 202-207

_Je Suis Partout_, 243, 251-258

Jews, persecution of, 64-65, 82, 360, 362-364

John of Leyden, 56

Jung, Dr. Carl G., analysis of Hitler and Nazism, 45-51, 54-55

Keynes, John Maynard, 286-287

Kirov, Sergei, assassination of, 69-71

Korff, resigns from Ullstein Verlag, 41-42

Labor party in England, 141-142

La Guardia, F. H., 345

Laval, Pierre, 239, 269-273

League of Nations, 143, 287, 334, 336-337 proposed, 223, 230

Lenin, Nikolai, 69, 98-99, 123 on morality, 103

Lewis, Sinclair, 353

Lindbergh, Anne Morrow, 81-83, 350, 355-356

Lindbergh, Charles A., 339-361, 364-376 admiration for Nazi Germany, 358-360 anti-Semitism, 361-362 character and personality, 347, 348, 351-353 classed as Copperhead, 339-341 and free speech, 343-344 ingratitude to France and England, 349-351 isolationist arguments answered, 368-376 kidnaping and murder of child, 356-357 “Letter to America,” 367-368 and newspaper publicity, 352-354 as one-time national hero, 346-348 political philosophy, 273-274, 350-351, 359, 361 praised by President Coolidge, 346-347 propagandist for Hitler, 198-200, 214 supporters of, 341, 343, 346, 367 visit to Soviet Union, 358-359

von Lossow, General, 11-12, 39

Ludendorff, General, 11, 32, 67, 327

Maginot line complex, 234, 240, 274-275, 296, 375

Mandel, Georges, 253-255

Masaryk, Thomas G., 51-52

Master race doctrine, 37, 191-192

_Mein Kampf_, 1, 31, 37, 41-42, 85, 283-284 Hackett’s index to, 44-45

Miller, Douglas, 111, 213

Morrow, Mrs. Dwight, 353

Mowrer, Edgar, 20, 60

Mosley, Oswald, 361

Munich Beer Hall, bombing attempt, 67-69

Munich Beer Hall Putsch, 1, 32

Munich pact, 28, 61, 360-361

Mussolini, Benito, 4-5, 49, 173 and Dollfuss Putsch, 8-10 first meeting with Hitler, 3-7 and political assassinations, 72-74 and yes-staff, 18

Napoleon, and Hitler, 17, 30 and Mussolini, 4-5

National Socialist German Workers Party, 13-14

Nazi Party Congress in Nuremberg, 9-10, 61-63

Nazi propaganda, 79-83, 239, 243, 248-262, 275-276

Nazism, 51-53, 83, 360 compared with Communism, 84-87

Nelson, Donald M., 294

Newspapers, American and French, 279-281

Nicolson, Harold, 174, 357

NKVD defined, 119-120

Norris, Kathleen, 345

Norway, invasion of, 30, 157-160

Nye, Senator Gerald P., 149, 214, 344-345

Okhrana, 75-76

von der Osten, Major, 25-26

_Out of the Night_, 68, 83-84, 163

Pax Anglo-Americana, 146, 229-230

Peace conference, 191-192, 214-231 Atlantic Charter, 200-202, 221, 334 Axis terms, 198-199, 202-208

Pétain, Marshal, character of, 262-265, 272 dupe of German propaganda, 239, 255-262 as head of Vichy government, 265-266, 292, 315 Hitler’s promise to, 284-285 request for armistice, 243-245

_Petit Journal_, 250-251

Poison gas, 302

Poland, attack on planned, 18 conquest by Nazis, 29-30, 191-193, 195, 322, 365 fate of, 184-185 and Russia, 100, 174-175

Prioux, General, 241-242

Raleigh, John McCutcheon, 45

Rauschning, Hermann, 160, 309

Reichstag fire, 68

Rhineland, reoccupation of, 24-26, 148, 226 von Ribbentrop, Joachim, 15, 29, 243, 251

Roehm, Ernst, 32-34, 39

Roosevelt, Franklin D., 145-147, 296 meeting with Churchill, 184-185 re-election and German morale, 330 verdict on Lindbergh, 339-341, 344

Rosenberg, Alfred, 15, 163

Royal Air Force, 22-23, 301, 303, 304, 332, 374 Churchill’s tribute to, 166

Russell, Bertrand, 323

Russia, 88-139 approval of Atlantic Charter, 227-228 and defeat of Germany, 101-103 development of Red Army, 92-94, 134-137 failure of Planned National Economy, 116, 121-123, 130-131 Five-Year Plans, 107-108, 116, 122 freedom of worship, 99-100 monetary system, 129-130 morale of people, 95-99 political assassinations in, 67-79 reasons for resistance to Nazi attack, 90-99 as refuge for Jews, 363-364 standard of living, 92, 118-123, 129 Terror under political police, 115-120, 125-128, 131-134 U. S. help for, 88-90, 100-104, 137-138 weaknesses of Soviet system, 115-134

Russo-German pact, 29, 100, 112

Schieffer, Colonel, 242, 277-278, 326

Schuman, Frederick L., defines dictatorship, 146

Selassie, Haile, 76

Shipbuilding capacities, 155-156

Siegfried line, 26, 28

Socialism, in wartime England, 231-233

South America, and the Nazis, 49, 191, 205, 208, 370-371

Soviet Union, _see_ Russia

Spanish Civil War, 25-26, 52-53, 97-98, 356

Stalin, Joseph, 88-115, 133-138 agreement with Churchill, 103-104 and compromise peace with Germany, 106-112 and political assassinations, 69-72, 76, 78 quarrel with Trotzky, 133-134 system of army espionage, 105-106

Stoddard, Lothrop, 44

Storm Troopers, 10, 32-34, 39, 54-55, 83

Swing, Raymond, 157, 299

Third Reich, symbolism of, 54-55

Thompson, Dorothy, 43-44

Tolischus, Otto, 43

Trotzky, Leon, 42-43, 123, 133-134, 176, 180