Part 4

The very designation lent itself to the spreading of a nationwide farmer-labor party. And it was the original hope of the Communist Party that through various forms of manipulation----

It was the Olson from Minnesota. I am quite sure, thinking back on it now, it was Floyd.

But be that as it may, it was the Governor Olson of Minnesota who was Governor in 1936 as a Farmer-Labor Governor.

However, at the very last moment when we had the resolution all ready to press before the convention, we finally received word that this Governor Olson was not well enough to undertake the job of organizing a new national farmer-labor party because of ill health, and begged off from the responsibility. Nationally, we were unable to find another figure of as much prominence whom we thought would be capable of leading such a successful effort. Consequently, we had to whip our party machinery into shape rather rapidly and change our tactics right on the floor of the WCF convention, and reverse ourselves in the process of debating the question.

Actually the resolutions committee had come in with a report in which a majority had objected to going the independent route. But I was one of the delegates who was in the minority who was leading a fight for going the independent route. And in the process of starting the debate we got the official word that it was a hopeless task, and we had to withdraw that effort.

We made a last-minute switch in our strategy and tactics, and some of those who had been fighting us so vigorously on the floor were completely dumfounded to find that we compromised--what appeared to be a compromise--when we changed our policy during the course of the debate on the resolution itself and withdrew our minority position.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you change your policy as a result of directions from the Communist Party head in New York?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. And the district organizer of the party was in the anteroom of the convention hall, sending word and direction to those of us who were up near the microphone who had an opportunity to command the microphone and the debate. And there were runners running back and forth to us rather rapidly telling us what the latest news of the party line was.

And the executive secretary of the Commonwealth Federation at that time was a man by the name of Howard Costigan who became somewhat alarmed to see such an obvious maneuver where between 15 and 20 different people were running back and forth passing messages to me and to others up in the front from Rappaport advising us what the official party policy was. He later on commented that he could see the party line running all over the place, but he didn’t know what was in it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was Howard Costigan a member of the Communist Party at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. Not at that time.

But that demonstration of power that we exercised in that convention was very convincing to him that if he wanted to remain as head of that organization he would have to make his peace with us, which he did before that summer was over.

Mr. TAVENNER. And did he become a member of the Communist Party?

Mr. DENNETT. He did.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, I think the record should show that Mr. Howard Costigan has appeared before the committee and has testified regarding some of the matters which have been mentioned here, including the fact that he did become a member of the Communist Party at about the time indicated by this witness, and at a later time, at approximately 1940, he left the Communist Party.

Mr. DENNETT. I could substantiate that.

There was another matter which arose as a serious issue in that convention, and it concerned a proposal for an initiative measure which became known as the production-for-use initiative.

Many people, because of the Communist Party influence in the unemployed days, were quite concerned and alarmed over the problem of unemployment, insecurity, possible impoverishment, et cetera. All the consequences of economic dislocation. They had read many of the so-called utopian pieces of literature such as Bellamy’s Looking Backward and other documents of the kind. They had also read Mr. Upton Sinclair’s program in California. They were somewhat acquainted with the propaganda of the Soviet Union, to the effect that production-for-use was the solution to the problems of capitalist lack of planning. In other words, planned economy.

Mr. VELDE. Mr. Dennett, you testified that you received the party line by courier, by runners from Rappaport. Do you have any idea how Rappaport received it from headquarters of the Communist Party?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes. Sometimes he received it by telegraph. In this particular instance, about this Governor Olson, he received that by telegram.

Mr. VELDE. Was there any secrecy involved, especially at that time?

Mr. DENNETT. No; there was no secrecy in that communication. As a matter of fact, they took parallel measures to see that somebody in Governor Olson’s staff also sent word to Howard Costigan directly. He also received the word. So that there was parallel information. At least we did make that concession to Costigan, that he would have official information about it.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did the rank-and-file membership of the Washington Commonwealth Federation know of the Communist Party manipulations which you have just described?

Mr. DENNETT. I am quite sure that most of them did not, although the behavior of many of the Democratic Party leaders at that convention would lead me to believe that they suspected it, because they fought us so bitterly and so hard.

Mr. TAVENNER. Proceed, please.

Mr. DENNETT. The story on the production-for-use initiative is simply this:

Because there was such a popular demand for some change in the economic situation to assure continued production and a cooperative effort, many people tried to translate an ideal of a cooperative commonwealth into some form of legislative effort. This resulted in many conferences and the calling in of legal talent to try to draft a measure which would be legal and which would satisfy the ambitions of the people to have the so-called dream of a cooperative commonwealth organization.

Mr. TAVENNER. Describe in a practical sense what production-for-use meant?

Mr. DENNETT. I wish I could satisfy you completely on that point because that is one of the problems we ran into in trying to draw up this initiative measure.

We could never satisfy ourselves that we had it satisfactorily organized. However, the staff who worked on it worked long and hard and finally produced a measure which was known as the production-for-use initiative. It was ready for presentation to that convention. However, some of us in the Communist Party, while we agreed that such a measure was a good propaganda weapon and felt that it was an excellent means of popularizing the ideas which we understood and claimed were the basis of the operation of the economy in the Soviet Union, we were startled when we read the document and found that it sounded a little bit more like the Fascist corporate state that the Italian leader Mussolini had established. We became so alarmed about it, and were so perplexed that we asked a very world-famous person, who happened to be a guest of the convention, what this person thought about it.

The person to whom I refer is Anna Louise Strong, who had just come from the Soviet Union, extended greetings to us, to the convention, and otherwise gave a very enlightening report on her travels, and won wide acclaim for that effort.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did she, on the floor of the convention, address herself to the problem of production-for-use?

Mr. DENNETT. She did not. Not at that moment. She spoke only in general terms about it, referring to it in a complimentary way and hoping for success. But at that moment she did not know very much about what was in that document.

However, we felt that she, coming from the Soviet Union with fresh knowledge, might know quite a lot about it and might be able to assist us in revising the document so that it would be possible to satisfy us that it was, in fact, a step in the direction of a cooperative commonwealth.

So she consented very graciously to take the document and work on it overnight. She did exactly that. And we read it the next morning, and, much to our surprise, she had moved the emphasis in the control even more in the direction of top control and less in the direction of allowing the members or the organizations to have anything to say about it, which was just the reverse of the trend that we had hoped for.

Consequently, we began to ask ourselves, that is, the Communists asked themselves, if this is the end result of an effort to draw up an initiative, maybe it would be smarter politically for us to see that this measure dies aborning. Consequently, we came to the conclusion that it was impossible to draw up an initiative measure which would be adequate and which would answer our propaganda needs and our desires to satisfy us that it was in harmony with our program. So we embarked upon a campaign in the course of the election----

Mr. TAVENNER. Was this a campaign to pass the proposed measure or to defeat it?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, we all went out presumably to win support to get the measure adopted. That is, it was an initiative measure and it was before the voters. The voters were to cast a vote yes or no on this initiative.

(The witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. DENNETT. My counsel asked me if I knew the number of it, and I have forgotten the exact number of that initiative at this moment. So I can’t furnish that. I wish I could. It is a matter of official record, however, and it can be verified if anyone is curious about it.

The Communist Party found itself in that predicament. We were committed to support the measure, but we were determined to bring about its defeat. Consequently, we campaigned far and wide all over the State of Washington, explaining the measure in such a way as to convince the people that they should not vote for it.

At the same time we represented ourselves as campaigning for the measure.

And we did it so successfully that the measure was defeated. If we hadn’t of done it I am afraid it would have been adopted.

(The witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. DENNETT. My counsel asked me who was the “we.”

I am referring to the Communist Party in that instance.

The leaders of the Washington Commonwealth Federation were terribly disturbed by the nature of the campaign that we were carrying on, that is, the Communists.

Mr. TAVENNER. I should think it would be a rather confusing campaign where the Communist Party, in order to defeat it, actually supported it.

Mr. DENNETT. That is true. It was very confusing to everyone, even to us at times.

Mr. TAVENNER. That is a very interesting thing. The Communist Party, in order to defeat this measure, went out and conducted a state-wide campaign in favor of it. But in order to accomplish its defeat, if I understand you correctly, the Communist Party so represented the issues that people would be bound to vote against it.

Mr. DENNETT. That is true.

Mr. MOULDER. I understood the situation to be that because of Communist Party support of the measure, the public sentiment opposed it.

Mr. DENNETT. Not necessarily so, sir, because they didn’t know that we who were speaking were Communists. They thought we were representatives of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.

Mr. MOULDER. Proceed.

Mr. DENNETT. There is triple deception in this maneuver, which is rather hard to follow. I hope I have explained it.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am afraid that the point may not be absolutely clear in the record, and I want to be sure that it is clear:

If I understand you correctly, it was not the fact that the Communist Party was supporting this measure that caused its defeat.

Mr. DENNETT. You are correct, sir. That was not the reason. It was the way we, as disguised Communists, carried on the campaign, ostensibly for it, but, in fact, against it.

Mr. TAVENNER. In other words, your representations were of such a character as to make known the weaknesses in the bill; and a person would actually think you were supporting it.

Mr. DENNETT. True. You understand it quite clearly.

Mr. TAVENNER. I think the bill was properly named when you used the word “initiative” because that certainly is the use of initiative. I am glad to know it is Communist Party initiative. It is a very deceptive type of campaign.

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Tavenner and Mr. Chairman, I would like to make one observation about my testimony earlier this afternoon.

I get the feeling, and I have a fear that perhaps people listening to this presentation might think that because of my testimony I was the only figure who was active in the Washington Commonwealth Federation carrying on this activity.

I hope that no one assumes that because I was one of a team. There were several others.

Mr. TAVENNER. Who composed the team?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, I didn’t mean to bring that up because I don’t like to have to do that. But I was fearful that people might think I was too much of a braggart in this thing, and I don’t mean to be because it is all ancient history and I am simply trying to furnish such information as I know of my own knowledge about that experience so that other people may comprehend it in full.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am sure, Mr. Dennett, that the committee, having heard as many witnesses as it has on the subject of communism, recognizes that it is teamwork that has enabled the Communist Party to get where it is, rather than grandstand playing.

Who were the other members of the team?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, that takes me into a description of the district bureau of the Communist Party in that particular period.

As I look back over it I might call it the golden age of the Communist Party’s efforts in the Northwest because it did at that time enjoy, that is, the leaders of the Communist Party did enjoy a relationship among each other and among themselves, and in the organizations to which each were members--they did enjoy a very full and rich democratic experience in procedure.

This, I think, was due largely to the efforts of Mr. Morris Rappaport who was the district organizer whom I mentioned earlier, who had, by his adroitness in calling the political moves, established himself in the eyes of the central committee of the Communist Party of the United States as a person capable of directing the political activities in the Northwest without the need of daily supervision on the part of national headquarters of the Communist Party. In other words, they did accord him the recognition that comes of confidence that he knew what he was doing and was capable of carrying it out.

And I am quite certain that the way he coordinated the efforts of each of us in the district bureau at that time were so gratifying to the central committee that most of the members of the central committee didn’t dare to try to interfere with our efforts for fear that they might be responsible for upsetting the applecart so to speak.

Now in that team were, first of all, Mr. Morris Rappaport, the district organizer. His right-hand man, who was also the trade-union secretary of the district, was a man known to me by the name of Henry or Harry Jackson. I know that that is not his real name, but I do not know what his real name was. That was his party name. That is the only name I knew him by in this area.

Mr. TAVENNER. How long was he in this area?

Mr. DENNETT. He came shortly after Morris Rappaport came.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did he come from New York?

Mr. DENNETT. He did. His original home was San Francisco.

Mr. TAVENNER. I am sure we know him.

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Jackson had his early training in the Marine Workers Industrial Union organizing maritime workers. He came here originally for that purpose, and then his assignment was switched to that of trade-union secretary for the district in the Northwest.

I was one of his closest associates because I was footloose and free and available to carry the Jimmy Higgins load that had to be carried at that time. We were working daily and devoting all of our time to that effort.

We had a few people who were prominent in the University of Washington at that time who were active members of our district bureau. One was Mr. Harold Ebey, E-b-e-y.

And another was Mr. Hugh DeLacy.

Mr. TAVENNER. Was he at one time a Member of Congress?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, he is the same person who was called as a witness before this committee at Dayton, Ohio, in September 1954, and who refused to answer material questions on the ground that to do so might tend to incriminate him.

Mr. DENNETT. I mentioned Mr. DeLacy’s name with a great deal of regret because I was a very close associate of Mr. DeLacy and I had a great deal of respect for him, and he for me. It is only under the compulsion of the subpena and the fact that I am testifying and I have to testify when I mention his name. I do so with regret. I wish the rules were such that it wasn’t necessary because it is a source of great embarrassment to me. But I feel that I owe a big obligation to the men that I work for, and, under the rules as constituted by this committee and the way it is operating, I have no choice in the matter.

I make my apologies to Mr. DeLacy for having to do this. I regret it. But at the same time, in the long run, I don’t think it is going to hurt him, and I think it may do him some good. I hope so.

Others who were prominent in the district bureau were, of course, Mr. Howard Costigan, Mr. Jess Fletcher, Mr. William K. Dobbins, Mr. Karley Larsen.

Mr. TAVENNER. Let me make this suggestion to you.

If you know whether any of these persons whose names you have mentioned, testified publicly before this or other committees and acknowledged their Communist Party membership and a withdrawal from the Communist Party, I think you should state it.

Mr. DENNETT. I can state that about three persons whom I know. I know that Mr. Jess Fletcher separated from the Communist Party, and he has testified in a number of instances. He began testifying before the Canwell committee when he was separated from the Communist Party and from his union as a consequence of that fight. He later testified before a number of Government agencies in a number of court cases.

Mr. Howard Costigan testified before this committee. I read his testimony in the proceedings which have been published by the committee.

Mr. Harold Ebey also appeared before the Canwell committee and testified there. He is out of the Communist Party and has been for quite a considerable period of time. At least, I believe, since this period 1936, 1937, and 1938.

Costigan is out of the Communist Party. He left shortly after later political difficulties arose, which I will soon get into.

There may have been a few others who were in and out of the district bureau. This district bureau was the leading body, the leading organ in the district. It was the top body which had the top authority to determine party policy in this area.

At one time I believe there were about 12 or 14 members of this bureau. It may have been confined to nine. I have some recollection that there were nine members officially on the bureau, but there were a few who were candidates. That is, they were the next alternates to become members in the event of any vacancy on the bureau so that we could always have a reserve to fill any vacancies which might occur.

That district bureau covered the Northwest area which were the States of, at that time, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Alaska.

Mr. TAVENNER. Do I understand you to mean that it was that group of individuals who took the leadership in the work within the Washington Commonwealth Federation?

Mr. DENNETT. Yes; they did.

Mr. Rappaport could not directly participate in the work of the Washington Commonwealth Federation because he was what was generally called the face of the party. He was the official representative of the party. And the Washington Commonwealth Federation, even though there were Communist leaders in it, it at no time accepted an affiliation from the Communist Party, and it at no time would acknowledge a Communist as a Communist in the organization unless it be someone like Rappaport who had the authority to represent the party as such.

By that I mean that if I presented myself to the Washington Commonwealth Federation to speak on any matter or to urge anything before its body, I could not speak in the name of the Communist Party even though other members of that executive board may know that I was a member of the Communist Party. I could not speak as a Communist. I could only speak as a member of that executive board, and it was the presumption that I was representing the affiliate from which I had been sent as a delegate.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you tell the committee, please, which of these Communist Party bureau members became officials in the Washington Commonwealth Federation.

Mr. DENNETT. Mr. Costigan already was an official. He was the executive secretary.

Mr. DeLacy became the president of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.

I became the vice president of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.

Mr. Harold Ebey served in some advisory capacity. I think that he came from a teachers’ union affiliate at that time.

Mr. Dobbins was a member there, but I do not recall the exact relation that he held to obtain his position.

Mr. Karley Larsen was a leader there by virtue of the fact that he was a leader in the Northern Washington District Council of the International Woodworkers of America.

Mr. TAVENNER. It would seem that the Communist Party had complete control of the organization.

Mr. DENNETT. We had another person there who is now deceased, but I don’t think that it gives a complete picture without mentioning him, and that is Mr. William Pennock, because Bill Pennock was the workhorse. Bill Pennock carried the load. He was a very efficient man, one of the fastest shorthand artists that I ever knew, and was capable of keeping up with the fast pace that Mr. Costigan set.

Mr. Pennock deserves honorable mention for the work that he did in that setup.

Mr. TAVENNER. What position did Pennock hold in the Communist Party?

Mr. DENNETT. He attended the bureau meetings, but I do not remember exactly whether he was a member of the bureau. But he attended most of the bureau meetings by virtue of the fact that he became the head of the pension union which was one of the big affiliates of the Washington Commonwealth Federation.

Mr. TAVENNER. You have given a very full description of how the Communist Party maneuvered to capture this organization.

Why was the Communist Party so interested in obtaining control of the Washington Commonwealth Federation?

Mr. DENNETT. Because we wanted to ultimately obtain political power for the Communist Party in the United States of America.

(The witness confers with his counsel.)

Mr. TAVENNER. In the same manner, I assume, that you were attempting to gain power for the Communist Party in every other field of endeavor.

Mr. DENNETT. Of course.

My counsel has suggested that I indicate the total membership of the Washington Commonwealth Federation in that period.

Mr. TAVENNER. Yes, I think you should.

Mr. DENNETT. I am unable to give that in exact numbers, but I can give you a proportionate situation which may indicate something of value.

It was our estimate and the result of our study from the election returns of the candidates that we endorsed and the propositions that we supported----

Mr. TAVENNER. When you say “we” are you speaking of the Communist Party or the Washington Commonwealth?

Mr. DENNETT. The Washington Commonwealth Federation.