Part 5

Mr. DENNETT. Well, the leaders were held responsible to see to it that they did make such an effort. It wasn’t so easy to do so among the ranks of the members who didn’t hold any official position, but any person who held an official position, such as a unit organizer or a section organizer or an agitprop director or a trade-union organizer or a fraction secretary, in any of those positions a person was expected to carry the Communist Party line. If he didn’t, he was certainly subject to discipline.

Mr. TAVENNER. The committee from time to time has heard a great deal of evidence about the organization of Communist Party cells or branches or units which have been variously termed neighborhood groups and street groups. There has been an effort made in some instances to make it appear that such groups had very little part to play or very little function in the overall picture and purposes of the Communist Party, although they testified that in the instances where Communist Party branches were organized within factories and within industry generally that they had a more definite purpose.

Will you tell the committee about the formation of neighborhood groups of the Communist Party, or what we call sometimes street groups, and explain what part those organizations played in the overall Communist Party program?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, first of all, it is necessary to understand one principle of organization that the Communist Party adopted, and that is, that the form of the organization had to satisfy a need, and that the form itself was subordinate, the form was not the principal question.

The principal question was the function that they were to serve.

So the Communist Party adopted a very flexible attitude on this. In some of the early Communist Party literature it refers almost exclusively to Communist cells. And cells are generally thought of as some very small unit that is sort of hidden away. Actually it was Lenin’s instruction to the party that they should make every factory a fortress for Communist activity.

And the directives of the Red International of Labor Unions always held forth that as an objective.

Now they found that in some countries such factory cells were impractical forms of organization. They just didn’t work out. And it was particularly true in the United States of America because most workers in most of the factories had very little opportunity to discuss political business while they were at work.

In some of the other countries workers did engage in that kind of effort and activity. So shop units and shop cells were possible of organization and were effected. In fact, they were openly known.

In the united States the Communist Party adopted the practice of adapting its basic organization, the elementary part of the organization, to whatever circumstances they found themselves in.

In the period of great unemployment people weren’t working in the factories. So we found them in the neighborhoods. And in the neighborhoods where we could recruit a half dozen Communists we made a neighborhood branch.

At first we called them units. In later years I understand they were called branches. But at the time when I was most active we always referred to them as units. And we would try to get each neighborhood branch to assume some responsibility for some factory or some industry, to carry on agitation and propaganda among the workers of a particular factory or plant for the purpose of trying to recruit those workers into the party and establish a shop unit or what later became known as a branch.

So the point that is of importance here, as I see it, is that the party was flexible in adopting forms of organization, but it was inflexible as to the purpose of those organizations. And their purpose certainly was always as far as I knew--and I was one of those who insisted that it must be kept foremost--to lead the working class to overthrow the capitalist class in political power.

Now I think that there is a great deal of misconception and misunderstanding as to just what that may involve.

The Communist Party went to great length to try to draw a distinction, particularly in the United States, between overthrowing the rule of a particular class and overthrowing the form of the particular government. And it was always the party’s claim in the United States that what they were trying to accomplish was to unseat the robber barons and the big business interests who had seized the seats of government in the United States, and the Communist Party always played down the problem of changing the form of government because nearly all liberal persons you come across will raise the point that one thing that America contributed which the rest of the world has never enjoyed is the right to individual freedom.

The preservation of the constitutional democratic form of organization in the United States governmental structure has always held a very firm appeal to any person who has made any study of governmental structures. The Communist leadership found it virtually impossible to convince anybody that is acquainted with that fact that this constitutional, democratic form of representative government should itself be changed. However, I think that it is a form of self-delusion, and I think that perhaps I have to admit my own in that connection because, among the principles that Lenin hammered away on was the necessity, once the workers seize power, of completely destroying the bourgeois forms of organization. And there is no question about it; there is plenty of literature to substantiate that that would include what was referred to as the constitutional democracies.

You must recall that in the history of the Russian Revolution when the Bolsheviks seized power they replaced a representative form of government, which had been completely unable to solve the economic, financial, and political problems that confronted the people in old Russia. So it was quite natural that the Bolsheviks should say we must sweep aside all these forms that are hindrances.

And I fear that the average person who attempts to transplant an arbitrary form or an idea which is erected in one part of the world because of a certain historical set of circumstances and arbitrarily transplant it to another part of the world under entirely different historical circumstances finds himself trying to solve an impossible problem. And I think that that is basically the problem which the Communist Party itself ran into.

There is no question about it: Lenin’s teachings and the teachings of the Communist Party call for the change of the form of the present so-called bourgeois democratic governments.

I don’t know how valuable or informative this line of response is for your committee, but I would just interject this part of my own thinking, that it is self-delusion on the part of those who think that it does not involve sweeping aside the present constitutional government.

I can see no explanation which would justify such a conclusion.

My own conclusion necessarily is that it does involve such a change, and for a long period of time I felt that such a change was justified because of the adamant refusal of people in high places in government to respond to the needs of the people. And that was particularly true in the depression period, in the unemployed period.

Mr. VELDE. I take it from your testimony that you feel the Communist Party of the United States never did teach the overthrow of our form of government by force and violence.

Mr. DENNETT. I would have to say to that that they did not emphasize that point.

I think it would be ridiculous to contend that that is the complete statement of it.

They relied and fell back on Lenin’s explanation of the question of force and violence. And Lenin’s explanation always was that force and violence occurs because the employers start it.

In the case of strikes Lenin always contended that it was the employers who started the violence by bringing in either strikebreakers or armed guards or police or something of that sort, and that the violence is started against the workers to begin with.

And then he taught that the workers must defend themselves.

Mr. VELDE. Did you have the feeling while you were in the Communist Party that the ultimate goal in case all peaceful methods fail was to use force and violence?

Mr. DENNETT. It is hard to give you a direct answer to the question as you are posing it.

Let me say it this way and see if this answers you:

This is the most delicate question that is before everyone on the subject, and I think that I would be unfaithful to myself if I were to give you a snap answer because a snap answer, I think, is inappropriate.

I think we have to get at the facts as they exist. And my own feeling and the thing that I was impressed with was, again, the teachings of Lenin wherein he proclaimed that never did any autocracy willingly yield up its power. Never did any tyranny willingly yield up its power, and that necessarily any group who sought to obtain political power under those circumstances would be confronted with solving a problem of force and violence. They would be met with force and they would have to answer it with force.

Mr. VELDE. That substantiates the testimony that Barbara Hartle gave us here last June. I am satisfied.

Mr. DENNETT. I think that is fundamental teaching of the Communist Party, and anyone who reads Lenin’s works very carefully will find that is there.

The point that is germane to us is: Does the United States come in the category that Lenin was speaking of?

Now the Communist Party went through a terrific amount of theoretical argument on this question, and some resolved the question as meaning, yes; the United States comes in that category.

Some questioned whether that were true, and I think that is why you will find a divergence of testimony from different Communists.

Mr. VELDE. I take it then you feel that the methods used in the United States were different than the methods used by the Comintern in other parts of the world, in countries that are now Communist countries.

Mr. DENNETT. I was referring in what I was discussing to the difference between the form of government in the United States and the form of government as exists in other countries, particularly comparing it with old Czarist Russia.

Something most people don’t realize is the extent of the oppression which existed under the old Czar. And it was only natural that people who sought to accomplish a change, after finding that no amount of effort could bring about a rational or reasonable change, finally came to the conclusion the only thing they could do was to eliminate the Czarist regime. That was an autocracy.

Now the question theoretically arises: Does such a situation obtain in the United States? Or is it possible for the people, by legitimate political organization, to bring about the changes that they consider to be desirable?

There was a great dispute raging in the ranks of the Communist Party over that question.

Mr. Jay Lovestone fell by the ax over it. He taught that America was an exceptional situation and that exceptional tactics had to be used in the United States. Because of that he suffered expulsion.

Mr. VELDE. Do you happen to know Jay Lovestone?

Mr. DENNETT. I did not know him. I have read some of his works. Not very much; only what the party said he said.

Mr. VELDE. Of course, Mr. Dennett, you realize that we have had, I think about 100 convictions under the Smith Act whereby various Communist Party leaders were convicted of advocating communism.

Mr. DENNETT. I didn’t know how many.

Mr. VELDE. It may be less or more than that.

Do you know, Mr. Tavenner?

Mr. TAVENNER. 86 or 87, according to my recollection.

Mr. VELDE. And, of course, those trials were held under our American system of jurisprudence.

I am inclined to agree with all the juries involved and all the judges involved that the Communist Party here in the United States of America did advocate the overthrow of our form of government by force and violence, if necessary. I don’t want to appear to be arguing with you.

Mr. DENNETT. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss this question with you because I think any general rule is a dangerous thing to lay down. I think that it has to be on the merits of each individual case. That is my own feeling. And I think that that is consistent with our American tradition of jurisprudence, too.

Mr. VELDE. I certainly agree with you on that.

Mr. DENNETT. I have a feeling that it is unwise to make sweeping, uniform applications of the rule. I think they have to be judged on the merits of each particular case. I think that is one of the things that we must fight with all our might and main to preserve.

Mr. TAVENNER. Did you state, with respect to Jay Lovestone, that you thought his group insisted on viewing the aspects of this problem under special circumstances?

Mr. DENNETT. It was known as the theory of exceptionalism.

Mr. TAVENNER. Will you state very briefly what the theory of exceptionalism is?

Mr. DENNETT. The Communist Party taught that the theory and tactics which Lenin taught were universally applicable, that they applied to all countries, they applied to all situations.

Lovestone said, “Yes; except in the United States. Here we have got to do something different.”

Mr. TAVENNER. I was discussing with you the purposes of the Communist Party in infiltrating the unemployment councils which you have described. I handed you, just a few moments ago, a document which was one of those you turned over to the staff. That document discusses the importance of Communist Party cell organizations. I believe it discusses it in very much the same way that you have.

Mr. DENNETT. I think that is where I learned it.

Mr. TAVENNER. What was the source of that document?

Mr. DENNETT. Well, the title of it is: “How the Communist International Formulates at Present the Problem of Organization.” And the title or the subject was written by a person by the name of B. Vassiliev. He was a high official in the Comintern and was responsible for one of the committees in the executive committee of the Communist International. I do not recall much else about him. And this document doesn’t establish much more. But I believe that the document originally came into my possession while I was an agitprop director, and it was in a mimeographed form. It came from the central committee.

Mr. TAVENNER. Of the Communist Party?

Mr. DENNETT. Of the Communist Party.

It was sending forth to the districts direct information as to the policy which had been laid down by the executive committee of the Communist International, and it was detailed information because many people had been complaining that nowhere was there anything in a detailed form describing organizational methods and practices.

Vassiliev came forth with a document which outlines it, spells it out in every detail. It spells out how to work under illegal conditions, it spells out how to work under legal conditions. It also spells out how to combine legal and illegal work.

This, by the way, for those who have been in the Army, you can readily recognize a similarity of military training with party organization because there is the method of the emphasis upon maintaining communication lines between various parts of the organization at all times, the necessity of having secondary lines of communication in case the primary lines are destroyed. And there is also the question of use of passwords. It is all described. The description of how to use code is also contained here. And I think that some people attach more significance to it than I do for the reason that I saw military organization practice virtually the same things.

Of course, that brings up a subject which may be unpleasant to reflect upon, and I suspect that the average member of the Communist Party is quite unaware of the similarity of his position as a member of the Communist Party to that of a person who is a member of the Armed Forces. He is under discipline. His directions come from above. He has to obey or suffer the consequences.

Mr. TAVENNER. Mr. Chairman, this is a very unusual document. I wish the committee had time right now to go into every phase of Communist Party organization that is referred to in it.

I think all that we can do now is to offer it as an exhibit and have it made a part of the record with the view of giving it more detailed study later. So I offer it in evidence and ask that it be marked “Dennett Exhibit No. 1,” and that it be incorporated in the transcript of the record.

Mr. MOULDER. The exhibit offered in evidence, marked “Dennett Exhibit No. 1” for identification, will be admitted as a part of the record.

DENNETT EXHIBIT NO. 1

HOW THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL FORMULATES AT PRESENT THE PROBLEM OF ORGANIZATION

(By B. Vassiliev)

The Enlarged Presidium of the E. C. C. I. (February 1930), summing up the international situation, called upon all Communist Parties to fundamentally change the methods and pace of their work by concentrating their chief attention on the problems of the preparation and the carrying out of mass REVOLUTIONARY ACTIONS OF THE PROLETARIAT--strikes, demonstrations, etc., while at the same time continuing as far as possible to promote their agitational and propaganda work. Consequently, in the present conditions, the Party apparatus, in response to the demands which the direction of the Comintern puts forward, should in the first place be fitted for the organization of demonstrations, strikes and other mass actions of the proletariat. Party leaders who are not capable of organizing demonstrations and strikes do not answer to the demands which the circumstances of the class struggle are now placing before the Communist Parties, and therefore should be replaced by others who have shown these qualities in the course of the class battles of the most recent period.

Why did the Enlarged Presidium put the question in this way? The political resolution of the Enlarged Presidium states that the growing new economic crisis is hastening the process of upsetting capitalist stabilization (it has already led to the beginning of the collapse of capitalist stabilization) and the growth of class contradictions, thus accelerating the rise of a new revolutionary wave. The resolution further states that the working class movement in the period since the 10th Plenum of the E. C. C. I. had been raised to a higher stage. The revolutionary activity of the proletarian masses has grown stronger, the fighting capabilities of the Communist Parties have been heightened. The whole position of the class struggle has placed before the Communist Parties and the Communist International as a whole, a number of new fighting tasks. In the process of the growth of a new revolutionary upsurge there are present already in certain capitalist countries elements of a gathering political crisis and of a revolutionary situation, as for example, in Poland, Italy, Spain, partly in Rumania, in Yugoslavia, and in Greece. A deep political crisis is present in China and India, being the starting point of a revolutionary situation. In Germany the process of the radicalization of the masses of the working class is proceeding at a swift pace. In France, another country of powerful capitalism, the number of strikers grew from 222,000 in 1928 to 431,000 in 1929, whilst these strikes assumed a more and more clearly expressed political character and were characterized by the growing tenacity of the workers. In England, in spite of extraordinary difficult conditions for the growth of a revolutionary movement, in spite of the extraordinary weakness of the Communist Party (on the 1st January 1930, 2,800 Party members and 120 members in the Y. C. L.), the number of strikers in 1929 compared with 1928 grew from 124,000 to 534,000 comprising the most important sections of industry, such as mining and textiles.

At the same time, the gigantic successes of socialist construction in the U. S. S. R. are sharpening in the most extreme way the contradictions between U. S. S. R. and the entire capitalist world and are forcing the leaders of the capitalist world to strengthen and hasten to the highest degree their military preparations of a new armed attack on the U. S. S. R. The 10th Plenum of the E. C. C. I. showed that the danger of new Imperialist wars and of new attacks of the imperialists on the U. S. S. R. never was so imminent from the time of the imperialist war of 1914-18 as it was at the moment of the 10th Plenum. By March 1930 that danger had increased still more.

In these conditions of growing economic crisis and heightened threat of war against the U. S. S. R. all measures will be taken by the ruling classes of the capitalist countries to guarantee their rear before declaring war, that is, everything will be done by them to weaken, disorganize and, as far as possible, liquidate completely all revolutionary proletarian organizations, and in the first place the Communist Parties.

Moreover, the elections themselves in illegal Parties must, as a rule, take place in such a way that even the members of the conference do not know who is elected on to the Party Committee. At the present time two methods of electing leading organs in illegal Parties are practised. The first method. The Party Conference elects a special commission for counting the votes cast for candidates for members of the Party Committee. Then the candidates are named and the election of the Party Committee proceeds by secret vote. The commission checks the results of the voting, whilst it does not report to the conference as to the personnel elected. Another method of election. The conference elects a narrow commission in which a representative of the higher Party Committee takes part and this narrow committee elects the new Party Committee. In strictly illegal Parties, as for example, the Italiana Communist Party, the latter method of election is the only one which more or less guarantees strict conspirative conditions.

Self-criticism of the mistakes of the Party direction in illegal Parties must also be organized through narrow conferences and must take place in such a way that the names of the Party leaders and the functioning of the Party apparatus, do not lose their conspirative character.

15. QUESTIONS OF COMMUNICATIONS