CHAPTER IV

ON THE APPLICATION OF LOGIC TO THE PROBLEM OF AN INTERNATIONAL LANGUAGE

The problem of an international language has a theoretical as well as a practical importance. I have no intention of discussing the latter here and of explaining once more the necessity of an auxiliary language for international relations of every sort, and the practical possibility of making oneself understood by means of an artificial language, a possibility which has been proved by experience. But an international language is also, according to the words of the celebrated philologist H. Schuchardt, a desideratum of science, in which connection it raises at once problems of philology and logic. That these problems are worthy of the study of scientific men is proved by the discussions of Professors Diels and Gomperz, the reports made to the Academy of Sciences of Leipzig by Professors Brugmann and Leskien, and, finally, the labours and decisions of the Committee of the _Délégation pour l'Adoption d'une Langue Internationale_. The latter, composed of highly competent scientists and linguists, has determined the principles necessary for an auxiliary language, and has practically realised them.

My desire in what follows is to show briefly the connection of the international language with logic, and its claims on the attention and interest of philosophers. In the words of Leibnitz, "Languages form the best mirror for the human spirit, and an exact analysis of the meaning and relationship of words would be the best means of disclosing the operations of the mind" (_N. Essais_, III., VII., end). But the majority of philosophers (with some distinguished exceptions, _e.g._, Professor Wundt) and the majority of linguists (also with some distinguished exceptions, _e.g._, M. Bréal) have given little attention to the study of language from the point of view of psychology and logic. Now this study is particularly easy and interesting in the case of an artificial language, since the latter presents a structure analogous to that of our existing languages, but much simpler and more regular.

The words of the international language consist of invariable elements (morphemes) of three sorts: stems, derivative affixes (prefixes and suffixes), and grammatical inflections which, as in the case of European languages, are always final letters or final syllables. The stems themselves can be divided into two categories: verb stems, which express a state, action, or relation, _e.g._, _dorm_, _parol_, _frap_; and non-verbal or nominal stems, which denote an object (living being or thing), or express an aspect of it, _e.g._, _hom_, _dom_, _bel_, _blind_. The latter can produce directly only names (substantives or adjectives): man, house, beautiful, blind (in Ido, _homo_, _domo_, _bela_, _blinda_); the former, on the contrary, produce directly verbs: to sleep, to speak, to strike (in Ido, _dormar_, _parolar_, _frapar_), but they can also give rise to nouns: sleep, word, blow (in Ido, _dormo_, _parolo_, _frapo_). The proper _rôle_ of the grammatical terminations is to determine the grammatical function of a stem word and to indicate the category to which the word belongs, whether verb, substantive, or adverb. Thus _parol-ar_ = to speak; _parol-o_ = (spoken) word; _parol-a_ = oral; _parol-e_ = orally. The _same_ idea, namely, that expressed by the stem word, always runs through the various categories. This follows from a principle which dominates the whole structure of the international language: "Every word element" (morpheme) "represents an elementary idea, which is always the same, so that a combination of elements has a meaning determined by the combination of the corresponding ideas." This principle is only a corollary to the general principle of uniqueness so clearly enunciated by Ostwald: "There exists a unique and reciprocal correspondence between the ideas and the morphemes which express them." This principle represents evidently the ideal of all language, for a language, being essentially a system of symbols, is only theoretically perfect (and useful and convenient in practice) when there exists a unique correspondence between the symbol and the idea symbolised.

Now it follows from this principle that it is quite incorrect to say, as is often done, "Being given a stem, it suffices to add to it _-ar_ to form a verb, _-o_ to form a substantive, _-a_ to form an adjective"; we require to define the sense possessed by this verb, substantive, and adjective. In other words, to every derivative of form there must correspond a derivative of sense which is in no wise arbitrary, but determined by general rules. If _dorm-ar_ = to sleep, _dorm-o_ cannot mean indifferently the sleeper, the dormitory, or the desire to sleep; if _blind-a_ = blind, _blind-o_ cannot signify at pleasure either blindness or the act of blinding. The rule which must guide us here is the principle enunciated above, namely, that a stem always preserves the same sense and expresses the same idea; if one wishes to express another idea related to the former in a definite way, it is necessary to add to the stem a morpheme expressing this relationship. The morphemes which denote the relations of our ideas are the affixes of derivation, which permit us to express a whole family of ideas by the aid and as the function of one fundamental idea, and to form correspondingly a family of words all derived from the same stem, as occurs, as a matter of fact, in natural languages. Certain of these affixes are wrongly classed amongst the grammatical inflections, such as, for example, the participial suffixes which serve to derive an adjective or a substantive from a verb, denoting him who performs the action, or is affected by (subject to) the state or relationship expressed by the stem: _dorm-ant-a_ = _sleeping, arol-ant-a_ = _speaking_, whence, by simple change of the final letter, _dorm-ant-o_ = _sleeper_, _parol-ant-o_ = _speaker_. One will perceive thereby the difference between _direct_ derivation, which is effected by means of the grammatical inflections, and _indirect_ derivation, which is effected by means of the addition of affixes. There is nothing arbitrary about this distinction, for it rests on the logical principles enunciated above, which determine the theoretical and practical value of the international language.

From these principles follow at once the rules of direct derivation. If one starts from a verbal stem, what must be the sense of the substantive directly derived from it? This sense can be none other than the state or action expressed by the verb: _dormar_ = _to sleep_, _dormo_ = _sleep_; _parolar_ = _to speak_, _parolo_ = _a word_; _frapar_ = _to strike_, _frapo_ = _a blow_. In these derived words we perceive the sense of the verb stem, and the proof of that is that in our natural languages we often employ the infinitive for this purpose: _le manger_, _le boire_, _le dormir_, _le rire_; _das rennen_ (in English the verbal in _-ing_ is employed with the sense of the infinitive). Indeed, one might completely identify the verbal substantive with the infinitive.

If one starts from a substantival stem, what must be the relation between the adjective and substantive derived from it? They must necessarily have the same sense, whichever of the two one considers the primary word; if _avara_ = _avaricious_, _avaro_ = _an avaricious person_; if _blinda_ = _blind_, _blindo_ = _a blind person_. This rule is all the more necessary in practice as there are a crowd of substantival stems concerning which one could not say whether they produce at first a substantive or an adjective: _vidva_ = _widowed_, _vidvo_ = _widower_; _nobela_ = _noble_, _nobelo_ = _nobleman_; _santa_ = _holy_, _santo_ = _a saint_. This is particularly true of the names of followers of this or that doctrine: _katoliko_, _katolika_; _skeptiko_, _skeptika_, etc. No one would think of using any suffix to derive one of these words from the other. There is only a very slight difference of meaning between a _katolika skeptiko_ and a _skeptika katoliko_, the substantive indicating in each case the primary and fundamental idea to which the other is superadded.

This brings us to the enunciation of the _principle of reversibility_, which may be formulated as follows: "Every derivation must be _reversible_; that is to say, if one passes from one word to another of the same family in virtue of a certain rule, one must be able to pass inversely from the second to the first in virtue of a rule which is exactly the inverse of the preceding." That is an evident corollary of the _principle of uniqueness_, for otherwise one would be led to give two meanings to the same word. Let us suppose, for example, that from the noun _krono_, = _a crown_, one imagines it possible to derive directly (as is the case in certain languages) the verb _kronar_ = _to crown_. From this verb one could deduce inversely in virtue of the general rule the substantive _krono_ = _coronation_, so that the same word _krono_ would then mean both _crown_ and _coronation_. That would be, however, a logical error inadmissible in the international language, however numerous may be the examples of it which occur in living languages. On the contrary, thanks to the principle of reversibility, one can proceed from any word whatsoever of a family and arrive at any other word of the same family, or return to the initial word, in an absolutely unique manner, whereas if one did not observe this principle one would inevitably obtain two meanings for the same word.

The principle of reversibility fixes the rules of direct derivation for the cases which are the converse of those we have studied. Just as the substantive directly derived from a verb denotes the state or action expressed by this verb (or, more strictly, by its root), so a verb can be derived directly from a substantive only if the latter expresses an action or a state. For example, _paco_ = _peace_; can one form the verb _pacar_, and if so what will be its meaning? This verb can only signify one thing, _to be in the state of peace_, and not _to pacify_ or _make peace_, for in that case _paco_ would mean _pacification_ or _conclusion of peace_, and not the _state of peace_. Similarly, if one can and must convert an adjective into a noun by the simple substitution of _-o_ for _-a_, the adjective immediately derived from a substantive can only mean "what is --." If _homo_ = _a man_ (a human being), _homa_ can only mean _human_ in the sense of _which is a man_ (human being); _homa ento_ = _a human being_. But if one wishes to obtain an adjective signifying "which belongs to --," "which relates to --," "which depends on --," it is necessary to employ a suffix (_-al_): _homala manuo_ = _a human hand_. One might equally well say _manuo di homo_ = _the hand of a man_ (human being). But just as the preposition _di_ is indispensable for indicating the relationship between two ideas which are not simply juxtaposed, but depend on each other, so, if we wish to express one of the ideas in adjectival form, we require a suffix which also expresses this relation or dependence. Besides, a suffix of this nature exists under different forms in all our languages: G. _-isch_; E. _-ic_, _-al_, _-ical_; F. _-ique_, _-al_, _-el_; I. _-ico_; S. _-ico_. The choice of _-al_ rather than _-ik_ was determined by reasons of euphony and also internationality, the derivative adjectives employed in science (the most international of all) ending often in _-al_: _mental_, _vocal_, _spatial_; _rationnel_, _universel_, _fonctionnel_, etc.

In this connection we shall make a general remark. The international language borrows its _stems_ from the European languages according to the principle of maximum internationality, _i.e._, adopts for each idea the most international stem, namely, that which is familiar to the greatest number of men. But it cannot, and must not, borrow their derivatives from living languages without losing all its theoretical and practical advantages, because the natural derivatives are too irregular. Sometimes the same affix has several different meanings; sometimes the same relationship is expressed by different affixes. In virtue of the principle of uniqueness, it is necessary to unify and regularise the meaning and employment of the affixes, assigning to each one a perfectly definite significance and function. Undoubtedly one must endeavour to adopt for the affixes forms which are international (as much as possible), or at least known in some language (like the suffix _-in_ of the feminine, borrowed from the German, _e.g._, _königin_, and the prefix _mal-_, denoting "a contrary," borrowed from the French, _e.g._, _malheureux_), so as to reproduce as much as possible international derivatives. But it is chimerical to endeavour to reproduce them all, since they are irregular and consequently incompatible with that logical regularity of the language on which is based not only its fertility, but also its simplicity in practical use and its facility for _all nationalities_ (even for non-European peoples who are not familiar with the anomalies and caprices of European languages). The international language must be autonomous in its formation of words; when the elements which it borrows from our languages have been once chosen (in the best possible manner), it must combine them freely according to its own rules, preserving their form and sense rigorously invariable. It is by virtue of this condition that it becomes a true language, richer in certain respects than our own, since it can form all the useful derivatives which are often wanting in one or the other, and not merely a simple imitation or copy of our languages, which would be as difficult as they, and which would require a previous knowledge of them.

We shall not explain here all the forms of indirect derivation, or enumerate the forty-seven affixes used for this purpose. We shall quote only a few of them for the sake of example, in order to show the application of the principles enunciated above. If there is one suffix which is particularly useful to philosophers, it is that which enables one to derive from an adjective the name of the corresponding abstract quality; that is the Greek suffix _-otet_ and the Latin suffix _-itat_ (_-itud_), whence have come the French _-ité_, the English _-ity_, the Italian _-ita_, the Spanish _-itad_; and the German suffix _-heit_ or _-keit_, etc. We perceive here a logical relation well known and made use of in all our languages. It must find a place in the international language, but by what suffix ought it to be represented? Now, if one analyses the idea involved in this suffix, one will find that _beauty_, _health_, _blindness_, are simply the states or facts of being beautiful, healthy, blind. The idea involved in this suffix is then the idea of _being_, not the idea of existence, but the idea _of being_ such and such, the idea of attribution which is expressed by the copula _est_. It is natural, therefore, to represent it by the Indo-European stem of the verb _to be_, namely, _es_; _bel-es-o_ = _beauty_; _san-es-o_ = _health_; _blind-es-o_ = _blindness_. The fact that this suffix recalls a French suffix (_richesse_), an Italian suffix (_bellezza_), and an English suffix _-ness_ (_happiness_) employed in the same sense can only serve as an accessory confirmation of the above choice, which was dictated by logical motives. Moreover, this agrees perfectly with our general rules; _to be well_ will be translated by _esar sana_ or _san-esar_, and the fact of being well will be _saneso_ = _health_. Conversely, if we start from _saneso_ = _health_, we can form the verb _sanesar_ = _to be in (good) health_. Whatever may be the point of departure, there is no fear of making a mistake or "going off the rails" in forming these derivatives, if we observe the principle of reversibility. It would, therefore, be not only arbitrary, but absurd, to express _health_ by _sano_, which latter can only mean a healthy being. For one must not imagine, as is often stated, that an adjective expresses a quality; it expresses precisely _he who, or that which, possesses the quality in question_. That is why all our languages employ a suffix for the purpose of deriving from an adjective the name of the corresponding quality.

But our languages often require to express the inverse relation, namely, that of the individual possessing a quality to that quality. For just as there are names of qualities which are derived from adjectives, as _beauté_, _gaieté_, _bellezza_, _tapferkeit_, _gleichheit_, so there are others which are primary and from which, therefore, the corresponding adjectives are derived: _courage_, _courageux_; _joie_, _joyeux_; _beauty_, _beautiful_; _glück_, _glücklich_; _freude_, _freudig_. And, as one sees, our languages employ in these cases a series of analogous suffixes. The international language must evidently imitate them, for it cannot decree that all the names of qualities shall be derivative, nor that they shall all be primary; that would amount to an arbitrary uniformity contrary to the spirit of our languages and probably also to our logical instincts. The international language must, therefore, have a suffix which will serve to derive from the name of a quality the name of the possessor of that quality. That will be _-oz_, a Latin suffix (_formosus_, _generosus_, etc.), occurring very frequently in the Romance and even Germanic languages (_mysteriös_, _mysterious_, _mystérieux_, _misterioso_). This suffix is the logical inverse of the preceding one (_-es_) and is quite as indispensable as it. It is a curious fact that our languages exhibit examples of the superposition of these two suffixes considered in respect of their sense, if not their form: _glück_, _glücklich_, _glücklichkeit_; _beauty_, _beautiful_, _beautifulness_. Latin has derived _formosus_ from _forma_; Spanish in its turn has derived _hermosura_ from _hermoso_, etc. Languages also provide us with frequent examples of the reciprocity of these suffixes.

On the one hand, On the other hand, _gaie_ gives _gaieté_; _joie_ gives _joyeux_; _gay_ " _gaiety_; _joy_ " _joyful_; _allegro_ " _allegrezza_; _gioja_ " _giojoso_; _fröhlich_ " _fröhlichkeit_; _freude_ " _freudig_.

The international language is, therefore, faithful not only to logic, but to the spirit of our languages, in admitting at the same time the two inverse derivations: _gaya_, _gayeso_; _joyo_, _joyoza_. A language which contained the suffix -es, and not the suffix _-oz_, would be lame or one-armed.

Besides, this lacuna would manifest itself very quickly in further derivations, for the latter would violate the principle of reversibility and therefore that of uniqueness. If from _joyo_ were derived _joya_, from this adjective, analogous to _gaya_, one could derive inversely _joyeso_ = _joyo_, thus producing two names for the same quality (just as above _sano_ would have been synonymous with _saneso_). If from _kurajo_ (_courage_) were derived _kuraja_ (_courageous_), one could derive from the latter _kurajeso_, synonymous with _kurajo_. And, on the other hand, _kurajo_ being the substantive of _kuraja_, this word would signify both _courage_ and _a courageous person_. From want of a single suffix the whole series of derivations would become confused and illogical, just as in a chain of reasoning a single error, or in an algebraical calculation a single false equation, would lead to the most absurd conclusions.

To sum up, one must take care not to derive a word directly from another, except when they both express the same idea (apart from the difference of their grammatical _rôle_ in the sentence). Consequently, whenever the sense changes, a word element must be added or disappear, in order to translate the modification of the idea. It is by virtue of this condition that the language will become the exact and faithful expression of our thoughts, and will conform to that indwelling and instinctive logic which, in spite of all sorts of irregularities and exceptions, animates our languages. In its system of derivation as well as in the rest of its structure, the international language is nothing but a purified and idealised extract, a quintessence of the European languages. The logic which holds sway there is not the Aristotelian logic of genus and species, but rather that logic newly constituted under the name of the _logic of relationships_, which is, however, as old as the world, since it lies, though obscurely, at the basis of the formative processes in our natural languages. That is the reason why the international language offers to philosophers a particularly instructive field of study. It is worthy of their interest in other respects. Not only does it offer to them, as it does to all men, a _medium of communication_ between all countries, but it furnishes them also with an _instrument of precision_ for the analysis and exact expression of the forms of thought, which is very superior, from the point of view of logic, to our traditional languages, encumbered as these are with confused and ambiguous expressions. It is their duty to contribute to the development and perfecting of a language which, without losing anything of its practical qualities, can and must realise by degrees the ideal of human language; if it is true that there _does_ exist an ideal in our languages, though hidden and irremediably disfigured by all sorts of anomalies. To quote a saying of Schuchardt, _Was die Sprache gewollt haben die Sprachen zerstört_.[5]

L. COUTURAT.