CHAPTER XXIII.

A REFUTATION OF THE CALUMNIES GENERALLY, BUT UNJUSTLY, URGED AGAINST THIS DOCTRINE.

When the human mind hears these things, its petulance breaks all restraint, and it discovers as serious and violent agitation as if alarmed by the sound of a martial trumpet. Many, indeed, as if they wished to avert odium from God, admit election in such a way as to deny that any one is reprobated. But this is puerile and absurd, because election itself could not exist without being opposed to reprobation. God is said to separate those whom he adopts to salvation. To say that others obtain by chance, or acquire by their own efforts, that which election alone confers on a few, will be worse than absurd. Whom God passes by, therefore, he reprobates, and from no other cause than his determination to exclude them from the inheritance which he predestines for his children. And the petulance of men is intolerable, if it refuses to be restrained by the word of God, which treats of his incomprehensible counsel, adored by angels themselves. But now we have heard that hardening proceeds from the Divine power and will, as much as mercy. Unlike the persons I have mentioned, Paul never strives to excuse God by false allegations; he only declares that it is unlawful for a thing formed to quarrel with its maker.[500] Now, how will those, who admit not that any are reprobated by God, evade this declaration of Christ: “Every plant which my heavenly Father hath not planted, shall be rooted up?”[501] Upon all whom our heavenly Father has not deigned to plant as sacred trees in his garden, they hear destruction plainly denounced. If they deny this to be a sign of reprobation, there is nothing so clear as to be capable of proof to such persons. But if they cease not their clamour, let the sobriety of faith be satisfied with this admonition of Paul, that there is no cause for quarrelling with God, if, on the one hand, willing to show his wrath, and to make his power known, he endures, “with much long-suffering, the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction;” and on the other, makes “known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, whom he had afore prepared unto glory.”[502] Let the reader observe that, to preclude every pretext for murmurs and censures, Paul ascribes supreme dominion to the wrath and power of God; because it is unreasonable for those deep judgments, which absorb all our faculties, to be called in question by us. It is a frivolous reply of our adversaries, that God does not wholly reject the objects of his long-suffering, but remains in suspense towards them, awaiting the possibility of their repentance; as though Paul attributed patience to God, in expectation of the conversion of those whom he asserts to be fitted to destruction. For Augustine, in expounding this passage, where power is connected with patience, justly observes, that God’s power is not permissive, but influential. They observe, also, that it is not said without meaning, that the vessels of wrath are fitted to destruction, but that God prepared the vessels of mercy; since by this mode of expression, he ascribes and challenges to God the praise of salvation, and throws the blame of perdition upon those who by their choice procure it to themselves. But though I concede to them, that Paul softens the asperity of the former clause by the difference of phraseology, yet it is not at all consistent to transfer the preparation for destruction to any other than the secret counsel of God; which is also asserted just before in the context, that “God raised up Pharaoh, and whom he will he hardeneth.” Whence it follows, that the cause of hardening is the secret counsel of God. This, however, I maintain, which is observed by Augustine that when God turns wolves into sheep, he renovates them by more powerful grace to conquer their obduracy; and therefore the obstinate are not converted, because God exerts not that mightier grace, of which he is not destitute, if he chose to display it.

II. These things will amply suffice for persons of piety and modesty, who remember that they are men. But as these virulent adversaries are not content with one species of opposition, we will reply to them all as occasion shall require. Foolish mortals enter into many contentions with God, as though they could arraign him to plead to their accusations. In the first place they inquire, by what right the Lord is angry with his creatures who had not provoked him by any previous offence; for that to devote to destruction whom he pleases, is more like the caprice of a tyrant than the lawful sentence of a judge; that men have reason, therefore, to expostulate with God, if they are predestinated to eternal death without any demerit of their own, merely by his sovereign will. If such thoughts ever enter the minds of pious men, they will be sufficiently enabled to break their violence by this one consideration, how exceedingly presumptuous it is only to inquire into the causes of the Divine will; which is in fact, and is justly entitled to be, the cause of every thing that exists. For if it has any cause, then there must be something antecedent, on which it depends; which it is impious to suppose. For the will of God is the highest rule of justice; so that what he wills must be considered just, for this very reason, because he wills it. When it is inquired, therefore, why the Lord did so, the answer must be, Because he would. But if you go further, and ask why he so determined, you are in search of something greater and higher than the will of God, which can never be found. Let human temerity, therefore, desist from seeking that which is not, lest it should fail of finding that which is. This will be a sufficient restraint to any one disposed to reason with reverence concerning the secrets of his God. Against the audaciousness of the impious, who are not afraid openly to rail against God, the Lord will sufficiently defend himself by his own justice, without any vindication by us, when, depriving their consciences of every subterfuge, he shall convict them and bind them with a sense of their guilt. Yet we espouse not the notion of the Romish theologians concerning the absolute and arbitrary power of God, which, on account of its profaneness, deserves our detestation. We represent not God as lawless, who is a law to himself; because, as Plato says, laws are necessary to men, who are the subjects of evil desires; but the will of God is not only pure from every fault, but the highest standard of perfection, even the law of all laws. But we deny that he is liable to be called to any account; we deny also that we are proper judges, to decide on this cause according to our own apprehension. Wherefore, if we attempt to go beyond what is lawful, let us be deterred by the Psalmist, who tells us, that God will be clear when he is judged by mortal man.[503]

III. Thus God is able to check his enemies by silence. But that we may not suffer them to deride his holy name with impunity, he supplies us from his word with arms against them. Therefore, if any one attack us with such an inquiry as this, why God has from the beginning predestinated some men to death, who, not yet being brought into existence, could not yet deserve the sentence of death,—we will reply by asking them, in return, what they suppose God owes to man, if he chooses to judge of him from his own nature. As we are all corrupted by sin, we must necessarily be odious to God, and that not from tyrannical cruelty, but in the most equitable estimation of justice. If all whom the Lord predestinates to death are in their natural condition liable to the sentence of death, what injustice do they complain of receiving from him? Let all the sons of Adam come forward; let them all contend and dispute with their Creator, because by his eternal providence they were previously to their birth adjudged to endless misery. What murmur will they be able to raise against this vindication, when God, on the other hand, shall call them to a review of themselves. If they have all been taken from a corrupt mass, it is no wonder that they are subject to condemnation. Let them not, therefore, accuse God of injustice, if his eternal decree has destined them to death, to which they feel themselves, whatever be their desire or aversion, spontaneously led forward by their own nature. Hence appears the perverseness of their disposition to murmur, because they intentionally suppress the cause of condemnation, which they are constrained to acknowledge in themselves, hoping to excuse themselves by charging it upon God. But though I ever so often admit God to be the author of it, which is perfectly correct, yet this does not abolish the guilt impressed upon their consciences, and from time to time recurring to their view.

IV. They further object, Were they not, by the decree of God, antecedently predestinated to that corruption which is now stated as the cause of condemnation? When they perish in their corruption, therefore, they only suffer the punishment of that misery into which, in consequence of his predestination, Adam fell, and precipitated his posterity with him. Is he not unjust, therefore, in treating his creatures with such cruel mockery? I confess, indeed, that all the descendants of Adam fell by the Divine will into that miserable condition in which they are now involved; and this is what I asserted from the beginning, that we must always return at last to the sovereign determination of God’s will, the cause of which is hidden in himself. But it follows not, therefore, that God is liable to this reproach. For we will answer them thus in the language of Paul: “O man, who art thou that repliest against God? Shall the thing formed say to him that formed it, Why hast thou made me thus? Hath not the potter power over the clay, of the same lump, to make one vessel unto honour and another unto dishonour?”[504] They will deny this to be in reality any vindication of God’s justice, and call it a subterfuge, such as is commonly resorted to by persons destitute of a sufficient defence. For what appears to be the meaning of this, but that God possesses power, that cannot be resisted, of doing any thing whatsoever according to his pleasure? But it is very different. For what stronger reason can be alleged, than when we are directed to consider who God is? How could any injustice be committed by him who is the Judge of the world? If it is the peculiar property of the nature of God to do justice, then he naturally loves righteousness and hates iniquity. The apostle, therefore, has not resorted to sophistry, as if he were in danger of confutation, but has shown that the reason of the Divine justice is too high to be measured by a human standard, or comprehended by the littleness of the human mind. The apostle, indeed, acknowledges that there is a depth in the Divine judgments sufficient to absorb the minds of all mankind, if they attempt to penetrate it. But he also teaches how criminal it is to reduce the works of God to such a law, that on failing to discover the reason of them, we presume to censure them. It is a well known observation of Solomon, though few rightly understand it, that “the great God, that formed all things, both rewardeth the fool, and rewardeth transgressors.”[505] For he is proclaiming the greatness of God, whose will it is to punish fools and transgressors, although he favours them not with his Spirit. And men betray astonishing madness in desiring to comprehend immensity within the limits of their reason. The angels who stood in their integrity, Paul calls “elect;”[506] if their constancy rested on the Divine pleasure, the defection of the others argues their being forsaken—a fact for which no other cause can be assigned than the reprobation hidden in the secret counsel of God.

V. Now, to any follower of Manes or Celestius, a calumniator of Divine Providence, I reply with Paul, that no account ought to be given of it, for its greatness far surpasses our understanding. What wonder or absurdity is there in this? Would he have the Divine power so limited, as to be unable to execute more than his little capacity can comprehend? I say, with Augustine, that the Lord created those who, he certainly foreknew, would fall into destruction, and that this was actually so because he willed it; but of his will it belongs not to us to demand the reason, which we are incapable of comprehending; nor is it reasonable that the Divine will should be made the subject of controversy with us, which, whenever it is discussed, is only another name for the highest rule of justice. Why, then, is any question started concerning injustice, where justice is evidently conspicuous? Nor let us be ashamed to follow the example of Paul, and stop the mouths of unreasonable and wicked men in this manner, repeating the same answer as often as they shall dare to repeat their complaints. Who are you, miserable mortals, preferring an accusation against God, because he accommodates not the greatness of his works to your ignorance? as though they were necessarily wrong, because they are concealed from carnal view. Of the immensity of God’s judgments you have the clearest evidences. You know they are called “a great deep.” Now, examine your contracted intellects, whether they can comprehend God’s secret decrees. What advantage or satisfaction do you gain from plunging yourselves, by your mad researches, into an abyss that reason itself pronounces will be fatal to you? Why are you not at least restrained by some fear of what is contained in the history of Job and the books of the prophets, concerning the inconceivable wisdom and terrible power of God? If your mind is disturbed, embrace without reluctance the advice of Augustine: “You, a man, expect an answer from me, who am also a man. Let us, therefore, both hear him, who says, O man, who art thou? Faithful ignorance is better than presumptuous knowledge. Seek merits; you will find nothing but punishment. O the depth! Peter denies; the thief believes; O the depth! Do you seek a reason? I will tremble at the depth. Do you reason? I will wonder. Do you dispute? I will believe. I see the depth, I reach not the bottom. Paul rested, because he found admiration. He calls the judgments of God unsearchable; and are you come to scrutinize them? He says, his ways are past finding out; and are you come to investigate them?” We shall do no good by proceeding any further; it will not satisfy their petulance; and the Lord needs no other defence than what he has employed by his Spirit, speaking by the mouth of Paul; and we forget to speak well when we cease to speak with God.

VI. Impiety produces also a second objection, which directly tends, not so much to the crimination of God, as to the vindication of the sinner; though the sinner whom God condemns cannot be justified without the disgrace of the Judge. For this is their profane complaint, Why should God impute as a fault to man those things which were rendered necessary by his predestination? What should they do? Should they resist his decrees? This would be vain, for it would be impossible. Therefore they are not justly punished for those things of which God’s predestination is the principal cause. Here I shall refrain from the defence commonly resorted to by ecclesiastical writers, that the foreknowledge of God prevents not man from being considered as a sinner, since God foresees man’s evils, not his own. For then the cavil would not stop here; it would rather be urged, that still God might, if he would, have provided against the evils he foresaw, and that not having done this, he created man expressly to this end, that he might so conduct himself in the world; but if, by the Divine Providence, man was created in such a state as afterwards to do whatever he actually does, he ought not to be charged with guilt for things which he cannot avoid, and to which the will of God constrains him. Let us see, then, how this difficulty should be solved. In the first place, the declaration of Solomon ought to be universally admitted, that “the Lord hath made all things for himself; yea, even the wicked for the day of evil.”[507] Observe; all things being at God’s disposal, and the decision of salvation or death belonging to him, he orders all things by his counsel and decree in such a manner, that some men are born devoted from the womb to certain death, that his name may be glorified in their destruction. If any one pleads, that no necessity was imposed on them by the providence of God, but rather that they were created by him in such a state in consequence of his foresight of their future depravity,—it will amount to nothing. The old writers used, indeed, to adopt this solution, though not without some degree of hesitation. But the schoolmen satisfy themselves with it, as though it admitted of no opposition. I will readily grant, indeed, that mere foreknowledge lays no necessity on the creatures, though this is not universally admitted; for there are some who maintain it to be the actual cause of what comes to pass. But Valla, a man otherwise not much versed in theology, appears to me to have discovered superior acuteness and judiciousness, by showing that this controversy is unnecessary, because both life and death are acts of God’s will, rather than of his foreknowledge. If God simply foresaw the fates of men, and did not also dispose and fix them by his determination, there would be room to agitate the question, whether his providence or foresight rendered them at all necessary. But since he foresees future events only in consequence of his decree, that they shall happen, it is useless to contend about foreknowledge, while it is evident that all things come to pass rather by ordination and decree.

VII. They say it is nowhere declared in express terms, that God decreed Adam should perish by his defection; as though the same God, whom the Scripture represents as doing whatever he pleases, created the noblest of his creatures without any determinate end. They maintain, that he was possessed of free choice, that he might be the author of his own fate, but that God decreed nothing more than to treat him according to his desert. If so weak a scheme as this be received, what will become of God’s omnipotence, by which he governs all things according to his secret counsel, independently of every person or thing besides? But whether they wish it or dread it, predestination exhibits itself in Adam’s posterity. For the loss of salvation by the whole race through the guilt of one parent, was an event that did not happen by nature. What prevents their acknowledging concerning one man, what they reluctantly grant concerning the whole species? Why should they lose their labour in sophistical evasions? The Scripture proclaims, that all men were, in the person of their father, sentenced to eternal death. This, not being attributable to nature, it is evident must have proceeded from the wonderful counsel of God. The perplexity and hesitation discovered at trifles by these pious defenders of the justice of God, and their facility in overcoming great difficulties, are truly absurd. I inquire again, how it came to pass that the fall of Adam, independent of any remedy, should involve so many nations with their infant children in eternal death, but because such was the will of God. Their tongues, so loquacious on every other point, must here be struck dumb. It is an awful decree, I confess; but no one can deny that God foreknew the future final fate of man before he created him, and that he did foreknow it because it was appointed by his own decree. If any one here attacks God’s foreknowledge, he rashly and inconsiderately stumbles. For what ground of accusation is there against the heavenly Judge for not being ignorant of futurity? If there is any just or plausible complaint, it lies against predestination. Nor should it be thought absurd to affirm, that God not only foresaw the fall of the first man, and the ruin of his posterity in him, but also arranged all by the determination of his own will. For as it belongs to his wisdom to foreknow every thing future, so it belongs to his power to rule and govern all things by his hand. And this question also, as well as others, is judiciously discussed by Augustine. “We most wholesomely confess, what we most rightly believe, that the God and Lord of all things, who created every thing very good, and foreknew that evil would arise out of good, and knew that it was more suitable to his almighty goodness to bring good out of evil than not to suffer evil to exist, ordained the life of angels and men in such a manner as to exhibit in it, first, what free-will was capable of doing, and afterwards, what could be effected by the blessings of his grace, and the sentence of his justice.”

VIII. Here they recur to the distinction between will and permission, and insist that God permits the destruction of the impious, but does not will it. But what reason shall we assign for his permitting it, but because it is his will? It is not probable, however, that man procured his own destruction by the mere permission, and without any appointment, of God; as though God had not determined what he would choose to be the condition of the principal of his creatures. I shall not hesitate, therefore, to confess plainly with Augustine, “that the will of God is the necessity of things, and that what he has willed will necessarily come to pass; as those things are really about to happen which he has foreseen.” Now, if either Pelagians, or Manichæans, or Anabaptists, or Epicureans, (for we are concerned with these four sects on this argument,) in excuse for themselves and the impious, plead the necessity with which they are bound by God’s predestination,—they allege nothing applicable to the case. For if predestination is no other than a dispensation of Divine justice,—mysterious indeed, but liable to no blame,—since it is certain they were not unworthy of being predestinated to that fate, it is equally certain, that the destruction they incur by predestination is consistent with the strictest justice. Besides, their perdition depends on the Divine predestination in such a manner, that the cause and matter of it are found in themselves. For the first man fell because the Lord had determined it was so expedient. The reason of this determination is unknown to us. Yet it is certain that he determined thus, only because he foresaw it would tend to the just illustration of the glory of his name. Whenever you hear the glory of God mentioned, think of his justice. For what deserves praise must be just. Man falls, therefore, according to the appointment of Divine Providence; but he falls by his own fault. The Lord had a little before pronounced “every thing that he had made” to be “very good.” Whence, then, comes the depravity of man to revolt from his God? Lest it should be thought to come from creation, God had approved and commended what had proceeded from himself. By his own wickedness, therefore, he corrupted the nature he had received pure from the Lord, and by his fall he drew all his posterity with him into destruction. Wherefore let us rather contemplate the evident cause of condemnation, which is nearer to us in the corrupt nature of mankind, than search after a hidden and altogether incomprehensible one in the predestination of God. And we should feel no reluctance to submit our understanding to the infinite wisdom of God, so far as to acquiesce in its many mysteries. To be ignorant of things which it is neither possible nor lawful to know, is to be learned: an eagerness to know them, is a species of madness.

IX. Some one perhaps will say, that I have not yet adduced a sufficient answer to that sacrilegious excuse. I confess it is impossible ever wholly to prevent the petulance and murmurs of impiety; yet I think I have said what should suffice to remove not only all just ground, but every plausible pretext, for objection. The reprobate wish to be thought excusable in sinning, because they cannot avoid a necessity of sinning; especially since this necessity is laid upon them by the ordination of God. But we deny this to be a just excuse; because the ordination of God, by which they complain that they are destined to destruction, is guided by equity, unknown indeed to us, but indubitably certain. Whence we conclude, that they sustain no misery that is not inflicted upon them by the most righteous judgment of God. In the next place, we maintain that they act preposterously, who, in seeking for the origin of their condemnation, direct their views to the secret recesses of the Divine counsel, and overlook the corruption of nature, which is its real source. The testimony God gives to his creation prevents their imputing it to him. For though, by the eternal providence of God, man was created to that misery to which he is subject, yet the ground of it he has derived from himself, not from God; since he is thus ruined solely in consequence of his having degenerated from the pure creation of God to vicious and impure depravity.

X. The doctrine of God’s predestination is calumniated by its adversaries, as involving a third absurdity. For when we attribute it solely to the determination of the Divine will, that those whom God admits to be heirs of his kingdom are exempted from the universal destruction, from this they infer, that he is a respecter of persons, which the Scripture uniformly denies; that, therefore, either the Scripture is inconsistent with itself, or in the election of God regard is had to merits. In the first place, the Scripture denies that God is a respecter of persons, in a different sense from that in which they understand it; for by the word _person_, it signifies not a man, but those things in a man, which, being conspicuous to the eyes, usually conciliate favour, honour, and dignity, or attract hatred, contempt, and disgrace. Such are riches, wealth, power, nobility, magistracy, country, elegance of form, on the one hand; and on the other hand, poverty, necessity, ignoble birth, slovenliness, contempt, and the like. Thus Peter and Paul declare that God is not a respecter of persons, because he makes no difference between the Jew and Greek, to reject one and receive the other, merely on account of his nation.[508] So James uses the same language when he means to assert, that God in his judgment pays no regard to riches.[509] And Paul, in another place, declares, that in judging, God has no respect to liberty or bondage.[510] There will, therefore, be no contradiction in our affirming, that according to the good pleasure of his will, God chooses whom he will as his children, irrespective of all merit, while he rejects and reprobates others. Yet, for the sake of further satisfaction, the matter may be explained in the following manner: They ask how it happens, that of two persons distinguished from each other by no merit, God, in his election, leaves one and takes another. I, on the other hand, ask them, whether they suppose him that is taken to possess any thing that can attract the favour of God. If they confess that he has not, as indeed they must, it will follow, that God looks not at man, but derives his motive to favour him from his own goodness. God’s election of one man, therefore, while he rejects another, proceeds not from any respect of man, but solely from his own mercy; which may freely display and exert itself wherever and whenever it pleases. For we have elsewhere seen also that, from the beginning, not many noble, or wise, or honourable were called,[511] that God might humble the pride of flesh; so far is his favour from being confined to persons.

XI. Wherefore some people falsely and wickedly charge God with a violation of equal justice, because, in his predestination, he observes not the same uniform course of proceeding towards all. If he finds all guilty, they say, let him punish all alike; if innocent, let him withhold the rigour of justice from all. But they deal with him just as if either mercy were forbidden him, or, when he chooses to show mercy, he were constrained wholly to renounce justice. What is it that they require? If all are guilty, that they shall all suffer the same punishment. We confess the guilt to be common, but we say, that some are relieved by Divine mercy. They say, Let it relieve all. But we reply, Justice requires that he should likewise show himself to be a just judge in the infliction of punishment. When they object to this, what is it but attempting to deprive God of the opportunity to manifest his mercy, or to grant it to him, at least, on the condition that he wholly abandon his justice? Wherefore there is the greatest propriety in these observations of Augustine: “The whole mass of mankind having fallen into condemnation in the first man, the vessels that are formed from it to honour, are not vessels of personal righteousness, but of Divine mercy; and the formation of others to dishonour, is to be attributed, not to iniquity, but to the Divine decree,” &c. While God rewards those whom he rejects with deserved punishment, and to those whom he calls, freely gives undeserved grace, he is liable to no accusation, but may be compared to a creditor, who has power to release one, and enforce his demands on another. The Lord, therefore, may give grace to whom he will, because he is merciful, and yet not give it to all, because he is a just judge; may manifest his free grace, by giving to some what they never deserve, while, by not giving to all, he declares the demerit of all. For when Paul says, that “God hath concluded all under sin, that he might have mercy upon all,”[512] it must, at the same time, be added, that he is debtor to none; for no man “hath first given to him,” to entitle him to demand a recompense.[513]

XII. Another argument often urged to overthrow predestination is, that its establishment would destroy all solicitude and exertion for rectitude of conduct. For who can hear, they say, that either life or death is appointed for him by God’s eternal and immutable decree, without immediately concluding that it is of no importance how he conducts himself; since no action of his can in any respect either impede or promote the predestination of God? Thus all will abandon themselves to despair, and run into every excess to which their licentious propensities may lead them. And truly this objection is not altogether destitute of truth; for there are many impure persons who bespatter the doctrine of predestination with these vile blasphemies, and with this pretext elude all admonitions and reproofs: God knows what he has determined to do with us: if he has decreed our salvation, he will bring us to it in his own time; if he has destined us to death, it will be in vain for us to strive against it. But the Scripture, while it inculcates superior awe and reverence of mind in the consideration of so great a mystery, instructs the godly in a very different conclusion, and fully refutes the wicked and unreasonable inferences of these persons. For the design of what it contains respecting predestination is, not that, being excited to presumption, we may attempt, with nefarious temerity, to scrutinize the inaccessible secrets of God, but rather that, being humbled and dejected, we may learn to tremble at his justice and admire his mercy. At this object believers will aim. But the impure cavils of the wicked are justly restrained by Paul. They profess to go on securely in their vices; because if they are of the number of the elect, such conduct will not prevent their being finally brought into life. But Paul declares the end of our election to be, that we may lead a holy and blameless life.[514] If the object of election be holiness of life, it should rather awaken and stimulate us to a cheerful practice of it, than be used as a pretext for slothfulness. But how inconsistent is it to cease from the practice of virtue because election is sufficient to salvation, while the end proposed in election is our diligent performance of virtuous actions! Away, then, with such corrupt and sacrilegious perversions of the whole order of election. They carry their blasphemies much further, by asserting, that any one who is reprobated by God will labour to no purpose if he endeavour to approve himself to him by innocence and integrity of life; but here they are convicted of a most impudent falsehood. For whence could such exertion originate but from election? Whoever are of the number of the reprobate, being vessels made to dishonour, cease not to provoke the Divine wrath against them by continual transgressions, and to confirm by evident proofs the judgment of God already denounced against them; so that their striving with him in vain is what can never happen.

XIII. This doctrine is maliciously and impudently calumniated by others, as subversive of all exhortations to piety of life. This formerly brought great odium upon Augustine, which he removed by his Treatise on Correction and Grace, addressed to Valentine, the perusal of which will easily satisfy all pious and teachable persons. Yet I will touch on a few things, which I hope will convince such as are honest and not contentious. How openly and loudly gratuitous election was preached by Paul, we have already seen; was he therefore cold in admonitions and exhortations? Let these good zealots compare his vehemence with theirs; theirs will be found ice itself in comparison with his incredible fervour. And certainly every scruple is removed by this principle, that “God hath not called us to uncleanness but that every one should know how to possess his vessel in sanctification and honour;”[515] and again, that “we are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus unto good works, which God hath before ordained, that we should walk in them.”[516] Indeed, a slight acquaintance with Paul will enable any one to understand, without tedious arguments, how easily he reconciles things which they pretend to be repugnant to each other. Christ commands men to believe in him. Yet his limitation is neither false nor contrary to his command, when he says, “No man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father.”[517] Let preaching therefore have its course to bring men to faith, and by a continual progress to promote their perseverance. Nor let the knowledge of predestination be prevented, that the obedient may not be proud as of any thing of their own, but may glory in the Lord. Christ had some particular meaning in saying, “Who hath ears to hear, let him hear.”[518] Therefore when we exhort and preach, persons endued with ears readily obey; and those who are destitute of them exhibit an accomplishment of the Scripture, that hearing they hear not.[519] “But why (says Augustine) should some have ears, and others not? ‘Who hath known the mind of the Lord?’[520] Must that which is evident be denied, because that which is concealed cannot be comprehended?” These observations I have faithfully borrowed from Augustine; but as his words will perhaps have more authority than mine, I will proceed to an exact quotation of them. “If, on hearing this, some persons become torpid and slothful, and exchanging labour for lawless desire, pursue the various objects of concupiscence, must what is declared concerning the foreknowledge of God be therefore accounted false? If God foreknew that they would be good, will they not be so, in whatever wickedness they now live? and if he foreknew that they would be wicked, will they not be so, in whatever goodness they now appear? Are these, then, sufficient causes why the truths which are declared concerning the foreknowledge of God should be either denied or passed over in silence? especially when the consequence of silence respecting these would be the adoption of other errors. The reason of concealing the truth (he says) is one thing, and the necessity of declaring it is another. It would be tedious to inquire after all the reasons for passing the truth over in silence; but this is one of them; lest those who understand it not should become worse, while we wish to make those who understand it better informed; who, indeed, are not made wiser by our declaring any such thing, nor are they rendered worse. But since the truth is of such a nature, that when we speak of it, he becomes worse who cannot understand it, and when we are silent about it, he who can understand it becomes worse,—what do we think ought to be done? Should not the truth rather be spoken, that he who is capable may understand it, than buried in silence; the consequence of which would be, not only that neither would know it, but even the more intelligent of the two would become worse, who, if he heard and understood it, would also teach it to many others? And we are unwilling to say what we are authorized to say by the testimony of Scripture. For we are afraid, indeed, lest by speaking we may offend him who cannot understand, but are not afraid lest in consequence of our silence, he who is capable of understanding the truth may be deceived by falsehood.” And condensing this sentiment afterwards into a smaller compass, he places it in a still stronger light. “Wherefore, if the apostles and the succeeding teachers of the Church both piously treated of God’s eternal election, and held believers under the discipline of a pious life, what reason have these our opponents, when silenced by the invincible force of truth, to suppose themselves right in maintaining that what is spoken of predestination, although it be true, ought not to be preached to the people? But it must by all means be preached, that he who has ears to hear may hear. But who has them, unless he receives them from him who has promised to bestow them? Certainly he who receives not may reject, provided he who receives, takes and drinks, drinks and lives. For as piety must be preached that God may be rightly worshipped, so also must predestination, that he who has ears to hear of the grace of God, may glory in God, and not in himself.”

XIV. And yet, being peculiarly desirous of edification, that holy man regulates his mode of teaching the truth, so that offence may as far as possible be prudently avoided. For he suggests that whatever is asserted with truth may also be delivered in a suitable manner. If any one address the people in such a way as this, If you believe not, it is because you are by a Divine decree already destined to destruction,—he not only cherishes slothfulness, but even encourages wickedness. If any one extend the declaration to the future, that they who hear will never believe because they are reprobated,—this would be rather imprecation than instruction. Such persons, therefore, as foolish teachers, or inauspicious, ominous prophets, Augustine charges to depart from the Church. In another place, indeed, he justly maintains, “that a man then profits by correction, when he, who causes whom he pleases to profit even without correction, compassionates and assists. But why some in one way, and some in another? Far be it from us to ascribe the choice to the clay instead of the potter.” Again afterwards: “When men are either introduced or restored into the way of righteousness by correction, who works salvation in their hearts, but he who gives the increase, whoever plants and waters? he whose determination to save is not resisted by any free-will of man. It is beyond all doubt, therefore, that the will of God, who has done whatever he has pleased in heaven and in earth, and who has done even things that are yet future, cannot possibly be resisted by the will of man, so as to prevent the execution of his purposes: since he controls the wills of men according to his pleasure.” Again: “When he designs to bring men to himself, does he bind them by corporeal bonds? He acts inwardly; he inwardly seizes their hearts; he inwardly moves their hearts, and draws them by their wills, which he has wrought in them.” But he immediately subjoins, what must by no means be omitted; “that because we know not who belongs, or does not belong, to the number of the predestinated, it becomes us affectionately to desire the salvation of all. The consequence will be, that whomsoever we meet we shall endeavour to make him a partaker of peace. But our peace shall rest upon the sons of peace. On our part, therefore, salutary and severe reproof, like a medicine, must be administered to all, that they may neither perish themselves nor destroy others; but it will be the province of God to render it useful to them whom he had foreknown and predestinated.”

Footnote 500:

Rom. ix. 20.

Footnote 501:

Matt. xv. 13.

Footnote 502:

Rom. ix. 22, 23.

Footnote 503:

Psalm li. 4.

Footnote 504:

Rom. v. 20, 21.

Footnote 505:

Prov. xxvi. 10.

Footnote 506:

1 Tim. v. 21.

Footnote 507:

Prov. xvi. 4.

Footnote 508:

Acts x. 34. Rom. ii. 11. Gal. iii. 28.

Footnote 509:

James ii. 5.

Footnote 510:

Col. iii. 25. Eph. vi. 9.

Footnote 511:

1 Cor. i. 26.

Footnote 512:

Gal. iii. 22. Rom. xi. 32.

Footnote 513:

Rom. xi. 35.

Footnote 514:

Ephes. i. 4.

Footnote 515:

1 Thess. iv. 4, 7.

Footnote 516:

Ephes. ii. 10.

Footnote 517:

John vi. 65.

Footnote 518:

Matt. xiii. 9.

Footnote 519:

Isaiah vi. 9.

Footnote 520:

Rom. xi. 34.