Part 6

Over 300,000 Czecho-Slovaks surrendered voluntarily to Russia whom they regarded as their liberator. Unfortunately the old regime in Russia did not always show much understanding of their aspirations. They were scattered over Siberia, cut off from the outer world, and often abandoned to the ill-treatment of German and Magyar officers. It is estimated that over thirty thousand of them perished from starvation. It was only after great efforts, after the Russian Revolution, and especially when Professor Masaryk himself went to Russia, that the Czecho-Slovak National Council succeeded in organising a great part of them into an army. Finally, when Austria desired to strike a death-blow at Italy in 1918, and began again to employ Slav troops, she failed again, and this failure was once more to a large extent caused by the disaffection of her Slav troops, as is proved by the Austrian official statements. Indeed, whenever Austria relied solely on her own troops she was always beaten, even by the "contemptible" Serbians. The Czechs and other Slavs have greatly contributed to these defeats by their passive resistance. It was only the intervention of German troops which saved Austria from an utter collapse in 1915, and which prevented the Czechs from completing their aim of entirely disorganising the military power of Austria. Slav regiments have since then been intermixed with German and Magyar troops. The Slavs receive their ammunition only at the front, where they are placed in the foremost ranks with Germans or Magyars behind them, so that they are exposed to a double fire if they attempt to surrender. Nevertheless, up to 1916 some 350,000 Czechs out of a total of 600,000 in the Austrian army surrendered to the Allies.

4. From the very beginning of the war Czech soldiers showed their real feelings. They were driven to fight against the Russians and Serbs who were their brothers by race and their sincere and devoted friends. They were driven to fight for that hated Austria which had trampled their liberties underfoot for centuries past, and for a cause which they detested from the bottom of their hearts. They were driven to fight in the interests of their German and Magyar enemies against their Slav brothers and friends under terrible circumstances.

In September, 1914, the 8th Czech Regiment refused to go to the front until threatened by the German troops. The 11th Czech Regiment of Pisek refused to march against Serbia and was decimated. The 36th Regiment revolted in the barracks and was massacred by German troops. The 88th Regiment, which made an unsuccessful attempt to surrender to Russia, was shot down by the Magyar Honveds. A similar fate befell the 13th and 72nd Slovak Regiments.

On the other hand, many Czech troops succeeded in surrendering. The 35th Regiment of Pilsen went over to the Russians in a body half-an-hour after arriving at the front. Soon after, the 28th Regiment of Prague surrendered _en masse_, having been "fetched" by the Czechs fighting on the Russian side. Immediately afterwards the Austrian commander-in-chief issued an order of the day in which he declared.

"On April 3, 1915, almost the whole of the 28th Regiment surrendered without fighting to a single enemy battalion.... This disgraceful act not only destroys the reputation of this regiment, but necessitates its name being struck off the list of our army corps, until new deeds of heroism retrieve its character. His Apostolic Majesty has accordingly ordered the dissolution of this regiment, and the deposition of its banners in the army museum."

And indeed "new deeds of heroism" did follow. A fresh battalion was founded composed of Czech youths who were sent to the Isonzo front and exposed in a dangerous position to deadly artillery fire. Almost the whole battalion was thus unscrupulously wiped out. Only eighteen of them survived. This was followed by a new imperial order saying that the disgrace of the 28th Regiment was "atoned for" by the "sacrifice" of this regiment on the Isonzo.

As regards Italy, over 20,000 Czechs surrendered voluntarily on the Italian front up to 1917, and 7000 during the last offensive on the Piave in June, 1918. Of recent cases we need mention only the "treachery of Carzano," where, on September 18, 1917, some Czech officers went over to the Italians, communicated to them the Austrian plans of campaign and led them against the Austrians whose front was thus successfully broken through. This incident was not the only one of its kind. It has been repeated several times by Czech officers whenever they found an opportunity of going over to the Italians. During the offensive of June, 1918, the Austrian press openly attributed the Austrian failure to "Czech treachery," asserting that the plan of the offensive was communicated to the Italian headquarters staff by Czecho-Slovak officers. This the Austrian military authorities themselves admitted later, when they published the following official statement, which appeared in the German press on July 28:

"On the morning of June 15, we started a vigorous offensive on the whole front between the Tyrolese mountains and the Adriatic, with a power that can be attained only by complete co-operation of all the units and with an accurate execution and a common and uniform action. But, just at the beginning of the attack, it became apparent that the enemy were making a counter-attack according to a well-defined plan, as in the case of a projected vigorous offensive. It was also found out that the enemy was perfectly aware of the extent, the day and the hour of our attack. The intended surprise, so important for the success of an offensive, has thus failed. In due course Italy also obtained, from documents which some deserters handed to the Italian high command, information which gave her a sufficiently precise idea of our dispositions. English, French and Italian officers and men captured by us declare unanimously that their regiments were advised on the evening of June 14 that the Austrian offensive would start at two o'clock on the following morning.

"The exact time of the beginning of our offensive must have been betrayed by _Yugoslav and Czech deserters_. The enemy took steps against the bombardment by means of gas, which was expected. These steps later proved insufficient. As an example we may mention only the following facts: The battalion of bersaglieri received, at 3.20 on June 14, a quantity of ammunition at 72 to 240 cartridges per man. The Pinerolo Brigade took up fighting position at 2 o'clock at night. An order, captured late on July 14, said: 'According to reports received, the enemy will commence early on June 15 their bombardment preparations for attack. At midnight hot coffee and meat conserves will be distributed. The troops will remain awake, armed and prepared to use their gas-masks.'

"For some time now the Italian command have tried to disorganise our troops by high treasonable propaganda. In the Italian prisoners-of-war camps the Slavs are persuaded by promises and corruption to enlist in the Czecho-Slovak army. This is done in a way prohibited by law. Their ignorance of the international situation and their lack of news from home, partly caused by Italian censorship, are exploited by means of propaganda without scruples. An order of the 5th Italian Army Corps (1658 Prot. R. J.) of May 14, 1918, refers to active propaganda by Czecho-Slovak volunteers with the object of disorganising the Austro-Hungarian army. The Italian military authorities on their part deceive the Czecho-Slovaks by telling them of the continuous disorders and insurrections in Bohemia. In the above-mentioned order it is asserted that in the corps to which it is addressed, as well as in other corps, some attempts of the Czecho-Slovak elements have been successful in causing confusion among enemy ranks. _Some of our Czecho-Slovak soldiers deserted and went over to the Italians_. Others remained in touch with them and declared themselves ready to stay in our positions as a source of ferment for future insurrections. Although the high treason miscarried owing to the heroic resistance which our troops, without distinction of nationality, offered to the enemy, it is nevertheless true that some elements succumbed to the treacherous enemy propaganda.

"The gunner Rudolf Paprikar, of the machine gun section, according to reports of the 8th Army Corps jumped off the river bank into the Piave below Villa Jacur and swam across under danger of being drowned. He betrayed the position, strength and composition of his sector, and through observation and spying, he acquired some valuable information by which our projected attack against Montello was disclosed. Further, he revealed to the enemy some very secret preparations for the crossing of the river Piave, and also supplied him with plans of the organisation of troops, battery positions, etc.

"The principal part in the treachery is attributed by the Italian high command, not without reason, to Lieutenant Karel Stiny of an infantry regiment, who deserted near Narenta. It appears from the detailed Italian official report in which his statements are embodied, that he betrayed all our preparations on the Piave and provided the enemy with a great deal of most important information. Let us mention further that Stiny in his mendacious statements to the Italian command about the Austro-Hungarian situation at the front and in the interior, followed the line of all traitors in order to appear in a favourable light. It is characteristic that in his declaration about our offensive he said that many Austro-Hungarian troops would have surrendered if it had not been for the German and Bulgarian bayonets behind their backs.

"_It is proved by various documents to what extent the Czechs have forgotten their honour and duty_. By breaking their oath to Austria and her emperor and king, they have also forgotten all those who were with them at the front, and they are responsible for the blood of our patriots and the sufferings of our prisoners in Italy. The false glory which is attributed to them by the Italian command, who have lost all sense of the immorality of these proceedings, cannot efface the eternal crime which history always attaches to the names of traitors."

5. We could give many proofs of the great service the Czecho-Slovaks rendered the Allies by their surrenders. But for our purpose it will be sufficient to quote only some more admissions of the Germans and Magyars themselves.

Count Tisza admitted that Czech troops could not be relied upon, and Count Windischgraetz stated that the chief of staff dare not use them except when mixed with Magyars and Germans.

Deputy Urmanczy declared in the Budapest Parliament on September 5, 1916, that during the first encounters with Rumania, a Czech regiment retired without the slightest resistance, provided themselves with provisions, entered a train and disappeared. The men went over to Rumania. He blamed the Czechs for the Austrian reverse in Transylvania.

On June 22, 1917, when the case of deputy Klofac was discussed by the Immunity Committee of the Reichsrat, General von Georgi, Austrian Minister for Home Defence, according to the Czech organ _Pozor_ of June 24, described

"... the conditions prevailing in the army, especially the behaviour of certain Czech regiments, and brought forward all the material which had been collected against the Czechs since the outbreak of the war, and which had been used against them. He referred to the 28th and 36th Regiments as well as to eight other Czech regiments which had voluntarily surrendered to the Russians. He mentioned also that Czech officers, not only those in reserve but also those on active service, including some of the highest ranks of the staff, surrendered to the enemy; in one instance fourteen officers with a staff officer thus surrendered. Czech soldiers in the Russian and French armies, as well as in other enemy armies, are fighting for the Entente and constitute legions and battalions of their own. The total number of Czechs in the enemy armies exceeds 60,000. In the prisoners' camps in the enemy countries, non-German prisoners were invited to join the enemy's ranks. Czech legions and battalions are composed almost entirely of former prisoners of war. The minister further went on to describe the propaganda of the Czechs abroad, the activity of Czech committees in enemy and neutral countries, especially in Russia and Switzerland. He also mentioned the case of Pavlu, a Czech soldier, who in a Russian newspaper described how he penetrated the Austrian trenches in the uniform of an Austrian officer, annihilated the occupants and after a successful scouting reconnaissance returned to the Russian ranks. The minister described the attitude of the 'Sokols' and the Czech teachers. The tenor of his speech was that Klofac is responsible for the anti-Austrian feeling of the Czech nation and that therefore he should not be released."

When the Russian offensive of July, 1917, started, Herr Hummer, member of the Austrian Reichsrat, addressed the following interpellation to the Austrian Minister for Home Defence:

"Is the Austrian Minister for Home Defence aware that in one of the early engagements of the new Russian offensive, the 19th Austrian Infantry Division, which consists almost entirely of Czecho-Slovaks and other Slavs, openly sided with the enemies of Austria by refusing to fight against the Russians and by surrendering as soon as an opportunity offered itself?"

The most interesting document in regard to the attitude of Czecho-Slovaks during the war is the interpellation of ninety German Nationalist deputies (Schurf, Langenhahn, Wedra, Richter, Kittinger and others), of which we possess a copy. It contains 420 large-size printed pages, and it is therefore impossible for us to give a detailed account of it. The chapters of this interpellation have the following headings:

1. The dangers of Pan-Slavistic propaganda. 2. The situation at the outbreak of the war. 3. Motives for the arrest of Kramar. 4. The behaviour of Czechs in Austria: _(a)_ Demonstrations of Czech national spirit in Prague; _(b)_ Czech school-books; _(c)_ Czech officials; _(d)_ The activities of the "Sokols"; _(e)_ What happened at Litomerice and elsewhere; _(f)_ The Czech attitude towards war loans; _(g)_ The Zivnostenska Banka and the war loans; _(h)_ The financial policy of the Zivnostenska Banka; _(i)_ The Czechs and war emergency affairs; _(k)_ The Czechs and the question of food supplies. 5. The anti-Austrian attitude of Czechs abroad: _(a)_ In France; _(b)_ In England; _(c)_ In Russia; _(d)_ In America; _(e)_ In Switzerland; _(f)_ The campaign of Professor Masaryk; _(g)_ The Czech secret intelligence service. 6. The conduct of Czech soldiers on the battlefield. 7. Military consequences. 8. Some recent documents.

According to the _Neue Freie Presse_ of June 6, 1918, the Austrian Minister for Home Defence made the following important admissions in reply to the part of this interpellation concerning the Czech contribution to the defeats of Austria:

"The 36th Regiment, according to unanimous reports of the high command, failed to do its duty in May, 1915, on the Russian front, and thereby caused a heavy defeat of other detachments. This regiment was dissolved by the imperial decree of July 16, 1915.

"The unsuccessful fighting and heavy losses of the 19th Division in the battle north of Tarnopol between September 9 and 11, 1915, were caused by the weak resistance of the 35th Regiment.... During the battles of June 29 to July 2, 1917, near Zloczow the resistance offered by this regiment was weak.

"As regards Regiment No. 28 of Prague, according to the statement of regimental commanders, it appears that the whole detachment, without firing a single shot, was taken prisoner by a single enemy battalion, or rather was brought by that battalion from its position."

And in this policy Czech soldiers continue by surrendering voluntarily to the Entente troops whenever they have the opportunity.

VI

THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL ACTION OF THE CZECHO-SLOVAKS ABROAD

When war broke out, the Czecho-Slovaks all over the world felt it their duty to prove by deeds that their place was on the side of the Entente. The Czecho-Slovaks in Great Britain, France and Russia volunteered to fight for the Allies, while in the United States of America, where there are some one and a half million Czecho-Slovaks, they have counteracted German propaganda and revealed German plots intended to weaken the American assistance to the Allies.

1. In France 471 Czechs, _i.e._ over 60 per cent., entered the Foreign Legion and greatly distinguished themselves by their bravery. The majority of them have been mentioned in dispatches and received the Military Cross. They have also won five crosses and twenty medals of the Russian Order of St. George. Their losses amount to more than 70 per cent.

Further, many Czechs living in Great Britain at the outbreak of the war joined the French Foreign Legion in France, and after His Majesty's Government allowed Czechs to volunteer for service in the British army in the autumn of 1916, practically all Czechs of military age resident in Great Britain enrolled so far as they were not engaged on munitions. In Canada, too, the Czechs joined the army in order to fight for the British Empire.

The most important part was taken, however, by the Czecho-Slovak colonies in Russia and America. In Russia, where there are large Czecho-Slovak settlements, numbering several thousand, a Czecho-Slovak legion was formed at the outbreak of the war which has rendered valuable services, especially in scouting and reconnoitring. This legion grew gradually larger, especially when Czech prisoners began to be allowed to join it, and finally, under the direction of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, it was formed into a regular army. In September, 1917, it had already two divisions, and in 1918 fresh prisoners joined it, so that it counted some 100,000.

In order to be able fully to appreciate this achievement, we must remember that this was an army of volunteers, organised by the Czecho-Slovak Council without the powers of a real government. At the beginning of the war the Czecho-Slovaks not only had no government of their own, but not even any united organisation. And if we realise that to-day, after three and a half years of strenuous effort, the National Council are recognised by the Allies as the Provisional Government of Bohemia with the right of exercising all powers appertaining to a real government, including the control of an army as large as Great Britain had at the outbreak of the war, it must be admitted that the action of the Czecho-Slovaks abroad was crowned with wonderful success.

In Russia the difficulties with which the National Council had to cope were especially grave, and mainly for two reasons. In the first place, the Czecho-Slovak prisoners who voluntarily surrendered were scattered all over Russia. It was extremely difficult even to get into touch with them. In addition there was a lack of good-will on the part of the old Russian Government. Thus very often these prisoners, who regarded Russia as Bohemia's elder brother and liberator, were sadly disillusioned when they were left under the supervision of some German officers, and thousands of them died from starvation. Nevertheless they never despaired. Eager to fight for the Allies, many of them entered the Yugoslav Division which fought so gallantly in the Dobrudja. Nearly all the Czech officers in this division were decorated with the highest Russian, Serbian and Rumanian orders. Half of them committed suicide, however, during the retreat rather than fall into the hands of the enemy.

It was not until after the Russian Revolution, and especially after the arrival of Professor Masaryk in Russia in May, 1917, that the Czecho-Slovak army in Russia became a reality.

The Czecho-Slovaks have been mentioned in Russian official _communiques_ of February 2, 1916, and March 29, 1917. The most glorious part was taken by the Czecho-Slovak Brigade during the last Russian offensive in July, 1917, in which the Czechs showed manifestly the indomitable spirit that animates them. Since every Czech fighting on the side of the Entente is shot, if he is captured by the Austrians, the Czechs everywhere fight to the bitter end, and rather commit suicide than be captured by their enemies. For this reason they are justly feared by the Germans. As in the Hussite wars, the sight of their caps and the sound of their songs struck terror in the hearts of the Germans and Magyars. At the battle of Zborov on July 2, 1917, the Czechs gave the whole world proof of their bravery. Determined to win or fall, they launched an attack almost without ammunition, with bayonets and hand-grenades--and they gained a victory over an enemy vastly superior in numbers.

According to the official Russian _communique_:

"On July 2, at about three o'clock in the afternoon, after a severe and stubborn battle, the gallant troops of the Czecho-Slovak Brigade occupied the strongly fortified enemy position on the heights to the west and south-west of the village of Zborov and the fortified village of Koroszylow. Three lines of enemy trenches were penetrated. The enemy has retired across the Little Strypa. The Czecho-Slovak Brigade captured sixty-two officers and 3150 soldiers, fifteen guns and many machine guns. Many of the captured guns were turned against the enemy."

Finally, however, when the Russians refused to fight, the Czechs had to retire as well. General Brussiloff declared:

"The Czecho-Slovaks, perfidiously abandoned at Tarnopol by our infantry, fought in such a way that the world ought to fall on its knees before them."

2. The spontaneous and unanimous political action of the Czecho-Slovaks abroad became co-ordinated when Professor Masaryk escaped from Austria and placed himself at the head of the movement.

_Professor Masaryk_, the distinguished Czech leader and scholar, whose name we have already mentioned in the preceding chapters, went to Italy in December, 1914, and although he desired once more to return to Austria before leaving finally for France, he found it too dangerous, as the reign of terror had already been established in Bohemia. He accordingly went to Switzerland and afterwards on to France and England. In October, 1915, he was appointed lecturer at the newly founded School of Slavonic Studies at King's College, University of London. Mr. Asquith, then Prime Minister, who was prevented through indisposition from presiding at Professor Masaryk's inaugural lecture on October 19, 1915, sent the following message to the meeting:

"I congratulate King's College on Professor Masaryk's appointment, and I can assure him that we welcome his advent to London both as a teacher--the influence of whose power and learning is felt throughout the Slav world--and as a man to whose personal qualities of candour, courage and strength we are all glad to pay a tribute. We believe that his presence here will be a link to strengthen the sympathy which unites the people of Russia and Great Britain."