Chapter 7

"First and foremost the Allies are fighting for the liberties of small nations, to the end that they may be left in future free from the tyranny of their more powerful neighbours to develop their own national life and institutions. Above all, to-day our thoughts and our sympathies are moved towards Serbia, whose undaunted courage wins day by day our unbounded sympathy and admiration."

During the lecture on the Problem of Small Nations in the European Crisis, Professor Masaryk outlined his political programme which he has ever since insisted the Allies should adopt, to destroy the German plans of Mitteleuropa. He declared:

"Great Britain came into this war to protect little Belgium, and now with her Allies she is faced by the task of protecting Serbia. This evolution of the war is almost logical, for Germany's aim is and was Berlin--Bagdad, the employment of the nations of Austria-Hungary as helpless instruments, and the subjection of the smaller nations which form that peculiar zone between the west and east of Europe. _Poland, Bohemia, Serbo-Croatia (the South Slavs) are the natural adversaries of Germany_, of her _Drang nach Osten_; to liberate and strengthen these smaller nations is the only real check upon Prussia. Free Poland, Bohemia and Serbo-Croatia would be so-called buffer states, their organisation would facilitate and promote the formation of a Magyar state, of Greater Rumania, of Bulgaria, Greece and the rest of the smaller nations. If this horrible war, with its countless victims, has any meaning, it can only be found in the liberation of the small nations who are menaced by Germany's eagerness for conquest and her thirst for the dominion of Asia. The Oriental question is to be solved on the Rhine, Moldau and Vistula, not only on the Danube, Vardar and Maritza."

Soon afterwards Professor Masaryk issued a proclamation signed by representatives of all Czecho-Slovaks abroad, the full text of which reads as follows:

"We come before the political public at a moment when the retreat of the victorious Russian army is exploited against Russia and her Allies. We take the side of the struggling Slav nations and their Allies without regard to which party will be victorious, simply because the Allies' cause is just. The decision as to which party in this fatal struggle is defending the right, is a question of principle and political morality which to-day cannot be evaded by any honest and clear-thinking politician nor by any self-conscious nation. But we are prompted to step forward also by our vivid sense of Slav solidarity: we express our ardent sympathies to our brother Serbs and Russians, as well as to our brother Poles, so heavily struck by the war. We believe in the ultimate victory of the Slavs and their Allies, and we are convinced that this victory will contribute towards the welfare of the whole of Europe and humanity. The spiteful anti-Slav attitude of Ferdinand the Koburg and his government cannot retard the victory of a just cause.

"The Czech nation made an alliance with Hungary and the Austrian Germans by a free election of a Habsburg to the throne of the kingdom of Bohemia in 1526; but the dynasty created through a systematic centralisation and germanisation a unitary absolutist state, thus violating their treaty guaranteeing the independence of the Bohemian State within and without. The Czech nation, exhausted by the European and Habsburg anti-reformation, has only since the Czech regeneration at the end of the eighteenth century been able to resist this violence. It was especially the revolution of 1848 which challenged it.

"The revolution was crushed, and the secured rights of nations, especially of the Czechs, were again sacrificed to absolutism which, however, was shattered by the war of 1859, and replaced by an incomplete constitutionalism. Then Vienna gave way to the Magyars. But the Czechs had to content themselves with solemn promises that were never kept. The Czech nation started a struggle of passive opposition. Later on it also took an active part in the new parliament, but whether in parliament or in the diets, it always claimed its historic right of independence and struggled against the German-Magyar dualism. The attempts made to come to an understanding were frustrated by the obstinate spirit of domination of the Germans and Magyars.

"The present war has only accentuated the Czecho-Slovak opposition to Austria-Hungary. War was declared without the parliament being consulted: all other states presented the declaration of war to their parliaments for ratification, only the Viennese Government was afraid to consult its peoples, because the majority of them would have declared against the war. The representatives of the Czech nation would have certainly protested with the greatest emphasis. That is why the government did not consult a single Czech deputy or politician with regard to taking so momentous a step.

"The Czech nation has always in modern times defended a thoroughly Slav programme. Also during this war, which has found our nation unprepared like all other peaceful nations, the Czechs have since the very beginning expressed their sympathies for Russia, Serbia and their Allies, notwithstanding the unprecedented Austrian terrorism, suppressing every manifestation of the real feelings of the people. The pro-Austrian declarations are enforced by the government. To-day the leading Czech politicians are in prison, the gallows have become the favourite support of the incapable administration, and Czech regiments have been decimated for acting spontaneously up to our national Czech programme. The rights of the Czech language have been ruthlessly violated during the war, and the absolutist military rule has reigned throughout Bohemia and other non-German and non-Magyar parts of the monarchy as in enemy countries. Every declaration in the Czech journals is suppressed, while our national adversaries are not only allowed to make propaganda against the Czech nation, but even the pan-German orgies in the spirit of Lagarde, von Hartmann, Mommsen, and Treitschke are supported by Vienna and Budapest.

"Under these circumstances the Czech nation cannot continue to keep silence. That is why the Czech and Slovak emigrants abroad deem it their duty to inform foreign opinion about the true situation of Bohemia, to interpret the aspirations of the Czecho-Slovak nation to the Allied statesmen, politicians and journalists, and to defend the Czecho-Slovak programme.

"The Czech parties have hitherto striven for the independence of their nation inside Austria-Hungary. _The course which this fratricidal war has taken and the ruthless violence of Vienna make it necessary for all of us to strive for independence without regard to Austria-Hungary. We are struggling for an absolutely independent Czecho-Slovak State_.

"The Czech nation has come to the conclusion that it must take its destiny into its own hands. Austria was defeated not only by Russia, but also by the small and despised Serbia, and became a dependency of Germany. To-day it has recovered a little under the direction of Berlin, but that desperate strain of forces does not deceive us: it is only a proof of the abdication of Austria-Hungary. We have lost all confidence in the vitality of Austria-Hungary, and we no more recognise its right to existence. Through its incapability and dependence it has proved to the whole world that the assumption of the necessity of Austria has passed, and has through this war been proved to be wrong. Those who have defended the possibility and necessity of Austria-Hungary--and at one time it was Palacky himself--demanded a confederated state of equal nations and lands. But the dualist Austria-Hungary became the oppressor of non-German and non-Magyar nationalities. It is the obstacle to peace in Europe and it has degenerated into a mere tool for Germany's expansion to the East, without a positive mission of its own, unable to create a state organisation of equal nations, free and progressive in civilisation. The dynasty, living in its absolutist traditions, maintains itself a phantom of its former world empire, assisted in government by its undemocratic partners, the barren aristocracy, the anti-national bureaucracy, and the anti-national military staff.

"To-day there is no doubt that Austria-Hungary wrongly used the assassination at Sarajevo as a pretext against Serbia. Vienna and Budapest did not hesitate to use forged documents manufactured by their own embassy against the Yugoslavs, and in this policy of deceit Vienna and Budapest have persisted during this war. To this deceit they have now added revengeful spitefulness and cruelty truly barbarian against the non-Germans and non-Magyars.

"Germany shares the guilt with Austria-Hungary; it was in Germany's power and it was her duty towards civilisation and humanity to prevent the war and not to take advantage of the imperialist lust of Vienna and Budapest.

"Austria-Hungary and Germany are fighting with their Turkish and Bulgarian Allies for a cause which is unjust and doomed."

Later on, when _Dr. Edward Benes_, lecturer at the Czech University of Prague and author of several well-known studies in sociology, also escaped abroad, the Czecho-Slovak National Council was formed, of which Professor Masaryk became the president, _Dr. Stefanik_, a distinguished airman and scientist, Hungarian Slovak by birth, the vice-president, and Dr. E. Benes the general secretary. A French review was started in Paris (_La Nation Tcheque_) in May, 1915, which became the official organ of the Czecho-Slovak movement. Up to May, 1917, it was published under the editorship of Professor Denis, and since then its editor has been Dr. Benes. A Central Czech organ is also published in Paris called _Samostatnost_ ("Independence"), edited by Dr. Sychrava, an eminent Czech journalist.

The undisputed authority enjoyed by Professor Masaryk among all the Czecho-Slovaks is undoubtedly the secret of the great strength and unity of the movement. It is also the reason for the great diplomatic successes achieved by the Czechs. The chief lieutenants of Professor Masaryk were Dr. Benes, an untiring worker with rare political instinct and perspicacity, and Dr. Milan Stefanik, who entered the French army as a private at the beginning of the war, was gradually promoted, and in May, 1918, rose to the rank of brigadier-general. He rendered valuable service to France as an astronomist before the war, and as an airman during the war. He has rendered still greater service to the Czecho-Slovak cause as a diplomat. These three men, unanimously recognised by the two million Czecho-Slovaks in the Allied countries as their leaders, were finally, in the summer of 1918, recognised also by the Allies as the _de facto_ provisional government of the Czecho-Slovak State, with all rights and powers of a real government. The central seat of the Czecho-Slovak Government is in Paris, and official Czecho-Slovak representatives and legations are in all the Allied capitals.

3. The first political success of the National Council was the Allies' Note to President Wilson of January 10, 1917. The Czechs are especially grateful to France for this first recognition of their claims.

In this Note, in which the Allies for the first time stated publicly and explicitly their war aims, the Allies declared that these include:

"The reorganisation of Europe guaranteed by a stable settlement, based upon the principle of nationality, upon the right which all peoples, whether small or great, have to the enjoyment of full security and free economic development, and also upon territorial agreements and international arrangements so framed as to guarantee land and sea frontiers against unjust attacks; the restitution of provinces or territories formerly torn from the Allies by force or contrary to the wishes of their inhabitants; _the liberation of Italians, Slavs, Rumanians and Czecho-Slovaks from foreign domination_; the liberation of the peoples who now lie beneath the murderous tyranny of the Turks, and the expulsion from Europe of the Ottoman Empire, which has proved itself so radically alien to Western civilisation."

The greatest success of the Czecho-Slovak National Council, however, has been the formal recognition by France of the formation of an autonomous Czecho-Slovak army in France with the National Council at its head. By this act France recognised:

(1) That the Czecho-Slovaks have a right to form an army of their own, which right appertains only to a sovereign and independent nation;

(2) That the Czecho-Slovaks have a right to fight on the side of the Entente, and therefore are to be considered as one of the Allies;

(3) That the political direction of the army is reserved to the Czecho-Slovak National Council, which right is usually accorded only to the government of an independent state.

The full text of this historic document, signed by the President of the French Republic, M. Poincare, the French Premier, M. Clemenceau, and the Foreign Secretary, M. Pichon, and dated December 19, 1917, reads as follows:

"1. The Czecho-Slovaks organised in an autonomous army and recognising, from the military point of view, the superior authority of the French high command, will fight under their own flag against the Central Powers.

"2. This national army is placed, from the political point of view, under the direction of the Czecho-Slovak National Council whose headquarters are in Paris.

"3. The formation of the Czecho-Slovak army as well as its further work are assured by the French Government.

"4. The Czecho-Slovak army will be subject to the same dispositions as regards organisation, hierarchy, administration and military discipline as those in force in the French army.

"5. The Czecho-Slovak army will be recruited from among:

(_a_) Czecho-Slovaks at present serving with the French army;

(_b_) Czecho-Slovaks from other countries admitted to be transferred into the Czecho-Slovak army or to contract a voluntary engagement with this army for the duration of war.

"6. Further ministerial instructions will settle the application of this decree.

"7. The President of the War Cabinet, the Secretary of War, and the Foreign Secretary are charged each in his own sphere to bring into effect the present decree, which will be published in the _Bulletin des Lois_ and inserted in the _Journal Officiel de la Republique Francaise_."

In a covering letter, dated December 16, 1917, and addressed to M. Poincare, the French Premier and the Foreign Secretary declared:

"France has always supported by all means in her power the national aspirations of the Czecho-Slovaks. The number of volunteers of this nationality who at the outbreak of the war enlisted to fight under the French flag was considerable; the gaps created in their ranks prove unquestionably the ardour with which they fought against our enemies.

"Certain Allied governments, especially the Russian Provisional Government, did not hesitate to authorise the formation on our front of units composed of Czecho-Slovaks who had escaped from the oppression of their enemy.

"It is only just that this nationality should be given means of defending, under their own flag and side by side with us, the cause of right and liberty of peoples, and it will be in accord with French traditions to assist the organisation of an autonomous Czecho-Slovak army."

Needless to say, the joy over this recognition was very great in Bohemia, while the German papers were furious. The _Neue Freie Presse_ of December 28 devoted its leading article to the Czecho-Slovak army on the Western front, and concluded with the following remarks:

"Although the strength of this new army is estimated at 120,000 men, the Czecho-Slovak army will not have a decisive influence on the military operations. Nevertheless, it may do us considerable harm in case we should transfer troops to the Western front. However, the greatest harm is in the moral effect which this act of wholesale treachery of the Czechs will have on the military power of the monarchy. In any case the co-operation of the Czecho-Slovak army on the side of the Entente will only strengthen the Allies' belief that right is on their side."

Soon afterwards Italy also generously allowed an expeditionary corps of the Czecho-Slovak army to be formed from the Czecho-Slovak prisoners of war who surrendered to her. On May 23, 1918, the Czecho-Slovak troops welcomed the Prince of Wales to Rome, and soon afterwards they distinguished themselves on the Piave and were mentioned in one of General Diaz's dispatches and also in the official Italian _communique_ of September 22, 1918.

From the recognition of the Czecho-Slovak army followed the full recognition which the National Council obtained from the Allies.

4. While the general secretariat was actively working for these concessions in the West, Professor Masaryk, after devoting his attention to the education of public opinion in Great Britain on the importance of Bohemia, by means of private memoranda and various articles in the _New Europe, Weekly Dispatch_ and elsewhere, decided in May, 1917, to go to Russia.

In Russia, Professor Masaryk succeeded admirably in uniting and strengthening all Czecho-Slovak forces, and in organising a regular army of the many thousands of Czecho-Slovak prisoners there. As we have already pointed out elsewhere, before the Revolution these efforts of the National Council and the Czech prisoners, who were always eager to fight for the Allies, were rendered immensely difficult by the obstacles inherent in the geographic conditions of Russia and by obstacles placed in their way by the old Russian regime.

Unfortunately now, when the Czecho-Slovaks had at last succeeded after much work in realising their plans, the Czecho-Slovak army became powerless owing to the collapse of Russia. Without ammunition, without support from anywhere, the Czecho-Slovaks thought they could no more render very effective service to the Allies in the East. They decided, therefore, to go over to join their compatriots in France.

The position of our army was as follows: After the offensive of July, 1917, the Czechs retreated to Kieff where they continued to concentrate fresh forces. At that time they numbered about 60,000, and this number had gradually increased to 80,000 by the end of 1917. They always observed strict neutrality in Russia's internal affairs on the advice of their venerable leader, Professor Masaryk. It was necessary to counsel this neutrality for the sake of our army itself, since it contained partisans of different creeds and parties disagreement among whom might have led to its dissolution. On the whole, the Czecho-Slovaks, who are an advanced nation, fully conscious of their national aspirations, remained unaffected by the misleading Bolshevist theories. The Czechs abstained throughout from interfering with Russian affairs, yet they did not wish to leave Russia as long as there was any chance for them to assist her. It was not until the shameful peace of Brest-Litovsk in February, 1918, that Professor Masaryk decided that the Czecho-Slovak army should leave Russia _via_ Siberia and join the Czecho-Slovak army in France. The Bolsheviks granted them free passage to Vladivostok.

This journey of some 5000 miles was not, however, an easy task for an army to accomplish. The troops had to move in small echelons or detachments, and concentration at the stations was prohibited. They had to procure their trains and their provisions, and they had constant trouble with the Bolsheviks, because in every district there was a practically independent Soviet Government with whom the Czechs had to negotiate. The first detachments with the generalissimo of the army, General Diderichs, at the head arrived in Vladivostok at the end of April, 1918. But the other detachments were constantly held up by the Bolsheviks and had great trouble in passing through.

They moved from Kieff _via_ Kursk, Tambov, Penza and Samara. The two last-named towns lie on the line between Moscow and Tcheliabinsk at the foot of the Urals, whence a direct line runs across Siberia to Vladivostok.

As we have already pointed out, the Bolsheviks agreed in principle to allow our troops to leave Russia. Their commander-in-chief, General Muraviev, allowed the Czechs free passage to France on February 16. The same concession had been granted by the Moscow Soviet. On the whole the Czechs were on tolerably good terms with the Bolsheviks. Professor Masaryk rejected every plan directed against the Bolsheviks submitted to him even by such of their political adversaries as could not justly be called counter-revolutionaries. The Czecho-Slovak troops went still further; they actually complied with the request of the Bolsheviks and partially disarmed. The trouble only began in May, 1918, when the Bolsheviks yielded to German intrigues and resolved to destroy our army.

Already at the beginning of May the Czechs had begun to feel embittered against the Bolsheviks, because in defiance of the agreement their troops were constantly being held up by local Soviets. At Tambov, for instance, they were held up for a whole month. At Tcheliabinsk the Czechs had a serious scuffle with Magyar ex-prisoners on May 26, and the Bolsheviks sided entirely with the Magyars, even arresting some Czecho-Slovak delegates. The Czechs simply occupied the city, liberated their comrades, and at a congress held by them at Tcheliabinsk on May 28 it was decided to refuse to surrender any more arms and ammunition and to continue transports to Vladivostok, if necessary with arms in their hands. This was a reply to Trotsky's telegram that the Czecho-Slovaks should be completely disarmed, which the Czecho-Slovaks defied as they knew that another order had been issued by Trotsky simultaneously, no doubt on the instigation of Count Mirbach, saying that the Czecho-Slovak troops must be dissolved at all costs and interned as prisoners of war. The Bolsheviks now arrested prominent members of the Moscow branch of the Czecho-Slovak National Council on the ground that they were "anti-revolutionaries." They alleged also that they had no guarantee that ships would be provided for the Czechs to be transported to France, and that the Czechs were holding up food supplies from Siberia. The Bolsheviks deliberately broke their word, and Trotsky issued an order to "all troops fighting against the anti-revolutionary Czecho-Slovak brigades" in which he said:

"The concentration of our troops is complete. Our army being aware that the Czecho-Slovaks are direct allies of the anti-revolution and of the capitalists, fights them well. The Czecho-Slovaks are retreating along the railway. Obviously they would like to enter into negotiations with the Soviets. We issued an order that their delegates should be received. We demand in the first place that they should be disarmed. _Those who do not do so voluntarily will be shot on the spot._ Warlike operations on the railway line hinder food transports. Energetic steps must be taken to do away with this state of affairs."