Chapter 12

FINAL REFLECTIONS

The farther the world war progressed, the more did it lose the character of the work of individual men. It assumed rather the character of a cosmic event, taking more and more from the effectiveness of the most powerful individuals.

All settlements on which coalitions were based were connected with certain war aims by the Cabinets, such as the promises of compensation given to their own people, the hopes of gain from the final victory. The encouragement of intense and boundless hatred, the increasing crude brutality of the world all tended to create a situation making each individual like a small stone which, breaking away from an avalanche of stones, hurls itself downwards without a leader and without goal, and is no longer capable of being guided by anyone.

The Council of Four at Versailles tried for some time to make the world believe that they possessed the power to rebuild Europe according to their own ideas. According to their own ideas! That signified, to begin with, four utterly different ideas, for four different worlds were comprised in Rome, Paris, London, and Washington. And the four representatives--"the Big Four," as they were called--were each individually the slave of his programme, his pledges, and his people. Those responsible for the Paris negotiations _in camera_, which lasted for many months, and were a breeding ground for European anarchy, had their own good reasons for secrecy; there was no end to the disputes, for which no outlet could be found.

Here, Wilson had been scoffed at and cursed because he deserted his programme; certainly, there is not the slightest similarity between the Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles and St. Germain, but it is forgotten now that Wilson no longer had the power to enforce his will against the three others. We do not know what occurred behind those closed doors, but we can imagine it, and Wilson probably fought weeks and months for his programme. He could have broken off proceedings and left! He certainly could have done so, but would the chaos have been any less; would it have been any better for the world if the only one who was not solely imbued with the lust of conquest had thrown down his arms? But Clemenceau, too, the direct opposite of Wilson, was not quite open in his dealings. Undoubtedly this old man, who now at the close of his life was able to satisfy his hatred of the Germans of 1870, gloried in the triumph; but, apart from that, if he had tried to conclude a "Wilson peace," all the private citizens of France, great and small, would have risen against him, for they had been told for the last five years: _Que les boches payeront tout_. What he did, he enjoyed doing; but he was forced to do it or France would have dismissed him.

And Italy? From Milan to Naples is heard the subterraneous rumbling of approaching revolution; the only means the Government have adopted to check the upheaval is to drown the revolution in a sea of national interests. I believe that in 1917, when the general discontent was much less and finances were much better, the Italian Government might much more probably have accepted Wilson's standpoint than after final victory. Then they could not do it. At Versailles they were the slaves of their promises. And does anyone believe that Lloyd George would have had the power at Versailles to extend the Wilson principle of the right of self-determination to Ireland and the Dominions? Naturally, he did not wish to do otherwise than he did; but that is not the question here, but rather that neither could have acted very differently even had he wished to do so.

It seems to me that the historical moment is the year 1917 when Wilson lost his power, which was swallowed up in Imperialism, and when the President of the United States neglected to force his programme on his Allies. Then power was still in his hands, as the American troops were so eagerly looked for; but later, when victory came, he no longer held it.

And thus there came about what is now a fact. A dictated peace of the most terrible nature was concluded and a foundation laid for a continuance of unimaginable disturbances, complications and wars.

In spite of all the apparent power of victorious armies, in spite of all the claims of the Council of Four, a world has expired at Versailles--the world of militarism. Solely bent on exterminating Prussian militarism, the Entente have gained so complete a victory that all fences and barriers have been pulled down and they can give themselves up unchecked to a torrent of violence, vengeance and passion. And the Entente are so swallowed up by their revengeful paroxysm of destruction that they do not appear to see that, while they imagine they still rule and command, they are even now but instruments in a world revolution.

The Entente, who would not allow the war to end and kept up the blockade for months after the cessation of hostilities, has made Bolshevism a danger to the world. War is its father, famine its mother, despair its godfather. The poison of Bolshevism will course in the veins of Europe for many a long year.

Versailles is not the end of the war, it is only a phase of it. The war goes on, though in another form. I think that the coming generation will not call the great drama of the last five years the world-war, but the world-revolution, which it will realise began with the world-war.

Neither at Versailles nor St. Germain has any lasting work been done. The germs of decomposition and death lie in this peace. The paroxysms that shattered Europe are not yet over; as, after a terrible earthquake, the subterraneous rumblings may still be heard. Again and again we shall see the earth open, now here, now there, and shoot up flames into the heavens; again and again there will be expressions of elementary nature and elementary force that will spread devastation through the land--until everything has been swept away that reminds us of the madness of the war and the French peace.

Slowly but with unspeakable suffering a new world will be born. Coming generations will look back to our times as to a long and very bad dream, but day follows the darkest night. Generations have been laid in their graves, murdered, famished, and a prey to disease. Millions, with hatred and murder in their hearts, have died in their efforts to devastate and destroy.

But other generations will arise and with them a new spirit: They will rebuild what war and revolution have pulled down. Spring comes always after winter. Resurrection follows after death; it is the eternal law in life.

Well for those who will be called upon to serve as soldiers in the ranks of whoever comes to build the new world.

_June, 1919._

APPENDIX

1

=Resolutions of the London Conference, of April 26, 1915=[11]

On February 28, 1917, the _Isvestia_ published the following text of this agreement:

"The Italian Ambassador in London, Marchese Imperiali, acting on the instructions of his Government, has the honour to convey to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, Sir Edward Grey, the French Ambassador in London, M. Cambon, and the Russian Ambassador in London, Count Benckendorff, the following notable points:

§1. A _Military Convention_ shall be concluded without delay between the General Staffs of France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy. This convention to determine the minimum of forces to be directed by Russia against Austria-Hungary in case that country should turn all its forces against Italy, provided Russia decides to concentrate chiefly against Germany. The Military Convention referred to shall also settle questions bearing upon an armistice, in so far as these by their nature come within the scope of the Army Command.

§2. Italy on her part undertakes to carry on war with all the means at her disposal, together with France, Great Britain and Russia, against all countries at war with them.

§3. The naval forces of France and Great Britain are to render Italy undiminished, active assistance until the _destruction of the Austrian fleet_, or until the moment peace is concluded. A _Naval Convention_ shall be concluded without delay between France, Great Britain and Italy.

§4. At the coming conclusion of peace Italy is to receive: the district of the _Trentino; the whole of South Tyrol as far as its natural geographical boundary, thereby understood the Brenner; the city and district of Trieste; the provinces of Goerz and Gradisca, the whole of Istria_ as far as Quarnero, including Volosca and the Istrian islands of Cherso and Lussin, also the smaller islands of Plavnica, Unie, Canidolo, Palazzoli, as well as the island of St. Peter de Nembi, Astinello and Cruica, with the neighbouring islands.

Note: 1. By way of supplement to §4, the frontier shall be drawn through the following-points: From the peak of the Umbrail in a northerly direction as far as the Stilfserjoch, and thence along the watershed of the Ratische Alps as far as the sources of the rivers Etsch and Eisack, then over the Reschen-Scheideck, the Brenner and the Oetztaler and Zillertaler Alps; the frontier line then to turn southwards, cutting the Toblach range, and proceeding as far as the present frontier of Grein, drawn towards the Alps; following this it will run to the heights of Tarvis, then, however, pursuing a course along the watershed of the Julian Alps, over the heights of Predil, Mangart and Triglav group, and the passes of Podbrda, Podlaneskan and Idria. From there the frontier continues in a south-easterly direction to the Schneeberg, so that the basin of the River Save, with its sources, shall not fall within the Italian territory. From the Schneeberg the frontier proceeds towards the coast, enclosing Castua, Matuglie and Volosca in the Italian possessions.

§5. Similarly, Italy is to receive the province of Dalmatia in its present form, including Lissarik and Trebinje in the north, and all possessions as far as a line drawn from the coast at Cape Blanca eastward to the watershed in the south, so as to include in the Italian possessions all valleys on the course of the rivers debouching at Sebenico, such as Cikola, Kerke and Budisnica, with all those situate on their sources. Similarly also, Italy is promised _all the islands lying north and west of the Dalmatian coast_, beginning with the islands of Premuda, Selve, Ulbo, Skerda Maon, Pago and Puntadura, etc., in the north; as far as Malarda in the south, adding also the islands of St. Andrae, Busi, Lissa, Lessina, Torzola, Curzola, Cazza and Lagosta, with all rocks and islets thereto pertaining, as well as Pelagosa, but not to include the islands of Great and Lesser Zirona, Pua, Solta and Brazza.

The following are to be _neutralised_: (1) The entire coast from Cape Blanca in the north as far as the southern end of the peninsula of Sabbioncello, and in the south including the whole of the mentioned peninsula in the neutralised area; (2) a part of the coast beginning from a point situate 10 versts south of the cape of Alt-Ragusa, as far as the river Wojusa in the south, so as to include within the boundaries of the neutralised zone _the whole of the Bay of Cattaro_ with its ports, Antivari, Dulcigno, San Giovanni di Medua and Durazzo; this not to affect the declarations of the contracting parties in April and May, 1909, as to the rights of _Montenegro_.

In consideration, however, of the fact that these rights were only admitted as applying to the present possessions of Montenegro, they shall not be so extended as to embrace any lands or ports which may in the future be ceded to Montenegro. In the same way, no part of the coast at present belonging to Montenegro shall be subject to future neutralisation. The restrictions in the case of the port of Antivari, agreed by Montenegro itself in 1909, remain in force. (3) Finally, the islands not accorded to Italy.

Note: 3. The following lands in the Adriatic Sea are accorded by the Powers of the Quadruple Alliance to the territories of _Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro_: In the north of the Adriatic, _the entire coast, commencing from the Bay of Volosca_ on the frontier of Istria as far as the _northern frontier_ of Dalmatia, including the whole of the coast-line now belonging to Hungary, the entire coast of Croatia, the port of Fiume and the small harbours of Novi and Carlopago, as also the islands of Velia, Pervicchio, Gregorio, Goli and Arbe. In the south of the Adriatic, where Serbia and Austrian interests lie, the entire coast from Cape Planca as far as the river Drina, with the principal ports of _Spaluto, Ragusa, Cattaro, Antivari, Dulcigno and San Giovanni di Medua_, and with the islands of Greater Zirona, Pua, Solta, Brazza, Jaklian and Calamotta.

The port of Durazzo can be accorded to an independent Mohammedan State of Albania.

§6. Italy to be given full possession of _Valona, the Island of Sasseno_, and a sufficiently extensive territory to protect it in military respects, approximately from the River Vojusa in the north and east to the boundary of the Chimara district in the south.

§7. Italy, receiving the Trentino according to §4, Dalmatia and the islands of the Adriatic according to §5, as well as Valona, is not to oppose the possible wishes of France, Great Britain and Russia in case of the establishment of a small autonomous neutralised state in Albania, as to _division of the northern and southern frontier belts of Albania between Montenegro, Serbia and Greece_. The southern strip of coast from the frontier of the Italian district of Valona as far as Cape Stiloa to be subject to neutralisation.

Italy has the prospect of _right to determine the foreign policy of Albania_; in any case, Italy undertakes to assent to the cession of a sufficient territory to Albania to make the frontiers of the latter on the west of the Ochrida Lake coincide with the frontiers of Greece and Serbia.

§8. Italy to have full possession of all the _islands of the Dodecanessus_ which it occupies at present.

§9. France, Great Britain and Russia accept in principle the fact of _Italy's interest in maintaining political equilibrium_ in the Mediterranean, as also Italy's right, in case of any _division of Turkey, to a like portion with themselves_ in the basin of the Mediterranean, and that in the part adjacent to the _province of Adalia_, where Italy has already acquired particular rights, and developed particular interests, to be noted in the Italo-British Convention. The zone then falling to the possession of Italy will in due time be determined according to the vital interests of France and Great Britain. Similarly, the interests of Italy are also to be considered in case the territorial integrity of Asiatic Turkey should be maintained by the Powers for a further period, and only a limitation between the spheres of interest be made. Should, in such case, any areas of Asiatic Turkey be occupied by France, Great Britain and Russia during the present war, then the entire area contiguous to Italy, and further defined below, shall be granted to Italy, together with the right to occupy the same.

§10. In Lybia, Italy is to be granted all rights and claims hitherto conceded to the Sultan on the basis of the Treaty of Lausanne.

§11. Italy to receive such part of the war contribution as shall be commensurate with her sacrifices and efforts.

§12. Italy subscribes to the declaration issued by France, England and Russia whereby _Arabia and the holy cities of the Mohammedans_ are to be granted to _an independent Mohammedan Power_.

§13. In case of any extension of the French and English colonial possessions in Africa at the expense of Germany, France and Great Britain acknowledge in principle the right of Italy to demand certain compensation in respect of extension of Italian possessions in Eritrea, Somaliland, in Lybia, and the colonial areas contiguous to the colonies of France and England.

§14. England undertakes to facilitate the immediate realisation of _a loan of not less than 50 million pounds sterling_ in the English market on favourable conditions.

§15. France, England and Russia undertake to support Italy in _preventing the representatives of the Holy See from taking any diplomatic steps whatever in connection with the conclusion of a peace_, or the regulation of questions connected with the present war.

§16. The present treaty to be _kept secret_. As regards Italy's agreement to the declaration of September 5, 1914, this declaration will be made public as soon as war is declared by Italy or against Italy.

The foregoing points having been duly noted, the respective authorised representatives of France, Great Britain and Russia, together with the representative of Italy similarly authorised by his Government for this purpose, are agreed: France, Great Britain and Russia declare their full agreement with the foregoing notable points, as set before them by the Italian Government. With regard to §§1, 2 and 3, referring to the agreement upon military and naval undertakings of all four Powers, _Italy undertakes to commence active operations at the earliest possible date_, and in any case not later than one month after the signing of the present document by the contracting parties.

The present agreement, in four copies, signed in London on the 26th April, 1915, and sealed, by

Sir Edward Grey, Cambon, Marchese Imperiali, Graf Benckendorff."

After the entry of Roumania into the war (September, 1916) this programme was further extended.

2

=Note from Count Czernin to the American Government, dated March 5, 1917=

From the _aide-mémoire_ of the American Ambassador in Vienna, dated February 18 of this year, the Imperial and Royal Ministry for Foreign Affairs understands that the Washington Cabinet entertains some doubt, in view of the statements issued by the Imperial and Royal Government on February 10 and January 11 of this year, as to what attitude Austria-Hungary contemplates adopting for the future with regard to submarine warfare, and whether the assurance given by the Austrian Government to the Washington Cabinet in the course of the proceedings with regard to the case of the vessels _Ancona_ and _Persia_ might not be taken as altered or withdrawn by the statements mentioned.

The Austrian Government is most willing to meet the desire of the United States Government that this doubt should be removed by a clear and final declaration.

It should here be permitted first of all to touch very briefly on the methods adopted by the Allied Powers in marine warfare, since these form the starting-point of the aggravated submarine warfare put into practice by Austria-Hungary and her allies, besides throwing a clear light upon the attitude hitherto adopted by the Austrian Government in the questions arising therefrom.

When Great Britain entered upon the war with the Central Powers, but a few years had elapsed since the memorable time when Great Britain itself, together with the remaining states, had commenced at the Hague to lay the foundations of a modern code of law for marine warfare. Shortly after that the English Government had brought about a meeting of representatives of the principal naval Powers, assembling in London, in order further to carry forward the work commenced at the Hague, presumably in a spirit of reasonable compromise between the interests of belligerents and those of neutrals. The unexpected success of these endeavours, which aimed at nothing less than concerted establishment of legal standards calculated to maintain the freedom of the seas and the interests of neutrals even in time of war, was not to be long enjoyed by the peoples concerned.

Hardly had the United Kingdom decided to take part in the war than it also began to break through the barriers with which it was confronted by the standards of international law. While the Central Powers immediately on the outbreak of war had announced their intention of observing the Declaration of London, which also bore the signature of the British representative, England discarded the most important points in that Declaration. In the endeavour to cut off the Central Powers from all supplies by sea, England gradually extended the list of contraband until it included everything now required by human beings for the maintenance of life. Great Britain then placed all the coasts of the North Sea--an important transit-way also for the maritime trade of Austria-Hungary--under the obstruction of a so-called "blockade," in order to prevent the entry into Germany of all goods not yet inscribed on the contraband list, as also to bar all neutral traffic with those coasts, and prevent any export from the same. That this method of proceeding stands in the most lurid contradiction to the standards of blockade law arrived at and established by international congress has already been admitted by the President of the United States in words which will live in the history of the law of nations. By this illegally preventing export of goods from the Central Powers Great Britain thought to be able to shut down the innumerable factories and industries which had been set up by industrious and highly-developed peoples in the heart of Europe; and to bring the workers to idleness and thence to want and revolt. And when Austria-Hungary's southern neighbour joined the ranks of the enemies of the Central Powers her first step was to declare a blockade of all the coasts of her opponent--following the example, of course, of her Allies--in disregard of the legal precepts which Italy had shortly before helped to lay down. Austria-Hungary did not fail to point out to the neutral Powers at once that this blockade was void of all legal validity.

For two years the Central Powers have hesitated. Not until then, and after long and mature consideration for and against, did they proceed to answer in like measure and close with their adversaries at sea. As the only belligerents who had done everything to secure the observance of the agreement which should provide for freedom of the seas to neutrals, it was sorely against their wishes to bow to the need of the moment and attack that freedom; but they took that step in order to fulfil their urgent duty to their peoples and with the conviction that the step in question must lead towards the freedom of the seas in the end. The declarations made by the Central Powers on the last day of January of this year are only apparently directed against the rights of neutrals; as a matter of fact, they are working toward the restitution of those rights which the enemy has constantly infringed and would, if victorious, annihilate for ever. The submarines, then, which circle round England's shores, announce to all peoples using and needing the sea--and who does not need it?--that the day is not far off when the flags of all nations shall wave over the seas in newly acquired freedom.

It may doubtless be hoped that this announcement will find echo wherever neutral peoples live, and that it will be understood in particular by the great people of the United States of America, whose most famous representative has in the course of the war spoken up with ardent words for the freedom of the seas as the highway of all nations. If the people and the government of the Union will bear in mind that the "blockade" established by Great Britain is intended not only to force the Central Powers to submission by starvation but ultimately to secure undisputed mastery of the sea for itself, and thereby ensure its supremacy over all other nations, while on the other hand the blockading of England and its Allies only serves to render possible _a peace with honour_ for these Powers and to guarantee to all peoples the freedom of navigation and maritime trade, thus ensuring their safe existence, then the question as to which of the two belligerent parties has right on its side is already decided. Though the Central Powers are far from wishing to seek for further allies in their struggle, they nevertheless feel justified in claiming that neutrals should appreciate their endeavours to bring to life again the principles of international law and the equal rights of nations.

Proceeding now to answer the questions set forth in the memorandum of February 18 of this year, already referred to, the Austrian Government would first of all remark that in the exchange of Notes in the cases of the _Ancona_ and _Persia_ this Government restricted itself to consideration of the concrete questions which had up to then arisen, without setting forth the legal position in point of principle. In the Note of December 29, 1915, however, regarding the _Ancona_ case it reserved the right to bring up the intricate questions of international law connected with the submarine warfare for discussion at a later date. In reverting now to this point, and taking up the question as to sinking of enemy ships, with which the memorandum is concerned, for brief consideration, it is with the hope that it may be made clear to the American Government that the Austrian Government now as heretofore _holds immovably by the assurance already given_, and with the endeavour to avoid any misunderstanding between the Monarchy and the American Union by clearing up the most important question arising out of the submarine warfare--most important as it rests on the dictates of humanity.

First and foremost the Austrian Government wishes to point out that the thesis advanced by the American Government and adopted in many learned works--to the effect that enemy merchant vessels, save in the event of attempted flight or resistance, should not be destroyed without provision for the safety of those on board--is also, in the opinion of the Austrian Government itself, the kernel, so to speak, of the whole matter. Regarded from a higher point of view, this theory can at any rate be considered in connection with possible circumstances, and its application be more closely defined; from the dictates of humanity, which the Austrian Government and the Washington Cabinet have equally adopted as their guide, we can lay down the general principle that, in exercising the right to destroy enemy merchant shipping, loss of life should be avoided as far as possible. This necessitates a warning on the part of the belligerent before exercising the right of destruction. And he can here adopt the method indicated by the theory of the Union Government referred to, according to which _the commander of the warship himself issues a warning to the vessel about to be sunk_, so that crew and passengers can be brought into safety at the last moment; or, on the other hand, the Government of the belligerent state can, when it is considered an imperative necessity of war, give warning, with complete effect, _before the sailing of the vessel_ to be sunk; or, finally, such Government can, when preparing comprehensive measures against the enemy traffic at sea, have recourse to _a general warning applicable to all enemy vessels concerned_.

That the principle as to providing for the safety of persons on board is liable to exceptions has been admitted by the Union Government itself. The Austrian Government believes, however, that destruction without warning is not only justifiable in cases of attempted escape or resistance. It would seem, to take one instance only, that the character of the vessel itself should be taken into consideration; thus merchant ships or other private craft, placed in the service of war operations, whether as transports or guardships, or with a military crew or weapons on board for the purpose of any kind of hostilities, should doubtless, according to general law, be liable to destruction without notice. The Austrian Government need not go into the question of how far a belligerent is released from any obligation as to provision for safety of human life when his opponent sinks enemy merchant vessels without such previous warning, as in the well-known cases, previously referred to, of the _Elektra_, _Dubrovnik_, _Zagreb_, etc., since, in this respect, despite its evident right, the Austrian Government itself has never returned like for like. Throughout the entire course of the war Austro-Hungarian warships have not destroyed a single enemy merchant vessel without previous warning, though this may have been of a general character.

The theory of the Union Government, frequently referred to, also admits of several interpretations; the question arises, for instance, whether, as has frequently been maintained, only armed resistance can be held to justify destruction of ship and persons on board, or whether the same applies to resistance of another sort, as, for example, when the crew purposely refrain from getting the passengers into the boats (the case of the _Ancona_), or when the passengers themselves decline to enter the boats. In the opinion of the Austrian Government cases such as those last should also justify destruction of the vessel without responsibility for the lives of those on board, as otherwise it would be in the power of anyone on the vessel to deprive the belligerent of his right to sink the ship. For the rest it should also be borne in mind that there is no unanimity of opinion really as to when the destruction of enemy merchant tonnage is justifiable at all.

The obligation as to issuing a warning immediately before sinking a vessel will, in the view of the Austrian Government on the one hand, involve hardships otherwise avoidable, while, on the other, it may in certain circumstances be calculated to prejudice the rightful interests of the belligerent. In the first place it cannot be denied that saving lives _at sea_ is nearly always a matter of blind uncertainty, since the only alternatives are to leave them on board a vessel exposed to the operations of the enemy, or to take them off in small boats to face the dangers of the elements. It is, therefore, far more in accordance with the dictates of humanity _to restrain people from venturing upon vessels thus endangered by warning them beforehand_. For the rest, however, the Austrian Government is not convinced, despite careful consideration of all legal questions concerned, that the subjects of neutral countries have any claim to immunity when travelling on board enemy ships.

The principle that neutrals shall also in time of war enjoy the freedom of the seas extends only to neutral vessels, not to neutral persons on board enemy ships, since the belligerents are admittedly justified in hampering enemy traffic at sea as far as lies in their power. Granted the necessary military power, they can, if deemed necessary to their ends, forbid enemy merchant vessels to sail the sea, on pain of instant destruction, as long as they make their purpose known beforehand so that all, whether enemy or neutral, _are enabled to avoid risking their lives_. But even where there is doubt as to the justification of such proceeding, and possible reprisals threatened by the opposing side, the question would remain one to be decided between the belligerents themselves alone, they being admittedly allowed the right of making the high seas a field for their military operations, of suppressing any interruption of such operations and supremely determining what measures are to be taken against enemy ships. The neutrals have in such case no legitimate claims beyond that of demanding that due notice be given them of measures contemplated against the enemy, in order that they may refrain from entrusting their persons or goods to enemy vessels.

The Austrian Government may presumably take it for granted that the Washington Cabinet agrees with the foregoing views, which the Austrian Government is fully convinced are altogether unassailable. To deny the correctness of these views would imply--and this the Union Government can hardly intend--that neutrals have the right of interfering in the military operations of the belligerents; indeed, ultimately to constitute themselves the judges as to what methods may or may not be employed against an enemy. It would also seem a crying injustice for a neutral Government, in order merely to secure for its subjects the right of passage on enemy ships when they might just as well, or indeed with far greater safety, travel by neutral vessels, to grasp at the arm of a belligerent Power, fighting perhaps for its very existence. Not to mention the fact that it would open the way for all kinds of abuses if a belligerent were forced to lay down arms at the bidding of any neutral whom it might please to make use of enemy ships for business or pleasure. No doubt has ever been raised as to the fact that subjects of neutral states are themselves responsible for any harm they may incur _by their presence in any territory on land where military operations are in progress_. Obviously, there is no ground for establishing another standard for naval warfare, particularly since the second Peace Conference expressed the wish that, pending the agreement of rules for naval warfare, the rules observed in warfare upon land should be applied as far as possible at sea.

From the foregoing it appears that the rule as to warning being given to the vessel itself before such vessel is sunk is subject to exceptions of various kinds under certain circumstances, as, for instance, the cases cited by the Union Government of flight and resistance, the vessel may be sunk without any warning; in others warning should be given before the vessel sails. The Austrian Government may then assert that it is essentially in agreement with the Union Government as to the protection of neutrals against risk of life, whatever may be the attitude of the Washington Cabinet towards some of the separate questions here raised. The Austrian Government has not only put into practice throughout the war the views it holds in this respect, but has gone even farther, regulating its actions with the strictest care according to the theory advanced by the Washington Cabinet, although its assurance as published only stated that was "essentially in agreement" with the Union Government's views. The Austrian Government would be extremely satisfied if the Washington Cabinet should be inclined to assist it in its endeavours, which are inspired by the warmest feelings of humanity, to save American citizens from risk at sea by instructing and warning its subjects in this direction.

Then, as regards the circular verbal note of February 10 of this year concerning the treatment of armed enemy merchant vessels, the Austrian Government must in any case declare itself to be, as indicated in the foregoing, of the opinion that the arming of trading ships, even when only for the purpose of avoiding capture, is not justified in modern international law. The rules provide that a warship is to approach an enemy merchant vessel in a peaceable manner; it is required to stop the vessel by means of certain signals, to interview the captain, examine the ship's papers, enter the particulars in due form and, where necessary, make an inventory, etc. But in order to comply with these requirements it must obviously be understood that the warship has full assurance that the merchant vessel will likewise observe a peaceable demeanour throughout. And it is clear that no such assurance can exist when the merchant vessel is so armed as to be capable of offering resistance to a warship. A warship can hardly be expected to act in such a manner under the guns of an enemy, whatever may be the purpose for which the guns were placed on board. Not to speak of the fact that the merchant vessels of the Entente Powers, despite all assurances to the contrary, have been proved to be armed for offensive purposes, and make use of their armament for such purposes. It would also be to disregard the rights of humanity if the crew of a warship were expected to surrender to the guns of an enemy without resistance on their own part. No State can regard its duty to humanity as less valid in respect of men defending their country than in respect of the subjects of a foreign Power.

The Austrian Government is therefore of opinion that its former assurance to the Washington Cabinet could not be held to apply to armed merchant vessels, since these, according to the legal standards prevailing, whereby hostilities are restricted to organised military forces, must be regarded as privateers (freebooters) which are liable to immediate destruction. History shows us that, according to the _general_ law of nations, merchant vessels have never been justified in resisting the exercise by warships of the right of taking prizes. But even if a standard to this effect could be shown to exist, it would not mean that the vessels had the right to provide themselves with guns. It should also be borne in mind that the arming of merchant ships must necessarily alter the whole conduct of warfare at sea, and that such alteration cannot correspond to the views of those who seek to regulate maritime warfare according to the principles of humanity. As a matter of fact, since the practice of privateering was discontinued, until a few years back no Power has ever thought of arming merchant vessels. Throughout the whole proceedings of the second Peace Conference, which was occupied with all questions of the laws of warfare at sea, not a single word was ever said about the arming of merchant ships. Only on one occasion was a casual observation made with any bearing on this question, and it is characteristic that it should have been by a British naval officer of superior rank, who impartially declared: "Lorsqu'un navire de guerre se propose d'arrêter et de visiter un vaisseau marchand, le commandant, avant de mettre une embarcation à la mer, fera tirer un coup de canon. Le coup de canon est la meilleure garantie que l'on puisse donner. _Les navires de commerce n'ont pas de canons à bord._" (When a warship intends to stop and board a merchant vessel the commander, before sending a boat, will fire a gun. The firing of a gun is the best guarantee that can be given. _Merchant vessels do not carry guns._)

Nevertheless, Austria-Hungary has in this regard also held by its assurance; in the circular verbal note referred to neutrals were cautioned beforehand against entrusting their persons or their goods on board any armed ship; moreover, the measures announced were not put into execution at once, but a delay was granted in order to enable neutrals already on board armed ships to leave the same. And, finally, the Austro-Hungarian warships are instructed, even in case of encountering armed enemy merchant vessels, to give warning and to provide for the safety of those on board, provided it seems possible to do so in the circumstances.

The statement of the American Ambassador, to the effect that the armed British steamers _Secondo_ and _Welsh Prince_ were sunk without warning by Austrian submarines, is based on error. The Austrian Government has in the meantime received information that no Austro-Hungarian warships were at all concerned in the sinking of these vessels.

The Austrian Government has, as in the circular verbal note already referred to--reverting now to the question of aggravated submarine warfare referred to in the memorandum--also in its declaration of January 31 of this year issued a warning to neutrals with corresponding time limit; indeed, _the whole of the declaration itself is, from its nature, nothing more or less than a warning to the effect that no merchant vessel may pass the area of sea expressly defined therein_. Nevertheless, the Austrian warships have been instructed as far as possible to warn such merchant vessels as may be encountered in the area concerned and provide for the safety of passengers and crew. And the Austrian Government is in the possession of numerous reports stating that the crews and passengers of vessels destroyed in these waters have been saved. But the Austrian Government cannot accept any responsibility for possible loss of human life which may after all occur in connection with the destruction of armed vessels or vessels encountered in prohibited areas. Also it may be noted that the Austro-Hungarian submarines operate only in the Adriatic and Mediterranean Seas, and there is thus hardly any question as to any action affecting American interests on the part of Austro-Hungarian warships.

After all that has been said in the preamble to this Memorandum, it need hardly be said that the declaration of the waters in question as a prohibited area is in no way intended as a measure aiming at the destruction of human life, or even to endangering the same, but that its object--apart from the higher aims of _relieving humanity from further suffering by shortening the war_, is only to place Great Britain and its Allies, who have--without establishing any legally effective blockade of the coasts of the Central Powers--hindered traffic by sea between neutrals and these Powers in a like position of isolation, and render them amenable to a peace with some guarantee of permanency. That Austria-Hungary here makes use of other methods of war than her opponents is due mainly to circumstances beyond human control. But the Austrian Government is conscious of having done all in its power to avoid loss of human life. _The object aimed at in the blockading of the Western Powers would be most swiftly and certainly attained if not a single human life were lost or endangered in those waters._

To sum up, the Austrian Government may point out that the assurance given to the Washington Cabinet in the case of the _Ancona_, and renewed in the case of the _Persia_, is neither withdrawn nor qualified by its statements of February 10, 1916, and January 31, 1917. Within the limits of this assurance the Austrian Government will, together with its Allies, continue its endeavours to secure to the peoples of the world a share in the blessings of peace. If in the pursuit of this aim--which it may take for granted has the full sympathy of the Washington Cabinet itself--it should find itself compelled to impose restrictions on neutral traffic by sea in certain areas, it will not need so much to point to the behaviour of its opponents in this respect, which appears by no means an example to be followed, but rather to the fact that Austria-Hungary, through the persistence and hatred of its enemies, who are determined upon its destruction, is brought to a state of self-defence in so desperate extreme as is unsurpassed in the history of the world. The Austrian Government is encouraged by the knowledge that the struggle now being carried on by Austria-Hungary tends not only toward the preservation of its own vital interests, but also towards the realisation of the idea of equal rights for all states; and in this last and hardest phase of the war, which unfortunately calls for sacrifices on the part of friends as well, it regards it as of supreme importance to confirm in word and deed the fact that it is guided equally by the laws of humanity and by the dictates of respect for the dignity and interests of neutral peoples.

3

=Speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the Submarine Warfare=

The _Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung_ of May 1, 1917, gives the following speech by Dr. Helfferich, Secretary of State, on the economic effects of the submarine warfare delivered in the principal committee of the Reichstag on April 28. The speech is here given verbatim, with the exception of portions containing confidential statements:

"In the sitting of yesterday a member rightly pointed out that the technical and economic results of the submarine warfare have been estimated with caution. In technical respects the caution observed in estimating the results is plain; the sinkings have, during the first month, exceeded by nearly a quarter, in the second by nearly half, the estimated 600,000 tons, and for the present month also we may fairly cherish the best expectations. The technical success guarantees the economic success with almost mathematical exactitude. True, the economic results cannot be so easily expressed numerically and set down in a few big figures as the technical result in the amount of tonnage sunk. The economic effects of the submarine warfare are expressed in many different spheres covering a wide area, where the enemy seeks to render visibility still more difficult by resorting, so to speak, to statistical smoke-screens.

"The English statistics to-day are most interesting, one might almost say, in what they wisely refrain from mentioning. The Secretary of State for the Navy pointed out yesterday how rapidly the pride of the British public had faded. The English are now suppressing our reports on the successes of our submarines and our statements as to submarine losses; they dare not make public the amount of tonnage sunk, but mystify the public with shipping statistics which have given rise to general annoyance in the English Press itself. The English Government lets its people go on calmly trusting to the myth that instead of six U-boats sunk there are a hundred at the bottom of the sea. It conceals from the world also the true course of the entries and departures of tonnage in British ports since the commencement of unrestricted submarine warfare. And more than all, the English Government has since February suppressed most strictly all figures tending to throw light on the position of the grain market. In the case of the coal exports, the country of destination is not published. The monthly trade report, which is usually issued with admirable promptness by the tenth of the next month or thereabouts, was for February delayed and incomplete; and for March it has not yet appeared at all. It is to be regretted that this sudden withdrawal of information makes it more difficult for us to estimate the effect of our submarine operations, but there is a gratifying side to the question after all. It is not to be supposed that England should suddenly become reticent in order to avoid revealing its strength.

"For the rest, what can be seen is still sufficient to give us an idea.

"I will commence with the tonnage. You are aware that in the first two months of the unrestricted submarine warfare more than 1,600,000 tons were sunk, of which probably considerably over one million tons sailed under the British flag.

"The estimates as to the quantity of English tonnage at present available are somewhat divergent; in any case, whether we take the higher or the lower figures, a loss of more than a million tons in two months is a thing that England cannot endure for long. And to replace it, even approximately, by new building, is out of the question. In the year 1914 England's newly-built ships gave a tonnage increment of 1,600,000; in 1915 it was 650,000 tons, in 1916 only 580,000, despite all efforts. And the normal loss of the British merchant fleet in peace time amounts to between 700,000 and 800,000 tons. It is hopeless to think of maintaining equilibrium by urging on the building of new vessels.

"The attempts which are made to enlist the neutral tonnage in British service by a system of rewards and punishments may here and there, to the ultimate disadvantage of the neutrals themselves, have met with some success, but even so, the neutrals must consider the need for preserving a merchant fleet themselves for peace time, so that there is a narrow limit to what can be attained in this manner. Even in January of this year about 30 per cent. of the shipping entries into British ports were under foreign flags. I have heard estimates brought up to 80 per cent. in order to terrify the neutrals; if but 50 per cent. of this be correct it means a decrease in British shipping traffic of roughly one-sixth. Counting tonnage sunk and tonnage frightened off, the arrivals at British ports have been reduced, at a low estimate, by one-fourth, and probably by as much as one-third, as against January. In January arrivals amounted to 2.2 million net tons. I may supplement the incomplete English statistics by the information that in March the arrivals were only 1.5 to 1.6 million tons net, and leave it to Mr. Carson to refute this. The 1.5 to 1.6 million tons represent, compared with the average entries in peace time, amounting to 4.2 millions, not quite 40 per cent. This low rate will be further progressively reduced. Lloyd George at the beginning of the war reckoned on the last milliard. Those days are now past. Then he based his plans on munitions. England has here, with the aid of America, achieved extraordinary results. But the Somme and Arras showed that, even with those enormous resources, England was not able to beat us. Now, in his greeting to the American Allies, Lloyd George cries out: 'Ships, ships, and yet more ships.' And this time he is on the right tack; it is on ships that the fate of the British world-empire will depend.

"The Americans, too, have understood this. They propose to build a thousand wooden vessels of 3,000 tons. But before these can be brought into action they will, I confidently hope, have nothing left to save.

"I base this confidence upon the indications which are visible, despite the English policy of suppression and concealment.

"Take the total British trade. The figures for March are still not yet available, but those for February tell us enough.

"British imports amounted in January of this year to 90 million pounds sterling, in February to only 70 million; the exports have gone down from 46 to 37 millions sterling--imports and exports together showing a decline of over 20 per cent. in the first month of the submarine warfare. And again, the rise in prices all round has, since the commencement of the U-boat war, continued at a more rapid rate, so that the decline in the import quantity from one month to another may fairly be estimated at 25 per cent. The figures for imports and exports, then, confirm my supposition as to the decrease of tonnage in the traffic with British ports.

"The British Government has endeavoured, by the strictest measures rigorously prohibiting import of less important articles, to ward off the decline in the quantity of vital necessaries imported. The attempt can only partially succeed.

"In 1916, out of a total import quantity of 42 million tons, about 31 millions fall to three important groups alone, viz., foodstuffs and luxuries, timber, and iron ore; all other goods, including important war materials, such as other ores and metals, petroleum, cotton and wool, rubber, only 11 million tons, or roughly one-fourth. A decline of one-fourth, then, as brought about by the first month of unrestricted submarine warfare, must affect articles indispensable to life and to the purposes of war.

"The decline in the imports in February, 1917, as against February, 1916, appears as follows:

"Wool 17 per cent., cotton 27 per cent., flax 38 per cent., hemp 48 per cent., jute 74 per cent., woollen materials 83 per cent., copper and copper ore 49 per cent., iron and steel 59 per cent. As to the imports of iron ore I will give more detailed figures:

"Coffee 66 per cent., tea 41 per cent., raw sugar 10 per cent., refined sugar 90 per cent., bacon 17 per cent., butter 21 per cent., lard 21 per cent., eggs 39 per cent., timber 42 per cent.

"The only increases worth noting are in the case of leather, hides, rubber and tin.

"As regards the group in which we are most interested, the various sorts of grain, no figures for quantities have been given from February onwards.

"The mere juxtaposition of two comparable values naturally gives no complete idea of the facts. It should be borne in mind that the commencement of the unrestricted U-boat campaign came at a time when the economical position of England was not normal, but greatly weakened already by two and a half years of war. A correct judgment will, then, only be possible when we take into consideration the entire development of the imports during the course of the war.

"I will here give only the most important figures.

"In the case of iron ore, England has up to now maintained its position better than in other respects.

"Imports amounted in 1913 to 7.4 million tons.

"In 1916 to 6.9 million tons.

"January, 1913, 689,000 tons; February, 1913, 658,000 tons.

"January, 1916, 526,000 tons; February, 1916, 404,000 tons.

"January, 1917, 512,000 tons; February, 1917, 508,000 tons.

"Here again comparison with the peace year 1913 shows for the months of January and February a not inconsiderable decrease, though the imports, especially in February, 1917, were in excess of those for the same month in 1916.

"Timber imports, 1913, 10.1 million loads. " " 1916, 5.9 " " " February, 1913, 406,000 loads. " " 1916, 286,000 " " " 1917, 167,000 "

"As regards mining timber especially, the import of which fell from 3.5 million loads in 1913 to 2.0 million in 1916, we have here December, 1916, and January, 1917, with 102,000 and 107,000 loads as the lowest import figures given since the beginning of 1913; a statement for the import of mining timber is missing for February.

"Before turning to the import of foodstuffs a word may be said as to the export of coal.

"The total export of coal has decreased from 78 million tons in 1913 to 461/2 million tons in 1915; in 1916 only about 42 million tons were exported. In December, 1916, the export quantity fell for the first time below 3 million tons, having remained between 3.2 and 3.9 million tons during the months from January to November, 1916. In January, 1917, a figure of 3.5 million tons was again reached; it is the more significant, therefore, that the coal export, which from the nature of the case exhibits only slight fluctuations from month to month, falls again in February, 1917, to 2.9 million tons (as against 3.4 million tons in February of the year before), thus almost reaching once more to the lowest point hitherto recorded--that of December, 1916. And it should be remembered that here, as in the case of all other exports, sunk transports are included in the English statistics.

"Details as to the destination of exported coal have since the beginning of this year been withheld. England is presumably desirous of saving the French and Italians the further distress of reading for the future in black and white the calamitous decline in their coal supply. The serious nature of this decline, even up to the end of 1916, may be seen from the following figures:

"England's coal export to France amounted in December, 1916, to only 1,128,000 tons, as against 1,269,000 tons in January of the same year; the exports to Italy in December, 1916, amounted only to 278,000 tons, as against 431,000 tons in January, and roughly 800,000 tons monthly average for the peace year 1913.

"As to the further development since the end of February, I am able to give some interesting details. Scotland's coal export in the first week of April was 103,000 tons, as against 194,000 tons the previous year; from the beginning of the year 1,783,000 tons, as against 2,486,000 tons the previous year. From this it is easy to see how the operations of the U-boats are striking at the root of railway and war industries in the countries allied with England.

"Lloyd George, in a great speech made on January 22 of this year, showed the English how they could protect themselves against the effects of submarine warfare by increased production in their own country. The practicability and effectiveness of his counsels are more than doubtful. He makes no attempt, however, to instruct his Allies how they are to protect themselves against the throttling of the coal supply.

"I come now to the most important point: _the position of England with regard to its food supply_.

"First of all I would give a few brief figures by way of calling to mind the degree to which England is dependent upon supplies of foodstuffs from overseas.

"The proportion of imports in total British consumption averaged during the last years of peace as follows:

"Bread-corn, close on 80 per cent.

"Fodder-grain (barley, oats, maize), which can be utilised as substitutes for, and to supplement, the bread-corn, 50 per cent.; meat, over 40 per cent.; butter, 60-65 per cent. The sugar consumption, failing any home production at all, must be entirely covered by imports from abroad.

"I would further point out that our U-boats, inasmuch as concerns the food situation in England, are operating under quite exceptionally favourable conditions; the world's record harvest of 1915 has been followed by the world's worst harvest of 1916, representing a loss of 45-50 million tons of bread and fodder-grain. The countries hardest hit are those most favourably situated, from the English point of view, in North America. The effects are now--the rich stocks from the former harvest having been consumed--becoming more evident every day and everywhere. The Argentine has put an embargo on exports of grain. As to the condition of affairs in the United States, this may be seen from the following figures:

"The Department of Agriculture estimates the stocks of wheat still in the hands of the farmer on March 1, 1917, at 101 million bushels, or little over 21/2 million tons. The stocks for the previous year on that date amounted to 241 million bushels. Never during the whole of the time I have followed these figures back have the stocks been so low or even nearly so. The same applies to stocks of maize. Against a supply of 1,138,000 bushels on March 1, 1916, we have for this year only 789,000 bushels.

"The extraordinary scarcity of supplies is nearing the panic limit. The movement of prices during the last few weeks is simply fantastic. Maize, which was noted in Chicago at the beginning of January, 1917, at 95 cents, rose by the end of April to 127 cents, and by April 25 had risen further to 148 cents. Wheat in New York, which stood at 871/4 cents in July, 1914, and by the beginning of 1917 had already risen to 1911/2 cents, rose at the beginning of April to 229 cents, and was noted at no less than 281 on April 2. This is three and a half times the peace figure! In German currency at normal peace time exchange, these 281 cents represent about 440 marks per ton, or, at present rate of exchange for dollars, about 580 marks per ton.

"That, then, is the state of affairs in the country which is to help England in the war of starvation criminally begun by itself!

"In England no figures are now made public as to imports and stocks of grain. I can, however, state as follows:

"On the last date for which stocks were noted, January 13, 1917, England's visible stocks of wheat amounted to 5.3 million quarters, as against 6.3 and 5.9 million quarters in the two previous years. From January to May and June there is, as a rule, a marked decline in the stocks, and even in normal years the imports during these months do not cover the consumption. In June, 1914 and 1915, the visible stocks amounted only to about 2 million quarters, representing the requirements for scarcely three weeks.

"We have no reason to believe that matters have developed more favourably during the present year. This is borne out by the import figures for January--as published. The imports of bread-corn and fodder-grain--I take them altogether, as in the English regulations for eking out supplies--amounted only to 12.6 million quarters, as against 19.8 and 19.2 in the two previous years.

"For February the English statistics show an increase in the import value of unstated import quantity of all grain of 50 per cent., as against February, 1916. This gives, taking the distribution among the various sorts of grain as similar to that of January, and reckoning with the rise in prices since, about the same import quantity as in the previous year. But in view of the great decrease in American grain shipments and the small quantity which can have come from India and Australia the statement is hardly credible. We may take it that March has brought a further decline, and that to-day, when we are nearing the time of the three-week stocks, the English supplies are lower than in the previous years.

"The English themselves acknowledge this. Lloyd George stated in February that the English grain supplies were lower than ever within the memory of man. A high official in the English Ministry of Agriculture, Sir Ailwyn Fellowes, speaking in April at an agricultural congress, added that owing to the submarine warfare, which was an extremely serious peril to England, the state of affairs had grown far worse even than then.

"Captain Bathurst, of the British Food Controller's Department (_Kriegsernährungsamt_), stated briefly on April 19 that the then consumption of breadstuffs was 50 per cent. in excess of the present _and prospective_ supplies. It would be necessary to reduce the consumption of bread by fully a third in order to make ends meet.

"Shortly before, Mr. Wallhead, a delegate from Manchester, at a conference of the Independent Labour Party in Leeds had stated that, according to his information, England would in six to eight weeks be in a complete state of famine.

"The crisis in which England is placed--and we can fairly call it a crisis now--is further aggravated by the fact that the supplies of other important foodstuffs have likewise taken an unfavourable turn.

"The import of meat in February, 1917, shows the lowest figures for many years, with the single exception of September, 1914.

"The marked falling off in the butter imports--February, 1917, showing only half as much as in the previous year--is not nearly counterbalanced by the margarine which England is making every effort to introduce.

"The import of lard also, most of which comes from the United States, shows a decline, owing to the poor American crops of fodder-stuffs. The price of lard in Chicago has risen from 151/2 cents at the beginning of January, 1917, to 211/2 cents on April 25, and the price of pigs in the same time from 9.80 to 16.50 dollars.

"Most serious of all, however, is the shortage of potatoes, which at present is simply catastrophic. The English crop was the worst for a generation past. The imports are altogether insignificant. Captain Bathurst stated on April 19 that in about four weeks the supplies of potatoes in the country would be entirely exhausted.

"The full seriousness of the case now stares English statesmen in the face. Up to now they have believed it possible to exorcise the danger by voluntary economies. Now they find themselves compelled to have recourse to compulsory measures. I believe it is too late."

The Secretary of State then gives a detailed account of the measures taken up to date in England for dealing with the food question, and thereafter continues:

"On March 22 again the English food dictator, Lord Devonport, stated in the House of Lords that a great reduction in the consumption of bread would be necessary, but that it would be _a national disaster_ if England should have to resort to compulsion.

"His representative, Bathurst, stated at the same time: 'We do not wish to introduce _so un-English a system_. In the first place, because we believe that the patriotism of the people can be trusted to assist us in our endeavours towards economy, and, further, because, as we can see from the example of Germany, the compulsory system promises no success; finally, because such a system would necessitate a too complicated administrative machinery and too numerous staffs of men and women whose services could be better employed elsewhere.'

"Meantime the English Government has, on receipt of the latest reports, decided to adopt this un-English system which has proved a failure in Germany, declaring now that the entire organisation for the purpose is in readiness.

"I have still something further to say about the vigorous steps now being taken in England to further the progress of agriculture in the country itself. I refrain from going into this, however, as the measures in question cannot come to anything by next harvest time, nor can they affect that harvest at all. The winter deficiency can hardly be balanced, even with the greatest exertions, by the spring. Not until the 1918 crop, if then, can any success be attained. And between then and now lies a long road, a road of suffering for England, and for all countries dependent upon imports for their food supply.

"Everything points to the likelihood that the universal failure of the harvest in 1916 will be followed by a like universal failure in 1917. In the United States the official reports of acreage under crops are worse than ever, showing 63.4, against 78.3 the previous year. The winter wheat is estimated at only 430 million bushels, as against 492 million bushels for the previous year and 650 million bushels for 1915.

"The prospects, then, for the next year's harvest are poor indeed, and offer no hope of salvation to our enemies.

"As to our own outlook, this is well known to those present: short, but safe--for we can manage by ourselves. And to-day we can say that the war of starvation, that crime against humanity, has turned against those who commenced it. We hold the enemy in an iron grip. No one can save them from their fate. Not even the apostles of humanity across the great ocean, who are now commencing to protect the smaller nations by a blockade of our neutral neighbours through prohibition of exports, and seeking thus to drive them, under the lash of starvation, into entering into the war against us.

"Our enemies are feeling the grip of the fist that holds them by the neck. They are trying to force a decision. England, mistress of the seas, is seeking to attain its end by land, and driving her sons by hundreds of thousands to death and mutilation. Is this the England that was to have sat at ease upon its island till we were starved into submission, that could wait till their big brother across the Atlantic arrived on the scene with ships and million armies, standing fast in crushing superiority until the last annihilating battle?

"No, gentlemen, our enemies have no longer time to wait. Time is on our side now. True, the test imposed upon us by the turn of the world's history is enormous. What our troops are doing to help, what our young men in blue are doing, stands far above all comparison. But they will attain their end. For us at home, too, it is hard; not so hard by far as for them out there, yet hard enough. Those at home must do their part as well. If we remain true to ourselves, keeping our own house in order, maintaining internal unity, then we have won existence and the future for our Fatherland. Everything is at stake. The German people is called upon now, in these weeks heavy with impending decision, to show that it is worthy of continued existence."

4

=Speech by Count Czernin to the Austrian Delegation, January 24, 1918.=

"Gentlemen, it is my duty to give you a true picture of the peace negotiations, to set forth the various phases of the results obtained up to now, and to draw therefrom such conclusions as are true, logical and justifiable.

"First of all it seems to me that those who consider the progress of the negotiations too slow cannot have even an approximate idea of the difficulties which we naturally had to encounter at every step. I will in my remarks take the liberty of setting forth these difficulties, but would like first to point out a cardinal difference existing between the peace negotiations in Brest-Litovsk and all others which have ever taken place in the history of the world. Never, so far as I am aware, have peace negotiations been conducted with open windows. It would be impossible that negotiations of the depth and extent of the present could from the start proceed smoothly and without opposition. We are faced with nothing less than the task of building up a new world, of restoring all that the most merciless of all wars has destroyed and cast down. In all the peace negotiations we know of the various phases have been conducted more or less behind closed doors, the results being first declared to the world when the whole was completed. All history books tell us, and indeed it is obvious enough, that the toilsome path of such peace negotiations leads constantly over hill and dale, the prospects appearing often more or less favourable day by day. But when the separate phases themselves, the details of each day's proceedings, are telegraphed all over the world at the time, it is again obvious that nervousness prevailing throughout the world must act like an electric current and excite public opinion accordingly. We were fully aware of the disadvantage of this method of proceeding. Nevertheless we at once agreed to the wish of the Russian Government in respect of this publicity, desiring to meet them as far as possible, and also because we had nothing to conceal on our part, and because it would have made an unfavourable impression if we had stood firmly by the methods hitherto pursued, of secrecy until completion. _But the complete publicity in the negotiations makes it insistent that the great public, the country behind, and above all the leaders, must keep cool._ The match must be played out in cold blood, and the end will be satisfactory if the peoples of the Monarchy support their representatives at the conference.

"It should be stated beforehand that the basis on which Austria-Hungary treats with the various newly-constituted Russian states is that of 'no indemnities and no annexations.' That is the programme which a year ago, shortly after my appointment as Minister, I put before those who wished to talk of peace, and which I repeated to the Russian leaders on the occasion of their first offers of peace. And I have not deviated from that programme. Those who believe that I am to be turned from the way which I have set myself to follow are poor psychologists. I have never left the public in the slightest doubt as to which way I intended to go, and I have never allowed myself to be turned aside so much as a hair's breadth from that way, either to right or left. And I have since become far from a favourite of the Pan-Germans and of those in the Monarchy who follow the Pan-German ideas. I have at the same time been hooted as an inveterate partisan of war by those whose programme is peace at any price, as innumerable letters have informed me. Neither has ever disturbed me; on the contrary, the double insults have been my only comfort in this serious time. I declare now once again that I ask not a single kreuzer, not a single square metre of land from Russia, and that if Russia, as appears to be the case, takes the same point of view, then peace must result. Those who wish for peace at any price might entertain some doubt as to my 'no-annexation' intentions towards Russia if I did not tell them to their faces with the same complete frankness that I shall never assent to the conclusion of a peace going beyond the lines just laid down. If the Russian delegates demand any surrender of territory on our part, or any war indemnity, then I shall continue the war, despite the fact that I am as anxious for peace as they, or I would resign if I could not attain the end I seek.

"This once said, and emphatically asserted, that there is no ground for the pessimistic anticipation of the peace falling through, since the negotiating committees are agreed on the basis of no annexations or indemnities--and nothing but new instructions from the various Russian Governments, or their disappearance, could shift that basis--I then pass to the two great difficulties in which are contained the reasons why the negotiations have not proceeded as quickly as we all wished.

"The first difficulty is this: that we are not dealing with _a single_ Russian peace delegation, but with various newly-formed Russian states, whose spheres of action are as yet by no means definitely fixed or explained among themselves. We have to reckon with the following: firstly, the Russia which is administered from St. Petersburg; secondly, our new neighbour proper, the great State of Ukraine; thirdly, Finland; and, fourthly, the Caucasus.

"With the first two of these states we are treating directly; that is to say, face to face; with the two others it was at first in a more or less indirect fashion, as they had not sent any representative to Brest-Litovsk. We have then four Russian parties, and four separate Powers on our own side to meet them. The case of the Caucasus, with which we ourselves have, of course, no direct questions to settle, but which, on the other hand, is in conflict with Turkey, will serve to show the extent of the matter to be debated.

"The point in which we ourselves are most directly interested is that of the great newly-established state upon our frontiers, Ukraine. In the course of the proceedings we have already got well ahead with this delegation. We are agreed upon the aforementioned basis of no indemnities and no annexations, and have in the main arrived at a settlement on the point that trade relations are to be re-established with the new republic, as also on the manner of so doing. But this very case of the Ukraine illustrates one of the prevailing difficulties. While the Ukraine Republic takes up the position of being entirely autonomous and justified in treating independently with ourselves, the Russian delegation insists that the boundaries between their territory and that of the Ukraine are not yet definitely fixed, and that Petersburg is therefore able to claim the right of taking part in our deliberations with the Ukraine, which claim is not admitted by the members of the Ukraine delegation themselves. This unsettled state of affairs in the internal conditions of Russia, however, gave rise to very serious delays. We have got over these difficulties, and I hope that in a few days' time we shall be able once more to resume negotiations.

"As to the position to-day, I cannot say what this may be. I received yesterday from my representative at Brest-Litovsk the following two telegrams:

"'Herr Joffe has this evening, in his capacity as President of the Russian Delegation, issued a circular letter to the delegations of the four allied Powers in which he states that the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic has decided to send two delegates to Brest-Litovsk with instructions to take part in the peace negotiations on behalf of the central committee of the workers', soldiers' and peasants' councils of Pan-Ukraine, but also to form a supplementary part of the _Russian_ delegation itself. Herr Joffe adds with regard to this that the Russian delegation is prepared to receive these Ukrainian representatives among themselves. The above statement is supplemented by a copy of a "declaration" dated from Kharkov, addressed to the President of the Russian Peace Delegation at Brest, and emanating from the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic, proclaiming that the Central Rada at Kiev only represents the propertied classes, and is consequently incapable of acting on behalf of the entire Ukrainian people. The Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government declares that it cannot acknowledge any decisions arrived at by the delegates of the Central Rada at Kiev without its participation, but has nevertheless decided to send representatives to Brest-Litovsk, there to participate as a supplementary fraction of the Russian Delegation, which they recognise as the accredited representatives of the Federative Government of Russia.'

"Furthermore: 'The German translation of the Russian original text of the communication received yesterday evening from Herr Joffe regarding the delegates of the Ukrainian Government at Kharkov and the two appendices thereto runs as follows:

"'To the President of the Austro-Hungarian Peace Delegation.

"'Sir,--In forwarding you herewith a copy of a declaration received by me from the delegates of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic, W.M. Schachrai and J.G. Medwjedew, and their mandates, I have the honour to inform you that the Russian Delegation, in full agreement with its frequently repeated acknowledgment of the right of self-determination among all peoples--including naturally the Ukrainian--sees nothing to hinder the participation of the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic in the peace negotiations, and receives them, according to their wish, among the personnel of the Russian Peace Delegation, as accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. In bringing this to your knowledge, I beg you, sir, to accept the expression of my most sincere respect.--The President of the Russian Peace Delegation: A. JOFFE.'

"'Appendix 1. To the President of the Peace Delegation of the Russian Republic. Declaration.

"'We, the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic, People's Commissary for Military Affairs, W.M. Schachrai, and the President of the Pan-Ukrainian Central Executive Committee of the Council of the Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputation, J.G. Medwjedew, delegated to proceed to Brest-Litovsk for the purpose of conducting peace negotiations with the representatives of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and Turkey, in full agreement with the representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Russian Federative Republic, thereby understood the Council of People's Commissaries, hereby declare as follows: The General Secretariat of the Ukrainian Central Rada can in no case be acknowledged as representing the entire Ukrainian people. In the name of the Ukrainian workers, soldiers and peasants, we declare categorically that all resolutions formed by the General Secretariat without our assent will not be accepted by the Ukrainian people, cannot be carried out, and can in no case be realised.

"'In full agreement with the Council of People's Commissaries, and thus also with the Delegation of the Russian Workers' and Peasants' Government, we shall for the future undertake the conduct of the peace negotiations with the Delegation of the four Powers, together with the Russian Peace Delegation.

"'And we now bring to the knowledge of the President the following resolution, passed by the Central Executive Committee of the Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, on the 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918:

"'The Central Committee has decided: To delegate Comrade Medwjedew, President of the Central Executive Committee, and People's Secretary Satonski and Commissary Schachrai, to take part in the peace negotiations, instructing them at the same time to declare categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act in the name of the Ukrainian people are to be regarded as _arbitrary steps_ on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population, against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine, and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada will be acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the Ukrainian people; that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government regards the Council of People's Commissaries as representatives of the Pan-Russian Soviet Government, and as accordingly entitled to act on behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government, sent out for the purpose of exposing the arbitrary steps of the Ukrainian Central Rada, will act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian Delegation.

"'Herewith: The mandate issued by the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Republic, 30th December, 1917.

"'Note: People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, was taken ill on the way, and did not therefore arrive with us.

"'January, 1918.

"'The President of the Central Executive Committee of the Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies, E. Medwjedew.

"'The People's Commissary for Military Affairs, Schachrai.

"'A true copy of the original.

"'The Secretary of the Peace Delegation, Leo Karachou.'

"Appendix 2.

"'On the resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Deputies of Ukraina, the People's Secretariat of the Ukrainian Republic hereby appoints, in the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of Ukraina, the President of the Central Executive Committee of the Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies of Ukraina, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, the People's Secretary for Military Affairs, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai, and the People's Secretary for Enlightenment of the People, Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski, in the name of the Ukrainian People's Republic, to take part in the negotiations with the Governments of Germany, Austria-Hungary, Turkey and Bulgaria as to the terms of peace between the mentioned states and the Russian Federative Republic. With this end in view the mentioned deputies, Jesim Gregoriewitch Medwjedew, Wasili Matwjejewitch Schachrai and Wladimir Petrowitch Satonski are empowered, in all cases where they deem it necessary, to issue declarations and to sign documents in the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian Republic. The accredited representatives of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government are bound to act throughout in accordance with the actions of the accredited representatives of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Russian Federative Republic, whereby is understood the Council of People's Commissaries.

"'In the name of the Workers' and Peasants' Government of the Ukrainian People's Republic, the People's Secretary for International Affairs, for Internal Affairs, Military Affairs, Justice, Works, Commissariat.

"'The Manager of the Secretariat.

"'Kharkov, 30th December, 1917/12th January, 1918.

"'In accordance with the copy.

"'The President of the Russian Peace Delegation, A. Joffe.'

"This is at any rate a new difficulty, since we cannot and will not interfere in the internal affairs of Russia.

"This once disposed of, however, there will be no further difficulties to encounter here; we shall, in agreement with the Ukrainian Republic determine that _the old boundaries between Austria-Hungary and the former Russia will also be maintained as between ourselves and the Ukraine._

=Poland=

"As regards Poland, the frontiers of which, by the way, have not yet been exactly determined, _we want nothing at all from this new state_. Free and uninfluenced, the population of Poland shall choose its own fate. For my part I attach no great weight to the _form_ of the people's vote in this respect; _the more surely it expresses the general wish of the people, the better I shall be pleased_. For I desire only the _voluntary_ attachment of Poland; only in the express _wish_ of Poland itself toward that end can I see any guarantee for lasting harmony. It is my unalterable conviction that _the Polish question must not be allowed to delay the signing of peace by a single day_. If, after peace is arrived at, Poland should wish to approach us, we will not reject its advances--_the Polish question must not and shall not endanger the peace itself_.

"I should have been glad if _the Polish Government had been able to take part in the negotiations_, since in my opinion Poland is _an independent state_. The Petersburg Government, however, takes the attitude that the present Polish Government is not entitled to speak in the name of the country, and does not acknowledge it as competent to represent the country, and we therefore gave way on this point in order to avoid possible conflict. The question is certainly one of importance, but it is more important still in my opinion _to set aside all difficulties likely to delay the negotiations_.

=German-Russian Differences as to the Occupied Areas=

"The second difficulty to be reckoned with, and one which has been most widely echoed in the Press, is the _difference of opinion between our German allies and the Petersburg Government_ anent the interpretation of _the right of self-determination among the Russian peoples_; that is to say, in the areas occupied by German troops. Germany maintains that it _does not aim at any annexation of territory by force_ from Russia, but, briefly stated, the difference of opinion is a double one.

"In the first place, Germany rightly maintains that _the numerous expressions of desire for independence_ on the part of _legislative corporations, communal representations_, etc., in the occupied areas should be taken as the _provisional_ basis for the will of the people, to be _later_ tested by _plebiscite on a broader foundation_, a point of view which the Russian Government at first was indisposed to agree to, as it did not consider the existing administrations in Courland and Lithuania entitled to speak for those provinces any more than in the case of Poland.

"In the second place, Russia demands that this plebiscite shall take place _after all German troops and officials have been withdrawn from the occupied provinces_, while Germany, in reply to this, points out that if this principle were carried to its utmost limits it would create a vacuum, which could not fail to bring about at once a state of complete anarchy and the utmost misery. It should here be noted that everything in these provinces which to-day renders possible the life of a state at all is _German property_. Railways, posts and telegraphs, the entire industry, and moreover the entire administrative machinery, police, law courts, all are in German hands. The sudden withdrawal of all this apparatus would, in fact, create a condition of things which seems _practically impossible to maintain_.

"In both cases it is a question of finding a _middle way_, which moreover _must be found_.

"_The differences between these two points of view are in my opinion not great enough to justify failure of the negotiations_.

"But such negotiations cannot be settled from one day to another; they take time.

"_If once we have attained peace with Russia, then in my opinion the general peace cannot be long delayed_, despite all efforts on the part of the Western Entente statesmen. I have learned that some are unable to understand why I stated in my first speech after the resumption of negotiations that it was not now a question at Brest of a general peace, but of a _separate peace with Russia_. This was the necessary recognition of a plain fact, which Herr Trotski also has admitted without reserve, and it was necessary, since the negotiations would have been on a different footing--that is to say, _in a more limited sphere_--if treating with Russia alone than if it were a case of treating for a general peace.

"Though I have no illusions in the direction of expecting the fruit of general peace to ripen in a single night, I am nevertheless convinced that the fruit _has begun to ripen_, and that it is now only a question of holding out whether we are to obtain a general honourable peace or not.

=Wilson's Message=

"I have recently been confirmed in this view by the offer of peace put forward by the President of the United States of America to the whole world. This is _an offer of peace_, for in fourteen points Mr. Wilson sets forth the principles upon which he seeks to establish a general peace. Obviously, an offer of this nature cannot be expected to furnish a scheme acceptable in every detail. If that were the case, then negotiations would be superfluous altogether, and peace could be arrived at by a simple acceptance, a single assent. This, of course, is not so.

"_But I have no hesitation in declaring that these last proposals on the part of President Wilson seem to me considerably nearer the Austro-Hungarian point of view_, and that there are among his proposals some which we can even agree to _with great pleasure_.

"If I may now be allowed to go further into these proposals, I must, to begin with, point out two things:

"So far as the proposals are concerned with _our Allies_--mention is made of the German possession of _Belgium_ and of the _Turkish Empire_--I declare that, in fulfilment of our duty to our Allies, I am firmly determined _to hold out in defence of our Allies to the very last. The pre-war possessions of our Allies we will defend equally with our own_. This standpoint is that of all four Allies in complete reciprocity with ourselves.

"In the second place, I have to point out that I must _politely but definitely decline_ to consider the Point dealing with our internal Government. We have in Austria _a parliament elected by general, equal, direct and secret ballot_. There is not a more democratic parliament in the world, and this parliament, together with the other constitutionally admissible factors, has the sole right to decide upon matters of _Austrian internal affairs_. I speak of _Austria_ only, because I do not refer to _Hungarian_ internal affairs in the _Austrian Delegation_. I should not consider it constitutional to do so. _And we do not interfere in American affairs; but, on the other hand, we do not wish for any foreign guidance from any state whatever._ Having said this, I may be permitted, with regard to the remaining Points, to state as follows:

"As to the Point dealing with the abolition of 'secret diplomacy' and the introduction of full openness in the negotiations, I have nothing to say. From my point of view I have _no objection to such public negotiations so long as full reciprocity_ is the basis of the same, though I do entertain _considerable doubt_ as to whether, all things considered, _it is the quickest and most practical method_ of arriving at a result. Diplomatic negotiations are simply a matter of business. But it might easily be imagined that in the case, for instance, of commercial treaties between one country and another it would not be advisable _to publish incomplete results beforehand_ to the world. In such negotiations both parties naturally commence by setting their demands as high as possible in order to climb down gradually, using this or that expressed demand as matter for _compensation in_ other ways until finally an _equilibrium of the opposing interests is arrived at_, a point which must necessarily be reached if agreement is to be come to at all. If such negotiations were to be carried on with full publicity, nothing could prevent the general public from passionately defending every separate clause involved, regarding any concession as a defeat, even when such clauses had only been advanced _for tactical reasons_. And when the public takes up any such point with particular fervour, ultimate agreement may be thereby rendered impossible or the final agreement may, if arrived at, be regarded as in itself _a defeat_, possibly by both sides. And this would not conduce to peaceable relations thereafter; it would, on the contrary, _increase the friction_ between the states concerned. And as in the case of commercial treaties, so also with _political_ negotiations, which deal with political matters.

"If the abolition of secret diplomacy is to mean that _no secret compacts are to be made_, that no agreements are to be entered upon without the public knowledge, then I have no objection to the introduction of this principle. As to how it is to be realised and adherence thereto ensured, I confess I have no idea at all. Granted that the governments of two countries are agreed, they will always be able to make a secret compact without the public being aware of the fact. These, however, are minor points. I am not one to stick by formalities, and _a question of more or less formal nature will never prevent me from coming to a sensible arrangement_.

"Point 1, then, is one that can be discussed.

"Point 2 is concerned with the _freedom of the seas_. In this postulate the President speaks from the hearts of all, and I can here _fully and completely share America's desire_, the more so as the President adds the words, 'outside territorial waters'--that is to say, we are to understand the freedom of _the open sea_, and there is thus, of course, no question of any interference by force in the sovereign rights of our faithful _Turkish_ Allies. Their standpoint in this respect will be ours.

"Point 3, which is definitely directed against any _future economic war_, is so right, so sensible, and has so often been craved by ourselves that I have here again nothing to remark.

"Point 4, which demands _general disarmament_, sets forth in particularly clear and lucid form the necessity of reducing after this present war the free competition in armaments to a footing sufficient for the _internal security_ of states. Mr. Wilson states this frankly and openly. In my speech at Budapest some months back I ventured to express the same idea; it forms _part of my political creed_, and I am most happy to find any other voice uttering the same thought.

"As regards the _Russian clause_, we are already showing in deeds that we are endeavouring to bring about friendly relations with our neighbours there.

"With regard to _Italy, Serbia, Roumania and Montenegro_, I can only repeat my statement already made in the Hungarian Delegation.

"I am not disposed to effect any insurance on the war ventures of our enemies.

"I am not disposed to make any one-sided concessions to our enemies, who still obstinately adhere to the standpoint of fighting on until the final victory; to prejudice permanently the Monarchy by such concessions, which would give the enemy the invaluable advantage of being able to carry on the war indefinitely without risk. (_Applause._)

"Let Mr. Wilson use the great influence he undoubtedly possesses among his Allies to persuade them on their part to declare _on what conditions they are willing to treat_; he will then have rendered the enormous service of having set on foot the _general peace negotiations_. I am here replying openly and freely to Mr. Wilson, and I will speak as openly and freely to any who wish to speak for themselves, but it must necessarily be understood that _time, and the continuation of the war, cannot but affect the situations here concerned_.

"I have already said this once before; Italy is a striking example. Italy had the opportunity before the war of making great territorial acquisitions without firing a shot. It declined this and entered into the war; it has lost hundreds of thousands of lives, milliards in war expenses and values destroyed; it has brought want and misery upon its own population, and all this _only to lose for ever an advantage which it might have won_.

"Finally, as regards Point 13, it is an open secret that we are adherents to the idea of establishing 'an independent Polish State to include the areas undoubtedly occupied by Polish inhabitants.' On this point also we shall, I think, soon agree with Mr. Wilson. And if the President crowns his proposals with the idea of a universal _League of Nations_ he will hardly meet with any opposition thereto on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

"As will be seen from this comparison of my views with those of Mr. Wilson, we are not only _agreed in essentials as to the great principles_ for rearrangement of the world after this war, but _our ideas as to several concrete questions bearing on the peace are closely allied_.

"The differences remaining do not appear to me so great but that a discussion of these points might lead to a clearer understanding and bring us closer still.

"The situation, then, seems to be this: Austria-Hungary on the one hand, and the United States of America on the other, are the two Great Powers in the hostile groups of states whose interests are least opposed one to the other. It seems reasonable, then, to suppose that _an exchange of opinion between these two Powers might form the natural starting point for a conciliatory discussion_ between all those states which have not yet entered upon peace negotiations. (_Applause._) So much for Wilson's proposals.

=Petersburg and the Ukraine=

"And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. But this conclusion is perhaps the most important of all I have to say; I am endeavouring to bring about peace between the Ukraine and Petersburg.

"The conclusion of peace with Petersburg alters nothing in our definitive situation. Austro-Hungarian troops are nowhere opposed to the Petersburg Government--we have the Ukrainian against us--and it is impossible to export anything from Petersburg, since they have nothing there themselves but _revolution and anarchy, goods which the Bolshevists, no doubt, would be glad to export, but which I must politely decline to receive_.

"In spite of this, I wish to make peace with Petersburg as well, since this, like any other cessation of hostilities, brings us nearer to the _general peace_.

"It is otherwise with Ukraine. For the Ukraine has supplies of provisions which they will export if we can agree on commercial terms. The question of food is to-day a matter of anxiety throughout the world; among our opponents, and also in the neutral countries, it is a burning question. I wish to profit by the conclusion of peace with those Russian states which have food to export, in order to help our own population. _We could and would hold out without this assistance._ But I know my duty, and my duty bids me do all that can be done to lighten the burden of our suffering people, and I will not, therefore, from any hysterical nervousness about getting to final peace a few days or a few weeks earlier, throw away this possible advantage to our people. Such a peace takes time and cannot be concluded in a day. For such a peace must definitely state whether, what and how the Russian party will deliver to us, for the reason that the Ukraine on its part wishes to close the business not after, but at the signing of peace.

"I have already mentioned that the unsettled conditions in this newly established state occasion great difficulty and naturally considerable delay in the negotiations.

=Appeal to the Country=

"_If you fall on me from behind, if you force me to come to terms at once in headlong fashion, we shall gain no economic advantage at all_, and our people will then be forced to renounce the alleviation which they should have gained from the peace.

"A surgeon conducting a difficult operation with a crowd behind him standing watch in hand may very likely complete the operation in record time, but in all probability the patient would not thank him for the manner in which it had been carried out.

"If you give our present opponents the impression that we must have _peace at once, and at any price_, we shall not get so much as a single measure of grain, and the result will be more or less platonic. It is no longer by any means a question principally of terminating the war on the Ukrainian front; neither we nor the Ukrainians themselves intend to continue the war now that we are agreed upon the no-annexation basis. It is a question--I repeat it once again--not of 'imperialistic' annexation plans and ideas, but of securing for our population at last the merited reward of their endurance, and procuring them those supplies of food for which they are waiting. Our partners in the deal are good business men and are closely watching to see _whether you are forcing me to act or not_.

"_If you wish to ruin the peace_, if you are anxious to renounce the supply of grain, then it would be logical enough to force my hand by speeches and resolutions, strikes and demonstrations, but not otherwise. And there is not an atom of truth in the idea that we are now at such a pass that we must prefer a bad peace without economic gain rather than a good peace with economic advantages to-morrow.

"The difficulties in the matter of food of late are not due solely to lack of actual provisions; it is the crises in coal, transport and organisation which are increasing. _When you at home get up strikes you are moving in a vicious circle; the strikes increase and aggravate the crises concerned and hinder the supplies of food and coal._ You are cutting your own throats in so doing, and all who believe that peace is accelerated thereby are terribly mistaken.

"It is believed that men in the country have been circulating rumours to the effect that the Government is instigating the strikes. I leave to these men themselves to choose whether they are to appear as _criminal slanderers or as fools_.

"If you had a Government desirous of concluding a peace different from that desired by the majority of the population, if you had a Government seeking to prolong the war for purposes of conquest, one might understand a conflict between the Government and the country. _But since the Government desires precisely the same as the majority of the people--that is to say, the speedy settlement of an honourable peace without annexationist aims--then it is madness to attack that Government from behind, to interfere with its freedom of action and hamper its movements._ Those who do so are fighting, not against the Government, they are fighting blindly against the people they pretend to serve and against themselves.

"As for yourselves, gentlemen, it is not only your right, but your duty, to choose between the following alternatives: either you trust me to proceed with the peace negotiations, and in that case you must help me, or you do not trust me, and in that case you must depose me. I am confident that I have the support of the majority of the Hungarian delegation. The Hungarian Committee has given me a vote of confidence. If there is any doubt as to the same here, then the matter is clear enough. The question of a vote of confidence must be brought up and put to the vote; if I then have the majority against me I shall at once take the consequences. No one of those who are anxious to secure my removal will be more pleased than myself; indeed far less so. Nothing induces me now to retain my office but the sense of duty, which constrains me to remain as long as I have the confidence of the Emperor and the majority of the delegations. A soldier with any sense of decency does not desert. But no Minister for Foreign Affairs could conduct negotiations of this importance unless he knows, and all the world as well, that he is endowed with the confidence of the majority among the constitutional representative bodies. There can be no half measures here. You have this confidence or you have not. You must assist me or depose me; there is no other way. I have no more to say."

5

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Brest-Litovsk=

The Austro-Hungarian Government entered upon the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk with the object of arriving as quickly as possible at a peace compact which, if it did not, as we hoped, lead to a general peace, should at least secure order in the East. The draft of a preliminary peace was sent to Brest containing the following points:

1. Cessation of hostilities; if general peace should not be concluded, then neither of the present contracting parties to afford any support to the enemies of the other.

2. No surrender of territory; Poland, Lithuania and Courland retaining the right of determining their own destiny for the future.

3. No indemnity for costs of war or damages due to military operations.

4. Cessation of economic war and reparation of damages sustained by private persons through the economic war.

5. Resumption of commercial intercourse and the same provisionally on the basis of the old commercial treaty and twenty years' preference subject to restriction in respect of any Customs union with neighbouring countries.

6. Mutual assistance in raw materials and industrial articles.

A further point was contemplated, dealing with the evacuation of the occupied areas, but the formulation of this had to be postponed until after consultation with the German Supreme Military Command, whose co-operation was here required owing to the mingling of German and Austro-Hungarian troops on the Russian front. The Army Command has indicated a period of at least six months as necessary for the evacuation.

In discussing this draft with the German delegates two points in particular were found to present great difficulty. One was that of evacuation. The German Army Command declared categorically that no evacuation of the occupied districts could be thought of until after conclusion of the general peace. The second difficulty arose in connection with the question as to treatment of the occupied districts. Germany insisted that in the peace treaty with Russia it should be simply stated that Russia had conceded to the peoples within its territory the right of self-determination, and that the nations in question had already availed themselves of that right. The plain standpoint laid down in our draft we were unable to carry through, although it was shared by the other Allies. However, in formulating the answer sent on December 25, 1916, to the Russian peace proposals a compromise was, after persistent efforts on our part, ultimately arrived at which at least prevented the full adoption of the divergent German point of view on these two points. In the matter of evacuation the Germans agreed that the withdrawal of certain bodies of troops before the general peace might be discussed.

In the matter of annexations a satisfactory manner of formulating this was found, making it applicable only in the event of general peace. Had the Entente then been disposed to make peace the principle of "no annexations" would have succeeded throughout.

Even allowing for the conciliatory form given through our endeavours to this answer by the four Powers to the Russian proposals, the German Headquarters evinced extreme indignation. Several highly outspoken telegrams from the German Supreme Command to the German delegates prove this. The head of the German Delegation came near to being recalled on this account, and if this had been done it is likely that German foreign policy would have been placed in the hands of a firm adherent of the sternest military views. As this, however, could only have had an unfavourable effect on the further progress of the negotiations, we were obliged to do all in our power to retain Herr Kühlmann. With this end in view he was informed and invited to advise Berlin that if Germany persisted in its harsh policy Austria-Hungary would be compelled to conclude a separate peace with Russia. This declaration on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs did not fail to create a certain impression in Berlin, and was largely responsible for the fact that Kühlmann was able to remain.

Kühlmann's difficult position and his desire to strengthen it rendered the discussion of the territorial questions, which were first officially touched upon on December 27, but had been already taken up in private meetings with the Russian delegates, a particularly awkward matter. Germany insisted that the then Russian front was not to be evacuated until six months after the general peace. Russia was disposed to agree to this, but demanded on the other hand that the fate of Poland was not to be decided until after evacuation. Against this the Germans were inclined to give up its original standpoint to the effect that the populations of occupied territories had already availed themselves of the right of self-determination conceded, and allow a new inquiry to be made among the population, but insisted that this should be done during the occupation. No solution could be arrived at on this point, though Austria-Hungary made repeated efforts at mediation. The negotiations had arrived at this stage when they were first interrupted on December 29.

On resuming the negotiations on January 6 the situation was little changed. Kühlmann's position was at any rate somewhat firmer than before, albeit only at the cost of some concessions to the German military party. In these circumstances the negotiations, in which Trotski now took part as spokesman for the Russians, led only to altogether fruitless theoretical discussions and the right of self-determination, which could not bring about any lessening of the distance between the two firmly maintained points of view. In order to get the proceedings out of this deadlock further endeavours were made on the part of Austria to arrive at a compromise between the German and Russian standpoints, the more so as it was generally, and especially in the case of Poland, desirable to solve the territorial question on the basis of complete self-determination. Our proposals to the German delegates were to the effect that the Russian standpoint should so far be met as to allow the plebiscite demanded by the Russians, this to be taken, as the Germans insisted should be the case, during the German occupation, but with extensive guarantees for free expression of the will of the people. On this point we had long discussions with the German delegates, based on detailed drafts prepared by us.

Our endeavours here, however, were again unsuccessful. Circumstances arising at the time in our own country were responsible for this, as also for the result of the negotiations which had in the meantime been commenced with the Ukrainian delegates. These last had, at the first discussion, declined to treat with any Polish representatives, and demanded the concession of the entire Cholm territory, and, in a more guarded fashion, the cession of Eastern Galicia and the Ukrainian part of North-Eastern Hungary, and in consequence of which the negotiations were on the point of being broken off. At this stage a food crisis broke out in Austria to an extent of which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was hitherto unaware, threatening Vienna in particular with the danger of being in a few days devoid of flour altogether. Almost immediately after this came a strike movement of threatening proportions. These events at home weakened the position of the Foreign Minister both as regards his attitude towards the German Allies and towards the opposing parties in the negotiations--with both of which he was then in conflict--and this, at a most critical moment, to a degree that can hardly be appreciated from a distance. He was required to exert pressure upon Germany, and was now forced, not merely to ask, but to entreat Germany's aid in sending supplies of food, or Vienna would within a few days be in the throes of a catastrophe. With the enemy, on the other hand, he was forced, owing to the situation at home, to strive for a settlement of peace that should be favourable to Austria, in spite of the fact that our food situation and our labour troubles were well known to that enemy.

This complete alteration of the position changed the whole basis and tactics of the Foreign Minister's proceedings. He had to obtain the supplies of grain asked for from Germany and thus to diminish political pressure on that country; but at the same time he had to persuade the Soviet delegates to continue negotiations, and finally to arrive at a settlement of peace under the most acceptable conditions possible with the Ukraine, which would put an end to the still serious difficulties of the food situation.

In these circumstances it was impossible now to work on the German delegates by talking of Austria-Hungary's concluding a separate peace with Russia, as this would have imperilled the chance of food supplies from Germany--the more so as the representative of the German Army Command had declared that it was immaterial whether Austria-Hungary made peace or not. Germany would in any case march on Petersburg if the Russian Government did not give way. On the other hand, however, the Foreign Minister prevailed on the leader of the Russian delegation to postpone the carrying out of the intentions of his Government--to the effect that the Russian delegation, owing to lack of good faith on the part of German-Austro-Hungarian negotiators, should be recalled.

At the same time the negotiations with the Ukrainian delegation were continued. By means of lengthy and wearisome conferences we succeeded in bringing their demands to a footing which might just possibly be acceptable, and gaining their agreement to a clause whereby Ukraine undertook to deliver at least 1,000,000 tons of grain by August, 1918. As to the demand for the Cholm territory, which we had wished to have relegated to the negotiations with Poland, the Ukrainian delegates refused to give way on this point, and were evidently supported by General Hoffmann. Altogether the German military party seemed much inclined to support Ukrainian demands and extremely indisposed to accede to Polish claims, so that we were unable to obtain the admission of Polish representatives to the proceedings, though we had frequently asked for this. A further difficulty in the way of this was the fact that Trotski himself was unwilling to recognise the Polish party as having equal rights here. The only result obtainable was that the Ukrainians should restrict their claims on the Cholm territory to those parts inhabited by Ukrainian majority and accept a revision of the frontier line, as yet only roughly laid down, according to the finding of a mixed commission and the wishes of the population, i.e. the principle of national boundaries under international protection. The Ukrainian delegates renounced all territorial claims against the Monarchy, but demanded from us on the other hand a guarantee as to the autonomous development of their co-nationals in Galicia. With regard to these two weighty concessions, the Foreign Minister declared that they could only be granted on the condition that the Ukraine fulfilled the obligation it had undertaken as to delivery of grain, the deliveries being made at the appointed times; he further demanded that the obligations on both sides should be reciprocal, i.e. that the failure of one party to comply therewith should release the other. The formulation of these points, which met with the greatest difficulties on the part of Ukraine, was postponed to a later date.

At this stage of the proceedings a new pause occurred to give the separate delegates time to advise their Governments as to the results hitherto attained and receive their final instructions. The Foreign Minister returned to Vienna and reported the state of the negotiations to the proper quarters. In the course of these deliberations his policy of concluding peace with Russia and Ukraine on the basis of the concessions proposed was agreed to. Another question dealt with at the same time was whether the Monarchy should, in case of extreme necessity, conclude a separate peace with Russia if the negotiations with that state should threaten to come to nothing on account of Germany's demands. This question was, after full consideration of all grounds to the contrary, answered _in thesi_ in the affirmative, as the state of affairs at home apparently left no alternative.

On resuming the negotiations at Brest-Litovsk further endeavours were made to persuade Germany to give way somewhat by pointing out what would be the consequence of its obstinate attitude. In the course of the deliberations on this point with Herr Kühlmann we succeeded after great difficulty in obtaining the agreement of the German delegates to a final attempt at compromise, to be undertaken by the Foreign Minister. The proposals for this compromise were based on the following considerations:

For months past conflicting views had been expressed as to:

1. Whether in the territories where constitutional alterations were to be made owing to the war the right of self-determination should be taken as already exercised, or whether a plebiscite should be taken first;

2. Whether such plebiscite, if taken, should be addressed to a constituent body or in the form of a referendum to the people direct;

3. Whether this should be done before or after evacuation; and

4. In what manner it was to be organised (by general franchise, by a vote of the nobles, etc.). It would be advisable, and would also be in accordance with the principles adopted by Russia, to leave the decision on all these points to the people themselves, and deliver them over to the "temporary self-administrative body," which should, also according to the Russian proposal (Kameneff), be introduced at once. The whole of the peace negotiations could then be concentrated upon a single point: the question as to the composition of this temporary body. Here, however, a compromise could be arrived at, as Russia could agree that the already existent bodies set in the foreground by Germany should be allowed to express a part of the will of the people, Germany agreeing that these bodies should, during the occupation, be supplemented by elements appointed, according to the Russian principles, by free election.

On February 7, immediately after Herr Kühlmann had agreed to mediation on this basis, the Foreign Minister saw the leader of the Russian delegation, Trotski, and had a series of conversations with him. The idea of compromise on the lines just set forth was little to Trotski's taste, and he declared that he would in any case protest against the handling of the self-determination question by the Four Powers. On the other hand, the discussion did lead to some result, in that a new basis for disposing of the difficulties which had arisen was now found. There was to be no further continuance of the conflict as to whether the territorial alterations involved by the peace should be termed "annexations," as the Russian delegates wished, or "exercise of the right of self-determination," as Germany wished; the territorial alterations were to be simply noted in the peace treaty ("Russia notes that ..."). Trotski, however, made his acquiescence to the conclusion of such a compact subject to two conditions: one being that the Moon Sound Islands and the Baltic ports should remain with Russia; the other that Germany and Austria-Hungary should not conclude any separate peace with the Ukrainian People's Republic, whose Government was then seriously threatened by the Bolsheviks and, according to some reports, already overthrown by them. The Foreign Minister was now anxious to arrive at a compromise on this question also, in which he had to a certain degree the support of Herr von Kühlmann, while General Hoffmann most vehemently opposed any further concession.

All these negotiations for a compromise failed to achieve their end owing to the fact that Herr Kühlmann was forced by the German Supreme Army Command to act promptly. Ludendorff declared that the negotiations with Russia must be concluded within three days, and when a telegram from Petersburg was picked up in Berlin calling on the German Army to rise in revolt Herr von Kühlmann was strictly ordered not to be content with the cessions already agreed to, but to demand the further cession of the unoccupied territories of Livonia and Esthonia. Under such pressure the leader of the German delegation had not the power to compromise. We then arrived at the signing of the treaty with Ukraine, which had, after much trouble, been brought to an end meanwhile. It thus appeared as if the efforts of the Foreign Minister had proved fruitless. Nevertheless he continued his discussions with Trotski, but these still led to no result, owing to the fact that Trotski, despite repeated questioning, persisted in leaving everything vague till the last moment as to whether he would, in the present circumstances, conclude any peace with the Four Powers at all or not. Not until the plenary session of February 10 was this cleared up; Russia declared for a cessation of hostilities, but signed no treaty of peace.

The situation created by this declaration offered no occasion for further taking up the idea of a separate peace with Russia, since peace seemed to have come _via facta_ already. At a meeting on February 10 of the diplomatic and military delegates of Germany and Austria-Hungary to discuss the question of what was now to be done it was agreed unanimously, save for a single dissentient, that the situation arising out of Trotski's declarations must be accepted. The one dissentient vote--that of General Hoffmann--was to the effect that Trotski's statement should be answered by declaring the Armistice at an end, marching on Petersburg, and supporting the Ukraine openly against Russia. In the ceremonial final sitting, on February 11, Herr von Kühlmann adopted the attitude expressed by the majority of the peace delegations, and set forth the same in a most impressive speech. Nevertheless, a few days later, as General Hoffmann had said, Germany declared the Armistice at an end, ordered the German troops to march on Petersburg, and brought about the situation which led to the signing of the peace treaty. Austria-Hungary declared that we took no part in this action.

6

=Report of the Peace Negotiations at Bucharest=

The possibility of entering upon peace negotiations with Roumania was considered as soon as negotiations with the Russian delegations at Brest-Litovsk had commenced. In order to prevent Roumania itself from taking part in these negotiations Germany gave the Roumanian Government to understand that it would not treat with the present King and the present Government at all. This step, however, was only intended to enable separate negotiations to be entered upon with Roumania, as Germany feared that the participation of Roumania in the Brest negotiations would imperil the chances of peace. Roumania's idea seemed then to be to carry on the war and gain the upper hand. At the end of January, therefore, Austria-Hungary took the initiative in order to bring about negotiations with Roumania. The Emperor sent Colonel Randa, the former Military Attaché to the Roumanian Government, to the King of Roumania, assuring him of his willingness to grant Roumania honourable terms of peace.

In connection with the peace negotiations a demand was raised in Hungarian quarters for a rectification of the frontier line, so as to prevent, or at any rate render difficult, any repetition of the invasion by Roumania in 1916 over the Siebenbürgen, despite opposition on the part of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. The strategical frontier drawn up by the Army Command, which, by the way, was influenced by considerations not conducive to peace, followed a line involving the cession to Hungary of Turnu-Severin, Sinaia and several valuable petroleum districts in Moldavia. Public opinion in Hungary voiced even further demands. The Hungarian Government was of opinion that the Parliament would offer the greatest hindrances to any peace not complying with the general desire in this respect, and leading Hungarian statesmen, even some among the Opposition parties, declared the rectification of the frontier to be a condition of peace _sine qua non_. Wekerle and Tisza in particular took this view. Despite this serious difference of opinion, the Foreign Minister, in entire agreement with the Emperor, even before the commencement of the negotiations in the middle of February, took up the position that demands connected with the frontier line should not offer any obstacle to the conclusion of peace. The rectification of the frontier should only seriously be insisted on as far as could be done on the basis of a loyal and, for the future, amicable relations with Roumania. Hungary regarded this lenient attitude on the part of the Foreign Minister with increasing disapproval. We pointed out that a frontier line conceding cities and petroleum districts to Hungary would be unfortunate in every respect. From the point of view of internal politics, because the number of non-Hungarian inhabitants would be thereby increased; from the military point of view, because it would give rise to frontier conflicts with unreliable Roumanian factions; and, finally, from the point of view of foreign policy, because it would mean annexations and the transference of population this way and that, rendering friendly relations with Roumania an impossibility. Nevertheless, it would be necessary for a time to hold fast by the frontier line as originally conceived, so that the point could be used to bring about the establishment in Roumania of a régime amicably disposed toward the Central Powers. The Foreign Minister was particularly anxious to see a Marghiloman Cabinet formed, inaugurating a policy friendly to ourselves. He believed that with such a Cabinet it would be easier to arrive at a peace of mutual understanding, and was also resolved to render possible such a peace by extensive concessions, especially by giving his diplomatic support in the Bessarabian question. He informed Marghiloman also in writing that he would be prepared to grant important concessions to a Cabinet of which he, Marghiloman, was the head, in particular as regards the cession of inhabited places such as Turnu-Severin and Ocna, on which points he was willing to give way. When the Marghiloman Cabinet was formed the Austro-Hungarian demands in respect of the frontier line would, despite active opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government, be reduced almost by half. The negotiations with Roumania were particularly difficult in regard to the question of two places, Azuga and Busteni. On March 24 Count Czernin prepared to terminate these negotiations, declaring that he was ready to renounce all claim to Azuga and Busteni and halve his demands as to the much-debated Lotru district, provided Marghiloman were willing to arrange the frontier question on this basis. Marghiloman declared himself satisfied with this compromise. On the next day, however, it was nevertheless rejected by the Hungarian Government, and not until after further telegraphic communication with the Emperor and Wekerle was the assent of all competent authorities obtained. This had, indeed, been widely considered in Hungarian circles as an impossibility.

Another Austro-Hungarian demand which played some part in the Bucharest negotiations was in connection with the plan of an economical alliance between Austria-Hungary and Roumania. This was of especial interest to the Austrian Government, whereas the frontier question, albeit in some degree affecting Austria as well, was a matter of indifference to this Government, which, as a matter of fact, did not sympathise with the demands at all. The plan for an economical alliance, however, met with opposition in Hungary. Immediately before the commencement of the Bucharest negotiations an attempt was made to overcome this opposition on the part of the Hungarian Government and secure its adherence to the idea of an economical alliance with Roumania--at any rate, conditionally upon the conclusion of a customs alliance with Germany as planned. It proved impossible, however, at the time to obtain this assent. The Hungarian Government reserved the right of considering the question later on, and on March 8 instructed their representatives at Bucharest that they must dissent from the plan, as the future economical alliance with Germany was a matter beyond present consideration. Consequently this question could play no part at first in the peace negotiations, and all that could be done was to sound the leading Roumanian personages in a purely private manner as to the attitude they would adopt towards such a proposal. The idea was, generally speaking, well received by Roumania, and the prevalent opinion was that such an alliance would be distinctly advisable from Roumania's point of view. A further attempt was therefore made, during the pause in the peace negotiations in the East, to overcome the opposition of the Hungarian Government; these deliberations were, however, not concluded when the Minister for Foreign Affairs resigned his office.

Germany had, even before the commencement of negotiations in Bucharest, considered the question of imposing on Roumania, when treating for peace, a series of obligations especially in connection with the economical relations amounting to a kind of indirect war indemnity. It was also contemplated that the occupation of Wallachia should be maintained for five or six years after the conclusion of peace. Roumania should then give up its petroleum districts, its railways, harbours and domains to German companies as their property, and submit itself to a permanent financial control. Austria-Hungary opposed these demands from the first on the grounds that no friendly relations could ever be expected to exist with a Roumania which had been economically plundered to such a complete extent; and Austria-Hungary was obliged to maintain amicable relations with Roumania.

This standpoint was most emphatically set forth, and not without some success, on February 5 at a conference with the Reichskansler. In the middle of February the Emperor sent a personal message to the German Emperor cautioning him against this plan, which might prove an obstacle in the way of peace. Roumania was not advised of these demands until comparatively late in the negotiations, after the appointment of Marghiloman. Until then the questions involved gave rise to constant discussion between Germany and Austria-Hungary, the latter throughout endeavouring to reduce the German demands, not only with a view to arriving at a peace of mutual understanding, but also because, if Germany gained a footing in Roumania on the terms originally contemplated, Austro-Hungarian economical interests must inevitably suffer thereby. The demands originally formulated with regard to the Roumanian railways and domains were then relinquished by Germany, and the plan of a cession of the Roumanian harbours was altered so as to amount to the establishment of a Roumanian-German-Austro-Hungarian harbour company, which, however, eventually came to nothing. The petroleum question, too, was reduced from a cession to a ninety years' tenure of the state petroleum districts and the formation of a monopoly trading company for petroleum under German management. Finally, an economic arrangement was prepared which should secure the agricultural products of Roumania to the Central Powers for a series of years. The idea of a permanent German control of the Roumanian finances was also relinquished owing to Austro-Hungarian opposition. The negotiations with Marghiloman and his representatives on these questions made a very lengthy business. In the economic questions especially there was great difference of opinion on the subject of prices, which was not disposed of until the last moment before the drawing up of the treaty on March 28, and then only by adopting the Roumanian standpoint. On the petroleum question, where the differences were particularly acute, agreement was finally arrived at, in face of the extreme views of the German economical representative on the one hand and the Roumanian Foreign Minister, Arion, on the other, by a compromise, according to which further negotiations were to be held in particular with regard to the trade monopoly for petroleum, and the original draft was only to apply when such negotiations failed to lead to any result.

The German demands as to extension of the period of occupation for five to six years after the general peace likewise played a great part at several stages of the negotiations, and were from the first stoutly opposed by Austria-Hungary. We endeavoured to bring about an arrangement by which, on the conclusion of peace, Roumania should have all legislative and executive power restored, being subject only to a certain right of control in respect of a limited number of points, but not beyond the general peace. In support of this proposal the Foreign Minister pointed out in particular that the establishment of a Roumanian Ministry amicably disposed towards ourselves would be an impossibility (the Averescu Ministry was then still in power) if we were to hold Roumania permanently under our yoke. We should far rather use every endeavour to obtain what could be obtained from Roumania through the medium of such politicians in that country as were disposed to follow a policy of friendly relations with the Central Powers. The main object of our policy to get such men into power in Roumania, and enable them to remain in the Government, would be rendered unattainable if too severe measures were adopted. We might gain something thereby for a few years, but it would mean losing everything in the future. And we succeeded also in convincing the German Secretary of State, Kühlmann, of the inadvisability of the demands in respect of occupation, which were particularly voiced by the German Army Council. As a matter of fact, after the retirement of Averescu, Marghiloman declared that these demands would make it impossible for him to form a Cabinet at all. And when he had been informed, from German sources, that the German Supreme Army Command insisted on these terms, he only agreed to form a Cabinet on the assurance of the Austrian Foreign Minister that a solution of the occupation problem would be found. In this question also we did ultimately succeed in coming to agreement with Roumania.

One of the decisive points in the conclusion of peace with Roumania was, finally, the cession of the Dobrudsha, on which Bulgaria insisted with such violence that it was impossible to avoid it. The ultimatum which preceded the preliminary Treaty of Buftea had also to be altered chiefly on the Dobrudsha question, as Bulgaria was already talking of the ingratitude of the Central Powers, of how Bulgaria had been disillusioned, and of the evil effects this disillusionment would have on the subsequent conduct of the war. All that Count Czernin could do was to obtain a guarantee that Roumania, in case of cession of the Dobrudsha, should at least be granted a sure way to the harbour of Kustendje. In the main the Dobrudsha question was decided at Buftea. When, later, Bulgaria expressed a desire to interpret the wording of the preliminary treaty by which the Dobrudsha "as far as the Danube" was to be given up in such a sense as to embrace the whole of the territory up to the northernmost branch (the Kilia branch) of the Danube, this demand was most emphatically opposed both by Germany and Austria-Hungary, and it was distinctly laid down in the peace treaty that only the Dobrudsha as far as the St. George's branch was to be ceded. This decision again led to bad feeling in Bulgaria, but was unavoidable, as further demands here would probably have upset the preliminary peace again.

The proceedings had reached this stage when Count Czernin resigned his office.

7

=Wilson's Fourteen Points=

I. Open covenants of peace openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind, but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view.

II. Absolute freedom of navigation upon the seas outside territorial waters alike in peace and in war except as the seas may be closed in whole or in part by international action for the enforcement of international covenants.

III. The removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance.

IV. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety.

V. A free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the Government whose title is to be determined.

VI. The evacuation of all Russian territory, and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy, and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and more than a welcome assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

VII. Belgium, the whole world will agree, must be evacuated and restored without any attempt to limit the sovereignty which she enjoys in common with all other free nations. No other single act will serve as this will serve to restore confidence among the nations in the laws which they have themselves set and determined for the government of their relations with one another. Without this healing act the whole structure and validity of international law is for ever impaired.

VIII. All French territory should be freed, and the invaded portions restored, and the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine, which has unsettled the peace of the world for nearly 50 years, should be righted in order that peace may once more be made secure in the interests of all.

IX. A readjustment of the frontiers of Italy should be effected along clearly recognisable lines of nationality.

X. The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the first opportunity of autonomous development.

XI. Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro should be evacuated, occupied territories restored, Serbia accorded free and secure access to the sea, and the relations of the several Balkan States to one another determined by friendly counsel along historically established lines of allegiance and nationality, and international guarantees of the political and economic independence and territorial integrity of the several Balkan States should be entered into.

XII. The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolutely unmolested opportunity of autonomous development, and the Dardanelles should be permanently opened as a free passage to the ships and commerce of all nations under international guarantees.

XIII. An independent Polish State should be erected which should include the territories inhabited by indisputably Polish populations, which should be assured a free and secure access to the sea, and whose political and economic independence and territorial integrity should be guaranteed by international covenant.

XIV. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike.

8

=Ottokar Czernin on Austria's Policy During the War=

_Speech delivered December 11, 1918_

GENTLEMEN,--In rising now to speak of our policy during the war it is my hope that I may thereby help to bring the truth to light. We are living in a time of excitement. After four years of war, the bloodiest and most determined war the world has ever seen, and in the midst of the greatest revolution ever known, this excitement is only too easily understood. But the result of this excitement is that all those rumours which go flying about, mingling truth and falsehood together, end by misleading the public. It is unquestionably necessary to arrive at a clear understanding. The public has a right to know what has really happened, it has the right to know why we did not succeed in attaining the peace we had so longed for, it has a right to know whether, and if so where, any neglect can be pointed out, or whether it was the overwhelming power of circumstances which has led our policy to take the course it did. The new arrangement of relations between ourselves and Germany will make an end of all secret proceedings. The day will come then when, fortunately, all that has hitherto been hidden will be made clear. As, however, I do not know when all this will be made public, I am grateful for the opportunity of lifting the veil to-day from certain hitherto unknown events. In treating of this theme I will refrain from touching upon those constitutional factors which once counted for so much, but which do so no longer. I do so because it seems to me unfair to import into the discussion persons who are now paying heavily for what they may have done and who are unable to defend themselves. And I must pay this honourable tribute to the Austro-Hungarian Press, that it has on the whole sought to spare the former Emperor as far as possible. There are, of course, exceptions--_exceptiones firmant regulam_. There are in Vienna, as everywhere else, men who find it more agreeable to attack, the less if those whom they are attacking are able to defend themselves. But, believe me, gentlemen, those who think thus are not the bravest, not the best, nor the most reliable; and we may be glad that they form so insignificant a minority.

But, to come to the point. Before passing on to a consideration of the various phases of the work for peace, I should like to point out two things: firstly, that since the entry of Italy and Roumania into the war, and especially since the entry of America, a "victorious peace" on our part has been a Utopian idea, a Utopia which, unfortunately, was throughout cherished by the German military party; and, secondly, that we have never received any offer of peace from the Entente. On several occasions peace feelers were put forward between representatives of the Entente and our own; unfortunately, however, these never led to any concrete conditions. We often had the impression that we might conclude a separate peace without Germany, but we were never told the concrete conditions upon which Germany, on its part, could make peace; and, in particular, we were never informed that Germany would be allowed to retain its possessions as before the war, in consequence of which we were left in the position of having to fight a war of defence for Germany. We were compelled by our treaty to a common defence of the pre-war possessions, and since the Entente never declared its willingness to treat with a Germany which wished for no annexations, since the Entente constantly declared its intention of annihilating Germany, we were forced to defend Germany, and our position in Berlin was rendered unspeakably more difficult. We ourselves, also, were never given any assurance that we should be allowed to retain our former possessions; but in our case the desire for peace was so strong that we would have made territorial concessions if we had been able thereby to secure general peace. This, however, was not the case. Take Italy, for instance, which was primarily at war with ourselves and not with Germany. If we had offered Italy concessions however great, if we had offered all that Italy has now taken possession of, even then it could not have made peace, being bound by duty to its Allies and by circumstances not to make peace until England and France made peace with Germany.

When, then, peace by sacrifice was the only peace attainable, obviously, as a matter of principle, there were two ways of reaching that end. One, a general peace, i.e. including Germany, and the other, a separate peace. Of the overwhelming difficulties attending the former course I will speak later; at present a few words on the question of separate peace.

I myself would never have made a separate peace. I have never, not even in the hour of disillusionment--I may say of despair at my inability to lead the policy of Berlin into wiser channels--even in such hours, I say, I have never forgotten that our alliance with the German Empire was no ordinary alliance, no such alliance as may be contracted by two Emperors or two Governments, and can easily be broken, but an alliance of blood, a blood-brotherhood between the ten million Austro-Germans and the seventy million of the Empire, which could not be broken. And I have never forgotten that the military party in power at that time in Germany were not the German people, and that we had allied ourselves with the German people, and not with a few leading men. But I will not deny that in the moments when I saw my policy could not be realised I did ventilate the idea of suggesting to the Emperor the appointment, in my stead, of one of those men who saw salvation in a separation from Germany. But again and again I relinquished this idea, being firmly convinced that separate peace was a sheer impossibility. The Monarchy lay like a great block between Germany and the Balkans. Germany had great masses of troops there from which it could not be cut off, it was procuring oil and grain from the Balkans; if we were to interpose between it and the Balkans we should be striking at its most sensitive vital nerve. Moreover, the Entente would naturally have demanded first of all that we joined in the blockade, and finally our secession would automatically have involved also that of Bulgaria and Turkey. Had we withdrawn, Germany would have been unable to carry on the war. In such a situation there can be no possibility of doubt but that the German Army Command would have flung several divisions against Bohemia and the Tyrol, meting out to us the same fate which had previously befallen Roumania. The Monarchy, Bohemia in particular, would at once have become a scene of war. But even this is not all. Internally, such a step would at once have led to civil war. The Germans of Austria would never have turned against their brothers, and the Hungarians--Tisza's Hungarians--would never have lent their aid to such a policy. _We had begun the war in common, and we could not end it save in common._ For us there was no way out of the war; we could only choose between fighting with Germany against the Entente, or fighting with the Entente against Germany until Germany herself gave way. A slight foretaste of what would have happened was given us through the separatist steps taken by Andrassy at the last moment. This utterly defeated, already annihilated and prostrate Germany had yet the power to fling troops toward the Tyrol, and had not the revolution overwhelmed all Germany like a conflagration, smothering the war itself, I am not sure but that the Tyrol might at the last moment have been harried by war. And, gentlemen, I have more to say. The experiment of separate peace would not only have involved us in a civil war, not only brought the war into our own country, but even then the final outcome would have been much the same. The dissolution of the Monarchy into its component national parts was postulated throughout by the Entente. I need only refer to the Conference of London. But whether the State be dissolved by way of reward to the people or by way of punishment to the State makes little difference; the effect is the same. In this case also a "German Austria" would have arisen, and in such a development it would have been hard for the German-Austrian people to take up an attitude which rendered them allies of the Entente. In my own case, as Minister of the Imperial and Royal Government, it was my duty also to consider dynastic interests, and I never lost sight of that obligation. But I believe that in this respect also the end would have been the same. In particular the dissolution of the Monarchy into its national elements by legal means, against the opposition of the Germans and Hungarians, would have been a complete impossibility. And the Germans in Austria would never have forgiven the Crown if it had entered upon a war with Germany; the Emperor would have been constantly encountering the powerful Republican tendencies of the Czechs, and he would have been in constant conflict with the King of Serbia over the South-Slav question, an ally being naturally nearer to the Entente than the Habsburgers. And, finally, the Hungarians would never have forgiven the Emperor if he had freely conceded extensive territories to Bohemia and to the South-Slav state; I believe, then, that in this confusion the Crown would have fallen, as it has done in fact. _A separate peace was a sheer impossibility._ There remained the second way: to make peace jointly with Germany. Before going into the difficulties which rendered this way impossible I must briefly point out wherein lay our great dependence upon Germany. First of all, in military respects. Again and again we were forced to rely on aid from Germany. In Roumania, in Italy, in Serbia, and in Russia we were victorious with the Germans beside us. We were in the position of a poor relation living by the grace of a rich kinsman. But it is impossible to play the mendicant and the political adviser at the same time, particularly when the other party is a Prussian officer. In the second place, we were dependent upon Germany owing to the state of our food supply. Again and again we were here also forced to beg for help from Germany, because the complete disorganisation of our own administration had brought us to the most desperate straits. We were forced to this by the hunger blockade established, on the one hand, by Hungary, and on the other by the official authorities and their central depots. I remember how, when I myself was in the midst of a violent conflict with the German delegates at Brest-Litovsk, I received orders from Vienna to bow the knee to Berlin and beg for food. You can imagine, gentlemen, for yourselves how such a state of things must weaken a Minister's hands. And, thirdly, our dependence was due to the state of our finances. In order to keep up our credit we were drawing a hundred million marks a month from Germany, a sum which during the course of the war has grown to over four milliards; and this money was as urgently needed as were the German divisions and the German bread. And, despite this position of dependence, the only way to arrive at peace was by leading Germany into our own political course; that is to say, persuading Germany to conclude a peace involving sacrifice. _The situation all through was simply this: that any momentary military success might enable us to propose terms of peace which, while entailing considerable loss to ourselves, had just a chance of being accepted by the enemy._ The German military party, on the other hand, increased their demands with every victory, and it was more hopeless than ever, after their great successes, to persuade them to adopt a policy of renunciation. I think, by the way, that there was a single moment in the history of this war when such an action would have had some prospect of success. I refer to the famous battle of Görlitz. Then, with the Russian army in flight, the Russian forts falling like houses of cards, many among our enemies changed their point of view. I was at that time still our representative in Roumania. Majorescu was then not disinclined to side with us actively, and the Roumanian army moved forward toward Bessarabia, could have been hot on the heels of the flying Russians, and might, according to all human calculations, have brought about a complete débâcle. It is not unlikely that the collapse which later took place in Russia might have come about then, and after a success of that nature, with no "America" as yet on the horizon, we might perhaps have brought the war to an end. Two things, however, were required: in the first place, the Roumanians demanded, as the price of their co-operation, a rectification of the Hungarian frontier, and this first condition was flatly refused by Hungary; the second condition, which naturally then did not come into question at all, would have been that we should even then, after such a success, have proved strong enough to bear a peace with sacrifice. We were not called upon to agree to this, but the second requirement would undoubtedly have been refused by Germany, just as the first had been by Hungary. I do not positively assert that peace would have been possible in this or any other case, but I do positively maintain that during my period of office _such a peace by sacrifice was the utmost we and Germany could have attained_. The future will show what superhuman efforts we have made to induce Germany to give way. That all proved fruitless was not the fault of the German people, nor was it, in my opinion, the fault of the German Emperor, but that of the leaders of the German military party, which had attained such enormous power in the country. Everyone in Wilhelmstrasse, from Bethmann to Kühlmann, wanted peace; but they could not get it simply because the military party got rid of everyone who ventured to act otherwise than as they wished. This also applies to Bethmann and Kühlmann. The Pan-Germanists, under the leadership of the military party, could not understand that it was possible to die through being victorious, that victories are worthless when they do not lead to peace, that territories held in an iron grasp as "security" are valueless securities as long as the opposing party cannot be forced to redeem them. There were various shades of this Pan-Germanism. One section demanded the annexation of parts of Belgium and France, with an indemnity of milliards; others were less exorbitant, but all were agreed that peace could only be concluded with an extension of German possessions. It was the easiest thing in the world to get on well with the German military party so long as one believed in their fantastic ideas and took a victorious peace for granted, dividing up the world thereafter at will. But if anyone attempted to look at things from the point of view of the real situation, and ventured to reckon with the possibility of a less satisfactory termination of the war, the obstacles then encountered were not easily surmounted. We all of us remember those speeches in which constant reference was always made to a "stern peace," a "German peace," a "victorious peace." For us, then, the possibility of a more favourable peace--I mean a peace based on mutual understanding--I have never believed in the possibility of a victorious peace--would only have been acute in the case of Poland and the Austro-Polish question. But I cannot sufficiently emphasise the fact that the Austro-Polish solution never was an obstacle in the way of peace and could never have been so. There was only the idea that Austrian Poland and the former Russian Poland might be united and attached to the Monarchy. It was never suggested that such a step should be enforced against the will of Poland itself or against the will of the Entente. There was a time when it looked as if not only Poland but also certain sections among the Entente were not disinclined to agree to such a solution.

But to return to the German military party. This had attained a degree of power in the State rarely equalled in history, and the rarity of the phenomenon was only exceeded by the suddenness of its terrible collapse. The most striking personality in this group was General Ludendorff. Ludendorff was a great man, a man of genius, in conception, a man of indomitable energy and great gifts. But this man required a political brake, so to speak, a political element in the Wilhelmstrasse capable of balancing his influence, and this was never found. It must fairly be admitted that the German generals achieved the gigantic, and there was a time when they were looked up to by the people almost as gods. It may be true that all great strategists are much alike; they look to victory always and to nothing else. Moltke himself, perhaps, was nothing more, but he had a Bismarck to maintain equilibrium. We had no such Bismarck, and when all is said and done it was not the fault of Ludendorff, or it is at any rate an excuse for him, that he was the only supremely powerful character in the whole of Germany, and that in consequence the entire policy of the country was directed into military channels. Ludendorff was a great patriot, desiring nothing for himself, but seeking only the happiness of his country; a military genius, a hard man, utterly fearless--and for all that a misfortune in that he looked at the whole world through Potsdam glasses, with an altogether erroneous judgment, wrecking every attempt at peace which was not a peace by victory. Those very people who worshipped Ludendorff when he spoke of a victorious peace stone him now for that very thing; Ludendorff was exactly like the statesmen of England and France, who all rejected compromise and declared for victory alone; in this respect there was no difference between them. The peace of mutual understanding which I wished for was rejected on the Thames and on the Seine just as by Ludendorff himself. I have said this already. According to the treaty it was our undoubted duty to carry on a defensive war to the utmost and reciprocally to defend the integrity of the State. It is therefore perfectly obvious that I could never publicly express any other view, that I was throughout forced to declare that we were fighting for Alsace-Lorraine just as we were for Trentino, that I could not relinquish German territory to the Entente so long as I lacked the power to persuade Germany herself to such a step. But, as I will show, the most strenuous endeavours were made in this latter direction. And I may here in parenthesis remark that our military men throughout refrained from committing the error of the German generals, and interfering in politics themselves. It is undoubtedly to the credit of our Emperor that whenever any tendency to such interference appeared he quashed it at once. But in particular I should point out that the Archduke Frederick confined his activity solely to the task of bringing about peace. He has rendered most valuable service in this, as also in his endeavours to arrive at favourable relations with Germany.

Very shortly after taking up office I had some discussions with the German Government which left those gentlemen perfectly aware of the serious nature of the situation. In April, 1917--eighteen months ago--I sent the following report to the Emperor Charles, which he forwarded to the Emperor William with the remark that he was entirely of my opinion.

[This report is already printed in these pages. See p. 146.]

This led to a reply from the German Government, dated May 9, again expressing the utmost confidence in the success of the submarine campaign, declaring, it is true, their willingness in principle to take steps towards peace, but reprehending any such steps as might be calculated to give an impression of weakness.

As to any territorial sacrifice on the part of Germany, this was not to be thought of.

As will be seen from this report, however, we did not confine ourselves to words alone. In 1917 we declared in Berlin that the Emperor Charles was prepared to permit the union of Galicia with Poland, and to do all that could be done to attach that State to Germany in the event of Germany making any sacrifices in the West in order to secure peace. But we were met with a _non possumus_ and the German answer that territorial concessions to France were out of the question.

The whole of Galicia was here involved, but I was firmly assured that if the plan succeeded Germany would protect the rights of the Ukraine; and consideration for the Ukrainians would certainly not have restrained me had it been a question of the highest value--of peace itself.

When I perceived that the likelihood of converting Berlin to our views steadily diminished I had recourse to other means. The journey of the Socialist leaders to Stockholm will be remembered. It is true that the Socialists were not "sent" by me; they went to Stockholm of their own initiative and on their own responsibility, but it is none the less true that I could have refused them their passes if I had shared the views of the Entente Governments and of numerous gentlemen in our own country. Certainly, I was at the time very sceptical as to the outcome, as I already saw that the Entente would refuse passes to their Socialists, and consequently there could be nothing but a "rump" parliament in the end. But despite all the reproaches which I had to bear, and the argument that the peace-bringing Socialists would have an enormous power in the State to the detriment of the monarchical principle itself, I never for a moment hesitated to take that step, and I have never regretted it in itself, only that it did not succeed. It is encouraging to me now to read again many of the letters then received criticising most brutally my so-called "Socialistic proceedings" and to find that the same gentlemen who were then so incensed at my policy are now adherents of a line of criticism which maintains that I am too "narrow-minded" in my choice of new means towards peace.

It will be remembered how, in the early autumn of 1917, the majority of the German Reichstag had a hard fight against the numerically weaker but, from their relation to the German Army Command, extremely powerful minority on the question of the reply to the Papal Note. Here again I was no idle spectator. One of my friends, at my instigation, had several conversations with Südekum and Erzberger, and encouraged them, by my description of our own position, to pass the well known peace resolution. It was owing to this description of the state of affairs here that the two gentlemen mentioned were enabled to carry the Reichstag's resolution in favour of a peace by mutual understanding--the resolution which met with such disdain and scorn from the Pan-Germans and other elements. I hoped then, for a moment, to have gained a lasting and powerful alliance in the German Reichstag against the German military plans of conquest.

And now, gentlemen, I should like to say a few words on the subject of that unfortunate submarine campaign which was undoubtedly the beginning of the end, and to set forth the reasons which in this case, as in many other instances, forced us to adopt tactics not in accordance with our own convictions. Shortly after my appointment as Minister the idea of unrestricted submarine warfare began to take form in German minds. The principal advocate of this plan was Admiral Tirpitz. To the credit of the former _Reichskansler_, Bethmann-Hollweg, be it said that he was long opposed to the idea, and used all means and every argument to dissuade others from adopting so perilous a proceeding. In the end he was forced to give way, as was the case with all politicians who came in conflict with the all-powerful military party. Admiral Holtzendorff came to us at that time, and the question was debated from every point of view in long conferences lasting for hours. My then ministerial colleagues, Tisza and Clam, as well as myself were entirely in agreement with Emperor Charles in rejecting the proposal, and the only one who then voted unreservedly in favour of it was Admiral Haus. It should here be noted that the principal German argument at that time was not the prospect of starving England into submission, but the suggestion that the Western front could not be held unless the American munition transports were sunk--that is to say, the case for the submarine campaign was then based chiefly on a point of _technical military importance_ and nothing else. I myself earnestly considered the question then of separating ourselves from Germany on this point; with the small number of U-boats at our disposal it would have made but little difference had we on our part refrained. But another point had here to be considered. If the submarine campaign was to succeed in the northern waters it must be carried out at the same time in the Mediterranean. With this latter water unaffected the transports would have been sent via Italy, France and Dover to England, and the northern U-boat campaign would have been paralysed. But in order to carry on submarine war in the Adriatic we should have to give the Germans access to our bases, such as Pola, Cattaro and Trieste, and by so doing we were _de facto_ partaking in the submarine campaign ourselves. If we did not do it, then we were attacking Germany in the rear by hindering their submarine campaign--that is to say, it would bring us into direct conflict with Germany. Therefore, albeit sorely against our will, we agreed, not convinced by argument, but unable to act otherwise.

And now, gentlemen, I hasten to conclude. I have but a few words to say as to the present. From time to time reports have appeared in the papers to the effect that certain gentlemen were preparing disturbances in Switzerland, and I myself have been mentioned as one of them. I am doubtful whether there is any truth at all in these reports; as for myself, I have not been outside this country for the last nine months. As, however, my contradiction on this head itself appears to have given rise to further misunderstandings, I will give you my point of view here briefly and, as I hope, clearly enough. I am most strongly opposed to any attempt at revolt. I am convinced that any such attempt could only lead to civil war--a thing no one would wish to see. I am therefore of opinion that the Republican Government must be maintained untouched until the German-Austrian people as a whole has taken its decision. But this can only be decided by the German people. Neither the Republic nor the Monarchy is in itself a dogma of democracy. The Kingdom of England is as democratic as republican Switzerland. I know no country where men enjoy so great freedom as in England. But it is a dogma of democracy that the people itself must determine in what manner it will be governed, and I therefore repeat that the final word can only be spoken by the constitutional representative body. I believe that I am here entirely at one with the present Government. There are two methods of ascertaining the will of the people: either each candidate for the representative body stands for election on a monarchical or a republican platform, in which case the majority of the body itself will express the decision; or the question of Monarchy or Republic can be decided by a plebiscite. It is matter of common knowledge that I myself have had so serious conflicts with the ex-Kaiser that any co-operation between us is for all time an impossibility. No one can, therefore, suspect me of wishing on personal grounds to revert to the old régime. But I am not one to juggle with the idea of democracy, and its nature demands that the people itself should decide. I believe that the majority of German-Austria is against the old régime, and when it has expressed itself to this effect the furtherance of democracy is sufficiently assured.

And with this, gentlemen, I have finished what I proposed to set before you. I vainly endeavoured to make peace together with Germany, but I was not unsuccessful in my endeavours to save the German-Austrians from ultimately coming to armed conflict with Germany. I can say this, and without exaggeration, that I have defended the German alliance as if it had been my own child, and I do not know what would have happened had I not done so. Andrassy's "extra turn" at the last moment showed the great mass of the public how present a danger was that of war with Germany. Had the same experiment been made six months before it would have been war with Germany; would have made Austria a scene of war.

There are evil times in store for the German people, but a people of many millions cannot perish and will not perish. The day will come when the wounds of this war begin to close and heal, and when that day comes a better future will dawn.

The Austrian armies went forth in the hour of war to save Austria. They have not availed to save it. But if out of this ocean of blood and suffering a better, freer and nobler world arise, then they will not have died in vain, all those we loved who now lie buried in cold alien earth; they died for the happiness, the peace and the future of the generations to come.

FOOTNOTES:

[11] Translated from the German text given by Count Czernin, no English text being available.

INDEX

Adler, Dr. Victor, a discussion with, 27 and the Socialist Congress at Stockholm, 168 and Trotski, 234, 235

Adrianople, cession of, 268

Aehrenthal, Franz Ferdinand and, 40 policy of expansion, 5

Air-raids on England, cause of, 16 their effect, 167

Albania, and the Peace of Bucharest, 6 Queen Elizabeth of Roumania and, 92

Albrecht von Würtemberg, 39

Alsace-Lorraine, Bethmann on, 74 cession of, demanded by Entente, 165 conquest of, a curse to Germany, 15 Emperor Charles's offer to Germany, 75 France insists on restoration of, 170 Germany and, 71, 158, 159

Ambassadors and their duties, 97, 110

America and the U-boat campaign, 116, 119, 120 enters the war, 17, 148 rupture with Germany, 127 shipbuilding programme of, 291 unpreparedness for war, 122 (_Cf._ United States)

American Government, Count Czernin's Note to, 279 _et seq._

Andrassy, Count, and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260 declares a separate peace, 24, 25 German Nationalist view of his action, 25

Andrian at Nordbahnhof, 219

Anti-Roumanian party and its leader, 77

Arbitration, courts of, 171, 176, 177

Arion, Roumanian Foreign Minister, 322

Armaments, pre-war fever for, 3

Armand-Revertera negotiations, the, 164, 169

Asquith, a warlike speech by, 181

Austria-Hungary, a rejected proposal decides fate of, 2 and Albania, 6 and cession of Galicia, 145 and question of separate peace, 27, 164, 170 and the U-boat campaign, 124, 125, 149, 334 ceases to exist, 179 consequences of a separate peace, 24 death-blow to Customs dues, 168 declaration on submarine warfare, 279 democratic Parliament of, 306 enemy's secret negotiations for peace, 141, 162 food troubles and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314 her army merged into German army, 21 her position before and after the ultimatum, 13 heroism of her armies, 336 impossibility of a separate peace for, 19, 21 _et seq._ maritime trade obstructed by blockade, 280 mobilisation and its difficulties, 8, 9 obstinate attitude after Sarajevo tragedy, 8 parlous position of, in 1917, 188 peace negotiations with Roumania, 259, 318 peace terms to, 179 policy during war, Count Czernin on, 325 racial problems in, 190 separatist tactics in, 164 Social Democracy in, 21, 31 terms on which she could make peace, 29 the Archdukes, 22 views on a "tripartite solution" of Polish question, 201

Austrian Delegation, Count Czernin's speech to, 298 _et seq._

Austrian Government and the Ukrainian question, 242, 245

Austrian Navy, the, Franz Ferdinand and, 50

Austrian Ruthenians, leader of, 247

Austro-Hungarian demands at Bucharest negotiations, 319

Austro-Hungarian army, General Staff of, 22 inferiority of, 21

Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, the, and foreign policy, 134 peace idea of, 174

Austro-Polish question, the, and the Ukrainian demands, 242 no bar to peace, 331 solution of, 200 _et seq._

Avarescu, interview with, 263 retirement of, 323

=B=

Baernreither, his views of a separate peace, 230

Balkan Wars, the, 6

Balkans, the, troubles in: attitude of German Emperor, 68

_Baralong_ episode, the, 133

Bathurst, Captain, and consumption of breadstuffs, 295 on an "un-English" system, 296

Bauer, Dr., German-Austrian Secretary of State, 18

Bauer, Herr, houses Trotski's library, 235

Bavarian troops enter into the Tyrol, 27

Belgian neutrality violated by Germany, 14

Belgian question, the, Germany ready for negotiations with England on, 180

Belgium, England's promise to, 14 German entry into, 14 Germany's views regarding, 157, 158

Belgium, invasion of, changes England's policy, 2

Benckendorff, Count, at London Conference, 275

Benedict XV, Pope, Austria's answer to peace Note of, 175 German reply to, 333 proposals for peace by, 167, 177

Berchtold, Count, and Franz Ferdinand, 43, 44 and the Roumanian question, 77 criticised by pro-war party at Vienna, 33 ultimatum to Serbia, 7 vacillation of, 10

Berlin, Byzantine atmosphere of, 62, 66 the English Ambassador demands his passport, 14

Bessarabia, Bolshevism in, 265

Bethmann-Hollweg, and Austria's willingness to cede Galicia, 146 and the Supreme Military Command, 156 draws up a peace proposal, 139 opposes U-boat warfare, 115, 334 optimistic view of U-boat campaign, 151 _et seq._ replies to author's _exposé_, 150 requests Vienna Cabinet to accept negotiations, 8 visits Western front, 73

Bilinski, Herr von, and the future of Poland, 205

Bismarck, Prince, and the invincibility of the army, 17 and William II., 52 dealings with William I., 65 heritage of, becomes Germany's curse, 15 his policy of "blood and iron," 15

Bizenko, Madame, murders General Sacharow, 220

Blockade, enemies feeling the grip of, 297 of Germany, 280 why established by Great Britain, 281

Bohemia as a possible theatre of war: author's reflections on, 24

Bolsheviks and the Kieff Committee, 245

Bolsheviks, dastardly behaviour of, 249 destruction wrought in Ukraine, 252 enter Kieff, 248, 249

Bolshevism, Czernin on, 216, 221 in Bessarabia, 265 in Russia, 211, 216, 229 terrorism of, 226 the Entente and, 273

Bosnia, as compensation to Austria, 207

Bozen, proposals for cession of, 170, 173

Bratianu, a tactless proceeding by, 112 apprises author of Sarajevo tragedy, 86 collapse of, 99 Ministry of, 88 on Russia, 263 reproaches author, 96

"Bread peace," origin of the term, 257

Brest-Litovsk, a dejected Jew at, 225 a victory for German militarism, 193 answer to Russian peace proposals, 224 arrival of Trotski at, 232 conflict with Ukrainians at, 235 episode of Roumanian peace, 260 evacuation of occupied areas: difficulties of, 312 first peace concluded at, 249 frontier question, 208 further Ukrainian representation at, 300 heated discussions at, 228 object of negotiations at, 305 peace negotiations at, 218 _et seq._, 311 Russians threaten to withdraw from, 227 territorial questions at, 235, 236, 245 Ukrainian delegation and their claims, 208, 231, 314

Briand, peace negotiations with, 182

Brinkmann, Major, transmits Petersburg information to German delegation, 230

British losses by submarines, 290 trade, and result of submarine warfare, 291

Bronstein and Bolshevism, 211

_Brotfrieden_ ("Bread peace"), 257

Bucharest, fall of, 99 report of peace negotiations at, 318 Zeppelin attacks on, 101 et seq.

Bucharest, Peace of, 6, 82, 100, 258 _et seq._, 270

Budapest, author's address to party leaders at, 174 demonstrations against Germany in, 233

Buftea, Treaty of, 323

Bulgaria, a dispute with Turkey, 268 and the Dobrudsha question, 263, 323 her relations with America, 125 humiliation of, 6 negotiations with the Entente, 162, 163, 269 question of her neutrality, 10 secession of, 183

Bulgarian representatives at Brest, 223

Bülow, Prince, exposes William II., 54

Burian, Count, 106, 200 and the division of Galicia, 244 draws up a peace proposal, 139 his Red Book on Roumania, 98, 114 succeeded by author, 114 visits German headquarters, 210

Busche, von dem, and territorial concessions, 107

=C=

Cachin, his attitude at French Socialist Congress, 214

Cambon, M., attends the London Conference, 275

Capelle and U-boats, 132

Carmen Sylva (_see_ Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania)

Carol, King, a fulfilled prophecy of, 88 and Serbia, 12 last days of, 90 peculiar policy of Government of, 81 tactfulness of, 79 Tsar's visit to, 88 urges acceptance of ultimatum, 90 visited by Franz Ferdinand, 79

Carp, 82, 87, 94

Catarau, and the crime at Debruzin, 89

Central-European question, the, 209 the terror of the Entente, 172

Central Powers and the Bratianu Ministry, 97 enemy blockade of, 132 favourable news in 1917, 143 why they adopted submarine warfare, 281 _et seq._

Charles VIII., Emperor, and Franz Ferdinand, 41 and problem of nationality, 192 and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56 and the Ukrainian question, 244 apprised by author of critical condition of food supply, 237, 239 cautions the Kaiser, 321 communicates with King Ferdinand on Roumanian peace, 260 confers a title on eldest son of Franz Ferdinand, 45 correspondence with Prince Sixtus, 164 frequent absences from Vienna, 61 his ever friendly demeanour, 57, 58 invites Crown Prince to Vienna, 75 opposes U-boat warfare, 334 reinstates Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61 rejoices at peace with Ukraine, 249 submits author's _exposé_ to William II., 146, 332 suggests sacrifices for ending World War, 75 visits South Slav provinces, 59

Clam-Martinic, Count, and the customs question, 168 and U-boat campaign, 121 attends conference on Polish question, 206 opposes submarine warfare, 334

Clemenceau, M., and Germany, 182 and the Peace of Versailles, 272 dominant war aim of, 184, 186

Colloredo-Mannsfield, Count, at Brest-Litovsk, 236 attends conference on U-boat question, 121 meets author, 219

Compulsory international arbitration, 171, 176, 177

Conrad, Chief of the General Staff, 44

Constantinople, an Entente group in, 163

Corday, Charlotte, cited, 227

Cossacks, the, 212

Courland demanded by Germany, 249

Crecianu, Ambassador Jresnea, house damaged in Zeppelin attack on Bucharest, 103

Csatth, Alexander, mortally wounded, 89

Csicserics, Lieut. Field-Marshal, 219 at Brest-Litovsk, 236

Czechs, the, attitude of, regarding a separate peace, 24

Czernin, Count Ottokar, a candid chat with Franz Ferdinand, 43 a hostile Power's desire for peace, 141 a scene at Konopischt, 39 abused by a braggart and brawler, 83 acquaints Emperor of food shortage, 237, 239 activities for peace with Roumania, 258 _et seq._ ambassador to Roumania, 7 an appeal for confidence, 310 and American intervention, 123 and the reinstatement of Archduke Joseph Ferdinand, 61 and the Ukrainian question (_see_ Ukrainian) answers explanation of an American request, 128 appeals to Germany for food, 238, 239, 329 appointed Ambassador to Bucharest, 77 apprises Berchtold of decision of Cabinet Council, 12 attends conference on U-boat warfare, 121 avoided by Pan-Germans, 160 becomes Minister for Foreign Affairs, 114 breakfasts with Kühlmann, 230 confers with Tisza, 27, 28 conflicts with the Kaiser, 335 conversation with Trotski, 248 converses with Crown Prince, 74 criticises Michaelis, 160 decorated by King Carol, 88 disapproves of U-boat warfare, 115 dismissal of, 183, 194, 266 extracts bearing on a trip to Western front, 72 friction with the Emperor, 210, 215 his hopes of a peace of understanding, 20 _et seq._, 174, 209, 217, 331, 333 imparts peace terms to Marghiloman, 266 informs Emperor of proceedings at Brest, 229 interviews King Ferdinand, 264 issues passports for Stockholm Conference, 168, 333 journeys to Brest-Litovsk, 218 learns of the assassination of Franz Ferdinand, 86 loss of a dispatch-case, 98 loyalty to Germany, 327 lunches with Prince of Bavaria, 222 meets the Emperor William II., 54 misunderstandings resulting from a speech by, 19, 23 nominated to the Herrenhaus, 46 note to American Government, 279 obtains a direct statement from William II., 57 on a separate peace, 327 on Austria's policy during war, 325 on Bolshevism, 216, 221 on President Wilson's programme, 192 on U-boat warfare, 148, 179, 334 passages of arms with Ludendorff, 247 peace programme of, 299 persecution of, 208 Polish leaders and, 205 President Wilson on, 193 private talk with the Emperor, 124 sends in his resignation, 23 sets interned prisoners at liberty, 95, 96 speech to Austrian Delegation, 298 _et seq._ threatens a separate peace with Russia, 228 unfounded charges against, 162 urges sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71 William II.'s gift to, 64 with Emperor Charles visits Eastern front, 57

=D=

Danube Monarchy, the, a vital condition for existence of Hungarian State, 202 dangers of a political structure for, 202

Debruzin, sensational crime at, 88

Declaration of London, the, 280

D'Esperey, General Franchet, and Karolyi, 260

Deutsch, Leo, and the Marxian Social Democrats, 211

Devonport, Lord, on the food question, 296

Disarmament, negotiations respecting, 4 international, 171, 176, 177, 308 question of, 181

Divorces in Roumania, 85

Dobrudsha, the, acquisition of, 82 assigned to Bulgaria, 268, 269 cession of, at peace with Roumania, 323 King Ferdinand and, 265 Marghiloman's view on, 266 question discussed with Avarescu, 263 Turkish attitude concerning, 268

Dualism, the curse of, 137

=E=

East Galicia, cession of, demanded by Ukrainians, 240 _et seq._

"Echinstvo" group, the, 211

Edward VII., King, and Emperor Francis Joseph, 1, 2 and William II., 63 encircling policy of, 1, 63

Elizabeth, Queen of Roumania, a word-picture by, 91 an operation for cataract, 93 her devotion to King Carol, 92

Ellenbogen, Dr., and Socialist Conference at Stockholm, 168 plain speaking by, 26

England, an effort at _rapprochement_ with Germany and its failure, 180 and dissolution of military power in Germany, 184 and the elder Richthofen, 246 attitude of, at beginning of World War, 15, 16 blockade of, by U-boats, 142, 151 bread shortage in, 295 declares war on Germany, 14 discards Declaration of London, 280 distress in, from U-boat warfare, 145 distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185 dread of gigantic growth of Germany in, 1 Flotow's tribute to, 120 food supply of, 293 freedom in, 335 her desire to remain neutral at opening of war, 2 negotiates with Germany on naval disarmament, 4 public opinion in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 8 refusal to restore German colonies, 166, 170 shortage of potatoes in, 296 the Pacifist party in, 167 "unbending resolve" of, to shatter Germany, 31, 32, 71

English mentality, a typical instance of, 4

English Socialists, 214

Entente, the, adheres to Pact of London, 209, 217 and arming of merchant vessels, 286 and Italy, 27 and the trial of William II., 66 answers President Wilson, 118, 120 as instruments in a world revolution, 273 Austria pressed to join, 2 demands abolition of German militarism, 165, 170, 171, 173 desire of final military victory, 164 exterminates Prussian militarism, 273 impression on, of author's speech at Budapest, 178 mine-laying by, 130 peace proposals to, 19, 20 rejects first peace offer, 115 suspicious of Germany's plans, 3 their "unbending resolve" to shatter Germany, 31, 326 views as to peace, 170

Enver Pasha, his influence in Turkey, 233, 269

Erzberger, Herr, agrees with "Czernin scheme", 185, 333 and author's secret report to the Emperor, 155 (note)

Espionage in Roumania, 97

Esterhazy succeeds Tisza, 136

Esthonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317

Eugen, Archduke, 22

Europe after the war, 175

European tension, beginnings of, 1

=F=

Fasciotti, Baron, and Austro-Hungarian action in Belgrade, 12

Fellowes, Sir Ailwyn, admits success of U-boats, 295

Ferdinand, King of Roumania, author's interview with, 264 German opinion of, 260 Queen Elizabeth's fondness for, 93

Ferdinand of Bulgaria, King, anti-Serbian policy of, 51

Filippescu, Nikolai, a proposal by, 80

Fleck, Major, at Nordbahnhof, 219

Flotow, Baron, interview with Hohenlohe, 117 reports on German attitude on U-boat warfare, 118

Fourteen Points, Wilson's, 190 _et seq._, 271, 305, 306, 323 _et seq._

France, and Austria: effect of Vienna troubles, 250 Bethmann's tribute to, 153 distrust of Germany's intentions in, 185 insists on restoration of Alsace-Lorraine, 170 opening of war a surprise to, 2 the Pacifist party in, 167

Francis Joseph, Emperor, a tribute to, 47 advised to accept negotiations, 8 and Franz Ferdinand, 42, 46 and the principle of ministerial responsibility, 56 author's audience with, 12 death of, 48 gives audience to author, 47 King Edward VII. and, 1, 2 on the Peace of Bucharest, 6 opposes Filippescu's scheme, 81

Franz Ferdinand, Archduke, a fortune-teller's prediction concerning, 44 anti-Magyar point of view of, 38, 50 antipathy to Hungary, 35, 37, 38 as gardener, 35 as husband and father, 44, 45 dislike for the Germans of, 50 false rumours concerning, 43 fearlessness of, 45 friendships of, 39 Goluchowski and, 36 Great-Austrian programme of, 41, 49 his high opinion of Pallavicini, 5 his sense of humour, 41 makes advances to the Kaiser, 42 marriage of, 41, 44 mentality of, 35 personality of, 34 pro-Roumanian proclivities of, 77, 78, 79 tragic end of, 49 (_see also_ Sarajevo tragedy) views on foreign policy of, 51

Freedom of the seas, 177 attacked by Entente, 280, 281 neutrals and, 284 President Wilson on, 281, 307

French Socialistic Congress, 214

Freyburg, Baron von, attends conference on U-boat question, 121

Friedrich, Archduke, a tribute to, 22 tact of, 72

Frontier rectifications, Hungary and, 258, 266, 319, 330

Fürstenberg, Karl, a request of, refused at Vienna, 112 report on Roumanian question by, 77

=G=

Galicia, proposed cession of, 20, 75, 145, 159, 173, 332 partition of, 209 Tisza and, 135

Gas attacks, reason for Germany's use of, 16

Gautsch, Baron, a code telegram from, 229 at Nordbahnhof, 219

George, Lloyd, admits grave state of grain supplies, 295 and the Peace of Versailles, 272 author in agreement with, 177-8 confers with Orlando, 164 Dr. Helfferich's allusions to, 290 his desire to crush Germany, 186 influence of, 184 on disarmament, 184

George V., King, his telegram to Prince Henry of Prussia, 9

German army, the General Staff, 22

German-Austria, 179 population of, 31

German Empire, the, creation of, 15, 66

German Government, _versus_ German Diplomacy, 10

German mentality, a typical instance of, 4 military party refuse peace, 32

German Nationalists and Count Andrassy, 25, 26

German policy founders on heritage left by Bismarck, 15

German-Russian differences as to occupied areas, 304

German Supreme Command and evacuation question, 312

Germans and a friendly attitude towards America, 122 at Brest conference, 224 attitude of, towards Poland, 203 inferior mentality of, 69 "insatiable appetite" of, 267 Lenin and, 216 oppose peace negotiations with Roumania, 260 refuse to renounce occupied territory, 226 the dynastic fidelity of, 52

Germany, a moral coalition against, 3 advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115 _et seq._ and Alsace-Lorraine, 71 and Austro-Hungarian military action in Ukraine, 254 answers the Papal Note, 177 blind faith in invincibility of her army, 17 blockade of, and her retaliatory measures, 16 confident of victory, 23, 71 culpability of, in matter of peace, 185 decides on U-boat campaign, 124 declares Armistice with Russia at an end, 318 disillusionment of, 31 dissatisfaction in, over peace resolution in Reichstag, 156 England declares war on, 14 evil times in store for, 336 her dream of a victorious peace, 326, 331 her hopes of food shortage in England, 145 Michaelis on internal economic and political situation in, 157 military party of, 19, 327, 330, 331 negotiations respecting naval disarmament, 4 post-war intentions of, 185 restricts building of U-boats, 131 revolution in, 328 rupture with America, 127 unsuccessful effort at _rapprochement_, 180 violates neutrality of Belgium, 14

Goluchowski, Count, vacillation of, 36

Görlitz, battle of, 96, 107, 329

Gratz, Dr., a good suggestion by, 248 author's discussion with, 219 on Austro-Polish solution of Polish question, 244

Great-Roumania, question of, 80

Great War, the, psychology of various cities, 197 (_See_ World War)

Grey, Sir Edward, an interview with Lichnowsky, 7 at London Conference, 275 proposes negotiations, 8

=H=

Habsburgs, Empire of, the Treaty of London and, 21, 29, 33

Hadik, apathetic attitude of, 238

Hague Convention, the, 280

Haus, Admiral, favours submarine warfare, 334 in Vienna, 121

Hauser, and the question of separate peace, 230

Hebel, appointment for, 154

Helfferich, Dr., disclosures by, 161 (note) on attitude of William II. during Balkan troubles, 68 speech on submarine warfare, 151, 288 _et seq._

Henry of Prussia, Prince, a telegram from King George to, 9

Hertling, Count, advised to suppress "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64 becomes Imperial Chancellor, 198 President Wilson on, 193 succeeds Michaelis, 161

Herzegovina as compensation to Austria, 207

Hindenburg, Field-Marshal, modesty of, 126 popularity of, in Germany, 17

Hoffmann, General, an unfortunate speech by, 237 and plans for outer provinces, 226 high words with Kühlmann, 235 received by the Kaiser, 230 receives a telegram from Petersburg, 229 visited by author, 219

Hohenberg, Duchess of, 41 welcomed in Roumania, 79

Hohendorf, General Conrad von, and his responsibility for the war, 18 (note)

Hohenlohe, Prince, and settlement of Wedel's request, 127 free speech with William II., 65 report on U-boat campaign, 116, 126

Holtzendorff, Admiral, and submarine campaign, 149 arrives in Vienna, 121 guarantees results of U-boat campaign, 122, 334

Hungarian Ruthenians, Wekerle on, 243 Social Democrats, 168

Hungary and cession of her territory, 106 and Roumanian intervention, 77, 106, 107 and the alliance with Roumania, 77 _et seq._ demands of, at Bucharest, 319 frontier rectification question, 258, 266, 319, 330 her influence on the war, 138 indignation in, at author's appointment to Bucharest, 77 "just punishment" of, 97 opposes economical alliance with Roumania, 266, 320 question of a separate peace, 27 repellent attitude of, 107 struggle for liberty in, 202 why her army was neglected, 22

=I=

Imperiali, Marchese, points submitted to London Conference by, 275

International arbitration (_see_ Arbitration)

International disarmament, 171, 176, 177

International law, Germany's breach of, in adoption of U-boat warfare, 280, 281

Internationalists, Russian, 211

Ischl, an audience with Emperor Francis Joseph at, 12

Iswolsky, 11

Italy, Allied defeat in, 183 and Albania, 6 and the Peace of Versailles, 272 Czernin on, 308 declares a blockade, 281 points submitted to London Conference, 275 stands in way of a peace of understanding, 188 ultimatum to, 12 why she entered the war, 3

=J=

Jaczkovics, Vicar Michael, tragic death of, 89

Jagow, Herr von, a frank disclosure by, 14

Joffe, Herr, a circular letter to Allies, 300 conversation with, at Brest, 220 criticisms on the Tsar, 227

Jonescu, Take, and the Sarajevo tragedy, 86

Joseph Ferdinand, Archduke, 22 appointed Chief of Air Force, 62 reinstatement of, 61 relinquishes his command, 62 the Luck episode, 61

=K=

Kameneff at Brest, 220, 316

Karachou, Leo, secretary of Peace Delegation, 303

Karl, Emperor, peace proposals to the Entente, 20

Karl of Schwarzenberg, Prince, Franz Ferdinand and, 39, 40

Karolyi and Roumanian peace negotiations, 260 his attitude before the Roumanian declaration of war, 28

Kerenski and the offensive against Central Powers, 211 newspaper report of condition of his health, 212

Kiderlen-Waechter, a satirical remark by, 63

Kieff, a mission to, 251 entered by Bolsheviks, 248, 249 in danger of a food crisis, 252 peace conditions at, 208

Kieff Committee and the Bolsheviks, 245

Kiel Week, the, 62

_Kienthaler_ (Internationalists), 211

Konopischt and its history, 34 _et seq._

Kreuznach, a conference at, 145

Kriegen, Dr. Bogdan, a fulsome work by, 64

Kühlmann, Dr., and the food shortage, 238, 239 author's talk with, 222 difficult position of, 313 high words with Hoffman, 235 his influence, 198, 199 informed of Roumanian peace overtures, 260 on the Kaiser, 228 returns to Brest, 230

=L=

Lamezan, Captain Baron, at Brest-Litovsk, 233

Landwehr, General, and the food shortage, 238, 240

Lansdowne, Lord, conciliatory attitude of, 184

Larin and Menshevik Socialists, 211

League of Nations, the, 308

Lenin, author on, 216 opposed to offensive against Central Powers, 211

Leopold of Bavaria, Prince, a day's shooting with, 231 chats with author, 219

Lewicky, M., 240

Lichnowsky interviews Sir Edward Grey, 7

Liége taken by Ludendorff, 22

Lithuania, Germany and, 249

Livonia demanded by Germany, 249, 317

London, Declaration of, discarded by England, 280

London, Pact of, 20, 170, 172, 179, 328 desired amendments to, 146 text of, 21, 275 _et seq._

Lublin, German demand for evacuation of, 204, 205, 206

Luck episode, the, 22, 106 Archduke Joseph Ferdinand and, 61

Ludendorff and Belgium, 186 and the Polish question, 207 candid admission by, 247 compared with enemy statesmen, 19 confident of success of U-boat warfare, 126 congratulates Hoffmann, 237 displays "a gleam of insight", 230 dominating influence of, 79, 115, 126 German hero-worship of, 17 his independent nature, 60 how he captured Liége, 22 personality of, 331

Lueger and Franz Ferdinand, 50

Luxembourg, German invasion of, 16

=M=

Mackensen, a fleet of Zeppelins at Bucharest, 101 failure at Maracesci, 261 headquarters at Bucharest, 105

Magyars, the, and Franz Ferdinand, 38, 50 author and, 78

Majorescu and Austria's policy, 330 and territorial concessions, 97, 206 forms a Ministry, 81

Mandazescu, arrest and extradition of, 89

Maracesci, attack on, 261

Marghiloman and co-operation of Roumania, 106 forms a Cabinet, 266, 320

Marie, Queen of Roumania, English sympathies of, 98, 99

Marne, the, first battle of, 17

Martow and the Menshevik party, 211

Martynoz, and the Russian Internationalists, 211

Medwjedew, J.G., Ukrainian delegate to Brest, 301

Mennsdorff, Ambassador, interviews General Smuts, 169

Menshevik party, the, 211

Meran, the Entente's proposals regarding, 170, 173

Merchant vessels, arming of, author on, 285

Merey meets Czernin at Brest, 219

Michaelis, Dr., appointed Imperial Chancellor, 156 defines Germany's views regarding Belgium, 157 on peace proposals, 157 Pan-Germanism of, 160

"Might before Right," Bismarckian principle of, 15

Miklossy, Bishop Stephan, marvellous escape of, 89

Militarism, German faith in, 17 England's idea of German, 166

Monarchists _v._ Republicans, 52

Monarchs, hypnotic complacency of, 58 _et seq._

Moutet, attitude of, at French Socialist conference, 214

=N=

Nationality, problem of, 190 Franz Ferdinand and, 191

Naval disarmament, negotiations on, 4

Nicholas, Grand Duke, and the military party in Russia, 2

Nicolai, Tsar, Joffe on, 227

North Sea, the, blockade of, 280

Noxious gas, why used by Germany, 16

=O=

Odessa, in danger of a food crisis, 252

Orlando confers with Ribot and Lloyd George, 164

Otto, Archduke, brother of Franz Ferdinand, 36

=P=

Pallavicini, Markgraf, discusses the political situation with author, 5

Pan-Germans, 330 conditions on which they would conclude peace, 160

Pan-Russian Congress, the, 212, 213, 214

Papal Note, the, 167, 177 Austria's reply to, 175 German reply to, 333

Paris, negotiations _in camera_ at, 271

Peace by sacrifice, 327

Peace Congress at Brest-Litovsk, 218 _et seq._

Peace movement, real historical truth concerning, 186

Peace negotiations, Count Czernin on, 298 _et seq._ deadlock in, 182 the Pope's proposals, 167, 175, 177, 333

Peace resolution, a, and its consequences, 156

Penfield, Mr., American Ambassador to Vienna, 131

People's Socialists, the, 212

Peschechonow, Minister of Food, 212

Petersburg and the Ukraine, 309

Plechanow, Georgei, and the Russian Social Patriots, 211

Poklewski, Russian Ambassador to Roumania, 86

Poland, a conference on question of, 205 becomes a kingdom, 200 conquest of, 106 Count Czernin on, 304 Emperor Charles's offer regarding, 75 future position of, 203 German standpoint on, 203 Michaelis on, 159 re-organisation of, 145 the German demands, 244 unrepresented at Brest, and the reason, 304, 315

Poles, the, and Brest-Litovsk negotiations, 208 party divisions among, 204

Polish question, and the Central-European project, 209 difficulties of, 200

Popow, Bulgarian Minister of Justice, 223

Pro-Roumanian party and its head, 77

Prussian militarism, England's idea of, 166 extermination of, 273 fear of, 174 (_See also_ German military party)

=Q=

Quadruple Alliance, the, dissension in, 250 Germany as shield of, 183 peace terms to Roumania, 262

=R=

Radek, a scene with a chauffeur, 237

Radoslawoff, ignorant of negotiations with Entente, 162

Randa, Lieut.-Col. Baron, a telling remark by, 104 and Roumanian peace overtures, 260, 262, 319

Reichstag, the, a peace resolution passed in, 156 demands peace without annexation, 156, 160

Renner and the Stockholm Congress, 168

Republicans _v._ Monarchists, 52

Ressel, Colonel, 264

Revertera negotiates for peace, 164, 169

Revolution, danger of, 147

Rhondda, Lord, British Food Controller, 151

Ribot confers with Orlando, 164 statement by, 152

Richthofen brothers, the, 246

Rosenberg meets author at Brest, 219

Roumania, 77 _et seq._ a change of Government in, 81 a land of contrasts, 84 affairs in, after Sarajevo tragedy, 86 and the Peace of Bucharest, 6 author's negotiations for peace, 258 between two stools, 261 declares war, 100, 279 espionage in, 97 freedom of the Press in, 84 Germany and, 262, 267 her treachery to Central Powers, 262 how news of Sarajevo tragedy was received in, 86 Marghiloman forms a Cabinet, 266 negotiations for peace, 318 out of action, 23 peace concluded with, 323 question of annexations of, 159, 207 question of her neutrality, 12, 95 Russian gold in, 111 social conditions in, 85 ultimatum to, 12, 262 why she entered the war, 3

Roumanian invasion of Transylvania, 108

Roumanians, mistaken views of strength of, 261 their love of travel, 85

Rudolf, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 37

Russia, a contemplated peace with, 211 abdication of the Tsar, 142 an appeal to German soldiers, 249 begins military operations without a declaration of war, 3 Bolshevism in, 211, 216, 229 declares for cessation of hostilities, 318 differences of opinion in, as to continuance of war, 211 _et seq._ enters the war, 7 Francis Joseph's inquiry as to a possible revolution in, 105 her responsibility for Great War, 10 incites German army to revolt, 317 negotiations for peace, 298 out of action, 23 peace treaty signed, 318 prepared for war, 112 the military party in, 2, 9 ultimatum to Roumania, 262

Russian Revolution, the, 142, 147, 211 _et seq._

Russians, their fear of Trotski, 237

Ruthenian districts of Hungary, Ukrainian demands, 242

=S=

Sacharow, General, murder of, 220

St. Mihiel, author at, 73

St. Privat, reminiscences of, 74

Salzburg negotiations, the, 210

Sarajevo, the tragedy of, 6, 49 sounds death knell of the Monarchy, 32

Sassonoff, a momentous statement by, 88 attitude of, after declaration of war, 8 visits Bucharest, 112

Satonski, Wladimir Petrowitch, 302

Schachrai, W.M., at Brest, 301

Schonburg, Alvis, and the Emperor Charles, 61

Schönerer, Deputy, Franz Ferdinand and, 50

Secret diplomacy, abolition of: author's views, 306-7

Sedan, a house with a history at, 74

Seidler, Dr. von, a _faux pas_ by, 56 and the food shortage, 240 and the partition of Galicia, 209 and the Ukrainian question, 208, 242, 243 apathetic attitude of, 238, 239 author's meeting with, 230 visits South Slav provinces, 59

Seitz, and the Stockholm Conference, 168

Serbia, arrogance of, 6 ultimatum to, 7

Sewrjuk, M., 240

Sixtus, Prince, letters from Emperor Charles to, 164

Skobeleff and the Mensheviks, 211

Skrzynski, Herr von, 250

Slapowszky, Johann, tragic death of, 89

Slav provinces, a visit by the Emperor to, 59

Smuts, General, interview with Mennsdorff, 170

Social Democrats and the question of peace, 26, 30 and the Stockholm Conference, 168, 333 Hungarian, 243 opposed to sacrifice of Alsace-Lorraine, 71

"Social Patriots," Russian, 211

Social Revolutionary Party, the, 212

Socialists and offensive against Central Powers, 211

Spanish reports of war-weariness in England and France, 143

Stirbey, Prince, 263

Stockholm, a Socialist Conference at, 168, 333 Russians ask for a conference at, 229

Stockholm Congress, negative result of, 169

Strikes and their danger, 310

Stumm, von, on Ukrainian claims, 241

Sturdza, Lieut.-Col., extraordinary behaviour of, 83

Stürgkh, Count, 18 (note) recollections of, 46

Submarine warfare, author's note to American Government on, 279 Czernin on, 334 destruction without warning justified, 283 enemy losses in, 290 enemy's "statistical smoke-screens" as to, 289 question of safety of passengers and crew, 282 speech by Dr. Helfferich on, 288 why adopted by Central Powers, 281 _et seq._ (_See also_ U-boats)

Südekum, Herr, and Austria-Hungary's peace proposals, 155, 333

Supreme Military and Naval Command, conditions of, for peace negotiations, 159

Switzerland, reported disturbances in: author's disclaimer, 335

Sycophancy in high places, 58, 60, 62, 63, 64

Sylvester, Dr., and the German-Austrian National Assembly, 26

=T=

Talaat Pasha arrives at Brest, 233 influence of, 143 threatens to resign, 269

Talleyrand, a dictum of, 174

Tarnowski, Count, author's opinion of, 110 German Ambassador to Washington, 127

Thomas, M., war speech on Russian front, 214

Tisza, Count Stephen, 18 (note) a characteristic letter from, 200 advocates unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 334 and American intervention, 123 and author's appointment to Bucharest, 78 and cession of Hungarian territory, 135 and control of foreign policy, 134 and the Stockholm Conference, 168 assassination of, 137 at a U-boat campaign conference, 121 author's conference with, 27, 28 defends Count Czernin, 108 dismissal of, 136, 203 Franz Ferdinand and, 38 his influence in Hungary, 27 leads anti-Roumanian party, 77 lively correspondence with author, 128 on dangers of pessimism, 154 on the Treaty of London, 28 opposes annexation of Roumania, 207 opposes the war, 10 opposes U-boat warfare, 131, 334 peace proposal of, 139 _pro-memoria_ of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 258 question of frontier rectifications, 319 refuses cession of Hungarian territory, 107 speech at conference on Polish question, 206 tribute to, 137 views regarding Poland, 200 visits the Southern Slavs, 30

Transylvania, 173 opposition to cession of, 107 proposed cession of, 28, 50 Roumanian invasion of, 108

Trentino, the, offered to Italy, 75

Trieste, Entente proposals regarding, 170, 173

"Tripartite solution" of Polish question, Tisza on, 201

Trnka and the Customs dues, 168

Trotski, a tactical blunder by, 236 accepts the German-Austria ultimatum, 235 and the Internationalist party, 211 arrives at Brest, 232 declines to sign, 250 his brother-in-law Kameneff, 220 his library, 235, 236 negotiations with, 247 opposed to ill-treatment of war prisoners, 236 ultimatum to, 234

Trudoviks, the, 212

Tscheidse, and the Mensheviks, 211, 213

Tschernow, speaks at Peasants' Congress, 212

Tschirsky, Herr von, a momentous communication to Berchtold, 7 and a telegram from King George, 9 his desire for war, 32 untactful diplomacy of, 10

Tseretelli and the Menshevik party, 211

Turkey, a dispute with Bulgaria, 268 asks for munitions, 95 how the Sultan was deposed, 233 probable secession of, 269

Turkish Grand Vizier arrives at Brest, 233

Turks, a reported advance by a hostile Power for a separate peace, 143 at Brest Conference, 223

Tyrol, the, German troops in, 24

=U=

U-boat warfare, 114 _et seq._ a conference in Vienna on, 121 "a terrible mistake", 126 and America's entry into the war, 126 and why adopted by Germany, 16 Czernin on, 148 political arguments against, 117, 118 what it achieved, 178 (_See also_ Submarine warfare)

Ugron, Herr von, and the "tripartite" solution of Polish question, 201

Ukraine and Petersburg, 309 Bolshevik destruction in, 252 food supplies from, 251 _et seq._, 315 military action in, and the consequences, 253 peace concluded with, 249 revolution in, 253 survey of imports from, 255 treaty signed, 317

Ukrainian Army General Committee appointed, 214 delegates at Brest, 231, 300 Workers' and Peasants' Government, a declaration from, 301

Ukrainians and their demands, 208, 240, 314 dictatorial attitude of, 241 negotiations with, 315

United States, the, scarcity of supplies in, 294 (_See also_ America)

=V=

Versailles, opening of Peace Congress at, 196 the Council of Four at, 271 the Peace of, 18, 19, 271 terrible nature of, 273 triumph of Entente at, 186

Vienna, a council in, 121 differences of opinion in, 77 disastrous effects of troubles in, 250 disturbances in, 58 food shortage and strikes in, 238, 239, 241, 314 politicians' views on peace proposals, 230 psychology of, 197 warlike demonstrations at, after Sarajevo tragedy, 33

Vredenburch, Herr von, Dutch Ambassador to Roumania, 104

=W=

Wales, Prince of (_see_ Edward VII., King)

Wallachia, occupation of, 99, 105

Wallhead, Mr., 295

Washington Cabinet, and Austria-Hungary's attitude to submarine warfare, 279

Wassilko, Nikolay, leader of Austrian Ruthenians, 247, 249

Wedel, Count, calls on Count Czernin, 127 disclosures of, 161 (note) revelations of, 155 (note)

Weisskirchner, Burgemeister, coins the term "bread peace," 257

Wekerle, Dr., and the Polish question, 203 author and, 136, 230 on the Ukrainian question, 242 standpoint of, on Roumanian peace negotiations, 260, 319

Western front, an Entente break-through on, 183

Western Powers, the, and Germany's ambitions, 2

Wiesner, Ambassador, von, and a Pan-German, 161 at Brest-Litovsk, 236 author discusses Russian peace with, 219

Wilhelm, Crown Prince, and Franz Ferdinand, 43 anxious for peace, 72 author's conversation with, 74 his quarters at Sedan, 74

William I. and Bismarck, 65

William II., Emperor, and Bismarck, 52 and Franz Ferdinand, 42 and the German Supreme Military Command, 17 as _causeur_, 66 as the "elect of God," 52, 53 cause of his ruin, 62 _et seq._ demonstrations against, in the Reichstag, 54 desires to help deposed Tsar, 70 difficulties of his political advisers, 60 fails to find favour in England, 63 his projected division of the world, 67 impending trial of: author's protest, 66 informed of serious nature of situation for Allies, 332 instructions to Kühlmann, 249 long years of peaceful government, 68 longs for peace, 70 on food troubles in England, 145 on impending attack on Italian front, 71 presents author with "Der Kaiser im Felde," 64 Prince Hohenlohe and, 65 question of his abdication, 75 the Press and, 65 warlike speeches of, 68

Wilson, President, advantages of his "Fourteen Points," 188 as master of the world, 192 author on his Message, 305 Count Andrassy's Note to, 25 Count Czernin on, 192 Entente's reply to his peace proposal, 118, 120, 123 his Fourteen Points and the Peace of Versailles, 271 on the freedom of the seas, 281 ready to consider peace, 250 reopens hopes of a peace of understanding, 189 speech to Congress, 193 text of the Fourteen Points, 323

Wolf, K.H., a scene in the "Burg," 169

World-domination, Germany's dream of, 1, 2

World organization, a new, principles of, 174 _et seq._

World War, the, an important phase of, 107 attempts at peace, 134 _et seq._ author's impressions and reflections on, 195 _et seq._, 271 _et seq._ by whom started, 18 (note) causes of, 3 President Wilson and, 188 _et seq._ questions of responsibility for outbreak of, 2

World War, the, U-boat warfare in, 114 _et seq._ (_see also_ Submarine warfare and U-boat) violent measures adopted by Germany in, 16

=Z=

Zeppelin raids on Bucharest, 100

Zimmermann, Herr, and author's peace proposals, 146 opposes unrestricted U-boat warfare, 115, 120

_Zimmerwalder_ (Russian Internationalists), 211

PRINTED BY CASSELL & COMPANY, LIMITED, LA BELLE SAUVAGE, LONDON, E.C. 4

* * * * *

+------------------------------------------------------------------+ | Typographical errors corrected in text: | | | | Table of Contents: Appendix is listed as 257, changed to 275 | | Page 47: 'and and in doing so' replaced with 'and in doing so' | | Page 81: 'to made room' replaced with 'to make room' | | Page 107: session replaced with cession | | Page 196: perdera replaced with perdra | | Page 201: Nr 63 replaced with Nr. 63 | | Page 251: official replaced with officials | | Page 286: 'Les navir' replaced with 'Les navires' | | Page 293: persumably replaced with presumably | | Page 333: Sudekum replaced with Südekum | | Page 334: 'would have have been' replaced with 'would have been' | | Page 343: Gouluchowski replaced with Goluchowski | | Page 344: Gorlitz replaced with Görlitz | | Page 346: Lubin replaced with Lublin | | | | The surname Colloredo-Mannsfield/Colloredo-Mannsfeld appears | | once each way, on page 121, and in the index | +------------------------------------------------------------------+

* * * * *

End of Project Gutenberg's In the World War, by Count Ottokar Czernin