CHAPTER XIII

REPUBLICS OF PANAMA AND NICARAGUA

1

From the Jungle to the Canal is almost as great a leap as to New York itself--out of barbarism to the most advanced post of civilization, the place where in all the world the Stars and Stripes wave most proudly.

President Roosevelt obtained almost as great prestige by the Canal of Panama as Disraeli did by that of Suez. In England he would have had more, but America ten years ago was not as sensible of the value of an ocean key as she is now. Disraeli never needed to make speeches on how he acquired the Suez Canal for the Empire, but Roosevelt tired the platform echoes with "I started it," "I made sure of the Panama Canal for the American people," "I let Congress talk, but the work of construction went on." Roosevelt was ready to go down to fame as the man who was responsible for the Canal. For he was by temperament a strong Imperialist, and the Canal, he knew, must prove a great factor in the future development of American commerce and in the increase of American influence in Latin America. Roosevelt confirmed the Monroe Doctrine in his political practice and by achieving the construction of the Canal he gave the Doctrine an extension of application. He reserved the commercial exploitation of America for the American nations.

The circumstances of the acquirement by the United States of the trans-isthmian strip of land ten miles wide, the Canal Zone, are of minor importance to-day. The Colombian Government, to whom it belonged, haggled long over terms, as usual with the Spanish peoples trying to get as much out of the rich Yankees as they could. Colombia grossly overdid it on this occasion, and in 1902 an insurrection was arranged by the United States in that part of Colombia now called the Republic of Panama. Roosevelt ordered the Fleet to prevent the landing of Colombian soldiers. There was therefore no bloodshed. It was one of the happiest of revolutions, and a new nation was at once recognized by Washington--the Panamanian. A constitution and a government for the Panamanian nation were soon obtained, and the long-desired treaty for the acquisition of the Zone was signed.

The Panamanians, that is, the families of its "aristokratia," did well. They received ten million dollars down and a rental of two hundred and fifty thousand dollars beginning February, 1913. They have become pensioners of the United States Government. What they do with the money is not very clear. The Speakities in the jungle do not seem to share in it; wages of police, firemen, postmen, and the like are said to be greatly in arrear.

The Colombians, however, remained in sore dudgeon: not only had they lost territory, but golden gain, and the rebels who had stolen the territory were those who were receiving the dollars. The Government of Colombia must have felt foolish. For it is they who would have had the money. They sent North a General to seek redress. This General tried to have the matter submitted to the Hague for arbitration. As Secretary Hay saw, that would hardly have proved satisfactory to the United States, and he refused.

The General then returned home and, despite failure, was elected president. In 1909 he made a strong effort once more to obtain redress. The United States then proved willing to do something to right the wrong, and a treaty was drawn up whereby the Panama Republic should pay Colombia a quarter of a million dollars annually. The paucity of this amount so shocked the Colombians that they turned their president out and the treaty was not signed.

In 1914 a new president of Colombia made a new attempt to get a settlement with the United States, and sent his envoy, Urrutia, to arrange a new treaty. This he did, but it was seven years before the talking died down and in a modified form it was signed. It provided for a twenty-five-million-dollar indemnity for "injuries," and an amendment provided that five million should be paid within six months of ratification. Colombia also was accorded special privileges in the use of the Panama Canal and Railroad. In exchange, she recognized the State of Panama. It was signed in December, 1921, and Colombia is now once more on friendly terms with the United States.

The Republic of Panama, it seems to me, has little future. Its habitable territory is scanty. In the interior are the Indians, who refuse to recognize it. It could improve places like Puerto Bello and Nombre de Dios--but it leaves that to the United States.

Article II of the treaty they signed provides that "the Republic of Panama further grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation, and control of any other lands and waters outside the Zone above described which may be necessary for the construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, or protection of the said Canal."

Whenever necessary, therefore, more territory can be added, should oil be found or new harbors desired. The importance of the Panama Canal lies not, however, in the jungle, which abuts it on both sides, but in itself.

2

Though I did not visit Nicaragua in these journeyings I think some notes on its position necessary to this study. It is the State next but one north of Panama, and is separated by the small State of Costa Rica. Though Nicaragua is broader than Panama from ocean to ocean, it has always been considered as possessing an alternative territory for a canal. This is owing to its large lake and existing waterways. British capitalists have in time past considered the feasibility of financing the construction of such a canal. The United States, bargaining with France for the price of de Lesseps' handiwork at Panama, used the idea of a Nicaraguan Canal as a persuader. It was used also with the Colombians before the Panama revolution.

Nicaragua is, therefore, a State on which the eyes of America have more frequently rested than on the remainder of the Central American republics. She has felt constrained to advise and help her, lend her money, and finally enter into virtual control.

In 1907 a war between Nicaragua and Honduras was settled by the joint efforts of Roosevelt and Diaz. The President of Mexico, who had succeeded in quelling the spirit of revolt in his own country, was ready to help in making Central America safe for Democracy, and under the auspices of his ideas a Central American Conference was held in Washington, and a sort of League of Nations tribunal was set up. Soon, however, fights broke out again, and Nicaragua started against Salvador, her north-western neighbor (1909). The United States then sent down the marines to hold the Nicaraguans in check.

Nicaragua was annoyed with the United States, but instead of showing it in action appealed ingratiatingly for some advice and money help. Next year the United States yielded a loan secured on her customs dues. It is like the story of a fallen woman--a little indignant at being ravished, she looks to the ravisher for advice and a little money. He says, "You can earn a good deal under my protection. I will advance you a small sum and take it back in dues upon your custom."

In 1914 Nicaragua was fourteen million dollars in debt and much embarrassed. It was, therefore, not difficult for the United States to drive a new bargain. In exchange for three million dollars, the expenditure of which the United States would supervise, Nicaragua was to grant to the said United States the exclusive right to construct an inter-oceanic canal. This canal the United States naturally had no intention of constructing. The significance of the deal is that no other Power should be granted powers to construct a canal--no competitor against the new Panama Canal. Besides this concession, by the same treaty two small off-coast islands were leased to the United States.

Nicaragua's debts to-day, internal and external, are greater than ever. She buys all she needs in American markets. A controller sits at the receipt of custom. She is indeed still a little annoyed, and corresponds with the patriots of Domingo and Cuba. The Central American nations, including Nicaragua, have however, concluded a new pact which brings them nearer to unity than they have ever been hitherto. This is based on the common ground of Latin sentiment, but its binding power is that of the dollar and a mutual economic interest. The relationship of these republics with the United States is friendly enough to be called domination with consent of those dominated. It is a remarkable contrast to the belligerency of Mexico. The Central American pact in 1923 came with a fanfare of drums heralding the Pan-American Conference at Santiago de Chile.