Part 4

Chamberlain[A] reports from Peshawur that it is quite evident Ameer is bent on utmost procrastination, and determined on making acceptance of our mission dependent on his pleasure and choice of time.... To await at Peshawur Ameer's pleasure would be to abandon whole policy and accept easy repulse at outset.... Consequently mission moved this morning to Jamrud; thence Cavagnari advances to Ali Musjid with small escort to demand passage....

[A] General Sir Neville Chamberlain.

_Telegram from Viceroy, September 22, 1878._

Following telegram received last night from Sir Neville Chamberlain. Message begins: Cavagnari reports that we have received a decisive answer from Faiz Mahomed, after personal interview, that he will not allow mission to proceed. He crowned the heights commanding the way with his levies, and though many times warned by Cavagnari that his reply would be regarded as reply of the Ameer, said he would not let mission pass....

_Telegram from Secretary of State, October 30, 1878._

Text of letter, as approved, to be sent to the Ameer.... In consequence of this hostile action on your part, I have assembled Her Majesty's forces on your frontier, but I desire to give you a last opportunity of averting the calamities of war. For this it is necessary that a full and suitable apology be offered by you in writing, and tendered on British territory by an officer of sufficient rank. Furthermore, as it has been found impossible to maintain satisfactory relations between the two States unless the British Government is adequately represented in Afghanistan, it will be necessary that you should consent to receive a permanent British Mission within your territory.... Unless these conditions are accepted, fully and plainly, by you, and your acceptance received by me not later than the 20th November, I shall be compelled to consider your intentions as hostile, and to treat you as a declared enemy of the British Government.

SHERE ALI (1878).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Afghanistan," C 2,190 of 1878, p. 225.

_Extract from a Memorandum by Lord Napier of Magdala._

We have unfortunately managed Shere Ali badly. Perhaps it might not have been possible, with our scruples and his want of them, to have managed him advantageously; but it must be admitted that we have not given him the reasons to unite himself with us that he naturally expected. First, we stood aloof in his struggles for life and empire, ready to acknowledge whoever might prove the master of Afghanistan. Then, when Shere Ali had subdued his enemies, he came forward to meet us with an alliance, but we were willing to form only an imperfect alliance with him. He was willing to trust us, provided that we would trust him; but we felt that we could not bind ourselves to unreserved support of a power whose ideas of right and wrong were so different from ours. We therefore proposed to bind him, leaving ourselves (according to his idea) free, and he recoiled from this bargain. His friendly feelings, however, were not entirely alienated by that experience of us; he abstained from any action towards Seistan at our desire, and he believed that the mediation which we pressed upon him would have ended by the restoration of the portion of Seistan that Persia had occupied in his days of trouble. And not only Shere Ali, but the whole Afghan people, believed that we should restore to them what they had lost. When they found that we had allowed Persia to obstruct and ill-treat our arbitrator, and to retain much of her encroachments, they looked upon us as a weak and treacherous people, who, under the guise of friendship, had spoiled them in favour of Persia. This I believe to be the root of Shere Ali's discontent with us.

DEATH OF SHERE ALI (1879).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Afghanistan," C 2,401 of 1879, p. 12.

_Translation of a Letter, dated February 26, 1879, from Sirdar Mahomed Yakub Khan to Major Cavagnari._

... I now write a second time in accordance with former friendship to inform you that to-day a letter was received by post from Turkestan announcing that my worthy and exalted father had, upon 29th Safar (21st February, 1879), obeyed the call of the summoner, and, throwing off the dress of existence, hastened to the region of the divine mercy.

THE GANDAMAK TREATY (1879).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Afghanistan," C 2,362 of 1879.

ARTICLE III.--His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies agrees to conduct his relations with foreign States in accordance with the advice and wishes of the British Government.... The British Government will support the Ameer against any foreign aggression with money, arms, or troops, to be employed in whatsoever manner the British Government may judge best for the purpose.

ARTICLE IV.--With a view to the maintenance of the direct and intimate relations now established ... it is agreed that a British Resident representative shall reside at Cabul, with a suitable escort, in a place of residence appropriate to his rank and dignity. It is also agreed that the British Government shall have the right to depute British Agents with suitable escorts to the Afghan frontiers, whensoever this may be considered necessary by the British Government in the interests of both States, on the occurrence of any important external fact....

ARTICLE IX.--The British Government restores to His Highness the Ameer of Afghanistan and its dependencies the towns of Candahar and Jellalabad, with all the territory now in possession of the British armies, excepting the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi. His Highness ... agrees on his part that the districts of Kurram, Pishin, and Sibi, according to the limits defined in the schedule annexed, shall remain under the protection and administrative control of the British Government: that is to say, the aforesaid districts shall be treated as assigned districts, and shall not be considered as permanently severed from the limits of the Afghan kingdom.... The British Government will retain in its own hands the control of the Khyber and Michni Passes, and of all relations with the independent tribes of the territory directly connected with these passes.

Done at Gandamak this 26th day of May, 1879.

THE CABUL MASSACRE (1879).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications, "Afghanistan,"_ C 2,457 of 1880, p. 95.

_Statement of Taimur (Timoss), Sowar B troop, Corps of Guides, on September 15, 1879._

I was in the Bala Hissar, Cabul, on the 3rd instant: Major Sir Louis Cavagnari and the other British officers were in the bungalow. At about 8 a.m. the Turkestani ("Ardal") regiment, which was in the Bala Hissar, was paraded to receive its pay. Daud Shah, the Commander-in-Chief, gave them one month's pay. They claimed two, and broke. They were paraded quite close to the Residency, and another regiment was also quartered with them. One of soldiery shouted out, "Let us destroy the Envoy first of all, and after that the Ameer!" They rushed into the courtyard in front of the Residency, and stoned some of the syces who were sitting there. We then opened fire on them, without orders from any European. All the British officers were inside. The Ameer's men then went for their weapons, and returned with them in a quarter of an hour. They then commenced to besiege the Residency, and from commanding positions made the roof of the Residency untenable. We made shelter trenches on it, and fired from the windows. The city people came to help the soldiers about 10 a.m. Major Sir Louis Cavagnari was wounded in the forehead about 1 p.m.; he was in a shelter trench. A man from the roof of a house shot at him, and the bullet striking a brick, it, together with a piece of brick, struck Sir Louis. But he was not killed. Mr. Jenkyns came up and sent for a Munshi to write to the Ameer, but the scribe was unable to write through fear. I then wrote briefly to the Ameer that we were besieged, and he was to help us; and sent it by Gholam Nabbi, a Kabuli, an old Guide Sowar who was in the Residency. No answer came. Gholam Nabbi afterwards told me that the Ameer wrote on the letter, "If God will, I am just making arrangements." Major Cavagnari was helped into the Residency, and tended to by Dr. Kelly. Mr. Jenkyns then ordered me to send a second letter to the Ameer, stating that Major Cavagnari was wounded, and to hasten on assistance. The letter was sent by a Hindu whose name I don't know. He was cut to pieces in front of the Residency. I was at about 3 p.m. sent with a letter by Mr. Hamilton promising six months' pay. By that time they had managed to get on to the roof of the Residency. I went armed into the midst of the crowd, and was immediately stripped of my arms, but my life was saved by an officer. They threw me from the roof of the Residency on to the roof of the neighbouring house. I lost my senses.... I know nothing of what happened after this, but I visited the place next morning. I recollect they had begun to set fire to the Residency just as I was leaving.... Daybreak I went to the Residency, and saw first the corpse of Lieutenant Hamilton lying over a mountain gun which had been brought up. The troops who were there told me Mr. Hamilton had shot about three men with his pistol, and had cut down two more before he was shot. He was stripped and cut into pieces, but not dishonoured. About 25 feet off was the body of Mr. Jenkyns in a similar state. I did not go into the Residency, but was told Dr. Kelly was lying killed in the Residency. Sir Louis Cavagnari was in the Residency when it fell in flames. He was in the room where the wounded were, and his body had not been discovered when I left the city.

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Afghanistan," C 2,457 of 1880, p. 83.

_Extract from Deposition of Ressaldar-Major Nakshband Khan._

At about 9 a.m., while the fighting was going on, I myself saw the four European officers charge out at the head of some twenty-five of the garrison; they drove away a party that were holding some broken ground. About a quarter of an hour after this another sally was made by a party with three officers at their head--Cavagnari was not with them this time--with the same result. A third sally was made with two British officers (Jenkyns and Hamilton) leading; a fourth sally was made with a Sikh Jemadar bravely leading. No more sallies were made after this. They all appeared to go to the upper part of the house, and fired from above. At about half-past eleven o'clock part of the building, in which the Embassy was, was noticed to be on fire. I do not know who fired it. I think it probable that the defenders, finding themselves so few, fired part, so as to have a less space to defend. The firing went on continuously all day; perhaps it was hottest from 10 a.m. to 3 p.m., after which it slackened, and the last shots were fired at about 8.30 p.m. or 9 p.m., after which all was quiet, and everyone dispersed. The next morning I heard shots being fired. I asked an old woman, to whose house I had been sent for safety by Sirdar Wali Muhammad Khan, what this was: she sent out her son to find out. He said: "They are shooting the people found still alive in the Residency."

THE MIDLOTHIAN CAMPAIGN (1879).

=Source.=--_The Saturday Review_, November 29.

The personal enthusiasm with which Mr. Gladstone is regarded by the mass of his followers has been largely stimulated by his appearance in Scotland and by his fervid harangues. The only local topic on which he has cared to dwell is the alleged creation of fagot votes by his opponents. There can be no doubt that the purchase of little freeholds for the sole purpose of obtaining votes is an abuse and a grievance, though it is said that Mr. Gladstone once held a fagot vote. For two or three years of his life Mr. Cobden concentrated all his efforts on a gigantic scheme of fagot votes, by which the manufacturing towns were to obtain control of the counties; but the total failure of the project caused it to be tacitly abandoned. If Mr. Gladstone is after all defeated in Midlothian, the moral effect of a Conservative victory will be greatly impaired by the process of tampering with the representation. To Mr. Gladstone's excited mind an attempt to pack a constituency probably assumes extravagant dimensions. Before he arrived at Edinburgh he began his public protest against fagot votes in Midlothian, as well as against the crimes of a Government which he has persuaded himself to regard as the worst and most dangerous that has held power in England. He has denounced his opponents so loudly and so often that even his overflowing eloquence could include nothing new, but the crowded assemblies which he addressed, though they had read his orations, and perhaps his pamphlets, had not heard him speak. It is not surprising that eager and unanimous multitudes should welcome with admiration and delight the detailed exposition, by the most eloquent of politicians, of the opinions which they had already been taught to hold. Few cold-blooded or dispassionate sceptics would ask themselves whether it was credible that a Ministry and a great and steady majority of the House of Commons should never, even by accident, have deviated into prudence, justice, or patriotic foresight. In private discussion and in Parliamentary debate it is found expedient, according to the old legal phrase, to give colour, or, in other words, to admit that the theory, which is impugned, though unsound, is at least credible or intelligible. Mr. Gladstone follows the bent of his own genius when he encourages the popular tendency to deal with difficult controversies as if they were wholly one-sided.

His Liberal colleagues, perhaps, regard his present enterprise with mixed feelings. Their confidence in their former leader is qualified by doubts of his judgment, and by uncertainty as to the present range of his ambition. They cannot but perceive that he assumes the character of representative of the party, although he probably intends no disloyalty to its official or nominal chiefs. It is true that if, in appealing to the multitude, he pushes his successors aside, they have little right to complain. Almost all of them have of late addressed vehement language to public meetings, though none of them can compete with Mr. Gladstone in the power of stirring political passion. Official subordination is set aside when policy is regulated, not by Parliament, but by the voice of the general population. Senators and Consulars must stand aside in the presence of a Dictator. Although it has long been customary for statesmen to make occasional speeches to public meetings, the extent to which the practice has lately been carried is altogether unprecedented. The result is that the Constitution is gradually weakened by the substitution of numerical majorities for the representatives of the people in Parliament. The approach of a General Election furnishes no sufficient justification for an innovation which accelerates the prevalence of democracy, and aggravates its evil tendencies. Mr. Gladstone himself perhaps understands and approves the organic change which promotes the supremacy of popular eloquence in the State. It is his habit to depreciate the honesty and judgment of the educated classes.

BEACONSFIELD KEEPS COOL.

=Source.=--Holland's _Life of the Duke of Devonshire_, i. 258. (Longmans and Co.)

_Lord Beaconsfield to Mr. Gathorne Hardy._

It certainly is a relief that the drenching rhetoric has at length ceased--but I have never read a word of it. "Satis eloquentiæ sapientiæ parum."

THE MAIWAND DISASTER (1880).

=Source.=--_Parliamentary Publications_, "Afghanistan," C 2,736 of 1880, p. 3.

_Telegram from Viceroy, June 27, 1880, to Secretary of State._

Telegram from Thomson at Teheran says: Ayub Khan marching against Candahar with large force. I think we should leave Shere Ali to defend himself beyond the Helmund, but it seems to me, after communicating with Stewart, that it would be inconsistent with security of our military position at Candahar to allow hostile forces to cross that river. I propose, therefore, to instruct Primrose, if Ayub reaches Furrah, to advance towards Girishk with sufficient force to prevent passage of Helmund....

_Telegram dated August 2, 1880, from Colonel St. John, Candahar, to Foreign, Simla (p. 33)._

_29th._--Arrived here yesterday afternoon with General Burrows and Nuttall and remnant of force. Telegraph has been interrupted ever since my arrival. No chance of restoration, so send this by messenger to Chaman. Burrows marched from Kushk-i-Nakhud on morning 27th, having heard from me that Ayub's advanced guard had occupied Maiwand, about three miles from the latter place. Enemy's cavalry appeared advancing from direction of Haidrabad, their camp on Helmund ten miles above Girishk. Artillery and cavalry engaged them at 9 a.m., so shortly afterwards whole force of enemy appeared, and formed line of battle--seven regiments, regulars in centre, three others in reserve; about 2,000 cavalry on right; 400 mounted men and 2,000 Ghazis and irregular infantry on left; other cavalry and irregulars in reserve; five or six batteries of guns, including one of breechloaders, distributed at intervals. Estimated total force, 12,000. Ground slightly undulating, enemy being well posted. Till 1 p.m. action confined to artillery fire, which so well sustained and directed by enemy that our superior quality armament failed to compensate for inferior number of guns. After development of rifle fire, our breechloaders told; but vigorous advance of cavalry against our left, and Ghazis along the front, caused native infantry to fall back in confusion on 66th, abandoning two guns. Formation being lost, infantry retreated slowly; and in spite of gallant efforts of General Burrows to rally them, were cut off from cavalry and artillery. This was at 3 p.m., and followers and baggage were streaming away towards Candahar. After severe fighting in enclosed ground, General Burrows succeeded in extricating infantry and brought them into line of retreat. Unfortunately no effort would turn fugitives from main road, waterless at this season. Thus majority casualties appear to have occurred from thirst and exhaustion. Enemy's pursuit continued to ten miles from Candahar, but was not vigorous. Cavalry, artillery, and a few infantry reached banks of Argandab, forty miles from scene of action, at 7 a.m., many not having tasted water since previous morning. Nearly all ammunition lost, with 400 Martini, 700 Sniders, and 2 nine-pounder guns. Estimated loss, killed, and missing: 66th, 400; Grenadiers, 350; Jacob's Rifles, 350; artillery, 40; sappers, 21; cavalry, 60.... Preparations being now made for siege....

_Extract from General Burrows's Report on the Action (p. 101)._

... Between two and three o'clock the fire of the enemy's guns slackened, and swarms of Ghazis advanced rapidly towards our centre. Up to this time the casualties among the infantry had not been heavy, and as the men were firing steadily, and the guns were sweeping the ground with case shot, I felt confident as to the result. But our fire failed to check the Ghazis; they came on in overwhelming numbers, and, making good their rush, they seized the two most advanced horse artillery guns. With the exception of two companies of Jacob's Rifles, which had caused me great anxiety by their unsteadiness early in the day, the conduct of the troops had been splendid up to this point; but now, at the critical moment, when a firm resistance might have achieved a victory, the infantry gave way, and, commencing from the left, rolled up, like a wave, to the right. After vainly endeavouring to rally them, I went for the cavalry.... The 3rd Light Cavalry and the 3rd Sind Horse were retiring slowly on our left, and I called upon them to charge across our front and so give the infantry an opportunity of reforming; but the terrible artillery fire to which they had been exposed, and from which they had suffered so severely, had so shaken them that General Nuttall was unable to give effect to my order. All was now over....

_Extract from Report by Lieutenant-General Primrose, Commanding 1st Division Southern Afghanistan Field Force (p. 156)._

I would most respectfully wish to bring to the Commander-in-Chief's notice the gallant and determined stand made by the officers and men of the 66th Regiment at Maiwand.... 10 officers and 275 non-commissioned officers and men were killed, and 2 officers and 30 non-commissioned officers and men wounded. These officers and men nearly all fell fighting desperately for the honour of their Queen and country. I have it on the authority of a Colonel of Artillery of Ayub Khan's army that a party of the 66th Regiment, which he estimated at one hundred officers and men, made a most determined stand in a garden. They were surrounded by the whole Afghan Army, and fought on until only eleven men were left, inflicting enormous loss upon the enemy. These eleven charged out of the garden, and died with their faces to the foe, fighting to the death. Such was the nature of their charge and the grandeur of their bearing that, although the whole of the Ghazis were assembled around them, not one dared approach to cut them down. Thus standing in the open, back to back, firing steadily and truly, every shot telling, surrounded by thousands, these eleven officers and men died; and it was not until the last man had been shot down that the Ghazis dared advance upon them.

THE BRADLAUGH CASE (1880).

=Source.=--_The Times_, June 25.

We may regard the episode of Tuesday's resolution, and its natural sequence in the imprisonment of Mr. Bradlaugh for defying the authority of the House, as now at an end.... We regret unfeignedly, as we have all along done, that Mr. Bradlaugh was not permitted to make affirmation, instead of taking an oath, when he first asked to be allowed to do so.... But opportunity of creating a precedent consonant with reason and common sense has been let slip, and in default of a reasonable precedent the only manly course now seems to be to supply its place by fresh legislation. If the personal question of Mr. Bradlaugh and his very unsavoury opinions can once be got out of the way, there are probably very few members of the House of Commons, and very few sensible Englishmen, however strong their religious opinions, who would not acknowledge the anomaly, the inexpediency, and the injustice of making the Parliamentary oath of allegiance more stringent and more exclusive than the existing statutory provisions for securing truth of testimony and uprightness of conduct.

SOCIAL AMELIORATIONS (1880).

EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY.

=Source.=--_The Times_, July 3.