Part 19

What others avoided, was in him predominant; that is to say, He lov’d that which was worst. If he possess’d any vertue, he employ’d it not to the benefit of Christendom, but of his own Family; as on the contrary he did his ill qualities to the mischief of the Church and the City.

At first indeed he seem’d so desirous of knowing all affairs both publick and private, that ’twas hoped, his Government would prove the happiest that ever was to the Church. But this vigilance caused no small hurt in general; for when the Subjects of the Ecclesiastical State, Prelates, and forreign Ministers, conceiving the same to proceed from zeal to Justice, had brought and delivered their Memorials, in hopes of a speedy Answer, it prov’d all but loss of time; for they never were call’d, nor admitted to any answer at all. Whence, the _Pope’s_ way, of denying all and resolving nothing, being understood, it became an ungrateful employment to have any thing to do at _Rome_.

And to make the way of arriving at their ends more difficult to Princes Ministers, for a long time together there was no Officer at Court to present the Petitions of Suiters, as formerly, but he declared one of his Nephews to be Cardinal Patron; who was the Cardinal _Astalli_, but with an authority so streight and limited, that he was almost asham’d of it.

By this means the Court became so much the more at a loss; for such as address’d to this Nephew, receiv’d no other comfort, but to behold him shrink up his shoulders, (as young maids do when ask’d by their Fathers whether they will marry) and hear him tell them, _That all should be represented to his Holiness_. And the truth is, as to this point he was very punctual: But he did it after so timerous and indifferent a manner, out of fear to cross the _Pope_, whose answer he knew was alwaies the same, _That the matter shall be taken into consideration_; The plain meaning whereof was, _That nothing at all shall be done in it_.

In this confusion some thought it best to address immediately to the _Pope_; but, besides the difficulty of Access, the Event prov’d alwaies alike; whatever care they took to make their Proposals clear and intelligible, they alwaies hung in the hedge. Yet there were some too that fansied _Innocent_ one of the greatest Politicians of the World, till perceiving by effects the clean contrary, they remain’d as mute as Statues for shame of their mistake.

His suffering _Donna Olympia_ to rule all, his exalting, and abasing his adopted Nephew _Astalli_; his banishing, and recalling _Don Camillo_ his own Nephew; his persecuting, and reingraciating with the _Barbarini_; and in a word, his changing his will and judgment every moment; and his inconstancy in every thing, save granting Sutes, would have imbroiled any Government whatsoever, and much more the Papal, which is naturally full of confusion.

When there happens a _Pope_ like _Innocent_, bent wholly to reject all the instances of Princes; the only remedy is to sow disturbances in the Church, and broyls between the Protestants and Catholicks, thereby to puzzle the _Pope’s_ brain, and frighten him, so that he shall rather seek the friendship of Princes, than they his. Of the success of which course I shall give some Examples.

When the Duke of _Parma’s_ Army took the Field, to get redress concerning the detension of _Castro_, under the Command of _Don Gauffrido_; the _Pope_ extremely affrighted, as one not much accustomed to the Trade of War, caused the Holy Sacrament to be expos’d forty hours, and Processions to be celebrated to all the Churches in _Rome_.

And not knowing what might be the issue of the War undertaken by the said Prince, who breathed nothing but the extremities thereof against his Person, he thought it his best course to gain the Princes of _Christendom_ to his side, and to oblige them to relinquish the Protection of the Duke, by rendring himself extraordinary easie to all Addresses, granting Favours to all Demanders, and receiving Publick Ministers with so much obligingness, that they needed no more but to open their mouths for any Suit or Request, that of the _Pope_ standing always open to accord it.

A certain Embassador, who for three years together could never obtain any other Favour but that of Common Indulgences, finding his desires now satisfied in what ever he demanded, writ to the Prince his Master, _That the_ Pope, _like a Hackney-horse_, _travelled very well with a Spur in his Flank_; _and that he had lately obtained_, _in eight days_, _more than he could do before in three years_: _So that it were to be wish’d that the Duke of_ Parma _would give him a touch or two more of the Spur_.

In the very same manner, at the time that the _French_ had made themselves Masters of _Portolongone_, all sort of Favours ran out with a full torrent, many times preventing Requests: Nor did the _Pope_ suffer any man to depart from his Presence, who was not satisfied to the height of his wishes.

But no sooner was this State of Affairs changed, that is to say, _Portolongone_ recovered by the _Spaniards_, and the Duke disappointed in the War, but Negatives appear’d afresh in the Field with greater peremptoriness than before; and the _Pope_ became as deaf as a Stone to all manner of Supplications or Petitions.

Hence it may be clearly seen, or at least argu’d, That most _Popes_ (if not all) neither grant Favours, nor bear any regard to Princes, save at such time as they stand in need of them.

_Urban_ the Eighth was of this very same humour, denying without exception all sort of Favours, which had not their original from his own or his Nephews inclination, however just Reasons might be alledged for them; and this as well to the _French_, whom he made semblance to love, but really lov’d not; as to the _Spaniards_, whom indeed he affected, though without giving them the satisfaction of seeing any tokens of that affection.

Nevertheless, when he saw _Odoardo Farnese_ Duke of _Parma_ enter victorious with 3000 Horse, for the regaining of _Castro_, most injuriously detained from him, then indeed he began both to humble himself to _Spain_, which he had kept under before, and to gratifie _France_, to which he had on divers occasions shewn himself ungrateful; and also to solicite the Friendship of all sort of Princes, as well small as great; and that not by promising, but by real concession of Favours with a plentiful hand in _Germany_ and _Italy_.

Wherefore seeing the _Popes_ have a particular Method of bearing themselves ruggedly and contemptuously to Princes, when they need them not; ’twere good Policy in Princes to bring it so to pass, that they might always be in a state of Fear, sometimes by threatning neer hand, and at other times by vexing them at distance.

The Indignities which Princes receive often from the Court of _Rome_, proceed not immediately from an evil intention in the _Popes_ towards them, but from the too good inclination of Princes towards the _Popes_; there being some so tender-conscienc’d, that they fear the loss of their Souls in disgusting a rascallion Court-fly that bears the Cassock of a Priest, and serves to sweep the Antichamber of his Holiness or the Cardinal-Nephew.

The Ecclesiasticks have Swords in their Mouths, but no Courage in their Breasts; I mean, they threaten all People, without considering what issue such Menaces may have: But when they see themselves reprov’d or threatned, then their hearts fail them, they fall a trembling, and humble themselves to every body, especially Grandees; although withall, they have the cunning to colour their Fear with the pretext of a religious, pious, and devout Meekness.

The nature of the Ecclesiasticks is to disgust such as comply with them, and fawn on those that disgust them; So that if Princes would advance their Affairs, and bring down the haughtiness of _Rome_, they must endeavour to mortifie the _Pope_.

The Catholick Crown, in testimony of its affection to the _Popes_, admits into its Jurisdiction only the _Roman_ Religion; besides that the _Spaniards_ also shew themselves most concerned in keeping up the _Pope_ the Head of the Church, and enriching the Ecclesiasticks.

However, they have fared little or not at all the better for it, as to their Negotiations at _Rome_, in regard that the Ecclesiasticks (that is, the _Popes_) esteem them not more than others for it; but through fear commonly afford as much or more countenance to the _French_: from whom on the other side they receive greater disgusts, under pretence of the _Gallican_ Priviledges.

’Tis true, the _Roman_ Court very well perceives, that the _Spaniards_ reverence it as the Sanctuary of their Glory, and the Absolute Mistress of the preservation of their States; and accordingly it treats them familiarly, that is to say, with good words and ill deeds, with fair shews and bad substance.

The _Spaniards_ suffering themselves to be too much domineer’d over in the Court of _Rome_, is not only hurtful to the Government of the _Spaniards_ themselves, but also thereby prejudices the Interests of all those Princes that have concerns either at _Rome_, or with _Rome_; For when any inferiour Prince would with specious Reasons defend his Right over Ecclesiastical Persons, these men presently alledge for their justification the Example of the _Spaniards_, and thereby enforce him not to refuse, what so great and powerful a Monarchy as _Spain_ refuseth not to do. And of these Examples the _Popes_ have the _Vatican_ full, and make use of the same in all Occurrences, to the perpetual nauseating of Princes therewith.

This manner of proceeding between the Ecclesiasticks and the _Spaniards_ cannot last long, because the long languishings of Princes, ensuing thereupon, will enforce them either to yield to some violent Remedy, or to open the gate to death.

Every day, yea, every moment, displeasures arise between the Crown of _Spain_ and _Rome_; which, how-much soever debated, turn always to the satisfaction of the _Pope_, and the disadvantage of the Interests of the Catholick King.

In brief, The Dominion which the Court of _Rome_ hath gotten over the _Spaniards_ is so great, that how many and considerable soever the disgusts be which this Court puts upon them from day to day, nevertheless the _Spaniards_ dare not come to a Rupture with it, being better contented to suffer themselves, than to make others suffer.

The Policy of the _North_, yea and that of _Italy_ too, laughs at this _Spanish_ Zeal, which stoops in so humble sort to the arrogance and insolent Proceedings of the Ecclesiasticks. And indeed What reason is there that such a Monarchy should submit its Empire to a simple Bishoprick? Nevertheless, this is seen done every day in the Ecclesiastick State.

Were it not for the _Spaniards_, I verily believe Affairs at _Rome_ would not be so imbroil’d and perplex’d as they are; for the _Popes_ become so extremely proud towards other Princes, and render all Negotiations so extremely difficult, through the little account they make of Publick Ministers, in regard they see themselves back’d and supported by so potent a Crown in _Italy_.

Nevertheless, I cannot but imagine, That other Princes are for this reason extremely incensed with anger against the _Spaniards_, who to satisfie an apparent out-side Zeal, ruine the Common Cause of the Sovereignty of all other Princes.

If the _Spaniards_ would comply with other Sovereigns, to give the _Popes_ now and then a touch of the Spur, thereby to oblige them to go on in the right way, the management of Affairs at _Rome_ would be very expedite, and the Ministers of Princes would not meet with so many difficulties: Which I leave, with the rest, to the consideration of the _Spaniards_ and other Princes.

Some Ministers there are, who flatter themselves into a belief that they may be able to bring their Negotiations to a prosperous end, by means of the friendship they have with Cardinals, and the great Interest these Cardinals have to defend those Princes of whom they are intitl’d Protectors.

But this Opinion of theirs hath no other effect but to confound their Negotiations so much the more, whilst the Protection of Princes by those Cardinals is only external and nominal: for otherwise Policy obliges them to seek in the first place the advantage of the _Pope_, before the profit of the Princes, whom they serve, or at least seem to serve.

Every blow of mortification which the _Pope_ receives from any Prince, recoils to the damage of the Cardinal Dignity; and therefore the Cardinals labour to bring it about, that the Advantages may be always on the _Popes_ side. Nor is it necessary to believe the Cardinal, who professeth, _That the Interests of his Prince are dearer to him_, _than those of the Scarlet Gown it self_.

But this would be a great failure in Policy and Interest: Whence it was, that when _Innocent_ beheld his Cousin _Olympia_ anxious and troubled lest the Ecclesiastical State should become involv’d in a War, and lest many Cardinals should engage in it on behalf of the Duke of _Parma_, out of spight to the _Pamphilian_ Family, the _Pope_ comforted her with these words; _Cousin_, _fear nothing_, _the Cardinals will be for us in spight of their own teeth_, _and will defend the Ecclesiastical State in consideration of their own Interest_, _though we should go about to ruine it for ours_.

The Grandeur of the Scarlet Gown depends upon the Majesty of the Triple Crown, and the Cardinals are proportionably Great as the _Pope_ is so; whence it is that they strive with all possible ardour to promote the Advantage of the Church, and the Honour of the _Pope_; which failing, their own Reputation and Glory must partake in the Eclipse.

Great undoubtedly is the Magnificence of the Colledge of Cardinals; and greater it would be, if it had not been perverted both from the first Institution thereof, and retrench’d of the Prerogatives wherewith it hath been augmented by divers _Popes_, for the maintenance of its Grandeur and Honour.

But the _Popes_ have corrupted and spoil’d all; inasmuch as into that Colledge, into which the greatest Princes of the World think it a glory to enter, they have introduc’d some, who have received their Original from the vilest Dunghil of the World; and ’tis not many years ago, that one was created Cardinal, who was the Son of a base Catchpole.

Hence it comes to pass, that the _Popes_ seeing the Scarlet Robe upon the Shoulders of so vile and unworthy Persons, they despise it likewise when it is worn on the backs of Great Princes. And ’tis more than true, That good _Popes_ honour the Cardinals, when such Honour brings profit to themselves; otherwise they make a mock both of their Persons, and their Order.

And hence it is, that Princes Ministers find themselves in a wrong Box, when they put any trust even in those Cardinals who seem the greatest Zealots for their Interests.

Thus I have made a Relation of the manner how things are wont to be negotiated at _Rome_, and shew’d how the great Polititians of _Europe_ may salve their Reputations; as also the Grounds and Causes of those Mischiefs, which break the sleep and make the heads ake of as many Publick Ministers as reside in _Rome_.

When the _Pope_ perceives that Negotiations tend to his own Advantage, he doth things like an absolute Monarch: but when he knows that they are likely to cause any prejudice to him, he lays the cause of not succeeding upon the Congregations of the Cardinals, of which there are infinite at _Rome_.

In this manner he shews himself rather as Head of a Commonwealth, than an absolute Prince: and indeed those Congregations serve more for a pretext and help to the _Pope_ and the Nephews, than for any benefit to the State.

From such a Government little Fruit, and no Satisfaction can be drawn by the Ministers that negotiate at _Rome_; but rather, as accordingly it falls out, disgusts, affronts, and dissatisfactions.

In the _Roman_ Court there passes not a day without reproaches against the _Pope_ and Nephews, as those who study nothing else but to accommodate themselves, and incommodate all others that endeavour the good of the State and the Church.

Greater attendance and application cannot be, than that of _Alexander_ the Seventh both to Civil and Ecclesiastical Affairs; and which is most considerable, he doth all things with such an eagerness, that he appears to take no small glory therein.

He lets not one day pass without giving publick Audience, at least very seldom, unless those Infirmities which are his constant Companions indispose him to follow his good intentions; as it hapned for these days lately passed, wherein for a good while together he was not able to give Audience to the Embassador of _France_.

_Innocent_ undertook things slowly, and this slowness spoil’d all; but _Alexander_, being most contrary to such a nature, enterpriseth every thing with great ardour: and this spoils all too, the Ship being lost oftentimes as well through too little Wind, by falling into the hands of Enemies, as likewise through too great a Wind striking upon Rocks.

The Ministers of Princes even still find very great difficulties in negotiating at _Rome_, and perhaps greater too than those which they found in the time of _Innocent_; who indeed intangled things, because he would not extricate them: but _Alexander_ confounds matters by too great eagerness to rectifie them. _Innocent_ lov’d not to meddle, but with those things whereunto he was enforced; but _Alexander_ thrusts himself upon such as might better be let alone.

Hence ’tis that Ministers seeing the _Pope_ employ his mind on a thousand businesses of Christendom, and but of a weak and infirm constitution, they forbear to trouble him; as Cardinal _Mazarine_ and _Don Lewis d’ Haro_ did, who would not let the _Pope_ have any hand in the Treaty of the last Peace, to the no small displeasure of the poor _Pope_, who was ambitious to receive his part of the glory in a business so important to the Universe.

That which makes publick Agents at _Rome_ thus backward, is the knowledge they have of the _Pope’s_ mind; who is inquisitive and curious to know every thing, to have a hand in every action, to pry into all the affairs of Christendom, and briefly, to lade himself with so many businesses, that he must needs precipitate them all through want of strength to carry them on: whence ’tis that oftentimes he answers one Minister concerning certain matters of which he had conferr’d with another, and so confounds both himself and them that negotiate with him, who for fear of further embarassing the _Pope’s_ understanding are fain to break off their most important Audiences.

In the beginning of his Papacy, being ambitious of glory, he would needs sustain alone the weight of all the world, not only of the State Ecclesiastical, in the middle whereof he lean’d upon others, but did not cast the burden wholly off from himself; and at present now he approaches towards his end, his infirmities enforce him to leave others to do, that which it grieves him that he cannot do for others.

Matters were well believ’d, but ill understood at the first entrance of the Cardinal Patron and _Don Mario_ into _Rome_: and now they are well understood, but ill believ’d. These Lords began to Reign with their Eyes shut, and their Ears open; and at present, the Style being changed, they rule with their Ears shut, and their Eyes open, whence proceeds the multitude of inconveniences to publick Agents.

The Cardinal _Patron_ exercises the Office of his Patronage, in giving himself Patronage for enjoying his pleasures, and avoiding, as much as possible, all hard and knotty affairs; which are wont to perplex the mind, and confound the brain of a Gallant.

Hence it is, that Embassadors, who treat with him, reap no other good but a fardle of Complements, and pleasing Expressions, with no small hope that he will act abundantly; but in reality he doth nothing: so that they depart from his Presence outwardly satisfi’d, with their hands empty of any thing of substance.

I have known some Ministers, who have believ’d they might speed in their publick affairs by the easiness of knowing the secrets of the Court; which is of great use to a publick Agent, namely, to know the actions, treaties, and conveniences of others, and to keep his own, and those of his Prince, secret.

Indeed, the secresie of the Court of _Rome_ seems not to be so great as the subtilty, although Excommunications and Censures make a great noise: For those who are introduc’d into this Court are so only for two ends, either to exalt their Family, and support it from falling, (for the Ecclesiasticks, having no Wives, naturally encline to enrich their own Nephews) or else to aggrandise themselves, out of that ambition which alwaies lies under the Robes of Prelacy.

The Cardinals, however sometimes vertuous and experienced persons, are not exempt from certain imperfections which commonly reign in _Rome_; for they are either oblig’d to Princes by a thousand benefices and gifts, or else are their natural Subjects: and for this reason the Princes who have great concerns with _Rome_, the more they see Authority and Offices of any Cardinal increas’d, the more they study how to oblige him to be at their devotion, and to withdraw him from that of the _Pope_.

Now almost all the Cardinals reveal the things which they pretend to discover, either through the importunity of inquisitive Agents, and not to disoblige those to whom they are oblig’d, or else to put greater obligations upon the Princes to whom they are Pensioners, to the end they may receive gratuity after gratuity both to themselves and their Kindred, and especially that they may be assisted in their Pretensions to the Papacy, when the See Apostolical shall become vacant; which is the greatest spur of all.

To this Embassadours trust, and alwaies treat with the Cardinals who are adherents to their Masters, to discover the Counsels by their means. But indeed, they deceive themselves; for the Cardinals being as much concern’d as the _Pope_ in the defense of the Church, the State, and the publick good, in regard all are in capacity to be _Popes_, they will never reveal any thing which may prejudice that Papacy which makes them great, and which they aim one day to govern.

The Cardinals are not so indiscreet as to reveal any thing that may in any wise prejudice the Interests of the Papacy and Ecclesiastick State; they reveal such things as may be of prejudice to the single person of the _Pope_, or rather of his Nephews, whom commonly they hate through envy.

The effect hereof is, that most _Popes_ put little trust in the Cardinals when any matter relating to their own House is in agitation, but they do all _motu proprio_: for themselves having, whilst they were Cardinals, revealed what they ought to have kept secret, they doubt, being afterwards _Popes_, that others do the like by them; and for this cause they secure themselves, as much as possible, from such dangers.

The Papal Excommunications, which are great against those that reveal the secrets of the _Roman_ Court, as well Temporal persons as Spiritual, have no other effect but to put all into confusion, and to cause ambiguities on all sides. Hence such things as are revealed, seem not really to be so, but only intimated; and consequently no small prudence is requisite to understand what is spoken, because the revealers fearing the sting of the Excommunication within their breasts, utter only doubtful, perplex’d, and ambiguous words; by which means such Agents, as think themselves illuminated by such revelations, soon after find themselves puzzled and confounded.

The cause hereof is the fear, which Excommunication begets in the breasts of the scrupulous. But it is true in general, that to mingle things certain with doubtful, is proper to the _Roman_ Court; and things true with false, to the Ecclesiasticks.