Part 13

And the _Pope_ was so customed to this usage, that it never came into his minde to be offended at it; but would very contentedly make amends for those faults which his Nephew did often commit in his administration: and whensoever he did see his Nephew come into his presence, he would say, _Nephew_, _I am sure ’tis some very hard and intricate business that brings you hither_, _for else we should scarce be repaired to for counsel_. And he had a great deal of reason to say so, for his Nephew did never communicate to him any negotiation, except he had first spoiled it, and brought himself to a _non-plus_; and then the _Pope_ would oblige the Congregations of the Cardinals to take the business into their care, and set right again that which had been spoiled by his inability.

The second reason for the _Nipotismo_ is, that the _Popes_ may be able to govern with more care and affection. There is nothing that forces more a Prince to answer the ends of Government, and to oblige his people, than when he considers that the Government is to descend to his Heirs; for a Prince without a Successor does often dissipate and spoil that which he would preserve, if he had any body to leave it to.

The State of _Venice_ which never established any Law without having first deliberated upon it, and sifted it in their Council of _Pregadi_, does think fit to oblige the kindred of the dead Duke to answer for their Kinsman’s misdemeanours and miscarriages; fining them in great summes of money for a reparation of his faults: so that often they are fain to endure for the dead Duke those punishments, which his Dignity when he was alive, and his death, have preserved him from.

The effect of this is, that the Dukes of _Venice_ do comport themselves with all moderation and equity, following exactly those rules of Government which they receive from the State; And the fear they are in of leaving their Relations engaged in a painful satisfaction for their faults, does oblige them to study night and day how they may serve the publick: in doing which, they do at the same time oblige their Countrey, themselves, and their Kindred; whereas else they might be subject to follow their own private interests, to the prejudice and detriment of all the Commonwealth.

The _Popes_ have almost the same fear upon them, and by consequent the like obligation; for the only consideration of leaving their Relations engaged with too powerful enemies, has often made them desist from enterprizes, which would have proved fatal to their State, and all Christendom.

_Urban_ the 8th. did often protest, that if it had not been out of a kindeness to his Nephews, he would either have hazarded the Popedom, or have brought Princes to his will.

The _Popes_ know very well by experience, that there is no way to preserve their _Nipotismo_ from the persecution which ordinarily they are to expect from their Successours; whensoever their Successors are such as come with pre-occupation against them, and finde in the Government of the Church and State so many abuses, which do quicken their indignation against the precedent _Nipotismo_.

This is a very great tye upon them in their administration, which appears if once they come to cast it off.

_Paul_ the 4th. who had much of a barbarous and inhumane humour in him, more becoming a Souldier than a Pope; as soon as he had banished his Nephew from _Rome_, did do things with a great deal more resolution and insolence than before: insomuch that it seemed, as if he had a minde to reduce all the world under his Laws, and force Christendom to follow the dictates of his _Capriccio_.

The Ministers of Princes who had to do with him, did extremely complain of this his proceeding; for he did no less than threaten them all upon every occasion: and one day particularly as the Spanish Ambassador was complaining to him of some occasion of disgust which his Holiness had given the Crown of _Spain_, he answered him in a fume, _That he had now no Nephews to care for_; _and that suppos’d_, _That his actions did deserve to be blamed_, _he little cared_: _for with his death all resentments would vanish_: meaning he was no longer concerned for his Relations, for whose sake he had all this while contained himself within the limits of the Papal Dignity.

Some say that _Julius_ the second did bear a great affection to his Kindred, but did forbear any demonstrations of kindeness to them out of a more solid Principle of Love; which was, That they might not receive any reproaches or injuries after his death, for those faults which he might have committed in his life time: for having resolved to do nothing but make War, and lead a Souldiers life, as indeed he did, he would infallibly have drawn the revenge of all his Enemies upon his kindred, to whom therefore he shewed himself averse.

And indeed it was wisely done of him, and kindely; for it was impossible but so warlike a humour as his was, must needs offend many Princes, who all would have been revenged upon his _Nipotismo_, as Authors, and Partakers of their Uncle’s Designs.

If _Urban_ had done the same thing, the persecution of the _Barberins_ had not been at all, or at least had not been so violent; but the great Authority with which they appeared under him, did make Princes believe that all the _Pope’s_ actions were of their plotting and managing.

So, when the Duke of _Parma_, and the Princes his allyes made War against the Church, they declared to all the world that they had no design to offend the _Pope_; but only to be revenged of the _Barberins_, whose ambition they accused as the Motive of the War.

Quite contrary, All the errors and miscarriages of _Innocent_ the 10th. were never imputed to his Nephew the Prince _Pamphilio_; for every body knew well, that he had no share in the administration of the Government, and yet he is in possession of all those riches and vast summes of money which _Donna Olympia_ his Mother had got together: and no doubt if she were now alive, she would certainly be in very great danger, if it were only, because of that opinion which Princes had conceived of the Authority with which she rul’d, and was thought to have a hand in all the transactions of her Brother’s Pontificate.

And on the other side, that tender affection which the Pope did bear to his Sister-in-law, was very useful towards the abating something of the violence of the _Pope’s_ temper, diverting him from all thoughts of War, and keeping him from entring into Leagues and Confederacies with Princes, with whom he desired to live in peace.

When the revolution of _Naples_ happened, which was the greatest occasion that ever any _Pope_ had to possess himself of that Kingdom, he was so far from attempting it, that he would never so much as say a word, or enter into deliberation about it; not that he wanted courage or desire: but only because he would not leave _Donna Olympia_, and his Kindred, involved in an irreconcilable War with _Spain_, and in danger of ruining themselves for ever.

Our _Alexander_ has alwayes used the same precautions, for when _Don Agostino_ in the heighth of his insolence and pride disobliged so openly the Family of _Colonna_, by making his Uncle the Cavalier _De la Ciaia_ take up that place in the Theatre, which the High Constable _Colonna_ had hired for himself.

The _Pope_ was infinitely offended at so rash an action, not out of any consideration for the merit of the Family of the _Colonna_; but because he knew that such an accident could not choose but be followed by an open enmity betwixt the two Families of _Chiggi_ and _Colonna_: therefore without any delay the _Pope_ gave order, that all the means of reconciliation should be sought out. And finding that _Don Agostino_ stood too much upon his terms, and would not be brought to make any satisfaction to the Constable, the _Pope_ grew passionate; and sending for him, forced him to a present complyance, using some reproaches: and amongst others, these words, _You commit extravagant follies_, _and I __must be put to the trouble of making amends for them_, _to free you from the danger of their consequences_. And a little after, _You do nothing but procure mischief to your self and me_, _while I make it my business to do you good_.

I will not say any thing of the business of the Duke of _Crequy_, for it is most certain, that without the consideration of his Kindred, the _Pope_ had never condescended to an agreement so advantageous for _France_.

Witness the _Pope’s_ own expressions to those Ambassadours and Cardinals, who for the quiet of _Italy_ did endeavour to take up the business. The Venetian Ambassadour above all did concern himself very much in the business, following the Orders of his Senate; which does wisely fore-see and endeavour to take away all causes of a War in _Italy_: and as he was pressing the _Pope_ upon the business, his Holiness answered him, _That it was a great affliction to him that he had introduced his Kindred into_ Rome; _for else he would either have broke himself_, _or have made_ France _bend_.

But the Ambassadour who was very ready in all occasions, but particularly prepared upon this, answered him, _If your Holiness had never brought your Kindred into_ Rome, _this accident had not happened_.

To which the _Pope_ replyed suddenly, _Well then_, _we must make all well again_, _to the Churches prejudice_, _and our Kindreds advantage_.

The like discourse he had with _Monsignor Rasponi_ (who now is Cardinal) and was then created Plenipotentiary for the Treaty of _Pisa_, after he had in vain been sent to _Lyons_, to make an agreement; for there the business was crossed with a thousand difficulties, amongst which the precedency was one.

The _Pope_ was brought into such a Labyrinth, that he did almost lose his wits in seeking how to come out of it; for on one side the affection of his Family did continually solicite him to yield to the great pretensions of the French King; on the other, the _Decorum_ and honour of his Pontificate, which would be blurr’d with the infamy of having given away so much of the Dignity and Profits of the Church, did make him resolve to be constant, and bate nothing of that respect and Majesty which the _Popes_ do use to expect from Princes: and the rather, because he had alwayes shewed himself a singular defender of the Pontifical Dignity, and could not endure to be forced to submit to a Crown for which he had never had any great inclination.

For all this, at last, the interest of his Kindred carried it before those of the Church; and after he had worn out all the slights and arts that the Court of _Rome_ could furnish him withal, he was forced at last to come to an agreement, as infamous for the See of _Rome_, as it was honourable for _France_.

Whereupon some of the most zealous Cardinals having vented their complaints in the Consistory it self, blaming _Monsignor Rasponi_ for signing the Treaty, He was obliged to excuse himself to every one of them in a particular Visit, by saying _That he had an express Order from his Holiness for what he had done_; _who had declared his resolution of yielding to any conditions_, _rather than of leaving his Family engaged against so powerful an Enemy as France_. To which purpose he related to some of his particular friends, the very words which the _Pope_ spoke to him when he went to take his leave of him to go to _Pisa_, to treat with the Duke of _Crequy_, which were these, _Be discreet and yield up something of the Popedom_, _to save our Family_; _and not leave them and the Church in an obligation of maintaining a dangerous War in_ Italy.

Thus it appears that it is not so much that universal care of a Father, that makes the _Popes_ maintain a good correspondence with Christian Princes; as the fear of leaving Enemies to their Families, and bringing ruine upon their Relations.

We all know that every _Pope_ either out of envy or some other motive is well pleased to lessen, if not utterly to destroy the Family of his Predecessor; and of this we have had many experiences since two ages. Therefore also the _Popes_, to prevent this misfortune, do ordinarily endeavour to get, while they are alive, the protection of some eminent Christian Prince, for their Family; under whose wings they may shelter themselves in a time of calamity.

And if this be, we may conclude, that all the affection, the care, and the desire which the _Popes_ have of advancing their Kindred, does at last turn to a general benefit and profit for Christendom; and if you except one inconvenience, which is, that they impoverish the Church, and carry away all its treasure, it were and is better for all other considerations, that the _Popes_ do govern conjoyntly with their _Nipotismo_, than without it: which is proved by a third reason; which is, that without a _Nipotismo_ the Negotiations and business of the Court could never be carried with secresie enough.

I am in doubt whether it be harder to keep a thing secret in the Court of a Prince, than in the Council of a Commonwealth; for in the Commonwealth the great number of Counsellors make the keeping of a Secret a very difficult thing: and in the Court of Princes, the envy of those Courtiers, who are excluded from the management of Affairs, is so sharp-sighted, and does so pry and penetrate into the most hidden Mysteries of the Court, to the end they may either hurt the Prince through his Counsellors, or the Counsellors through the Prince, that it is almost impossible to keep any thing hidden from them.

I am of opinion, that for one reason the Secrets of a Commonwealth are better concealed, which is; because that those that are conscious to them, are themselves the Princes and Masters of the State: but in a Monarchy, the Prince being forced to trust some of his Subjects, it is much more dangerous for him and for his business; for he becomes slave and dependent of those who should be his. Divers Histories will furnish us with examples to prove what we say; and if that be true, and that yet nevertheless it is very hard to keep counsel in a Commonwealth, it is easily inferr’d, how difficult a thing it is to do it in a Monarchy.

But what shall we say then of the state of the Church, of which no body can tell whether it be Commonwealth, or Monarchy, the _Popes_ appearing sometimes absolute like Princes, and other while dependent like Dukes of Commonwealths; and without doubt the _Popes_ could never be able to conceal so many private and publick interests without that trust and relyance, which they have in their _Nipotismo_: and this particularly for two reasons. The first is thus.

The Court of _Rome_ taken in all its latitude, is without doubt the greatest of _Europe_, and the most magnificent of Christendom; for it yields to no other in the great number of Ambassadours, and publick Ministers which reside in it.

For the _Popes_, that they may the better conserve the title of Universal Father, which they affect, do by all means procure to have as many Ambassadors of Christian Princes near them as they can. But that very thing by which this Court seems to be most honoured, does also carry with it an evident danger; for these Ambassadours and Residents being unwilling to stay in _Rome_, without procuring some considerable advantage to the Princes that send them, are perpetually watching for occasions to discover the _Popes_ most secret designs: so that they are in effect so many spyes, who the more they are in number, the more do they encrease the difficulty of preserving and concealing the Secrets of the Court.

Before I speak of the second Reason, which makes the Court of _Rome_ so suspicious a place for Secrets, I must say something about the Cardinals, and their Office, and Employment.

The Cardinals are the _Pope’s_ Counsellors, who by the Dignity of their place, and the Majesty of their Habit, do much augment the pomp and splendor of the Court. The _Popes_ do every day give them new Priviledges and Prerogatives, by the means of which they are respected like so many Kings.

This makes Forreign Princes endeavour to get their friendship by all means, giving them both secret and publick allowances and Pensions, in consideration of these Prerogatives, and of the power which they have to chuse the _Pope_; who must necessarily be one of their number.

But if Princes shew a promptitude and readiness to win the Cardinals affections, they are themselves reciprocally courted by the Cardinals for divers reasons; As first, for the Emolument of their Pensions; Next, that they may not obstruct their way to the Popedom by an open Exclusion in the Conclave; And last of all, that they may live in greater reputation and esteem in _Rome_, Where those Cardinals are most valued that entertain an exact correspondence with Princes: particularly if it be with any of the two Crowns of _Europe_, that is, _France_, or _Spain_; upon whose Brigues and Interests does ordinarily depend the election of the _Pope_.

Now it is to be believed, that these Princes do not prodigally spend their Treasure without receiving a continual Interest for it; which Interest is an exact information of all that is done, treated, and managed in the Court of _Rome_: And of this the Cardinals acquit themselves with great industry and diligence.

So we see, how intricate and troublesome the Government of _Rome_ would become to the _Popes_; if they had not Confidents, that is, Nephews, on whom they might relie; and to whom they might trust their secrets without fear.

For indeed, a _Pope_ without Kindred must renounce Monarchy, and resolve to be only as the Head of a Commonwealth; which would be just to give himself up into the hands of the Cardinals, and be at their discretion: Which if it were, every body may easily infer how dangerous it would prove to the _Pope’s_ Authority, and how unbeseeming the greatness and _decorum_ of his place and dignity. Besides that, probably things would fall into confusion and disorder, while every Cardinal would be more intent to satisfie his own ends; and, as they say, draw the water to his Mill, than to mind the necessities of the State and Church.

If the _Pope_ could do nothing without the counsel and assent of the Cardinals, How would he be able to treat any Leagues, make Wars, or Peace? Which are things so incident to the nature of a great State, such as the _Pope’s_ is, that it can seldom be without them. There would be framed a thousand difficulties in the very beginnings of Negotiations; and the Enemy would know all before you had resolved any thing. Every Cardinal would support his Prince and Country, and at last they would all be so embarassed and confounded, that they would either be in danger of losing themselves for the Church, or of exposing the Church to mischief to save themselves.

How would it be fit, that the _Pope_ should advise with the Senate of Cardinals, if they themselves are his and the Churches greatest enemies, If they have not only promised, but sworn fidelity to the Party of those Princes that give them Pensions and Revenues? How then can they follow the _Pope’s_ directions, or consent to his designs? Certainly they must either cheat the Prince, that they may be true to the Church; or be false to the Church, that they may not be ungrateful to those Princes, whose money they have taken.

There are some Cardinals that would not care, if all were lost, so they did but save their Family, which is under the protection of some Prince; and avoid themselves the reproach of ingratitude from their Benefactors.

The greatest part of the Cardinals are either of the _French_ or _Spanish_ Faction, and each of them makes it his greatest glory to defend the Pretensions of the Crown he protects, whether just or unjust; so that often between them they neglect and ruine the Interests of the Church and _Pope_. How were it possible then for the _Pope_ either to preserve himself or the Church in its Prerogatives, if he would take and follow the counsel of those whose interest makes them the Enemies to both; though they pretend, that what they do is only out of a tender consideration of the publick good.

To this purpose I remember that a certain _Italian_ Cardinal, being weary of holding for many years on the _Spaniards_ side, gave himself to the _French_ by the mediation of a better Pension which they promised him. And indeed the Cardinals, whatsoever they pretend, have no other inclination to either party than what their Interest leads them to; For he that gives highest Pensions, and the best Benefices, is sure to have them.

This Cardinal, having thus renounced the _Spaniard_, did go about to take away the imputation of inconstancy and self-interest; and would say in all companies, _That he had no other end in doing so_, _but a desire to be able to serve the Church and_ Pope _the better_.

But another Cardinal, of great experience and prudence, hearing him one day discourse after this rate, could not forbear saying these words to him, _I wish to __God that your Eminence_, _that have never been able to do the Church any service while you were a true_ Spaniard, _may do her some now you are a counterfeit_ Frenchman. And this he said in the presence of divers Cardinals and Embassadours.

Let us then conclude, that the State and Church can never be well governed, as to the point in hand, if the _Popes_ be without Nephews to relye on, and in whose secrecy they may confide.

_Innocentius_ the tenth was so convinced of this truth, that finding himself deprived of those helps which he could not receive from his lawful Kindred by reason of their inabilities; and withal seeing that he was exposed to the unsatiable avarice of a woman, his Sister-in-Law, he was fain to take the young _Astalli_ and declare him Cardinal Nephew, and _Padrone_, giving him the name of _Pamphilio_; and in a word, made him in _Rome_, as _Pharaoh_ was in _Ægypt_, the Governour of all things.

But what hapned? This young Cardinal not being able to comply with the _Pope’s_ humours, and having no tye of Consanguinity upon him, was rather a Traytor to him than a Nephew; for he did reveal to the _Spaniards_, from whom he did secretly receive good Pension, all that passed through his hands, or that could come to his knowledge: caring not how he hazarded and engaged the _Pope’s_ Honour and Reputation.

Particularly, at that time that the _Pope_ and the _Barberins_ together, did consult how they should fall upon the Kingdom of _Naples_ and divide it among themselves, _Astalli_ all day long did set spies, and endeavour himself to discover their Counsels; and then secretly in the night did give the _Spaniards_ notice of all; who, being thus well instructed, did easily prevent their Enemies designs, by taking away all those means which the Pretendants relied upon for the execution of their Enterprize.

Upon this the _Pope_ enraged against _Astalli_, banished him from _Rome_, took away from him all that he had so liberally given him, except the quality of Cardinal; of which he could not be deprived but for great crimes, and that by a fair trial too.

Now if the _Pope Innocent_ could not trust one whom he had raised from nothing; and if the secrets of his Court were revealed and published by a Cardinal so much obliged to him, How can other _Popes_ trust Cardinals that are as it were their enemies by being too much other Princes friends?

These are the reasons that force the _Popes_ to call their Kindred about them, and shew them all demonstrations of kindness; and I think they are such as prove that the _Pope_ cannot govern according to the rules of good Policy, if their Kindred be not with them, and have not a share in their fortune.