Part 12

But was there ever a better Prince in the World than the late King of _England_, _Charles_ the First, who had no fault but that he was too good? And yet such Royal Goodness could not preserve him (I tremble to speak of it) from the barbarous hands of his own Subjects; and upon an ignominious Scaffold, was forced to lose his Life by a fatal Ax.

What are Kingdoms and States, to any body, if they must be perpetually from morning to night busied about their own preservation? And what a misfortune to a Man is a Kingdom, if to preserve himself from his own Subjects, he must be fain to raise Cittadels and build Castles in all the places where he goes, that he can never sleep, if Guards and Sentinels do not watch for him? Certainly a Subject’s condition, that takes his rest without fear, is much more to be valued, than the perpetual perplexity of a fearful Prince.

The _Popes_ nevertheless are these unfortunate Men, and are more exposed to the danger of being made away, than all the Princes of _Christendom_. For if any body be so bold and wicked as to wish and desire the death of a Prince whose Crown is Hereditary; yet he stops in his Enterprise, and considers, That he must fear the Sons Vengeance. Those Men who consented to the death, or, to say better, pronounced Sentence upon the late King of _England_, wheresoever they are now, they do without doubt repent their Action; and if they had ever thought of the happy Restauration of _Charles_ the Second, they had dealt otherwise with his Father. So that I must say, by the leave of those _Cromwellian_ Politicians, That they were but pittiful ones that could not foresee that. Wo be to those that offend a Prince, in hopes that his Heir will forget the offence.

This Reason procures some Security to Princes of an Hereditary Kingdom, and makes the _Popes_ endeavour to find out some means also to secure themselves by their Kindred: For it is well known how many _Popes_ have been poysoned and made away, sometimes by Emperours, sometimes by the People, sometimes by particular Persons; and yet no body has ever taken upon them to revenge their death. And why? Because that their Kindred, not being Heirs of their Power, are not in a capacity to shew their resentment; and are much more busied in getting into the next _Pope’s_ favour, who is ordinarily their Enemy, than in revenging their Uncle’s death.

The Cardinals themselves, who for their own Interest are not much concerned in the _Pope’s_ preservation, do not trouble themselves to inquire by what means he came to his end; ’tis enough for them that the Popedom is vacant, and that they have the Authority of chusing a Successor, who must be one of themselves.

The _Popes_ Lives are a perpetual War; for without they are set upon by the Cares and Troubles of their Employment, and within by the fear of death, which is so great in them, that they are afraid of the very Air they breath.

_Sixtus_ the Fifth went one day to the Convent of the Apostles, which was assigned to the Fryars of the Order he had bin of: and coming in of a sudden without giving any warning, met in their Refectory with a Brother who was eating a Mess of Beans very hungrily. The good _Pope_ remembring his ancient condition, sat down by him upon a wooden Form, and fell to eating with as great an appetite as the Brother, and made him fill the Dish up again when they had emptied it.

The _Pope’s_ Followers wondered, and were much surprized at his Phancy, or rather extravagant Appetite; but he taking no notice of them, continued to eat on with his wooden Spoon, the Beans that were very well oyled. At last having emptied the Dish a second time, and thanked the Brother for his kindness, he turned to his Followers and said, _This Dish of Beans will make me live two years longer than I should have done_; _for I have eaten them with pleasure_, _and without fear_. Then lifting up his hands and eyes to Heaven, he blessed God that had given a _Pope_ once in his life an occasion of eating a meals Meat in quiet.

_Pius_ the Fifth, who was very lean, was used to say, _That it was impossible that the_ Popes _should ever grow fat_, _for that Nature in them was never supplied but in fear_. And yet this _Pope_ was one of the holiest and best; though it is true, That Holiness is subject to Envy, and therefore obliged to preserve it self against the malignity of its Enemies.

And indeed the diligence which the _Popes_ use in preserving themselves, is such, that it cannot chuse but communicate to them a continual apprehension of some imminent danger: for they do not only watch what they eat, but they never eat any thing which has not been first tasted by those that dress it, and serve it up; chusing ordinarily upon a sudden, and not bespeaking that which they like.

_Paul_ the Fourth was wont to give the greatest part of his Dinner to those that stood by, and make them eat it in his presence; and then often he would take some of that which they had left: So that the whole Court was in perpetual fear, seeing the _Pope_ so timerous.

But fear is not only inseparable from them at Table, but at the Altar too; where they never eat the consecrated Host, before they have given a part of it to the Sacristan there present, whose care it is to provide them, and to eat that part which he receives from the _Pope_; who having divided it into two parts, gives him sometimes the right side, sometimes the left, as he pleases.

The same precaution is used in the taking of the Cup or Chalice, which the _Pope_ never tastes, till the Sacristan has drunk some of it before him. So that it is evident, That the _Popes_ do use many more preventions than any other Prince.

Now if it be thus with them, can they do better than to call about them their proper Kindred, into whose hands they may commit their Persons? Who will take a greater care of their preservation, than they who hope for Riches and Honour to their Family? And who will take the pains to contribute to the lasting of any Empire, but he that has the greatest share in the enjoyments of it?

Those _Popes_ who at first seemed averse from their Relations, having in a small time come to know the difficulty of their own preservation in the hands of Strangers, have immediately called them to _Rome_, and thrown themselves into their Arms, as a place of Refuge against so many who had an interest to destroy them; and by all sorts of Favours, sought to make it their Kindreds Interest to love and take care of them.

It may be that _Urban_ the Eighth, who lived 23 Years _Pope_, had not attained to half that Age, if the _Barberins_ had not used all imaginable means to prolong his life; which else would have been plotted against by both Princes and private persons. But no body durst undertake that which seemed impossible. And without doubt, the care they took of him, did exceed the desire he had of living; for old age was become a burden to him at last.

_Innocent_ the Tenth, after the Design of getting the Kingdom of _Naples_ from the _Spaniard_ was discovered, stood in perpetual fear, lest, to be revenged, they should plot his death; which it may be they had done, if _Donna Olympia_ had not taken the care to dress his Meat, and feed him with her own hands: and in acknowledgment of her kindness, he would often say to her, _Sister_, _do you take care of me_, _and I’le take care that the Popedom shall be yours_.

_Pius_ the Third, of the Family of _Picolomini_ of _Siena_, had not died by poyson, procured him by _Pandolfo Petruccii_ Tyrant of the said place, if he had had some of his Relations neer him; whereupon he was forced to trust his life in Strangers hands, and lose it miserably, before he could see any of his Kindred about him.

But here some body will say, _That indeed it would not be amiss that the_ Pope _should resign the care of his Person to his Kindred_, _but not give them an unlimited Power over Church and State_; _That it is fit they do not want necessaries_, _but that he should not go about to content their insatiability_. To this we will answer in time and Place; it is enough for the present to have proved, That they are the most necessary Instruments of the _Popes_ preservation. And because the obligation of him that receives his life from another is infinite, therefore the _Popes_ do think, that they cannot repay but by infinite Gifts and Favours. Now we will pass to the third Reason, which is, The Reason of State.

The State or Politick Government of the Church, is the most unfortunate and miserable in the World; for it is neither Commonwealth nor Monarchy: and as an ingenious Prelate said, _It is neither from God nor the Devil_. And the causes of its Misery are divers; but particularly one is, Because the Supreme Governour always dying without Heirs, there is no body left to take pity of the grievances which are continually introduc’d by the Governours of Provinces who rule as they please.

Many compare all the Ecclesiastick State to a Town taken by an Enemy, who being out of hopes to keep it any time falls to plundering and destroying it, carrying away all that’s good; and leaving to the poor Citizens nothing but the liberty of venting their complaints: Just so do the Church-men who are in authority in one _Pope’s_ life; for foreseeing that their power is like to expire with him, and be resigned up to his Successor, they make Hay while the Sun shines, and use all manner of Extortions and Violences in their respective places for fear else of departing with their hands empty. And the people are so far from obtaining redress from those that succeed them, that they had rather be under the Government of their old Masters; for the new ones come with intention to do as much, if not worse, than the others.

In the time of _Francesco Maria della Rovere_, last Duke of _Urbin_, his Creatures seeing him past hopes of having any Heirs; and that after his death the Estate was like to fall to the Church, as being a Feife of it, they applyed themselves to make their advantage by all means; that is, they plunder’d and ruin’d it, that they might leave it bare to the Church-men their Successors. Particularly, when they saw the Duke languishing in a decrepit Age, they then bestirr’d themselves, and flew about like so many Bees to suck the rest of the Honey: But he hapning to live longer than they expected they were at a loss, and had drained all the State so dry; that they themselves were fain to sit and look upon the desolate condition of that Dukedom without being able to make it worse.

It came thus lean and impoverished into the Church-mens hands, who, for all they have such good Stomachs, were fain to forbear eating for the first seven years, till it had gathered a little flesh again; and then they fell to devouring of it afresh, and have since continued to do so: no sooner perceiving it to be a little recruited, but they extenuate it with Taxes, Impositions, and Extortions.

That which hapned once to the Dutchy of _Urbin_, happens often to the whole state of the Church; for as soon as the Governours, and other subordinate Officers, see the _Pope_ drawing to his end, and by consequence that their time of getting is also ready to expire, every new _Pope_ advancing new Creatures, there is no sort of Violence, Theft, Robbery, or Extortion that they do not commit in their respective charges: which they no sooner resign to new Officers, but that they who come in poor, and must maintain the _Decorum_ of their places, invent some new way of vexing the poor people, and enriching themselves; giving afterwards a little respite to the people to breath in, and by that time the _Pope_ is a dying, and then they fall on a fresh.

So that it appears that the Popedom being Elective and not Hereditary, causes all these misfortunes to the State and people; for this makes every body think of the present, and none of the future, there being no future amongst Church-men.

But if this inconveniency be great, it would without doubt prove much more intolerable, if the _Pope_ had no Kindred to help them in the Government of the State and Church; For though it seem that a _Nipotismo_ is directly bent upon its own profit and advantage: yet for divers reasons and respects they do preserve many places from ruine, and many Subjects from oppression. Whereas if the _Pope_ were without them, he would be forced to trust to a great number of Governours, who would every one be as greedy, and as absolute as a Nephew; and Lord it as high with the title of _Dominus Dominantium_.

The Nephews, who are few in number, take upon them to be both Shepherds, and Shearers; Treasurers, and Extorters: so that they suffer no body to grow rich but for them, nor to rise but by their means and to their profit, nor to take from others except it be to present them. For woe be to those Ministers of State, or subordinate Officers, that dare contradict a Nephew’s Will; or do any thing without their Order.

Now this being so, it is evident that it is more easie to satisfie one mans avidity than a hundreds. If the Nephews were not, every Prelate, every Bishop, every Abbot, every Cardinal, would treat the Church as the Jews did our Saviour’s Garments; that is, divide it amongst them: and it may be, would leave nothing for their Successors; for their Maximes are indeed to live well themselves, but not to provide that others may do so too.

The _Nipotismo_ looks upon the Popedom as their own, and so they have some consideration for a thing in which they pretend a propriety. When once their Purse is full they let it breath, and recover its forces. ’Tis true that that seldom falls out; for we have seen the _Barbarins_, enjoy the state of the Church for three and twenty years: and yet shew as much avidity when they were upon the point to leave it, as when they first entred upon it.

Besides this, if _Rome_ were without a _Nipotismo_, the Government of the City would be every day in new hands; every Church-man’s ambition being to climbe up to the top of the Wheel, and supplant him that stands next to the Soveraign Power. So that the Church would be in one Pontificate, tossed like a ball from one to the other; and that most commonly by very unskilful persons: the mystery of Church-Government being a thing not to be mastered but by those who stay long in it, and acquire great experience in the management of affairs.

Moreover, if the State were governed by different Persons under the Reign of one _Pope_, it would be a very hard matter to find out the Author of the Peoples miseries, every one having his Predecessors actions for an excuse; so that men would also lose that poor consolation of being able to show their Tormenters: But it is not so when a _Nipotismo_ governs, for then as they have the Honour, and Riches; so must they endure the Reproaches, and Complaints made against their Government, which the _Romans_ do without mercy, making the air sound and repeat their murmurs with a thousand Echoes.

These reasons do sometimes prevail upon the _Pope’s_ Kindred to make them abstain from doing all the mischief they would do; or at least they suffer not others to commit crimes and faults which they know will be laid to their charge: and of the imputation of which they shall be sure to be heirs as well as of their Uncle’s riches.

And indeed, how would it be possible for the State of the Church, which is a Monarchy, to be governed well if it were governed as a Republick. For in Commonwealths the Governours are the Citizens and Natives themselves, who being sure that the State they govern, is their own, do administer with Justice and Equity; first, as reaping a benefit by their moderation; And secondly, as being sure to expect a punishment when they are out of their charges: But the _Pope_ having the disposing of all places and charges, does often advance Strangers; who have no design but of making their own Fortune, and who, when once removed from their dignities, may either leave the State, or else procure impunity by a part of those riches which they have extorted from the poor people. It is much better therefore that there should be a _Nipotismo_, into whose hands the _Popes_ may trust their Government and Person; and who by the purchase which they make of great Estates do, as it were, settle themselves within the State: and may fear the being called to an account for their violences, if they exceed measure.

There are three other reasons which seem to conclude very strongly in favour of a _Nipotismo_, which are these:

That the _Pope_ may more easily discover the interests of Foreign Princes; That he may be able to govern with more care and affection; And that he may be able to carry on the Negotiations of his Court with more secrecy.

And indeed, it would not only be difficult, but almost impossible for the _Pope_ to dive into the hidden interests and designs of Foreign Princes without a _Nipotismo_; For how could he trust Strangers with his secrets, if he could not be assured that they would reciprocally reveal to him all theirs. The Ministers of State would be easily corrupted to betray the _Pope_ their Master, and incline much more to oblige Princes, upon whom, because of their hereditary and settled condition, they might relie, than to be faithful to one who might fail every moment; and with him all their hopes and expectations.

Besides, the Princes themselves would hardly condescend to reveal their secrets, and treat of important matters in the Court of _Rome_, when they should know and see that they must confide in strangers, whom another Prince might bribe and corrupt to their disadvantage; For just so far do Soveraigns trust the _Pope_ as they see about him people, in whom he may trust himself.

_Urban_ the eighth deserves no small praises for his Policy, all along his Reign: but particularly, for his method and way of treating with the Soveraigns of _Europe_; whose secrets were all revealed to him, whereas none of his were revealed to them again. For the same means, which he used to discover others designs, help him to conceal his own.

For having created his two Nephews Cardinals, and gave them instructions worthy such a politick head as his was, he made one of them declare for _Spain_, and the other for _France_; each of them making demonstration of an extraordinary kindness for the Crown they protected. Which thing proved most fortunate to the _Pope_, and successful in the design he had, to be Master of the secrets of both Kings.

Now that this was a design of the Uncle, and no particular inclination of the Nephews, appears easily; because that Cardinal _Antonio_, who sided with the French, had never had any communication with this Nation before his being made Cardinal: neither had he received from them any kindness that could endear him to their Party: Nay, indeed he had rather reason to encline to the Spaniards, from whom he had received many courtesies worth acknowledging; but he followed in this his Uncle’s suggestions.

The Cardinal _Francesco_ on the other side who had never any great inclination for _Spain_, and who in the services he did do them, did not appear with that violence that Cardinal _Antonio_ did; for the _French_ would nevertheless in obedience to his Uncle often declare for them: and in some occasions show a great deal of affection and desire to oblige a Crown, which did seek after his protection.

_Urban_ having thus assigned the care of the interest of these two Potent Princes to his Nephews, could not chuse but be perfectly informed of their designs, and secret intrigues of their Courts; whose Ministers and Ambassadours in order to a further discovery of the _Pope’s_ inclinations, were forced to communicate before hand a great part of their secrets to the Cardinal, Protector of their Kingdom, in hopes by his means of diving further into that which was yet hidden to them: but most commonly they got little light and intelligence by it, for the Nephews following exactly their Uncle’s Instructions, did endeavour to pump every body else, and keep themselves close. Their Uncle in the mean time well informed on both hands, was sure to take just measures; and by an even carriage so to entertain the affections of both Kings, as to make them both his Friends: and really one who could govern a Popedom so well, and easily, betwixt so opposed and different Interests, did deserve to govern as long as _Urban_ did.

_Innocentius_ might have been named for one of the greatest Politicians in the world, if his Sister-in-law had not lead him astray; or rather if he had been guilty of an unparalell’d inconstancy in changing so often his _Nipotismo_.

For they that were disgraced did immediately reveal to Princes all the secrets of his Court, and they who came in their room could never penetrate into the hidden designs of Forreign Courts; for the Princes of those Kingdoms and States durst not trust them with any thing, as being alwayes afraid, lest they should be turned off as the first.

And in effect, as soon as the news of the adoption of Cardinal _Astalli_ was spread abroad, there were many that laid great wagers, that he would not conserve himself in his post long; and the grounds they went upon, was the unconstant humour of the Pope, which no body could trust to.

Cardinal _Mazarine_ himself being weary of so many extravagant changes in the _Nipotismo_ of _Innocentius_, and seeing _Astalli_ fallen out of his favour, and the _Barberins_ in his place, said to one of his Confidents, in the presence of a French Protestant, these words, _I have never relyed much upon the Cardinal_ Astalli; _and I shall now scarce rely upon the Pope himself_. Many Princes both of _Italy_ and _Germany_ were of Cardinal _Mazarine’s_ minde in this, and became very cautious in all their negotiations; avoiding all occasions of treating with his Holiness, as knowing that nothing could be well managed in such divisions, and changes.

Thus we see, that not only the _Popes_ must have near them those that have the title of Nephews; but they must be really such, as by consanguinity may be obliged to the same interest with the _Pope_, if he means that others should trust them. This is the only way to make the _Popes_ appear Sovereigns, as really they desire to be; and any other way they will seem rather to be the Heads of a Commonwealth than absolute Princes.

It is fit therefore, that they should be allowed a _Nipotismo_ for their own and others safety; but it is not just that they should so indulge this _Nipotismo_, as to set it above themselves, and become its slaves. Let them treat with Princes, but let them not become so themselves, and usurp the _Pope’s_ Authority, so far as to use it without his knowledge, and often contrary to the Interests of the Church and State.

Let them not do as _Gregory_ the 15th. who had given to the Cardinal _Ludovisio_ his Nephew, so great an Authority of doing and saying what he pleased, without so much as consulting his Uncle, that he was really become _Pope_, and the _Pope_ as if he had been the Nephew; and if ever he come and give him part of any secret negotiation, it was because the thing was so intricate, that he either could not, or durst not undertake to come to execution, without being first fortified with his Uncle’s advice and approbation.

But the best was, that the _Pope_ himself did not dare to ask him any questions about business, or inform himself otherwise; but sometimes would be whole weeks together without so much as seeing the face of an Ambassadour, or publick Minister: his Nephew in the mean time giving Audience, and concluding all business with them.