Chapter 82

THE RUSSIAN CAMPAIGN

In the very beginning Russia had marked out one point for attack. This was the city of Cracow. No doubt the Grand Duke Nicholas had not hoped to be able to invest that city early. The slowness of the mobilization of the Russian army made a certain prudence advisable at the beginning of the campaign. But the great success of his armies in Lemberg encouraged more daring aims. He had invested Przemysl, and Galicia lay before him. Accordingly, he set his face toward Cracow.

Cracow, from a military point of view, is the gate both of Vienna and Berlin. A hundred miles west of it is the famous gap of Moravia, between the Carpathian and the Bohemian mountains, which leads down into Austria. Through this gap runs the great railway connecting Silesia with Vienna, and the Grand Duke knew that if he could capture Cracow he would have an easy road before him to the Austrian capital. Cracow also is the key of Germany.

Seventy miles from the city lies the Oder River. An army might enter Germany by this gate and turn the line of Germany's frontier fortresses. The Oder had been well fortified, but an invader coming from Cracow might move upon the western bank. The Russian plan no doubt was to threaten both enemy capitals. Moreover, an advance of Russia from Cracow would take its armies into Silesia, full of coal and iron mines, and one of the greatest manufacturing districts in the German Empire. This would be a real success, and all Germany would feel the blow.

Another reason for the Russian advance in Galicia was her desire to control the Galician oil wells. To Germany petrol had become one of the foremost munitions of war. Since she could not obtain it from either America or Russia she must get it from Austria, and the Austrian oil fields were all in Galicia. This, in itself, would explain the Galician campaign. Moreover, through the Carpathian Mountains it was possible to make frequent raids into Hungary, and Russia understood well the feeling of Hungary toward her German allies.

She hoped that when Hungary perceived her regiments sacrificed and her plains overrun by Russian troops, she would regret that she had allowed herself to be sacrificed to Prussian ambition. The Russians, therefore, suddenly, moved toward Cracow.

Then von Hindenburg came to the rescue. The supreme command of the Austrian forces was given to him. The defenses of Cracow were strengthened under the direction of the Germans, and a German army advanced from the Posen frontier toward the northern bank of the Vistula. The advance threatened the Russian right, and, accordingly, within ten days' march of Cracow, the Russians stopped. The German offensive in Poland had begun. The news of the German advance came about the fifth of October. Von Hindenburg, who had been fighting in East Prussia, had at last perceived that nothing could be gained there. The vulnerable part of Russia was the city of Warsaw. This was the capital of Poland, with a population of about three-quarters of a million. If he could take Warsaw, he would not only have pleasant quarters for the winter but Russia would be so badly injured that no further offensive from her need be anticipated for a long period. Von Hindenburg had with him a large army. In his center he probably had three-quarters of a million men, and on his right the Austrian army in Cracow, which must have reached a million.

Counting the troops operating in East Prussia and along the Carpathians, and the garrison of Przemysl, the Teuton army must have had two and a half million soldiers. Russia, on the other hand, though her mobilization was still continuing, at this time could not have had as many as two million men in the whole nine hundred miles of her battle front.

The fight for Warsaw began Friday, October 16th, and continued for three days, von Hindenburg being personally in command. On Monday the Germans found themselves in trouble. A Russian attack on their left wing had come with crushing force. Von Hindenburg found his left wing thrown back, and the whole German movement thrown into disorder. Meanwhile an attempt to cross the Vistula at Josefov had also been a failure. The Russians allowed the Germans to pass with slight resistance, waited until they arrived at the village Kazimirjev, a district of low hills and swampy flats, and then suddenly overwhelmed them.

Next day the Russians crossed the river themselves, and advanced along the whole line, driving the enemy before them, through great woods of spruce out into the plains on the west. This forest region was well known to the Russian guides, and the Germans suffered much as the Russians had suffered in East Prussia. Ruzsky, the Russian commander, pursued persistently; the Germans retreating first to Kielce, whence they were driven, on the 3d of November, with great losses, and then being broken into two pieces, with the north retiring westward and the south wing southwest toward Cracow.

Rennenkampf's attack on the German left wing was equally successful, and von Hindenburg was driven into full retreat. The only success won during this campaign was that in the far south where Austrian troops were sweeping eastward toward the San. This army drove back the Russians under Ivanov, reoccupied Jaroslav and relieved Przemysl. This was a welcome relief to Przemysl, for the garrison was nearly starved, and it was well for the garrison that the relief came, for in a few days the Russians returned, recaptured Jaroslav and reinvested Przemysl. As von Hindenburg retreated he left complete destruction in his wake, roads, bridges, railroad tracks, water towers, railway stations, all were destroyed; even telegraph posts, broken or sawn through, and insulators broken to bits.

It was now the turn of Russia to make a premature advance, and to pay for it. Doubtless the Grand Duke Nicholas, whose strategy up to this point had been so admirable, knew very well the danger of a new advance in Galicia, but he realized the immense political as well as military advantages which were to be obtained by the capture of Cracow. He therefore attempted to move an army through Poland as well as through Galicia, hoping that the army in Poland would keep von Hindenburg busy, while the Galician army would deal with Cracow.

The advance was slow on account of the damaged Polish roads. It was preceded by a cavalry screen which moved with more speed. On November 10th, the vanguard crossed the Posen frontier and cut the railway on the Cracow-Posen line. This reconnaissance convinced the Russian general that the German army did not propose to make a general stand, and it seemed to him that if he struck strongly with his center along the Warta, he might destroy the left flank of the German southern army, while his own left flank was assaulting Cracow. He believed that even if his attack upon the Warta failed, the Russian center could at any rate prevent the enemy from interfering with the attack further south upon Cracow.

The movement therefore began, and by November 12th, the Russian cavalry had taken Miechow on the German frontier, about twenty miles north of Cracow. Its main forces were still eighty miles to the east. About this time Grand Duke Nicholas perceived that von Hindenburg was preparing a counter stroke. He had retreated north, and then, by means of his railways, was gathering a large army at Thorn. Large reinforcements were sent him, some from the western front, giving him a total of about eight hundred thousand men. In his retreat from Warsaw, while he had destroyed all roads and railways in the south and west, he had carefully preserved those of the north already planning to use them in another movement. He now was beginning an advance, once again, against Warsaw. On account of the roads he perceived that it would be difficult for the Russians to obtain reinforcements. Von Hindenburg had with him as Chief of Staff General von Ludendorff, one of the cleverest staff officers in the German army, and General von Mackensen, a commander of almost equal repute.

The Russian army in the north had been pretty well scattered. The Russian forces were now holding a front of nearly a thousand miles, with about two million men. The Russian right center, which now protected Warsaw from the new attack could hardly number more than two hundred thousand men. Von Hindenburg's aim was Warsaw only, and did not affect directly the Russian advance to Cracow, which was still going on. Indeed, by the end of the first week in December, General Dmitrieff had cavalry in the suburbs of Cracow, and his main force was on the line of the River Rava about twelve miles away. Cracow had been strongly fortified, and much entrenching had been done in a wide circle around the city.