Chapter 64

THE PLOTTER BEHIND THE SCENES

One factor alone caused the great war. It was not the assassination at Sarajevo, not the Slavic ferment of anti-Teutonism in Austria and the Balkans. The only cause of the world's greatest war was the determination of the German High Command and the powerful circle surrounding it that "Der Tag" had arrived. The assassination at Sarajevo was only the peg for the pendant of war. Another peg would have been found inevitably had not the projection of that assassination presented itself as the excuse.

Germany's military machine was ready. A gray-green uniform that at a distance would fade into misty obscurity had been devised after exhaustive experiments by optical, dye and cloth experts co-operating with the military high command. These uniforms had been standardized and fitted for the millions of men enrolled in Germany's regular and reserve armies. Rifles, great pyramids of munitions, field kitchens, traveling post-offices, motor lorries, a network of military railways leading to the French and Belgian border, all these and more had been made ready. German soldiers had received instructions which enabled each man at a signal to go to an appointed place where he found everything in readiness for his long forced marches into the territory of Germany's neighbors.

More than all this, Germany's spy system, the most elaborate and unscrupulous in the history of mankind, had enabled the German High Command to construct in advance of the declaration of war concrete gun emplacements in Belgium and other invaded territory. The cellars of dwellings and shops rented or owned by German spies were camouflaged concrete foundations for the great guns of Austria and Germany. These emplacements were in exactly the right position for use against the fortresses of Germany's foes. Advertisements and shop-signs were used by spies as guides for the marching German armies of invasion.

All suggestions and negotiations looking forward to peace were brought to a tragic end on the following day, Tuesday, July 28th, when Austria declared war on Serbia, having speedily mobilized troops at strategic points on the Serbian border. Russian mobilization, which had been proceeding only in a tentative way, on the Austrian border, now became general, and on July 30th, mobilization of the entire Russian army was proclaimed.

Germany's effort to exclude England from the war began on Thursday, July 29th. A note, sounding Sir Edward Grey on the question of British neutrality in the event of war was received, and a curt refusal to commit the British Empire to such a proposal was the reply. Sir Edward Grey, in a last determined effort to avoid a world-war, suggested to Germany, Austria, Serbia and Russia that the military operations commenced by Austria should be recognized as merely a punitive expedition. He further suggested that when a point in Serbian territory previously fixed upon should have been reached, Austria would halt and would submit her further action to arbitration in the conference of the Powers. Russia and Serbia agreed unreservedly to this proposition. Austria gave a half-hearted assent to the principle involved. Germany made no reply.

The die was cast for war on the following day, July 31st, when Germany made a dictatorial and arrogant demand upon Russia that mobilization of that nation's military forces be stopped within twelve hours. Russia made no reply, and on Saturday, August 1st, Germany set the world aflame with the dread of war's horror by her declaration of war upon Russia.

Germany's responsibility for this monumental crime against the peace of the world is eternally fixed upon her, not only by these outward and visible acts and negotiations, not only by her years of patient preparation for the war into which she plunged the world. The responsibility is fastened upon her forever by the revelations of her own ambassador to England during this fateful period. Prince Lichnowsky, in a remarkable communication which was given to the world, laid bare the machinations of the German High Command and its advisers. He was a guest of the Kaiser at Kiel on board the Imperial yacht Meteor when the message was received informing the Kaiser of the assassination at Sarajevo. His story continues:

Being unacquainted with the Vienna viewpoint and what was going on there, I attached no very far-reaching significance to the event; but, looking back, I could feel sure that in the Austrian aristocracy a feeling of relief outweighed all others. His Majesty regretted that his efforts to win over the Archduke to his ideas had thus been frustrated by the Archduke's assassination.

I went on to Berlin and saw the Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg. I told him that I regarded our foreign situation as very satisfactory as it was a long time indeed since we had stood so well with England. And in France there was a pacifist cabinet. Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg did not seem to share my optimism.

He complained of the Russian armaments. I tried to tranquilize him with the argument that it was not to Russia's interest to attack us, and that such an attack would never have English or French support, as both countries wanted peace.

I went from him to Dr. Zimmermann (the under Secretary) who was acting for Herr von Jagow (the Foreign Secretary), and learned from him that Russia was about to call up nine hundred thousand new troops. His words unmistakably denoted ill-humor against Russia, who, he said, stood everywhere in our way. In addition, there were questions of commercial policy that had to be settled. That General von Moltke was urging war was, of course, not told to me. I learned, however, that Herr von Tschirschky (the German Ambassador in Vienna) had been reproved because he said that he had advised Vienna to show moderation toward Serbia.

Prince Lichnowsky went to his summer home in Silesia, quite unaware of the impending crisis. He continues:

When I returned from Silesia on my way to London, I stopped only a few hours in Berlin, where I heard that Austria intended to proceed against Serbia so as to bring to an end an unbearable state of affairs. Unfortunately, I failed at the moment to gauge the significance of the news. I thought that once more it would come to nothing; that even if Russia acted threateningly, the matter could soon be settled. I now regret that I did not stay in Berlin and declare there and then that I would have no hand in such a policy.

There was a meeting in Potsdam, as early as July 5th, between the German and Austrian authorities, at which meeting war was decided on. Prince Lichnowsky says:

I learned afterwards that at the decisive discussion at Potsdam on July 5th the Austrian demand had met with the unconditional approval of all the personages in authority; it was even added that no harm would be done if war with Russia did come out of it. It was so stated at least in the Austrian report received at London by Count Mensdorff (the Austrian Ambassador to England).

At this point I received instructions to endeavor to bring the English press to a friendly attitude in case Austria should deal the death-blow to "Greater-Serbian" hopes. I was to use all my influence to prevent public opinion in England from taking a stand against Austria. I remembered England's attitude during the Bosnian annexation crisis, when public opinion showed itself in sympathy with the Serbian claims to Bosnia; I recalled also the benevolent promotion of nationalist hopes that went on in the days of Lord Byron and Garibaldi; and on these and other grounds I thought it extremely unlikely that English public opinion would support a punitive expedition against the Archduke's murderers. I thus felt it my duty to enter an urgent warning against the whole project, which I characterized as venturesome and dangerous, I recommended that counsels of moderation he given Austria, as I did not believe that the conflict could be localized (that is to say, it could not be limited to a war between Austria and Serbia).