History of European Morals From Augustus to Charlemagne (Vol. 1 of 2)
book ii. ch. xxviii. “Take away pleasures and pains, not only
happiness, but justice, and duty, and obligation, and virtue, all of which have been so elaborately held up to view as independent of them, are so many empty sounds.”—Bentham’s _Springs of Action_, ch. i. § 15.
6 “Il lui est aussi impossible d’aimer le bien pour le bien, que d’aimer le mal pour le mal.”—Helvétius _De l’Esprit_, disc. ii. ch. v.
7 “Even the goodness which we apprehend in God Almighty, is his goodness to us.”—Hobbes _On Human Nature_, ch. vii. § 3. So Waterland, “To love God is in effect the same thing as to love happiness, eternal happiness; and the love of happiness is still the love of ourselves.”—_Third Sermon on Self-love._
8 “Reverence is the conception we have concerning another, that he hath the power to do unto us both good and hurt, but not the will to do us hurt.”—Hobbes _On Human Nature_, ch. viii. § 7.
9 “The pleasures of piety are the pleasures that accompany the belief of a man’s being in the acquisition, or in possession of the goodwill or favour of the Supreme Being; and as a fruit of it, of his being in the way of enjoying pleasures to be received by God’s special appointment either in this life or in a life to come.”—Bentham’s _Principles of Morals and Legislation_, ch. v. “The pains of piety are the pains that accompany the belief of a man’s being obnoxious to the displeasure of the Supreme Being, and in consequence to certain pains to be inflicted by His especial appointment, either in this life or in a life to come. These may be also called the pains of religion.”—Ibid.
10 “There can be no greater argument to a man of his own power, than to find himself able not only to accomplish his own desires, but also to assist other men in theirs; and this is that conception wherein consisteth charity.”—Hobbes _On Hum. Nat._ ch. ix. § 17. “No man giveth but with intention of good to himself, because gift is voluntary; and of all voluntary acts, the object to every man is his own good.”—Hobbes’ _Leviathan_, part i. ch. xv. “Dream not that men will move their little finger to serve you, unless their advantage in so doing be obvious to them. Men never did so, and never will while human nature is made of its present materials.”—Bentham’s _Deontology_, vol. ii. p. 133.
11 “Pity is imagination or fiction of future calamity to ourselves, proceeding from the sense of another man’s calamity. But when it lighteth on such as we think have not deserved the same, the compassion is greater, because there then appeareth more probability that the same may happen to us; for the evil that happeneth to an innocent man may happen to every man.”—Hobbes _On Hum. Nat._ ch. ix. § 10. “La pitié est souvent un sentiment de nos propres maux dans les maux d’autrui. C’est une habile prévoyance des malheurs où nous pouvons tomber. Nous donnons des secours aux autres pour les engager à nous en donner en de semblables occasions, et ces services que nous leur rendons sont, à proprement parler, des biens que nous nous faisons à nous-mêmes par avance.”—La Rochefoucauld, _Maximes_, 264. Butler has remarked that if Hobbes’ account were true, the most fearful would be the most compassionate nature; but this is perhaps not quite just, for Hobbes’ notion of pity implies the union of two not absolutely identical, though nearly allied, influences, timidity and imagination. The theory of Adam Smith, though closely connected with, differs totally in consequences from that of Hobbes on this point. He says, “When I condole with you for the loss of your son, in order to enter into your grief, I do not consider what I, a person of such a character and profession, should suffer if I had a son, and if that son should die—I consider what I should suffer if I was really you. I not only change circumstances with you, but I change persons and characters. My grief, therefore, is entirely upon your account.... A man may sympathise with a woman in child-bed, though it is impossible he should conceive himself suffering her pains in his own proper person and character.”—_Moral Sentiments_,