CHAPTER XXXI.

THE ARMY ON THE MISSOURI.

The rôle which the army was called upon to fill in the history of our Indian affairs was a most unpleasant one. It began while the proud spirit of the tribes was as yet unbroken, but had been aroused by ever-increasing aggression to the point of active resistance. It then became necessary to subdue them by force to absolute subordination to the government, and to remove them from their larger hunting grounds to small reservations. This thankless task devolved upon the army. It was not merely a thankless task, but a most arduous and formidable one. Compared with service in the Indian campaigns, that in the South during the Civil War was a holiday pastime. What tragedy in all our national wars can compare with the battle of the Little Big Horn? What record of retreat and pursuit is there like that of the Nez Percé campaign of 1877? Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow had no terrors for the individual soldier like those of the winter campaign of Crook in the Powder River country in March, 1876, when it was so cold that the men were not permitted to go to sleep at night for fear they would never wake up.

[Sidenote: THE WEIGHT OF A DREAD POWER.]

In the course of twenty years after 1855 military posts sprang up all over the West. There was scarcely an Indian trail in that entire region that did not witness the passage of government troops. From one haunt to another his relentless pursuers tracked the desperate Indian. Ambushes and massacres were met with crushing defeats in battle, but the general drift of the conflict was uniformly one way. The Indian was learning the weight of that dread power which had so far tolerated his independence, but was now to extinguish it forever. The struggle lasted in its main features about sixteen years, or from 1862 to 1877; but its extreme limits were the Grattan Massacre of August 19, 1854, and the battle of Wounded Knee, December 29, 1890.

For some years the Indians who were parties to the treaty of Laramie observed its conditions fairly well; but in 1854 an unfortunate affair occurred which temporarily interrupted the general peace. Some fifteen hundred Indians of three different Sioux bands were encamped in the Platte Valley, about six miles below Fort Laramie, in August of that year. One of the Indians drove off and killed a stray cow belonging to an emigrant train. The owner complained of the theft to the officer in command at Laramie, and Lieutenant Grattan, with about twenty men, was sent to bring in the thief. He probably did not show very much tact in performing his delicate task, and made the mistake of attempting to take the culprit by force in the presence of nearly ten times his number of Indians. The result was the massacre of his entire party. The Indians then went to the American Fur Company warehouse, where their annuity goods were in waiting, broke open the building, and carried off the annuities.

[Sidenote: BATTLE OF ASH HOLLOW.]

Thereupon the government ordered General Harney to take the field with a military force, establish convenient bases of supplies, protect the frontier and the emigrant routes, and to deal a heavy blow upon the offending Indians. On September 3, 1855, General Harney attacked a large force of Indians who had taken part in the Grattan massacre, completely routed them, killed and captured upward of two hundred, and destroyed nearly all their property. This affair took place across the Platte River from Ash Hollow, a noted situation on the emigrant trail, from which the battle has taken its name.

General Harney next moved his force to the Missouri River, where the old trading post of Fort Pierre had been lately acquired by the government, and there held councils with various tribes, which again resulted in general pacification. In the following year the important military post of Fort Randall was built, and Fort Pierre was abandoned because of its undesirable situation. General Harney discharged his task in a manner highly creditable to himself and satisfactory both to the Indians and the government; and seven years were to elapse before any further difficulty of a serious character should occur.

[Sidenote: SITUATION GROWING WORSE.]

[Sidenote: INTRIGUES OF THE HALF-BREEDS.]

But while the severe lesson of Ash Hollow, the frank counsel of General Harney, and the presence of a military force at Fort Randall, kept the tribes in comparative peace, the wrongs from which they suffered continually increased, and their temper grew constantly worse. The discovery of gold in Montana brought a multitude of emigrants to and through this country, with the consequent destruction of game and threats of roads and railroads and loss of lands. Events were fast developing into a crisis, when the outbreak of the Civil War in the United States gave the tribes their desired opportunity. The frontier garrisons were depleted in order that the regular troops might be sent south. New levies made up of the able-bodied citizens went away to the war. The Indian was quick to see how this movement weakened the frontier settlements. He was made to believe, by gross exaggeration, that the situation of the Great Father in Washington was a desperate one, that his capital was about to be taken and his power destroyed. It has been asserted that the Confederates had emissaries among the Indians, but there is no proof of any direct intrigue of this character. Indirectly, however, they exercised a powerful influence upon them. The people of the British possessions, like those of the mother country, sympathized ardently with the South, and this sympathy found effective expression in the intercourse of the British half-breeds north of the boundary with the Indians south. These half-breeds knew the border tribes perfectly, and had greater influence with them than the whites, who were strangers to their customs and the authors of their many wrongs. Selfish motives of trade combined with national prejudice to stir up strife against the Americans and to provide means for making that strife effective. The half-breeds circulated freely south of the border, and the tracks of their carts could be seen everywhere from the Red River of the North to the Missouri River. They brought powder and balls, guns, rum, and regular merchandise of trade, and their influence at this particular time was decisive. Their territory, moreover, offered a sure asylum from punishment for any outrages which the Indians might commit.[68]

[Sidenote: THE MINNESOTA MASSACRE.]

Trouble first broke out in 1862 among the Minnesota Indians, where the evil conditions from which the tribes had been suffering had reached an acute stage. Under the leadership of a noted Sioux chief, Little Crow, the Indians in the valley of the Minnesota River above Mankato attacked the settlement of New Ulm and others in that vicinity, on the 18th of August, murdering and taking captive the inhabitants, destroying property, and spreading consternation in every direction. In the course of three days nearly a thousand persons were killed and two million dollars’ worth of property destroyed.

The State and national governments sent instant relief; the outrages were checked; the Indians were driven up the Minnesota Valley and beaten in several battles; the captive whites were mostly released, and a large number of hostiles engaged in the massacre were taken prisoners. This work was done under the immediate leadership of General H. H. Sibley, first Governor of Minnesota. The captured Indians were tried by court martial, and a great number were condemned to death, but this penalty was commuted by President Lincoln except in the cases of thirty-eight, who were hanged at Mankato, December 26, 1862.

[Sidenote: AN INDIAN WAR.]

In the meanwhile the Indians under Little Crow, though checked and driven back, were not conquered or discouraged. Their emissaries were active among the tribes of the Missouri, who were aroused almost to the point of war. The execution of the Indians at Mankato exasperated Little Crow to a desperate pitch, and he vowed extermination of the whites. It was clear that an Indian war was at hand, and the government at once prepared for it. Its conduct was placed in the hands of General John Pope, who had been relieved from his command of the Army of the Potomac after the second Bull Run, and was now in command of the Department of the Northwest, with headquarters at Milwaukee. General Pope organized two expeditions, one under General Sibley, to move west from Mankato against the Indians and drive them toward the Missouri, and the other under General Sully, to move from Sioux City up the Missouri and cut off their retreat. The plan was well conceived, but the extreme low water in the Missouri in 1863 prevented General Sully from receiving his supplies in time to carry out his part of the programme.

[Sidenote: EXPEDITION OF GENERAL SIBLEY.]

Sibley’s expedition left Camp Pope in the Minnesota Valley June 16, 1863, and two days later that of General Sully left Sioux City. Sibley’s route lay up the Minnesota to its source, thence by way of Lake Traverse to the Cheyenne River of North Dakota, and up that stream toward Devil’s Lake, where the Indians were supposed to be. Learning that they had left that region and had gone toward the Missouri, General Sibley changed his march to the southwest, and pursued the retreating enemy with great vigor. He came upon them and fought three battles within a week--Big Mound, July 24; Dead Buffalo Lake, July 26; and Stony Lake, July 28. The Indians were defeated in all three fights, and then crossed the Missouri River just below where Bismarck, N. D., now stands. General Sibley reached that stream on July 29, and here his expedition ended. Two days later his command set out on its homeward march.[69]

At this time General Sully was at Fort Pierre. The transportation of his supplies had delayed him, and it was not until the 14th of August that he started from that point on his march north. He went up the east bank of the Missouri, with a great deal of vexatious delay, and finally reached the scene of Sibley’s third fight just a month after it had taken place. The Indians, meanwhile, far from being conquered or dispirited, had recrossed the river and were on their way back to the grazing grounds on the Coteau of the Missouri. Some of them harassed the homeward-bound column of General Sibley. Sully pursued them to the northeast and overtook and fought them at Whitestone Hill, some thirty miles south and slightly west of Jamestown, N. D. The Indians were badly defeated, many of them were killed, and a large amount of their property was destroyed. Sully then returned to the Missouri and built a new post, Fort Sully, on the left bank of the river, opposite the head of Farm Island, midway between Fort Pierre and Fort George. With this work the campaign of 1863 came to an end.

[Sidenote: CAMPAIGN INDECISIVE.]

The movements of troops in this campaign and the force of Indians engaged were the largest yet known in the history of the United States. The number of warriors was estimated at over six thousand, while the troops under Sibley and Sully numbered about four thousand. The campaign, however, was not conclusive. Although the Indians had been defeated with severe loss in every engagement, they were still unsubdued, and retained their defiant attitude during the following winter. Accordingly another campaign was planned for the summer of 1864. General Sully was placed in charge with a cavalry force of about 2500 men.

[Sidenote: SULLY’S CAMPAIGN OF 1864.]

General Sully’s first move was to build a post near the mouth of the Cannon Ball River--Fort Rice, forty miles below where Bismarck now stands, and on the other side of the river. The Indians being reported as near the source of Heart River, General Sully concluded to continue his march in search of them, whether found or not, until he should reach the Yellowstone River. He took with him only the necessary rations for the march and sent his steamboats with supplies and materials for a new post around to meet him at the Brasseau Houses on the Yellowstone, fifty miles above the mouth of that stream. Accompanying Sully’s march to the Yellowstone was an emigrant train of about 125 people bound for the mines of Montana.

Sully’s route lay up the Cannon Ball River nearly to its source, and thence across to the head waters of Heart River. Here the General packed his train and left it with the emigrants under a strong guard, and himself and command, in light marching order, struck out for Knife River, where the Indians were reported encamped. He found them as expected. They were defiant and eager for battle, and an engagement immediately followed. The Indians were badly defeated, a large number being killed, and all of their property destroyed. This was the battle of Tahkahokuty, or Killdeer Mountain, and was fought July 28, 1864.

[Sidenote: THE ARMY REACHES THE YELLOWSTONE.]

Sully then returned to his camp on Heart River, and, under the guidance of a single Indian, who, of all those with him, professed to know a passable route, started on the perilous undertaking of carrying a wagon train through the Bad Lands to the Yellowstone River. The route was west to the Little Missouri, where it turned sharply to the northwest and struck the Yellowstone about fifteen miles below the Brasseau Houses. This point was reached on the 12th of August, and fortunately the supply steamers were close at hand to relieve the necessities of the troops. This was the first expedition across the Bad Lands of North Dakota, and was accomplished at the cost of great labor and suffering.

The command crossed the Yellowstone and then marched to the Missouri River opposite Fort Union. This stream was forded with much peril, and the troops then returned to Fort Rice along the north shore. Garrisons were left at Forts Union and Berthold, but the contemplated post on the Yellowstone could not be built, owing to the wrecking of one of the steamers with most of the material on board.

Thus the military forces of the United States were advanced in permanent occupation to the mouth of the Yellowstone River. Only twice before had the uniform of the American soldier been so far up the Missouri--in 1805–06, when the Lewis and Clark expedition passed this point, and in 1825, when General Atkinson took his command to a point about a hundred miles farther up. Neither of these earlier visits contemplated permanent occupation.

[Sidenote: SIGNS OF WEAKENING.]

By this time the Indians began to realize the magnitude of the power they were contending with, and to show signs of weakening. No extensive campaign was found necessary along the river for a number of years, although many of the Indians continued hostile and committed numerous depredations. The termination of the Civil War, with complete victory for the government, and the release of so many soldiers from Southern fields who could now be sent to the frontier, all tended to make the Indians proceed in their schemes of war with greater caution and hesitation. Could the evils of our Indian system have been corrected the tribes might readily have been brought to terms of “lasting peace,” which was so confidently predicted at the time by Indian agents and even by some military officers.

In this matter of the military conquest of the Missouri Valley, as in that treated in the last chapter, it is not possible, with our present space, to follow in detail the course of events during the next twelve years. The army made some new advances every year, not only in the Missouri Valley, but throughout the entire West. Campaigns, battles, and some appalling massacres occurred, and the soldiers became as familiar with the country and as expert in savage methods of warfare as the Indian himself. Finally, in 1875–77, came the last act in the great tragedy, by which the power of the Sioux nation was broken and their career as an independent people brought to an end.

[Sidenote: NON-TREATY SIOUX.]

Great efforts had been made for several years to reduce the Sioux tribes, by peaceable methods, to life on the reservations. Several government commissions were sent to them, and one in particular, of which General Sherman was a member, went into the whole matter with the greatest possible care. Most of the Sioux were finally located on the reservations and appeared to be peaceably disposed. But there were some exceptions, estimated to number not more than six or eight hundred warriors, who had persistently refused from the first to recognize in any way the treaties or other arrangements with the government. The agents had failed to get them to quiet down on the reservations, and they continued to roam over the country as of old, subsisting upon the fruits of the chase. They were uncompromisingly hostile to the whites and their Indian allies, and committed outrages without number upon both. Finally the Indian Department served notice upon them that unless they settled down on the reservations before January 31, 1876, they would be turned over to the military authorities and be dealt with by force. The Indians paid no attention to this ultimatum, and their case was accordingly placed in the hands of the army.

[Sidenote: CAMPAIGN OF 1876.]

An effort was made to reach these Indians by a winter campaign, but after one attempt, which ended in a battle of no decisive results, the scheme was abandoned, because the excessive cold made it impossible to conduct operations in that shelterless country. General Sheridan, who was charged with the conduct of this important business, thereupon planned a campaign which was to be carried out as soon as the season would permit. He determined upon a concentric movement by which bodies of troops from widely separated localities should move upon a given section where it was believed that the hostile band would be found. General Crook was to start from Fort Fetterman, on the Platte, and move north; General Terry from Fort Abraham Lincoln, on the Missouri, and move west; and General Gibbon from Fort Ellis, in western Montana, and move east. The point of rendezvous was to be in the Yellowstone Valley near the mouth of the Powder River, or wherever in that vicinity further development might indicate. General Crook left Fort Fetterman May 29 with about 1000 men; General Terry left Fort Lincoln May 17 with about 1000 men, sending his supplies around into the Yellowstone by steamboat. General Gibbon, with 450 men, left Fort Ellis on the 1st of April, crossed over to the Yellowstone, and marched down the left bank of that stream.

[Sidenote: ERRONEOUS ESTIMATES.]

Up to this time all obtainable evidence indicated that the hostile Indians did not number more than 800 warriors. As a matter of fact, discontented Indians from nearly all the surrounding Sioux and Cheyenne agencies had for some time past been leaving the reservations and going to the hostiles, until the latter had gathered a force of not less than 2500 men. It was against this force, more than three times as large as was supposed, that the joint movement of Generals Terry, Crook, and Gibbon was directed.

General Crook was the first to encounter the Indians. He met and fought them on the head of the Rosebud River June 17, and although the Indians withdrew, the battle was indecisive, and the great number of the Indians, as disclosed by the fight, induced General Crook not to take the risk of going further. He withdrew to the valley of Goose Creek and sent for re-enforcements.

Generals Terry and Gibbon met about fifteen miles below the mouth of the Tongue River on the 9th of June, and their combined forces formed a junction at the mouth of the Rosebud on the 21st of that month. Here the plan of operations against the Indians was agreed upon. Nothing was known of Crook’s whereabouts, nor of his recent fight, but it was pretty well established, from various scouting parties, that the Indian village was in the valley of the Little Big Horn, from seventy-five to ninety miles distant. It was decided that General Custer, with the 7th Cavalry, should proceed up the Rosebud until he should strike a large Indian trail which had been discovered a few days before, and should then follow it to the Little Big Horn, feeling well to the south to prevent the escape of the Indians. General Gibbon, whose column General Terry accompanied, was to ascend the Yellowstone to the mouth of the Big Horn, and that stream to the mouth of the Little Big Horn, where it was expected to arrive not later than the 26th, and where it should come into touch with Custer.

[Sidenote: THE CUSTER MASSACRE.]

In carrying out his part of the programme, General Custer moved more rapidly than his instructions contemplated, so rapidly, in fact, that he would have arrived at the appointed rendezvous, had his march not been interrupted, an entire day in advance of that fixed for the arrival of General Gibbon. The result was that his command came upon the Indian village on the morning of the 25th while advancing in three separate columns not within supporting distance of each other. Custer’s column was surrounded and annihilated to a man. The other two detachments, under Major Reno and Captain Benteen, effected a junction and intrenched themselves on the river bluff of the Little Big Horn, where they withstood for nearly thirty hours the terrific siege by the Indians, who were confident and exultant from their late victory over Custer. The total loss to Custer’s command was about 270 men. General Gibbon’s column reached the scene of the battle on the 27th, the Indians withdrawing upon their approach.

[Sidenote: MILITARY PROBLEM SOLVED.]

This was the crowning tragedy of the long Sioux wars, which had been waged at intervals for upward of twenty years. Although a great disaster to the whites, it marked the downfall of the Indian power. The various bands into which the hostile force scattered after the Custer massacre were relentlessly pursued until all were driven into the reservations or beyond the British line. Once on the reservations they were disarmed and dismounted, so as to cripple them from further resistance. Another year was consumed in this work, and the military posts were further extended into the Indian country; but by the end of 1877 the military problem in our Indian affairs was practically solved.