Chapter 12

ECCLESIASTICAL CHRISTIANITY AND PHILOSOPHY. THE APOLOGISTS.

1. _Introduction._[340]

The object of the Christian Apologists, some of whom filled ecclesiastical offices and in various ways promoted spiritual progress,[341] was, as they themselves explained, to uphold the Christianity professed by the Christian Churches and publicly preached. They were convinced that the Christian faith was founded on revelation and that only a mind enlightened by God could grasp and maintain the faith. They acknowledged the Old Testament to be the authoritative source of God's revelation, maintained that the whole human race was meant to be reached by Christianity, and adhered to the early Christian eschatology. These views as well as the strong emphasis they laid upon human freedom and responsibility, enabled them to attain a firm standpoint in opposition to "Gnosticism," and to preserve their position within the Christian communities, whose moral purity and strength they regarded as a strong proof of the truth of this faith. In the endeavours of the Apologists to explain Christianity to the cultured world, we have before us the attempts of Greek churchmen to represent the Christian religion as a philosophy, and to convince outsiders that it was the highest wisdom and the absolute truth. These efforts were not rejected by the Churches like those of the so-called Gnostics, but rather became in subsequent times the foundation of the ecclesiastical dogmatic. The Gnostic speculations were repudiated, whereas those of the Apologists were accepted. The manner in which the latter set forth Christianity as a philosophy met with approval. What were the conditions under which ecclesiastical Christianity and Greek philosophy concluded the alliance which has found a place in the history of the world? How did this union attain acceptance and permanence, whilst "Gnosticism" was at first rejected? These are the two great questions the correct answers to which are of fundamental importance for the understanding of the history of Christian dogma.

The answers to these questions appear paradoxical. The theses of the Apologists finally overcame all scruples in ecclesiastical circles and were accepted by the Græco-Roman world, because they made Christianity _rational_ without taking from, or adding to, its traditional historic material. The secret of the epoch-making success of the apologetic theology is thus explained: These Christian philosophers formulated the content of the Gospel in a manner which appealed to the common sense of all the serious thinkers and intelligent men of the age. Moreover, they contrived to use the positive material of tradition, including the life and worship of Christ, in such a way as to furnish this reasonable religion with a confirmation and proof that had hitherto been eagerly sought, but sought in vain. In the theology of the Apologists, Christianity, as the religious enlightenment directly emanating from God himself, is most sharply contrasted with all polytheism, natural religion, and ceremonial. They proclaimed it in the most emphatic manner as the religion of the spirit, of freedom, and of absolute morality. Almost the whole positive material of Christianity is embodied in the story which relates its entrance into the world, its spread, and the proof of its truth. The religion itself, on the other hand, appears as the truth that is surely attested and accords with reason--a truth the content of which is not primarily dependent on historical facts and finally overthrows all polytheism.

Now this was the very thing required. In the second century of our era a great many needs and aspirations were undoubtedly making themselves felt in the sphere of religion and morals. "Gnosticism" and Marcionite Christianity prove the variety and depth of the needs then asserting themselves within the space that the ecclesiastical historian is able to survey. Mightier than all others, however, was the longing men felt to free themselves from the burden of the past, to cast away the rubbish of cults and of unmeaning religious ceremonies, and to be assured that the results of religious philosophy, those great and simple doctrines of virtue and immortality and of the God who is a Spirit, were certain truths. He who brought the message that these ideas were realities, and who, on the strength of these realities, declared polytheism and the worship of idols to be obsolete, had the mightiest forces on his side; for the times were now ripe for this preaching. What formed the strength of the apologetic philosophy was the proclamation that Christianity both contained the highest truth, as men already supposed it to be and as they had discovered it in their own minds, and the absolutely reliable guarantee that was desired for this truth. To the quality which makes it appear meagre to us it owed its impressiveness. The fact of its falling in with the general spiritual current of the time and making no attempt to satisfy special and deeper needs enabled it to plead the cause of spiritual monotheism and to oppose the worship of idols in the manner most easily understood. As it did not require historic and positive material to describe the nature of religion and morality, this philosophy enabled the Apologists to demonstrate the worthlessness of the traditional religion and worship of the different nations.[342] The same cause, however, made them take up the conservative position with regard to the historical traditions of Christianity. These were not ultimately tested as to their content, for this was taken for granted, no matter how they might be worded; but they were used to give an assurance of the truth, and to prove that the religion of the spirit was not founded on human opinion, but on divine revelation. The only really important consideration in Christianity is that it is _revelation, real revelation_. The Apologists had no doubt as to what it reveals, and therefore any investigation was unnecessary. The result of Greek philosophy, the philosophy of Plato and Zeno, as it had further developed in the empires of Alexander the Great and the Romans, was to attain victory and permanence by the aid of Christianity. Thus we view the progress of this development to-day,[343] and Christianity really proved to be the force from which that religious philosophy, viewed as a theory of the world and system of morality, first received the courage to free itself from the polytheistic past and descend from the circles of the learned to the common people.

This constitutes the deepest distinction between Christian philosophers like Justin and those of the type of Valentinus. The latter sought for a _religion_; the former, though indeed they were not very clear about their own purpose, sought _assurance_ as to a theistic and moral conception of the world which they already possessed. At first the complexus of Christian tradition, which must have possessed many features of attraction for them, was something foreign to both. The latter, however, sought to make this tradition intelligible. For the former it was enough that they had here a revelation before them; that this revelation also bore unmistakable testimony to the one God, who was a Spirit, to virtue, and to immortality; and that it was capable of convincing men and of leading them to a virtuous life. Viewed superficially, the Apologists were no doubt the conservatives; but they were so, because they scarcely in any respect meddled with the contents of tradition. The "Gnostics," on the contrary, sought to understand what they read and to investigate the truth of the message of which they heard. The most characteristic feature is the attitude of each to the Old Testament. The Apologists were content to have found in it an ancient source of revelation, and viewed the book as a testimony to the truth, i.e., to philosophy and virtue; the Gnostics investigated this document and examined to what extent it agreed with the new impressions they had received from the Gospel. We may sum up as follows: The Gnostics sought to determine what Christianity is as a religion, and, as they were convinced of the absoluteness of Christianity, this process led them to incorporate with it all that they looked on as sublime and holy and to remove everything they recognised to be inferior. The Apologists, again, strove to discover an authority for religious enlightenment and morality and to find the confirmation of a theory of the universe, which, if true, contained for them the certainty of eternal life; and this they found in the Christian tradition.

At bottom this contrast is a picture of the great discord existing in the religious philosophy of the age itself (see p. 129, vol. I.). No one denied the fact that all truth was divine, that is, was founded on revelation. The great question, however, was whether every man possessed this truth as a slumbering capacity that only required to be awakened; whether it was rational, i.e., merely moral truth, or must be above that which is moral, that is, of a religious nature; whether it must carry man beyond himself; and whether a real redemption was necessary. It is ultimately the dispute between morality and religion, which appears as an unsettled problem in the theses of the idealistic philosophers and in the whole spiritual conceptions then current among the educated, and which recurs in the contrast between the Apologetic and the Gnostic theology. And, as in the former case we meet with the most varied shades and transitions, for no one writer has developed a consistent theory, so also we find a similar state of things in the latter;[344] for no Apologist quite left out of sight the idea of redemption (deliverance from the dominion of demons can only be effected by the Logos, i.e., God). Wherever the idea of freedom is strongly emphasised, the religious element, in the strict sense of the word, appears in jeopardy. This is the case with the Apologists throughout. Conversely, wherever redemption forms the central thought, need is felt of a suprarational truth, which no longer views morality as the only aim, and which, again, requires particular media, a sacred history and sacred symbols. Stoic rationalism, in its logical development, is menaced wherever we meet the perception that the course of the world must in some way be helped, and wherever the contrast between reason and sensuousness, that the old Stoa had confused, is clearly felt to be an unendurable state of antagonism that man cannot remove by his own unaided efforts. The need of a revelation had its starting-point in philosophy here. The judgment of oneself and of the world to which Platonism led, the self-consciousness which it awakened by the detachment of man from nature, and the contrasts which it revealed led of necessity to that frame of mind which manifested itself in the craving for a revelation. The Apologists felt this. But their rationalism gave a strange turn to the satisfaction of that need. It was not their Christian ideas which first involved them in contradictions. At the time when Christianity appeared on the scene, the Platonic and Stoic systems themselves were already so complicated that philosophers did not find their difficulties seriously increased by a consideration of the Christian doctrines. As _Apologists_, however, they decidedly took the part of Christianity because, according to them, it was the doctrine of reason and freedom.

The Gospel was hellenised in the second century in so far as the Gnostics in various ways transformed it into a Hellenic religion for the educated. The Apologists used it--we may almost say inadvertently--to overthrow polytheism by maintaining that Christianity was the realisation of an absolutely moral theism. The Christian religion was not the first to experience this twofold destiny on Græco-Roman soil. A glance at the history of the Jewish religion shows us a parallel development; in fact, both the speculations of the Gnostics and the theories of the Apologists were foreshadowed in the theology of the Jewish Alexandrians, and particularly in that of Philo. Here also the Gospel merely entered upon the heritage of Judaism.[345] Three centuries before the appearance of Christian Apologists, Jews, who had received a Hellenic training, had already set forth the religion of Jehovah to the Greeks in that remarkably summary and spiritualised form which represents it as the absolute and highest philosophy, i.e., the knowledge of God, of virtue, and of recompense in the next world. Here these Jewish philosophers had already transformed all the positive and historic elements of the national religion into parts of a huge system for proving the truth of that theism. The Christian Apologists adopted this method, for they can hardly be said to have invented it anew.[346] We see from the Jewish Sibylline oracles how wide-spread it was. Philo, however, was not only a Stoic rationalist, but a hyper-Platonic religious philosopher. In like manner, the Christian Apologists did not altogether lack this element, though in some isolated cases among them there are hardly any traces of it. This feature is most fully represented among the Gnostics.

This transformation of religion into a philosophic system would not have been possible had not Greek philosophy itself happened to be in process of development into a religion. Such a transformation was certainly very foreign to the really classical time of Greece and Rome. The pious belief in the efficacy and power of the gods and in their appearances and manifestations, as well as the traditional worship, could have no bond of union with speculations concerning the essence and ultimate cause of things. The idea of a religious dogma which was at once to furnish a correct theory of the world and a principle of conduct was from this standpoint completely unintelligible. But philosophy, particularly in the Stoa, set out in search of this idea, and, after further developments, sought for one special religion with which it could agree or through which it could at least attain certainty. The meagre cults of the Greeks and Romans were unsuited for this. So men turned their eyes towards the barbarians. Nothing more clearly characterises the position of things in the second century than the agreement between two men so radically different as Tatian and Celsus. Tatian emphatically declares that salvation comes from the barbarians, and to Celsus it is also a "truism" that the barbarians have more capacity than the Greeks for discovering valuable doctrines.[347] Everything was in fact prepared, and nothing was wanting.

About the middle of the second century, however, the moral and rationalistic element in the philosophy and spiritual culture of the time was still more powerful than the religious and mystic; for Neoplatonism, which under its outward coverings concealed the aspiration after religion and the living God, was only in its first beginnings. It was not otherwise in Christian circles. The "Gnostics" were in the minority. What the great majority of the Church felt to be intelligible and edifying above everything else was an earnest moralism.[348] New and strange as the undertaking to represent Christianity as a philosophy might seem at first, the Apologists, so far as they were understood, appeared to advance nothing inconsistent with Christian common sense. Besides, they did not question authorities, but rather supported them, and introduced no foreign positive materials. For all these reasons, and also because their writings were not at first addressed to the communities, but only to outsiders, the marvellous attempt to present Christianity to the world as the religion which is the true philosophy, and as the philosophy which is the true religion, remained unopposed in the Church. But in what sense was the Christian religion set forth as a philosophy? An exact answer to this question is of the highest interest as regards the history of Christian dogma.

2. _Christianity as Philosophy and as Revelation_.

It was a new undertaking and one of permanent importance to a tradition hitherto so little concerned for its own vindication, when Quadratus and the Athenian philosopher, Aristides, presented treatises in defence of Christianity to the emperor.[349] About a century had elapsed since the Gospel of Christ had begun to be preached. It may be said that the Apology of Aristides was a most significant opening to the second century, whilst we find Origen at its close. Marcianus Aristides expressly designates himself in his pamphlet as a _philosopher of the Athenians_. Since the days when the words were written: "Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit" (Col. II. 8), it had constantly been repeated (see, as evidence, Celsus, passim) that Christian preaching and philosophy were things entirely different, that God had chosen the fools, and that man's duty was not to investigate and seek, but to believe and hope. Now a philosopher, as such, pleaded the cause of Christianity. In the summary he gave of the content of Christianity at the beginning of his address, he really spoke as a philosopher and represented this faith as a philosophy. By expounding pure monotheism and giving it the main place in his argument, Aristides gave supreme prominence to the very doctrine which simple Christians also prized as the most important.[350] Moreover, in emphasing not only the supernatural character of the Christian doctrine revealed by the Son of the Most High God, but also the continuous inspiration of believers--the new _race_ (not a new _school_)--he confessed in the most express way the peculiar nature of this philosophy as a divine truth. According to him Christianity is philosophy because its content is in accordance with reason, and because it gives a satisfactory and universally intelligible answer to the questions with which all real philosophers have concerned themselves. But it is no philosophy, in fact it is really the complete opposite of this, in so far as it proceeds from revelation and is propagated by the agency of God, i.e., has a supernatural and divine origin, on which alone the truth and certainty of its doctrines finally depend. This contrast to philosophy is chiefly shown in the unphilosophical form in which Christianity was first preached to the world. That is the thesis maintained by all the Apologists from Justin to Tertullian,[351] and which Jewish philosophers before them propounded and defended. This proposition may certainly be expressed in a great variety of ways. In the first place, it is important whether the first or second half is emphasised, and secondly, whether that which is "universally intelligible" is to be reckoned as philosophy at all, or is to be separated from it as that which comes by "nature." Finally, the attitude to be taken up towards the Greek philosophers is left an open question, so that the thesis, taking up this attitude as a starting-point, may again assume various forms. But was the contradiction which it contains not felt? The content of revelation is to be rational; but does that which is rational require a revelation? How the proposition was understood by the different Apologists requires examination.

_Aristides._ He first gives an exposition of monotheism and the monotheistic cosmology (God as creator and mover of the universe, as the spiritual, perfect, almighty Being, whom all things need, and who requires nothing). In the second chapter he distinguishes, according to the Greek text, three, and, according to the Syriac, four classes of men (in the Greek text polytheists, Jews, Christians, the polytheists being divided into Chaldeans, Greeks, and Egyptians; in the Syriac barbarians, Greeks, Jews, Christians), and gives their origin. He derives the Christians from Jesus Christ and reproduces the Christian _kerygma_ (Son of the Most High God, birth from the Virgin, 12 disciples, death on the cross, burial, resurrection, ascension, missionary labours of the 12 disciples). After this, beginning with the third chapter, follows a criticism of polytheism, that is, the false theology of the barbarians, Greeks, and Egyptians (down to chapter 12). In the 13th chapter the Greek authors and philosophers are criticised, and the Greek myths, as such, are shown to be false. In the 14th chapter the Jews are introduced (they are monotheists and their ethical system is praised; but they are then reproached with worshipping of angels and a false ceremonial). In the 15th chapter follows a description of the Christians, _i.e._, above all, of their pure, holy life. It is they who have found the truth, because they know the creator of heaven and earth. This description is continued in chapters 16 and 17: "This people is new and there is a divine admixture in it." The Christian writings are recommended to the emperor.

_Justin._[352] In his treatise addressed to the emperor Justin did not call himself a philosopher as Aristides had done. In espousing the cause of the hated and despised Christians he represented himself as a simple member of that sect. But in the very first sentence of his Apology he takes up the ground of piety and philosophy, the very ground taken up by the pious and philosophical emperors themselves, according to the judgment of the time and their own intention. In addressing them he appeals to the [Greek: logos sôphrôn] in a purely Stoic fashion. He opposes the truth--also in the Stoic manner--to the [Greek: doxais palaiôn].[353] It was not to be a mere _captatio benevolentiæ_. In that case Justin would not have added: "That ye are pious and wise and guardians of righteousness and friends of culture, ye hear everywhere. Whether ye are so, however, will be shown."[354] His whole exordium is calculated to prove to the emperors that they are in danger of repeating a hundredfold the crime which the judges of Socrates had committed.[355] Like a second Socrates Justin speaks to the emperors in the name of all Christians. They are to hear the convictions of the wisest of the Greeks from the mouth of the Christians. Justin wishes to enlighten the emperor with regard to the life and doctrines ([Greek: bios kai mathêmata]) of the latter. Nothing is to be concealed, for there is nothing to conceal.

Justin kept this promise better than any of his successors. For that very reason also he did not depict the Christian Churches as schools of philosophers (cc. 61-67). Moreover, in the first passage where he speaks of Greek philosophers,[356] he is merely drawing a parallel. According to him there are bad Christians and seeming Christians, just as there are philosophers who are only so in name and outward show. Such men, too, were in early times called "philosophers" even when they preached atheism. To all appearance, therefore, Justin does _not_ desire Christians to be reckoned as philosophers. But it is nevertheless significant that, in the case of the Christians, a phenomenon is being repeated which otherwise is only observed in the case of philosophers; and how were those whom he was addressing to understand him? In the same passage he speaks for the first time of Christ. He introduces him with the plain and intelligible formula: [Greek: ho didaskalos Christos] ("the teacher Christ").[357] Immediately thereafter he praises Socrates because he had exposed the worthlessness and deceit of the evil demons, and traces his death to the same causes which are now he says bringing about the condemnation of the Christians. Now he can make his final assertion. In virtue of "reason" Socrates exposed superstition; in virtue of the same reason, this was done by the teacher whom the Christians follow. _But this teacher was reason itself; it was visible in him, and indeed it appeared bodily in him._[358]

Is this philosophy or is it myth? The greatest paradox the Apologist has to assert is connected by him with the most impressive remembrance possessed by his readers as philosophers. In the same sentence where he represents Christ as the Socrates of the barbarians,[359] and consequently makes Christianity out to be a Socratic doctrine, he propounds the unheard of theory _that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason of God_.

Justin nowhere tried to soften the effect of this conviction or explain it in a way adapted to his readers. Nor did he conceal from them that his assertion admits of no speculative demonstration. That philosophy can only deal with things which ever are, because they ever were, since this world began, is a fact about which he himself is perfectly clear. No Stoic could have felt more strongly than Justin how paradoxical is the assertion that a thing is of value which has happened only once. Certain as he is that the "reasonable" emperors will regard it as a rational assumption that "Reason" is the Son of God,[360] he knows equally well that no philosophy will bear him out in that other assertion, and that such a statement is seemingly akin to the contemptible myths of the evil demons.

But there is certainly a proof which, if not speculative, is nevertheless sure. The same ancient documents, which contain the Socratic and super-Socratic wisdom of the Christians, bear witness through prophecies, which, just because they are predictions, admit of no doubt, that the teacher Christ is the incarnate reason; for history confirms the word of prophecy even in the minutest details. Moreover, in so far as these writings are in the lawful possession of the Christians, and announced at the very beginning of things that this community would appear on the earth, they testify that the Christians may in a certain fashion date themselves back to the beginning of the world, because their doctrine is as old as the earth itself (this thought is still wanting in Aristides).

The new Socrates who appeared among the barbarians is therefore quite different from the Socrates of the Greeks, and for that reason also his followers are not to be compared with the disciples of the philosophers.[361] From the very beginning of things a world-historical dispensation of God announced this reasonable doctrine through prophets, and prepared the visible appearance of reason itself. The same reason which created and arranged the world took human form in order to draw the whole of humanity to itself. Every precaution has been taken to make it easy for any one, be he Greek or barbarian, educated or uneducated, to grasp all the doctrines of this reason, to verify their truth, and test their power in life. What further importance can philosophy have side by side with this, how can one think of calling this a philosophy?

And yet the doctrine of the Christians can only be compared with philosophy. For, so far as the latter is genuine, it is also guided by the Logos; and, conversely, what the Christians teach concerning the Father of the world, the destiny of man, the nobility of his nature, freedom and virtue, justice and recompense, has also been attested by the wisest of the Greeks. They indeed only stammered, whereas the Christians speak. These, however, use no unintelligible and unheard-of language, but speak with the words and through the power of reason. The wonderful arrangement, carried out by the Logos himself, through which he ennobled the human race by restoring its consciousness of its own nobility, compels no one henceforth to regard the reasonable as the unreasonable or wisdom as folly. But is the Christian wisdom not of divine origin? How can it in that case be natural, and what connection can exist between it and the wisdom of the Greeks? Justin bestowed the closest attention on this question, but he never for a moment doubted what the answer must be. Wherever the reasonable has revealed itself, it has always been through the operation of the _divine_ reason. For man's lofty endowment consists in his having had a portion of the divine reason implanted within him, and in his consequent capacity of attaining a knowledge of divine things, though not a perfect and clear one, by dint of persistent efforts after truth and virtue. When man remembers his real nature and destination, that is, when he comes to himself, the divine reason is already revealing itself in him and through him. As man's possession conferred on him at the creation, it is at once his most peculiar property, and the power which dominates and determines his nature.[362] All that is reasonable is based on revelation. In order to accomplish his true destiny man requires from the beginning the inward working of that divine reason which has created the world for the sake of man, and therefore wishes to raise man beyond the world to God.[363]

Apparently no one could speak in a more stoical fashion. But this train of thought is supplemented by something which limits it. Revelation does retain its peculiar and unique significance. For no one who merely possessed the "seed of the Logos" ([Greek: sperma tou logou]), though it may have been his exclusive guide to knowledge and conduct, was ever able to grasp the whole truth and impart it in a convincing manner. Though Socrates and Heraclitus may in a way be called Christians, they cannot be so designated in any real sense. Reason is clogged with unreasonableness, and the certainty of truth is doubtful wherever the whole Logos has not been acting; for man's natural endowment with reason is too weak to oppose the powers of evil and of sense that work in the world, namely, the demons. We must therefore believe in the prophets in whom the whole Logos spoke. He who does that must also of necessity believe in Christ; for the prophets clearly pointed to him as the perfect embodiment of the Logos. Measured by the fulness, clearness, and certainty of the knowledge imparted by the Logos Christ, all knowledge independent of him appears as merely human wisdom, even when it emanates from the seed of the Logos. The Stoic argument is consequently untenable. Men blind and kept in bondage by the demons require to be aided by a special revelation. It is true that this revelation is nothing new, and in so far as it has always existed, and never varied in character, from the beginning of the world, it is in this sense nothing extraordinary. _It is the divine help granted to man, who has fallen under the power of the demons, and enabling him to follow his reason and freedom to do what is good. By the appearance of Christ this help became accessible to all men._ The dominion of demons and revelation are the two correlated ideas. If the former did not exist, the latter would not be necessary. According as we form a lower or higher estimate of the pernicious results of that sovereignty, the value of revelation rises or sinks. This revelation cannot do less than give the necessary assurance of the truth, and it cannot do more than impart the power that develops and matures the inalienable natural endowment of man and frees him from the dominion of the demons.

Accordingly the teaching of the prophets and Christ is related even to the very highest human philosophy as the whole is to the part,[364] or as the certain is to the uncertain; and hence also as the permanent is to the transient. For the final stage has now arrived and Christianity is destined to put an end to natural human philosophy. When the perfect work is there, the fragmentary must cease. Justin gave the clearest expression to this conviction. Christianity, i.e., the prophetic teaching attested by Christ and accessible to all, puts an end to the human systems of philosophy that from their close affinity to it may be called Christian, inasmuch as it effects all and more than all that these systems have done, and inasmuch as the speculations of the philosophers, which are uncertain and mingled with error, are transformed by it into dogmas of indubitable certainty.[365] The practical conclusion drawn in Justin's treatise from this exposition is that the Christians are at least entitled to ask the authorities to treat them as philosophers (Apol. I. 7, 20: II. 15). This demand, he says, is the more justifiable because the freedom of philosophers is enjoyed even by such people as merely bear the name, whereas in reality they set forth immoral and pernicious doctrines.[366]

In the dialogue with the Jew Trypho, which is likewise meant for heathen readers, Justin ceased to employ the idea of the existence of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" ([Greek: sperma logou emphuton]) in every man. From this fact we recognise that he did not consider the notion of fundamental importance. He indeed calls the Christian religion a philosophy;[367] but, in so far as this is the case, it is "the only sure and saving philosophy." No doubt the so-called philosophies put the right questions, but they are incapable of giving correct answers. For the Deity, who embraces all true being, and a knowledge of whom alone makes salvation possible, is only known in proportion as he reveals himself. True wisdom is therefore exclusively based on revelation. Hence it is opposed to every human philosophy, because revelation was only given in the prophets and in Christ.[368] The Christian is _the_ philosopher,[369] because the followers of Plato and the Stoics are virtually no philosophers. In applying the title "philosophy" to Christianity he therefore does not mean to bring Christians and philosophers more closely together. No doubt, however, he asserts that the Christian doctrine, which is founded on the knowledge of Christ and leads to blessedness,[370] is in accordance with reason.

_Athenagoras._ The petition on behalf of Christians, which Athenagoras, "the Christian philosopher of Athens," presented, to the emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus, nowhere expressly designates Christianity as a philosophy, and still less does it style the Christians philosophers.[371] But, at the very beginning of his writing Athenagoras also claims for the Christian doctrines the toleration granted by the state to all philosophic tenets.[372] In support of his claim he argues that the state punishes nothing but practical atheism,[373] and that the "atheism" of the Christians is a doctrine about God such as had been propounded by the most distinguished philosophers--Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics--who, moreover, were permitted to write whatsoever they pleased on the subject of the "Deity."[374] The Apologist concedes even more: "If philosophers did not also acknowledge the existence of one God, if they did not also conceive the gods in question to be partly demons, partly matter, partly of human birth, then certainly we would be justly expelled as aliens."[375] He therefore takes up the standpoint that the state is justified in refusing to tolerate people with completely new doctrines. When we add that he everywhere assumes that the wisdom and piety of the emperors are sufficient to test and approve[376] the truth of the Christian teaching, that he merely represents this faith itself as the _reasonable_ doctrine,[377] and that, with the exception of the resurrection of the body, he leaves all the positive and objectionable tenets of Christianity out of account,[378] there is ground for thinking that this Apologist differs essentially from Justin in his conception of the relation of Christianity to secular philosophy.

Moreover, it is not to be denied that Athenagoras views the revelation in the prophets and in Christ as completely identical. But in one very essential point he agrees with Justin; and he has even expressed himself still more plainly than the latter, inasmuch as he does not introduce the assumption of a "seed of the Logos implanted by nature" [Greek: sperma logou emphuton]. The philosophers, he says, were incapable of knowing the full truth, since it was not from God, but rather from themselves, that they wished to learn about God. True wisdom, however, can only be learned from God, that is, from his prophets; it depends solely on revelation.[379] Here also then we have a repetition of the thought that the truly reasonable is of supernatural origin. Such is the importance attached by Athenagoras to this proposition, that he declares any demonstration of the "reasonable" to be insufficient, no matter how luminous it may appear. Even that which is most evidently true--e.g., monotheism--is not raised from the domain of mere human opinion into the sphere of undoubted certainty till it can be confirmed by revelation.[380] This can be done by Christians alone. Hence they are very different from the philosophers, just as they are also distinguished from these by their manner of life.[381] All the praises which Athenagoras from time to time bestows on philosophers, particularly Plato,[382] are consequently to be understood in a merely relative sense. Their ultimate object is only to establish the claim made by the Apologist with regard to the treatment of Christians by the state; but they are not really meant to bring the former into closer relationship to philosophers. Athenagoras also holds the theory that Christians are philosophers, in so far as the "philosophers" are not such in any true sense. It is only the problems they set that connect the two. He exhibits less clearness than Justin in tracing the necessity of revelation to the fact that the demon sovereignty, which, above all, reveals itself in polytheism,[383] can only be overthrown by revelation; he rather emphasises the other thought (cc. 7, 9) that the necessary attestation of the truth can only be given in this way.[384]

_Tatian's_[385] chief aim was not to bring about a juster treatment of the Christians.[386] He wished to represent their cause as the good contrasted with the bad, wisdom as opposed to error, truth in contradistinction to outward seeming, hypocrisy, and pretentious emptiness. His "Address to the Greeks" begins with a violent polemic against all Greek philosophers. Tatian merely acted up to a judgment of philosophers and philosophy which in Justin's case is still concealed.[387] Hence it was not possible for him to think of demonstrating analogies between Christians and philosophers. He also no doubt views Christianity as "reasonable;" he who lives virtuously and follows wisdom receives it;[388] but yet it is too sublime to be grasped by earthly perception.[389] It is a heavenly thing which depends on the communication of the "Spirit," and hence can only be known by revelation.[390] But yet it is a "philosophy" with definite doctrines ([Greek: dogmata]);[391] it brings nothing new, but only such blessings as we have already received, but could not retain[392] owing to the power of error, i.e., the dominion of the demons.[393] Christianity is therefore the philosophy in which, by virtue of the Logos revelation through the prophets,[394] the rational knowledge that leads to life[395] is restored. This knowledge was no less obscured among the Greek philosophers than among the Greeks generally. In so far as revelation took place among the barbarians from the remotest antiquity, Christianity may also be called the barbarian philosophy.[396] Its truth is proved by its ancient date[397] as well as by its intelligible form, which enables even the most uneducated person that is initiated in it[398] to understand it perfectly.[399] Finally, Tatian also states (c. 40) that the Greek sophists have read the writings of Moses and the prophets, and reproduced them in a distorted form. He therefore maintains the very opposite of what Celsus took upon him to demonstrate when venturing to derive certain sayings and doctrines of Christ and the Christians from the philosophers. Both credit the plagiarists with intentional misrepresentation or gross misunderstanding. Justin judged more charitably. To Tatian, on the contrary, the mythology of the Greeks did not appear worse than their philosophy; in both cases he saw imitations and intentional corruption of the truth.[400]

_Theophilus_ agrees with Tatian, in so far as he everywhere appears to contrast Christianity with philosophy. The religious and moral culture of the Greeks is derived from their poets (historians) and philosophers (ad Autol. II. 3 fin. and elsewhere). However, not only do poets and philosophers contradict each other (II. 5); but the latter also do not agree (II. 4. 8: III. 7), nay, many contradict themselves (III. 3). Not a single one of the so-called philosophers, however, is to be taken seriously;[401] they have devised myths and follies (II. 8); everything they have set forth is useless and godless (III. 2); vain and worthless fame was their aim (III. 3). But God knew beforehand the "drivellings of these hollow philosophers" and made his preparations (II. 15). He of old proclaimed the truth by the mouth of prophets, and these deposited it in holy writings. This truth refers to the knowledge of God, the origin and history of the world, as well as to a virtuous life. The prophetic testimony in regard to it was continued in the Gospel.[402] Revelation, however, is necessary because this wisdom of the philosophers and poets is really demon wisdom, for they were inspired by devils.[403] Thus the most extreme contrasts appear to exist here. Still, Theophilus is constrained to confess that truth was not only announced by the Sibyl, to whom his remarks do not apply, for she is (II. 36): [Greek: en Ellêsin kai en tois loipois ethnetin genomenê prophêtis], but that poets and philosophers, "though against their will," also gave clear utterances regarding the justice, the judgment, and the punishments of God, as well as regarding his providence in respect to the living and the dead, or, in other words, about the most important points (II. 37, 38, 8 fin.). Theophilus gives a double explanation of this fact. On the one hand he ascribes it to the imitation of holy writings (II. 12, 37: I. 14), and on the other he admits that those writers, when the demons abandoned them ([Greek: tê psychê eknêpsantes ex autôn]), of themselves displayed a knowledge of the divine sovereignty, the judgment etc., which agrees with the teachings of the prophets (II. 8). This admission need not cause astonishment; for the freedom and control of his own destiny with which man is endowed (II. 27) must infallibly lead him to correct knowledge and obedience to God, as soon as he is no longer under the sway of the demons. Theophilus did not apply the title of philosophy to Christian truth, this title being in his view discredited; but Christianity is to him the "wisdom of God," which by luminous proofs convinces the men who reflect on their own nature.[404]

_Tertullian and Minucius Felix._[405] Whilst, in the case of the Greek Apologists, the acknowledgment of revelation appears conditioned by philosophical scepticism on the one hand, and by the strong impression of the dominion of the demons on the other, the sceptical element is not only wanting in the Latin Apologists, but the Christian truth is even placed in direct opposition to the sceptical philosophy and on the side of philosophical dogmatism, i.e., Stoicism.[406] Nevertheless the observations of Tertullian and Minucius Felix with regard to the essence of Christianity, viewed as philosophy and as revelation, are at bottom completely identical with the conception of the Greek Apologists, although it is undeniable that in the former case the revealed character of Christianity is placed in the background.[407] The recognition of this fact is exceedingly instructive, for it proves that the conception of Christianity set forth by the Apologists was not an individual one, but the necessary expression of the conviction that Christian truth contains the completion and guarantee of philosophical knowledge. To Minucius Felix (and Tertullian) Christian truth chiefly presents itself as the wisdom implanted by nature in every man (Oct. 16. 5). In so far as man possesses reason and speech and accomplishes the task of the "examination of the universe" ("inquisitio universitatis"), conditioned by this gift, he has the Christian truth, that is, he finds Christianity in his own constitution, and in the rational order of the world. Accordingly, Minucius is also able to demonstrate the Christian doctrines by means of the Stoic principle of knowledge, and arrives at the conclusion that Christianity is a philosophy, i.e., the true philosophy, and that philosophers are to be considered Christians in proportion as they have discovered the truth.[408] Moreover, as he represented Christian ethics to be the expression of the Stoic, and depicted the Christian bond of brotherhood as a cosmopolitan union of philosophers, who have become conscious of their natural similarity,[409] the revealed character of Christianity appears to be entirely given up. This religion is natural enlightenment, the revelation of a truth contained in the world and in man, the discovery of the one God from the open book of creation. The difference between him and an Apologist like Tatian seems here to be a radical one. But, if we look more closely, we find that Minucius--and not less Tertullian--has abandoned Stoic rationalism in vital points. We may regard his apologetic aim as his excuse for clearly drawing the logical conclusions from these inconsistencies himself. However, these deviations of his from the doctrines of the Stoa are not merely prompted by Christianity, but rather have already become an essential component of his philosophical theory of the world. In the first place, Minucius developed a detailed theory of the pernicious activity of the demons (cc. 26, 27). This was a confession that human nature was not what it ought to be, because an evil element had penetrated it from without. Secondly, he no doubt acknowledged (I. 4: 16. 5) the natural light of wisdom in humanity, but nevertheless remarked (32. 9) that our thoughts are darkness when measured by the clearness of God. Finally, and this is the most essential point, after appealing to various philosophers when expounding his doctrine of the final conflagration of the world, he suddenly repudiated this tribunal, declaring that the Christians follow the prophets, and that philosophers "have formed this shadowy picture of distorted truth in imitation of the divine predictions of the prophets." (34) Here we have now a union of all the elements already found in the Greek Apologists; only they are, as it were, hid in the case of Minucius. But the final proof that he agreed with them in the main is found in the exceedingly contemptuous judgment which he in conclusion passed on all philosophers and indeed on philosophy generally.[410] (34. 5: 38. 5) This judgment is not to be explained, as in Tertullian's case, by the fact that his Stoic opinions led him to oppose natural perception to all philosophical theory--for this, at most, cannot have been more than a secondary contributing cause,[411] but by the fact that he is conscious of following _revealed_ wisdom.[412] Revelation is necessary because mankind must be aided from without, i.e., by God. In this idea man's need of redemption is acknowledged, though not to the same extent as by Seneca and Epictetus. But no sooner does Minucius perceive the teachings of the prophets to be divine truth than man's natural endowment and the speculation of philosophers sink for him into darkness. Christianity is the wisdom which philosophers sought, but were not able to find.[413]

We may sum up the doctrines of the Apologists as follows: (1) Christianity is revelation, i.e., it is the divine wisdom, proclaimed of old by the prophets and, by reason of its origin, possessing an absolute certainty which can also be recognised in the fulfilment of their predictions. As divine wisdom Christianity is contrasted with, and puts an end to, all natural and philosophical knowledge. (2) Christianity is the enlightenment corresponding to the natural but impaired knowledge of man.[414] It embraces all the elements of truth in philosophy, whence it is _the_ philosophy; and helps man to realise the knowledge with which he is naturally endowed. (3) Revelation of the rational was and is necessary, because man has fallen under the sway of the demons. (4) The efforts of philosophers to ascertain the right knowledge were in vain; and this is, above all, shown by the fact that they neither overthrew polytheism nor brought about a really moral life. Moreover, so far as they discovered the truth, they owed it to the prophets from whom they borrowed it; at least it is uncertain whether they even attained a knowledge of fragments of the truth by their own independent efforts.[415] But it is certain that many seeming truths in the writings of the philosophers were imitations of the truth by evil demons. This is the origin of all polytheism, which is, moreover, to some extent an imitation of Christian institutions. (5) The confession of Christ is simply included in the acknowledgment of the wisdom of the prophets; the doctrine of the truth did not receive a new content through Christ; he only made it accessible to the world and strengthened it (victory over the demons; special features acknowledged by Justin and Tertullian). (6) The practical test of Christianity is first contained in the fact that all persons are able to grasp it, for women and uneducated men here become veritable sages; secondly in the fact that it has the power of producing a holy life, and of overthrowing the tyranny of the demons. In the Apologists, therefore, Christianity served itself heir to antiquity, i.e., to the result of the monotheistic knowledge and ethics of the Greeks: "[Greek: Osa oun para pasikalôs eirêtai, hêmôn tôn Christianôn esti]" (Justin, Apol. II. 13). It traced its origin back to the beginning of the world. Everything true and good which elevates mankind springs from divine revelation, and is at the same time genuinely human, because it is a clear expression of what man finds within him and of his destination (Justin, Apol. I. 46: [Greek: hoi meta logou biôsantes Christianoi eisi, kan atheoi enomisthêsan, oion en Hellêsi men Sôkratês kai Êrakleitos kai oi omoioi autois, en barbarois de Abraam k.t.l.], "those that have lived with reason are Christians, even though they were accounted atheists, such as Socrates and Heraclitus and those similar to them among the Greeks, and Abraham etc. among the barbarians"). But everything true and good is Christian, for Christianity is nothing else than the teaching of revelation. No second formula can be imagined in which the claim of Christianity to be the religion of the world is so powerfully expressed (hence also the endeavour of the Apologists to reconcile Christianity and the Empire), nor, on the other hand, can we conceive of one where the specific content of traditional Christianity is so thoroughly neutralised as it is here. But the really epoch-making feature is the fact that the intellectual culture of mankind now appears reconciled and united with religion. The "dogmas" are the expression of this. Finally, these fundamental presuppositions also result in a quite definite idea of the essence of revelation and of the content of reason. The essence of revelation consists in its form: it is divine communication through a miraculous inward working. All the media of revelation are passive organs of the Holy Spirit (Athenag. Supplic. 7; Pseudo-Justin, Cohort. 8; Justin, Dialogue 115. 7; Apol. I. 31, 33, 36; etc.; see also Hippolytus, de Christo et Antichr. 2). These were not necessarily at all times in a state of ecstasy, when they received the revelations; but they were no doubt in a condition of absolute receptivity. The Apologists had no other idea of revelation. What they therefore viewed as the really decisive proof of the reality of revelation is the prediction of the future, for the human mind does not possess this power. It was only in connection with this proof that the Apologists considered it important to show what Moses, David, Isaiah, etc., had proclaimed in the Old Testament, that is, these names have only a _chronological_ significance. This also explains their interest in a history of the world, in so far as this interest originated in the effort to trace the chain of prophets up to the beginning of history, and to prove the higher antiquity of revealed truth as compared with all human knowledge and errors, particularly as found among the Greeks (clear traces in Justin,[416] first detailed argument in Tatian).[417] If, however, strictly speaking, it is only the form and not the content of revelation that is supernatural in so far as this content coincides with that of reason, it is evident that the Apologists simply took the content of the latter for granted and stated it dogmatically. So, whether they expressed themselves in strictly Stoic fashion or not, they all essentially agree in the assumption that true religion and morality are the natural content of reason. Even Tatian forms no exception, though he himself protests against the idea.

3. _The doctrines of Christianity as the revealed and rational religion._

The Apologists frequently spoke of the doctrines or "dogmas" of Christianity; and the whole content of this religion as philosophy is included in these dogmas.[418] According to what we have already set forth there can be no doubt about the character of Christian dogmas. _They are the rational truths, revealed by the prophets in the Holy Scriptures, and summarised in Christ_ ([Greek: christos logos kai nomos]), _which in their unity represent the divine wisdom, and the recognition of which leads to virtue and eternal life._ The Apologists considered it their chief task to set forth these doctrines, and hence they can be reproduced with all desirable clearness. The dogmatic scheme of the Apologists may therefore be divided into three component parts. These are: (A) Christianity viewed as monotheistic cosmology (God as the Father of the world); (B) Christianity as the highest morality and righteousness (God as the judge who rewards goodness and punishes wickedness); (C) Christianity regarded as redemption (God as the Good One who assists man and rescues him from the power of the demons).[419] Whilst the first two ideas are expressed in a clear and precise manner, it is equally true that the third is not worked out in a lucid fashion. This, as will afterwards be seen, is, on the one hand, the result of the Apologists' doctrine of freedom, and, on the other, of their inability to discover a specific significance for the _person_ of Christ within the sphere of revelation. Both facts again are ultimately to be explained from their moralism.

The essential content of revealed philosophy is viewed by the Apologists (see A, B) as comprised in three doctrines.[420] First, there is one spiritual and inexpressibly exalted God, who is Lord and Father of the world. Secondly, he requires a holy life. Thirdly, he will at last sit in judgment, and will reward the good with immortality and punish the wicked with death. The teaching concerning God, virtue, and eternal reward is traced to the prophets and Christ; but the bringing about of a virtuous life (of righteousness) has been necessarily left by God to men themselves; for God has created man free, and virtue can only be acquired by man's own efforts. The prophets and Christ are therefore a source of righteousness in so far as they are teachers. But as God, that is, the divine Word (which we need not here discuss) has spoken in them, Christianity is to be defined as the Knowledge of God, mediated by the Deity himself, and as a virtuous walk in the longing after eternal and perfect life with God, as well as in the sure hope of this imperishable reward. By knowing what is true and doing what is good man becomes righteous and a partaker of the highest bliss. This knowledge, which has the character of divine instruction,[421] rests on faith in the divine revelation. This revelation has the nature and power of redemption in so far as the fact is undoubted that without it men cannot free themselves from the tyranny of the demons, whilst believers in revelation are enabled by the Spirit of God to put them to flight. Accordingly, the dogmas of Christian philosophy theoretically contain the monotheistic cosmology, and practically the rules for a holy life, which appears as a renunciation of the world and as a new order of society.[422] The goal is immortal life, which consists in the full knowledge and contemplation of God. The dogmas of revelation lie between the cosmology and ethics; they are indefinitely expressed so far as they contain the idea of salvation; but they are very precisely worded in so far as they guarantee the truth of the cosmology and ethics.

1. The dogmas which express the knowledge of God and the world are dominated by the fundamental idea that the world as the created, conditioned, and transient is contrasted with something self-existing, unchangeable and eternal, which is the first cause of the world. This self-existing Being has none of the attributes which belong to the world; hence he is exalted above every name and has in himself no distinctions. This implies, first, the unity and uniqueness of this eternal Being; secondly, his spiritual nature, for everything bodily is subject to change; and, finally, his perfection, for the self-existent and eternal requires nothing. Since, however, he is the cause of all being, himself being unconditioned, he is the fulness of all being or true being itself (Tatian 5: [Greek: katho pasa dunamis oratôn te kai aoratôn autos hupostasis ên, sun autô ta panta]). As the living and spiritual Being he reveals himself in free creations, which make known his omnipotence and wisdom, i.e., his operative reason. These creations are, moreover, a proof of the goodness of the Deity, for they can be no result of necessities, in so far as God is in himself perfect. Just because he is perfect, the Eternal Essence is also the Father of all virtues, in so far as he contains no admixture of what is defective. These virtues include both the goodness which manifests itself in his creations, and the righteousness which gives to the creature what belongs to him, in accordance with the position he has received. On the basis of this train of thought the Apologists lay down the dogmas of the monarchy of God ([Greek: tôn holôn to monarchikon]), his supramundaneness ([Greek: to arrêton, to anekphraston, to achôrêton, to akatalêpton, to aperinoêton, to asugkriton, to asymbibaston, to anekdiêgêton]; see Justin, Apol. II. 6; Theoph. I. 3); his unity ([Greek: eis Theos]); his having no beginning ([Greek: anarchos, hoti agenêtos]); his eternity and unchangeableness ([Greek: analloiôtos kathoti athanatos]); his perfection ([Greek: teleios]); his need of nothing ([Greek: aprosdeês]); his spiritual nature ([Greek: pneuma ho Theos]); his absolute causality ([Greek: autos hyparchôn tou pantos hê hypostasis], the motionless mover, see Aristides c. 1); his creative activity ([Greek: ktistês tôn pantôn]); his sovereignty ([Greek: despotês tôn holôn]); his fatherhood ([Greek: patêr dia to einai auton pro tôn holôn]) his reason-power (God as [Greek: logos, nous, pneuma, sophia]); his omnipotence ([Greek: pantokratôr hoti autos ta panta kratei kai emperiechei]); his righteousness and goodness ([Greek: patêr tês dikaiosunês kai pasôn tôn aretôn chrêstotês]). These dogmas are set forth by one Apologist in a more detailed, and by another in a more concise form, but three points are emphasised by all. First, God is primarily to be conceived as the First Cause. Secondly, the principle of moral good is also the principle of the world. Thirdly, the principle of the world, that is, the Deity, as being the immortal and eternal, forms the contrast to the world which is the transient. In the cosmology of the Apologists the two fundamental ideas are that God is the Father and Creator of the world, but that, as uncreated and eternal, he is also the complete contrast to it.[423]

These dogmas about God were not determined by the Apologists from the standpoint of the Christian Church which is awaiting an introduction into the Kingdom of God; but were deduced from a contemplation of the world on the one hand (see particularly Tatian, 4; Theophilus, I. 5, 6), and of the moral nature of man on the other. But, in so far as the latter itself belongs to the sphere of created things, the cosmos is the starting-point of their speculations. This is everywhere dominated by reason and order;[424] it bears the impress of the divine Logos, and that in a double sense. On the one hand it appears as the copy of a higher, eternal world, for if we imagine transient and changeable matter removed, it is a wonderful complex of spiritual forces; on the other it presents itself as the finite product of a rational will. Moreover, the matter which lies at its basis is nothing bad, but an indifferent substance created by God,[425] though indeed perishable. In its constitution the world is in every respect a structure worthy of God.[426] Nevertheless, according to the Apologists, the direct author of the world was not God, but the personified power of reason which they perceived in the cosmos and represented as the immediate source of the universe. The motive for this dogma and the interest in it would be wrongly determined by alleging that the Apologists purposely introduced the Logos in order to separate God from matter, because they regarded this as something bad. This idea of Philo's cannot at least have been adopted by them as the result of conscious reflection, for it does not agree with their conception of matter; nor is it compatible with their idea of God and their belief in Providence, which is everywhere firmly maintained. Still less indeed can it be shown that they were all impelled to this dogma from their view of Jesus Christ, since in this connection, with the exception of Justin and Tertullian, they manifested no specific interest in the incarnation of the Logos in Jesus. The adoption of the dogma of the Logos is rather to be explained thus: (1) The idea of God, derived by abstraction from the cosmos, did indeed, like that of the idealistic philosophy, involve the element of unity and spirituality, which implied a sort of personality; but the fulness of all spiritual forces, the essence of everything imperishable were quite as essential features of the conception; for in spite of the transcendence inseparable from the notion of God, this idea was nevertheless meant to explain the world.[427] Accordingly, they required a formula capable of expressing the transcendent and unchangeable nature of God on the one hand, and his fulness of creative and spiritual powers on the other. But the latter attributes themselves had again to be comprehended in a unity, because the law of the cosmos bore the appearance of a harmonious one. From this arose the idea of the Logos, and indeed the latter was necessarily distinguished from God as a separate existence, as soon as the realisation of the powers residing in God was represented as beginning. _The Logos is the hypostasis of the operative power of reason, which at once preserves the unity and unchangeableness of God in spite of the exercise of the powers residing in him, and renders this very exercise possible._ (2) Though the Apologists believed in the divine origin of the revelation given to the prophets, on which all knowledge of truth is based, they could nevertheless not be induced by this idea to represent God himself as a direct actor. For that revelation presupposes a speaker and a spoken word; but it would be an impossible thought to make the fulness of all essence and the first cause of all things speak. The Deity cannot be a speaking and still less a visible person, yet according to the testimony of the prophets, a Divine Person was seen by them. The Divine Being who makes himself known on earth in audible and visible fashion can only be the Divine Word. As, however, according to the fundamental view of the Apologists the principle of religion, i.e., of the knowledge of the truth, is also the principle of the world, so that Divine Word, which imparts the right knowledge of the world, must be identical with the Divine Reason which produced the world itself. In other words, the Logos is not only the creative Reason of God, but also his revealing Word. This explains the motive and aim of the dogma of the Logos. We need not specially point out that nothing more than the precision and certainty of the Apologists' manner of statement is peculiar here; the train of thought itself belongs to Greek philosophy. But that very confidence is the most essential feature of the case; for in fact the firm belief that the principle of the world is also that of revelation represents an important early-Christian idea, though indeed in the form of philosophical reflection. To the majority of the Apologists the theoretical content of the Christian faith is completely exhausted in this proposition. They required no particular Christology, for in every revelation of God by his Word they already recognised a proof of his existence not to be surpassed, and consequently regarded it as Christianity _in nuce_.[428] But the fact that the Apologists made a distinction _in thesi_ between the prophetic Spirit of God and the Logos, without being able to make any use of this distinction, is a very clear instance of their dependence on the formulæ of the Church's faith. Indeed their conception of the Logos continually compelled them to identify the Logos and the Spirit, just as they not unfrequently define Christianity as the belief in the true God and in his Son, without mentioning the Spirit.[429] Further their dependence on the Christian tradition is shown in the fact that the most of them expressly designated the Logos as the _Son_ of God.[430]

The Logos doctrine of the Apologists is an essentially unanimous one. Since God cannot be conceived as without reason, [Greek: alogos], but as the fulness of all reason,[431] he has always Logos in himself. This Logos is on the one hand the divine consciousness itself, and on the other the power (idea and energy) to which the world is due; he is not separate from God, but is contained in his essence.[432] For the sake of the creation God produced (sent forth, projected) the Logos from himself, that is, he engendered[433] him from his essence by a free and simple act of will ([Greek: Theos ek Theou pephukôs ex heautou]. Dial. 61). Then for the first time the Logos became a hypostasis separate from God, or, in other words, he first came into existence; and, in virtue of his origin, he possesses the following distinctive features:[434] (1) The inner essence of the Logos is identical with the essence of God himself; for it is the product of self-separation in God, willed and brought about by himself. Further, the Logos is not cut off and separated from God, nor is he a mere modality in him. He is rather the independent product of the self-unfolding of God ([Greek: oikonomia]), which product, though it is the epitome of divine reason, has nevertheless not stripped the Father of this attribute. The Logos is the revelation of God, and the visible God. Consequently the Logos is really God and Lord, i.e., he possesses the divine nature in virtue of his essence. The Apologists, however, only know of one kind of divine nature and this is that which belongs to the Logos. (2) From the moment when he was begotten the Logos is a being distinct from the Father; he is [Greek: arithmô eteron ti, Theos heteros, Theos deuteros] ("something different in number, another God, a second God.") But his personality only dates from that moment. "Fuit tempus, cum patri filius non fuit," ("there was a time when the Father had no Son," so Tertullian, adv. Hermog. 3). The [Greek: logos prophorikos] is for the first time a hypostasis distinct from the Father, the [Greek: logos endiathetos] is not.[435] (3) The Logos has an origin, the Father has not; hence it follows that in relation to God the Logos is a creature; he is the begotten, that is, the created God, the God who has a beginning. Wherefore in rank he is below God ([Greek: en deutera chôra]--[Greek: deuteros Theos], "in the second place, and a second God"), the messenger and servant of God. The subordination of the Logos is not founded on the content of his essence, but on his origin. In relation to the creatures, however, the Logos is the [Greek: archê], i.e., not only the beginning but the principle of the vitality and form of everything that is to receive being. As an emanation (the begotten) he is distinguished from all creatures, for he alone is the Son;[436] but, as having a beginning, he again stands on a level with them. Hence the paradoxical expression, [Greek: ergon prôtotokon tou patros] ("first begotten work of the Father"), is here the most appropriate designation. (4) In virtue of his finite origin, it is possible and proper for the Logos to enter into the finite, to act, to speak, and to appear. As he arose for the sake of the creation of the world, he has the capacity of personal and direct revelation which does not belong to the infinite God; nay, his whole essence consists in the very fact that he is thought, word, and deed. Behind this active substitute and vicegerent, the Father stands in the darkness of the incomprehensible, and in the incomprehensible light of perfection as the hidden, unchangeable God.[437]

With the issuing forth of the Logos from God began the realisation of the idea of the world. The world as [Greek: kosmos noêtos] is contained in the Logos. But the world is material and manifold, the Logos is spiritual and one. Therefore the Logos is not himself the world, but he is its creator and in a certain fashion its archetype. Justin and Tatian used the expression "beget" [Greek: gennan] for the creation of the world, but in connections which do not admit of any importance being attached to this use. The world was created out of nothing after a host of spirits, as is assumed by most Apologists, had been created along with heaven, which is a higher, glorious world. The purpose of the creation of the world was and is the production of men, i.e., beings possessed of soul and body, endowed with reason and freedom, and therefore made in the image of God; beings who are to partake of the blessedness and perfection of God. Everything is created for man's sake, and his own creation is a proof of the goodness of God. As beings possessed of soul and body, men are neither mortal nor immortal, but capable either of death or immortality.[438] The condition on which men can attain the latter introduces us to ethics. The doctrines, that God is also the absolute Lord of matter; that evil cannot be a quality of matter, but rather arose in time and from the free decision of the spirits or angels; and finally that the world will have an end, but God can call the destroyed material into existence, just as he once created it out of nothing, appear in principle to reconcile the dualism in the cosmology. We have the less occasion to give the details here, because they are known from the philosophical systems of the period, especially Philo's, and vary in manifold ways. All the Apologists, however, are imbued with the idea that this knowledge of God and the world, the genesis of the Logos and cosmos, are the most essential part of Christianity itself.[439] This conception is really not peculiar to the Apologists: in the second century the great majority of Christians, in so far as they reflected at all, regarded the monotheistic explanation of the world as a main part of the Christian religion. The theoretical view of the world as a harmonious whole, of its order, regularity and beauty; the certainty that all this had been called into existence by an Almighty Spirit; the sure hope that heaven and earth will pass away, but will give place to a still more glorious structure, were always present, and put an end to the bright and gorgeously coloured, but phantastic and vague, cosmogonies and theogonies of antiquity.

2. Their clear system of morality is in keeping with their relatively simple cosmology. In giving man reason and freedom as an inalienable possession God destined him for incorruptibility ([Greek: athanasia, aphtharsia]), by the attainment of which he was to become a being similar to God.[440] To the gift of imperishability God, however, attached the condition of man's preserving [Greek: ta tês athanasias] ("the things of immortality"), i.e., preserving the knowledge of God and maintaining a holy walk in imitation of the divine perfection. This demand is as natural as it is just; moreover, nobody can fulfil it in man's stead, for an essential feature of virtue is its being free, independent action. Man must therefore determine himself to virtue by the knowledge that he is only in this way obedient to the Father of the world and able to reckon on the gift of immortality. The conception of the content of virtue, however, contains an element which cannot be clearly apprehended from the cosmology; moral goodness consists in letting oneself be influenced in no way by the sensuous, but in living solely, after the Spirit, and imitating the perfection and purity of God. Moral badness is giving way to any affection resulting from the natural basis of man. The Apologists undoubtedly believe that virtue consists negatively in man's renunciation of what his natural constitution of soul and body demands or impels him to. Some express this thought in a more pregnant and unvarnished fashion, others in a milder way. Tatian, for instance, says that we must divest ourselves of the human nature within us; but in truth the idea is the same in all. The moral law of nature of which the Apologists speak, and which they find reproduced in the clearest and most beautiful way in the sayings of Jesus,[441] calls upon man to raise himself above his nature and to enter into a corresponding union with his fellow-man which is something higher than natural connections. It is not so much the law of love that is to rule everything, for love itself is only a phase of a higher law; it is the law governing the perfect and sublime Spirit, who, as being the most exalted existence on this earth, is too noble for the world. Raised already in this knowledge beyond time and space, beyond the partial and the finite, the man of God, even while upon the earth, is to hasten to the Father of Light. By equanimity, absence of desires, purity, and goodness, which are the necessary results of clear knowledge, he is to show that he has already risen above the transient through gazing on the imperishable and through the enjoyment of knowledge, imperfect though the latter still be. If thus, a suffering hero, he has stood the test on earth, if he has become dead to the world,[442] he may be sure that in the life to come God will bestow on him the gift of immortality, which includes the direct contemplation of God together with the perfect knowledge that flows from it.[443] Conversely, the vicious man is given over to eternal death, and in this punishment the righteousness of God is quite as plainly manifested, as in the reward of everlasting life.

3. While it is certain that virtue is a matter of freedom, it is just as sure that no soul is virtuous unless it follows the will of God, i.e., knows and judges of God and all things as they must be known and judged of; and fulfils the commandments of God. This presupposes a revelation of God through the Logos. A revelation of God, complete in itself and mediated by the Logos, is found in the cosmos and in the constitution of man, he being created in his Maker's image.[444] But experience has shown that this revelation is insufficient to enable men to retain clear knowledge. They yielded to the seduction of evil demons, who, by God's sufferance, took possession of the world, and availed themselves of man's sensuous side to draw him away from the contemplation of the divine and lead him to the earthly.[445] The results of this temptation appeared in the facts that humanity as a whole fell a prey to error, was subjected to the bonds of the sensuous and of the demons, and therefore became doomed to death, which is at once a punishment and the natural consequence of want of knowledge of God.[446] Hence it required fresh efforts of the Logos to free men from a state which is indeed in no instance an unavoidable necessity, though a sad fact in the case of almost all. For very few are now able to recognise the one true God from the order of the universe and from the moral law implanted in themselves; nor can they withstand the power of the demons ruling in the world and use their freedom to imitate the virtues of God. Therefore the Almighty in his goodness employed new means through the Logos to call men back from the error of their ways, to overthrow the sovereignty of the demons upon earth, and to correct the disturbed course of the world before the end has yet come. From the earliest times the Logos (the Spirit) has descended on such men as preserved their souls pure, and bestowed on them, through inspiration, knowledge of the truth (with reference to God, freedom, virtue, the demons, the origin of polytheism, the judgment) to be imparted by them to others. These are his "prophets." Such men are rare among the Greeks (and according to some not found at all), but numerous among the barbarians, i.e., among the Jewish people. Taught by God, they announced the truth about him, and under the promptings of the Logos they also committed the revelations to writings, which therefore, as being inspired, are an authentic record of the whole truth.[447] To some of the most virtuous among them he himself even appeared in human form and gave directions. He then is a Christian, who receives and follows these prophetic teachings, that have ever been proclaimed afresh from the beginning of the world down to the present time, and are summed up in the Old Testament. Such a one is enabled even now to rescue his soul from the rule of the demons, and may confidently expect the gift of immortality.

With the majority of the Apologists "Christianity" seems to be exhausted in these doctrines; in fact, they do not even consider it necessary to mention _ex professo_ the appearance of the Logos in Christ (see above, p. 189 ff.). But, while it is certain that they all recognised that the teachings of the prophets contained the full revelation of the truth, we would be quite wrong in assuming that they view the appearance and history of Christ as of no significance. In their presentations some of them no doubt contented themselves with setting forth the most rational and simple elements, and therefore took almost no notice of the historical; but even in their case certain indications show that they regarded the manifestation of the Logos in Christ as of special moment.[448] For the prophetic utterances, as found from the beginning, require an attestation, the prophetic teaching requires a guarantee, so that misguided humanity may accept them and no longer take error for truth and truth for error. The strongest guarantee imaginable is found in the fulfilment of prophecy. Since no man is able to foretell what is to come, the prediction of the future accompanying a doctrine proves its divine origin. God, in his extraordinary goodness, not only inspired the prophets, through the Logos, with the doctrines of truth, but has from the beginning put numerous predictions in their mouth. These predictions were detailed and manifold; the great majority of them referred to a more prolonged appearance of the Logos in human form at the end of history, and to a future judgment. Now, so long as the predictions had not yet come to pass, the teachings of the prophets were not sufficiently impressive, for the only sure witness of the truth is its outward attestation. In the history of Christ, however, the majority of these prophecies were fulfilled in the most striking fashion, and this not only guarantees the fulfilment of the relatively small remainder not yet come to pass (judgment, resurrection), but also settles beyond all doubt the truth of the prophetic teachings about God, freedom, virtue, immortality, etc. In the scheme of fulfilment and prophecy even the irrational becomes rational; for the fulfilment of a prediction is not a proof of its divine origin unless it refers to something extraordinary. Any one can predict regular occurrences which always take place. Accordingly, a part of what was predicted had to be irrational. Every particular in the history of Christ has therefore a significance, not as regards the future, but as regards the past. Here everything happened "that the word of the prophet might be fulfilled." Because the prophet had said so, it had to happen. Christ's destiny attests the ancient teachings of the prophets. Everything, however, depends on this attestation, for it was no longer the full truth that was wanting, but a convincing proof that the truth was a reality and not a fancy.[449] But prophecy testifies that Christ is the ambassador of God, the Logos that has appeared in human form, and the Son of God. If the future destiny of Jesus is recorded in the Old Testament down to the smallest particular, and the book at the same time declares that this predicted One is the Son of God and will be crucified, then the paying of divine honours to this crucified man, to whom all the features of prophecy apply, is completely justified. The stage marked by Christ in the history of God's revelation, the content of which is always the same, is therefore the highest and last, because in it the "truth along with the proof" has appeared. This circumstance explains why the truth is so much more impressive and convinces more men than formerly, especially since Christ has also made special provision for the spread of the truth and is himself an unequalled exemplification of a virtuous life, the principles of which have now become known in the whole world through the spread of his precepts.

These statements exhaust the arguments in most of the Apologies; and they accordingly seem neither to have contemplated a redemption by Christ in the stricter sense of the word, nor to have assumed the unique nature of the appearance of the Logos in Jesus. Christ accomplished salvation as a divine _teacher_, that is to say, his teaching brings about the [Greek: allagê] and [Greek: epangôgê] of the human race, its restoration to its original destination. This also seems to suffice as regards demon rule. Logically considered, the individual portions of the history of Jesus (of the baptismal confession) have no direct significance in respect to salvation. Hence the teachings of the Christians seem to fall into two groups having no inward connection, i.e., the propositions treating of the rational knowledge of God, and the predicted and fulfilled historical facts which prove those doctrines and the believing hopes they include.

But Justin at least gave token of a manifest effort to combine the historical statements regarding Christ with the philosophical and moral doctrines of salvation and to conceive Jesus as the Redeemer.[450] Accordingly, if the Christian dogmatic of succeeding times is found in the connection of philosophical theology with the baptismal confession, that is, in the "scientific theology of facts," Justin is, in a certain fashion, the first framer of Church dogma, though no doubt in a very tentative way. (1) He tried to distinguish between the appearance of the Logos in pre-Christian times and in Christ; he emphasised the fact that the whole Logos appeared only in Christ, and that the manner of this appearance has no counterpart in the past. (2) Justin showed in the Dialogue that, independently of the theologoumenon of the Logos, he was firmly convinced of the divinity of Christ on the ground of predictions and of the impression made by his personality.[451] (3) In addition to the story of the exaltation of Christ, Justin also emphasised other portions of his history, especially the death on the cross (together with baptism and the Lord's Supper) and tried to give them a positive significance.[452] He adopted the common Christian saying that the blood of Christ cleanses believers and men are healed through his wounds; and he tried to give a mystic significance to the cross. (4) He accordingly spoke of the forgiveness of sins through Christ and confessed that men are changed, through the new birth in baptism, from children of necessity and ignorance into children of purpose and understanding and forgiveness of sins.[453] Von Engelhardt has, however, quite rightly noticed that these are mere words which have nothing at all corresponding to them in the general system of thought, because Justin remains convinced that the knowledge of the true God, of his will, and of his promises, or the certainty that God will always grant forgiveness to the repentant and eternal life to the righteous, is sufficient to convert the man who is master of himself. Owing to the fundamental conviction which is expressed in the formulæ, "perfect philosophy," "divine teacher," "new law," "freedom," "repentance," "sinless life," "sure hope," "reward," "immortality," the ideas, "forgiveness of sins," "redemption," "reconciliation," "new birth," "faith" (in the Pauline sense) must remain words,[454] or be relegated to the sphere of magic and mystery.[455] Nevertheless we must not on that account overlook the intention. Justin tried to see the divine revelation not only in the sayings of the prophets, but in unique fashion in the person of Christ, and to conceive Christ not only as the divine teacher, but also as the "Lord and Redeemer." In two points he actually succeeded in this. By the resurrection and exaltation of Jesus Justin proved that Christ, the divine teacher, is also the future judge and bestower of reward. Christ himself is able to give what he has promised--a life after death free from sufferings and sins, that is the first point. The other thing, however, which Justin very strongly emphasised is that Jesus is even now reigning in heaven, and shows his future visible sovereignty of the world by giving his own people the power to cast out and vanquish the demons in and by his name. Even at the present time the latter are put to flight by believers in Christ.[456] So the redemption is no mere future one; it is even now taking place, and the revelation of the Logos in Jesus Christ is not merely intended to prove the doctrines of the rational religion, but denotes a real redemption, that is, a new beginning, in so far as the power of the demons on earth is overthrown through Christ and in his strength. Jesus Christ, the teacher of the whole truth and of a new law, which is the rational, the oldest, and the divine, the only being who has understood how to call men from all the different nations and in all stages of culture into a union of holy life, the inspiring One, for whom his disciples go to death, the mighty One, through whose name the demons are cast out, the risen One, who will one day reward and punish as judge, must be identical with the Son of God, who is the divine reason and the divine power. In this belief which accompanies the confession of the one God, creator of heaven and earth, Justin finds the special content of Christianity, which the later Apologists, with the probable exception of Melito, reproduced in a much more imperfect and meagre form. One thing, however, Justin in all probability did not formulate with precision, viz., the proposition that the special result of salvation, i.e., immortality, was involved in the incarnation of the Logos, in so far as that act brought about a real secret transformation of the whole mortal nature of man. With Justin, indeed, as with the other Apologists, the "salvation" ([Greek: sôtêria]) consists essentially in the apportioning of eternal life to the world, which has been created mortal and in consequence of sin has fallen a prey to the natural destiny of "death;" and Christ is regarded as the bestower of incorruptibility who thus brings the creation to its goal; but as a rule Justin does not go beyond this thought. Yet we certainly find hints pointing to the notion of a physical and magical redemption accomplished at the moment of the incarnation. See particularly the fragment in Irenæus (already quoted on page 220), which may be thus interpreted, and Apol. I. 66. This conception, in its most complete shape, would have to be attributed to Justin if the fragment V. (Otto, Corp. Apol. III. p. 256) were genuine.[457] But the precise form of the presentation makes this very improbable. The question as to how, i.e., in what conceivable way, immortality can be imparted to the mortal nature as yet received little attention from Justin and the Apologists: it is the necessary result of knowledge and virtue. Their great object was to assure the belief in immortality. "Religion and morality depend on the belief in immortality or the resurrection from the dead. The fact that the Christian religion, as faith in the incarnate Son of God the creator, leads to the assurance that the maker of all things will reward piety and righteousness with the bestowal of eternal and immortal life, is the essential advantage possessed by the Christian religion over all others. The righteousness of the heathen was imperfect in spite of all their knowledge of good and evil, because they lacked the certain knowledge that the creator makes the just immortal and will consign the unjust to eternal torment." The philosophical doctrines of God, virtue, and immortality became through the Apologists the certain content of a world-wide religion, which is Christian because Christ guarantees its certainty. They made Christianity a deistical religion for the whole world without abandoning in word at least the old "teachings and knowledge" ([Greek: didagmata kai mathêmata]) of the Christians. They thus marked out the task of "dogmatic" and, so to speak, wrote the prolegomena for every future theological system in the Church (see Von Engelhardt's concluding observations in his "Christenthum Justin's" pp. 447-490, also Overbeck in the Historische Zeitschrift, 1880, pp. 499-505.) At the same time, however, they adhered to the early-Christian eschatology (see Justin, Melito, and, with reference to the resurrection of the flesh, the Apologists generally), and thus did not belie their connection with early Christianity.[458]

_Interpretation and Criticism, especially of Justin's Doctrines._

1. The fundamental assumption of all the Apologists is that there can only be one and the same relation on earth between God and free man, and that it has been conditioned by the creation. This thought, which presupposes the idea of God's unchangeableness, at bottom neutralises every quasi-historical and mythological consideration. According to it grace can be nothing else than the stimulation of the powers of reason existent in man; revelation is supernatural only in respect of its form, and the redemption merely enables us to redeem ourselves, just as this possibility was given at the creation. Sin, which arose through temptation, appears on the one hand as error which must almost of necessity have arisen so long as man only possessed the "germs of the Logos" ([Greek: spermata tou logou]) and on the other as the dominion of sensuousness, which was nearly unavoidable since earthly material clothes the soul and mighty demons have possession of the world. The mythological idea of the invading sway of the demons is really the only interruption of the rationalistic scheme. So far as Christianity is something different from morality, it is the antithesis of the service and sovereignty of the demons. Hence the idea that the course of the world and mankind require in some measure to be helped is the narrow foundation of the thought of revelation or redemption. The necessity of revelation and redemption was expressed in a much stronger and more decisive way by many heathen philosophers of the same period. Accordingly, not only did these long for a revelation which would give a fresh attestation to old truth, but they yearned for a force, a real redemption, a _præsens numen_, and some new thing. Still more powerful was this longing in the case of the Gnostics and Marcion; compare the latter's idea of revelation with that of the Apologists. It is probable indeed that the thought of redemption would have found stronger expression among them also, had not the task of _proof_, which could be best discharged by the aid of the Stoic philosophy, demanded religious rationalism. But, admitting this, the determination of the highest good itself involved rationalism and moralism. For immortality is the highest good, in so far as it is perfect knowledge--which is, moreover, conceived as being of a rational kind,--that necessarily leads to immortality. We can only find traces of the converse idea, according to which the change into the immortal condition is the _prius_ and the knowledge the _posterius_. But, where this conception is the prevailing one, moralistic intellectualism is broken through, and we can now point to a specific, supernatural blessing of salvation, produced by revelation and redemption. Corresponding to the general development of religious philosophy from moralism into mysticism (transition from the second to the third century), a displacement in this direction can also be noticed in the history of Greek apologetics (in the West it was different); but this displacement was never considerable and therefore cannot be clearly traced. Even later on under altered circumstances, apologetic science adhered in every respect to its old method, as being the most suitable (monotheism, morality, proof from prophecy), a circumstance which is evident, for example, from the almost complete disregard of the New Testament canon of Scripture and from other considerations besides.

2. In so far as the possibility of virtue and righteousness has been implanted by God in men, and in so far as--apart from trifling exceptions--they can actually succeed in doing what is good only through prophetic, i.e., divine, revelations and exhortations, some Apologists, following the early Christian tradition, here and there designate the transformation of the sinner into a righteous man as a work of God, and speak of renewal and regeneration. The latter, however, as a real fact, is identical with the repentance which, as a turning from sin and turning to God, is a matter of free will. As in Justin, so also in Tatian, the idea of regeneration is exhausted in the divine call to repentance. The conception of the forgiveness of sins is also determined in accordance with this. Only those sins can be forgiven, i.e., overlooked, which are really none, i.e., which were committed in a state of error and bondage to the demons, and were well-nigh unavoidable. The blotting out of these sins is effected in baptism, "which is the bath of regeneration in so far as it is the voluntary consecration of one's own person. The cleansing which takes place is God's work in so far as baptism was instituted by him, but it is effected by the man who in his change of mind lays aside his sins. The name of God is pronounced above him who repents of his transgressions, that he may receive freedom, knowledge, and forgiveness of his previous sins, but this effects a change only denoting the new knowledge to which the baptised person has attained." If, as all this seems to show, the thought of a specific grace of God in Christ appears virtually neutralised, the adherence to the language of the cultus (Justin and Tatian) and Justin's conception of the Lord's Supper show that the Apologists strove to get beyond moralism, that is, they tried to supplement it through the mysteries. Augustine's assertion (de predest. sanct. 27) that the faith of the old Church in the efficacy of divine grace was not so much expressed in the _opuscula_ as in the _prayers_, shows correct insight.

3. All the demands, the fulfilment of which constitutes the virtue and righteousness of men, are summed up under the title of _the new law_. In virtue of its eternally valid content this new law is in reality the oldest; but it is new because Christ and the prophets were preceded by Moses, who inculcated on the Jews in a transient form that which was eternally valid. It is also new because, being proclaimed by the Logos that appeared in Christ, it announced its presence with the utmost impressiveness and undoubted authority, and contains the promise of reward in terms guaranteed by the strongest proof--the proof from prophecy. The old law is consequently a new one because it appears now for the first time as purely spiritual, perfect, and final. The commandment of love to one's neighbour also belongs to the law; but it does not form its essence (still less love to God, the place of which is taken by faith, obedience, and imitation). The content of all moral demands is comprehended in the commandment of perfect, active holiness, which is fulfilled by the complete renunciation of all earthly blessings, even of life itself. Tatian preached this renunciation in a specially powerful manner. There is no need to prove that no remains of Judæo-Christianity are to be recognised in these ideas about the new law. It is not Judæo-Christianity that lies behind the Christianity and doctrines of the Apologists, but Greek philosophy (Platonic metaphysics, Logos doctrine of the Stoics, Platonic and Stoic ethics), the Alexandrine-Jewish apologetics, the maxims of Jesus, and the religious speech of the Christian Churches. Justin is distinguished from Philo by the sure conviction of the living power of God, the Creator and Lord of the world, and the steadfast confidence in the reality of all the ideals which is derived from the person of Christ. We ought not, however, to blame the Apologists because to them nearly everything historical was at bottom only a guarantee of thoughts and hopes. As a matter of fact, the assurance is not less important than the content. By dint of thinking one can conceive the highest truth, but one cannot in this way make out the certainty of its reality. No positive religion can do more for its followers than faith in the revelation through Christ and the prophets did for the Apologists. Although it chiefly proved to them the truth of that which we call natural theology and which was the idealistic philosophy of the age, so that the Church appears as the great insurance society for the ideas of Plato and Zeno, we ought not at the same time to forget that their idea of a divine spirit working upon earth was a far more lively and worthy one than in the case of the Greek philosophers.

4. By their intellectualism and exclusive theories the Apologists founded philosophic and dogmatic Christianity (Loofs: "they laid the foundation for the conversion of Christianity into a revealed doctrine."[459]) If about the middle of the second century the short confession of the Lord Jesus Christ was regarded as a watchword, passport, and _tessera hospitalitas (signum et vinculum)_, and if even in lay and uneducated circles it was conceived as "doctrine" in contradistinction to heresy, this transformation must have been accelerated through men, who essentially conceived Christianity as the "divine doctrine," and by whom all its distinctive features were subordinated to this conception or neutralised. As the philosophic schools are held together by their "laws" ([Greek: nomoi]) as the "dogmas" form the real bond between the "friends," and as, in addition to this, they are united by veneration for the founder, so also the Christian Church appeared to the Apologists as a universal league established by a divine founder and resting _on the dogmas of the perfectly known truth_, a league the members of which possess definite laws, viz., the eternal laws of nature for everything moral, and unite in common veneration for the Divine Master. In the "dogmas" of the Apologists, however, we find nothing more than traces of the fusion of the philosophical and historical elements; in the main both exist separately side by side. It was not till long after this that intellectualism gained the victory in a Christianity represented by the clergy. What we here chiefly understand by "intellectualism" is the placing of the scientific conception of the world behind the commandments of Christian morality and behind the hopes and faith of the Christian religion, and the connecting of the two things in such a way that this conception appeared as the foundation of these commandments and hopes. Thus was created the future dogmatic in the form which still prevails in the Churches and which presupposes the Platonic and Stoic conception of the world long ago overthrown by science. The attempt made at the beginning of the Reformation to free the Christian faith from this amalgamation remained at first without success.

Footnotes:

[Footnote 340: Edition by Otto, 9 Vols., 1876 f. New edition of the Apologists (unfinished; only Tatian and Athenagoras by Schwarz have yet appeared) in the Texte und Untersuchungen zur altchristlichen Litteratur-Geschichte, Vol. IV. Tzschirner, Geschichte der Apologetik, 1st part, 1805; id., Der Fall des Heidenthums, 1829. Ehlers, Vis atque potestas, quam philosophia antiqua, imprimis Platonica et Stoica in doctrina apologetarum habuerit, 1859.]

[Footnote 341: It is intrinsically probable that their works directly addressed to the Christian Church gave a more full exposition of their Christianity than we find in the Apologies. This can moreover be proved with certainty from the fragments of Justin's, Tatian's and Melito's esoteric writings. But, whilst recognising this fact, we must not make the erroneous assumption that the fundamental conceptions and interests of Justin and the rest were in reality other than may be inferred from their Apologies.]

[Footnote 342: That is, so far as these were clearly connected with polytheism. Where this was not the case or seemed not to be so, national traditions, both the true and the spurious, were readily and joyfully admitted into the _catalogus testimoniorum_ of revealed truth.]

[Footnote 343: Though these words were already found in the first edition, Clemen (Justin 1890, p. 56) has misunderstood me so far as to think that I spoke here of conscious intention on the part of the Apologists. Such nonsense of course never occurred to me.]

[Footnote 344: Note here particularly the attitude of Tatian, who has already introduced a certain amount of the "Gnostic" element into his "Oratio ad Græcos," although, he adheres in the main to the ordinary apologetic doctrines.]

[Footnote 345: Since the time of Josephus Greek philosophers had ever more and more acknowledged the "philosophical" character of Judaism; see Porphyr., de abstin. anim. II. 26, [Greek: hate philosophoi to genos ontes.]]

[Footnote 346: On the relation of Christian literature to the writings of Philo, of Siegfried, Philo von Alexandrien, p. 303 f.]

[Footnote 347: It is very instructive to find Celsus (Origen, c. Cels. I. 2) proceeding to say that the Greeks understood better how to judge, to investigate, and to perfect the doctrines devised by the barbarians, and to apply them to the practice of virtue. This is quite in accordance with the idea of Origen, who makes the following remarks on this point: "When a man trained in the schools and sciences of the Greeks becomes acquainted with our faith, he will not only recognise and declare it to be true, but also by means of his scientific training and skill reduce it to a system and supplement what seems to him defective in it, when tested by the Greek method of exposition and proof, thus at the same time demonstrating the truth of Christianity."]

[Footnote 348: See the section "Justin und die apostolischen Váter" in Engelhardt's "Christenthum Justin's des Martyrers," p. 375 ff., and my article on the so-called 2nd Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians (Zeitschrift für Kirchengeschichte I. p. 329 ff.). Engelhardt, who on the whole emphasises the correspondences, has rather under- than over-estimated them. If the reader compares the exposition given in Book I., chap. 3, with the theology of the Apologists (see sub. 3), he will find proof of the intimate relationship that may be traced here.]

[Footnote 349: See Euseb., H. E. IV. 3. Only one sentence of Quadratus' Apology is preserved; we have now that of Aristides in the Syriac language; moreover, it is proved to have existed in the original language in the Historia Barlaam et Joasaph; finally, a considerable fragment of it is found in Armenian. See an English edition by Harris and Robinson in the Texts and Studies I. 1891. German translation and commentary by Raabe in the Texte und Untersuchungen IX. 1892. Eusebius says that the Apology was handed in to the emperor Hadrian; but the superscription in Syriac is addressed to the emperor Titus Hadrianus Antoninus.]

[Footnote 350: See Hermas, Mand I.]

[Footnote 351: With reservations this also holds good of the Alexandrians. See particularly Orig., c. Cels. I. 62.]

[Footnote 352: Semisch, Justin der Martyrer, 2 Vols, 1840 f. Aubé, S Justin, philosophe et martyre, 2nd reprint, 1875. Weizsäcker, Die Theologie des Martyrers Justin's in the Jahrbuch fur deutsche Theologie, 1867, p. 60 ff. Von Engelhardt, Christenthum Justin's, 1878; id, "Justin," in Herzog's Real-Encyklopädie. Stählin, Justin der Martyrer, 1880 Clemen, Die religionsphilosophische Bedeutung des stoisch-christlichen Eudamonismus in Justin's Apologie, 1890. Flemming, zur Beurtheilung des Christenthums Justin's des Martyrers, 1893. Duncker, Logoslehre Justin's, 1848. Bosse, Der prae istente Christus des Justinus, 1891.]

[Footnote 353: Apol. I. 2, p. 6, ed. Otto.]

[Footnote 354: Apol. I. 2, p. 6, sq.]

[Footnote 355: See the numerous philosophical quotations and allusions in Justin's Apology pointed out by Otto. Above all, he made an extensive use of Plato's Apology of Socrates.]

[Footnote 356: Apol. I. 4. p. 16, also I. 7, p. 24 sq: I. 26.]

[Footnote 357: Apol. I. 4, p. 14.]

[Footnote 358: Apol. I. 5, p. 18 sq., see also I. 14 fin.: [Greek: ou sophistês hupêrchen alla dunamis Theou ho logos autou ên.]]

[Footnote 359: L.c.: [Greek: ou gar monon en Hellêsi dia Sôkratous hupo logou êlegchthêtauta, alla kai en barbarois hup' autou tou logou morphôthentos kai anthrôpou kai Iêsou Christou klêthenos.]]

[Footnote 360: Celsus also admits this, or rather makes his Jew acknowledge it (Orig., c. Cels. II. 31). In Book VI. 47 he adopts the proposition of the "ancients" that the world is the Son of God.]

[Footnote 361: See Apol. II. 10 fin.: [Greek: Sôkratei oudeis epeisthê huper toutou tou dogmatos apothnêskin Christô de tô kai hupo Sôkratous apo merous gnôsthenti ... ou philosophoi oude philologoi monon epeisthêsan.]]

[Footnote 362: The utterances of Justin do not clearly indicate whether the non-Christian portion of mankind has only a [Greek: sperma tou logon] as a natural possession, or whether this [Greek: sperma] has in some cases been enhanced by the inward workings of the whole Logos (inspiration). This ambiguity, however, arises from the fact that he did not further discuss the relation between [Greek: ho logos] and [Greek: to sperma tou logou] and we need not therefore attempt to remove it. On the one hand, the excellent discoveries of poets and philosophers are simply traced to [Greek: to emphuton panti genei anthrôpôn sperma tou logou] (Apol. II. 8), the [Greek: meros spermatikou logou] (ibid) which was implanted at the creation, and on which the human [Greek: heuresis kai theôria] depend (II. 10). In this sense it may be said of them all that they "in human fashion attempted to understand and prove things by means of reason;" and Socrates is merely viewed as the [Greek: pantôn eutonôteros] (ibid.), his philosophy also, like all pre-Christian systems, being a [Greek: philosophia anthrôpeios] (II. 15). But on the other hand Christ was known by Socrates though only [Greek: apo merous]; for "Christ was and is the Logos who dwells in every man." Further, according to the Apologist, the [Greek: meros tou spermatikou theiou logou] bestows the power of recognising whatever is related to the Logos ([Greek: to sungenes] II. 13). Consequently it may not only be said: [Greek: hosa para pasi kalôs eirêtai hêmôn, tôn Christianôn esti] (ibid.), but, on the strength of the "participation" in reason conferred on all, it may be asserted that all who have lived with the Logos ([Greek: meta logou])--an expression which must have been ambiguous--were Christians. Among the Greeks this specially applies to Socrates and Heraclitus (I. 46). Moreover, the Logos implanted in man does not belong to his nature in such a sense as to prevent us saying [Greek: upo logou dia Sôkratous êlegchthê k.t.l.] (I. 5). Nevertheless [Greek: autos ho logos] did not act in Socrates, for this only appeared in Christ (ibid). Hence the prevailing aspect of the case in Justin was that to which he gave expression at the close of the 2nd Apology (II. 15: alongside of Christianity there is only _human_ philosophy), and which, not without regard for the opposite view, he thus formulated in II. 13 fin.: All non-Christian authors were able to attain a knowledge of true being, though only darkly, by means of the seed of the Logos naturally implanted within them. For the [Greek: spora] and [Greek: mimêma] of a thing, which are bestowed in proportion to one's receptivity, are quite different from the thing itself, which divine grace bestows on us for our possession and imitation.]

[Footnote 363: "For the sake of man" (Stoic) Apol. I. 10: II. 4, 5; Dial. 41, p. 260, Apol I. 8: "Longing for the eternal and pure life, we strive to abide in the fellowship of God, the Father and Creator of all things, and we hasten to make confession, because we are convinced and firmly believe that that happiness is really attainable." It is frequently asserted that it is the Logos which produces such conviction and awakens courage and strength.]

[Footnote 364: Justin has destroyed the force of this argument in two passages (I. 44, 59) by tracing (like the Alexandrian Jews) all true knowledge of the poets and philosophers to borrowing from the books of the Old Testament (Moses). Of what further use then is the [Greek: sperma logos emphuton]? Did Justin not really take it seriously? Did he merely wish to suit himself to those whom he was addressing? We are not justified in asserting this. Probably, however, the adoption of that Jewish view of the history of the world is a proof that the results of the demon sovereignty were in Justin's estimation so serious that he no longer expected anything from the [Greek: sperma logos emphuton] when left to its own resources; and therefore regarded truth and prophetic revelation as inseparable. But this view is not the essential one in the Apology. That assumption of Justin's is evidently dependent on a tradition, whilst his real opinion was more "liberal."]

[Footnote 365: Compare with this the following passages: In Apol. I. 20 are enumerated a series of the most important doctrines common to philosophers and Christians. Then follow the words: "If we then in particular respects even teach something similar to the doctrines of the philosophers honoured among you, though in many cases in a divine and more sublime way; and we indeed alone do so in such a way that the matter is proved etc." In Apol. I. 44: II. 10. 13 uncertainty, error, and contradictions are shown to exist in the case of the greatest philosophers. The Christian doctrines are more sublime than all human philosophy (II. 15). "Our doctrines are evidently more sublime than any human teaching, because the Christ who appeared for our sakes was the whole fulness of reason" ([Greek: to logikon to holon], II. 10). "The principles of Plato are not foreign ([Greek: allotria]) to the teaching of Christ, but they do not agree in every respect. The same holds good of the Stoics" (II. 13). "We must go forth from the school of Plato" (II. 12). "Socrates convinced no one in such a way that he would have been willing to die for the doctrine proclaimed by him; whereas not only philosophers and philologers, but also artisans and quite common uneducated people have believed in Christ" (II. 10). These are the very people--and that is perhaps the strongest contrast found between Logos and Logos in Justin--among whom it is universally said of Christianity: [Greek: dunamis esti tou arrêtou patros kai ouchi anthrôpeiou logou kataskeuê] (see also I. 14 and elsewhere.)]

[Footnote 366: In Justin's estimate of the Greek philosophers two other points deserve notice. In the first place, he draws a very sharp distinction between real and nominal philosophers. By the latter he specially means the Epicureans. They are no doubt referred to in I. 4, 7, 26 (I. 14: Atheists). Epicurus and Sardanapalus are classed together in II. 7; Epicurus and the immoral poets in II. 12; and in the conclusion of II, 15 the same philosopher is ranked with the worst society. But according to II. 3 fin. ([Greek: adunaton Kunikô, adiaphoron to telos prothemenô, to agathon eidenai plên adikphorias]) the Cynics also seem to be outside the circle of real philosophers. This is composed principally of Socrates, Plato, the Platonists and Stoics, together with Heraclitus and others. Some of these understood one set of doctrines more correctly, others another series. The Stoics excelled in ethics (II. 7); Plato described the Deity and the world more correctly. It is, however, worthy of note--and this is the second point--that Justin in principle conceived the Greek philosophers as a unity, and that he therefore saw in their very deviations from one another a proof of the imperfection of their teaching. In so far as they are all included under the collective idea "human philosophy," philosophy is characterised by the conflicting opinions found within it. This view was suggested to Justin by the fact that the highest truth, which is at once allied and opposed to human philosophy, was found by him among an exclusive circle of fellow-believers. Justin showed great skill in selecting from the Gospels the passages (I. 15-17), that prove the "philosophical" life of the Christians as described by him in c. 14. Here he cannot be acquitted of colouring the facts (cf. Aristides) nor of exaggeration (see, for instance, the unqualified statement: [Greek: ha echomen eis koinon pherontes kai panti deomenô koinônountes]). The philosophical emperors were meant here to think of the "[Greek: philois panta koina]." Yet in I. 67 Justin corrected exaggerations in his description. Justin's reference to the invaluable benefits which Christianity confers on the state deserves notice (see particularly I. 12, 17.) The later Apologists make a similar remark.]

[Footnote 367: Dialogue 8. The dialogue takes up a more positive attitude than the Apology, both as a whole and in detail. If we consider that both works are also meant for Christians, and that, on the other hand, the Dialogue as well as the Apology appeals to the cultured heathen public, we may perhaps assume that the two writings were meant to present a graduated system of Christian instruction. (In one passage the Dialogue expressly refers to the Apology.) From Justin's time onward the apologetic polemic of the early Church appears to have adhered throughout to the same method. This consisted in giving the polemical writings directed against the Greeks the form of an introduction to Christian knowledge, and in continuing this instruction still further in those directed against the Jews.]

[Footnote 368: Dial. 2. sq. That Justin's Christianity is founded on theoretical scepticism is clearly shown by the introduction to the Dialogue.]

[Footnote 369: Dial. 8: [Greek: houtôs dê kai dia tauta philosophos egô].]

[Footnote 370: Dial., l.c.: [Greek: parestin soi ton Christon tou Theou epignonti kai teleiô genomenô eudaimonein].]

[Footnote 371: See particularly the closing chapter.]

[Footnote 372: Suppl. 2,]

[Footnote 373: Suppl. 4.]

[Footnote 374: Suppl. 5-7.]

[Footnote 375: Suppl. 24 (see also Aristides c. 13).]

[Footnote 376: Suppl, 7 fin. and many other places.]

[Footnote 377: _E.g._, Suppl. 8. 35 fin.]

[Footnote 378: The Crucified Man, the incarnation of the Logos etc. are wanting. Nothing at all is said about Christ.]

[Footnote 379: Suppl. 7.]

[Footnote 380: Cf. the arguments in c. 8 with c. 9 init.]

[Footnote 381: Suppl. 11.]

[Footnote 382: Suppl. 23.]

[Footnote 383: Suppl. 18, 23-27. He, however, as well as the others, sets forth the demon theory in detail.]

[Footnote 384: The Apology which Miltiades addressed to Marcus Aurelius and his fellow-emperor perhaps bore the title: [Greek: huper tês kata Christianous philosophias] (Euseb., H. E. V. 17. 5). It is certain that Melito in his Apology designated Christianity as [Greek: hê kath' hêmas philosophia] (l.c., IV. 26. 7). But, while it is undeniable that this writer attempted, to a hitherto unexampled extent, to represent Christianity as adapted to the Empire, we must nevertheless beware of laying undue weight on the expression "philosophy." What Melito means chiefly to emphasise is the fact that Christianity, which in former times had developed into strength among the barbarians, began to flourish in the provinces of the Empire simultaneously with the rise of the monarchy under Augustus, that as foster-sister of the monarchy, it increased in strength with the latter, and that this mutual relation of the two institutions had given prosperity and splendour to the state. When in the fragments preserved to us he twice, in this connection, calls Christianity "philosophy," we must note that this expression alternates with the other "[Greek: ho kath' hêmas logos]", and that he uses the formula: "Thy forefathers held this philosophy in honour along with the other cults" [Greek: pros tais allais thrêskeichis]. This excludes the assumption that Melito in his Apology merely represented Christian as philosophy (see also IV. 26. 5, where the Christians are called "[Greek: to tôn theosebôn genos]"). He also wrote a treatise [Greek: peri ktiseôs kai geneseôs Christou]. In it (fragment in the Chron. Pasch) he called Christ [Greek: Theou logos pro aiônôn].]

[Footnote 385: See my treatise "Tatian's Rede an die Griechen übers." 1884 (Giessener Programm). Daniel, Tatianus, 1837. Steuer, Die Gottes- und Logoslehre des Tatian, 1893.]

[Footnote 386: But see Orat. 4 init., 24 fin., 25 fin., 27 init.]

[Footnote 387: He not only accentuated the disagreement of philosophers more strongly than Justin, but insisted more energetically than that Apologist on the necessity of viewing the practical fruits of philosophy in life as a criterion; see Orat. 2, 3, 19, 25. Nevertheless Socrates still found grace in his eyes (c. 3). With regard to other philosophers he listened to foolish and slanderous gossip.]

[Footnote 388: Orat. 13, 15 fin., 20. Tatian also gave credence to it because it imparts such an intelligible picture of the creation of the world (c. 29).]

[Footnote 389: Orat. 12: [Greek: ta tês hêmeteras paideias estin anôterô tês kosmikês katalêpseôs]. Tatian troubled himself very little with giving demonstrations. No other Apologist made such bold assertions.]

[Footnote 390: See Orat. 12 (p. 54 fin.), 20 (p. 90), 25 fin., 26 fin., 29, 30 (p. 116), 13 (p. 62), 15 (p. 70), 36 (p. 142), 40 (p. 152 sq.). The section cc. 12-15 of the Oratio is very important (see also c. 7 ff); for it shows that Tatian denied the natural immortality of the soul, declared the soul (the material spirit) to be something inherent in all matter, and accordingly looked on the distinction between men and animals in respect of their inalienable natural constitution as only one of degree. According to this Apologist the dignity of man does not consist in his natural endowments: but in the union of the human soul with the divine spirit, for which union indeed he was planned. But, in Tatian's opinion, man lost this union by falling under the sovereignty of the demons. The Spirit of God has left him, and consequently he has fallen back to the level of the beasts. So it is man's task to unite the Spirit again with himself, and thereby recover that religious principle on which all wisdom and knowledge rest. This anthropology is opposed to that of the Stoics and related to the "Gnostic" theory. It follows from it that man, in order to reach his destination, must raise himself above his natural endowment; see c. 15: [Greek: anthrôpon legô ton porrô men anthrôptêtos pros auton de ton Theon kechôrêkota]. But with Tatian this conception is burdened with radical inconsistency; for he assumes that the Spirit reunites itself with every man who rightly uses his freedom, and he thinks it still possible for every person to use his freedom aright (11 fin., 13 fin., 15 fin.) So it is after all a mere assertion that the natural man is only distinguished from the beast by speech. He is also distinguished from it by freedom. And further it is only in appearance that the blessing bestowed in the "Spirit" is a _donum superadditum et supernaturale_. For if a proper spontaneous use of freedom infallibly leads to the return of the Spirit, it is evident that the decision and consequently the realisation of man's destination depend on human freedom. That is, however, the proposition which all the Apologists maintained. But indeed Tatian himself in his latter days seems to have observed the inconsistency in which he had become involved and to have solved the problem in the Gnostic, that is, the religious sense. In his eyes, of course, the ordinary philosophy is a useless and pernicious art; philosophers make their own opinions laws (c. 27); whereas of Christians the following holds good (c. 32): [Greek: logou tou dêmosiou kai epigeiou kechôrismenoi kai peithomenoi theou parangelmasi kai nomô patros aphtharsias hepomenoi, pan to en doxê keimenon anthrôpinê paraitoumetha].]

[Footnote 391: C. 31. init.: [Greek: hê hêmetera philosophia]. 32 (p. 128): [Greek: hoi boulomenoi philosophein par' hêmin anthrôpoi]. In c. 33 (p. 130) Christian women are designated [Greek: hai par hêmin philosophousai]. C. 35: [Greek: hê kath' hêmas barbaros philosophia]. 40 (p. 152): [Greek: hoi kata Môusea kai homoiôs autô philosophountes]. 42: [Greek: ho kata barbarous philosophôn Tatianos]. The [Greek: dogmata] of the Christians: c. 1 (p. 2), 12 (p. 58), 19 (p. 86), 24 (p. 102), 27 (p. 108), 35 (p. 138), 40, 42. But Tatian pretty frequently calls Christianity "[Greek: hê hêmetera paideia]", once also "[Greek: nomothesia]" (12; cf. 40: [Greek: hoi hêmeteroi nomoi]), and often [Greek: politeia].]

[Footnote 392: See, e.g., c. 29 fin.: the Christian doctrine gives us [Greek: ouch hoper mê elabomen, all' hoper labontes hupo tês planês echein ekoluthêmen].]

[Footnote 393: Tatian gave still stronger expression than Justin to the opinion that it is the demons who have misled men and rule the world, and that revelation through the prophets is opposed to this demon rule; see c. 7 ff. The demons have fixed the laws of death; see c. 15 fin. and elsewhere.]

[Footnote 394: Tatian also cannot at bottom distinguish between revelation through the prophets and through Christ. See the description of his conversion in c. 29. where only the Old Testament writings are named, and c. 13 fin., 20 fin.. 12 (p. 54) etc.]

[Footnote 395: Knowledge and life appear in Tatian most closely connected. See, e.g., c. 13 init.: "In itself the soul is not immortal, but mortal; it is also possible, however, that it may not die. If it has not attained a knowledge of that truth it dies and is dissolved with the body; but later, at the end of the world, it will rise again with the body in order to receive death in endless duration as a punishment. On the contrary it does not die, though it is dissolved for a time, if it is equipped with the knowledge of God."]

[Footnote 396: Barbarian: the Christian doctrines are [Greek: ta tôn barbarôn dogmata] (c. 1): [Greek: kath' hêmas barbaros philosophia] (c. 35); [Greek: hê barbarikê nomothesia] (c. 12); [Greek: graphai barbarikai] (c. 29); [Greek: kainotomein ta barbarôn dogmata] (c. 35); [Greek: ho kata barbarous philosophôn Tatianos] (c. 42); [Greek: Môusês pasês barbarou philosophias archêgos] (c. 31); see also c. 30, 32. In Tatian's view barbarians and Greeks are the decisive contrasts in history.]

[Footnote 397: See the proof from antiquity, c. 31 ff.]

[Footnote 398: C. 30 (p. 114): [Greek: toutôn oun tên katalêpsin memuêmenos].]

[Footnote 399: Tatian's own confession is very important here (c. 26): "Whilst I was reflecting on what was good it happened that there fell into my hands certain writings of the barbarians, too old to be compared with the doctrines of the Greeks, too divine to be compared with their errors. And it chanced that they convinced me through the plainness of their expressions, through the unartificial nature of their language, through the intelligible representation of the creation of the world, through the prediction of the future, the excellence of their precepts, and the summing up of all kinds under one head. My soul was instructed by God and I recognised that those Greek doctrines lead to perdition, whereas the others abolish the slavery to which we are subjected in the world, and rescue us from our many lords and tyrants, though they do not give us blessings we had not already received, but rather such as we had indeed obtained, but were not able to retain in consequence of error." Here the whole theology of the Apologists is contained _in nuce_; see Justin, Dial. 7-8. In Chaps. 32, 33 Tatian strongly emphasises the fact that the Christian philosophy is accessible even to the most uneducated; see Justin, Apol. II. 10; Athenag. 11 etc.]

[Footnote 400: The unknown author of the [Greek: Logos pros Ellênas] also formed the same judgment as Tatian (Corp. Apolog., T. III., p. 2 sq., ed. Otto; a Syrian translation, greatly amplified, is found in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658. It was published by Cureton, Spic. Syr., p. 38 sq. with an English translation). Christianity is an incomparable heavenly wisdom, the teacher of which is the Logos himself. "It produces neither poets, nor philosophers, nor rhetoricians; but it makes mortals immortal and men gods, and leads them away upwards from the earth into super-Olympian regions." Through Christian knowledge the soul returns to its Creator: [Greek: dei gar apokatatathênai othen apestê].]

[Footnote 401: Nor is Plato "[Greek: ho dokôn en autois semnoteron pephilosophêkenai]" any better than Epicurus and the Stoics (III. 6). Correct views which are found in him in a greater measure than in the others ([Greek: ho dokôn Hellênôn sophôteros gegenêsthai]), did not prevent him from giving way to the stupidest babbling (III. 16). Although he knew that the full truth can only be learned from God himself through the law (III. 17), he indulged in the most foolish guesses concerning the beginning of history. But where guesses find a place, truth is not to be found (III. 16: [Greek: ei de eikasmô, ouk ara alêthê estin ta hup' autou eirêmena]).]

[Footnote 402: Theophilus confesses (I. 14) exactly as Tatian does: [Greek: kai gar egô êpistoun touto esesthai, alla nun katanoêsas auta pisteuô, hama kai epituchôn hierais graphais tôn agiôn prophêtôn, hoi kai proeipon dia pneumatos Theou ti progegonota ô tropô gegonen kai ta enestôta tini tropô ginetai, kai ta eperchomena poia taxei apartisthêsetai. Apodeixin oun labôn tôn ginomenôn kai proanapephônêmenôn ouk apistô]; see also II. 8-10, 22, 30, 33-35: III. 10, 11, 17. Theophilus merely looks on the Gospel as a continuation of the prophetic revelations and injunctions. Of Christ, however, he did not speak at all, but only of the Logos (Pneuma), which has operated from the beginning. To Theophilus the first chapters of Genesis already contain the sum of all Christian knowledge (II. 10-32).]

[Footnote 403: See II. 8: [Greek: hupo daimonôn de empneusthentes kai hup' autôn phusiôthentes ha eipon di' autôn eipon].]

[Footnote 404: The unknown author of the work _de resurrectione_, which goes under the name of Justin (Corp. Apol., Vol. III.) has given a surprising expression to the thought that it is simply impossible to give a demonstration of truth. ([Greek: O men tês alêtheias logos estin eleutheroste kai autexousios, upo mêdemian basanon elegchou thelôn piptein mêde tên para tois akouousi di' apodeixeôs exetasin hupomenein. To gar eugenes autou kai pepoithos autô tô pempsanti pisteuesthai thelei]). He inveighs in the beginning of his treatise against all rationalism, and on the one hand professes a sort of materialistic theory of knowledge, whilst on the other, for that very reason, he believes in inspiration and the authority of revelation; for all truth originates with revelation, since God himself and God alone is the truth. Christ revealed this truth and is for us [Greek: tôn olôn pistis kai apodeixis]. But it is far from probable that the author would really have carried this proposition to its logical conclusion (Justin, Dial. 3 ff. made a similar start). He wishes to meet his adversaries "armed with the arguments of faith which are unconquered" (c. 1, p. 214), but the arguments of faith are still the arguments of reason. Among these he regarded it as most important that even according to the theories about the world, that is, about God and matter, held by the "so-called sages," Plato, Epicurus, and the Stoics, the assumption of a resurrection of the flesh is not irrational (c. 6, p. 228 f.). Some of these, viz., Pythagoras and Plato, also acknowledged the immortality of the soul. But, for that very reason, this view is not sufficient, "for if the Redeemer had only brought the message of the (eternal) life of the soul what new thing would he have proclaimed in addition to what had been made known by Pythagoras, Plato, and the band of their adherents?" (c. 10, p. 246.) This remark is very instructive, for it shows what considerations led the Apologists to adhere to the belief in the resurrection of the body. Zahn, (Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte, Vol. VIII., pp. 1 f., 20 f.) has lately reassigned to Justin himself the fragment de resurr. His argument, though displaying great plausibility, has nevertheless not fully convinced me. The question is of great importance for fixing the relation of Justin to Paul. I shall not discuss Hermias' "Irrisio Gentilium Philosophorum," as the period when this Christian disputant flourished is quite uncertain. We still possess an early-Church Apology in Pseudo-Melito's "Oratio ad Antoninum Cæsarem" (Otto, Corp. Apol. IX., p. 423 sq.). This book is preserved (written?) in the Syrian language and was addressed to Caracalla or Heliogabalus (preserved in the Cod. Nitr. Mus. Britt. Add. 14658). It is probably dependent on Justin, but it is less polished and more violent than his Apology.]

[Footnote 405: Massebieau (Revue de l'histoire des religions, 1887, Vol. XV. No. 3) has convinced me that Minucius wrote at a later period than Tertullian and made use of his works.]

[Footnote 406: Cf. the plan of the "Octavius." The champion of heathenism here opposed to the Christian is a philosopher representing the standpoint of the middle Academy. This presupposes, as a matter of course, that the latter undertakes the defence of the Stoical position. See, besides, the corresponding arguments in the Apology of Tertullian, e.g., c. 17, as well as his tractate: "de testimonio animæ naturaliter Christianæ." We need merely mention that the work of Minucius is throughout dependent on Cicero's book, "de natura deorum." In this treatise he takes up a position more nearly akin to heathen syncretism than Tertullian.]

[Footnote 407: In R. Kühn's investigation ("Der Octavius des Min. Felix," Leipzig, 1882)--the best special work we possess on an early Christian Apology from the point of view of the history of dogma--based on a very careful analysis of the Octavius, more emphasis is laid on the difference than on the agreement between Minucius and the Greek Apologists. The author's exposition requires to be supplemented in the latter respect (see Theologische Litteratur-Zeitung, 1883, No. 6).]

[Footnote 408: C. 20: "Exposui opiniones omnium ferme philosophorum.... ut quivis arbitretur, aut nunc Christianos philosophos esse aut philosophos fuisse jam tunc Christianos."]

[Footnote 409: See Minucius, 31 ff. A quite similar proceeding is already found in Tertullian, who in his _Apologeticum_ has everywhere given a Stoic colouring to Christian ethics and rules of life, and in c. 39 has drawn a complete veil over the peculiarity of the Christian societies.]

[Footnote 410: Tertullian has done exactly the same thing; see Apolog. 46 (and de præscr. 7.)]

[Footnote 411: Tertull., de testim. I.: "Sed non eam te (animam) advoco, quæ scholis formata, bibliothecis exercitata, academiis et porticibus Atticis pasta sapientiam ructas. Te simplicem et rudem et impoliitam et idioticam compello, qualem te habent qui te solam habent... Imperitia tua mihi opus est, quoniam aliquantulæ peritiæ tuæ nemo credit."]

[Footnote 412: Tertull., Apol. 46: "Quid simile philosophus et Christianas? Græciæ discipulus et coeli?" de præscr. 7: "Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiæ et ecclesiæ?" Minuc. 38.5: "Philosophorum supercilia contemnimus, quos corruptores et adulteros novimus... nos, qui non habitu sapientiam sed mente præferimus, non eloquimur magna sed vivimus, gloriamur nos consecutos, quod illi summa intentione quæsiverunt nec invenire potuerunt. Quid ingrati sumus, quid nobis invidemus, si veritas divinitatis nostri temporis ælate maturuit?"]

[Footnote 413: Minucius did not enter closely into the significance of Christ any more than Tatian, Athenagoras, and Theophilus; he merely touched upon it (9. 4: 29. 2). He also viewed Christianity as the teaching of the Prophets; whoever acknowledges the latter must of necessity adore the crucified Christ. Tertullian was accordingly the first Apologist after Justin who again considered it necessary to give a detailed account of Christ as the incarnation of the Logos (see the 21st chapter of the Apology in its relation to chaps. 17-20).]

[Footnote 414: Among the Greek Apologists the unknown author of the work "de Monarchia," which bears the name of Justin, has given clearest expression to this conception. He is therefore most akin to Minucius (see chap. I.). Here monotheism is designated as the [Greek: katholikê doxa] which has fallen into oblivion through bad habit; for [Greek: tês anthrôpinês phuseôs to kat' archên suzugian suneseôs kai sôtêrias labousês eis epignôsin alêtheias thrêskeias te tês eis ton hena kai pantôn despotên.] According to this, then, only an awakening is required.]

[Footnote 415: But almost all the Apologists acknowledged that heathendom possessed prophets. They recognise these in the Sibyls and the old poets. The author of the work "de Monarchia" expressed the most pronounced views in regard to this. Hermas (Vis. II. 4), however, shows that the Apologists owed this notion also to an idea that was widespread among Christian people.]

[Footnote 416: See Justin, Apol. I. 31, Dial. 7, p. 30 etc.]

[Footnote 417: See Tatian, c. 31 ff.]

[Footnote 418: In the New Testament the content of the Christian faith is now here designated as dogma. In Clement (I. 11.), Hermas, and Polycarp the word is not found at all; yet Clement (I. 20. 4, 27. 5) called the divine order of nature [Greek: ta dedogmatismena hupo Theou]. In Ignatius (ad Magn. XIII. 1) we read: [Greek: spoudazete oun bebaiôthênai en tois dogmasin tou kuriou kai tôn apostolôn], but [Greek: dogmata] here exclusively mean the rules of life (see Zahn on this passage), and this is also their signification in [Greek: Didachê] XI. 3. In the Epistle of Barnabas we read in several passages (I. 6: IX. 7: X. 1, 9 f.) of "dogmas of the Lord;" but by these he means partly particular mysteries, partly divine dispensations. Hence the Apologists are the first to apply the word to the Christian faith, in accordance with the language of philosophy. They are also the first who employed the ideas [Greek: theologein] and [Greek: theologia]. The latter word is twice found in Justin (Dial. 56) in the sense of "aliquem nominare deum." In Dial. 113, however, it has the more comprehensive sense of "to make religio-scientific investigations." Tatian (10) also used the word in the first sense; on the contrary he entitled a book of which he was the author "[Greek: pros tous apophênamenous ta peri Theou]" and not "[Greek: pros tous theologountas]". In Athenagoras (Suppl. 10) theology is the doctrine of God and of all beings to whom the predicate "Deity" belongs (see also 20, 22). That is the old usage of the word. It was thus employed by Tertullian in ad nat. II. 1 (the threefold division of theology; in II. 2, 3 the expression "theologia physica, mythica" refers to this); Cohort, ad Gr. 3, 22. The anonymous writer in Eusebius (H. E. V. 28. 4, 5) is instructive on the point. Brilliant demonstrations of the ancient use of the word "theology" are found in Natorp, Thema und Disposition der aristotelischen Metaphysik (Philosophische Monatshefte, 1887, Parts I and 2, pp. 55-64). The title "theology," as applied to a philosophic discipline, was first used by the Stoics; the old poets were previously called "theologians," and the "theological" stage was the prescientific one which is even earlier than the "childhood" of "physicists" (so Aristotle speaks throughout). To the Fathers of the Church also the old poets are still [Greek: hoi palaioi theologoi]. But side by side with this we have an adoption of the Stoic view that there is also a philosophical theology, because the teaching of the old poets concerning the gods conceals under the veil of myth a treasure of philosophical truth. In the Stoa arose the "impossible idea of a 'theology' which is to be philosophy, that is, knowledge based on reason, and yet to have positive religion as the foundation of its certainty." The Apologists accepted this, but added to it the distinction of a [Greek: kosmikê] and [Greek: theologikê sophia.]]

[Footnote 419: Christ has a relation to all three parts of the scheme, (1) as [Greek: logos]; (2) as [Greek: nomos, nomothetês], and [Greek: kritês]; (3) as [Greek: didaskalos] and [Greek: sotêr].]

[Footnote 420: In the reproduction of the apologetical theology historians of dogma have preferred to follow Justin; but here they have constantly overlooked the fact that Justin was the most Christian among the Apologists, and that the features of his teaching to which particular value is rightly attached, are either not found in the others at all (with the exception of Tertullian), or else in quite rudimentary form. It is therefore proper to put the doctrines common to all the Apologists in the foreground, and to describe what is peculiar to Justin as such, so far as it agree with New Testament teachings or contains an anticipation of the future tenor of dogma.]

[Footnote 421: Cicero's proposition (de nat. deor. II. 66. 167): "nemo vir magnus sine aliquo afflatu divino unquam fuit," which was the property of all the idealistic philosophers of the age, is found in the Apologists reproduced in the most various forms (see, e.g., Tatian 29). That all knowledge of the truth, both among the prophets and those who follow their teaching, is derived from inspiration was in their eyes a matter of certainty. But here they were only able to frame a theory in the case of the prophets; for such a theory strictly applied to all would have threatened the spontaneous character of the knowledge of the truth.]

[Footnote 422: Justin, Apol. I. 3: [Greek: Hêmeteron oun ergon kai biou kai mathêmatôn tên episkepsin pasi parechein].]

[Footnote 423: See the exposition of the doctrine of God in Aristides with the conclusion found in all the Apologists, that God requires no offerings and presents.]

[Footnote 424: Even Tatian says in c. 19: [Greek: Kosmou men gar ê kataskeuê kalê, to de en autô politeuma phaulon].]

[Footnote 425: Tatian 5: [Greek: Oute anarchos ê hulê kathaper ho Theos, oude dia to anarchon kai autê isodunamos tô Theô gennêtê de kai ouch hupo tou allou gegonuia monon de hupo tou pantôn dêmiourgou probeblêmenê]. 12. Even Justin does not seem to have taught otherwise, though that is not quite certain; see Apol. I. 10, 59, 64, 67: II. 6. Theophilus I. 4: II. 4, 10, 13 says very plainly: [Greek: ex ouk ontôn ta panta epoiêsen.... ti de mega, ei ho theos ex hupokeimenês hulês epoiei ton kosmon].]

[Footnote 426: Hence the knowledge of God and the right knowledge of the world are most closely connected; see Tatian 27: [Greek: hê Theou katalêpsis ên echô peri tôn holôn].]

[Footnote 427: The beginning of the fifth chapter of Tatian's Oration is specially instructive here.]

[Footnote 428: According to what has been set forth in the text it is incorrect to assert that the Apologists adopted the Logos doctrine in order to reconcile monotheism with the divine honours paid to the crucified Christ. The truth rather is that the Logos doctrine was already part of their creed before they gave any consideration to the person of the historical Christ, and _vice versâ_ Christ's right to divine honours was to them a matter of certainty independently of the Logos doctrine.]

[Footnote 429: We find the distinction of Logos (Son) and Spirit in Justin, Apol. I. 5, and in every case where he quotes formulæ (if we are not to assume the existence of interpolation in the text, which seems to me not improbable; see now also Cramer in the Theologische Studien, 1893. pp. 17 ff., 138 ff.). In Tatian 13 fin. the Spirit is represented as [Greek: ho diakonos tou peponthotos Theou]. The conception in Justin, Dial. 116, is similar. Father, Word, and prophetic Spirit are spoken of in Athenag. 10. The express designation [Greek: trias] is first found in Theophilus (but see the Excerpta ex Theodoto); see II. 15: [Greek: hai treis hêmerai tupoi heisin tês triados, tou Theou kai tou logou autou kai tês sophias autou]; see II. 10, 18. But it is just in Theophilus that the difficulty of deciding between Logos and Wisdom appears with special plainness (II. 10). The interposition of the host of good angels between Son and Spirit found in Justin, Apol. I. 5 (see Athenag.), is exceedingly striking. We have, however, to notice, provided the text is right, (1) that this interposition is only found in a single passage, (2) that Justin wished to refute the reproach of [Greek: atheotês], (3) that the placing of the Spirit after the angels does not necessarily imply a position inferior to theirs, but merely a subordination to the Son and the Father common to the Spirit and the angels, (4) that the good angels were also invoked by the Christians, because they were conceived as mediators of prayer (see my remark on I. Clem, ad Corinth. LVI. 1); they might have found a place here just for this latter reason. On the significance of the Holy Spirit in the theology of Justin, see Zahn's Marcellus of Ancyra, p. 228: "If there be any one theologian of the early Church who might be regarded as depriving the Holy Spirit of all scientific _raison d'etre_ at least on the ground of having no distinctive activity, and the Father of all share in revelation, it is Justin." We cannot at bottom say that the Apologists possessed a doctrine of the Trinity.]

[Footnote 430: To Justin the name of the Son is the most important; see also Athenag. 10. The Logos had indeed been already called the Son of God by Philo, and Celsus expressly says (Orig., c. Cels. II. 31); "If according to your doctrine the Word is really the Son of God then we agree with you;" but the Apologists are the first to attach the name of Son to the Logos as a proper designation. If, however, the Logos is intrinsically the Son of God, then Christ is the Son of God, not because he is the begotten of God in the flesh (early Christian), but because the spiritual being existing in him is the antemundane reproduction of God (see Justin, Apol. II. 6: [Greek: ho huios tou patros kai Theou, ho monos legomenos kuriôs huios])--a momentous expression.]

[Footnote 431: Athenag., 10; Tatian, Orat. 5.]

[Footnote 432: The clearest expression of this is in Tatian 5, which passage is also to be compared with the following: [Greek: Theos ên en archê, tên de archên logou dunamin pareilêphamen. Ho gar despotês tôn holôn, autos huparchôn tou pantos hê hupostasis, kata men tên mêdepô gegenêmenên poiêsin monos ên, katho de pasa dunamis, horatôn te kai aoratôn autos hupostasis ên, sun autô ta panta sun autô dia logikês dunameôs autos kai ho logos, hos ên auto, hupestêse. Thelêmati de tês aplotêtos autou propêda logos, ho de logos, ou kata kenou chôrêsas, ergon prôtotokon tou patros ginetai. Touton ismen tou kosmou tên archên. Gegone de kata merismon, ou kata apokopên to gar apotmêthen tou prôtou kechôristai, to de meriothen oikonomas tên hairesin proslabon ouk endea ton hothen eilêptai pepoiêken. Ôsper gar aro mias dados anaptetai men pura polla, tês de prôtês dados dia tên exapsin tôn pollôn dadôn ouk elattoutai to phôs, houtô kai ho logos proelthôn ek tês tou patros dunameôs ouk alogon pepoiêke ton gegennêkota]. In the identification of the divine consciousness, that is, the power of God, with the force to which the world is due the naturalistic basis of the apologetic speculations is most clearly shown. Cf. Justin, Dial. 128, 129.]

[Footnote 433: The word "beget" ([Greek: gennan]) is used by the Apologists, especially Justin, because the name "Son" was the recognised expression for the Logos. No doubt the words [Greek: exereugesthai, proballesthai, proerchesthai, propêdan] and the like express the physical process more exactly in the sense of the Apologists. On the other hand, however, [Greek: gennan] appears the more appropriate word in so far as the relation of the essence of the Logos to the essence of God is most clearly shown by the name "Son."]

[Footnote 434: None of the Apologists has precisely defined the Logos idea. Zahn, l.c., p. 233, correctly remarks: "Whilst the distinction drawn between the hitherto unspoken and the spoken word of the Creator makes Christ appear as the thought of the world within the mind of God, yet he is also to be something real which only requires to enter into a new relation to God to become an active force. Then again this Word is not to be the thought that God thinks, but the thought that thinks in God. And again it is to be a something, or an Ego, in God's thinking essence, which enters into reciprocal intercourse with something else in God; occasionally also the reason of God which is in a state of active exercise and without which he would not be rational." Considering this evident uncertainty it appears to me a very dubious proceeding to differentiate the conceptions of the Logos in Justin, Athenagoras, Tatian, and Theophilus, as is usually done. If we consider that no Apologist wrote a special treatise on the Logos, that Tatian (c. 5) is really the only one from whom we have any precise statements, and that the elements of the conception are the same in all, it appears inadvisable to lay so great stress on the difference as Zahn, for instance, has done in the book already referred to, p. 232 f. Hardly any real difference can have existed between Justin, Tatian, and Theophilus in the Logos doctrine proper. On the other hand Athenagoras certainly seems to have tried to eliminate the appearance of the Logos in time, and to emphasise the eternal nature of the divine relationships, without, however, reaching the position which Irenæus took up here.]

[Footnote 435: This distinction is only found in Theophilus (II. 10); but the idea exists in Tatian and probably also in Justin, though it is uncertain whether Justin regarded the Logos as having any sort of being before the moment of his begetting.]

[Footnote 436: Justin, Apol. II. 6., Dial. 61. The Logos is not produced out of nothing, like the rest of the creatures. Yet it is evident that the Apologists did not yet sharply and precisely distinguish between begetting and creating, as the later theologians did; though some of them certainly felt the necessity for a distinction.]

[Footnote 437: All the Apologists tacitly assume that the Logos in virtue of his origin has the capacity of entering the finite. The distinction which here exists between Father and Son is very pregnantly expressed by Tertullian (adv. Marc. II. 27): "Igitur quæcumque exigitis deo digna, habebuntur in patre invisibili incongressibilique et placido et, ut ita dixerim, philosophorum deo. Quæcumque autem ut indigna reprehenditis deputabuntur in filio et viso et audito et congresso, arbitro patris et ministro." But we ought not to charge the Apologists with the theologoumenon that it was an inward necessity for the Logos to become man. Their Logos hovers, as it were, between God and the world, so that he appears as the highest creature, in so far as he is conceived as the production of God; and again seems to be merged in God, in so far as he is looked upon as the consciousness and spiritual force of God. To Justin, however, the incarnation is irrational, and the rest of the Greek Apologists are silent about it.]

[Footnote 438: The most of the Apologists argue against the conception of the natural immortality of the human soul; see Tatian 13; Justin, Dial. 5; Theoph. II. 27.]

[Footnote 439: The first chapter of Genesis represented to them the sum of all wisdom, and therefore of all Christianity. Perhaps Justin had already written a commentary to the Hexaëmeron (see my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 169 f.). It is certain that in the second century Rhodon (Euseb., H. E. V. 13. 8), Theophilus (see his 2nd Book ad Autol.), Candidus, and Apion (Euseb., H. E. V. 27) composed such. The Gnostics also occupied themselves a great deal with Gen. I.-III.; see, e.g., Marcus in Iren. I. 18.]

[Footnote 440: See Theophilus ad Aut. II. 27: [Greek: Ei gar ho Theos athanaton ton anthrôpon ap' archês pepoiêkei, Theon auton pepoiêkei; palin ei thnêton auton pepoiêkei edokei an ho Theos aitios einai tou thanatou autou. Oute oun athanaton auton epoiêsen oute mên thnêton, alla dektikon amphoterôn, hina, ei rhepsê epi ta tês athanasias têrêsas tên entolên tou Theou, misthon komisêtai par' autou tên athanasian kai genêtai Theos, ei d' au trapê epi ta tou thanatou pragmata parakousas tou Theou, autos eautô aitios ê tou thanatou.]]

[Footnote 441: See Justin, Apol. I. 14 ff. and the parallel passages in the other Apologists.]

[Footnote 442: See Tatian, Orat. II. and many other passages.]

[Footnote 443: Along with this the Apologists emphasise the resurrection of the flesh in the strongest way as the specific article of Christian anticipation, and prove the possibility of realising this irrational hope. Yet to the Apologists the ultimate ground of their trust in this early-Christian idea is their reliance on the unlimited omnipotence of God and this confidence is a proof of the vividness of their idea of him. Nevertheless this conception assumes that in the other world there will be a return of the flesh, which on this side the grave had to be overcome and regarded as non-existent. A clearly chiliastic element is found only in Justin.]

[Footnote 444: No uniform conception of this is found in the Apologists; see Wendt, Die Christliche Lehre von der menschlichen Vollkommenheit 1882, pp. 8-20. Justin speaks only of a heavenly destination for which man is naturally adapted. With Tatian and Theophilus it is different.]

[Footnote 445: The idea that the demon sovereignty has led to some change in the psychological condition and capacities of man is absolutely unknown to Justin (see Wendt, l.c., p. 11 f., who has successfully defended the correct view in Engelhardt's "Das Christenthum Justin's des Märtyrers" pp. 92 f. 151. f. 266 f., against Stählin, "Justin der Märtyrer und sein neuester Beurtheiler" 1880, p. 16 f.). Tatian expressed a different opinion, which, however, involved him in evident contradictions (see above, p. 191 ff.). The apologetic theology necessarily adhered to the two following propositions: (1) The freedom to do what is good is not lost and cannot be. This doctrine was opposed to philosophic determinism and popular fatalism. (2) The desires of the flesh resulting from the constitution of man only become evil when they destroy or endanger the sovereignty of reason. The formal _liberum arbitrium_ explains the possibility of sin, whilst its actual existence is accounted for by the desire that is excited by the demons. The Apologists acknowledge the universality of sin and death, but refused to admit the necessity of the former in order not to call its guilty character in question. On the other hand they are deeply imbued with the idea that the sovereignty of death is the most powerful factor in the perpetuation of sin. Their believing conviction of the omnipotence of God, as well as their moral conviction of the responsibility of man, protected them in theory from a strictly dualistic conception of the world. At the same time, like all who separate nature and morality in their ethical system, though in other respects they do not do so, the Apologists were obliged in practice to be dualists.]

[Footnote 446: Death is accounted the worst evil. When Theophilus (II. 26) represents it as a blessing, we must consider that he is arguing against Marcion. Polytheism is traced to the demons; they are accounted the authors of the fables about the gods; the shameful actions of the latter are partly the deeds of demons and partly lies.]

[Footnote 447: The Old Testament therefore is not primarily viewed as the book of prophecy or of preparation for Christ, but as the book of the full revelation which cannot be surpassed. In point of content the teaching of the prophets and of Christ is completely identical. The prophetical details in the Old Testament serve only to attest the _one_ truth. The Apologists confess that they were converted to Christianity by reading the Old Testament. Cf. Justin's and Tatian's confessions. Perhaps Commodian (Instruct. I. 1) is also be understood thus.]

[Footnote 448: The _Oratio_ of Tatian is very instructive in this respect. In this book he has nowhere spoken _ex professo_ of the incarnation of the Logos in Christ; but in c. 13 fin. he calls the Holy Spirit "the servant of God who has suffered," and in c. 21 init. he says: "we are not fools and do not adduce anything stupid, when we proclaim that God has appeared in human form." Similar expressions are found in Minucius Felix. In no part of Aristides' Apology is there any mention of the pre-Christian appearance of the Logos. The writer merely speaks of the revelation of the Son of God in Jesus Christ.]

[Footnote 449: We seldom receive an answer to the question as to why this or that particular occurrence should have been prophesied. According to the ideas of the Apologists, however, we have hardly a right to put that question; for, since the value of the historical consists in its having been predicted, its content is of no importance. The fact that Jesus finds the she-ass bound to a vine (Justin, Apol. I. 32) is virtually quite as important as his being born of a virgin. Both occurrences attest the prophetic teachings of God, freedom, etc.]

[Footnote 450: In Justin's polemical works this must have appeared in a still more striking way. Thus we find in a fragment of the treatise [Greek: pros Markiôna], quoted by Irenæus (IV. 6. 2), the sentence "unigenitus filius venit ad nos, suum plasma in semetipsum recapitulans." So the theologoumenon of the _recapitulatio per Christum_ already appeared in Justin. (Vide also Dial. c. Tryph. 100.) If we compare Tertullian's _Apologeticum_ with his Antignostic writings we easily see how impossible it is to determine from that work the extent of his Christian faith and knowledge. The same is probably the case, though to a less extent, with Justin's apologetic writings.]

[Footnote 451: Christians do not place a man alongside of God, for Christ is God, though indeed a second God. There is no question of two natures. It is not the divine nature that Justin has insufficiently emphasised--or at least this is only the case in so far as it is a second Godhead--but the human nature; see Schultz, Gottheit Christi, p. 39 ff.]

[Footnote 452: We find allusions in Justin where the various incidents in the history of the incarnate Logos are conceived as a series of arrangements meant to form part of the history of salvation, to paralyse mankind's sinful history, and to regenerate humanity. He is thus a forerunner of Irenæus and Melito.]

[Footnote 453: Even the theologoumenon of the definite number of the elect, which must be fulfilled, is found in Justin (Apol. I. 28, 45). For that reason the judgment is put off by God (II. 7). The Apology of Aristides contains a short account of the history of Jesus; his conception, birth, preaching, choice of the 12 Apostles, crucifixion, resurrection, ascension, sending out of the 12 Apostles are mentioned.]

[Footnote 454: "To Justin faith is only an acknowledgment of the mission and Sonship of Christ and a conviction of the truth of his teaching. Faith does not justify, but is merely a presupposition of the justification which is effected through repentance, change of mind, and sinless life. Only in so far as faith itself is already a free decision to serve God has it the value of a saving act, which is indeed of such significance that one can say, 'Abraham was justified by faith.' In reality, however, this took place through [Greek: metanoia]." The idea of the new birth is exhausted in the thought: [Greek: Theos kalei eis metanoian], that of the forgiveness of sins in the idea: "God is so good that he overlooks sins committed in a state of ignorance, if man has changed his mind." Accordingly, Christ is the Redeemer in so far as he has brought about all the conditions which make for repentance.]

[Footnote 455: This is in fact already the case in Justin here and there, but in the main there are as yet mere traces of it: the Apologists are no mystics.]

[Footnote 456: If we consider how largely the demons bulked in the ideas of the Apologists, we must rate very highly their conviction of the redeeming power of Christ and of his name, a power continuously shown in the victories over the demons. See Justin Apol. II. 6, 8; Dial. II, 30, 35, 39, 76, 85, 111, 121; Tertull., Apol. 23, 27, 32, 37 etc. Tatian also (16 fin.) confirms it, and c. 12, p. 56, line 7 ff. (ed. Otto) does not contradict this.]

[Footnote 457: Von Engelhardt, Christenthum Justin's, p. 432 f., has pronounced against its genuineness; see also my Texte und Untersuchungen I. 1, 2, p. 158. In favour of its genuineness see Hilgenfeld, Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1883, p. 26 f. The fragment is worded as follows: [Greek: Plasas ho Theos kat' archas ton anthrôpon tês gnômês autou ta tês phuseôs apêôrêsen entolê mia poiêsamenos tên diapeiran. Phulaxanta men gar tautên tês athantou lêxeôs pepoiêken esesthai, parabanta de tês enantias. Outô gegonôs ho anthrôpos kai pros tên parabasin euthus elthôn tên phthoran phusikôs eisedexato. Phusei de tês phthoras prosgenomenês anankaion ên hoti sôsai boulomenos ên tên phthoropoion ousian aphanisas. Touto de ouk ên heteros genesthai, ei mêper hê kata phusin zôê proseplakê tô tên phthoran dexamenô, aphanizousa men tên phthoran, athanaton de tou loipou to dexamenon diatêrousa. Dia touto ton logon edeêsen en sômati genesthai, hina (tou thanatou) tês kata phusin hêmas phthoras eleutherôsê. Ei gar, hôs phate, neumati monon ton thanaton hêmôn apekôlusen, ou prosêi men dia tên boulêsin ho thanatos, ouden de êtton phthartoi palin êmen phuikên en heautois tên phthoran peripherontes].]

[Footnote 458: Weizsäcker, Jahrbücher fur deutsche Theologie, 1867, p. 119, has with good reason strongly emphasised this element. See also Stählin, Justin der Martyrer, 1880, p. 63 f., whose criticism of Von Engelhardt's book contains much that is worthy of note, though it appears to me inappropriate in the main.]

[Footnote 459: Loofs continues: "The Apologists, viewing the transference of the concept 'Son' to the preëxistent Christ as a matter of course, enabled the Christological problem of the 4th century to be started. They removed the point of departure of the Christological speculation from the historical Christ back into the preëxistence and depreciated the importance of Jesus' life as compared with the incarnation. They connected the Christology with the cosmology, but were not able to combine it with the scheme of salvation. Their Logos doctrine is not a 'higher' Christology than the prevailing form; it rather lags behind the genuine Christian estimate of Christ. It is not God who reveals himself in Christ, but the Logos, the depotentiated God, who _as God_ is subordinate to the supreme Deity."]