CHAPTER XXII.

HONDURAS AFFAIRS.

1865-1886.

NATIONAL FLAG AND ESCUTCHEON—ORDER OF SANTA ROSA—MEDINA'S LONG RULE—HIS DIFFERENCES WITH DUEÑAS, AND TRIUMPH—WAR WITH SALVADOR AND GUATEMALA—MEDINA DEFEATED AND OVERTHROWN—CÉLEO ARIAS SUCCEEDS HIM—HIS LIBERAL POLICY—HE IS BESET BY THE CONSERVATIVES—HIS FORMER SUPPORTERS DEPOSE HIM—PONCIANO LEIVA BECOMES PRESIDENT—HIS COURSE DISPLEASES BARRIOS, WHO SETS MEDINA AGAINST HIM—HE IS FORCED TO RESIGN—MARCO AURELIO SOTO MADE PRESIDENT BY BARRIOS—ATTEMPTED REVOLT OF EX-PRESIDENT MEDINA—HIS TRIAL AND EXECUTION—SOTO'S ADMINISTRATION—HE GOES ABROAD—HIS QUARREL WITH BARRIOS, AND RESIGNATION—PRESIDENT BOGRAN—FILIBUSTERING SCHEMES.

There is very little to record for Honduras in the five years from 1865 to 1870; the country enjoyed comparative peace under the same conservative system existing in Guatemala and Salvador. President Medina being reëlected was again inducted into office on the 1st of February, 1866, and a few days later the military rank of lieutenant-general was conferred on him.[XXII-1] On the 16th of the same month congress decreed a change in the national coat of arms and flag, in the manner described at foot.[XXII-2]

Early in 1868 Medina and congress, with the approbation of the council of state,[XXII-3] resolved upon the creation of an order of merit to reward important civil, military, and religious services rendered to the nation, and other praiseworthy acts of its citizens. Congress then on the 21st of February established the Órden de Santa Rosa y de la Civilizacion de Honduras.[XXII-4] The executive promulgated the decree on the 24th with the signature appended of Trinidad Ferrari, minister of the interior. The idea met with the approval of some, and excited the ridicule of others. The order soon fell into discredit, many unworthy persons having obtained it, and its suppression was decreed.[XXII-5]

Medina was chosen president for another term of four years. In order to do this, the clause in article 33 of the national constitution forbidding reëlection for the next immediate period was repealed, which Medina's partisans effected through a constituent assembly convoked ad hoc.[XXII-6] He was accordingly reinaugurated February 1, 1870.

Honduras was now to experience another series of troubles, which lasted several years. In the last days of December 1869, disturbances were apprehended in Olancho and Paraiso, in connivance with Nicaraguan exiles, for which reason those refugees were concentrated in Comayagua. Some seditious attempts were made in the following year, but were easily put down.

[Sidenote: TROUBLES WITH SALVADOR.]

Early in 1871, serious differences existed between the governments of Honduras and Salvador, or, to be more exact, between presidents Medina and Dueñas, on several points. The causes, as well as the fruitless efforts made by Honduran commissioners in San Salvador to effect a peaceable settlement of long-existing differences, are fully explained elsewhere.[XXII-7] Medina, on the 7th of February, declared all treaties between the two republics suspended, and war soon broke out. A Salvadoran army, under General Xatruch, invaded Honduras and took Comayagua, that commander styling himself provisional president. The Honduran government had entered into a correspondence with the United States ministers resident at Tegucigalpa and San Salvador, calling their attention to the 14th article of the treaty of July 4, 1864, between their nation and Honduras, under which the former recognized the rights of ownership and sovereignty of the latter in the line of the Honduras interoceanic railway, the works on which, it said, were in danger of interruption by the Salvadoran invaders. From the tenor of its notes, it would seem as if it expected the United States to hoist their flag over Comayagua, which might have hindered the operations of Xatruch. Medina's pretension was untenable, the understanding being that the obligation of the United States did not attach till after the completion of the work.[XXII-8] Moreover, the Honduran government could not reasonably expect that those ministers had an armed force at their command. The United States had no need, even if willing to accept the duty of protecting those works, to adopt any measures, being assured by the Salvadoran government that the neutrality of the Honduras railway would not be interfered with in any manner.

Medina was not idle in devising means to injure the enemy. He occupied Sensuntepeque on March 17th, and next Ilobasco. Dueñas' forces under General Tomás Martinez attacked the latter place on the 19th, and being repulsed retreated to Cojutepeque. General Santiago Gonzalez with Hondurans and disaffected Salvadorans occupied San Vicente on the 19th, the reserve remaining in Sensuntepeque, which revolted against Dueñas.[XXII-9] The campaign in Salvador ended at Santa Ana, where the fate of Dueñas' government was decided.[XXII-10] Peace was then concluded between the new government of Salvador and that of Honduras. Medina started after Xatruch, who then had about 700 men in Gracias; but the news of the result at Santa Ana reaching there his troops deserted him. The war was soon over, Xatruch himself in a proclamation of May 11th signifying his intention to leave the country. After this the political situation was for a while satisfactory. Still Medina deemed it expedient to invite a plebiscite, and ascertain if the people wished him to continue at the head of affairs the rest of his term.[XXII-11] The result was as he desired it.

A great commotion was caused in August by 300 or 400 Indians and revolutionists, against whom the government forces never obtained but partial successes. The disturbance lasted until an understanding was arrived at with the rebel leaders on the 13th of December.[XXII-12]

[Sidenote: PERPETUAL WAR.]

Further trouble was impending, this time between Medina and the liberal governments lately established in Salvador and Guatemala. He claimed of Salvador an indemnity for his services in overthrowing Dueñas, which that government deemed preposterous and disallowed. The two governments, which had entered into an alliance offensive and defensive, on the other hand accused Medina of having formed a coalition with the oligarchs to restore the latter to power.[XXII-13]

Medina closed official relations with Salvador March 25th; and this act, being looked upon by Salvador and Guatemala as a declaration of war, they invaded Honduras, and soon after a victory over Medina's general, Velez, occupied the principal towns, all of which revolted against Medina, and a provisional government was set up[XXII-14] with Céleo Arias at the head of affairs. Medina had temporarily placed the executive office in charge of Crescencio Gomez, and taken command of his troops in the field. Upon Comayagua being occupied by the Salvadorans, Gomez and his officials fled to Gracias. Medina attempted, May 27th, to recapture Comayagua, but was repulsed.[XXII-15]

Omoa had been given up July 20th to Juan Antonio Medina, a Salvadoran general, for Arias' government. Medina, the president, suffered a defeat on the same day at Potrerillos, and a crushing one on the 26th, in Santa Bárbara, at the hands of the allied forces of Arias, Guatemala, and Salvador, escaping with only six officers to Omoa,[XXII-16] where he joined the other man of the same surname, who had a few days previously accepted the executive office, transferred to him by Crescencio Gomez, proclaiming himself provisional president, and appointing a cabinet. But a revolt of the troops put an end to this arrangement, José M. Medina, his substitute Gomez, and others being made prisoners, and sent at once to Comayagua, where they arrived on or about August 9th.[XXII-17] Arias' government now had but little difficulty to secure its tenure of power. Ex-president Medina was held in confinement to answer such charges as would be preferred against him before the next national congress.[XXII-18] A full amnesty was decreed for all political offences committed from March 5, 1871, to November 1, 1872, the only persons excluded from its benefits being José María Medina, and his ministers, Manuel Colindres and Rafael Padilla, who were also to abide the action of congress.[XXII-19]

The constitution of 1865 having become a dead letter, the provisional government, in a decree of November 15th, recognized as existing in their full force all the rights of citizens under republican institutions,[XXII-20] though reserving the privilege of suspending some of them in the event of public disturbance. This decree was countersigned by the three ministers of state.[XXII-21] The people were on the 17th of March, 1873, convoked to choose deputies to a convention which was to frame a new constitution. The last Sunday of the following April was named for the elections.[XXII-22]

[Sidenote: COMING OF CONSERVATIVES.]

Guatemala was experiencing troubles in her eastern departments. An expedition of conservatives landed at Trujillo from the ship _General Sherman_, menacing the government of Arias, and at the same time aiding the faction which was trying to overthrow that of Guatemala.[XXII-23] The latter and Salvador attributing the scheme to President Guardia of Costa Rica, jointly accredited a minister in Nicaragua, the result of whose mission was a tripartite defensive alliance. Arias decreed martial law, and reassumed the dictatorship which the people conferred on him the previous year.[XXII-24]

The revolutionary forces under Miranda were signally defeated by the Guatemalan commander, Solares, on the north side of the Chamelecon River on the 9th of August, with great loss, General Casto Alvarado and Colonel A. Muñoz being killed, and a large quantity of war material falling into the victor's hands.[XXII-25] The presidents of Guatemala and Salvador, after the insurrection in the former republic had been quelled, held conferences at Chingo on the situation in Honduras, and came to the conclusion that Arias' government, being unpopular, could not sustain itself without their material as well as moral support, which would be a heavy burden. He was then asked in a joint note to give up the executive office to some one more in the confidence of the people. He refused to accede to the demand, and the allied troops approached Comayagua to carry out their suggestion. The first notice of their intent was the proclamation in the town of Aguanqueterique, of Ponciano Leiva as provisional president, who organized his administration at Choluteca on the 23d of November, and on the 8th of December declared all the acts of Arias null.[XXII-26]

The allied forces of Leiva under his minister of war, General Juan Lopez, of Guatemala under Solares, and of Salvador under Espinosa, laid siege to Comayagua on the 6th of January, 1874, and after seven days' resistance, Arias, together with his ministers and chief supporters, had to capitulate on the 13th. Ex-president Medina was released from confinement, and eventually, having recognized the new ruler, was set free, when he went to live in La Paz.[XXII-27]

[Sidenote: LEIVA SUCCEEDS ARIAS]

Leiva's government was soon recognized by the other states. It was of course expected to pursue a policy in accord with the governments that gave it existence. But it seems that Leiva preferred to follow an independent course,[XXII-28] and in a short time the two powers that so elevated him were in antagonism, Guatemala using her influence against and Salvador for him, as will be seen hereafter. A constituent congress convoked by Leiva adjourned in May, after adopting three important measures; namely, confirming Leiva as provisional president, restoring the constitution of 1865, and ordering Arias into exile for five years.[XXII-29] The political state of affairs was not satisfactory to Guatemala. The elections had yielded a majority of conservatives and reactionists in congress, and many if not most of the public offices had gone into the hands of men of that party, one of the most prominent being Manuel Colindres. The regular congress was installed on the 20th of January, 1875, and the next day the executive sent in his message, giving in detail the condition of public affairs. February 1st he took the oath of office as constitutional president, having been elected by the people.[XXII-30] A full amnesty for political offences was granted by congress February 9th, and promulgated the same day by the president and his minister of relations and justice, Adolfo Zúñiga.

The people of Honduras were not allowed, however, to enjoy the benefits of peace but for a short time; for Ex-president Medina instigated, as it was generally believed, by President Barrios of Guatemala, raised at Gracias, on the 21st of December, the standard of revolution, proclaiming himself provisional president.[XXII-31] He afterward suffered for his lack of wisdom. The government at once prepared to meet the emergency. Salvador organized a force to support it, and Guatemala resolved to sustain Medina, whose real plan was to hurl Gonzalez from the executive chair of Salvador, as well as Leiva from that of Honduras.

The revolution assumed proportions, and Medina had come to believe himself master of the situation. The presidents of Salvador and Guatemala arranged at Chingo, on the 15th of February, 1876, to intervene in Honduras and stop the revolution. At this time it was thought that Leiva could not hold his own, his forces having been routed at Intibucá, and his authority being felt only in the eastern departments. The rebels had captured the capital, Comayagua, and delivered it to the horrors of an exterminating war. But the battle of Naranjo changed the aspect of affairs, Leiva's troops gaining there a decisive victory, which restored his authority over almost the whole extent of the republic.[XXII-32] There was no further need of Guatemala and Salvador pacifying Honduras; peace had been virtually restored, and only a few scattered parties of rebels in the departments of Copan and Gracias had to be eliminated.[XXII-33] But soon after another contestant for the presidential office appeared on the field, namely, Marco Aurelio Soto, ex-minister of foreign relations of Guatemala,[XXII-34] whom a Guatemalan force supported. A treaty of peace was concluded, however, with the mediation of Salvador, at Los Cedros June 8, 1876,[XXII-35] and the executive office went into the hands of Crescencio Gomez by transfer from Marcelino Mejía, to whom the treaty had given it. Gomez decreed August 12th to turn over the office to Medina, who declined accepting it; but as the republic was thereby left without a chief magistrate, he concluded on the 18th to call Marco Aurelio Soto to fill the position,[XXII-36] denying in a manifesto that Guatemala purposed controlling the affairs of Honduras.[XXII-37]

[Sidenote: PRESIDENT SOTO.]

Soto announced August 27th from Amapala[XXII-38] his assumption of the executive duties, declaring that his policy would be fair and friendly at home and toward the other Central American states, and that he was free from internal or foreign entanglements. He was soon after recognized by other governments as the legitimate chief magistrate of Honduras.[XXII-39] Under his administration the people were once more enabled to devote themselves to peaceful pursuits. On the 27th of May, 1877, in an extensive message to congress, he set forth the condition of public affairs, and what his government had done in every branch of the public service during the last nine months. He assured the representatives that no branch had been neglected; and expressed the hope that if peace and order were preserved, the country would erelong begin to reap the benefits of his measures.[XXII-40] He had been chosen by the people, on April 22d, constitutional president, and the extraordinary congress acknowledged him as such on the 29th of May. He was formally inaugurated on the following day.

Ex-president Medina, and the Salvadoran general Ezequiel Marin, together with two colonels and several other officers of less rank, and a number of civilians, for an attempted rebellion in the latter end of 1877, were subjected to the action of a court-martial at Santa Rosa, on the charge of high treason and other offences,[XXII-41] and sentenced to death. The cause being taken, for revision, to the supreme council of war, the sentence against Medina and Marin was confirmed, the court having found no extenuating circumstances; one lieutenant and one sergeant obtained a commutation to ten years' confinement in the fortress at Omoa. The other prisoners were set at liberty, but with a warning never again to engage in similar conspiracies, or the sentence of the court-martial against them would be enforced. Medina and Marin were shot at Santa Rosa at 8 o'clock in the morning of February 8, 1878.[XXII-42] The other two men were at once despatched to their prison at Omoa.

* * * * *

[Sidenote: AN INFAMOUS RULER.]

José María Medina has been styled a genuine liberal, and his friends gave him credit as a commander of resources, and an able administrator. His military record showed that he surrendered the fortress of Omoa to General Carrera, and followed him to Guatemala, where he was rewarded for that service with a lieutenant-colonelcy. He never won any action of importance. During the insurrection of Olancho in 1864, he never went beyond Yoro until informed that the affair was over. He issued the order of December 25, 1864, countersigned by his minister, Francisco Cruz, empowering all his officers to put prisoners to death,[XXII-43] and that in the face of several constitutional clauses abolishing the death penalty, and forbidding the trial of citizens by military courts. He was also guilty of incendiarism in burning many towns and haciendas, and of confiscation. He made himself and his satellites wealthy at the expense of his country and his victims. He reached the presidency by the favor of the oligarchs of Guatemala. As a ruler he was an unmitigated tyrant; as an administrator he left nothing to entitle him to a place among the benefactors of his nation—no schools, no material improvements of any kind. In lieu thereof he left the national name dishonored abroad, the national character degraded, financial ruin, corruption, immorality, poverty, bitter animosities, and almost every misfortune that could have befallen hapless Honduras.

* * * * *

Nothing worthy of particular mention occurred from this time on till November 2, 1880, when the national capital was removed to Tegucigalpa. In December of the same year Marco Aurelio Soto was reëlected president,[XXII-44] and the people continued enjoying the benefits of peace. The national assembly met at Tegucigalpa on the 19th of February, 1883. Doctor Soto was again installed as president by virtue of a reëlection, and in an able and lucid address congratulated the representatives of the people that since their last meeting in 1881 quiet had reigned, and the liberal constitution framed in 1877 had worked successfully. Relations with Costa Rica, interrupted in 1878, were renewed on the 15th of last October; and those with the rest of the Central American states, as well as with other powers, were on the most friendly footing. The long-pending boundary question with Salvador had been referred to the arbitration of President Zavala of Nicaragua. The government had, on the 15th of September, 1882, sanctioned the plan of Central American unification. Finances were in a satisfactory state, large payments having relieved the treasury of heavy burdens. The administration of justice had become improved, and public education advanced. Agriculture was progressing, trade on the increase with the facilities afforded it; and mining had engaged the attention of capitalists both at home and abroad.[XXII-45]

President Soto sent in his resignation to congress on March 10th, pleading ill health. It was not accepted, and instead a leave of absence was granted him with a liberal pecuniary allowance for expenses.[XXII-46] Congress thought proper, however, to utilize his intended visit to Europe to place on a better footing the financial affairs of the republic.[XXII-47] Before taking his departure, Soto placed, on the 9th of May, the executive office in charge of the council of ministers, namely, Enrique Gutierrez, Luis Bogran, and Rafael Alvarado. This was in accordance with the constitution. In bidding good by to his fellow-citizens, Soto congratulated them upon the reign of peace at home,[XXII-48] and the cordiality existing with other nations. He promised to come back as soon as possible to complete his term, and to surrender the trust to his successor.[XXII-49]

[Sidenote: SOTO AND BARRIOS.]

A serious quarrel occurred soon after, while Soto was in San Francisco, California, between him and Barrios. He received, as he considered it, from a reliable source, information that Barrios, being displeased with his government, had resolved to promote a revolution in Honduras as an excuse for war and for overthrowing that government. He wrote Barrios on July 6, 1883, that his government having been ever loyal and friendly to and fulfilled its treaty obligations with Guatemala, he must attribute to personal motives Barrios' intended course. He was not, he said, disposed to give the latter an opportunity to sow distraction in his own country, and to let loose again the dogs of war in all Central America. To avert those calamities he was ready to bring about a legal transfer of his office, and would lay his final resignation before congress. But he wished Barrios to know that he did so actuated by patriotic motives, and not by fear, for he had sufficient power in Honduras to sustain himself, and to defend her against unjust aggression. Barrios returned a scathful answer on August 3d. After denying Soto's accusations, he attributes his resignation to a preconceived resolve to desert by actual flight his post, and lead abroad a life of ease and luxury upon his ill-gotten wealth; and now was using his, Barrios', name as a pretext to justify his conduct. He asserts that Soto left Honduras with the intention of not returning, and indeed, with a full knowledge that the Hondurans would never permit his return.[XXII-50] The writer in the plainest language accuses him of having enriched himself at the expense of a country which he had ruined, and of private parties alike. As to Soto's brave words, they are taken, he says, at their true worth in Guatemala, where he is well known. It would be easier and less costly to hurl him from power, than it was to raise him to and keep him at the head of the government.

Barrios concluded that he would take no further notice of Soto's remarks, as there was a broad sea between them. His charges about Soto's incompetency, disloyalty, and general dishonesty are certainly exaggerated. Soto sent his resignation from San Francisco, and congress unanimously accepted it on the 3d of September.[XXII-51]

General Luis Bogran was spontaneously and almost by unanimity chosen by the people president of the republic,[XXII-52] and assumed the duties on the 30th of November, soon after organizing his cabinet with the ministers named below.[XXII-53]

The country continued at peace, and there was no reason to apprehend any immediate disturbance. In the attempt made by Guatemala to reorganize Central America by force of arms, in the early part of 1885, Honduras pledged her coöperation, but had little opportunity to take an active part. Upon hearing of the Guatemalan defeat, and of the death of President Barrios on the 2d of April, she wavered, but finally made peace with Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica.

[Sidenote: PEACE RESTORED.]

About the middle of 1885 there were near Trujillo some slight disturbances, but quiet was restored. A filibustering expedition was expected at Trujillo on the ship _Dorian_, said to have been fitted out by Ex-president Soto, with the view of recovering power. The government of Belize, at the request of the Honduran authorities, despatched the gun-boat _Lily_ to Trujillo, where she arrived September 29th, and made known the object of her visit.[XXII-54] No such expedition came to create disturbance. Still later, in 1886, a similar attempt was made but failed, the ship supposed to have been engaged for the purpose being captured at sea by an American cruiser.