CHAPTER X.

DISSOLUTION OF THE UNION.

1839-1852.

INTERSTATE DISSENSIONS—PACTO DE CHINANDEGA—CONFEDERACION CENTRO AMERICANA—SUPREMO DELEGADO CHAMORRO—HOSTILITY OF GUATEMALA AND BRITISH OFFICIALS—ARCE INVADES SALVADOR—WAR OF THE CONFEDERACY AGAINST GUATEMALA—HELPLESSNESS OF CHAMORRO—END OF THE PACTO DE CHINANDEGA—CONDITION OF THE STATES—FERRERA'S BAD FAITH—SALVADOR AND HONDURAS AGAINST NICARAGUA—HORRORS OF LEON—VICE-PRESIDENT JOAQUIN E. GUZMAN—HONDURAS AND SALVADOR AT WAR—GUARDIOLA'S VANDALISM—MALESPIN OVERTHROWN—RENEWED EFFORTS TO CONFEDERATE—GUATEMALA AN INDEPENDENT REPUBLIC—COSTA RICA FOLLOWS—SALVADOR, NICARAGUA, AND HONDURAS A CONFEDERACY—ITS SHORT LIFE—FURTHER UNSUCCESSFUL ATTEMPTS.

[Sidenote: ENGLISH INTERVENTION.]

The government of Nicaragua, on the 13th of September, 1839, following the advice of Minister Pavon of Guatemala, asked for the mediation of Frederick Chatfield, the British consul, in an endeavor to bring to an end the existing dissensions with Salvador. Chatfield declined to interfere, on the plea that Salvador, in a treaty with the state of Los Altos, on the 10th of August, had insulted the British crown.[X-1] However, on the 27th of May, 1840, he sent to the government of Nicaragua an extract of a despatch of March 2d from the British foreign office, saying that his sovereign would cordially mediate between the two states, provided such mediation was asked for by both, or by all the governments interested, in which event he, Chatfield, was authorized to use his good offices. But he was at the same time directed to add that Great Britain was not disposed to enter into any engagement binding her to employ armed forces in Central America. This course was not pleasing to Pavon, but fully satisfied the executive of Nicaragua. Chatfield's mediation was never called for.

* * * * *

Buitrago, director of the state of Nicaragua, was drawn by the force of public opinion to give his assent to the state taking part in a convention intended to reorganize the republic of Central America.[X-2] The Nicaraguan delegates used their best endeavors for the accomplishment of their mission; but from the beginning they found their efforts hindered by the machiavelism of the aristocrats of Guatemala, and in disgust left the convention after filing a protest.[X-3] They returned to it afterward, however, and on the 11th of April, 1842, the convention made a declaration in seven articles establishing a 'gobierno nacional provisorio,' having at its head a 'supremo delegado,' with a council composed of one representative chosen by each of the respective state assemblies.[X-4] Antonio José Cañas was appointed supremo delegado. But this great effort on the part of the men imbued with a truly patriotic spirit came to naught, because the assembly of Guatemala indignantly rejected the compact of Chinandega, and Ferrera of Honduras acted in bad faith. Costa Rica accepted it with certain restrictions.[X-5]

A second effort was made on the 27th of July at Chinandega by the delegates of Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, who passed an act to form a league under the name of Confederacion Centro Americana.[X-6] Sixteen of the articles in the constitution conformed with the instructions given by the aristocrats of Guatemala through the state assembly to the commissioners despatched to the villa de Santa Rosa on the 28th of September, 1839; and yet, after their adoption by the convention of Chinandega, these same persons made opposition to them. The fact was, that they had been all along using deception, appointing commissioners to several diets, but never intending that a reorganization of Central American nationality should be arrived at.[X-7]

[Sidenote: PACTO DE CHINANDEGA.]

Guatemala accredited a legation at Leon, Gerónimo Carcache being the envoy. He tried to exculpate his government for its opposition to the compact of Chinandega, asserting at the same time its firm resolve to uphold the treaty concluded in October 1842, by Pavon, Arriaga, and Duran, and accepted by Costa Rica in May 1843.[X-8] This opposition, notwithstanding the organization of the executive and council, under the compact of Chinandega, was effected at San Vicente, in Salvador, on the 29th of March, 1844; Fruto Chamorro, delegate from Nicaragua, being chosen supremo delegado, Juan Lindo, delegate from Honduras, president of the council, and Justo Herrera, ex-jefe of the same state, secretary of that body. The installation of the confederate government was at once communicated to the several states.

Honduras, on the 27th of April, recognized and accepted what had been done at San Vicente. Salvador and Nicaragua expressed much satisfaction. The reactionary government of Guatemala kept silent, and on being pressed for an answer, returned a cold and laconic one, to the effect that the matter would be laid before the legislative body; that is to say, the assembly which, on the 17th of April, 1839, had declared the Central American confederation dissolved.[X-9] It could not be expected that such an assembly would give its assent. The committee to which the subject was referred made an unfavorable report, which the assembly accepted. Costa Rica suggested amendments to the 'pacto de Chinandega.'[X-10] This document never had any practical value, for the governments which were parties thereto took no account of the duties it imposed on them. It will be seen that the executive of Honduras was its covert enemy, and that the government of Salvador openly infringed a number of its clauses.

[Sidenote: MALESPIN AND ARCE.]

Malespin, president of Salvador, was arranging affairs for a change in favor of a theocratic régime to please Viteri, bishop of San Salvador, when news came that the state had been invaded at Atiquizaya by Manuel José Arce. The ex-president had with him troops of Guatemala, and a supply of arms and ammunition to put in the hands of Malespin's enemies. The question will be asked, Why did the aristocrats of Guatemala cause the invasion of Salvador, her executive being their agent Malespin, who was, moreover, under the control of Bishop Viteri? This is easily explained. Malespin was, in the eyes of the aristocrats, another Carrera, disposed at times to slip out of their hands. It was, therefore, important to have him superseded by Arce, when affairs in the state would go on smoothly and to their satisfaction. In Arce ruling over Salvador, they would have, besides, a support against Carrera.[X-11] But the people of Salvador, albeit much dissatisfied with Malespin and Viteri, were decidedly opposed to Arce with aristocratic surroundings. His invasion of the state only served to strengthen Malespin's power for a time. The president set the whole state in motion to meet the emergency. He did even more: he asked for the assistance of the supremo delegado of the confederacy, which was promised him. Each state was to furnish 1,000 men; but meanwhile Salvador was to place 2,000 men at the disposal of the confederate executive.[X-12] The general government agreed to use its utmost endeavors to avert the subjugation of Salvador by Guatemala. Malespin was enjoined, on his part, to confine his military operations within the territory of his own state. He easily got together in a few days at San Salvador 4,000 men, with which force he marched to the front. One portion of the vanguard, under Lieutenant-colonel Pedro Escalon, on the 5th of May, reached the Chingo Valley in pursuit of Arce, Aquilino San Martin, and Guillermo Quintanilla, who fled to their headquarters at Coatepeque. They were attacked there, and took to flight a second time, leaving a large quantity of arms and ammunition. Another portion of the vanguard occupied Chalchuapa, placing a force and the artillery at Santa Ana.[X-13]

Malespin, in disregard of the command he had received from the supremo delegado, marched triumphantly to Jutiapa, in Guatemala; in consequence of which, the government of Rivera Paz assumed that Guatemala was in a state of war, her territory having been invaded; and Carrera was called upon to use her forces against the invaders. A forced loan was decreed, and a change took place in the cabinet, Manuel F. Pavon assuming the portfolios of relations, government, and war.[X-14] Pavon was certainly the man for the occasion.[X-15] He returned an answer to a note from the minister of the supremo delegado, which Milla, his biographer, has pronounced an able and conclusive one. But it was in reality a mass of abuse against Salvador and Malespin. He did not attempt to show that Arce's invasion was not the act of the Guatemalan government, as he should have done; but claimed that the war against Malespin was not a consequence of Arce's act, but of the malice of the Salvadoreños.[X-16]

[Sidenote: TREATY BETWEEN HONDURAS AND SALVADOR.]

The bad climate of Jutiapa soon began to decimate the Salvador army, reducing it to about 3,000 men. Moreover, the government of Salvador, then in charge of Vice-president Guzman, could not easily procure means for the support of such a force. It was quite evident that the time for upsetting Carrera had not yet come; and Malespin's defeat would only bring greater outrages upon the people. Patience was necessary under the circumstances. It was consequently decided to abandon Jutiapa and recross the rio de la Paz, which was effected on the 17th of June.[X-17] The assembly empowered the government to negotiate for peace, and a convention was entered into at the hacienda de Quezada on the 5th of August, 1844,[X-18] under which friendly relations were restored, and Guatemala promised to accredit a commissioner near the confederate government.[X-19] This convention was, however, annulled by the Guatemalan commissioners, because the supremo delegado had refused to ratify it.[X-20] But the government of Guatemala determined that it should be held valid by Malespin's accepting it as law for the Salvadoreños. Bishop Viteri undertook to accomplish this, and succeeded.[X-21] Malespin gave his assent to the convention being ratified by the supremo delegado, and made a declaration of peaceful intentions toward Guatemala.[X-22] He refers to the liberals residing at Leon, who had been driven from Honduras by Ferrera, and from Salvador by himself; and he accuses them of being the cause of much trouble, for which they should be discountenanced by honorable men. The pacto de Chinandega, as we have seen, had become a dead letter. Honduras and Salvador entered, on the 10th of July, 1844, at San Salvador, into a treaty, which was ratified by both governments.[X-23]

Chamorro's government was notified by Ferrera that auxiliary forces from Nicaragua would no longer be allowed to traverse Honduran territory.[X-24] Chamorro's minister, M. Aguilar, remonstrated against a measure which would prevent the arrival of friendly troops to defend the confederacy, whereof Honduras was a component part.[X-25] Chamorro, using his lawful authority, ordered J. Trinidad Muñoz, who commanded the Honduras force of operations, not to obstruct the passage of the Nicaraguan troops. Muñoz disobeyed the order; and upon the Nicaraguans arriving at Choluteca, on the 17th of August, he required them to leave the territory of Honduras forthwith; which not being done, he assailed and conquered them on the 19th, after a three hours' fight.[X-26] This action had a great influence on the fate of Central America; for it satisfied the aristocrats of Guatemala that the supremo delegado had no means for enforcing his authority or for carrying out his plans. It was virtually a declaration of war between Honduras and Nicaragua. Malespin was likewise emboldened by it to assail Nicaragua. The latter must then move with the utmost activity against Ferrera, before Malespin, now at peace with Guatemala, could come to his aid. But difficulties that could not be overcome were in the way; and it was only on the 23d of October that upwards of 1,000 Nicaraguans appeared before Nacaome, which they assaulted the next day, and after two hours of hard fighting, were repulsed.[X-27]

[Sidenote: WAR ON NICARAGUA.]

Trinidad Cabañas and Gerardo Barrios, two of Morazan's officers, made, on the 5th of September, 1844, an attempt at San Miguel to overthrow Malespin without bloodshed; but having failed, they went off to Nicaragua by way of La Union. Malespin's minister, José Antonio Jimenez, then demanded of the Nicaraguan government that Cabañas and Barrios should be either expelled or surrendered to Salvador for punishment. The demand was rejected. The two officers were by no means discouraged. They persevered in their efforts, which, more than anything else, finally brought about the tyrant's overthrow. By virtue of a special decree, Malespin took, on the 25th of October, personal command of the state forces, placing the executive office in charge of the vice-president, Joaquin Eufracio Guzman, who on the same day entered upon the discharge of his duties, giving Malespin unlimited powers for the defence of the state. Such authorization did not justify Malespin's carrying the war into Nicaragua.[X-28] This state, after the defeat of its troops at Nacaome, had removed them from Honduran territory, and sued for peace. And yet Malespin, in violation of the laws of Salvador, made preparations for an offensive war against Nicaragua.

It will be well, before relating the events of this campaign, to cast an eye upon the present lamentable condition of the four states thus bent upon each other's destruction. Guatemala was ruled by the aristocrats with a rod of iron. Her financial affairs were completely disorganized. In Salvador Malespin had no other rule of conduct than his own will and Bishop Viteri's evil counsels. He believed himself surrounded by enemies, and indeed he was.[X-29] Honduras was in a disturbed state, and the victim of Ferrera's despotism. Nicaragua was in anything but a satisfactory situation. The men who with their superior talents, statesmanship, and influence might have carried the ship of state safely through the coming storm, Francisco Castellon and Máximo Jerez, were in Europe working to undo the evils wrought against Central America by Pavon and Chatfield. The director of the state, Manuel Perez,[X-30] lacked the prestige that the occasion required. Casto Fonseca, the commander of the forces, had been given the rank of 'gran mariscal.'[X-31]

The pacto de Chinandega had ceased to exist. Owing to hostile acts of Malespin, Chamorro had to seek safety in flight. Ferrera treated Chamorro with contumely, and shamefully abused him in a report to the chambers of Honduras, in January 1846.[X-32] Malespin and his army against Nicaragua entered Honduras, and at Nacaome made an address to the president and army of Honduras.[X-33] The two allied presidents had a conference at Sauce on the 7th of November, and agreed that Malespin should be recognized as the general-in-chief of their forces. At Choluteca proposals for peace came from Leon; and on the 21st of the same month the treaty of Zatoca[X-34] was concluded, which was disgraceful to the Nicaraguan negotiators.[X-35] A secret clause was also agreed to, binding Nicaragua, among other things, to retire her troops from Chinandega to Chichigalpa. But the authorities and people of Leon preferred death with honor to submission to such degrading demands. The treaty and secret clause were indignantly rejected. Perez, the director, surrendered the executive office to Senator Emiliano Madrid.

[Sidenote: ATTACK ON LEON.]

In the night of November 21st the allied forces encamped in the barranca de San Antonio.[X-36] On the 26th, at 8 in the evening, they were in front of Leon, and threw bombs into the city. The next morning at 3 o'clock Malespin, being drunk, ordered an assault, which resulted disastrously for the invaders; for at sunrise he found his camp strewn with corpses.[X-37] The attack was, however, continued that day till 4 o'clock in the afternoon, when the allies found themselves short of ammunition, and with many of their chief officers killed or wounded. Discord now broke out among them, and the Hondurans wanted to abandon the campaign; but J. Trinidad Muñoz, acting for Malespin, quieted them, and the struggle went on. That night Muñoz erected intrenchments, and at break of day on the 28th the allies were in condition to act vigorously.[X-38]

Commissioners came out to the allied headquarters, and on the 1st of December a treaty was negotiated,[X-39] to which no ratification was given in the city, and the war continued. Meanwhile there was much agitation in Salvador, with occasional revolutionary attempts, which becoming known at Leon, emboldened the authorities and citizens to keep up the fight, notwithstanding the other departments had turned against them.[X-40]

José Francisco Montenegro and Juan Ruiz were the commissioners of Rivas and Granada, near Malespin. Their mission brought about the creation of a new government, which had no recognition in Leon. Senator Silvestre Selva lent himself to be made by Malespin and his allies director supremo of Nicaragua, under the stipulation of ratifying the convention of December 1st, adding the name of Pio Castellon to the list of the proscribed.[X-41]

[Sidenote: SIEGE OF LEON.]

Several partial actions took place in other parts of the department of Leon, which turned out favorably for the invaders.[X-42] But Malespin was furious at his failure thus far to capture Leon. The firing of his guns was incessant. He made a final effort, throwing himself at the head of a force upon the works of Sutiaba, which were in charge of Gerardo Barrios; and after some hours' hard fighting was repulsed, leaving the field covered with his killed and wounded. But there was no unity of action in the city at this time. Some officers believed that Casto Fonseca, though brave, was not competent to make a proper defence; and one of them, named José M. Valle, alias El Chelon, suggested that he should turn over the command to Cabañas. Fonseca looked upon the suggestion as an insult, and in consequence Valle retired, and Cabañas became an object of suspicion to Fonseca. The siege with its horrors continued. The fatal spirit of localism that maintained discord between the several towns, specially between Granada and Leon, was now as ever, and till the transfer of the capital from Leon to Managua, a great misfortune for the whole country. The besiegers made the most of it.[X-43]

A vessel arrived at this time at Realejo with arms for the besieged, of which Malespin got information from the Englishman Manning, and through Selva's agent he obtained possession of 1,000 muskets, 200 rifles, 200 barrels of powder, 200 quintals of lead, and 12,000 flints. With this supply the operations against Leon were pushed with still greater vigor, and the city succumbed to an assault by Guardiola on the 24th of January, 1845. Malespin now gave full sway to his bloody instincts, by shooting a number of prominent citizens and surrendering the town to the soldiery for plunder.[X-44] The outrages committed defy description.[X-45]

* * * * *

[Sidenote: INDEPENDENCE OF SALVADOR.]

While Malespin was engaged in the Nicaragua campaign, the state of Salvador was preparing to throw off the yoke, and his brother Calixto was issuing arbitrary orders without the knowledge or assent of Vice-president Guzman. At last, at midnight between the 30th and 31st of December, 1844, the garrison at San Salvador was surprised by a party of armed men from the Calvario, and captured, together with the arms in the barracks.[X-46] After that the revolt went on gaining large proportions; but the rebels were defeated in the plain of Jucuapa, Cojutepeque, on the 4th of January, 1845.

The liberal chiefs Cabañas and Barrios, who escaped from Nicaragua, reached La Union. Barrios,[X-47] with the view of rousing the Salvadorans, spread the report that Malespin had succumbed at Leon. Cabañas, a truthful man, disliked the scheme, but finally allowed his companion to pursue his plan without contradiction. They both entered San Miguel on the 28th of January, 1845, and loudly congratulated his friends and acquaintances on Malespin's defeat. The whole department was soon in commotion, and letters poured upon Guzman to sound the cry for liberty. Calixto Malespin continued his arbitrary acts, and Guzman concluded to oust him from his command, without bloodshed if possible. In this he was successful on the 2d of February;[X-48] the barracks were soon surrendered to him, the troops following his lead. The capital seconded the movement, and was soon followed by the other departments.[X-49] The government sent a circular to the other states announcing the change effected, and it was recognized by all but Honduras.[X-50]

The chambers of Salvador assembled on the 15th, before which Guzman made an energetic speech, and Malespin was not only dethroned, but his election to the presidency was declared null.[X-51] However, there was much to do yet to uproot him from Central American politics, as he had the support of Honduras. In an encounter at Quelepa Cabañas was defeated, which gave the reactionists courage to approach San Vicente; but public opinion was now so clearly pronounced against Malespin that Bishop Viteri turned against him, and began his efforts to win over to the clerico-oligarchic party the new president, Joaquin Eufracio Guzman.[X-52] He at once issued a decree of excommunication against Ex-president Malespin.[X-53] But the government of Honduras being bent on supporting Malespin at all hazards, Guardiola landed at La Union with an armed force, and occupied San Miguel; notwithstanding which act Guzman did not declare war against Honduras. Attributing it to ignorance of the true state of affairs in Salvador, he sent a second note, which, like the first, remained unanswered. Malespin continued—with the assent of Honduras, and without that of Nicaragua, which had assumed neutrality in the contest—calling himself general-in-chief of the armies of Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua, and declared Guzman, the Salvadoran chambers, and the inhabitants of upwards of 100 towns which had set him aside, guilty of treason.

Guzman was now menaced from several quarters; namely, from Malespin's partisans in San Salvador, the military at Comayagua, J. Trinidad Muñoz, who wanted to destroy the liberals that had escaped from Leon, and lastly, Rafael Carrera, who, though at times inclined to wheedle the liberals, generally had his claws ready to tear them to pieces. Guzman found the panther more untractable than the other wild beasts. It was therefore necessary to place in Guatemala experienced tamers; but he was unsuccessful in this. His commissioners, though they managed by fawning to approach Carrera, met with poor success in their mission.[X-54]

[Sidenote: TREATY OF PEACE.]

Guzman marched against Belloso at San Vicente and defeated him. He next went to San Miguel, which he entered amidst the plaudits of the people.[X-55] Malespin entered with him into a convention at Jocoro, binding himself to surrender all national property of Salvador and to leave the country. But the authorities of Honduras disapproved the arrangement, and it fell to the ground;[X-56] the war continued, till on the 18th of April a treaty of peace and friendship was concluded at Chinameca, to which the minister of Salvador, Dueñas, added another clause, requiring that both Salvador and Honduras should disband their troops immediately after the ratification of the treaty.[X-57] Honduras failed to ratify it, and proposed that new conferences should be held at Gualcinse, and at the same time despatched 900 men upon that place under Malespin. Armed parties from Honduras invaded Salvador; and, indeed, Ferrera was using all possible means to exasperate the latter state into committing acts of hostility against the former, so that Carrera might have an opportunity to take a hand in the game.

The chambers of Salvador assembled at this time, and Minister Dueñas reported a treaty of peace, amity, and alliance with Guatemala.[X-58] He seemed to expect aid from that side of the river Paz.[X-59] Nicaragua had extended a friendly reception to two Salvador commissioners.[X-60] The chambers gave Guzman ample powers for the defence of the state. This did not include authority to invade any other state, unless as a retaliatory measure. A resort to this was finally resolved upon, and a Salvadoran army under Cabañas marched the 24th of May upon Comayagua, meeting with defeat there on the 2d of June, and again at Sensenti on the 10th of the same month.[X-61] The Hondureños inhumanly put to death all the wounded Salvadoreños left at Comayagua and Santa Rosa. Ferrera, now flushed with victory, thought that he could dictate terms to Salvador.[X-62] It was a mistake on his part, for the people of Salvador rose en masse to repair the disasters of Comayagua and Sensenti.

[Sidenote: GUARDIOLA'S VANDALISM.]

Guardiola committed many acts of vandalism in La Union, in consequence of which Minister Dueñas, on the 25th of July, addressed a circular to the agents of foreign nations protesting against the seizure of foreign goods in the government's warehouse at that port. Cabañas, after the disasters before related, arrived at San Miguel with scarcely fifty men, and endeavored to collect his scattered forces; but his efforts were unavailing, and Guardiola marched into the city—which had been abandoned by nearly all the inhabitants—and gave it up to be plundered by his soldiers.[X-63]

All that part of Salvador on the Lempa and the district of Chalatenango were in the hands of the enemy, who acted as the master of a conquered country. One of the commanders was the notorious Manuel Quijano. The Salvadoreños attacked him and were defeated. The Hondurans now felt certain that they could capture San Salvador. But on the 15th of August Guardiola with 900 men attacked the Salvadoreños at the hacienda del Obrajuelo and was routed, losing two thirds of his force and most of his war material.[X-64] He evacuated San Miguel at midnight. The authorities of Honduras soon after published a suspension of hostilities in order to negotiate a peace.[X-65] An armistice was afterward signed at Sumpul.[X-66] Muñoz of Nicaragua, for motives of his own, exerted himself to bring about peace between Honduras and Salvador, to which end he despatched Sebastian Escobar as commissioner to the two belligerents. Sensenti was finally fixed upon as the place for holding the conferences, and a treaty of peace, amity, and alliance was concluded on the 27th of November, 1845, under which Malespin and Espinosa were forbidden to set foot in Salvador without leave of her government.[X-67]

[Sidenote: GUATEMALAN INDEPENDENCE.]

The government of Guatemala, with a view of not too openly going counter to public opinion in the states desiring to see a national government established, inserted in the treaty concluded with Salvador on the 4th of April, 1845, a clause apparently intended to promote that end.[X-68] And yet it was at the same time considering the expediency of declaring the entire independence of Guatemala, and gathering material which was made public in a manifesto in March 1847. Indeed, she had no desire to carry out the stipulations, though she named Joaquin Duran and Doctor Mariano Padilla her commissioners.[X-69] Pretexts were not wanting, and new commissioners appointed, namely, Marure and Rodriguez, both of whom favored Guatemala's absolute independence. The result was the abandonment of the plan of reorganization as entirely impracticable.[X-70] The declaration of independence was made in the decree of March 21, 1847.[X-71] Carrera, the president, in a manifesto, set forth the causes that had prompted such a measure, which he called one of regeneration, and asked the people to greet it with the same enthusiasm that was shown in 1821, when the cry for separation from Spain was raised.[X-72]

The secessionists pronounced it an able effort; but it caused a disagreeable impression in the states, and in none more so than in Salvador. It wounded public sentiment. Carrera had no legal right to take such a step. The constituent assembly had placed him in charge of the executive, but had not made him a legislator. For all that, the separation from the rest of Central America became an accomplished fact, and Carrera was declared a hero, the founder of the republic, and coin was struck with his bust on it.[X-73] This act was ratified on the 14th of September, 1848, by the constituent assembly of Guatemala, when Carrera was no longer in power.

Lindo was ruling in Honduras and Guerrero in Nicaragua, but these two states were in accord with Salvador, from fear of British pretensions, on the necessity of a Central American union. They constituted, early in 1848, the diet of Nacaome, which urgently invited Guatemala and Costa Rica to join it; but the former peremptorily declined, alleging that the decree of March 21st precluded her taking any step backward. Costa Rica sent deputies to Nacaome.[X-74] The celebrated Ecuatorian general, Juan José Flores, arrived in Costa Rica in July 1848, and was received with much consideration, which flattered his vanity. He wanted the aid of Costa Rica for his own plans, and got himself into the good graces of President Castro. The dissolution of the Colombian republic had enabled him to become the ruler of Ecuador; and being of the same way of thinking as Pavon and his fellow-secessionists of Guatemala, he counselled a complete separation of the states of Central America. Several influential men of Costa Rica favored the policy of a wholly independent government for their state.[X-75]

[Sidenote: REPUBLIC OF COSTA RICA.]

Congress, on the 30th of August, 1848, consummated the work of final separation, with a decree declaring that the title 'Estado de Costa Rica' was not in consonance with the 22d article of the constitution, which established the principle of Costa Rica's sovereignty, freedom, and independence; that with this understanding, and as a free, sovereign, and independent nation, other powers had treated with her on a footing of equality. It was therefore resolved, carrying out the wishes of the municipal districts, that the term 'república' be substituted for that of 'estado.'[X-76] President Castro sanctioned its promulgation on the 31st.

Notwithstanding so many difficulties, the friends of union never resigned the hope of accomplishing their purpose. In November 1849 commissioners of Honduras, Salvador, and Nicaragua assembled at Leon, and on the 8th agreed upon a basis of union of the three states, the terms of which were subsequently promulgated;[X-77] and it was left optional with Guatemala and Costa Rica to join it or not. The remnants of the aristocratic element, with the support of British officials,[X-78] opposed the union, and in order to defeat it, promoted revolutions in Nicaragua and Honduras. The compact went into effect, however, on the 9th of January, 1851, when the national representatives assembled in Chinandega, José F. Barrundia, representative from Salvador, being chosen their president.[X-79]

The national constituent congress was installed at Tegucigalpa on the 9th of October, 1852, and began its labors on the following day.[X-80]

[Sidenote: A SHORT-LIVED FEDERATION.]

Trinidad Cabañas was on the 13th elected jefe supremo of the federation, but he declined the honor, being desirous of disarming opposition to the new organization on the part of his political opponents. His resignation was accepted on the 26th, and Francisco Castellon chosen on the 28th.[X-81] An organic law was enacted on the 13th of October, and communicated to the government of the federation.[X-82] The supreme executive authority, on the 20th of November, 1852, was held by Pedro Molina, vice-jefe, four senators, and two acting ministers of state. The federation thus organized was not destined to be long lived. Upon the allegation that the congress had created a dictatorship, and referred the organic statute to the people instead of the legislatures of the states, the assemblies of Salvador and Nicaragua set aside the federation, and declared themselves independent states.[X-83] Nicaragua may have receded from that act; but whether it was so or not, the union between Honduras and Nicaragua was dissolved by the war which broke out in February 1863 between Salvador and Guatemala, Honduras joining one of those states, and Nicaragua the other. Further efforts have been made from time to time—1871-76, and even as late as 1885—to accomplish the union of the states under one government; but obstacles have been in the way, the chief doubtlessly being the personal ambition or jealousy of rulers, and the project still remains as a possible event to come about in a few years, as it is believed to be much desired by the majority of Central Americans.[X-84]