CHAPTER VII.

DISSOLUTION OF THE REPUBLIC.

1837-1840.

CAMPAIGN AGAINST CARRERA—SEVERAL DEPARTMENTS OF GUATEMALA IN REBELLION—JEFE GALVEZ DEPOSED—CARRERA TAKES GUATEMALA—MURDER OF SALAZAR—CARRERA ACCEPTS MONEY TO LEAVE THE CITY—DICTATORSHIP OFFERED MORAZAN BY THE ARISTOCRATS AND REFUSED—CARRERA'S SECOND REBELLION—THE REPUBLIC IN PERIL—MORAZAN'S EFFORTS TO SAVE IT—NICARAGUA AND HONDURAS FORCES INVADE SALVADOR—MORAZAN DEFEATS THEM—HIS RETREAT TO SAN SALVADOR—HE EMBARKS—IS REFUSED HOSPITALITY IN COSTA RICA—GOES TO SOUTH AMERICA—THE REPUBLIC IS DEAD—SALVADOR AT THE MERCY OF CARRERA.

Only a week after the success of the insurgents on the field of Ambelis, a numerous armed force was sent against them by the government, which achieved victory near Mataquescuintla.[VII-1] The revolution might have ended here but for the excesses of the government troops, which roused the Indians, and rendered reconciliation impossible.[VII-2] Henceforth the war was one of races. Carrera, upheld as he was by the priests, found no difficulty, in his visits from village to village, to induce the native population to join the revolt, which, notwithstanding the triumphant language of the military officers in their reports—calling the rebels cowards and themselves intrepid and invincible—was fast spreading. Carefully avoiding encounters with the regular army, Carrera succeeded in getting together a large force, which, though raw and undisciplined, often surprised and defeated detachments of the regulars, seeking a refuge when pursued in the inaccessible mountain fastnesses.[VII-3]

To make matters worse, the departments of Sacatepequez, Chiquimula, and Salamá, declared themselves independent of the government, and the rebels of the first district,[VII-4] concentrating at La Antigua, threatened to attack the capital. In the latter place a division had occurred in the liberal party,[VII-5] some of whose members from this time sided with the serviles; which circumstance made it more difficult to place the city of Guatemala in a proper state of defence. A mutiny of the federal troops in the city[VII-6] increased the danger, but it soon was quelled with the execution of the ringleader. On the 27th of January, 1838,[VII-7] Galvez despatched the vice-president, José Gregorio Salazar, and the secretary of relations, Miguel Álvarez, as commissioners, to confer with General Carrascosa, the commander of the rebel forces, and bring about an amicable arrangement. The commissioners signed at Guarda Viejo[VII-8] a convention containing the following stipulations: 1st, resignation of Galvez; 2d, occupation of the capital by the forces of Sacatepequez; 3d, the forces in the capital to go out, and place themselves under the orders of General Morazan; 4th, the forces of Sacatepequez to guarantee the persons and property of all; 5th, the commissioners would arrange the manner of evacuating the city; 6th, upon the ratification of these clauses, they were to be carried out within twenty-four hours. Nothing was done, however,[VII-9] and after four hours' waiting, Carrascosa continued his march toward the gate of Buenavista, where he met the government commissioners, who assured him, with great mortification, that the convention had not been ratified.[VII-10]

[Sidenote: ATTACK ON GUATEMALA.]

Sacatepequez' force, 800 strong, entered the capital during the night of the 29th of January, from the Calvario side, reaching the plazuela de San Francisco, afterward known as plaza de la Concordia. The roar of artillery apprised the inhabitants at 1 o'clock in the morning that the struggle had begun. Generals Prem and Gorris, colonels Yañez, Arias, Mariscal, Cerda, and Córdoba, and the other officers of the garrison, made a stout defence. Their troops, though inferior in number, were for their discipline more efficient than their assailants, who were mostly raw recruits. It was quite evident that Carrascosa and his colleague Carballo would waste their efforts unless they were strongly reënforced. But the opponents of Galvez were resolved to depose him,[VII-11] even if they had to make use of Carrera to accomplish their purpose. It was a fatal thought.

José F. Barrundia was authorized by President Morazan to enter into peaceable negotiations with Carrera, and the clergymen José María de Castilla, Manuel María Zeceña, and José Vicente Orantes. Barrundia, together with Manuel Arrivillaga, started for the hacienda of La Vega to confer with Carrera; but at Ojo de Agua they ascertained that he was at Mataquescuintla, and declined to hold any conferences, and yet an arrangement with other opponents had been signed at Santa Rosa. This document, which was shown by Father Duran to Barrundia, stipulated the immediate coming of a bishop, the abolition of the code and of other liberal measures decreed by Barrundia, and that Carrera should become the commander of the reform forces, or in other words, the arbiter of the country, which was what the clergy wanted. Barrundia was indignant, but he had to submit and keep calm, else he might lose his life. He merely said that the arrangement needed some discussion, which might lead to the adoption of some amendments. Duran had not worked to promote Barrundia's nor Molina's ideas, but his own interests. He coolly replied that the matter had been well considered, and admitted of no changes.

Barrundia wrote Carrera, asking for an interview to explain Morazan's views, but Carrera appeared angry at the mention of Morazan's name, and declined the invitation, saying that the time for negotiations had passed, and that his march against Guatemala was in order.[VII-12] He became much mollified on receiving from La Antigua a request for his coöperation,[VII-13] and was now satisfied that the fate of the country was in his own hands. Three days after Carrascosa's failure, Carrera joined him with a numerous force of Indians, and after some fruitless negotiations, marched into the city on the 1st of February,[VII-14] at the head of about 10,000 men, women, and children, the troops of the government having retreated in an opposite direction. The result of this was that Galvez ceased to be the jefe of the state, and was succeeded by the vice-jefe, Pedro Valenzuela.[VII-15]

[Sidenote: CARRERA TAKES THE CAPITAL.]

The entry of Carrera's hordes into Guatemala might well create consternation. Outlaws and robbers were among the leaders; the soldiers were in rags,[VII-16] and equipped with a variety of arms, from the rusty musket down to clubs, and knives secured at the end of long poles, while others carried sticks shaped like muskets, with tin-plate locks. Conspicuous among the mass of followers were thousands of women having bags to carry away the booty, and who gazed with amazement on the fine houses.[VII-17] Shouting 'Viva la religion! Mueran los extranjeros!' the invaders entered the main plaza. After a few hours the work of rapine began.[VII-18] No regard was paid by Carrera and his hordes to the wishes of the vice-jefe Valenzuela, who had asked that only the force from La Antigua should occupy the plaza.

The leader of the opposition urged Carrera to leave the city; but he manifested much indignation at such a request, and several of his chiefs refused compliance. Carrera himself wanted to sack the city,[VII-19] and it was only with great effort that he was prevented. In lieu of pillage he was given $11,000,[VII-20] $10,000 for his troops and $1,000 for himself. He was also flattered with the commission of lieutenant-colonel and the appointment of comandante of Mita. A number of those who had defended the city having voluntarily joined the Sacatepequez force, Carrascosa was now better able to meet emergencies. He at once, by order of the vice-jefe, made known to Carrera that the interests of the public service demanded that he should repair to Mita and take charge of the comandancia there. He made no resistance, and went away with his horde,[VII-21] the inhabitants again breathing freely for a time.[VII-22] Thus were the serviles balked once more. Carrera was sent away from Guatemala, Valenzuela remaining in charge of the state executive. Morazan was at San Salvador recognized as the chief magistrate of the republic, and Vijil held the executive office of that gallant little state.

[Sidenote: MORAZAN VERSUS CARRERA.]

Carrera and his supporters continued, however, their menaces, creating no little alarm, which was quieted on receipt of the tidings that Morazan was marching toward Guatemala with 1,500 men. On his arrival he found not only that the serviles had been deriving advantages from the disturbed political situation, but that the western departments of Los Altos, namely, Quezaltenango, Totonicapan, and Sololá, had declared themselves, on the 2d of February, a separate state under an independent government.[VII-23] Without interfering with those arrangements, Morazan endeavored to secure by peaceful means the submission of Carrera, or rather, the disbanding of his force; failing in which, he opened, on the 30th of March, the campaign against him. Three months of military operations ensued, the federal arms being victorious at every encounter, but without obtaining any definitive result, for the enemy defeated in one place rallied in another, continually increasing in numbers, and never crushed.[VII-24] Morazan returned at last to Guatemala, where in the mean time servile influence had become predominant.[VII-25] The most strenuous efforts, even to fulsome sycophancy, were used by the serviles to win him to their side, and to prevail on him to accept the dictatorship.[VII-26]

The president returned in July to San Salvador to quell a revolt. A few weeks later, on the 20th of July, 1838, the eleventh and last federal congress of Central America, presided over by Basilio Porras, closed its session.[VII-27] Subsequent efforts to bring it again into life proved unavailing, and from this time the dismemberment of the republic made rapid progress. Two days after the adjournment of congress, on the 22d, the state government of Guatemala was also dissolved, and was temporarily intrusted to the federal authorities,[VII-28] though the executive office finally was assumed by Mariano Rivera Paz, as president of the council, which satisfied the people, and peace was unbroken, it being understood that a constituent assembly would be summoned at once.

[Sidenote: SALAZAR DEFEATS CARRERA.]

As soon as Morazan was at some distance from Guatemala on his way to San Salvador, Carrera, the supposed beaten rebel leader, for whose capture a liberal reward had been offered,[VII-29] began to show signs of rallying. He gathered a numerous force, with which, about the middle of August, he defeated the federal troops, first at Jalapa and next at Petapa. He then, unresisted, took possession of La Antigua, a portion of which was pillaged, and forthwith started on his march for Guatemala.[VII-30] A general clamor for Morazan was aroused; but it was impossible for him to reach Guatemala in time, and the danger was imminent that Carrera would not only take the city, but also carry out his threats of burning every house in it. In this emergency, General Cárlos Salazar, with the garrison of 900 men, sallied forth, and aided by a thick fog, surprised Carrera at Villanueva, where the latter was concentrating his forces, now about 2,400 strong, with the plunder secured at La Antigua. A battle ensued, the bloodiest that occurred in 1837 or 1838, and Carrera was routed,[VII-31] with the loss of 350 killed and 24 prisoners, one of whom was the notorious Father Duran, the representative and agent of the aristocrats near the person of Carrera;[VII-32] besides giving up a number of federal prisoners and losing three pieces of artillery, 305 muskets, and a large number of other arms, besides ammunition. A portion of the defeated forces fled to La Antigua, and a smaller one joined the rebel Mangandí, who had 500 men. The latter, being ignorant of Carrera's mishap, approached Guatemala on the 11th, at 10 o'clock in the morning, causing no little commotion; but on learning of his leader's defeat, he retired to the mountains. The war might have ended here had the victors followed up their success; but petty annoyances prevented Salazar from doing so, and he threw up his command in disgust,[VII-33] though he was afterward induced to resume it.

The greater part of the clergy friendly to Carrera never forsook him. It was not so with the aristocrats, Manuel Pavon, Luis Batres, and Pedro and Juan Jose Aycinena, who feared at times that they could not control him. After his defeat at Villanueva they called him an 'antropófago sediento de sangre humana.'[VII-34] At that time they asked the vicar-general, Larrazábal, to fulminate censures against Carrera, which he did.[VII-35] Friar Bernardo Piñol also railed against him from the pulpit in the cathedral.[VII-36] However, not long afterward Carrera was called from that same pulpit 'hijo predilecto del Altísimo.'

[Sidenote: CARRERA AGAIN DEFEATED.]

The lack of energy on the part of the authorities after the affair of Villanueva[VII-37] enabled Carrera to reorganize his forces, with which he made a successful raid, in the latter part of October, against Ahuachapan and Santa Ana,[VII-38] returning afterward to Guatemala, when, on the 4th of November, he was attacked in Chiquimulilla by Colonel Carballo, defeated, and driven back to the mountain recesses of Mita.[VII-39] Morazan had in the mean time concentrated forces in Guatemala, and aided Carballo's operations by marching against the Indian chieftain from a northern direction. But all efforts to crush the enemy failed, though the federal troops were everywhere victorious; many of Carrera's followers were taken and shot, but he always managed to escape.[VII-40] This warfare, or rather chase, was kept up nearly two months. At last a capitulation was concluded, on the 23d of December, at Rinconcito. Carrera and his followers were to surrender their arms[VII-41] and recognize the government, which in turn was to confirm the former in his office of comandante of the district of Mita, and respect the lives and property of its inhabitants.[VII-42] Thus was Carrera a second time given a legal standing. General Guzman, who treated with him, seemed to place on the treacherous and barbarous mountaineer the same faith as if he were a civilized man and a respecter of treaty stipulations.[VII-43] The agreement was not carried out by Carrera, for he delivered only a small portion of useless arms, and kept his force under the pretext that the safety of his district demanded it. The government not only had the weakness to enter into this arrangement, but also that of not enforcing its fulfilment to the letter. This rendered the renewal of hostilities but a question of time.

I have mentioned the congressional decree of May 30, 1838, granting the states the privilege of acting as best suited their views. This was tantamount to a dissolution of the union; and when Morazan's second presidential term expired, on the 1st of February, 1839,[VII-44] not even an outward tie remained to hold together the several states. Morazan, and he alone, did not relinquish all hope of restoring the republic, and without delivering up an office which had ceased to exist, the strife was continued under his leadership. His efforts, supported by force though they were, met with resistance on the part of Nicaragua and Honduras, united by a treaty of alliance since January 18, 1839, which had been entered into for the purpose of maintaining the independence and sovereignty of the two states.[VII-45] Similar agreements were made in the following months between nearly all the other states, always protesting a willingness to form a federal convention of the Central American states, but opposing the idea of confederation.[VII-46]

[Sidenote: FIGHTING IN SALVADOR.]

A conciliatory spirit, to bring to an end the war against Salvador, and to act as mediator, was effected in these treaties; but it had no influence for good, and the hostilities continued between Nicaragua and Honduras on the one part, and Salvador on the other. Troops of the two former states entered Salvador territory in March 1839, and surprising a federal party at the crossings of the Lempa River, called Xicaral and Petacones, took without resistance the town of San Vicente; but having advanced to the heights of Xiboa, were repulsed and beaten by Colonel Narciso Benitez.[VII-47] The allies were signally defeated at Espíritu Santo, near the Lempa, by the Salvadorans, called federals, under Morazan, on the 6th of April.[VII-48] Equally successful were Morazan's operations during the rest of the year. His officers invaded Honduras, took the capital and Tegucigalpa, and routed the allies in several encounters.[VII-49]

But affairs underwent a change against him early in the following year. A joint force of Nicaraguans and Hondurans, under Manuel Quijano,[VII-50] attacked the federals under Cabañas at the hacienda del Potrero, on the 31st of January, 1840, and forced them to leave the state of Honduras.[VII-51] A formidable servile coalition was being formed against Morazan. Nicaragua was resolved to drive this jefe of Salvador from the executive chair. Honduras, under Jáuregui, was controlled by Quijano's sword. Los Altos had become again a department of Guatemala, which was subject to Carrera's will. This chieftain, in his pronunciamiento of March 24, 1839, had avowed his intention to champion the sovereignty of the several states as concordant with his own ideas.[VII-52] Morazan thought the situation might be saved with an extraordinarily bold move, attacking the serviles in their headquarters, and made preparation to bring matters to a final issue in the city of Guatemala. The serviles, on their part, pursuing their aim of overthrowing Morazan, entered into a league with Carrera, and invited him to take possession of Guatemala.

[Sidenote: TRIUMPH AND DEFEAT OF MORAZAN.]

Morazan convoked the assembly of Salvador, and caused the vice-jefe, Silva, to assume the executive office of the state, in order to enable himself to take command of the forces for the campaign in Guatemala, which at first amounted to 900 men. He was afterward joined by many who had been persecuted by the aristocrats, who pledged themselves to conquer or perish at his side, and faithfully carried out the promise.[VII-53] Morazan marched upon the city of Guatemala, and his movement created the greatest alarm when he neared Corral de Piedra. Consternation then seized the serviles.[VII-54] Preparations were made, however, for defence. All men capable of bearing arms were called to the service,[VII-55] and Carrera established his headquarters at Aceituno, his plan being to catch the men of Salvador between the fortifications of the city and his own force.[VII-56] The plan failed. Morazan entered the city on the 18th of March at sunrise, by the Buenavista gate, and after some fighting, made himself master of it, and of all the defences.[VII-57] Liberals who were in the prisons were set free. Among them was General Agustin Guzman, whom Carrera had outrageously treated, confining him shackled in a dungeon. Guzman hailed the victor who returned him to freedom, but was unable to afford any aid; the shackles had made him a cripple. The numerous prisoners taken were all treated with every kindness. Such had always been his practice. However, it was not destined that he should enjoy his victory. Carrera attacked him on the next day—the 19th—and after a fight of twenty-two hours, compelled Morazan to retreat.[VII-58] His forces had been shattered at the Calvario. The number of assailants, known as cachurecos, was overwhelming.[VII-59] At 4 o'clock in the morning he left the city by the plaza de Guadalupe with upwards of 400 men, and was far away before the escape became known. No pursuit of the fugitives was attempted.[VII-60]

[Sidenote: FALL OF MORAZAN.]

On arriving at San Salvador, Morazan found the tables turned against him. He was openly insulted in the streets; and becoming convinced that it would be impossible to raise a new army and continue the war, he concluded to cease the struggle and leave the country. He accordingly called a meeting and made known the necessity of such a course in order to save the state from anarchy. On the 5th of April he embarked at La Libertad upon the schooner _Izalco_, together with Vice-president Vijil and thirty-five of his supporters.[VII-61] The vessel reached Puntarenas, where the chief of Costa Rica, Braulio Carrillo, who had congratulated Guatemala on the defeat of Morazan, refused him residence in the state, though it was granted to some of his companions.[VII-62] Morazan and his remaining companions continued their voyage to South America, where he remained about two years. After a time, touching at David, in Colombia, he issued a stirring manifesto to the Central American people.[VII-63] He was the last champion of the 'Confederacion de Centro América,' whose establishment had been greeted with so much joy on the 1st of July, 1823.

The governments of Nicaragua and Honduras, which had promised Guatemala aid to resist Morazan, on hearing of his downfall congratulated the victor on the defeat of the 'common enemy of all the states.' They thought that with the fall of Morazan, Central American nationality would be revived. They could not yet see that they had been the dupes of the aristocrats and their clerical allies in Guatemala, who, while holding out the promise of reuniting Central America, had been all along working for the destruction of federal nationality.

After the departure of Morazan and Vijil, Antonio José Cañas, by virtue of his position as a councillor of state, assumed the rulership of Salvador, and called the assembly to hold a special session. It was expected that, Morazan being out of the way,[VII-64] with so honorable and upright a man as Cañas at the head, concord would be restored. But Salvador was still the subject of abuses, and on the remonstrances of Cañas, the government of Guatemala despatched a diplomatic mission to San Salvador. It was composed of the former pig-driver Rafael Carrera, and Joaquin Duran, and had for an attaché Francisco Malespin, a military officer whose sword had been dyed in the best blood of Quezaltenango.[VII-65] A convention was concluded on the 13th of May, 1840, placing Salvador at the mercy of Guatemala, Cañas having to submit to the conditions imposed.[VII-66] The most humiliating condition of the understanding was not mentioned in the convention, namely, that the attaché Francisco Malespin should remain in San Salvador, with the office of comandante de armas. This treaty convinced the people of Salvador that they could expect no favor from the aristocracy of Guatemala, their implacable foe.