CHAPTER V.

CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT.

1825-1830.

GENERAL ELECTIONS—MEETING OF THE FIRST CONGRESS—MANUEL JOSÉ ARCE, FIRST PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC—FOREIGN RELATIONS—ARCE'S PREVARICATIONS—CONFLICT WITH GUATEMALA—PARTY BICKERINGS—LIBERALS QUARREL WITH ARCE—HE JOINS THEIR OPPONENTS—BITTERNESS ENGENDERED—PRESIDENT VERSUS GUATEMALAN RULERS—ARREST OF JEFE JUAN BARRUNDIA—RIOTS AT QUEZALTENANGO—MURDER OF VICE-JEFE CIRILO FLORES—ARCE AS DICTATOR IN GUATEMALA—WAR AGAINST SALVADOR—ARCE DEFEATED—HE GIVES UP THE PRESIDENCY, AND CANNOT RECOVER IT—BLOODY WAR OF 1826-9—MORAZAN THE VICTOR—JOSÉ FRANCISCO BARRUNDIA, ACTING PRESIDENT—LIBERAL MEASURES—PEACE RESTORED—SPANISH SCHEMES.

The first constitutional congress of the Estados Federados de Centro América was installed on the 6th of February, 1825, Mariano Galvez being chosen president,[V-1] as well as the leader of the liberal party. A number of the old delegates had been reëlected for the new body,[V-2] whose principal duties were the election of a president, and the ratification of the constitution. The latter, as we have already seen, was on the 1st of September; the former proved a more difficult task, and was achieved amidst contradictions and stormy discussions. The provisional executive power elected in 1823 had not been harmonious. Arce and Valle assumed their duties soon after their election, and before many days had serious differences, which ended in Arce's resignation of the presidency of the triumvirate. Being replaced by José Manuel de la Cerda, he departed for Salvador and Nicaragua, exerting himself in the pacification of the latter. His services in this direction won him much good-will, and it was proposed to make him the first constitutional president of the republic, a proposition that met with popular favor. Meanwhile his opponent, Valle, was also working.[V-3] Since May 1824 the congress had been convoked. Both liberals and moderados had untiringly worked for their respective candidates. The latter seemed to have every prospect of victory; of the 79 votes cast, 41 being for Valle, their candidate.[V-4] As 42 votes were necessary for a choice under the constitution, congress assumed the right of selecting one of the two candidates. A compromise between the contending parties was effected, Arce pledging himself to remain neutral on certain questions upon which the other party was much disturbed.[V-5] The moderados then voted for Arce, and congress, on the 21st of April, 1825, declared him to have been duly elected by a majority of twenty-two votes against five for Valle. The latter was recognized as the vice-president, and having declined the position, Mariano Beltranena was chosen in his place.[V-6] The justices of the supreme court were elected at the same time, and on the 29th of April[V-7] took possession of their offices.

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[Sidenote: RECOGNITION BY THE UNITED STATES.]

The recognition of the Central American republic as an independent nation had engaged the attention of the supreme authorities at the same time that the internal organization was proceeding. The first treaty concluded by the new republic was on the 15th of March, 1825, with Colombia, Pedro Molina acting as its plenipotentiary at Bogotá.[V-8] A few months later, at Washington, on the 5th of December, 1825, a treaty was entered into with the United States of America, with which power there had been formal relations since the beginning of the year.[V-9] Antonio José Cañas represented Central America as her plenipotentiary. The United States soon after accredited William Miller as chargé d'affaires near the new republic. Diplomatic relations with Great Britain and the Netherlands were opened early in 1825. Spain continued refusing to recognize the independence of Central America, and the pope followed in her footsteps, as he had done in regard to Mexico.[V-10]

The republic being now fairly launched, had Arce possessed the ability all might have gone well. But he either overestimated his administrative powers, or underrated the magnitude of his task; and after decreeing some wise measures upon the military defences, he began to sow dissatisfaction by his vacillating policy. A member of the liberal party from the first day that he took part in the political affairs of the country, he now committed the serious error of abandoning the ground upon which he might have trod with safety. In his endeavors to please both parties, he succeeded in offending the liberals without securing the confidence of their opponents, who, though willing enough to admit him to their ranks, declined rendering implicit obedience. His former friends now openly assailed him.[V-11]

A conflict sprang up, also, between the federal government and the local authorities of Guatemala City, because the latter refused to take part in celebrating the anniversary of the installation of the first assembly on the 24th of June, and force was at last brought to bear upon them.[V-12]

[Sidenote: ARCE, RAOUL, AND VALLE.]

The ill-feeling against Arce became intensified when the state government soon after decreed a transfer of its seat to Guatemala, and for want of accommodations in public buildings, took possession of the property of private citizens without their consent. The owners claimed protection from the federal congress, and serious disturbances were averted only by a compromise. During this episode the moderados or serviles kept fanning the flame of discord between Arce and the liberals, extolling his measures. When the first congress closed its session, on the 25th of December, 1825,[V-13] the political features of the country had notably changed. But fortunately the danger to the republic from the action of the serviles was avoided, because, upon lots being cast on the 1st of October for the renewals of members of congress,[V-14] the retiring members happened to be chiefly of districts where the servile party had majorities before, and were now replaced by liberals, the preponderance of the latter being thus increased. The second constitutional congress assembled on the 1st of March, 1826. Among its members was Valle, who, bent on revenge, erelong made common cause with the liberals,[V-15] though he was not allowed to exercise a predominant influence in their counsels.

On the day congress opened, the president delivered his message detailing the condition of the country, but most of it had reference to the relations with foreign powers.[V-16] The impending rupture was finally hastened by the president's course toward Colonel Nicolás Raoul, a French officer who had recently arrived from Colombia, and had been made commander of the artillery and a member of the council of war.[V-17] Notwithstanding the considerations and favors conferred on him by Arce, no sooner had he received his appointment than he openly sided with the liberals and gave utterances against the government. Therefore, when Raoul was summoned by congress to aid in the organization of the federal troops, the president, to get rid of him, sent him to explore the northern coasts.[V-18] Arce then undertook to increase the federal army to 4,000 men, under the pretext that such a force was needed for the pacification of Nicaragua, and the defence of the country against a Spanish invasion, rumors of which were circulating. In order to facilitate the operation, he proposed that the members of congress should stir up public enthusiasm in their respective states; but instead of acceding to his recommendation, several persons known to be hostile to the government, among them Raoul, were selected by that body. All remonstrances to the contrary on the part of Arce[V-19] had no other effect than to imbitter the liberals against him. Charges were accordingly brought forth, such as his neglecting to lay before congress an account of expenditures during his administration, and his having squandered a considerable portion of the money raised by loan in London. The outcry against his conduct was growing louder from day to day.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs determined Arce to dissolve congress. Still he was loath to use violent means, and in fact, there was no need of it. One of the clauses of the constitution allowed the admission of substitutes for the deputies to congress in certain cases, and both parties had taken advantage of it without opposition. However, when the question of calling the president to account arose, the serviles protested against the presence of the liberal substitutes which gave to that party the majority.[V-20] On the 2d of June the deputies from Salvador, under instructions from their government, which was friendly to Arce, abandoned their seats, their example being followed by those from Costa Rica and most of the serviles, thus leaving the chamber without a quorum.[V-21] The session was reopened, however, ten days later, upon the liberals pledging themselves not to introduce any motion against the president or the serviles, and thenceforth the discussions were confined to matters of a general character till the 30th of June, when the session was closed; but the deputies of Salvador and Costa Rica had not resumed their seats.

[Sidenote: STATE AND NATION.]

It was now evident that a collision was unavoidable. The state government, controlled by the liberals, became fearful that the serviles, in their endeavor to support the president, might also attack the authorities of Guatemala, and under the pretext of an invasion threatening from Chiapas, secretly began to make military preparations. Salvador and Costa Rica, on the other hand, offered aid of troops to the federal government. Both parties precipitated the crisis: the liberals by their heedless attacks on the clergy,[V-22] and specially by ridiculing its members; the serviles by fanning, jointly with the clericals, ill feeling among the low, ignorant classes, whom it was easy to persuade that the liberal party aimed at the destruction of their religion. This had now become a matter of greater ease, owing to the irritation already existing, caused by the forced loans and recruiting for the army decreed by the state government. Strange though it may appear, the serviles had no suspicion that the federal authorities were aware of their intrigues. The clash came in May 1826, when Raoul, without having fulfilled his commission on the northern coast, tendered his resignation, accompanied with a number of invectives against the executive, which he subsequently repeated in a second letter.[V-23] He was arrested on the 17th of July, and subjected to the action of a court-martial for disrespect and insubordination. This raised a storm of fury in the local legislature, where Raoul's arrest was considered as an encroachment on the state's authority. An order of arrest was issued against Captain Espínola, the officer who had carried out the commands of the federal executive, and the jefe, or chief of the state, Juan Barrundia, was authorized to raise a sufficient force to seize Espínola's person,[V-24] and the pecuniary contingent of the state for federal expenses was withheld.[V-25]

The troops despatched to arrest Espínola numbered 300 men, and were commanded by Cayetano de la Cerda, who encountered his man near Acasaguastlan. To avoid bloodshed, a capitulation was agreed upon by both parties until they should obtain further orders from their respective governments.[V-26]

When news of this agreement reached Guatemala, a few days later, simultaneously rumors came to the ears of Arce that a coup-de-main was contemplated by Barrundia, with the evident intent of effecting his removal. To anticipate the blow,[V-27] on the 5th of September Arce secretly ordered the commander of the federal forces to arrest Barrundia at an early hour the following morning, and disarm the state troops, using force if necessary.[V-28] This was done, the officer meeting with no resistance.[V-29] The liberals had no suspicion of Arce's resolve till after its execution. The vice-jefe of the state, Cirilo Flores, then forthwith assumed the government, and being tendered the aid of federal troops to support his authority, proudly rejected it.[V-30]

[Sidenote: ARREST OF BARRUNDIA.]

On the following day the chiefs of the other states were apprised of Barrundia's arrest, in a circular from Arce defending his course, which he declared to have been pursuant to duty under the constitution.[V-31] Such was the position assumed by his friends and by the serviles in general; while the radical liberals, taking a different view, denounced him as a violator of the constitution.[V-32] However, the energy thus displayed by Arce was rather favorably looked upon, perhaps from a feeling of relief arising from the supposition that party bickerings had been brought to an end, more than from any sympathy for Arce. The president might now have strengthened his party, but did not, and went on committing serious mistakes. Instead of turning the imprisoned Barrundia over to the state assembly, as prescribed by the constitution, to be tried upon the several charges that had been ostentatiously preferred against him, he allowed the legal time for prosecution to elapse, and then released the prisoner under bonds.[V-33]

The second constitutional congress was to meet on the 1st of October, 1826, and the liberal party had, since September, industriously worked to secure a majority. But on the appointed day there was no quorum, the members of the opposition having refused to take their seats, evidently to prevent the adoption of any measures against the president.[V-34] It was rather suspicious that the government at San Salvador, always friendly to Arce, had forbidden its delegates to occupy their seats in congress unless it were to discuss the expediency of transferring the federal authorities to some place distant from Guatemala.[V-35] It soon became apparent that the president's aim was to have his own assembly, for on the 10th of October he convoked an extraordinary congress.[V-36] This was open violation of the constitution, which vested in the senate the authority for convoking, and moreover limited representation to only one delegate for every 30,000 inhabitants. Much indignation was felt by the members of congress, who had constituted themselves into an organizing commission, but dispersed on the same day that Arce's decree was published.[V-37]

[Sidenote: MURDER OF FLORES.]

Exciting events now followed in quick succession. The vice-jefe Cirilo Flores and the state authorities had retired on the 8th of October to Quezaltenango, where he was murdered a few days afterward—on the 13th—by a mob of fanatical Indians.[V-38] The act was attributed to Arce and his immediate friends, but apparently without much reason,[V-39] though it must be admitted that intrigues of the servile party and the preaching of hostile priests aroused the fanaticism of the populace to such a degree that the slightest cause would bring about the commission of outrages. The trouble did not end with Flores' death, for many members of the assembly and representative council were compelled to flee for their lives.

The state was now powerless, for even its military forces disappeared before the federal troops. The liberals in the state and republic saw their hopes dashed, and many emigrated.[V-40] Arce held the executive authority of both the federation and the state of Guatemala; and acting upon the advice of Salvador, he began reorganization, decreeing on the 31st of October the election of a new executive and legislature for Guatemala, from which the inhabitants entertained hopes of a final restoration of peace throughout the republic. But those hopes were frustrated by a sudden change of policy on the part of the Salvador government, which surprised everybody, all the more from the fact that it had heretofore firmly supported the president.

[Sidenote: ARCE'S VICTORY AND DEFEAT.]

Pedro Molina arrived at San Salvador from Panamá when Arce had in his charge the affairs of Guatemala, and had decreed the new elections for the state. Being a political opponent of the president, Molina refused to go to Guatemala to report the action of the Panamá congress. It was not a difficult matter for him to find congenial spirits for an intrigue against the federal executive. An estrangement had occurred between Arce and Delgado, who aspired to be bishop of San Salvador,[V-41] and was a man of great political power. Moreover, it so happened that the jefe of Salvador, owing to ill health, had to turn over his office to the vice-jefe, Mariano Prado, who was under the influence of the discontented party. His first act was to repeal Arce's decree of October 10th convoking an extraordinary congress at Cojutepeque.[V-42] Then simultaneously forces were levied in Salvador, ostensibly to protect congress when assembled at Ahuachapan. Internal difficulties in Honduras led the federal government to interfere;[V-43] and thus, at the end of 1826, there were a number of forces at work to drive Arce from the presidential seat. This state of affairs continued till February 1827, when rumors of an invasion began to circulate in Guatemala. The next month Salvadoran forces, under Trigueros, started on their march toward the capital. All doubts about the plans of the invading army having ceased, Arce displayed unusual activity in his preparations to meet the enemy. With the aid of the newly chosen jefe of Guatemala, Aycinena, he increased the garrison to 2,000 men, and leaving the executive authority in charge of Vice-president Beltranena, took personal command of the troops. He made an effort, however, to avert an encounter, but without avail;[V-44] and they fought, a few days later, at Guadalupe, a short distance from Guatemala, the invaders being repulsed, and the following day, March 23d, utterly routed at Arrazola.[V-45] This victory caused great exultation in Guatemala, and Arce's prestige grew rapidly. Money and reënforcements were cheerfully placed at his command, and he allowed himself to be carried away by evil counsels to pursue an aggressive policy and punish Salvador.[V-46]

[Sidenote: CÁSCARAS IN SALVADOR.]

The federal army marched in April into the state of Salvador, and reënforced from Sonsonate and Santa Ana,[V-47] reached Nejapa without opposition, that place being about twelve miles from the city of San Salvador. After certain negotiations for peace, which had no satisfactory result, Arce attacked the city on the 18th of May, at the head of 2,000 men, and was repulsed with heavy loss. His slow movements had given the Salvadorans time to act.[V-48] His retreat was in good order to Santa Ana; but from this place, desertions having greatly diminished the force, it degenerated into flight, of which the pursuing Salvadorans failed to take advantage. Arce reached Cuajiniquilapa toward the end of May, with only 300 men. This early failure of a war from which were to flow such great results brought odium on Arce; but by the efforts of friends, confidence in him was restored, and about 700 men were obtained to resume operations by taking Santa Ana.[V-49] For several months no events of importance occurred. The time was employed by Arce in strengthening his force, with which he made a fruitless attempt to intercept a Salvador division that assailed Sonsonate. Overtures for peace were again made by Salvador, but though not absolutely rejected, no understanding was arrived at. They gave rise, however, to a discussion as to whether the federal president was, as he thought himself, authorized to decide upon the question of peace or war without consulting the state government of Guatemala.[V-50] Piqued at the opposition he had met, which he supposed to arise from want of confidence, Arce received with pleasure a request from Vice-president Beltranena to give up the army and return to Guatemala and take charge of the government.[V-51] Brigadier Francisco Cáscaras was thereupon made commander of the army on the 12th of October, 1827. Soon after Arce's return to Guatemala he took steps to restore peace, and issued, on the 5th of December, a decree to convoke a new congress,[V-52] and at the same time ordered a suspension of hostilities. But his commissioner, Juan de Dios Mayorga, who was to notify the authorities at San Salvador of his measures, was not allowed to proceed to that city, the Salvadorans, now reënforced with officers exiled from Colombia,[V-53] being more than ever opposed to conciliation. Hostilities were resumed and conducted with alternating success;[V-54] but on the whole, disadvantageously for the federal force, owing to Cáscaras' lack of strategy, and the temporizing policy of the enemy; for the latter, whenever pressed, would make overtures of peace, protesting a willingness to terminate the war, though breaking their promises as fast as they were made.[V-55] Cáscaras' situation was daily becoming perilous, on account of the numerous desertions of his troops. At last, on the 17th of December, a bloody encounter took place in the streets of Santa Ana, which terminated in a capitulation, under which both forces were to leave the place the next day. Cáscaras left it as stipulated, but Colonel Merino with the Salvadorans remained.[V-56] Cáscaras returned to Guatemala toward the end of December, the Salvadorans having regained possession of Santa Ana, and of all the other places formerly occupied by the federal army.

Shortly after, with Aycinena's assistance, another federal army was organized, but Arce took good care to give positions in it only to trusted friends.[V-57] As soon as the organization was nearly completed, detachments were sent to check the enemy's raids in Chiquimula, and then, under the command of a foreigner named William Perks, the army marched against the Salvadoran headquarters at Ahuachapan. Once more stratagem was resorted to by the wily Salvadorans, who made proffers of peace, the farce ending as usual.[V-58] In the mean time troubles broke out in the federal army, and Perks, the commander, was deposed by the field-officers and sent to Guatemala as a prisoner.[V-59] The command then devolved upon Colonel Antonio José Irisarri. Arce tried in vain to have Perks reinstalled, and his efforts in that direction only served to increase the ill feeling, which grew so strong that on the 14th of February, 1828, he turned over the executive office, though without a formal resignation, to Beltranena,[V-60] who conferred the command of the federal army on Brigadier Manuel Arzú. This officer marched at once against the Salvadorans, refusing to listen to any overtures for negotiations from their chief, Merino. The armies met at Chalchuapa on the 1st of March, and the federal troops obtained a victory, which drove the foe back to San Salvador.[V-61] Arzú followed and made an assault on that city, in which both sides gave proofs of extraordinary bravery. The assault failed; at the end of six hours' fighting the assailants had to retreat behind their intrenchments.[V-62] From this time San Salvador and San Miguel became the theatres of war. A series of encounters, none of sufficient importance to be lengthily described, followed, with varying success for either side.[V-63] The Salvadorans having besieged the remnants of the federal army under Colonel Manuel Montúfar, at Mejicanos, after eight months compelled them to surrender, on the 20th of September. Their commander and general staff were held as prisoners of war.[V-64]

[Sidenote: GUATEMALA AND SALVADOR.]

The division of the federal army that occupied the department of San Miguel, which had been defeated by General Morazan at Gualcho on the 6th of July, being intercepted on its retreat toward the Lempa, laid down its arms, under honorable terms, at San Antonio, on the 9th of October.[V-65]

The condition of federal affairs was now far from encouraging. It may be that Arce, had he been replaced, might have turned disaster; but his application had met with a refusal, and he took no further part in the political events of the republic.[V-66] After all hostile forces had been either captured or expelled from Salvador, Morazan made a triumphant entry into the state capital on the 23d of October, 1828.[V-67] Shortly before this a commission had come from Costa Rica to mediate between Guatemala and Salvador, but the latter demanded too much.[V-68] Morazan's presence in San Salvador greatly strengthened the warlike party, and the idea of invading Guatemala gained favor from day to day, till it was finally carried out. After peace overtures had been rejected by the federal authorities, Morazan began his march toward Guatemala in the latter end of November 1828.[V-69] The news struck terror into the hearts of the now defenceless Guatemalans, and no steps to meet the emergency could be taken, owing to lack of order, official rivalries, and party intrigues. It was, as a saving measure, finally decided in the assembly to detach the state from the federation, though it was never sanctioned or carried out. To increase difficulties, a revolution broke out in the department of La Antigua, placing it under the protection of Morazan,[V-70] who, at the head of about 2,000 men, assuming the title of 'ejército aliado protector de la ley,' laid siege to the city of Guatemala, assailing it from the side of the Garita del Golfo, on the 5th of February. He was repulsed after a brisk fire.[V-71] This was followed on the 15th by a sally of the garrison, which annihilated at Mixco a considerable portion of the invading army.[V-72]

[Sidenote: SUCCESS OF MORAZAN.]

In consequence of this reverse, Morazan raised the siege of Guatemala, and concentrated his forces at La Antigua. The success of Mixco was the last experienced by the federal army; for with the same neglect which had characterized its operations almost throughout the whole campaign, no advantage was taken of the victory, nor of several military errors of Morazan.[V-73] A strong division under Pacheco sallied out of Guatemala toward the towns of Zumpango and El Tejar, as if to confine Morazan in La Antigua; but Pacheco disseminated his force, and was beaten.[V-74] Early in March Morazan's troops reoccupied Mixco, and when attacked, shortly afterward,[V-75] by the federal forces at Las Charcas, signally defeated them, and the fate of the servile party in Guatemala was thus sealed.[V-76]

Through the mediation of General Verveer, minister from the Netherlands, an attempt was made to bring peace to the distracted country. Commissioners representing the several belligerents assembled, on the 27th of March, at the house of Ballesteros, and discussed the propositions laid before them, which were rejected, and they then retired. Morazan, who was anxious for a compromise, specially as he had good reasons to apprehend the dissolution of his army by the small-pox epidemic which had broken out, urged Verveer to invite the commissioners to hold another conference. It took place; and those of Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua presented four propositions, which were likewise rejected by the federal and Guatemalan negotiators.[V-77] Morazan had felt certain that those proposals would be accepted, and believed them to be exceedingly generous in view of the fact that the city could no longer hold out. However, hostilities were resumed, and on the 9th of April the forces under Morazan attacked the city, and a part of it was taken and plundered.[V-78]

[Sidenote: FALL OF GUATEMALA CITY.]

Aycinena applied on the 11th to Morazan, as commander-in-chief of the allied army of Honduras and Salvador, for a suspension of hostilities, in order to negotiate a capitulation which he was disposed to enter into. Morazan replied at once that he could agree to nothing but the unconditional surrender of the city, though offering to guarantee the lives and property of all persons existing therein.[V-79] The fighting continued, and on the 12th the place capitulated. The occupation was effected on the following day,[V-80] and immediately Vice-president Beltranena and his ministers of relations and treasury, Aycinena and his secretary Piélago, and Ex-president Arce[V-81] were placed under arrest.[V-82] Morazan, assuming then all the powers of state, restored Juan Barrundia to the position of jefe of Guatemala,[V-83] whereof he had been deprived by Arce. The capitulation of April 12th was on the 20th declared void, on the ground that the federal commander had failed to comply with its terms in not giving up all the arms his forces held at the time of the surrender.[V-84] Morazan treated the functionaries, both federal and of the state of Guatemala, who had taken part in the revolution of 1826 to 1829, with much rigor.[V-85]

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[Sidenote: MORAZAN'S MEASURES.]

A period of reaction, or restoration as it was properly called, was now inaugurated. During several years the servile party had held undisputed control of public affairs in Guatemala, crushing out all opposition to the best of its ability. Its policy had been one of intolerance, and its downfall was hailed with joy. Morazan seemed to have been chosen by providence to inflict condign punishment on those who had so cruelly exercised a usurped power. Surrounded as he was by so many diverse elements, the severity of the blows he dealt must not be all laid to his account. The state assembly, which had been dissolved in 1826, having again met on the 21st of April, 1829,[V-86] with its old president, Nicolás Espinosa, was practically a tool in the hands of the victorious general, and enacted several vigorous laws against the vanquished party.[V-87] On the 4th of June the assembly passed an act, which was sanctioned by the consejo representativo on the 12th, and by Jefe Barrundia on the 13th, declaring null all elections made pursuant to the unconstitutional decree of the president of the republic dated October 31, 1826, and the subsequent ones of 1827 and 1828. It furthermore stamped as revolutionists and usurpers all persons who by virtue of those decrees had obtained and held office of the federation or the state of Guatemala, and as such guilty of high treason, and amenable to the death penalty.[V-88] On the same day was issued a so-called amnesty law; but the number of exemptions from its benefits made its name a piece of irony.[V-89] The position of the prisoners taken in Guatemala at the time of the capture of said city, and others, became a more complicated one, in consequence of a decree passed by the assembly of Salvador on the 9th of June, declaring that it would not recognize in the assembly of Guatemala any authority to grant, without the assent of the other states, amnesty to the factious disturbers of public order; and that the capitulation entered into between Morazan and Aycinena having been annulled, the captives were really prisoners of war of the allied states.[V-90] A number of the prisoners were, however, permitted to go into exile within fifteen days, paying first the expenses of their support while in prison, and one third of the value of their estates[V-91] into the federal treasury, as indemnification for the damages they had inflicted on the country. That privilege was not granted to the president and vice-president and their ministers, the former chief of Guatemala, and others. In fact, it was a proscription of all the principal men who had sided with the servile party.[V-92] It was also decreed that all salaries paid from October 1826 to April 1829 should be refunded. Harsh measures were used to force a compliance.

The federal congress that was dismissed in October 1826 assembled on the 22d of June,[V-93] under the presidency of Doroteo Vasconcelos, and on the 25th José Francisco Barrundia[V-94] assumed the office of president of the republic, he being the senior senator, and having been specially called thereto by the congress, though the real power in the country was Morazan.

[Sidenote: EXPULSION OF FRIARS.]

The chief point of discussion in congress[V-95] was, what to do with the prisoners. Some members favored their execution, and though others disapproved of such a disposal of them, none had sufficient courage to openly condemn such vindictiveness. The discussions continued till July 9th, when a number of the prisoners were sent under an escort to Sonsonate, to be embarked at Acajutla and expatriated.[V-96] Two days later a similar blow was struck at the church, evidently because of the sympathy of its head men with the servile party.[V-97] During the night between the 10th and 11th of July, an armed force, acting under orders of Morazan, who issued them in accordance with the views of the acting president and the jefe of Guatemala, seized the archbishop and the friars of several orders, and despatched them to the Atlantic coast, where they were embarked for Habana. Several of the friars are represented to have died on the voyage.[V-98] Whether there was sufficient cause for so violent a proceeding is doubtful. However, the federal congress thanked the executive for his zeal. The sentence of expatriation against the archbishop was not formally issued till about a year after.[V-99] On the 28th of July the assembly of Guatemala decreed the suppression of all monastic establishments of men, excepting only the Bethlehemite hospitallers, who were allowed to remain as secular priests, and prohibited in the nunneries vows and professions in the future. All the temporalities of the suppressed convents were declared confiscated to the state. The federal congress approved this act on the 7th of September, declaring that the nation would no longer receive or recognize within its territory any religious orders.[V-100]

Peace being finally restored, the large army of Morazan was gradually dissolved, and the leader became a candidate for the presidency. The necessity of an energetic man, such as Morazan was, at the head of affairs, was quite apparent, for new difficulties were threatening from different quarters. Costa Rica, disapproving the course of Salvador, declared her secession from the union, and it was only after much persuasion that she retracted it. The federal government, and that of the state of Guatemala, now in charge of Pedro Molina,[V-101] clashed on several occasions, and specially when, in 1830, the question of constituting Guatemala city as a federal district again came upon the tapis. The state rejected the plan, as on every previous occasion.[V-102] A project of Molina to reform the confederation met with the same fate. He favored the model of the Swiss republic at that time, abolishing the expensive machinery of a federal government, which was almost continually at variance with the different states.[V-103] The failure of this scheme brought with it the downfall of Molina, who was afterward suspended on fictitious charges and tried, and though acquitted, was not reinstated.[V-104]

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[Sidenote: SPANISH EFFORTS.]

The plan of King Fernando VII. of Spain for the reconquest of his former American dominions, and the steps he was taking to accomplish it, naturally caused a sensation in Central America, where that monarch would be sure to find elements favorable to his views. The so-called nobles, who had endeavored, after the downfall of Iturbide and the separation from Mexico, to establish in Central America an aristocratic republic, such as that of Genoa or Venice, had been again balked in their aims by the successes of Morazan. In their disappointment they turned their eyes to Fernando, and through special agents, as well as through Archbishop Casaus, made known to the captain-general of Cuba that the circumstances Central America was then in were most propitious for the restoration of the royal sway; for, as they asserted, all honest, right-thinking men and women in the country yearned for it, and the Indians were likewise anxious for the change. Therefore, the only opposition thereto lay in the comparatively small number of aspirants to public offices, who made revolution in order to control the public funds for their own benefit. Such reports were full of encouragement for the Spaniards who were intriguing in behalf of Fernando's interests, which were probably also their own.

Positive information was at last received from a reliable source that Spain was preparing, in Habana, an expedition to land at Omoa and march on Guatemala, where it expected to find the requisite coöperation.[V-105] This report coincided with the departure of the Spanish expedition under Brigadier Barradas to Tampico.[V-106] President Barrundia, on the 3d of September, 1829, issued a stirring address; and the congress, in October and November, with the sanction of the executive, passed an act forbidding Spaniards to enter or land in Central American territory under any pretext. The ports of the republic were closed to the Spanish flag, and to the products and manufactures of Spain, her colonies, and dependencies.

There were not a few Spaniards who, together with the self-styled nobles of native birth, desired to see the flag of the old country waving again over Central America. That anxiously wished for day had become almost the only subject of conversation in their circles, of which the assembly of Guatemala took due warning. In November it declared the sequestration of all property belonging to Spaniards who dwelt in the republic, coupled with the assurance that none should be restored till Spain had formally recognized the independence of Central America.[V-107]