Part 972

"Since Austria had laid down arms by signing the peace of Vienna, and had thus proved the inefficiency of England's last allies—since among the sovereigns of the Continent Napoleon boasted none but courtiers or subjects, Wellington saw that all the resources and all the efforts of his gigantic power would be turned against the only country which still struggled for the liberty of Europe. What could Spain achieve with her bands of insurgents and her defeated armies, albeit so persevering? or the small English army effect against so formidable an adversary, aided by the combined forces of so many nations? But during the very time when the world looked upon all as lost, and Napoleon's proudest enemies were growing weak, Wellington never despaired of the cause he had embraced. Far from allowing himself to be cast down by the magnitude or the imminence of the danger, he derived from that very circumstance, not only the resolution of fighting to the last extremity, but also the energy to conceive and to execute a project which will continue to be the admiration of the world, and an everlasting lesson to nations oppressed by foreign rule. He had always thought that some day, sooner or later, the whole of Europe would rise against Napoleon's tyranny, provided that an opportunity for such a rising were afforded to it by a prolonged resistance in certain points. The end to aim at therefore was, in his opinion, not so much to drive the French out of the Peninsula, as the tacticians of the central junta wildly fancied, but rather to keep the contest there alive at any cost, until the moment should arrive for so inevitable and universal a revolt. In view of the new invasion pouring into Spain, he could not dream of undertaking any offensive operations against the French. Even if conducted with genius, they would have rapidly exhausted his very limited forces. His small army … could not have lasted a month amidst the large masses of French troops then in Spain. He therefore resolved to entrench it in strong positions, rendered still more formidable by every resource of defensive warfare, where he might defy superiority in numbers and the risk of surprise, where he could also obtain supplies by sea, and whence if necessary he might embark in case of disaster; where, also, he might take advantage of the distances and the difficulties of communication which were so rapidly exhausting our troops, by creating around us a desert in which we should find it impossible to live. To stand out under these restricted but vigorously conceived conditions, and to resist with indomitable obstinacy until Europe, ashamed to let him succumb, should come to his succour, was the only course which afforded Wellington some chance of success in view of the feeble means at his disposal; and such, with equal firmness and decision, was the one he now adopted. The necessity which suggested it to him in no wise diminishes the merit or originality of an operation which was, one may say, without precedent in military history. The position he was seeking for he found in the environs of Lisbon, in the peninsula formed by the Tagus at its entrance to the sea. Protected on almost every side either by the ocean or the river, which at this point is nearly as wide as an inland sea, this peninsula was accessible only on the north where it joined the mainland. There, however, the prolongation of the Sierra d'Estrella presented a series of rugged heights, craggy precipices and deep ravines filled with torrents, forming a true natural barrier, the strength of which had already struck more than one military observer. … Wellington was the first who conceived and executed the project of transforming the whole peninsula into a colossal fortress, of more than a hundred miles in circumference. He desired that this fortress should be composed of three concentric enclosures, defended by cannon, and large enough to contain not only his army and the Portuguese allies—comprising the regular troops, the militia and Ordenanzas—but the whole available population of the Southern provinces of Portugal, with their harvests, their cattle and their provisions, so that the country surrounding Lisbon should offer no resource whatever to the invaders. He at the same time secured his retreat by means of a spacious and fortified port, in which, should any untoward accident occur, the English army and even the Portuguese troops might embark in safety. {3009} This immense citadel extended to the north from Zizembre and the heights of Torres Vedras, which protected its front, as far as Alemquer; thence to the east by Sobral and Alvera it followed the counterforts of the Estrella which overhang the Tagus, and extended to Lisbon, where it was covered alike by the mouth of the river and by the ocean. … From the beginning of the month of October, 1809, with the aid of Colonel Fletcher of the Engineers, he had employed thousands of workmen and peasants, without intermission, in throwing up intrenchments, constructing redoubts, and forming sluices for inundating the plain."

_P. Lanfrey, Life of Napoleon I., volume 4, chapter 4._

ALSO IN: _W. H. Maxwell, Life of Wellington, volume 2, chapters 9-12._

_General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, book 11, chapter 8 (volume 2)._

SPAIN: A D. 1810. Revolt of the Argentine provinces.

See ARGENTINE REPUBLIC: A. D. 1806-1820.

SPAIN: A D. 1810-1812. The French advance into Portugal. Their recoil from the Lines of Torres Vedras.

"By the spring of 1810, the French armies in Spain numbered fully 350,000 men, and Napoleon had intended to cross the Pyrenees, at the head of this enormous force. His marriage, however, or more probably the innumerable toils and cares of Empire prevented him from carrying out his purpose; and this was one of the capital mistakes of his life, for his presence was necessary on the scene of events. He still despised the insurrection of Spain; he held Wellington cheap as a 'Sepoy general'; strange as it may appear, he was wholly ignorant of the existence of the Lines of Torres Vedras, and he persisted in maintaining that the only real enemy in the Peninsula was the British army, which he estimated at 25,000 men. He gave Masséna 70,000, with orders 'to drive the English into the sea'; and at the same time, he sent a great army to subdue Andalusia and the South, false to his art in thus dividing his forces. A contest followed renowned in history, and big with memorable results for Europe. Massena took the fortresses on the northeast of Portugal, and by the close of September had entered Beira; he met a bloody reverse at Busaco [September 27], but he succeeded in turning Wellington's flank, and he advanced, in high heart, from Coimbra, on Lisbon. To his amazement, however, the impregnable lines, a gigantic obstacle utterly unforeseen, rose before him, and brought the invaders to a stand, and the 'spoiled child of victory,' daring as he was, after vain efforts to find a vulnerable point, recoiled from before the invincible rampart, baffled and indignant, but as yet hopeful. Massena, with admirable skill, now chose a formidable position near the Tagus, and held the British commander in check. … But Wellington, with wise, if stern, forethought, had wasted the adjoining region with fire and sword; Napoleon, meditating a new war, was unable to despatch a regiment from France; Soult, ordered to move from Andalusia to the aid of his colleague, paused and hung back; and Massena, his army literally starved out, and strengthened by a small detachment only, was at last reluctantly forced to retreat. The movement began in March, 1811; it was conducted with no ordinary skill; but Wellington had attained his object and the French general re-entered Spain with the wreck only of a once noble force. Massena, however, would not confess defeat; having restored and largely increased his army, he attacked Wellington at Fuentes de Onoro, and possibly only missed a victory, owing to the jealousies of inferior men. This, nevertheless, was his last effort; he was superseded in his command by Napoleon, unjust in this instance to his best lieutenant, and Wellington's conduct of the war had been completely justified. Torres Vedras permanently arrested Napoleon's march of conquest; the French never entered Portugal again. … Meantime, the never-ceasing insurrection of Spain continued to waste the Imperial forces, and surrounded them, as it were, with a circle of fire. It was all in vain that another great army was struck down in the field at Ocana; that Suchet invaded and held Valencia; that Soult ravaged Andalusia; that Victor besieged Cadiz. The resistance of the nation became more intense than ever; Saguntum, which had defied Hannibal, Girona, Tortosa, and, above all, Tarragona, defended their walls to the last; and not a village from Asturias to Granada acknowledged Joseph at Madrid, as its lawful king. … After Fuentes de Onoro the contest in Spain had languished in 1811, though Marmont and Soult missed a great chance of assailing Wellington, with very superior numbers. In the following year the British commander pounced on Ciudad Rodrigo, and Badajoz, the keys of Spain from the Portuguese frontier, completely deceiving the distant Emperor, who would direct operations from Paris; and he defeated Marmont in a great battle, at Salamanca, beside the Tormes, which threw open to him the gates of Madrid. Yet, in an effort made against the communications of the French, the object he steadily kept in view, he was baffled by the resistance of Burgos, and before long he was in retreat on Portugal, having just escaped from a great French army, so various were the fortunes of this most instructive war."

_W. O'C. Morris, Napoleon, chapters 10-11._

ALSO IN: _G. Hooper, Wellington, chapter 7._

_J. H. Stocqueler, Life of Wellington, volume 1, chapters 4-10._

_General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, volumes 2-3._

_R. Southey, History of the Peninsular War, volumes 4-5._

_A. Thiers, History of the Consulate and Empire, book 42 (volume 4)._

_General Sir J. T. Jones, Journal of the Sieges in Spain, volume 1._

SPAIN: A. D. 1810-1821. Revolt and achievement of independence in Venezuela and New Granada.

See COLOMBIAN STATES: A. D. 1810-1819.

A. D. 1810-1825. Revolt and independence of Mexico.

See MEXICO: A. D. 1810-1819; and 1820-1826.

SPAIN: A. D. 1812 (June-August). Wellington's victory at Salamanca. Abandonment of Madrid by King Joseph.

"In the month of May, 1812, that rupture took place [between Napoleon and Alexander I. of Russia] which was to determine, by its issue, whether Europe should acknowledge one master; and Napoleon, too confident in his own fortunes, put himself at the head of his armies and marched on Moscow. The war in Spain, which had hitherto occupied the first place in public attention, became from that hour, as far as France was concerned, a matter of minor consideration. Whatever effective battalions were at the disposal of the war-minister, were forwarded to the Vistula; while to recruit the regiments in Spain, depôts were formed in the south, out of which, from time to time, a body of conscripts were equipped and dispatched to reinforce the French armies. {3010} Lord Wellington's army consisted of 60,000 men, Portuguese and Spaniards included. Of these, 10,000 infantry, with about 1,200 cavalry, were cantoned on the Tagus at Almarez; while the commander-in-chief, with the remainder, prepared to operate, on the north of that river, against Marmont. The capture of the redoubts at Almarez had, in some degree, isolated the French marshal; and, although he was at the head of 50,000 veterans, Lord Wellington felt himself in a condition to cope with him. At the same time Lord Wellington had to observe Soult, who, commanding the army of the south, was around Seville and Cordova with 58,000 men—while Suchet held the eastern provinces with 50,000 excellent troops—Souham was in the north with 10,000—and the army of the centre, probably 15,000 more, was disposed around the capital, and kept open the communications between the detached corps. On the other hand, there were on foot no Spanish armies deserving of the name. Bands of guerrillas moved, indeed, hither and thither, rendering the communications between the French armies and their depots exceedingly insecure; but throughout the north, and west, and centre of Spain, there was no single corps in arms of any military respectability. In the east, Generals Lacy and Sarsfield were at the head of corps which did good service, and occupied Suchet pretty well; while D'Eroles, more bold than prudent, committed himself at Rhonda with General Rourke, in a combat which ended in his total defeat and the dispersion of his troops. Yet were the French far from being masters of the country. Few fortified towns, Cadiz and Alicante excepted, continued to display the standard of independence, but every Sierra and mountain range swarmed with the enemies of oppression, out of whom an army, formidable from its numbers, if not for its discipline, might at any moment be formed. But it had never entered into the counsels of the allies to furnish a nucleus round which such an army might be gathered. … Meanwhile, the commander-in-chief, after having given his army a few weeks' repose, … broke up from his cantonments, and advanced in the direction of Salamanca. On the 17th of June his divisions crossed the Tormes, by the fords above and below the town, and, finding no force in the field competent to resist them, marched direct upon the capital of the province." Salamanca was taken on the 27th of June, after a siege of ten days, and a series of manœuvres—a great game of tactics between the opposing commanders—ensued, which occupied their armies without any serious collision, until the 22d of July, when the decisive battle of Salamanca was fought. "The dispositions of the French, though masterly against one less self-collected, had been, throughout the day, in Wellington's opinion, full of hazard. They aimed at too much—and, manœuvring to throw themselves in force upon the English right, risked, as the event proved fatally, the weakening of their own right and centre. Lord Wellington saw that filing constantly in one direction disconnected the divisions of Marmont's army, and left an interval where he might strike to advantage. … It was the first mistake that Marmont had made, and Wellington never permitted him to retrieve it. Lord Wellington had dined amid the ranks of the third division, and Packenham, its frank and chivalrous leader, was one of those who shared his simple and soldier-like meal. To him the commander-in-chief gave his orders, somewhat in the following words: 'Do you see those fellows on the hill, Packenham? Throw your division into columns of battalions —at them directly—and drive them to the devil.' Instantly the division was formed—and the order executed admirably. … By this magnificent operation, the whole of the enemy's left was destroyed. Upward of 3,000 prisoners remained in the hands of the victors, while the rest, broken and dispirited, fell back in utter confusion upon the reserves, whom they swept away with them in their flight. Meanwhile, in the centre, a fiercer contest was going on. … Marmont, … struck down by the explosion of a shell, was carried off the field early in the battle, with a broken arm and two severe wounds in the side. The command then devolved upon Clausel, who did all that man in his situation could do to retrieve the fortune of the day. … But Lord Wellington was not to be arrested in his success, nor could his troops be restrained in their career of victory. … Seven thousand prisoners, two eagles, with a number of cannon and other trophies, remained in the hands of the English: 10,000 men, in addition, either died on the field or were disabled by wounds; whereas the loss on the part of the allies amounted to scarcely 5,000 men. … After this disaster, Clausel continued his retreat by forced marches. … Meanwhile, Joseph, ignorant of the result of the late battle, was on his way, with 20,000 men, to join Marmont, and had arrived at the neighbourhood of Arevolo before the intelligence of that officer's defeat was communicated to him. He directed his columns instantly toward Segovia. … On the 7th of August the British army moved; … while Joseph, retreating with precipitation, left the passes of the Guadarama open, and returned to Madrid, where the confusion was now extreme. … Lord Wellington's march was conducted with all the celerity and good order which distinguished every movement of his now magnificent army. On the 7th, he entered Segovia. … On the 12th [he] entered Madrid in triumph. … The city exhibited the appearance of a carnival, and the festivities were kept up till the dawn of the 13th came in. … Immediately the new constitution was proclaimed; Don Carlos D'Espana was appointed governor of the city, and the people, still rejoicing, yet restrained from excesses of every sort, returned to their usual employments."

_General Vane (Marquess of Londonderry), Story of the Peninsular War, chapter 30._

ALSO IN: _General Sir W. F. P. Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, book 18 (volume 4)._

_Lieutenant Colonel Williams, Life, and Times of Wellington, volume 1, pages 275-290._

{3011}

SPAIN: A. D. 1812-1814. Final campaigns of the Peninsular War. Expulsion of the French.

"The south and centre of Spain … seemed clear of enemies, but the hold of the French was as yet shaken only, not broken; for in fact though Wellington's march had forced his enemies in two directions (Clausel, with the remainder of Marmont's army, having retired north, while the king withdrew south-east), such were their numbers that each division became the centre of an army as powerful as his own. … Of the two armies against which Wellington had to contend by far the largest was the army of Soult, and the king, on the south-east. On the other hand, Clausel's forces were beaten and retreating, so that it appeared to the general better to leave a detachment under Hill to cover Madrid, while he himself repaired with the bulk of his army to strike a final blow at Clausel by the capture of Burgos, intending to return at once and with his whole combined forces fight a great battle with Soult and the king before the capital. … The resistance offered by Burgos and the deficiency of proper artillery proved greater obstacles than had been expected. The delay thus caused allowed the French to recover. … As Soult began to draw towards Madrid from Valencia, thus threatening the safety of Hill, there was no course left but to summon that general northward, and to make a combined retreat towards Salamanca and Portugal. … This was the last of Wellington's retreats. Events in Europe lessened the power of his enemies; while fighting for his very existence on the main continent of Europe, Napoleon could not but regard the war in Spain as a very secondary concern, and a great many old and valuable soldiers were withdrawn. The jealousy which existed between Joseph and the generals, and the dislike of the great generals to take upon themselves the Spanish war, threw it into inferior hands for some little while, and there is little more to chronicle than a succession of hard-won victories. … A vigorous insurrection had arisen all along the northern provinces; and it was this more than anything else which decided Wellington's course of action. While leaving troops to occupy the attention of the French in the valley of the Tagus, he intended to march northwards, … connect himself with the northern insurgents, and directly threaten the communications with France. … As he had expected, the French had to fall back before him; he compelled them to evacuate Burgos and attempt to defend the Ebro. Their position there was turned, and they had again to fall back into the basin of Vittoria. This is the plain of the river Zadora, which forms in its course almost a right angle at the south-west corner of the plain, which it thus surrounds on two sides. Across the plain and through Vittoria runs the high road to France, the only one in the neighbourhood sufficiently large to allow of the retreat of the French army, encumbered with all its stores and baggage, and the accumulated wealth of some years of occupation of Spain. While Wellington forced the passage of the river in front south of the great bend, and drove the enemy back to the town of Vittoria, Graham beyond the town closed this road. The beaten enemy had to retreat as best he could towards Salvatierra, leaving behind all the artillery, stores, baggage, and equipments [June 21, 1813]. The offensive armies of France had now to assume the defensive and to guard their own frontier. Before advancing to attack them in the mountains, Wellington undertook the blockade of Pampeluna and the siege of St. Sebastian. It was impossible for the French any longer to regard diplomatic or dynastic niceties. Joseph was superseded, and the defence of France intrusted to Soult, with whom the king had hopelessly quarrelled. He proved himself worthy of the charge. A series of terrible battles was fought in the Pyrenees, but one by one his positions were forced. With fearful bloodshed, St. Sebastian was taken, the Bidasoa was crossed (October 7), the battle of the Nivelle fought and won (November 10), and at length, in February, the lower Adour was passed, Bayonne invested, and Soult obliged to withdraw towards the east. But by this time events on the other side of France had changed the appearance of the war. … Napoleon was being constantly driven backward upon the east. The effect could not but be felt by the southern army, and Soult deserves great credit for the skill with which he still held at bay the victorious English. He was however defeated at Orthes (February 27), lost Bordeaux (March 8), and was finally driven eastward towards Toulouse, intending to act in union with Suchet, whose army in Catalonia was as yet unbeaten. On the heights upon the east of Toulouse, for Wellington had brought his army across the Garonne, was fought, with somewhat doubtful result, the great battle of Toulouse [April 10]. The victory has been claimed by both parties; the aim of the English general was however won, the Garonne was passed, the French position taken, Toulouse evacuated and occupied by the victors. The triumph such as it was had cost the victors 7,000 or 8,000 men, a loss of life which might have been spared, for Napoleon had already abdicated, and the battle was entirely useless."

_J. F. Bright, History of England, period 3, pages. 1317-1321._